NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
Communication Satellites
63. Position Paper for the United States Delegation/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, TEL 6. Limited Official Use. This position paper, prepared for a meeting with members of the European Conference on Satellite Communications and Canadian officials, is an enclosure to a letter from Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Harland Cleveland to Legal Adviser Abram Chayes. MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS AND THE CANADIANS The European Conference on Satellite Communication, composed of 22 European Governments, has invited the United States and Canada to meet with it in Rome for several days beginning February 10. The agenda for the meeting, proposed by the European Conference and accepted by the United States, is as follows: 1. Functions, structure, and financing of the world organization; 2. Planning and negotiating machinery required in the preparatory period; 3. Design and operation of the system in the preliminary and subsequent stages; 4. Problems connected with provision of equipment, procurement of services, exchange of technical information; 5. Timetable for the preliminary and subsequent stages of the system, including coordination with cable systems; 6. Date and composition of the conference of interested governments. I. United States Objectives The basic objectives of the United States in the field of satellite communication have been defined in a number of public policy statements. The most important of these are the President's policy statement of July 24, 1961, the Communication Satellite Act of 1962, Part D of the US-sponsored General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), an Aide-Mémoire of June 26, 1962, a paper distributed to selected delegations at the ITU Space Communication Conference held in October, 1963, and the President's statement on the results of that conference. The basic objectives of the United States, as set forth in these statements, are: 1. To get a communications satellite system operating as soon as possible; 2. To have this system reflect US political and technological leadership; 3. To extend the system to provide global coverage with nondiscriminatory access at the earliest practicable date; 4. To direct care and attention to providing the services of the system to economically less developed countries and areas as well as those more highly developed; 5. To establish the system as part of an improved global communications network, to reflect the benefits of this new technology in both quality of services and charges, and to make efficient use of the frequency spectrum; 6. To have, for economic, political, and technical reasons, a single global commercial system rather than competing systems; 7. To provide an opportunity for participation in the system by other countries, both through investment, with consequent participation in design, ownership and management, and through leasing of channels or other arrangements; and 8. To give the qualified industries of participating countries an opportunity to compete for supplying satellites, launchers and other equipment for the system as it is expanded and developed. These objectives will set the framework for United States participation at the Rome meeting. II. Background This is the first major meeting with the European Conference on Satellite Communications in which the United States will be an official participant. It marks an important stage in the development of international arrangements for satellite communication. However, the meeting is not a negotiation and the delegation is not authorized to negotiate or enter into any agreements. The principal purpose of the meeting is to permit the parties to explore views and objectives, both on the subject of definitive arrangements for satellite communication and on the question of interim arrangements. These explorations look towards continuing discussion with European countries culminating, hopefully, in the negotiation and conclusion of organizational agreements. The United States is the only country that has developed and launched communication satellites. The Soviet Union is presumed to have the technology, and could probably launch communication satellites in a short period of time. It will be several years at best before any European countries, acting either individually or in combination, can launch communication satellites with their own boosters, and many years before they would be in a position to launch a system competitive with that of the United States. The United States is in a position to move forward rapidly with the development of a communication satellite system. This development will fall roughly into three stages. First, the Communication Satellite Corporation plans to establish a limited "experimental/operational" capability over the North Atlantic in 1965. Work will go forward also on various medium altitude systems. Second, there will be a basic global system. Under present plans, the choice of basic system will be made in September, 1965. If the Corporation opts for synchronous satellites the "experimental/operational" systems will be extended to provide it. If not, it will be a medium altitude system. In any event the United States anticipates that the basic system, which will have a global capability, will come into being in 1966-67. And finally, there will be a fully developed global system of communication satellites. This will have to evolve over a period of years. Although technical developments may thus be divided into three roughly defined stages, it is convenient to think of organizational arrangements in terms of two stages: first, arrangements for an interim period, and second, a definitive organizational structure designed to accommodate a broader range of international interests. Both stages are on the agenda for discussion at the Rome meeting. The primary goal of the United States at the Rome meeting will be to explore ways of obtaining participation by other nations in each of these stages on a basis that is compatible with United States satellite communications objectives, and particularly in such a way as not to delay the schedule on which the CSC is now operating. As to definitive arrangements, the United States will necessarily have to discuss these in rather generalized terms because our thinking is still not very far advanced. It will be important, however, to explore in as much detail as possible the ideas of individual European countries and the Conference so that, as we develop our own proposals over the coming months, the United States will be able to make maximum use of its bargaining power, which may well be at its peak during the early years of the system when we have a monopoly of the boosters and of communication technology. The European countries know that the United States will dominate the system for the next few years, and it is likely that a primary interest on their part will be to assure that this country does not continue to monopolize the system indefinitely. With some variations in attitude from country to country, the European delegations are likely to press hard for assurances on the ultimate organizational structure. This may be the price that they demand for permitting the Corporation to manage the interim system. As to interim arrangements, for a commercially viable system it is desirable that there be some form of European participation./2/ Originally both the Corporation and the United States Government thought exclusively in terms of European participation through capital investment in the system from the beginning, either on behalf of the Conference or by several individual European countries. As the Corporation's plans matured and the prospect of an "experimental/operational" capability in 1965 emerged, a number of European countries expressed interest in participating at this stage by leasing channels rather than by making a capital investment. Recently, at a technical meeting in Karlsruhe, European interest in capital investment from the beginning has again emerged, largely as a result of an indication that the UK would be prepared to invest. Investment and channel leasing are not mutually exclusive; discussions and negotiations could proceed on both forms of arrangement simultaneously. /2/Telegram 3775 from Paris, February 7, reported that the French, for example, "made much of point that GOF [Government of France] could not and would not treat communications satellite problems as solely telecommunications affairs. Emphasized repeatedly that strong national interests are involved." (Ibid.) It is obvious that arrangements for rental of channels in the 1965 limited capability would be simpler to negotiate and would retain maximum managerial control in the United States. At the same time, if a number of European countries indicate that they may be prepared to make an investment commitment now in the over-all CSC program, we will want to discuss interim organizational arrangements permitting such investment. These arrangements would be somewhat more complicated, but they would have to be simple enough to operate efficiently and to be compatible with the over-riding United States interest in developing a system as soon as possible. The United States has on several occasions asked the Soviet Union if it wished to discuss a communication satellite system. An Aide-Mémoire in February 1963 suggested exploratory talks, there were probes at the ITU Space Communication Conference, Ambassador Kohler approached Gromyko on the subject in November, and approaches were made in December at the UN. The Soviet Union has not responded affirmatively to any of these. The Europeans are likely to ask for our views on Soviet participation in a communication satellite system. The delegation is authorized to point out that the United States is committed to seek a single global system, and that this implies Soviet participation as a desirable objective. However, the United States will be guided by the principle that the development of the system should not be delayed by the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to participate, or by unproductive negotiations with the Soviet Union. [Here follows Section III, Agenda Items.]
64. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 13, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications Systems, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. 1 [2 of 2]. Confidential. SUBJECT The discussions under way to explore whether it would be feasible for the Communications Satellite Corporation to provide satellite communications services for the NCS,/2/ using the Government's transportable and fixed ground terminals, through the global system the Corporation will deploy have resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding covering these services (Tab 1)./3/ The Corporation's Board of Directors and management favor entering into the arrangement. They believe that it must also be acceptable to the communications common carriers and the key European countries interested in investing in the global system. Discussions with these parties and appropriate Congressional Committees are in process. /2/NSAM No. 252, July 11, 1963, called for the establishment of a National Communications System by linking together the facilities of various federal agencies. The objective of the system "will be to provide necessary communications for the Federal Government under all conditions ranging from a normal situation to national emergencies and international crises, including nuclear attack." (Ibid.) /3/Neither tab was attached. The terms of the Memorandum are substantially agreed upon. An outstanding question with respect to frequency allocation is still being resolved. The Memorandum makes provision for adequate satellite services to be supplied for the NCS if it should develop that the global system the Corporation decides to deploy is not suitable for the Government's needs. Inasmuch as the Memorandum of Understanding deals with the satellite circuits required for the entire NCS, it would be preferable that the Memorandum be executed by the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for the NCS. This would permit the arrangements for the Government's procurement of such services to be integrated with anticipated arrangements for the participation of other governments in the global system which may result from discussions being carried on with foreign governments by the Corporation and the Department of State. Accordingly, I have prepared for your approval Tab 2 which would authorize the Secretary of Defense, as Executive Agent for the NCS, to sign the Memorandum of Understanding on behalf of the Government. Previous directives are not explicit in giving this power to the Secretary of Defense. The Ad Hoc Committee Group on Satellite Communications concurs in this course of action. Cyrus Vance
65. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Chayes) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, March 16, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, TEL 6. Drafted by Leonard Marks (USIA). Copies were sent to Cleveland (IO), Johnson (E), Nesbitt (SCI), and Edgar J. Beigel (WE). SUBJECT Mr. Welch, Dr. Charyk, Lee Marks, and Alvin Friedman (Special Assistant to John McNaughton in DOD) visited London, Paris, Bonn and Rome last week to discuss proposed arrangements between the United States Government (DOD) and the Corporation regarding a shared commercial-United States Government communication satellite system. They also showed and discussed the draft Interim Agreement relating to arrangements for international participation in the system, which had been prepared for the February 10 Rome Conference. The European Conference on Communication Satellites met in London Friday and Saturday. Lee Marks returned home via London and talked with Mr. Hope-Jones, of the UK Foreign Ministry, about the Conference. Two issues emerged--the nature of the proposed U.S. Government-Corporation "deal", and the form and timing of negotiations on the draft Interim Agreement. 1. The U.S. Government-Corporation "deal". The Europeans did not react strongly to the proposed deal. They questioned whether it was technically possible to use one satellite system to meet both commercial needs and those of the U.S. Government, and they questioned whether it was politically saleable. Hope-Jones told Lee Marks Saturday that the European Conference had discussed the proposal briefly and decided it was a "political non-starter". Sweden and Austria reportedly said flatly they could not participate in a system one-half of which was reserved exclusively for the U.S. military needs. I believe the U.S. Government and the Corporation could nonetheless conclude a Memorandum of Understanding if it was properly drafted and presented. It is important that we not lead Congress or the Europeans to believe that the deal gives the Government the right to use half of a 24-satellite medium-altitude random-orbit system if that is the system deployed. Rather, the deal must provide a series of options--i.e., shared system, Corporation deployment of a separate system for the Government--all subject to suitable arrangements being worked out. The present draft of the Memorandum of Understanding should probably be altered to make this clear. Mr. Friedman and Dr. Charyk see this point clearly. We do not know what Secretary McNamara's views are. This issue is complicated because the Military Operations Sub Committee (headed by Chet Holifield) of the Government Operations Committee begins two weeks of hearings on DOD use of a communications satellite system tomorrow. 2. Form and Timing of Negotiations. As you will recall, the Europeans proposed at the Rome meeting that a group representing the European Conference come to the United States to negotiate in mid-March or early April. Although we agreed to this approach in Rome, upon reconsideration, the Corporation decided that it did not like this and we thereupon declined to set a date for the negotiating meeting. My reply to Ambassador Ortona, attached at Tab A,/2/ suggested an alternative and was approved by the Corporation. A reply to my letter, attached at Tab B,/3/ was sent from London last week end. It rejects our proposal and asks for an early "informal" conference. We must now reply to Ambassador Ortona's letter. /2/Not printed. In this letter, March 5, Chayes told Ortona that the corporation faced "a number of domestic decisions and actions in the next weeks which would make it difficult to prepare for and carry out the proposed negotiations," since COMSAT was preparing to release a prospectus and issue stock. Chayes proposed that a series of informal, bilateral sessions be held instead. /3/Not printed. On March 14 Ortona wrote to Chayes: "The members of the conference do not favor the proposal that there should be bilateral discussions. They wish once again to point out to the United States that they will be pursuing a common aim in these negotiations, and that they are determined to negotiate in common." The Corporation prefers to negotiate bilaterally, although as a result of the trip last week, it may now realize that this is simply not possible. Alternatively, it would like to talk to a small group of countries. It doesn't want to deal with the Conference as such, or with a group of countries on behalf of the Conference. The Europeans have a strong political stake in the European Conference and seem so far to have achieved a high degree of unity. (Hope-Jones told Lee Marks in London that the British and French Governments, at "the highest levels," considered the political stake "enormous" because "we and the French agree on every point and together we are leading the rest of Europe.") Moreover, they are generally irritated at the Corporation's insistence on bilateral talks and on what they believe to be the brush-off of my letter to Ambassador Ortona. The issue is how strongly we should press the Corporation to accept Ambassador Ortona's proposal or to make a reasonable counter-proposal. Our problem, of course, is that if we press the Corporation to negotiate we will bear the onus for what comes out of the negotiations; and the issues of State Department involvement that were discussed so heatedly during the legislative battle over the Act, and that have popped up from time to time in recent months, will be raised again. Predominant congressional feeling is undoubtedly that the less State Department involvement the better. The FCC Staff, and several of the Commissioners (though not the Chairman) share this view. On the other hand, DOD has an interest in this issue since the success of its deal, and indeed of a separate communication satellite system, may depend on not irritating the Europeans unnecessarily. A joint approach to the Corporation by State and DOD might be possible. These issues will probably have to be resolved in the next few days. Pending further developments at the Corporation and DOD, we do not have any recommendations, but we believe you should be aware of the problems./4/ /4/Chayes responded to the Europeans on March 23, announcing the arrival of a U.S. delegation on April 6. "Because of the problems of publicity in connection with the stock issues of the Corporation, we would very much prefer to meet in Europe, in any city that is agreeable to you." (Telegram 2203, March 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, TEL 6)
66. Editorial Note In February 1964 the Soviet Union accepted a long-standing U.S. proposal for discussion of a global communications satellite system. The United States had first proposed an exploratory exchange of views with the Soviet Union in February 1963. In a March 30 memorandum for Secretary Rusk, Abram Chayes speculated that Soviet interest was related to the ongoing U.S. discussions with the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) and the European Conference on Satellite Communication. He recommended that the talks take place in June. "By that time, our negotiations with the Europeans and others should have advanced sufficiently so that the risks of Soviet participation would be minimal." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, TEL 6) The Soviet Union's interest in the U.S.-European negotiations was strong. In April a Soviet Embassy official asked Joseph Charyk, President of COMSAT, about the progress of the talks. "Mr. Karpov then indicated that it was his understanding that we were having a difficult time negotiating with the European countries and that as a matter of fact this had been described as a 'telephone war.' Charyk assured him that there was great interest on the part of the Europeans." (Airgram CA-10238, April 6; ibid.)
67. Letter From the Chairman of the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations (Holifield) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 13, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. 1. No classification marking. Dear Mr. President: I take this opportunity to convey to you my deep concern over recent developments in the Government's program for satellite communications. My Military Operations Subcommittee has been holding extensive hearings on this subject, updating some earlier work in this field. In April of last year, General Starbird of the Defense Communications Agency told us about the Defense Department plans for a medium altitude random orbit system of satellite communications. The Defense Department has been ready for some time to build such a system, but the project has been held up since at least October 1963, when Secretary McNamara decided to explore with the Communications Satellite Corporation the possibility of a joint military-commercial system operation. Many months have been consumed in technical and policy discussions. Numerous options have been analyzed, numerous proposals made and discarded. Several drafts of an "agreement" between the Department and the Corporation have been formulated, the latest of which is now before the Corporation for approval or, possibly, further negotiations. Even if an "agreement" is entered into, the Defense Department will not know until October 1965 whether the Corporation is prepared to meet its requirements. The Corporation may decide the military tie-in is not profitable because of added satellite weight and complexity. The Corporation may go synchronous, in which case the military specifications will not be met. Or the Corporation may find that its foreign partners object to the military tie-in, in which case the State Department will not approve it. Our hearings have made it clear that a time delay of a year or more would be involved if the Department waits on the Corporation to decide what system it wants to choose. While it appears, through the testimony and our other investigations, that most of the civilian and military experts in Government communications are opposed to a shared system operation, or at least have serious reservations about it (because the operating advantages are nil and the economies dubious), the Defense Department is still trying to work out an agreement. Possibly an agreement has this attraction--that public capital outlays on satellite communications will not be necessary for the next several budget years. And later, the Defense Department will pay off that portion of the Corporation's investment required for special Government purposes by paying yearly rates for services approved by the Federal Communications Commission. From the Corporation's standpoint, presumably there is an advantage in having a "built-in" major customer committed several years in advance of system operations. The hearings impel me to seriously question whether the long-range interests of the United States will be served by associating the most sensitive military and other essential Government requirements for satellite communications with the business requirements of a commercial corporation which must pay dividends to stockholders. I see all kinds of political and international implications. For the next few years the Corporation will be deeply involved in transactions and arrangements with domestic and foreign carriers and in devising a system operation which will produce revenues in competition with cable and other communications systems. Can the Government afford to hold up while these complicated problems are being solved--a lengthy process which entails numerous international negotiations, regulatory agency proceedings, and other involvements? Indeed, the Government adds to the Corporation's domestic and international problems by the proposed tie-in. The Cuban crisis showed how seriously deficient we were in our communications, and the directive for a National Communications System was President Kennedy's immediate response to these deficiencies. While the Government now buys communications services from carriers and will buy such services from the Corporation in the future, it seems to be the better part of wisdom for the Government, without further delay, to move ahead with its own hard-core military system, already carefully studied, already designed and engineered. I trust you will give this matter your personal attention./2/ /2/A response to Holifield's letter provoked debate among the White House staff. Special Assistant Joseph Califano and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance urged Lawrence O'Brien to sign a letter to the Congressman, reassuring him that "The present shared satellite design meets all of the important technical and operational requirements that would also be met by an independent Government design." (Memorandum from Califano to O'Brien, June 10; ibid.) But Edward Welsh, Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, disagreed, explaining that Holifield had made a persuasive case and that the proposed response "is not fully responsive to the Congressman's letter." Welsh also pointed out that the Department of Defense proposal "would make the whole problem more difficult for the State Department." Welsh noted that "In fact, it would be better not to send any further response than to send the one proposed." (Memorandum from Welsh to O'Brien, June 11; ibid.) No final response to the Congressman has been found. Respectfully yours,
68. Telegram From the Embassy in Switzerland to the Department of State/1/ Geneva, June 16, 1964, 1 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, TEL 6. Confidential. Passed to Charyk and Ende (FCC). An advance copy was passed to Bushong (L) and the E message center was notified. 2285. Space Communications Talks with Soviets. US group met June 15 with six-man Sov delegation consisting Blagonravov and Milovidov (Academy of Sciences), Badalov and Kalashnikov (Ministry Communications), Stashevsky and Krasulin (Foreign Ministry)./2/ /2/A full transcript of the meetings is in circular airgram 2247, August 26. (Ibid.) Blagonravov said he made head delegation since Academy responsible for communications satellite experiments. Said assumption from outset his talks with Dryden in 1962 was that joint US-USSR efforts would lead to global communications satellite system, but experiments needed on both sides. USSR does not yet have communications satellite but expects to and has had experiments on means of communication in connection its space flights. (When queried later re nature of such experiments, Sovs referred only to television broadcasts from Vostok spacecraft to earth and between spacecraft.) Morning devoted mainly to introduction by Chayes and to technical presentation by Istvan (CSC) of company's work to date and future plans. Sovs questioned justification for planning use of frequencies assigned by EARC on temporary basis. Asked why US emphasized telephone traffic in calculating needed future capacity for satellites, and not giving more weight to television. Same alleged Sov concern emerged in afternoon discussion of US majority control based on telephone traffic with little regard to television. Afternoon meeting devoted mainly to exposition of organizational plans by Johnson (CSC)./3/ Sovs claimed US plan had discriminatory features in violation GA Res 1721 and Communications Satellite Act. Pointed out frequency bands are property of all countries. Objected as discriminatory to right organization would have after six months to set terms for adherence by additional countries, on ground committee could impose onerous terms on countries which may not now have resources to participate. Chayes pointed out this would be contrary both to agreements creating committee and to US law, emphasizing Presidential authority over CSC. /3/John A. Johnson of the Communications Satellite Corporation. Sovs concerned to know whether agreements would be between governments or entities appointed by governments. US closed with frank explanation why inevitable that US, which has pioneered technology, should have main influence over early years of organization. Comment: US presentation candid throughout, supplying details where appropriate or requested by Sovs. No mention yet of discussions with Europeans. Sovs attentive but somewhat reserved, asking few questions. Next meeting Tuesday pm. Tubby
69. Editorial Note In late June and early July 1964, the discussions of the COMSAT-Department of Defense joint satellite project continued. In a long memorandum for the President, General James O'Connell, the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications, laid out the issue: "Top echelons of DOD and COMSAT both want this agreement for financial and other reasons." He explained: "If we seek to look at this mixed system from the viewpoint of world opinion, the COMSAT Act of 1962 proposed to the world a global system for peaceful use. No matter how much we wish to disguise the fact, it is clear that the U.S. military will have the use of half the system and is attempting to provide financial and other inducements to bring about a COMSAT and consortium decision to adopt the type of system the Defense Department desires. Such a setup can have the tendency to drive out other countries and reduce the possibility that there will be a truly global system. In any case, our position as advocating and promoting a peaceful global system appears hypocritical. Another view which foreign nations may take with some logic is that our Defense Department exercises such decisive influence on our national objectives as to have changed the originally stated purposes of our global COMSAT network." O'Connell concluded that the United States could have a more flexible communications system if the Department of Defense network was separate, and he cautioned: "We are taking a step right now which has very large implications with regard to the future of communication satellites in the world. Irrevocable decisions can be made now which, while having relatively little impact in the short run, may have long-range impact on our world position." He argued: "The change in worldwide public image of our COMSAT system is an important consideration. A global commercial system dedicated to increasing world understanding, and for the equal opportunity of use by all nations, is the image we have sought to create. It does not seem credible that all nations could think that equal opportunity is practical when the U.S. military has nearly half the potential of each satellite." Summing up, he noted that "the proposed agreement, because of a preponderance of negative long-range potential consequences, presents hazards which are virtually impossible adequately to evaluate and is therefore not the best choice for the United States Government." (Undated, but probably June 1964; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications System, COMSAT, etc.) Vol. 1 [1 of 2]) The President's Science Adviser, Donald Hornig, also examined the issue. In a draft memorandum for the President on July 2, he commented: "It is clear that our international relations would be better if our military communications system were separated from the international system. If we were to back off from the concept of an international system at this stage, if that is indeed possible, our position on peaceful uses of space would at least be greatly weakened in the eyes of the world." (Ibid.) A later version of the Memorandum of Understanding, dated June 12, with Department of Defense revisions is in a memorandum from Fubini (DOD) to McGeorge Bundy, July 17; ibid. [Continue with the next documents]
|
