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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea Washington, May 18, 1965, 5:03-5:41 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. II, July 1964 to August 1965. Secret. Drafted by Thomson and Fearey and approved by the White House on June 5. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The time and place of the meeting are from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) After the meeting Johnson and Pak met with members of the media. (Ibid.) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. Side Korean Side The President welcomed President Park and congratulated him warmly on his Press Club speech of that noon; he understood that it had been very well received, and this was high praise since the Press Club audience was a tough one. The President said that Ambassador Brown had forwarded him a letter dated May 7 which contained a check from the Korean people to assist the victims of the tornadoes which had devastated the Midwest in April. The letter indicated that the check was intended both to help the victims of the tornadoes and to strengthen friendship between Korea and the United States. This gift was symbolic of the way the people of the two countries feel about each other. This brotherly and neighborly gesture was worth more to us than millions of dollars; it was deeply touching. The President asked President Park to tell the National Council which had sent the letter and check that the money would be used to assist veterans of the Korean War who had suffered loss of their homes or of members of their families in the tornadoes. The President said that every chair had been filled at the dinner the previous evening. That morning a number of the guests had told Mrs. Johnson and him how indebted they were for having been included to honor President Park and, through him, the people of Korea. The President said that he and Mrs. Johnson had been much pleased to see how many people had been prepared to travel all the way across the country to attend the dinner. The President said that the previous day President Park and he, at his initiative, had covered a number of topics which he had thought were of greatest interest to President Park and to the Korean people. The topics had included a status of forces agreement, Korean unification, economic assistance, support of the Korean forces, and assurances that the United States would not withdraw armed forces from Korea, at least without first obtaining the understanding of the Korean Government. The President said that he and President Park appeared to have pretty well covered the waterfront when they finished. He had asked President Park a number of times whether he had something to raise, and had asked him not to hesitate to do so. He would welcome the President's now raising anything he might wish. The President said that he and Secretary Rusk had been trying to keep the rebels and the loyalists in the Dominican Republic from attacking each other throughout the night. President Park said that it might seem a small matter but he wished to note that he had discussed the MAP Transfer Program with the Secretary of Defense at breakfast. Secretary McNamara had said that he understood the difficulty, that he would study the matter further, and that he would keep it under review. President Park said that he would like the President, too, to keep it in mind. The President said that he was familiar with the program. He would be happy to make the gesture of eliminating this requirement but this would lead to trouble with Congress. He said that he understood the difficulty, however, and that we would be as understanding as we could. The President said that he still did not have any indication whether he would have three billion dollars or nothing for military and economic assistance in the coming year. As President Park had noted, he had had to postpone certain visits by friends from other parts of the world because he disliked meeting and discussing problems against a background of such uncertainty over his own appropriations. President Park said that the Republic of Korea had 600,000 men in its armed forces. These men were well-trained and well-disciplined. He wanted President Johnson to realize that these forces really formed part of U.S. forces ready to fight against Communism. In a fight they would be with the United States; but at the same time they were dependent on U.S. assistance. The President said that President Park's assurance was very heartening. The President emphasized what he had said the day before: that the action the Koreans have taken in sending forces to Viet-Nam is not only a help to us in Viet-Nam, but also on Capitol Hill. President Park said he had an additional item to raise, that of Korea's diplomatic relations with African nations. He had discussed this matter with Ambassador Brown. Successful diplomacy in Africa was important to Korea, and on this matter they needed our help; but they could also perhaps be of help to us. This was a subject on which the President had undoubtedly been briefed by his advisors, but President Park wanted to emphasize the cooperative role our two nations might play together in Africa. President Johnson expressed his appreciation of President Park's offer of mutual assistance and said that we would explore this matter further. President Park commented that his meeting with the Secretary of State that morning had been very successful; he was sure that the President was informed of the results. President Johnson asked if there were any other matters that should be discussed. He repeated that U.S. Government officials and the guests at the dinner the night before had deeply appreciated the chance to meet with Park. He commented on the Administration's high regard for Ambassador Kim and his wife as strong friends and allies; he said that they fitted into our society with ease and worked with our people most effectively. He wanted to compliment the Ambassador. President Park expressed his thanks for the role played by Ambassador Brown; he noted that a number of problems had been solved since Ambassador Brown's arrival. President Johnson responded that Ambassador Brown was one of our most trusted and able officials. He then asked if any of President Park's associates desired to raise any further items--otherwise they could move on to the communique and then to the reception. Defense Minister Kim raised the problem of the low state of pay of Korean armed forces; the pay scale was so low, he said, that they faced serious difficulties in morale. The United States should be concerned with this matter in considering these forces as its own troops. The President said that he was not familiar with this problem but would explore it further with our Secretary of Defense. He said that Congress was pressing for pay increases for our own armed forces, which would be difficult within budgetary limits. President Park then expressed his thanks for the communique and also for the President's new proposal for an Institute for Technology and Applied Science; he was glad to accept this proposal. President Johnson noted that the two Presidents belonged to the "same lodge" of school teachers. Deputy Prime Minister Chang asked if it would be possible to strike out the word "annual" on page 5 of the communique; we might substitute the word "applicable". President Johnson agreed to strike the word "annual" without making a substitution. He added, however, that we would have to be candid with our own press and Congress, as they realize that our assistance is subject to annual legislative review. Secretary General Lee commented that their side understood our legislative system in this regard. He added that since we had helped the Koreans in this way, they would try to work even harder to make good use of our assistance. President Johnson said that if he could always produce documents like this where he went, he would get a lot of votes. He asked if Ambassador Brown or Ambassador Kim had anything to add; both responded in the negative. President Johnson asked President Park to tell Mrs. Park that he and Mrs. Johnson were looking forward to seeing them at 7 o'clock at the reception; they would be slightly late, because he had some further business on his schedule. He concluded the meeting by expressing his hope that President Park had enjoyed himself, and that he had found U.S. officials helpful and courteous.
52. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ I-23517/65 Washington, May 18, 1965, 6-6:30 p.m. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 333 Korea. Secret. Drafted by Boyes, and approved by McNaughton on May 21. The meeting was held in McNamara's office at the Pentagon. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Defense Department Side Korean Side Military Assistance Program--Minister Kim said that the ROKG understood the FY 66 MAP had been increased. The Secretary replied that it looked as if there might be some increase to the program; at least at this point it looked more favorable. He said that the Congress had proposed a substantial cut, but that was reversed. We now believe that FY 66 will be a satisfactory program. However, he said in 1966 each country must take effective means to use MAP dollars in the best manner possible. For Korea, the FY 66 MAP should help, but it should also be the time for the ROKG to consider the proper size of the Korean armed forces. The Secretary said that in relation to North Korea and Communist China, the ROK must bear in mind how much strength plus that of the U.S. is needed to protect South Korea, but it should not be too large. Korea must look at what should be the proper size of its forces in 1966, keeping in mind available MAP funds and the pay problem. Kim said that President Park was worried about the threat of Red China and North Korea. The Secretary said we should be worried about this threat. We would continue to assure that the U.S. strength plus that of South Korea was enough--that in considering the threat we must always think of the combined power of the South Koreans and the U.S. He said that he, personally, thought the South Korean forces were too large. The ROKG should give careful thought to what size is necessary in respect to its resources. The Secretary said we should always keep in mind that the Chinese Communists, and their servants the North Koreans, will move toward any weakness, whether it is in the south or the north. We must be strong everywhere, and firm, but "we do not need two fists when one fist will do." South Viet-Nam. Kim said South Korea has received a request from the Government of Viet-Nam for additional South Korean forces to be sent to support Viet-Nam; they will do their utmost to help that country in its troubles. Kim said the VN war was known as the "McNamara War," but since the Korean troops are going to SVN, the war is becoming known in Korea as "Kim's War." The Secretary said that the U.S. determination in SVN shows the U.S. is against Communist aggression anywhere and this helps South Korea against Communist aggression in the north. Kim said that in order to send more Korean troops, constitutional processes were required. He, personally, wants to send these additional forces and is not seeking any bargains. He needs the Secretary's support and cooperation to sell the Korean National Assembly on sending more troops. The problem is a sensitive one, for if the size of the Korean forces to SVN is increased, the South Korean people worry about an increase in the ChiCom and North Korean threat. Also, any force reductions in U.S. or Korean force levels create domestic problems. Kim said he believed it necessary, if one RCT is sent to SVN, that an RCT cadre be formed in Korea and, likewise, if a Korean Division went to SVN, the ROKG should mobilize and put into training one division in Korea to maintain the image of force. The Secretary said that Kim should talk to General Beach about this. He said he doubted the need to replace an RCT or division sent to SVN, but he was not a military expert. He added that he would be surprised if the replacement of units was needed. Kim said such action was necessary to swing the Congress of Korea behind the idea of additional forces and this replacement of units was a way to do it. The Secretary said that we have a strong commitment to Korea with the Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. will act and provide sufficient forces to fight. Further, we will recommend, advise, and assist on the proper level of forces needed by ROK. He said President Park made an important point this morning (18 May breakfast Park-McNamara)/2/ when he said that it is necessary for Korea to make economic progress to be strong. The Secretary added that the ROKG should not put into its military more force than is required; Korea must use its resources wisely. He said that he was inclined to feel there was not a requirement to have as large forces as Korea now has. /2/See Document 49. Military Transfer Program and Pay Raise. Kim said he felt that there should be an easing of the Military Transfer Program and that a pay raise was essential. The Secretary said that we should remove any inequities in pay that existed between the military, civil service, and the civilians, and certainly take necessary steps to correct and improve conditions that were not satisfactory. We should undertake a joint study together in Korea on the pay problem and the actual requirements to be met. The Secretary replied that the Transfer Program should continue. He was willing to consider the Military Transfer Program in light of prevailing economic conditions, tax revenues, expenditures, and what is in the best interests of our two countries. He said Korea's economy is important, MAP is not the place to solve the economic problems, and the Military Transfer Program helps the economy. We would like, therefore, to pursue the Transfer Program. It is important not to hold up a military pay raise and economic developments because of the Transfer Program. We will continue to keep the Transfer Program under study and look over the Program each year for adjustments if they become necessary. MAP Excess Material. Kim asked for the Secretary's views on the transfer to Korea of MAP excess material sale proceeds. (Koreans proposed proceeds of sales should go to Korea for barracks, and quarters since their budget and MAP funds are so austere.) The Secretary said that he had not seen the proposal. He would be glad to look into the proposal when it was received. Compensation for Korean Casualties in SVN. Kim said a problem existed in not having sufficient funds to provide adequate pensions and death benefits for Korean casualties in SVN. The Secretary said that Kim should draft a paper of what he thought was necessary and talk this over with Ambassador Brown and General Beach. Korean Logistical Support to SVN. Kim said President Park wanted him to bring personally to the Secretary's attention the need for Korean participation in logistical support in SVN. The Secretary said that if Korea could meet the requirements and meet the bids as to quality, quantity, time and price, he saw no reason why ROK could not get some of the business. He said that under our AID programs it seemed quite appropriate for Korea to participate. Kim said the problem was one of equity between Korea and Japan in providing the logistical support in SVN. He said Japan made money out of the Korean War by supplying materials while the Koreans did the fighting and now the same thing was going on again in SVN. He said the Koreans need a "special advantage." The Secretary said if everything was equal, he would tend to favor Korea because of the need to boost the Korean economy. Kim said Korea wants to have a U.S. procurement office in Seoul to help them compete with the Japanese who have such an office (Kim might be talking about U.S. Army Logistics Center Japan (USALCJ) which services the Far East). The Secretary said he did not think we were favoring Japan in such a manner, but he did not want to favor Japan over Korea procedurally. He would have the procedural problem looked into. (ISA was asked to do this.) Secretary Invited to Visit Korea. Kim invited the Secretary to visit Korea on October 1, 1965, which is Armed Forces Day in Korea. The Secretary said he would very much like to come if possible; he and Mr. McNaughton had been trying for over a year to visit that area but just had not been able to do so. He would keep it in mind.
53. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, June 3, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 KOR S-VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram. 1271. 1. In courtesy call on President Pak he raised question of ROK combat troops for RVN, asking clarification whether number desired was regimental combat team as mentioned by Amb Lodge or division mentioned by President Johnson. I replied that question was one of timing. A division was wanted, but combat team was all that could be accommodated at first. Pak said he would ask Assembly for authority to send up to division, to avoid necessity approaching Assembly twice./2/ /2/The Embassy learned from the Presidential Secretary that Pak understood the need for additional troops in Vietnam, wanted to "make additional forces available as gesture of appreciation for warm treatment and support accorded him on recent presidential visit," and would request the National Assembly authorize sending a division to Vietnam. (Telegram 1268 from Seoul, June 2; ibid.) 2. In response to direct question Pak stated it was his considered judgment that asking Assembly now to approve dispatch combat troops to RVN would not add materially to problem of obtaining Assembly approval of settlement with Japan. In fact there might be some advantage in presenting Assembly with several important questions at once. Opposition would have problem where to concentrate its fire. (FonMin made same point to me earlier today.) Pak expects about same result in vote on combat force as was achieved in vote on 2,000 non-combat troops. 3. Pak has requested GRVN through charge here for formal request for division. As soon as this is received he plans publish it and ask Assembly approval. He regrets that matter has prematurely leaked to press, and has instructed Min Defense to deny flatly that any agreement for dispatch or division was reached in Washington or that any firm plans for such dispatch yet exists. 4. Memcon follows./3/ /3/Not found. 5. Comment: While I hesitate to question Pak's judgment on internal political matter and certainly did not feel justified in doing so to his face, I am afraid that I cannot share his easy optimism. To send 20,000 combat troops to RVN is a major undertaking for any country. It certainly is for Korea. Many Koreans will have sincere doubts as to wisdom of such a course. The opposition will claim that at same time Pak is turning Korea over to Japanese economic domination under unsatisfactory settlement, he is also weakening Korean defenses and increasing Korean danger from Communist neighbors, thus confirming his irresponsibility and incapacity to govern. How much force this will add to "extreme struggle" against Japan settlement already promised by opposition cannot be accurately appraised. That it will add something seems inescapable. I would therefore be much happier in terms of our primary objective of buttoning up Japanese settlement to see the troop question deferred until the settlement is ratified. At the least I would like action to be deferred until we can see more clearly how the opposition and public react to the troop dispatch proposal as publicized in press which is now center of public discussion here, and also to aftermath of Washington visit and program of Tokyo and SOFA negotiations. Consequently I recommend that we seek to delay any further GRVN request at least long enough to permit a more accurate reading of the situation here./4/ Brown /4/In light of Brown's comments, the Department of State requested that, since the Korean-Japan treaty "has top priority," Saigon should "get GVN to hold off on making formal request for ROK division." The Department of State also questioned whether Pak might be reneging on his commitment to achieve a treaty with Japan by pressing the troop issue. (Telegram 2788 to Saigon, June 3, repeated to Seoul; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 KOR S-VIET S) Brown replied that in his view Pak did not intend to replace one issue with the other and was not hindering negotiations with Japan. (Telegram 1283 from Seoul, June 7; ibid.) The Embassy in Saigon reported that the Vietnamese Foreign Minister agreed to hold the request for additional Korean troops until the matter was discussed with him further. (Telegram 4064 from Saigon, repeated to Seoul as telegram 85, June 5; ibid.)
54. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, June 4, 1965, 1000Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-2 US-KOR S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Tokyo. 1278. Ref A. Embtel 1269; B. Deptel 1224./2/ Subject: Proposed reduction US force in Korea. /2/In telegram 1269 from Seoul, June 4, Brown stated he would discuss proposed U.S. troop reductions with the Country Team and requested that no actions be taken until he reported further. (Ibid.) In telegram 1224 to Seoul, June 2, the Department of State quoted from a Department of Defense letter indicating that troop strength in Korea would be reduced to 48,700. (Ibid.) 1. I have reviewed with General Howze both the military and political implications of the proposed reduction of US army strength in Korea to 48,700 including transients. Three aspects of the problem are crucial to any decision, namely: A. The effect of the reduction on the combat strength and effectiveness of the US forces in Korea. B. The need to restructure the Army in Korea if the contemplated reduction is carried out. C. Whether the establishment of this level of forces and any restructuring that is carried out because of it will be construed by the ROKG and the public as a weakening of Korea's defenses and a decrease in the US commitment to the ROK. 2. We are quite aware that the reduced force level would result in total strength (numbers) only about 3000 men below the average of the years 1960-1963, and that for one brief moment of time in the past, which was a low point in the normal fluctuation of strength, the numbers here got down to the figure now proposed. General Howze is nonetheless convinced that, especially with the present structure, the 48,700 level would result in a combat effectiveness of the two US Army divisions in the ROK of little more than 50 percent of the effectiveness contemplated by their tables of organization and taking into account Katusa augmentation. The full tables of organization and distribution of US units assigned to EUSA today call for 69,453 (present for duty--no transients included). A reduced effectiveness had in fact prevailed in the lean years 1960-1963, but the hope had been that strength could one day be improved to levels considered barely adequate to the present structure (i.e., about 55,000, including transients). As a result of strenuous and carefully documented representations made by General Howze after becoming COMUS Korea in 1963, force levels were in fact brought up to this level in 1964. 3. The reduction of military capability involved in a permanent 48,700 ceiling naturally gives me concern. 4. A decision to restructure might have been in order earlier, but the fact that force levels could, and occasionally did, rise to figures regarded as reasonably consistent with the existing structure, made it possible to postpone such a decision. If, however, a new and permanent lower ceiling is to be established, the question can no longer logically be avoided. 5. General Howze has documented to the Dept of Army the need for a restructuring if the force level is to be permanently at the new figure of 48,700 including transients. Basically his plan calls for the reduction of the 7th infantry to a brigade, and a beefing up of the 1st cavalry division. Some units of the 7th infantry would be abolished and the spaces transferred to remaining combat units. In the process some compounds in the 7th division area would be deactivated, and the military port of Inchon would be closed except for the POL terminal. The 1st cavalry would be strengthened as a result of these changes and the 7th division, though restructured as a brigade, would according to military opinion be stronger than it would be if its available manpower were scattered through a large number of units. Such changes are the logical corollary of a decision to limit the total numbers of personnel to a figure at which a number of presently organized combat units are badly below strength. To "retain both divisions at full structure and reduce manning levels" to proposed level as suggested in reftel B would not be militarily sound and would provide in fact less military power than the 48,700 figure could actually provide. 6. So much for the military aspects of the situation. The political problem presented is more immediate. I do not need to repeat here the importance attached by all Koreans to the US military commitment to Korea and the maintenance of US forces here. To meet this concern many high level US officials, including Secretary Rusk and, most recently, President Johnson, have assured the Koreans of continued powerful US forces in Korea and of prior consultation should we decide to reduce our forces here./3/ /3/In telegram 1372 from Seoul, June 24, the Embassy reported that the Korean Government seemed to suspect that U.S. troop strength was being reduced. According to an intelligence report, at least two local police stations were instructed to watch closely the military installations in their locality to determine and report any reductions of U.S. troops. In addition, each police station in an area having a U.S. military base was ordered to recruit an informant working on the base to acquire information about troop strength. That information would then be used to evaluate ROK policy toward furnishing additional troops to Vietnam. (Ibid.) 7. As the ROKG and public were unaware of the buildup in 1964, the attrition to about 48,000 in March 1965, and the recent buildup, it is quite possible that they can remain in ignorance of the further reduction to 48,700 which is now proposed. This is however, not certain since the entire strength will now fluctuate around a lesser level. 8. To restructure in such manner as to use the 48,700 most effectively will certainly attract attention, and lead Koreans to the conclusion that the US is reducing its forces. Some of this can be countered. For example, closure of Inchon can be represented as part of a larger program to shift the 8th army's supply routes and logistic base to the Pusan/Taegu area. However, the ROKG would for purely operational reasons have to be told of the reduction of the 7th division to a brigade and will inevitably inquire as reasons for this restructuring. 9. I do not need to belabor the obvious point that this is no time to give the Koreans the impression that we are pulling out any troops. Nor do we want to give our free world allies or the Communists any such impression./4/ /4/In telegram 166 to Seoul, August 12, the Department of State notified the Embassy of decisions made by the Secretary of the Army to reduce "US forces in Korea for gold-flow reasons." The charges conformed to suggestions advanced by the CT in Korea, namely, that troop levels would be maintained at 53,000 including transients and that Inchon would be used only for POL. In addition, some Pershing missile units and medium-range helicopters would no longer be sent to Korea. (Ibid.) 10. Thus a permanent reduction to 48,700 level makes little military sense without restructuring, but to restructure will do major political damage in weakening the present govt when it needs all possible strength for the ratification of the settlement with Japan and to be able to make a further contribution of troops to GVN. 11. The best solution from both the political and military viewpoint is to rebuild to approximately 55,000 including transients and maintain the present structure. With this we can maintain a reasonable military posture and avoid political problems. 12. A less satisfactory solution would be to reduce to about the average of the last 5 years, or 52,000, and struggle along with the present structure, hoping that by reduction of the proportion of transients we can keep our structure sufficiently filled to be reasonably effective militarily, and being able if questioned by the ROKG about any deficiencies to say that there is no reduction from the average number we have had in the past. 13. A still less desirable solution, for reasons stated above, is to reduce to 48,700 and keep the present structure. 14. A final possibility (preferable from a purely military point of view to that in para 13) is simply to tell the Koreans about the reduction, point out that after it our force levels would be only a few thousand men below the mean level of 1960-1963, that restructuring will improve the effectiveness of the new number, and that with the present situation in South Vietnam this is the best we can do. 15. We should not contemplate this possibility at this time. No matter how presented by us, the headlines in Korea would be "US withdrawing its troops," and the impact on the ROK-Japan settlement and the prospect of further Korean troops for RVN would be highly adverse for obvious reasons. 16. I therefore recommend that for the next 6 months we adopt the first solution (para 11) or, as a last resort, the 2nd (para 12). The matter could then be reviewed in the light of circumstances then existing. Brown
55. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, June 14, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Saigon and passed to the White House. No time of transmission appears on the telegram. 1309. For Bundy and Johnson from Ambassador. Subj: ROK troops to Vietnam. 1. President Park has just told me that ROKG has received message from GRVN expressing appreciation for decision ROKG to send division combat troops to RVN and asking that such troops be sent as soon as possible. 2. President points out it obviously impossible for ROKG to act on such a message, which places him in most embarrassing position as he has consistently and publicly denied any decision to send combat troops. 3. President still wishes to send troops and to do so as soon as possible. He asks that anything necessary be done to get formal request from GRVN for combat decision without any prejudgment ROKG position. 4. President still wants such request prior ending present Assembly session June 18 since if he gets request before session closes he may be able to get extension session to consider request. Next session is scheduled for July and President plans devote it to ratification settlement with Japan. He does not want to complicate this later session with troop issue if he can possibly avoid it./2/ /2/In telegram 1317 from Seoul, June 15, Brown reported on his conversation with Pak in which the latter recounted his discussions with several DRP Assembly members about sending combat troops to Vietnam. The members urged the matter be submitted to the Assembly as soon as possible so that it would not be "considered at the same session with the Japanese settlement." Accordingly, Pak was anxious to receive the request and was prepared to ask for a special session of the Assembly to consider it. (Ibid., POL 27-3 KOR S) 5. Meanwhile General Howze advises that General Westmoreland wishes marine regimental combat team as soon as possible and plans to use it different location from rest of ROK division. For practical military reasons General Howze feels that if ROK troops are to be used in separate locations request might better be for division plus regimental combat team since division would operate more effectively as complete unit. 6. I have not had time to consider this carefully or to discuss it fully with General Howze, but my preliminary reaction is that in view of confused and checkered history of this matter illustrated by GRVN message referred to above, it would be most unwise complicate political situation by asking for any more than division at this time. I may comment more fully on this point after having chance consider it more carefully with General Beach who assumes command tomorrow. 7. I, of course, made it clear to President Park that no one on US side had told GRVN that ROKG had decided to send combat division. All that we had told GRVN was that we were confident ROKG would give request for combat division very sympathetic consideration. 8. President Park urgently requested that GRVN message be kept completely secret in view obvious embarrassment to his government should its contents become known. 9. Text GRVN request follows separate telegram./3/ /3/Telegram 1310 from Seoul, June 14, transmitted the GVN request. (Ibid., POL 27-3 VIET S) Brown 56. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, June 23, 1965, 1300Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 KOR S-VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Saigon, CINCPAC for POLAD, and COMUSMACV. 1369. Ref: Deptel 1312, Saigon 2993, CINCPAC unn, COMUSMACV unn./2/ Subj: Support and Allowances for ROK Troops in RVN. /2/Telegram 1312 to Seoul, June 21, authorized the Embassy to inform the ROKG of the allowances to be paid to a Korean division in Vietnam. The source of funding was still to be determined. (Ibid.) The Embassy informed Washington that the Country Team in Seoul preferred payment in the present form, namely, "direct cash payment to MND outside normal aid channels." The Country Team did not want payments to interfere with U.S. policy for Korean stabilization and development and wanted to avoid discussions about funding that "could range all the way from charges that ROK forces are being used as mercenaries to complaints that ROKG not being adequately compensated for services rendered." (Telegram 7 from Seoul, July 2; ibid., POL 27-3 VIET S) 1. On June 18 Korea Times reported Minister of National Defense (MND) Kim Song-un had on previous day told National Assembly Defense Committee "U.S. had agreed to provide the additional troops (i.e. 400 men to reinforce ROK troops already in South Vietnam) with munitions and the same overseas service allowances as granted to the Korean forces already stationed there." Ambassador called on Kim same day and reminded him of written agreement between his Ministry and ourselves that fact U.S. was paying overseas allowances for the two thousand Korean troops in Vietnam would be held secret. 2. Minister said he had not realized we were concerned about keeping this secret and was sorry if he had caused any embarrassment. Ambassador said matter would come up again and asked him to avoid any mention of our contribution in future if conceivably possible, and, if not, to play it down as much as possible./3/ Memcon pouched./4/ /3/The Embassy in Saigon concurred with this strategy, pointing out that release of information about U.S. payments to Korean troops would have a "detrimental effect both within VN and internationally." In the Embassy's view, release of that information would make Vietnam more vulnerable to charges that its government was merely a "U.S. puppet" and undercut U.S. claims that the Vietnam effort had the support of international forces. (Telegram 23 from Saigon, July 2; ibid., DEF 19 KOR S-VIET S) /4/Not found. 3. Ambassador also expressed hope that there would be no public discussion of any arrangements with respect to despatch of division to South Vietnam until Min of Natl Defense, FonMin, PriMin, General Beach and Embassy had all agreed on same story and same way of putting it to public. Minister said he fully agreed and would try to avoid or play down reference to our support for units now in Vietnam. He said he was sorry he had caused trouble and would certainly be in touch with us in advance about anything that was said about larger unit. 4. ROK JCS has now prepared and submitted agenda for discussion between MND and COMUSK containing long list ROKG requests in regard not only allowances but combat pay and logistic support in RVN of ROK division requested by GVN. COMUSK meeting with MND afternoon June 23 and will report in separate message/5/ and in detail on ROK stated requirements. /5/Not found. 5. Comment: With despatch of ROK forces in division or even RCT strength it will be difficult if not impossible to conceal extent to which U.S. will presumably be paying expenses in RVN, already many Koreans seem to take for granted that U.S. footing bill and that sending troops to RVN is "good business" for ROK. So far we have detected no particular public or press criticism this feature ROKG support in RVN. 6. We realize degree to which we can maintain privacy of arrangements for ROK combat forces will depend on nature of arrangements still to be worked out. Would appreciate having Dept's comments on this aspect after our recommendations have been received and studied. Brown
57. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, July 10, 1965, 0510Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. 40. Ref: A. Deptel 15, B. Deptel 27./2/ For Assistant Secretary Bundy from Ambassador. Subj: ROK Deployment RVN-MAP Transfer and Pay Raise. /2/Telegrams 15 and 27 to Seoul, July 5 and 8, outlined the terms Washington was prepared to meet, if ROKG agreed to provide additional troops to Vietnam. (Ibid.) With reference to the ROKG requests, Brown stressed the importance of four military matters to the U.S.-ROK relationship: maintenance of U.S. troop strength in Korea, suspension or modification of the MAP transfer program, an increase in MAP, and financial assistance for a Korean military pay raise. Noting ROKG dissatisfaction with the U.S. response to these concerns thus far, Brown stated that without some concessions on those points the U.S. would be strongly criticized by the Korean press and public and the National Assembly could refuse to approve the dispatch of troops to Vietnam. (Telegram 12 from Seoul, July 3; ibid.) 1. If Korea provides a combat division for RVN this will add a new dimension to our relationship. 2. Korea, a small country bordering on the Communist world, will be in actual combat in one of the most active areas of RVN against Communist forces. It will have provided very substantially greater combat manpower than any other free world country great or small except the United States. This is a decision of great import for any country to make. 3. It comes at a rather crucial period for Korea, a sort of watershed in its current history. For if the settlement with Japan is ratified, as we hope it will be, a period of new relationships and new problems will begin which will provide great opportunities, but also problems the solution of which will tax all ROKG's capabilities and all our skill and understanding. 4. Tensions with the Communist world are heightening everywhere. This is no time to drop our guard. Rather we should accelerate our effort to build free world strength wherever opportunity offers. 5. At the moment trained combat manpower is a crucial need in RVN. It is fair to say to Korea that this battle is hers as well as ours, that she can afford the men, that it is her duty to return in some measure the help rendered her so unstintingly by the free world in the past, and that we will ensure that this will not involve her in extra cost. 6. But it is also a cold fact that Korea does not have to do this, that it does involve Korea in some additional risk, that a well-trained combat division can be a real contribution to the struggle, and that it can save us a great deal in blood and treasure. 7. This question is now about to be considered by the Assembly in an atmosphere which for a variety of reasons has become superheated and casts doubt upon the outcome. It is not just the opposition which is causing the trouble, but also many members of the DRP. The question is mixed up with the feeling against Japan and the ever present haunting doubts about US support. The opposition, already in full cry on the ratification of the K-J settlement, is beginning to attack on the second front of the troop issue. Some members of the DRP are accusing the govt of failure to get proper recompense from the US for what the ROKG is prepared to do in RVN. On top of this, public opinion has been inflamed by distorted reports that the US expects flesh and blood from Korea while concentrating its purchases of war materials in Japan to the advantage of that economy rather than the ROK. 8. The question of a pay raise has become a current political issue in specific reference to the question of sending troops to RVN. This pay raise is unquestionably not only justified, but is essential if morale and efficiency in the armed forces and civil service is to be maintained. That it is long overdue is clear from the fact that the cost of living has increased about 75 percent since pay was last adjusted. The 1966 budget, shortly to be presented to the Assembly, will have to deal with this question in some form. In every phase of service, military, govt, education, low pay is a drag upon progress and efficiency which the country can ill afford. Yet the cost is also great for it to afford. 9. A 75 percent pay raise plus the present MAP transfer program would, for example, increase the military budget by about 35 percent. 10. I have devoted a lot of thought as to what we could do to meet this combination of political and economic problems in a way most consistent with our current economic strategy. We need a measure which will meet the political objections which the govt faces in seeking to send combat troops to RVN, which will contribute at least partially to the solution of the economic problems which the govt faces, which will recognize the real contribution which Korea will in fact be making, and which will be consistent with our aid policy and stabilization program. 11. There is a solution which meets all of these criteria and meets most of them dramatically, namely a suspension of the ROK funding requirement of the MAP transfer program for so long as ROK maintains substantial forces in RVN by means of US offshore procurement from Korea of those items now scheduled for transfer, upon the understanding that ROKG budgetary savings from this action be a contribution to a substantial military and civilian pay raise. 12. We cannot give preference to Korea in procurement for RVN as they want us to do, for reasons of law and principle. But we can meet political difficulties and show our appreciation without sacrifice of either by this adjustment of MAP transfer. 13. Such action would have a considerable effect. It would be represented by the ROKG as a great political victory. It would go far to ensure united DRP support for despatch of a division to RVN. It would correct the adverse effects of the untimely release of the Poats and McNamara statements, which, however proper in their context, have caused untold political difficulties for us and for the ROKG here./3/ It would be consistent with Secretary McNamara's promise to President Pak to review the MAP transfer program in the light of Korea's real economic needs. It would not finance all of a pay raise, but would help make a pay raise possible. OSP of items programmed for transfer would continue the stimulation of local industry which we have so strongly emphasized as important and would set the stage for budgetary transfer when the ROKG is equal to the task. Korean dollar earnings would be increased. The stabilization and SA policies would not be weakened. /3/The Korean Minister of National Defense obtained news reports quoting McNamara as having said that Korea would bear the full 75 percent military pay increase and stating that Poats believed that Korea could easily shoulder $7 or $8 million in defense increases. News that the United States intended to purchase munitions from Japan for use in Vietnam also reached Korea. (Telegram 1390 from Seoul, June 29; ibid., DEF 19 US-KOR S) 14. Realize that this course will add something to our dollar outflow. But the amount pales into insignificance in comparison with the cost of sending a US division to RVN instead of a ROK division. 15. Of course to suspend MAP transfer and still make good on our recent commitment (refs A and B) to increase ROK active army divisions combat effectiveness and to bring 3 ready reserve divisions to full equipment levels, Korea MAP funding must necessarily be further increased. But in my view this is a lesser evil than a reluctant despatch of the division or failure to send it at all, or indeed the loss of a substantial pay raise. 16. We may lose some face in yielding on a point on which we have for so long held firm. But the possibility of a change of view was established at the highest level during the Pak visit to Washington and we do have more facts and new circumstances. So this doesn't worry me. 17. I think a suspension of the MAP program is now both politically expedient and economically and militarily justified. 18. I therefore recommend that we agree to it and do so promptly, so that it can have its effect upon current Assembly consideration of the troop issue./4/ /4/In a Joint State-Defense-AID message, the Embassy received authorization to inform ROKG that the MAP transfer program would be suspended as long as Korean troops served in Vietnam and funding of the offshore procurement program for transfer items had been approved. The savings Korea realized from those actions was to go to covering the costs of military and civilian pay increases. (Telegram 47 to Seoul, July 12; ibid., POL 27-3 VIET S) Brown notified the Department of State that he would keep the information secret until he had determined the most appropriate manner and time to utilize it. (Telegram 45 from Seoul, July 13; ibid.) But Brown feared that without an increase in MAP funds for Korea the United States would be unable to meet other promises to provide military equipment and investment funds. (Telegram 53 from Seoul, July 14; ibid.) 19. All members of the Country Team concur. Brown
58. Editorial Note On August 13, 1965, the Korean National Assembly began deliberating the proposal to dispatch a combat division to Vietnam. Assembly members of the opposition People's Party decided to walk out or abstain from voting, even though many supported the proposal. According to the Embassy many regarded "any sign of cooperation with ROKG as political kiss of death at this critical juncture." (Telegram 123 from Seoul, August 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S) On August 13 the Assembly authorized sending combat troops to Vietnam by a virtually unanimous vote: 101 for the proposal, 1 against, with 2 abstentions. Opposition members were not present for the vote. (Telegram 154 from Seoul, August 13; ibid.) President Johnson responded by sending President Pak a message of thanks for "this further demonstration of the devotion of the people of Korea to the spirit of liberty and independence." (Telegram 171 to Seoul, August 13; ibid., POL 27-3 VIET S) The text of the President's letter is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, page 781.
59. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the United States Operations Mission to Korea (Brown) to the Director of the United States Operations Mission to Korea of the Agency for International Development (Bernstein)/1/ Seoul, September 23, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 KOR S. Secret. Attached to a September 28 letter from Roger Ernst, Acting Director of the United States Operations Mission to Korea, to Barnett. SUBJECT Over the last several months there has been considerable discussion within Korea and between the ROKG and the U.S. on procurement in Korea for Vietnam. Discussions have touched on both civilian procurement, using U.S. aid funds for Vietnam, and military procurement both for U.S. forces and under the Vietnam MAP./2/ /2/Documentation regarding increased Korean participation in procurement programs for Vietnam under AID and MAP is ibid., POL 27-3 VIET S; DEF 12-5 KOR-VIET S; DEF 19 US-KOR S; DEF 19 KOR S-VIET S; AID VIET S; and AID (KOR S) VIET S. In our general discussions with the ROKG we have informed them that there is no possibility of granting Korea special preference for such procurement for both political and legislative reasons. We have also stressed that Korea should emphasize the development of permanent export markets rather than place too much emphasis on what is hopefully a temporary situation. At the same time, it is important for the U.S. to recognize the political and psychological attitudes within Korea on this question. Korea is providing a full combat division plus a non-combat engineering unit to Vietnam. While the ROKG and the U.S. have repeatedly maintained that such action was based on Korea's understanding of its own interests in the war in South Vietnam and its responsibilities to the Free World, there is inevitably the feeling within Korea, and particularly in the Assembly, that Korea should receive some tangible trade benefits from its willing response to the request for troops. This feeling is fortified by the feeling that persists in Korea that Japan profited greatly economically from the Korean War. Korea now sees an opportunity to capitalize itself on the economic consequences of the Vietnam engagement. But equally important, Korea resents any implication that while Korea is contributing troops to the war, Japan may once again be making large profits through U.S. off-shore procurement. In order to meet these problems, the U.S. has promised the ROKG that Korea will be given full and equal opportunity to compete for U.S. off-shore procurement whether military or civilian. Some steps have been taken in this regard, but others still remain to be implemented, and certain other recommendations in this area are still awaiting U.S. action. Civilian: USOM recommended in April that Korea be made eligible for purchases under Supporting Assistance for Vietnam of tires and tubes which are currently restricted to U.S. procurement. This recommendation was made on the basis of Korean capability to produce tires and tubes of high quality, having supplied such products over the past several years to U.S. forces stationed here in Korea. Furthermore, Korea utilizes U.S. surplus rubber in its production of tires and tubes and thus the procurement in Korea would not represent entirely a gold drain. Finally, this industry is one which AID has helped to develop and is one of the most competent and competitive industries in Korea. Action on this recommendation lies with AID/W. The second recommendation on civilian procurement, made in June, related to the 10% rule on steel products. The rule in question states that not more than 10% of an item purchased on a limited world-wide basis can be obtained from a non-eligible source of procurement. In the case of galvanized steel products from Korea, roughly 10% of the value of the final product is paid for with cash to Japan for certain interim processing with additional payment to Japan paid for with scrap iron imported from the U.S. Thus while Japan contributes more than 10% of the total value of the finished product, only 10% is paid for in dollars and the remainder in U.S. purchased scrap. Our recommendation was that the U.S. interpret the 10% rule broadly enough to permit Korean exports of this product under the AID Vietnam program. This was not a waiver request, but a request for a broad interpretation which appears legitimate within the purposes for which the rule was established. This recommendation is important because Korean exports of galvanized steel to Vietnam have run as high as $13 million a year and steel has thus been one of Korea's chief exports to Vietnam. In addition, Korea manufacturers undertook long negotiations and paid an indemnity to Vietnam to reopen the market in Vietnam after a bad shipment caused the RVN to exclude Korean steel imports. To deny this market to Korea now would mean rendering past Korean efforts both in developing the market and in settling a difficult dispute useless. Action on this question is with USOM/Saigon, which has been given discretionary authority by AID/W to resolve the matter. We discussed with Washington the possibility of other types of civilian procurement in Korea, particularly the processing of PL 480 products for Vietnam and the purchase of textiles. Washington has informed us that such procurement is not feasible. Military: Korea has been informed that MAP and DOD funds can only be spent off-shore for emergency or other special reasons such as storage problems, substantial price differences, etc. In such cases, procurement must be completely competitive, and no preference can be granted. To meet Korean complaints about procurement in Japan, DOD has requested Japan, Vietnam and Korea to review procurement procedures and to determine whether Korea was in fact in a less advantageous position, because Korea was now receiving information on all orders for Vietnam and would in the future be receiving information on all U.S. procurement in the Far East for U.S. forces. However, to date while information on Vietnam procurement has been provided to the U.S. Army's Korean Procurement Agency, information on other military procurement of the Far East has not been so provided. While Korea may not be able to compete with Japan on certain sophisticated items, there is an important political and psychological importance in giving Korea completely equal opportunity to compete on all U.S. off-shore procurement in the Far East. Action on this matter lies evidently with U.S. Army's Japan Procurement Agency. A second item of military procurement was in the use of Korean facilities of rehabilitation and repair of vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment, for which Korea was believed to have some very adequate facilities. Last spring, CINCPAC undertook to survey some of these facilities--on a priority basis--for use in connection with Vietnam. To date, however, nothing has been heard from CINCPAC on this matter. Conclusion: Korea's hopes for large-scale exports to Vietnam, which have frequently been mentioned as high as $30 million a year, will largely be frustrated, particularly since off-shore procurement of most textiles, which represented over half of the value of items in the Korean planning, has been precluded by Washington under either U.S. forces or AID procurement. This makes it all the more important that in those items in which Korea does have a legitimate right to compete, efforts should be made to provide Korea the necessary information and opportunities. Action on the tires and tubes and on the steel questions for example, would be most welcome. A determination of Korea's capability in repair and rehabilitation would also be important. In addition, off-shore procurement by the U.S. for other than Vietnam should not discriminate against Korea and should in fact provide Korea with as much opportunity as possible. Particularly important in this area is the procurement for the U.S. forces stationed in Korea, including the purchases for the PX. This subject is dealt with in a separate paper which is attached./3/ /3/Attached but not printed. [Continue with the next documents]
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