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40. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, March 23, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, S/PC Files: Lot 72 D 124, Scientific and Technological Development 1966. Confidential. Drafted by James E. Goodby (S/P) on March 25. SUBJECT I attended a debriefing today/2/ given by Herman Pollack on discussions which took place at this week's meeting at the Space Council. According to Mr. Pollack the Space Council had a very lively discussion of whether the U.S. was making the best use of its space program in the international field./3/ The implication of the various remarks made at the meeting seemed to be that the U.S. had been playing a fairly passive role in space cooperation and ought to do much more. Mr. Pollack is seeing Ed Welsh of the Space Council staff this afternoon about setting up an interdepartmental working group which will conduct a fundamental review of international space cooperation. Mr. Pollack will suggest that the question of export of space technology be handled by one group while all other aspects of space cooperation be handled by a second group. Mr. Pollack apparently thinks that G/PM might handle the export of space technology while SCI would take the leadership on all other aspects. /2/March 23. /3/Discussions at the meeting also linked the space program to nuclear weapons, according to an account Webb wrote to McNamara on April 23: "In connection with our brief conversation, at the March 23 meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, about the problems of stimulating foreign involvement in space technology as a means of diverting energies from the development of nuclear weapon systems, I suggest that we both take steps to indicate to our staffs the importance of this objective." (Letter from Webb to McNamara, April 23; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Files of the Office of International Affairs) Webb raised the same issue with U. Alexis Johnson in an April 26 letter: "The rapid advance of vehicle technology in Europe may be outdating some of our controls and concerns and may warrant our focusing on a very few critical items still left to us, such as advanced guidance and reentry systems. Indeed, the basic reason for restricting vehicle technology at all is its supporting role in nuclear weapons delivery. If we could focus our controls upon the weapons themselves, we might even hope to free vehicle technology for maximum stimulus of space activity abroad." (Letter from Webb to Johnson, April 26; ibid.) The State Department had evidently gone to this session of the Space Council prepared to take the initiative in suggesting a basic review of space cooperation but was pre-empted to some extent by Vice President Humphrey. The Vice President expressed concern that European industry gets the benefits of technological spin-offs from the U.S. space program at a bargain basement price, not having to pick up the tab for basic research which is done in the United States. Mr. Webb pointed out that technology is sold to Europeans by U.S. industry on the basis of cash on the barrel head. Secretary McNamara charged into this subject in a major way with sharp criticism of present restraints on the export of technological information. He maintained that we should restrict export of information only to a narrow range of subjects having to do with capabilities to acquire a nuclear delivery capability./4/ Moreover, the Government should not let business determine the nature of cooperation with European industry. Government cooperation would be preferable in some instances and, in particular, there should be a pro rata charge of the R&D element of technological information, a cost often borne by the U.S. Government. Secretary McNamara also suggested that rather than ask each country what its interest was in the space field we should look at each country's technological capacity and then push them to use this capacity to the limit in the space field. In response to a question from the Vice President as to whether this was "positive disarmament" Secretary McNamara replied that it was since at the present time many countries felt they should make technological progress through military hardware programs. A divergence to a space program would be wholesome for all concerned. /4/In an April 29 letter to U. Alexis Johnson, John S. Foster, Jr. of the Department of Defense cautioned, "Although DOD is alert and receptive to new opportunities in the military space programs, our cooperative efforts must necessarily be highly selective." He detailed joint ventures with the United Kingdom and Canada and said that Australia soon might also be a partner, but stated: "We should pay particular attention to the need for avoiding the export to the French of booster technology....France's role in the international space organizations, ELDO and ESRO represent special problems." McNamara wrote to Webb on May 14: "As you know, I strongly support international cooperative ventures in space. I have directed my staff to be as liberal as possible regarding the release of space technology for payloads and other support items." (Ibid.) It was also mentioned by Mr. Pollack that Leonard Marks will come up with a proposal for exploitation of space technology. This proposal will obviously have a close relationship to the working groups which Mr. Pollack anticipates will be established.
41. Memorandum for the Files/1/ Washington, March 29, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Milner (SCI) on April 5. SUBJECT STATE SPACE COUNCIL Dr. Welsh opened the meeting by stating that he had dispatched a letter to each member of the Space Council (copy attached),/2/ which indicated the necessary follow-up action resulting from the last Space Council meeting. /2/Dated March 29; not printed. Mr. Pollack then stated that he had delved into the export of technology question and determined that it has a long history; that considerable work had been accomplished by an interagency working group under NSAMs 294 and 338;/3/ that ACDA had done considerable thinking in this area and were now pushing the position for "positive disarmament." /3/NSAM No. 294, "US Nuclear and Strategic Delivery Systems to France," and NSAM No. 338, "Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in Development of Foreign Communications Satellite Capabilities." (Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316) Mr. Pollack queried into the background of why the Vice President raised the export of technology question at the Space Council. Dr. Welsh pointed out that in meetings with the Space Council staff the export of technology had been discussed and that this probably grew out of earlier interagency working group meetings in which the export of technology had been added as a possible item for discussion by the Space Council. He also pointed out at the Space Council meeting on March 3, 1966 the Vice President had announced that the next Space Council meeting would be on the subject of International Cooperation. This subject was the Vice President's idea and it resulted from his travels and thinking. However, the Vice President wanted to talk about specific items and the advanced working group meeting had been held for the purpose of delineating the specific items which would be worthy of discussion by the Space Council. The Vice President stated he would like to see a greater participation by Europe in space activities particularly in cooperation with the US and that the great scientific potential of Europe, Germany for instance, tapped to help solve the space problems. Dr. Welsh emphasized that the export of technology is only one of many items which had entered into the overall international cooperation picture. He acknowledged it was the most talked about item at the Space Council meeting but implied that this was only because the participants who did the most talking were particularly interested in this aspect of international cooperation. Dr. Welsh pointed out that considerable importance was attached to international cooperation in space as evidenced by the fact that international cooperation was the only subject on which the Space Council had had two meetings. This emphasis was due to the fact that it was considered by the Space Council staff to be a subject of great importance. Dr. Welsh pointed out that in the letter he sent to the Space Council principals the Vice President had requested each member of the Space Council to prepare a paper on ways international cooperation in space could be improved and to pass these to U. Alexis Johnson. The principal purpose of this exercise was to bring in ideas. It was not the desire of the Vice President at this time to tell the agencies how to improve international cooperation in space but to seek ideas from the agencies. Some of the example suggestions were: positive disarmament, selling abroad, and improved public relations of our space program. At a future Space Council meeting Mr. Johnson should probably present a consolidation of these ideas pointing out existing authority or additional authority that was needed to accomplish the program, existing funds available or funds that would be required to carry out the program. Dr. Welsh further pointed out that the "Marks" Study is not a separate entity but a part of the overall program. Mr. Pollack then raised the question about communication satellites and how this fits into the overall picture. He pointed out this was a very large subject in itself and would require extensive study from the point of view of educational satellites, TV satellites, distribution satellites and direct broadcasting satellites and ground stations. It was pointed out that considerable study is already underway by various agencies of the Government as well as by the ComSat Corporation in these areas./4/ /4/See Documents 63 ff. Dr. Welsh concluded by stating that proposals for more effectiveness in international cooperation in space should not be inhibited by any current policy directives or studies, that we should come up with a number of items that could improve international cooperation in space,/5/ that he hoped one of these items would be the export of space technology. /5/On March 30 Nesbitt (SCI) transmitted such items in a memorandum to Pollack. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, SP 1-1)
42. Editorial Note In March 1966 Donald Hornig, the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, asked Vice President Humphrey if he could attend Space Council meetings, a request his predecessor, Jerome Wiesner, had also made. Hornig wrote in his March 29 letter to Humphrey: "I was sorry not to have been invited to the most recent meeting, since it concerned questions in which I have been deeply interested for the President." He noted that he particularly wanted to discuss international and trade policies with the Vice President, so that his "efforts and thinking could be closely tied into it." (Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, Outer Space General Files, 1964-Apr 1967) The initial draft response, prepared by Vice President Humphrey's staff, was unreceptive to Hornig's request, because membership in the Council had been limited by Congress. (Draft memorandum from Humphrey to Hornig, April 6; ibid.) Humphrey rejected the draft, and the final response, dated April 6, read: "As you know, membership of the Council is prescribed by statute. I do believe, however, that we can and should have considerable flexibility in inviting responsible officials on the basis of subject matter to be covered and the specific interest of the members in the views of those invited." (Ibid.) On April 22 Welsh informed Humphrey that he had issued the invitation to Hornig as directed, but had taken precautions in case the Science Adviser tried to send a staff member instead, noting the fact that Hornig's likely choice "is quite unpopular with Webb and Seaborg." (Memorandum from Welsh to Humphrey, April 22; ibid.) It is unclear to whom Welsh was referring.
43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/ Washington, April 20, 1966, 5:17 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential. Drafted by Percival (EUR/RPE), Milner (SCI), and George (G/PM) and cleared by Jerome H. Kahan (ACDA), Murray (DOD) (informed), Hausman (NASA) (informed), and Howard Meyers (G/PM) in draft. Also sent to Brussels, Canberra, London, Paris, Rome, and The Hague; and repeated to Geneva. 1919. 1. Department concerned about speculation that future of ELDO is uncertain. We see advantages in multilateral framework for launcher development. In such framework rocket programs tend to be more open, serve peaceful uses, are subject to international control and absorb manpower and financial resources that might otherwise be diverted to purely national programs. National rocket programs on other hand tend to concentrate on militarily significant solid or storable liquid fuel systems, are less open, and less responsive to international controls. Any breakup of ELDO might lead to some national programs tending in latter direction. 2. In order to assist us in review current ELDO situation, request your evaluation of ELDO's future viability and interest host governments in continuing ELDO programs. Department particularly interested in UK intentions, French interest in continuing ELDO, and your assessment of significance ELDO Council meeting later this month./2/ /2/According to telegram 4981 from London, April 22, the United Kingdom, which was funding the largest share of the ELDO bill, was unenthusiastic about the organization in light of its fiscal difficulties. (Ibid.) Telegram 893 from The Hague, April 22, indicated that the Netherlands strongly supported the ELDO and was seriously concerned about its future, but that confidential Netherlands sources had indicated that the "French military would be happy with ELDO breakup so that French ELDO contribution could be channeled into national programs, mainly military." (Ibid.) The Embassy in Bonn reported that the Federal Republic of Germany also wanted to preserve ELDO as a vehicle for advancement and cooperation: "The FRG would strongly support U.S. cooperation of any kind with ELDO. ELDO would be materially strengthened in FRG eyes by firm U.S. endorsement through an offer to cooperate." (Telegram 3458 from Bonn, April 26; ibid.) 3. We have been giving preliminary thought to possibility of U.S. cooperation with ELDO which would involve supplying non-storable liquid-fueled rocket technology. This might be attractive to ELDO and we believe cooperative offer could be designed and implemented in such manner as not conflict with current U.S. non-proliferation objectives and guidelines. In fact, as indicated above, such cooperation might assist in non-proliferation effort by channeling resources down non-storable liquid-fueled road rather than solid fuel or storable liquid roads, which are much more significant in military terms. 4. In addition to comment on points mentioned para 2 request addressees evaluation of likely reception such offer of U.S. cooperation and likely effect in terms strengthening ELDO. Ball
44. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb)/1/ Washington, May 12, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, ORG 7 NASA. Confidential. Drafted by Nesbitt (SCI) and cleared by Johnson (G), Schaetzel (EUR), and Percival (EUR/RPE). Dear Jim: I have given considerable thought to the proper timing for a visit by you to Europe to discuss larger space cooperation./2/ There are a number of problems, either directly related to a visit by you or having a bearing thereon, that are currently with us in our relations with Western Europe./3/ Among these are the lack of clarity as to the ESRO response to the President's space offer, the ELDO crisis and the situation regarding NATO. /2/According to a memorandum for the Secretary, Webb wrote to Rusk on April 8 asking for advice on a proposed visit. (Ibid., SP 1-1 EUR-US) NASA files include such a letter, but it is hand-dated April 6, 1966. In it, Webb asked for advice on the timing of his visit, acknowledging Rusk's concerns: "Several times you have expressed some concern that we not oversell a larger space cooperation program for Europe but rather be prepared to cooperate with the Europeans as they determine their own interests." (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Files of the Office of International Affairs) /3/"The present situation is not auspicious for an early Webb visit," Pollack (SCI) wrote to Rusk in an April 25 memorandum. "Governments potentially interested in the project are currently preoccupied with the NATO crisis." (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383, SP 1-1) Webb finally visited London and Bonn in September 1966. (Memorandum from Pollack to Rusk, September 27; ibid.) Under the circumstances, I feel that it would be a mistake to risk the President's or your prestige in the face of European indifference or reluctance. Therefore, I do not think it propitious for you to plan a visit, even if on an informal basis, to Europe at this time. The picture may clear up by the end of June, and we can perhaps settle then on the best time for you to visit Europe./4/ /4/Webb agreed with Rusk's assessment and noted that German Science Minister Stoltenberg also concurred. (Letter from Webb to Rusk, May 24; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Files of the Office of International Affairs) With warm regards, /5/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
45. Action Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, May 16, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. Limited Official Use. Cleared by J. Robert Schaetzel (EUR). A copy was sent to Ball. A May 16 cover memorandum attached to the source text reads: "Amb. Johnson believes you should be aware of the attached for your meeting with George Thomson but does not believe you should take the initiative in raising it. E.J.S." SUBJECT Discussion This morning Mr. Richard Faber of the United Kingdom Embassy, acting on instructions of the Ambassador who had just received a letter from the Foreign Office, suggested it would be useful if you could mention to Mr. George Thomson that the United States is hopeful that the United Kingdom will not withdraw from ELDO. Background ELDO, created in 1960 largely at the initiative of the United Kingdom which supplies 38 percent of the ELDO budget, is now facing a major crisis due to the threat of United Kingdom withdrawal (composition and functions of ELDO attached)./2/ This threat is motivated largely by budgetary concerns and doubts as to the cost effectiveness of the British investment in ELDO. /2/Not printed. Member assessments were: U.K.--38.79 percent; France--23.93 percent; Germany--22.01 percent; Italy--9.78 percent; Belgium--2.85 percent; and the Netherlands--2.64 percent. Australia contributed the use of the Woomera Range. The British Foreign Office has staunchly supported continued participation in ELDO because of its implications to British relationships with the Continent and the Common Market, and because of adverse impact on European multilateral developments that would follow a breakup of ELDO. Comparable considerations ran through the minds of various officials of the Department and NASA. Additionally, we preferred multilateral to national programs of launcher development, we were concerned about possible Soviet moves to fill the vacuum that would be created by ELDO's dissolution, and we related Europe's technological development to its participation in major space activities. Our general concerns about the consequences of ELDO's dissolution were conveyed to the British prior to the ELDO meeting on April 28. Partially as a consequence the British Cabinet decided against immediate withdrawal and the ELDO meeting resulted in a six-week "reprieve". The crucial ELDO meeting will now be held on June 9. The British Cabinet will be meeting on May 26, according to Mr. Faber, to settle the British position to be taken at that ELDO meeting./3/ /3/Telegram 7206 from Paris, April 28, reads: "the only new pro-ELDO argument having any impression on [British] Prime Minister was suggestion of possible U.S. interest in cooperation with ELDO." According to sources, the argument had enough impact to reverse a previous U.K. decision to "make a clean out." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, SP 11 ELDO) Although State and NASA are in general agreement that ELDO ought not to fail there is as yet no agreed interdepartmental position on this matter. Deputy Under Secretary Johnson has convened an interdepartmental meeting for this coming Thursday, May 19, which I will chair, to develop a government-wide position. Although there are involved problems of communication satellite policy and export of booster technology, I am reasonably confident that we shall end up encouraging the continuation of ELDO and expressing a willingness to provide ELDO with meaningful support, if this should prove necessary. Recommendation That you seek an opportunity to express to Mr. Thomson your concern about the possible United Kingdom withdrawal from ELDO and inform him that we are currently studying ways in which we might be helpful to ELDO's future program.
46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, May 24, 1966, 8:29 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Pollack and cleared by Morris (OTM), Robert L. Bruce (S/S), Barber, Frutkin (NASA), Frank E. Loy (E/TT), Sidney N. Graybeal (ACDA), and Spurgeon Keeny (White House). Cleared by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, Paris, Rome, and The Hague. 7034. Ref: Deptel 6208, April 20 repeated Bonn 2771, Brussels 1285, Canberra 875, Paris 5349, Rome 2205, The Hague 705. Deptel 6902 to London./2/ /2/Telegram 6208 is dated April 20. (Ibid.) Telegram 6902 was not found. Interdepartmental working group of committee established pursuant to Space Council decision to review possibilities of expanded international cooperation in space held initial meeting on May 19 on subject of cooperation in launcher technology./3/ Discussion centered on cooperation with ELDO. It was agreed that continuation of ELDO is desirable from U.S. point of view and that a U.S. position would be prepared providing for cooperation with ELDO in the event ELDO members desire such cooperation. U.S. cooperation would be subject to government to government agreement that ELDO members would honor their Intelsat commitments, i.e., adherence to a single global commercial satellite system, and that launcher technology would not be used for advancement of national missile launching capability or be provided to non-ELDO nations. NASA currently developing for Government review list of items of cooperation U.S. would be willing to undertake in assisting ELDO projects. /3/Details of the meeting are in the summary minutes, May 19. (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383, SP 1 NASC) Department is seeking to establish fully cleared government position on urgent basis. In its discretion Embassy may advise Foreign Office and other appropriate officials of evolving consensus within U.S. Government but with cautionary note that fully cleared U.S. Government position not yet established. Rusk
47. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in Belgium/1/ Washington, June 4, 1966, 2:17 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential. Drafted by Pollack on June 4, cleared by Percival (EUR/RPE) in substance and Alexander L. Rattray (S/S), and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Secretary Rusk was in Brussels for a meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, June 6-8. During this session, the Ministers agreed to move NATO headquarters to Belgium. Tosec 68. FYI. British Embassy informed Department June 3 that British Government will announce at June 9 meeting of ELDO its decision to withdraw from participation in ELDO once its current commitments have been met./2/ This action based on British budgetary considerations and concern with poor cost effectiveness of launch vehicle ELDO producing. Since U.K. provides 38 percent of ELDO financing its withdrawal makes continuation of European multilateral space launching program most unlikely. Other members ELDO are France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Australia. /2/Details of the British decision are in a June 3 memorandum of conversation between Pollack (SCI) and Faber of the U.K. Embassy. (Ibid.) Department and other interested agencies had been concerned about this prospect because of implications of collapse of European multilateral organization at this time, our preference for multilateral launcher development programs in contrast to national programs, connection between space technology and European efforts to meet technological gap and potential for advantage to Soviets in collapse of ELDO. We also have in mind implications to British relationships to Continent in Common Market. These views conveyed to British Embassy here and to Sir Solly Zuckerman during visit to Washington early May. On May 16 British Embassy suggested it would be useful if highest levels Department could mention to George Thomson U.S. hopes that U.K. would not withdraw from ELDO. Both Alex Johnson and Under Secretary did so. Interested U.S. agencies have been in process of developing U.S. position providing for U.S. cooperation with ELDO in event that proved relevant to ELDO's continuation (see Deptel 1285 to Brussels)./3/ /3/Not found. Other European members will be much aggrieved at British decision and reaction may be strong./4/ Since all ELDO members now aware of British decision, it is possible that this subject may be raised with you in Brussels. /4/In a June 14 memorandum to Frutkin, Ousley described the members' reactions: "Stoltenberg can be credited (in Aubiniere's mind) with providing the European arguments and support for the continuation of ELDO. During the ELDO Ministers' conference, he effectively led the constructive discussions. Peyrefitte only summarized the other countries' positions, never stating that of France. The Dutch were the most violent against the UK, with Italy weakly calling for the continuation of ELDO based primarily on European cooperation principles." (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Files of the Office of International Affairs) Ball
48. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/ Washington, June 10, 1966, 6:31 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Michael F. Smith (SCI) and cleared in substance by Frutkin and Percival; approved by Nesbitt (SCI). Also sent to Bonn, London, Rome, The Hague, and Brussels. 6606. Subject: ELDO Crisis. Ref: NATUS 8588,/2/ Info Bonn 1423, London 1697, Rome 1155, The Hague 874, Brussels 959. /2/Not found. 1. Huigens/Von Merkatz report on ELDO crisis,/3/ charging that US offer to cooperate with Europe in advanced space projects is aimed at insuring US monopoly in com sat field and obliging Europeans choose between major project and ELDO, has great mischief-making potential if left unchallenged. /3/Not found. 2. Posts should draw on following guidance in discussing matter with appropriate officials: (a) Contrary to conclusion of Von Merkatz report, US has demonstrated consistent pattern of helpfulness toward ELDO, which is recognized as primary instrument for achievement of European launcher capability. (b) Original establishment of ELDO depended on US permission for UK to share Blue Streak technology with other ELDO members. (c) When ELDO turned to US for fuel to permit development of ELDO stages, US promptly licensed export of storable liquid fuel (UDMH) and has continued to do so. (d) When ELDO requested advanced Hydrogen-Oxygen technology for future systems, US licensed North American Aviation to furnish such assistance. (e) Other accommodations have included technology for separation devices for ELDO stages and access to US ground facilities. (f) Contrary to rumor reported by Huigens, US was seriously concerned about threatened UK withdrawal from ELDO./4/ US has favored and continues favor multilateral framework for launcher development. Supports continuation ELDO, including UK, as in US interest and has indicated to European governments willingness to consider sympathetically request for help./5/ /4/See Document 47. /5/In a June 25 memorandum to Shapley, Frutkin noted: "A positive US attitude toward ELDO was expressed through State Department and NASA channels and a task group has been agreed on a program for such assistance (developed by NASA). Mr. Rusk, during the NATO negotiations in early June, explicitly conveyed this positive posture toward ELDO to several of the NATO foreign ministers, including Michael Stewart [of the UK] and Fanfani [Italy]." (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Files of the Office of International Affairs) (g) As explained by Advance Team in February,/6/ President's space offer was open-ended and invited European initiative to propose major space project of advanced scientific and technological nature of interest to Europe. Interplanetary exploration was cited merely as illustrative of magnitude of projects which US had in mind. Cooperation in projects of direct economic benefit, while not stressed, was not excluded from consideration. Nature of response left entirely to Europe, and US still awaits European response. /6/See Document 39. (h) Similarly, US booster offer was open-ended and went far beyond anything currently planned in Europe. US also made clear its willingness discuss European assumption of responsibility, most likely through ELDO, for developing high energy kick stage for deep space use if project selected requires it (Depcirtel 1849)./7/ /7/Dated March 25. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, SP 1-1 EUR-US) 3. In connection with threatened UK withdrawal from ELDO, we note Peyrefitte-Stoltenberg meeting (Bonn's 4049)/8/ in which Ministers "announced their intention to seek solutions in concert with other member nations to permit cooperative European rocket development to proceed." While decision obviously European matter, US would continue to regard favorably effective European functional approach to launcher development. This would be in keeping with our overall European policy. /8/Not found. Action Requested: Addressee posts should convey sense of US concern at tone of report to influential host country officials. We would hope that next week's proceedings might reflect recognition of points in paragraph 2 above and contribute to more constructive atmosphere on this subject. Ball
49. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, June 14, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. This paper was prepared for a meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council on June 15 to discuss post-Apollo planning and specifically to answer a question of the Vice President: "Do you see any special advantages in selecting any particular goals in advancing this country's prestige or bargaining position abroad?" (Memorandum from Pollack to Rusk, June 15; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, SP 10) In the June 13 covering memorandum to the Secretary that accompanied this memorandum, Pollack stated the Department's goals: "Because of the hard facts of international relations in a space conscious world, post-Apollo programs have significant political importance and must therefore be constructed with that in mind. In order to establish and clarify the record it is suggested that you table a paper at the meeting ... which would voice the Department's interest in post-Apollo programs." (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383) According to reports of the meeting, "The Secretary stated that his main interest was in near earth activities in space rather than expensive activities for interplanetary performance. He stressed communications and navigation satellites, space sciences, improvement in defense use of space; he did very nicely." (Memorandum from Nesbitt to Pollack, June 15; ibid.) DEPARTMENT OF STATE VIEWS ON THE POST-APOLLO PROGRAM United States scientific and technological achievements have become prominent indices of our international power and standing. Such achievements, and especially those in the field of space, are important components in the definition of our international stature. The United States should not be diffident about using its scientific and technological prowess in support of its international objectives. Yet we must recognize that international advantage flows more readily and constantly from sound and solid scientific endeavors than from enterprises designed primarily for political purposes. In the development of a post-Apollo program, the first and overriding objective must be goals that are sound, scientifically valid and consistent with fiscal realities. At the same time it must be appreciated that the size, scope, content and effectiveness of the program will inevitably have a significant bearing on international events and the way we are regarded by the rest of the world. In short, the effect of the U.S. Space Program on our international posture is substantial and cannot be overlooked. Design of programs should be calculated to fulfill the scientific and technological potential of outer space, but on a scale and in a manner that will exploit all reasonable opportunities which may enhance our world position in the future. Soviet skill in exploiting space achievements to their advantage in the areas of national prestige and international politics must be recognized and countered. We must expect that space spectaculars will continue to be the order of the day to the extreme limit of Soviet capability. And they will not stop at the moon. During the first ten years of the Space Age we have regularly found ourselves in the apparent position of following the Soviet lead in space exploration, of responding to, rather than issuing, challenges. We have, and should continue to have, a superior program characterized by openness and a willingness to share knowledge freely. We should guard against a gap in planning and development that will vitiate our advantages and leave us in a posture of response rather than of leadership. In view of all these points it does not seem too early to seek answers to several questions regarding what comes next. 1. When will the post-Apollo program provide for exploration of near-by planets? Manned? Unmanned? 2. How adequate are the resources allocated to research for advanced, post-Apollo, space vehicle propulsion systems? Are power sources for spacecraft receiving sufficient support? 3. What is the nature of the follow-on lunar program? What are the plans for a lunar research station? When will we be ready for internationally manned lunar stations? 4. Does the program include development of technology for broadcast satellites direct to community antennae? To homes? 5. What does the program provide for the development of remote sensing technology for agricultural, geological, oceanographic, and other scientific and commercial purposes? 6. When will the program provide for a Manned Orbiting Research Laboratory? What degree of international cooperation is foreseen in utilizing such facilities? [Continue with the next documents]
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