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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 60. Editorial Note Korean Foreign Minister Yi Tong-won visited Washington November 29-December 1, 1965. On November 29 the Foreign Minister met with Assistant Secretary of State Bundy for discussions covering the treaty with Japan, the Korean item and Chinese representation in the United Nations, Korean procurement for and the situation in Vietnam, and Korean fishing interests. Many of those topics were also discussed between Foreign Minister Yi and Secretary Rusk later that day. The Foreign Minister also met with Vice President Humphrey and Secretary McNamara during the visit. The major topic discussed at those meetings was Vietnam. Memoranda of conversations and other relevant documentation pertaining to the Foreign Minister's visit are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 KOR S; POL 15-1 KOR S; POL 27 KOR/UN; POL 33-4 KOR S-US; POL 27 VIET S; and Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 333 Korea.
61. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 7, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bundy and approved in S/S on December 8. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Kim asked to see me alone this afternoon. After a preliminary inquiry about subjects that Secretary McNamara had intended to raise if he had been able to carry out his hope of going to Korea after the NATO meeting, the Ambassador came to his point, which was that he had a letter from President Park's chief secretary, Yi Hu Rak, asking in effect whether the US intended to solicit additional Korean forces now for South Viet-Nam./2/ /2/Foreign Minister Yi's discussions about Vietnam during his visit to Washington produced reports in the Korean media about the possibility of an increase in ROK troops in Vietnam. According to the Embassy in Seoul, that possibility had not yet produced much public or political response, but at least one major newspaper, Choson Ilbo, had struck a somewhat critical note on the issue of additional troops being dispatched from Korea. (Airgram A-212 from Seoul, December 9; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S) The U.S. Government had denied that the matter of additional troops had been discussed with the Foreign Minister and took the official position that the issue was not currently being discussed between U.S. and Korean officials. (Telegram 605 from Seoul, December 17; ibid.) I responded that we did believe that additional forces were required in 1966 and that we were studying the extent of the need urgently. I made clear that no decisions or final evaluations had yet been made, so that I could not now say whether the question of additional Korean forces would be raised. I then went on to stress that, "when and if" we did come to believe that it would be useful to have additional Korean forces, we would take great care to see that the matter was raised personally with President Park before we did anything else. Ambassador Kim noted that his attaches in the Pentagon were picking up word that additional Korean forces were being envisaged in various plans for 1966. I said that we had contingency plans for a great many situations, but that their existence did not at all mean that the US Government had come to a firm decision. He also noted that there had been a certain amount of newspaper speculation and that he was getting inquiries whether Korea was planning to send "two divisions". I told him that such speculation was virtually inevitable, although it did not do any good and we would do our best to prevent it. He expressed agreement that press speculation on the subject was not useful. (Subsequent to my meeting with Ambassador Kim, I received from Deputy Assistant Secretary Friedman in DOD his memorandum of a similar call by Ambassador Kim this morning./3/ Mr. Friedman gave the same basic response that I did, except that he did not specifically say that we would take the matter up with President Park in the first instance if we did come to the view that additional Korean troops were needed. Mr. Friedman also elicited Ambassador Kim's personal view that any request for additional troops would probably be favorably received, but that it would have to be carefully handled to assure that it did not become a "political football" and that the Korean Government would have to be in a position to show its people more clearly the importance of the move to Korea. Ambassador Kim further volunteered that his Government might be thinking of one or two additional divisions, to make up a corps.) /3/Memorandum of conversation not found. Comment: It was Mr. Friedman's conclusion from Ambassador Kim's responses that the Korean Government would be interested in very early discussions on this subject. Pending consultation with Ambassador Brown, prior to his departure for Korea on Saturday, I am less sure of this conclusion. Ambassador Kim has a way of speaking for himself alone, and the message from Yi Hu Rak could be interpreted to mean that we should be very careful how we handle this and particularly careful to deal with President Park himself before the matter seemed to be a wide general assumption in the press or otherwise. However, the absence of any negative element in the Yi Hu Rak message does at least suggest that the Korean Government realizes that the matter is virtually sure to come up, and in this sense the message may argue for the possibility of an early request at least on a discreet basis.
62. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, December 16, 1965, 0930Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Saigon Eyes Only for the Ambassador, Department of Defense for McNaughton, and CINCPAC. 598. For Bundy, FE. Subject: Further Korean Troops to Vietnam. 1. This afternoon I called on President Park and gave him a full exposition of our appraisal of the situation in South Vietnam, of our plans for augmentation of U.S. forces there, our efforts to get further contributions from Asian countries and their probable results, and asked his reaction to the possibility of the contribution of further Korean division by July and a brigade by October. I said that the U.S. would be prepared to see that the physical security of Korea would not be impaired by such a contribution and that no added economic burden be placed on Korea because of it. 2. The President said this was a matter which he would have to consider very carefully. It might perhaps be well, having once contributed combat forces, to add to that contribution and try to help get it over as soon as possible, but he had to consider the National Assembly,/2/ Korean public opinion and many other matters before reaching any decision. He said he would like the fact of my approach kept a secret. He would mention it only to his Prime Minister and Minister National Defense and hoped that complete silence on this point would be obtained in Washington and Saigon as well as in Seoul. /2/Brown reported separately in telegram 605 from Seoul, December 17, that Pak also expressed regret that earlier in the year he had asked the Assembly to approve a specific number of troops for Vietnam rather than request blanket authorization to dispatch what he determined to be appropriate numbers of troops. (Ibid.) 3. He agreed that the sole channel of communication between the two governments on this matter should be in Seoul. 4. It was left that he would get in touch with me when he was ready to talk fuller. 5. Comment: I got the impression that the President felt this was going to be a very sticky problem for him and that, on first reaction, although anxious to be helpful, he was by no means clear in his own mind as to what the right course for Korea should be. 6. Full memcon follows./3/ /3/Not found, but telegram 605 from Seoul, December 17, contains a detailed summary of the Pak-Brown discussion of issues pertaining to Vietnam. Brown
63. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, December 22, 1965, 1135Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of Defense, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 627. Subject: Additional Korean Troops for South Vietnam. 1. PriMin Chong Il-kwon raised this subject with me at lunch today, indicating he had discussed matter with President Pak and with Minister National Defense. He stated that President Pak, MND and he all agree that ROK should send additional troops we had requested but that US help would be required in handling problems with political opposition and press that would arise when request became public knowledge. I questioned him closely with respect to authoritativeness of his statement, asking on three separate occasions whether this statement represented official response to my conversation with President Pak. On each occasion PriMin responded in the affirmative. 2. Conversation was devoted primarily to discussion of tactics for handling political problems. PriMin said it would be essential, before troop request became public, that either Secretary Rusk or Secretary McNamara come to Korea for consultation with President Pak. He suggested about January 25 for such visit. He said visit needed to assure Korean public of continuing deep concern and support of US leadership for ROKG. Immediately following consultation Secretary could publicly reaffirm US support for Korea's security, point to concrete measures being taken by US to strengthen ROK forces (e.g., new equipment for divisions), assure public that modernization ROK forces would continue and that MAP program would not decrease in next two years or so, describe plans for augmentation US forces in SVN, and express hope that Korea could make further troop contribution. (PM envisaged that in meantime favorable news could continue emanate from Washington and Saigon on US and GVN procurement from Korea for SVN and augmentation Korean exports.) 3. Immediately following this announcement President would confirm request and convene National Assembly to present authorizing legislation, which it would have secretly prepared in advance. PriMin said he anticipated legislation could be passed before President Pak departs February 7 on his Southeast Asian tour. He expressed view such hurried passage necessary to get legislation passed before public unrest develops during traditional period of food scarcity in late winter and before opposition and its press supporters could organize resistance and mobilize student action. He thought President Pak would have no difficulty in keeping DRP in line, although he admitted some DRP members might make trouble. 4. PriMin said that he foresees two major political problems facing ROKG in coming months. One was the possibility of difficulties, particularly on economic aspects, with administration of Japan-ROK agreements. These might give opposition and press opportunities to attack Pak government. Second was possibility that something might go wrong in Vietnam, where serious reverses could damage prestige of ROKG. He therefore thought it essential that to extent possible effort be made to educate press and opposition assemblymen as to Vietnam situation and US determination before troop request made public. PriMin said in this context he thought it would be extremely useful if the USG could arrange and finance early visits to US and Vietnam by group of about 15 key DRP and opposition assemblymen and to Vietnam by selected group of reporters and editorial writers. Those selected could report to Korean people on actual conditions in US and Vietnam, could be indoctrinated on need for additional forces in present ROK area of responsibility by ROK commanders in SVN, and could generally prepare way for acceptance troop request. 5. In response to foregoing I told him that it might be possible to have Secretary McNamara visit Korea during last week of January/2/ and that we would see what we could do about arranging for visits to US and Vietnam by assemblymen and press people. With respect quid pro quo I gave him essentially same assurances I had given to President Pak but did not go into detail. I told him that US would be as forthcoming as possible and that we would expect detailed discussions of military aspects this subject would take place between MND and General Beach as soon as MND was ready to talk. I concluded this conversation by expressing deep appreciation on behalf of USG and people for the response which he had given me. /2/McNamara did not visit South Korea at this time. As part of a previously arranged trip to several Asian countries, Vice President Humphrey was scheduled to visit Seoul January 1-2, 1966. The Embassy advised that since the "request for additional ROK troops is now most important subject involving US/ROK relations" Humphrey should be prepared to discuss the subject when he met with Pak. The Department of State concurred. (Telegrams 628 from Seoul, December 22, and 623 to Seoul, December 23; both ibid.) 6. Comment: I am not completely satisfied with this interview, particularly in view of fact that MND has not mentioned this subject to General Beach, although after his talk with Prime Minister, MND had lengthy discussion with Beach on related subjects. This makes me feel it necessary to confirm personally with President Pak that ROKG position is as stated by PriMin. This I will try to do morning December 24. 7. I also find it difficult to believe that things will go as smoothly as PriMin seemed to indicate. For one thing it appears unlikely that ROKG would be able to push enabling legislation through National Assembly before President Pak's departure for Southeast Asia. Indeed PriMin seemed to confirm this doubt when he later referred to possibility that assemblymen and newsmen might take suggested trips while President Pak was away. It is also clear that considerable hard bargaining with respect quid pro quo will ensue once MND gets into this act. On the whole, however, PriMin's reply confirms our feeling that highest levels ROKG wish to respond favorably to our request and that major problems will involve satisfying MND's demands on quid pro quo and minimizing public and political opposition to request when it is presented to National Assembly. These may be considerable. 8. For tactical reasons, I propose now to wait for approach from MND to General Beach, which I will try to get President to accelerate if I am able to discuss subject with him on Dec. 24, or if not, by raising matter again with Prime Minister, at latest Dec 27. Meanwhile, we are considering how we could assist with brain-washing operation on opposition and press which PriMin suggested and would appreciate any suggestions Department may offer. Would also appreciate soonest indication of whether it would be possible for Secretary McNamara to schedule Seoul visit last week January. Brown
64. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, December 24, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram. Repeated to the Department of Defense, CINCPAC, and Saigon and passed to the White House. 645. Ref: Embtel 643./2/ /2/Telegram 643 from Seoul, December 24, summarized the discussion of ROK troops in Vietnam between U.S. Senator Stuart Symington and Pak. Pak expressed his satisfaction with the treatment and support given his troops and mentioned in general terms the possibility of additional ROK units being sent to Vietnam. Since the discussion of that issue was nonspecific, Brown indicated his belief that no "compromise of secrecy with respect to our larger request was involved in the President's remarks." Nevertheless, Symington was cautioned that the topic "should be handled as a matter of the highest classification." (Ibid.) 1. By previous arrangement I remained after the President's interview with Senator Symington and General Beach reported reftel. I said to the President that the PriMin had raised with me on Dec 22 the matter of an additional Korean division and brigade for SVN, which I had broached to the President on Dec 16. The PM had said that the President wished to send these forces if necessary arrangements for preserving Korea's security and satisfying Korean public opinion could be made. He had also said that the President felt if this was to be done it were best that it be done quickly, perhaps even before he left for his trip to Southeast Asia. Since this was so important a question, I wished to confirm that this was indeed the President's view and if so to ask him how to proceed further. 2. The President said the PM had told him of our talk and had correctly reflected his views. If additional troops were to be sent it was best that they should be sent when they were needed and not after long, drawn-out delays. To make this possible, many things would have to be done by his govt and a number of things by the US. 3. I said that I recognized this and repeated that our request had been made on the basis that the physical security of Korea would not thereby be impaired and that no additional economic burden would thereby be imposed. The President nodded. I realized that this would involve a number of practical arrangements which would have to be worked out. The PM was leaving for Manila on the 28th and would not be back until the first. How would the President contemplate that we should get on with necessary arrangements? 4. The President said that the PM had doubtless issued the necessary instructions to the MND and perhaps we should get in touch with him. I said that at any time the Minister of National Defense notified us that he was ready to talk, we would be prepared to do so. I therefore suggested the MND inform General Beach as soon as he was ready to begin discussion. General Beach was prepared to respond immediately and the sooner we received this word from the MND the better. The President agreed that we should proceed in this fashion. 5. I told the President that this action on his part would be deeply appreciated in [garble--US?] and closed discussion with a heartfelt "Thank you," to which he responded with a shy and friendly "Merry Christmas." 6. Comment: The entire second part of this interview lasted less than ten minutes. The President was calm, sober and laconic. Indeed, it struck me as remarkable that a matter of such moment should be dealt with so calmly. 7. It is unmistakably clear, however, from what the President said and from the PM's earlier comments that they have genuine concern, both about the physical security of Korea and about what the Korean people will think about that security. It is important to them (and I think to us, also) that they secure the necessary Assembly approval, not by just a bare majority or a straight party vote after bitter debate and genuine doubts, but with the reasonable support and consensus of a satisfied public opinion. Indeed, as a conscientious President he could take no other position and it is doubly important for him personally with an election coming up. 8. The next move is up to the ROK, and I tried to arrange it that way because I think it is better psychologically for MND to be coming to us, particularly since I have twice established with the President the fundamental basis upon which we approach this negotiation. We know that MND has established a secret noforn task force to consider this matter. If General Beach does not hear from MND in a few days I will raise the matter again, but will apply the needle, not to MND, but to the Blue House or to the PM. 9. I am aware of General Westmoreland's and CINCPAC's strong desire for the arrival of any new ROK contingents before the dates of July and October contained in my original proposal to the President. I suggest, however, that we do not raise this question yet, but in the light of the President's and PM's stated feelings that this matter should be dealt with promptly, bring up the need for earlier deployment at the negotiating level when discussions have developed an agreed basis upon which the troops can be sent. Brown
65. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, December 28, 1965, 0730Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, Department of Defense, and Saigon. 656. Troops for Vietnam. 1. The Prime Minister told me evening December 27 that he had just come from meeting with President, DPM, Minister of National Defense, Foreign Minister and Yi Hu-rak, in which requirements from U.S. necessary to make possible reinforcement Korean troops in Vietnam were formulated. Memorandum will be prepared and handed to me in next day or two by Foreign Minister, who will conduct subsequent negotiations. Prime Minister will check on progress of discussions after Vice President's visit. 2. I said that I recognized certain things would have to be done by U.S. and the sooner we received the memorandum the better. I repeated that the basis upon which we were proceeding was no impairment of Korean security and no economic burden for Korea./2/ The PriMin said that he and the President wanted very much to be helpful, but they had problems with Korean Assembly and public. /2/Proposals exchanged by the Department of State, the Country Team in Seoul, and COMUSKOREA examining the needs and costs involved in accomplishing those goals are ibid. 3. I asked if President was still thinking of time table which PriMin had outlined (Embtel 627)./3/ He replied that President had not decided on time table and could not do so until he saw what arrangements could be made with U.S. /3/Document 63. 4. PriMin said President was thinking of asking Assembly for authorization in general terms to increase or decrease troops in South Vietnam without specifying numbers. 5. PriMin added that Foreign Minister had assured the President that he would be "a very tough bargainer" in these negotiations. Comment. 6. Additional troops issue has thus now become matter of formal inter-government negotiation, including economic and political, as well as purely military matters. ROKs are reserving commitment until they see what they can get. MND strategy will doubtless be to get as broad commitments from U.S. as possible before getting down to military details, and Yi Tong-won will doubtless try to maintain reputation of "giant killer" which he has built up in negotiations with Japanese. 7. I anticipate rather confused situation, for a while at least, in view personalities involved and Yi Tong-won's ignorance of matters economic and military. We will just have to play this by ear and will know more when we see the memorandum. It will be real advantage to us if ROKG makes opening gambit. 8. In any event it appears that things are moving seriously on the Korean side. Brown
66. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, December 28, 1965, 0935Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of Defense, CINCPAC for POLAD, and Saigon. 657. Additional Troops for Vietnam. Deptel 588./2/ /2/In telegram 588, December 17, the Department of State presented, among other things, the proposed commitments the United States was willing to make to Korea, should additional ROK forces be deployed to Vietnam. (Ibid.) 1. As is evident already from my talks with the President and the Prime Minister, the main problem facing them in acceding to request for more troops will be the creation of a favorable climate of opinion in Korean Assembly, press and public. 2. U.S. attitude and even more important, U.S. actions, will inevitably exert a strong formative influence, one way or the other, on this climate. 3. Our overriding purpose is to get additional troops and, almost equally important, to get them with as solid a basis of Korean national support as possible. It would not be good for us or for our cause, for example, if these troops were sent by a narrow margin of Assembly approval after bitter debate and in the face of serious press and public criticism or even serious doubt. 4. There are many ways in which we can make our formative influence helpful. Some of these are large scale and dramatic, e.g., increased MAP support, public statements by very high level U.S. officials. But the cumulative effect of a series of smaller actions, or avoidance of action, especially in areas which are currently the focus of Korean public interest, can have an equal and, in some instances, a more solid and perhaps even greater beneficial influence. 5. If for example, over the next few weeks and months there should be a series of favorable procurement actions for SVN, or increased export to U.S. or new DLF loan approvals, or a better textile quota, or avoidance of bad news on use of counterpart, even in relatively small amounts in each case, the psychological effect here would be very constructive. 6. Most helpful at the moment would be a demonstration of U.S. good faith by early arrival of substantial quantities of the military equipment for the three ready reserve divisions (particularly fighting items) which was promised the ROKG when it agreed to send the Tiger division to SVN. Delay in these deliveries has already been the subject of anxious ROKG questions. 7. Much is already being done, e.g., DOD procurement mission, and this has already been helpful. It nevertheless seems to me that we should for the next few months look at every action affecting Korea proposed by any part of our government in terms of its contribution to, or detraction from, the service of this main objective, and how, if possible, such action or inaction can be made to serve, or be kept from hurting, the achievement of that objective. A current small case in point can be found in Embtel 626./3/ Another is the "unfunding" of U.S. won accounts (a purely technical matter) which has resulted in a sudden and complete cessation for December of dollar receipts from won conversion for U.S. military and has elicited strongest representations from the DPM today. /3/In telegram 626 from Seoul, December 22, the Embassy discussed upcoming talks regarding the renewal of a contract between the Department of Defense and the Korea Oil Corporation to supply MAP-financed POL to meet Korean military requirements. (Ibid., DEF 19-8 US-KOR S) 8. We are establishing necessary machinery here to try to forward this purpose and hope Washington can do likewise. 9. I would like to add that if the Koreans make this further troop contribution, it will be utterly impossible for them to understand why there can be no preferred treatment for them in matters economic, especially as they relate to SVN. They will be making a contribution in the irreplaceable commodity of human life, and doing so on a scale utterly disproportionate to the contributions of their competitors, particularly Japan. In such case the assurance of equal treatment with these competitors seems small recompense. 10. It seems to me that we are being faced with a political and human problem directly related to a bloody war in which we are deeply committed, to the solution of which our normal rules of commercial policy and peacetime procurement must also make their contribution. Brown
67. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, December 30, 1965, 0945Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Repeated to the Department of Defense, CINCPAC, and Saigon. This telegram and the referenced telegram (see footnote 2 below) were retyped and given to President Johnson as attachments to a December 30 memorandum from Bromley Smith. Smith's memorandum indicates that Johnson read the telegrams. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. III) 675. ROK Troops for Vietnam. Ref: Deptel 662./2/ /2/In telegram 662 to Seoul, December 29, the Department of State informed the Embassy of decisions made at a Cabinet meeting, including approval by the President of developmental loans to Korea in the amount of $29 million. The Department of State also reported that the President attached "the utmost importance" to obtaining additional South Korean troops for Vietnam. Brown was instructed "to exert maximum pressure to obtain these forces for a reasonable price." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S) 1. During call on Foreign Minister related to other matters, he volunteered that he had discussed with President our request for additional ROK troops for SVN. The President's reaction was favorable. But there were many problems about which the President had consulted with the Deputy Minister and Foreign Minister, who were considering what advice to give him. 2. He then made three points: (A) It has been less than two months since the first full ROK combat division arrived in SVN and less than six months since the matter had last been discussed in a divided Assembly. This was a very short time in which to present another such proposal to the Korean people. (B) The issue of troops for SVN had been somewhat overshadowed in Assembly debate by emotion surrounding settlement with Japan. When it came before Assembly again it would stand out alone as an issue. The opposition, which is currently totally disorganized, is trying to make a comeback and regain the face which it lost in the struggle over the ratification of the Japan treaty. It was likely to seize upon the question of further troops as a major issue, since opposition members felt strongly that only way they can keep themselves together is to have an issue on which to fight the majority. (C) Many Koreans felt that Korea had already made its full and proper contribution to South Vietnamese war. Every Korean felt that Korea's contribution is vastly greater than that of any other free Asian country. Contributions of men from other Asian countries, even in small amounts, would be helpful and perhaps necessary. 3. The FonMin said he wanted it clear that President Pak's policy was to support the US and that he and the FonMin felt that the war in SVN was theirs as much as ours. But the President had to deal with a practical domestic political problem. Questions of timing, presentation, etc., would be of paramount importance. Although the President's mood was favorable, the Cabinet members who knew about it, plus Kim Chong-pil, who was also being consulted, were not united in their opinion. In response to a specific question as to Kim Chong-pil's attitude, he declined to indicate who thought what. 4. I pointed out the importance of early decision, since the struggle was urgent and many physical preparations had to be made in SVN and elsewhere which depended on the number and character of the troops which would be available. Equipment had to be ordered, etc., all of which involved long lead time. 5. FonMin said he and DPM were considering this problem very seriously and he wanted to discuss it with me, but specifically asked that he be given a little time. "I assure you that I will get in touch with you. I have not disappointed you yet" he said. 6. I plan as our next move to suggest to Vice President Humphrey that he underline with President Pak the personal interest of President Johnson and sense of urgency about this matter. I understand Vice President is prepared to do this. I will follow up with a specific request to President, in Vice President's presence, for negotiation action by ROKG. Brown
68. Memorandum From Vice President Humphrey to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 5, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Council File, National Security Council Meetings File. No classification marking. SUBJECT In my discussions with President Park of the Republic of Korea, I was told that there had been undue delay in the provision of military assistance during the past year. Furthermore, there was a grave shortage of spare parts. I was further informed that much of the equipment, radar, field pieces, anti-aircraft guns and rifles were of World War II vintage and in a serious state of disrepair. This same message was given to me by the military authorities during my inspection of ROK troops. I am not in a position to judge the accurateness of this complaint, but I do pass it along for your information and respectfully suggest that an inquiry be made at the Defense Department. If there is delay, then indeed someone should expedite the shipment of the necessary equipment and parts. There was grave concern in the government circles of Korea that we would be sharply reducing military assistance at the very time that Korea was taking a more active role in Vietnam. The President and the Prime Minister of Korea made a strong plea for offshore procurement from Korea to supply forces in Vietnam. They emphasized first of all that all offshore purchasing for the Korean forces in Vietnam should be made from Korea. They also requested that a sizable portion of offshore procurement for other forces in Vietnam be obtained through Korean sources. Both the President and the Prime Minister and other Cabinet officials expressed concern that the United States might do most of its offshore purchasing from Japan. I assured the Korean officials that these observations would be brought to your attention. The report of Mr. Valenti as to my conversations with President Park and the Prime Minister relates in more detail the substance of the Korean position on procurement and its relationship to additional Korean forces in Vietnam./2/ /2/Dated January 2. (Ibid., Office of the President File, Valenti, Jack, Memoranda of Conversations--Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, December 1965-January 1966) Memoranda of Humphrey's three conversations with the President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and other Korean officials, all on January 2, were sent to the Department of State as enclosures to airgram A-255 from Seoul, January 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S) President Park is anxious to be of greater help in Vietnam/3/ but faces some serious political and economic problems at home. He feels that he could overcome these problems even though 1967 is an election year, if the United States would give special consideration to Korean economic needs by purchasing supplies in Korea and making available the necessary military assistance to further modernize the Korean armed forces. I made it quite clear to President Park and his government that there was no U.S. blank check or open-end account. I urged that he make a specific proposal to our Ambassador so that we had something to talk about and some idea of what the Koreans wanted and needed./4/ I stressed that it would not be possible for us to estimate Korean needs or offer any effective assistance until we had a proposal from the Korean government. I gather that such will be forthcoming. /3/In telegram 682 from Seoul, January 3, reporting on Humphrey's meetings with Pak and other senior Korean officials, Brown attributed Pak's willingness to assist the United States in Vietnam to three factors: "a wish to assume leadership role in East Asia, a genuine concern to oppose Communist aggression in Asia in ROK own interest, and a recognition of need to demonstrate further the closeness of the US-ROK relationship." (Ibid.) /4/In telegram 682 from Seoul, January 3, Brown noted that the United States was "in for a period of bargaining" on the Vietnam troop issue. He indicated that although Pak's requests have been modest, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister were looking for something more and making the rewards "as large as possible." (Ibid.)
69. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, January 5, 1966, 0830Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Saigon and CINCPAC for POLAD and passed to the Department of Defense. 689. Department please pass DOD. Troops for South Vietnam. 1. Foreign Minister called in Ambassador January 4 to initiate troop talks./2/ They agreed that General Beach and MND should meet to discuss what would be necessary on military side to prevent impairment Korean security if further division and brigade sent South Vietnam. They also agreed DPM and Bernstein should meet, but FonMin refused limit their discussion to what would be necessary prevent added economic burden and insisted that they also discuss "political and economic plus to which Vice President Humphrey referred in his talk with President Pak." /2/In telegram 703 to Seoul, January 8, the Department of State asked that the Embassy begin negotiations as soon as practicable in order to meet "high priority USG objective to obtain one Korean brigade by April 1966 and one Korean division force in SVN by July 1966." The telegram also detailed the package of military and economic commitments the United States was prepared to offer the Koreans in exchange for providing troops to Vietnam. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) 2. General Beach later met MND, who presented broad program of demands for additional trade benefits totalling $500 million, pointed out that (a) no economic benefits had yet been received as result despatch Tiger division, and (b) no significant amounts of equipment promised for ready reserve division or for improvement firepower regular divisions had yet arrived, and made a number of other points covered in COMUSK message 53935./3/ /3/Not found. 3. At General Beach's insistence MND finally agreed to formation joint US/ROK working group to consider practical military problems involved. Group hopes begin work soon. 4. MND stated Ministers concerned all had different ideas and he was going to see President later in afternoon. 5. At same time MND was at Blue House DPM met with Bernstein./4/ DPM was more reasonable, confirmed that ministers had different ideas, repeated in the main the requests he had made to Vice President Humprey/5/ and stressed that he alone was to be the channel for talks on economic aspects of the proposed troop dispatch. These talks will continue. /4/Detailed information on the discussion between the Deputy Prime Minister and Bernstein was transmitted in telegram 705 from Seoul, January 7. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID(US) KOR S) /5/The Deputy Prime Minister told Humphrey that the United States could help Korea by increasing the amount of raw material sent to the ROK for processing, by assisting in the creation of export markets, by expanding procurement of Korean goods for Korean and all other forces in Vietnam, by excluding Japan from those markets for a few years, and by lending U.S. merchant ships to Korea to benefit its foreign exchange position. (Memorandum of conversation, January 2, enclosure 2 to airgram A-255 from Seoul; ibid., POL 27 VIET S) 6. Concurrently Yi Hu-rak told DCM that President was needled yesterday by Blue House press as to what Korea had got out of dispatch of Tiger division. He said President wants to send more troops but must be able justify his action to Korean people in simple terms and show that Korea is benefiting at least as much as other countries not militarily involved, i.e., Japan. Simplest explanation would be increased trade and aid. Yi had in mind about $100 million in directed procurement for SVN and $30/40 million in program loans. 7. There is clearly as yet no coordination or considered opinion within ROKG, but things are moving and with time and patience we believe we can sort things out. 8. We are more convinced than ever that, despite DPM's currently more sophisticated and long range approach, key to satisfactory solution lies in Yi Hu-rak's statement that Korea must demonstrably benefit at least as much as other countries not militarily involved, especially through directed procurement of materiel, services and manpower for SVN. 9. Further reporting will be limited to major developments and matters requiring Washington decision. Brown
70. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, January 6, 1966, 0935Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15-3 KOR S-US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to the Department of Defense and CINCPAC. 716. SOFA Negotiations. 1. FonMin this morning told Ambassador that at very high level meeting which President attended ROKG had decided to postpone SOFA signing. Sole reason for decision, according FonMin, is ROKG concern lest consideration of SOFA by Assembly about same time as request for additional troops for Vietnam be exploited by opposition and DRP dissidents so as to jeopardize chances of approval of latter./2/ /2/In a January 11 meeting the Foreign Minister told Brown that the signing would be postponed because the "time was not ripe for introducing measure to National Assembly prior to President Pak's SEA trip scheduled to begin about Feb. 7." Brown also learned prior to that meeting that the Koreans wanted to reopen the negotiations on the labor clause of the agreement and indicated he would try to resolve the problem without creating a major impasse. (Telegram 726 from Seoul, January 13; ibid.) 2. After ascertaining that President was party to this decision, Ambassador said it was matter for Korea's own judgment. He made it clear to FonMin that U.S. could not accept any indication on ROKG's part that U.S. responsible for delay. FonMin said he had never mentioned January 28 (now widely publicized as proposed date of signing) and if asked why SOFA not being signed then, would say it had never been his date and that certain details remained to be worked out. He might also refer to fact DRP floor leader had recommended March signing./3/ /3/In telegram 1098 from Seoul, March 31, Brown reported that acceptance of the SOFA agreement was in doubt because of increasing Korean demands to renegotiate the criminal jurisdiction article as well as the labor article. Ratification by the National Assembly presented another obstacle because of opposition to some of the agreement's provisions and the precarious position of the Foreign Minister relative to that body due to his "alleged poor handling of negotiations with US on troop despatch" issue. (Ibid.) Brown
71. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, January 10, 1966, 1010Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, Saigon, and Tokyo and passed to the Department of Defense. 713. Joint Embassy/USOM Message. Department pass DOD. Troops for Vietnam. Ref: Embtel 705, Deptel 703./2/ /2/See footnotes 4 and 2, Document 69. 1. ROKG list, entitled Economic and Financial Supports Suggested for Review by USG handed to us January 8. Foreign Office official advised Embassy officer that paper was an official communication which President Pak wanted handled through diplomatic channels. Some won budget support type requests also included in shorter note handed to us January 7./3/ /3/The documents submitted by the ROKG to the Embassy along with the latter's response are attached to airgram A-275 from Seoul, January 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S) 2. ROKG list includes: (1) Additional budget costs from sending troops, including death and disability payments and provision new division to re- place Tiger division already in SVN (estimated by ROKG at 3 billion won). (2) U.S. budget support for three quarters of military budget until 1971 (end next 5 year development plan). (3) Compensation for land and building requisitioned by UNC (estimated at 4.6 billion won through 1963). (4) $10 million special assistance from "U.S. Presidential Contingency Fund" for cultural, educational, welfare projects. (5) Variety of OSP proposals under MAP and AID. Also priority to Korea over Japan and other Asian countries. Expansion and full use Korean facilities for producing military supplies and repair services. Abolish application aid [garble] American policy to OSP for Vietnam (e.g., iron and steel). Process PL 480 wheat and cotton for Vietnam in Korea. Use Korean technicians in Vietnam and train Vietnamese technicians in Korea. (6) Variety of development loan requests: Allocation $100 million DL year for six years 1966 through 1971; accelerate approval of projects under $150 million commitment; finance steel plant, machine shop; approve thermal power loans Ulsan and Yongdong areas before end 1966; support port expansion Inchon, Yosu, Phohang, Masan, Pusan to enable start of work before end 1966; finance before end of 1966 six dredges for development industrial areas Ulsan, Piin and Chinhae, and 200 bulldozers and 500 dump trucks for farm land expansion and national construction projects; 500 freight cars. (7) To finance commodities for economic stabilization, export promotion, and domestic capital mobilization, $50 million program loan in 1966 and $20 million per year from 1967. (8) 150,000 tons of cargo ships by grants-in-aid and loans in kind. (9) Encouragement Korean exports to U.S. Lift U.S. quota on Korean textiles. (10) January 7 paper on military requirements includes counter-infiltration assistance (affecting AID and MAP), item (2) above, suspension MAP transfer through 1971, and MAP for construction barracks and welfare facilities (could involve some additional won counterpart release). 3. This list discussed January 8 between DPM, USOM Director and Economic Counselor. DPM indicated that list was compiled by Foreign Ministry which assembled specific proposals suggested by Prime Minister, DPM, Minister Defense, Foreign Minister, Chief Secretary Blue House and President. Impression, confirmed by private remarks DPM's program assistant, is that each Minister felt compelled support largest possible demands in competition with colleagues to appear to Korean people to be bringing greatest benefits to Korea. Resultant list extremely unreasonable./4/ /4/In a letter to Brown, January 18, Berger wrote that the list of Korean requirements had "caused some disappointment here. We have thought that the mendicant period of Korean history was drawing to a close and that we could expect the increasingly confident and sophisticated Park Government to present a stiff but essentially reasonable initial Korean negotiating position." Berger concluded by expressing hope that "the Koreans will in the end accept a reasonable economic-military assistance package in return for the additional division and brigade." (Ibid.) 4. U.S. side indicated not in position give U.S. official reaction without full CT review and Washington instructions, or even to react informally on individual items until there had been time for review. However gave informal general reactions (1) list very unrealistic and unreasonable; (2) many items failed meet basic assistance criteria as to need, absorptive capacity, avoidance waste, statutory and policy limitations, etc.; (3) requests go beyond U.S. financial capabilities, in light global claims on limited MSA funds; (4) tended to run counter to fundamentals of development policies laid down officially and vigorously by President Pak, DPM and ROKG in legislative program, public declarations, and private statements, and followed with increasing success in recent period, i.e., policies involved in moving rapidly as feasible toward self-reliance and careful use investment funds./5/ /5/In a telephone conversation with President Johnson on January 17, McNamara reported that the Koreans wanted "about $600-700 million worth of cumshaw" for the additional troops. Their proposal had been rejected by both the State and Defense Departments, but, McNamara noted, the United States was willing to provide "something on the order of $70 million worth of extra equipment and payments" to the Koreans. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.02, Side A, PNOs 1 and 2) For text of the conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. IV, Document 26. 5. DPM defended list in general political terms without justification specific points or showing much fervor. Said he did not wish to push additional assistance to point at which produced effects contrary to established self-help policies, but that ROKG and Korean people wanted increase in aid that would permit acceleration of investment and growth rate. (DPM and President Pak appear to believe it is politically necessary and feasible for Korea to absorb effectively faster capital inflow than now in sight and thereby expand economy faster. (Director emphasized that development programs and external resources in prospect for next several years are roughly at maximum that can be absorbed without negative effect.) DPM said there was much discontent over unemployment and poverty and people expected government to do more to reduce these problems faster. Said he considered assistance of two kinds desirable: (1) accelerating foreign exchange earnings, (2) accelerating capital goods inflow. At one point he also referred to need for more active U.S. role in meeting domestic capital requirements than was in prospect for next number of years, reiterating that he did not advocate more supporting assistance for this purpose, ROKG felt it needed to seize opportunity that Vietnam situation offered to increase these types of help for accelerated economic growth, having in mind stimulus Korean War provided to Japanese economy. DPM also argued U.S. should use this opportunity to give Korean economy last big push it needed to get over the hill. Then, he said, we can be stronger than North Korea. He cited Vice President Humphrey as saying Korea may get extra help if it sends troops to Vietnam. In responding to query re status of proposals in ROKG view, DPM said ROKG needed to consider the Korean realities and U.S. its own realities in reviewing proposals, leaving implication that list was a bargaining tactic. 6. DPM called Blue House during session to arrange meeting with President to report negative U.S. reaction. He called director afterwards to confirm that submission should be regarded as a list of suggestions for U.S. to consider. DPM suggested talks adjourn until January 17 (i.e., after his return from Saigon trip). We agreed. 7. Meanwhile, we are responding by paper stating that our concept is preservation integrity Korean security and avoidance new economic burden plus some modest "plus", and setting forth initial offer included Deptel 703 just received plus "best efforts" promise on procurement for SVN and willingness explore any projects submitted by ROKG, including those specifically referred to in their paper, for DLF financing in context Johnson-Pak communique of May 20, 1965. We are including promise to replace brigade as well as division, as we consider this both necessary for security and omission this assurance would adversely color whole negotiations, this may perhaps get us down to serious bargaining. We are also pressing for early activation ROK/U.S. planning group on technical military problems involved promised by MND on January 5. 8. We will have comments on Deptel 703 later and would appreciate earliest comments on Embtel 705. Ambassador and Country Team repeat their personal conviction that we cannot and will not get these extra forces, except possibly with unacceptable arm twisting and bitterness, unless we can find some way to give Korea preference in a significant area of procurement for SVN, at least over Japan. Brown [Continue with the next documents]
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