450. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 7, 1967.
/1/Source: Department of State, NEA/ARP
Files: Lot 69 D 350, POL YEMEN-US, YEMEN 1967. Confidential.
Drafted by Brewer.
SUBJECT
US-YARG Break in Relations
PARTICIPANTS
His Excellency Abdulaziz al-Futaih, Ambassador of Yemen
Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs
Mr. William D. Brewer, Country Director, Arabian Peninsula States
Ambassador Battle said that he had asked Ambassador Futaih to
call. He deeply regretted the purpose of this meeting. We had,
however, been informed by our Charge in Sanaa of the YARG's
decision to break relations with the US./2/
This was a source of particular regret to us due to the baseless
nature of the charges on which the YARG action was founded.
Ambassador Battle noted that Ambassador Goldberg on June 6 had
publicly invited the United Nations to send investigators to the
Sixth Fleet to satisfy themselves that the charges that US
aircraft had been involved in support of Israeli military
operations were groundless. With a very minimum of effort,
Ambassador Battle thought that the accuracy of these allegations
could have been correctly established.
/2/Telegram 208565 to Sanaa, June 6,
instructed the Embassy to take immediate steps to evacuate
all personnel and to close both Sanaa and
Taiz, and stated that the U.S. Government was asking the Italian
Government to represent U.S. interests in Yemen. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967-69, POL 17 US-UAR) Telegram 210053 to Asmara, June 10,
informed former Charge d'Affaires Lee F. Dinsmore that the
Italian Government had formally agreed to serve as the protecting
power for U.S. interests in Yemen. (Ibid., POL 17 US-YEMEN)
Telegram 210598 to Rome, June 13, instructed the Embassy to
inform the Italian Foreign Ministry that the Somali Embassy in
Washington had informed the Department that the Government of
Yemen had asked Somalia to act as the protecting power for Yemeni
interests in the United States. (Ibid., POL 17 YEMEN-US)
Ambassador Battle told Ambassador Futaih that we must now
reciprocate the YARG action. Accordingly, we must request that
all YARG diplomats accredited to the US be withdrawn from this
country within 48 hours. Ambassador Battle assumed Ambassador
Futaih, as his Government's accredited representative to the
United Nations, would go to live in New York. Other members of
the Embassy staff had until 3:00 PM on June 9 to leave the
country, slightly more time than was being given to our
representatives in the Yemen.
Ambassador Battle continued that he was deeply disturbed by
reports just received that our installations in Taiz were on
fire. He very much hoped that the break in relations would be
dignified and that full protection would be accorded our
diplomats in Yemen as it would be to Ambassador Futaih and his
staff here.
Ambassador Futaih said that he had received no word from his
Government. There was nothing that he personally could do. He
felt that the political and social system in the US made it easy
for one group to manipulate public opinion. US policy then had to
reflect this public opinion. He thought this had brought great
trouble on the US and expressed hope that those responsible in
this country would think increasingly of Near Eastern problems in
their basic human terms.
Ambassador Battle said that we had recognized the YARG early
on. We had extended considerable aid to the Yemen. The USG had
extended much more aid to the Arab countries than to Israel,
including over one billion dollars in assistance to the UAR
alone. Ambassador Futaih commented that the USG had been held in
much higher regard by the Arabs years ago, even before major aid
programs had been instituted. Both Ambassadors expressed personal
regret that their association had been so short.
451. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Saudi Arabia/1/
Washington, June 28, 1967, 5:32 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN.
Secret; Limdis; Noforn. Drafted by Brewer on June 27; cleared by
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow,
Davies, Bergus, Battle, and Deputy Director of the INR Office of
Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia Herbert J.
Liebesny; and approved by Katzenbach.
219929. Jidda 5498,/2/ 5520,/3/ 5538./4/
/2/In telegram 5498 from Jidda, June 22,
Eilts reported that Rashad Pharaon informed him that during the
recent crisis several Arab states had urged Faisal to settle the
Yemen problem. The Saudi response had been consistent; the King
had indicated that if UAR troops were withdrawn from Yemen, Saudi
aid to the royalists would also cease. The Saudis would expect a
period of civil war, following which the Yemenis would decide
their own government. In the absence of UAR troops in Yemen,
Saudi Arabia would accept any government the Yemenis themselves
chose. (Ibid.)
/3/Dated June 24. (Ibid.)
/4/Dated June 25. (Ibid.)
1. Recent UAR military defeat in Sinai and accompanying area
developments, including further Egyptian troop withdrawals from
YAR, obviously have implications for Yemen problem. Jidda 5538
suggests these not lost on Royalists and their backers, who may
well believe now is the time resume major fighting with maximum
chance success in ejecting remainder Egyptian troops and causing
downfall Sallal regime.
2. Royalist capabilities remain something of an enigma. They
appear recently have scored some success in local fighting around
Hajja, but whether they can interdict UAR communications and
capture Sanaa would appear highly uncertain. Though reduced in
numbers UAR Air Force in Yemen is still unchallenged. Ruthless
gas bombings seem to have cowed populace in some areas, and such
tribal leaders as al-Ahmar and Ruwayshan seem for moment to have
swung toward YARG.
3. Particularly view radical successes South Arabia, UAR may
well consider it should remain in Yemen at all costs in order (a)
avoid additional loss of face which withdrawal now would mean;
and (b) facilitate FLOSY's takeover in Aden. If UAR is so
disposed, and we not in position to tell, new Royalist military
effort could well backfire, prompting return more troops and
increasing Egyptian military and subversive pressure on SAG.
4. Whether indigenous effort can force Egyptians out remains
uncertain, but circumstances have now altered due Israeli
triumph. Moreover, we have less to lose vis-a-vis UAR than
formerly, should Yemen war intensify in coming months with active
Saudi support.
5. Our reiterated counsels restraint on SAG in past were
prompted by concern that UAR countermeasures, including
occupation Saudi territory, would directly involve USG in view
our commitments to Saudi regime. Now, however, even though UAR
may still be able maintain itself in Yemen, Egyptian capability
for offensive military action against Saudi Arabia would seem to
be reduced. It would of course be error for us counsel SAG to
"unleash" Royalists, since such palpable encouragement
would increase our vulnerability to Saudi appeals were renewed
fighting to backfire on Saudis. However, circumstances do suggest
we might now be somewhat less emphatic and repetitive in
recording our well-known reservations re increased Saudi support
for Royalists. This would not substantively change our position
but would be tactical modification.
6. Unless you perceive objection, you should be guided by
foregoing in your future discussions Yemen problem with senior
SAG officials. Suggest you point out, per State 214082,/5/ that we continue believe any action
which might prompt brutal UAR military response against Saudi
Arabia might be ill advised. However, in absence normal means
accurately assessing situation in either Yemen or Egypt, we no
longer in position give Saudis as much meaningful counsel on this
subject as formerly. In any case, decision re Royalist action
obviously one entirely for SAG to take in light all
circumstances./6/
/5/Dated June 21. (Ibid., POL 15-1 SAUD)
/6/In telegram 5616 from Jidda, June 30,
Eilts reported that he had mentioned to Prince Sultan that Yemen
seemed to be quiet for the moment, to which Sultan had replied
that things were not as peaceful there as it might seem and that
he expected the center of attention would soon shift back to
Yemen. Sultan also said that the Saudis were maintaining very
strong restraints on the Yemeni royalists in spite of their
eagerness to resume action. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)
Rusk
452. Editorial Note
On July 14, 1967, the 303 Committee, the interdepartmental
committee which reviewed and authorized covert operations,
discussed a [text not declassified] proposal for covert
support on a trial basis of paramilitary operations by dissident
groups in Yemen with the purpose of increasing Nasser's
difficulties in Yemen and South Arabia. Deputy Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs Foy D. Kohler, representing the
Department of State, stated that in view of the tenseness and
uncertainty throughout the Middle East, he wanted to discuss the
matter with Secretary Rusk. At a meeting with the President on
July 18, Rusk stated his opposition to the proposal. Secretary of
Defense McNamara expressed his agreement, and the President said
it was agreed that nothing would be done. At an August 7 meeting
of the 303 Committee, chairman Walt Rostow reported that the
Yemen proposal had arisen at a "Tuesday lunch" with
"higher authority," and that the Secretary of State was
opposed. The 303 Committee did not approve the proposal. (Minutes
of 303 Committee meetings, July 14 and August 7, 1967; National
Security Council Intelligence Files, 303 Committee Files,
Minutes--1967, and ibid., Yemen; memorandum from Helms to Rostow,
July 15, 1967; ibid.; notes of meeting, July 18, 1967; Johnson
Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings)
453. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission
to the European Office of the United Nations/1/
Washington, July 22, 1967, 12:37 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-10 YEMEN.
Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Frank A. Sieverts (U) on July 21,
cleared by Brewer and Senior Intelligence Officer Susan T. Tait
(INR/RNA), and approved by Eugene Rostow.
11599. Ref: Geneva 145./2/
/2/Telegram 145 from Geneva, July 12,
reported that the ICRC was becoming increasingly concerned over
unconfirmed reports that UAR planes had again carried out poison
gas attacks on scattered villages in the royalist areas of Yemen.
(Ibid.)
1) ICRC concern over UAR gas use in Yemen fully justified by
information available to us, including press reports. Gas attacks
continued for two weeks after ICRC Delegation visit to Gahar (May
16), then stopped in June, during and after Sinai crisis. Attacks
resumed July 2-3, with dozens of gas bombs dropped on several
villages, including al Darb in area of Khaulan, with many victims
killed or gravely affected by gas. Further attack occurred July
15 at Hajjah, with 150 reported dead.
2) As ICRC knows, we fully share their concern about this
subject. Committee's public statement on gas use in Yemen, and
delegation report sent to four parties, were significant actions
in calling attention to subject, though these actions have not
received the wide publicity they merit, due in part to fact that
Middle East news coverage in past two months has been occupied by
Sinai crisis. UAR may have been encouraged to resume gas attacks
in July because of relative lack of public outcry.
3) We sympathize with ICRC request re gas masks, medicaments
and related equipment. We see practical difficulties in mass
distribution such materials, and wonder if this is what Committee
has in mind. Effective use of masks, medicines, and equipment
requires training or supervision of type not easy to arrange in
conditions of this area. Many Yemeni illiterate and would require
oral instructions in use of masks. Yemeni known to fear
injections and would be hard to train to make proper use of
medical kits.
4) Mass distribution might have significant propaganda effect
and thus deter UAR from further attacks. If this is Committee's
intention, limited or general appeal to societies or governments
for masks, medicaments and equipment would seem more appropriate
than private request to us. It goes without saying USG would be
prepared respond positively.
5) As alternative to mass distribution, Committee might
consider establishing small stock of needed items, to be stored
with its own medical supplies, for its own use and for
distribution to Yemenis in areas likely be affected. We would be
willing quietly supply masks, medicines and equipment on this
basis. However, most such equipment readily available
commercially in Europe, so might be simpler for Committee to
purchase items itself, financed from Committee's general funds to
which we have made, and expect continue to make, substantial
contributions. We understand West Germans may have 20,000 surplus
masks in which Israel formerly interested. Committee might wish
contact Bonn directly, suggesting Germans make available as whole
or partial grant.
6) Particularly because inhumane gas campaign continuing, we
believe additional actions needed focus world attention on this
problem. We wonder whether ICRC has yet received replies from any
of four recipients of its original report. If ICRC has no plans
publish report, is Committee thinking of sending it to UN? In our
view some such positive action would make significant
contribution toward generating atmosphere in world public opinion
which would render such outrages less likely in future.
7) We remain deeply concerned on this subject but desire stay
in background because of sensitive intelligence and propaganda
implications. Mission should discuss subject frankly and
informally with Committee in this light and report fully.
Rusk
454. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the
Department of State/1/
Jidda, July 23, 1967, 0931Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL
Historical Files, Roger Channel Telegrams, Jidda. Secret; Roger
Channel; Special Handling.
281. State 10446./2/
/2/Telegram 10446 to Jidda, July 20,
informed the Ambassador that after further examination of the
possibility of assisting Yemeni groups, the Department had
concluded that no positive action should be taken at that time.
(Ibid.)
1. Appreciate rationale re Dept's conclusion that no positive
action should be taken now to assist various anti-UAR Yemeni
groups. I should point out, however, that pursuant SecState
219929/3/ I have stopped actively
urging Saudis not to assist Yemeni royalists or to continue
restrain them. Instead, I have taken line with Rashad and others
that Saudis aware of dangers and matter is one for them to
decide. Saudis have quickly sensed our more relaxed line which, I
suspect, is one reason we beginning hear rumors of Saudi help to
Yemeni royalists and of permitting them try their luck.
/3/Document 451.
2. I respectfully request Dept's reconsideration of one
possible item of aid to Yemeni royalists, namely 20,000 (or as
many as we can provide) gas masks. UAR continues indiscriminately
use poison gas in Yemen. On our part we no longer seeking obscure
this fact. Various items in US press including US News and
World Report and Drummond's article in Washington Post,
are publicizing it. Pursuant State 217282,/4/
we here are also discreetly urging Yemeni royalists give wider,
more effective publicity to these poison gas attacks. However,
apart from more publicity, a real need exists for some gas mask
protection. We could supply such masks though Saudis if we prefer
not to be directly involved. Even if it became known, provision
of such equipment could scarcely be labeled as offensive help to
Yemeni royalists, but as essential defense need to meet blatant
UAR use of gas against combatants and non-combatants alike in
Yemen. It would also show Yemeni royalists that our concern with
Yemen is an impartial one.
/4/Dated June 27. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17
YEMEN-SAUD)
3. In this connection, I assume that with YAR withdrawal of
recognition from USG our political commitments in Yemen have been
wiped clean. We ought now try to establish contact with as wide
spectrum of Yemeni political contacts as possible. We should seek
develop at least some influence with all groupings, but at this
time commit ourselves to none. By doing so, hopefully, we may at
some future time be able to exert constructive influence for a
broadly based Yemeni Govt. This will have to include Yemeni
royalists who have shown remarkable staying power. It is
unrealistic continue to ignore them. Apart from few personal
contacts with Ahmad Shami, we have heretofore leaned over
backwards to avoid contact with royalists to avoid embarrassing
our relations with UAR and YAR. These considerations obviously no
longer apply. Assume Dept has no objection to a discreet but
overt effort on our part to broaden, our personal bases, our
circle of Yemeni royalist contacts./5/
/5/Telegram 13532 to Jidda, July 27,
informed the Embassy that the Department had no objection to a
discreet effort to broaden its circle of Yemeni royalist contacts
on a personal basis. Regarding the Ambassador's request for
20,000 gas masks for the royalists, the telegram stated that the
United States should avoid direct involvement with any Yemeni
faction at that stage. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical
Files, Roger Channel Telegrams, Jidda)
4. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
concurs.
Eilts
455. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in France/1/
Washington, July 24, 1967, 2209Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN.
Confidential. Drafted by Brewer, cleared by Rene A. Tron (AFN),
and Country Director for France and
Benelux Robert Anderson, and approved by Brewer. Repeated to
Algiers, Jidda, London, Moscow, Rome, and Aden.
12259. Rome 338,/2/ Paris 1068
(Notal)./3/
/2/Telegram 338 from Rome, July 15,
reported that the Italian Embassy in Sanaa had informed the
Italian Foreign Ministry that 20,000-21,000 troops had left Yemen
during May and June. (Ibid.)
/3/Telegram 1068 from Paris, July 21,
reported that the Quai d'Orsay estimated that fewer than 20,000
UAR troops were left in Yemen. (Ibid.)
1. FYI. While Dept has no desire get into numbers game with
French or Italians re size UAR forces Yemen, our own best
estimate is there still some 25,000 UAR troops there. End FYI.
2. Far from Egyptian withdrawal being "closer to
route" as QuaiOff indicated Paris reftel, UAR seems
determined remain. Egyptians have in fact recently reoccupied
several outlying posts and have had renewed resort to gas bombing
on several occasions so far this month. We have seen no evidence
Egyptians have modified their decision remain in Yemen at least
until after South Arabian independence proclaimed in January
1968.
3. Re French report suggesting Algerian troops for Yemen (para
2, Paris reftel), we of course unable confirm. As far as we
aware, only Algerian combat until now outside Algeria is
battalion posted along Suez Canal. However, UPI carried ticker
item from Aden July 22 quoting "travellers from Republican
areas of Yemen" that Algerian infantry and airmen are moving
into Yemen. View greater role Algeria now seeking play in Near
East, we cannot exclude this possibility and would appreciate any
additional info addressees able develop. Repeat replies Aden.
Rusk
456. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Saudi Arabia/1/
Washington, August 2, 1967, 1524Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-10 YEMEN.
Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Brewer; cleared by Sieverts, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs David
H. Popper, and Daniel Brown (NEA/P); and approved by Battle.
Repeated to Geneva, London, and USUN.
14947. Ref Jidda 383./2/
/2/Dated July 30. (Ibid.)
(1) Re SAG interest in what USG had in mind in its public
reference to support of international action to deal with gas
problem/3/ (para 4 reftel), you may
inform Masud following response Dept spokesman to press question
August 1 as to whether US trying to collect its own evidence on
gas warfare situation: "No, I would not say that this is a
case in which the United States is trying to lead the field. We
have been concerned about the reports. We would like to see the
countries most affected take some initiative and as I indicated
before we would be prepared to support any appropriate
international action."
/3/On July 27 Robert J. McCloskey,
Director of the State Department's Office of News, told a press
conference that the United States continued to be deeply
disturbed by the many reports regarding use of poison gas against
civilians in Yemen, condemned such actions as inhumane and
entirely contrary to the laws of nations, and would support
international action to deal with this problem. (American
Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 630-631)
(2) FYI. Understand British may shortly approach us on this
problem (London 714)./4/ We have no
preconceived notions on this subject but character USG support
would certainly take account of specific international action
which might be proposed by state or states directly concerned.
End FYI.
/4/Dated July 28. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-10
YEMEN)
Rusk
457. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Saudi Arabia/1/
Washington, August 19, 1967, 1808Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN.
Secret. Drafted by Dinsmore, cleared by H. Eugene Bovis
(NEA/UAR), and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Beirut,
Kuwait, London, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Dhahran, and USUN.
24047. Ref: Jidda 631./2/
/2/In telegram 631 from Jidda, August
17, Eilts reported that Deputy Foreign Minister Saqqaf had
informed him that Saudi Arabia was under considerable Arab
pressure to accept a UAR offer to revert to the Jidda Agreement.
Saqqaf stated he had continued to make clear that the Jidda
Agreement, which the United Arab Republic had scuttled, was no
longer a valid basis for settlement of the Yemen problem. He said
that his government was also unwilling to agree to establishment
of a proposed three-man committee on the grounds that this would
simply result in renewed Arab mediation and buy the United Arab
Republic more time. (Ibid.)
1. Department understands Saudi hesitancy regarding
initiatives on Yemen which it fears may merely be clever UAR
attempt gain respectability by submission proposal which not only
sterile but also cloaks Egyptian intention to maintain its course
toward objective of subservient Yemen. Department finds this
interpretation plausible but does not necessarily share it.
2. Saudi problem is complicated by encouragement from other
Arab states. UAR proposals may appear to latter be sincere UAR
offer to settle reasonably.
3. If you should find opportunity, believe expression
following observations may be useful reminder at this point:
(a) Since other Arabs showing interest in expressing
themselves on this Arab problem Saudis may find it useful to
consider ways and means to invite other Arabs join in search for
solution.
(b) In any event, we presume Saudis sense they must take
reasonably positive stance in response UAR gesture lest they find
themselves unfavorably isolated on problem in which they vitally
concerned.
Rusk
458. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
No. 713
Washington, September 1, 1967.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN.
Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research.
SUBJECT
Mediators for Yemen Face a Rough Road
The first tangible result of the Arab Summit meeting in
Khartoum/2/ is its authorization of
a plan proposed by the Government of Sudan to end the Saudi-UAR
confrontation over Yemen. This paper examines the latest
mediation effort and its chances of success as one aspect of the
summit meeting. The results with regard to the Arab-Israeli
dispute are not yet clear enough to be analyzed and these aspects
will be dealt with later.
/2/The heads of state of 12 Arab nations
(minus Syria) conferred in Khartoum, August 29-September 1.
The conference-approved device proposed by Sudan does little
more than remove the Yemeni dispute from contention at the
moment. Deliberately general, the summit-meeting resolution
reflects an agreement in principle on the part of the UAR and
Saudi Arabia, but neither protagonist has given significant
ground on the issues in dispute or on the timing of the proposed
disengagement. In sum, this new approach only transfers the task
at which two earlier mediators had failed to a tripartite
committee (Morocco, Iraq, and Sudan); Prime Minister Mahgoub
serves as the "neutral" chairman. Although Mahgoub has
stated that he wants to start from the viewpoint of the Yemenis
themselves, both the Yemeni republicans and the royalists have
denounced the plan before it has even gotten under way. And the
committee has no magic formula for gaining access to the several
dissident factions within Yemen.
The most optimistic development is a slightly softer attitude
on the part of the UAR, to whom the cost of the Yemen occupation
must now be doubly burdensome. Nasser no longer demands the exile
of the former Yemeni ruling house, the Hamid al-Dins, as a
condition precedent to his withdrawal. But there is no sign that
he is willing to accept open and humiliating defeat. Furthermore,
Nasser's "reasonableness" could be merely a tactical
device to help create a facade of Arab unity and to secure
moderate support against radical pressures from Algeria and
Syria. Saudi King Faysal, who now feels that he has the upper
hand, is in an even less generous mood than before.
Another factor also enters into the calculation. According to
reports from Khartoum Saudi Arabia will contribute $140 million
to a fund of $378 million designed to alleviate the economic
difficulties of the UAR and Jordan. Kuwait ($154 million) and
Libya ($84 million) are the other two contributors. It is not
clear when and how these funds are to be made available and what
proportion of the total for the UAR ($266 million) will come from
Saudi Arabia. In any event, the fact that the UAR needs Saudi
money strengthens Faysal's position and may give him a weapon to
obtain concessions from the UAR.
Finally, Sudan's internal politics will affect the performance
of the Committee. Sudanese President al-Azhari desired the
original plan as part of an intricate maneuver to expel or
neutralize the leftists and Nasserites in his government, and to
carry it back to the former moderate coalition. But the leading
role now has been seized by Mahgoub, whose backing includes the
more radical nationalists. Political maneuverings within the
Sudan may thus affect the committee's chances for success.
459. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to
Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, October 13, 1967.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 YEMEN.
Confidential. Drafted by Dinsmore and cleared by Brewer.
SUBJECT
New Cabinet in Yemen
President Sallal announced a reorganization of his government
on October 13. Dropping the most thoroughly discredited stooges
of the UAR from his Cabinet, he has chosen several well-known
moderate and conservative personalities whose credentials should
be acceptable to all but the most die-hard Royalist
oppositionists to the Republic. Sallal himself has become Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister, as well as President and
Commander-in-Chief.
Of particular interest is the appointment of a person as
Adviser for Presidential Affairs who maintained fairly close and
cordial relations with the American Embassy in Yemen, and who is
acceptable to Yemeni tribes.
Sallal quite obviously is trimming his sails as he heads into
a precarious period when his Egyptian supporters finally leave
Yemen. They have announced they will be out of the capital,
Sanaa, by October 15 and completely out of Yemen by December 15.
Meanwhile several members of the outgoing Cabinet, known for
their loyalty to the UAR, are believed to have left Yemen for
safe-haven in Egypt.
Hard-bitten Royalists will not be mollified by the
announcement of a new government but will continue to insist upon
and may cause the ouster of Sallal. Nevertheless, he is
demonstrating an ability to gain the cooperation of a few of the
country's most important tribal leaders and to maintain Army
loyalty. Sallal is trying to ride out the storm which Egyptian
withdrawal will set in motion. It is too early to determine
whether he has more courage than good judgment in making this
attempt.
460. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to
Certain Posts/1/
Washington, November 7, 1967, 0018Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 YEMEN.
Secret. Drafted by Brewer on November 6, cleared by Davies, and
approved by Brewer. Sent to Aden, Amman, Beirut, Dhahran, Kuwait,
London, Rome, Tehran, Tel Aviv, and USUN.
65492. Recent Yemen coup/2/
represents move in more moderate direction and may improve
possibility some YARG/Royalist compromise settlement. However,
picture still far from clear and atmosphere civil war likely
continue characterize situation for some period. In these
circumstances, we are refraining from substantive public comment
on Yemen developments, both (a) to prevent any embarrassment
moderates which US welcome recent move might cause at this
juncture Arab-American affairs; and (b) to avoid giving
impression to new YARG that we would be receptive to renewal
formal relations and provision specific help at early date. In
our view, US attitude should be one of quiet encouragement to
both sides to compose their differences in order stable and
viable central government can be established which would merit
broad international recognition. Addressees should be guided by
foregoing and should in general avoid speculation re USG attitude
towards new regime.
/2/On November 5 Sallal was removed from
office by a military coup as Qadi Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani was
named Chairman of the Presidency Council and former Yemeni
Ambassador to the United States Muhsin al-Aini became Prime
Minister.
Rusk
461. Memorandum From John W. Foster and Harold H. Saunders
of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special
Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, November 13, 1967.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Saunders Files, Yemen, 4/1/66-1/20/69. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
The Situation in Yemen
Just a background word about Yemen since it provides a measure
of Nasser's and Faisal's relative fortunes and of prospects for
future Arab-Arab cohesiveness. Very simply, Nasser continues
his pull-out, and the Yemeni Republican coup improved chances of
an internal political settlement.
It's still too early to tell whether the Yemenis are gong to
be able to work out their problems and whether the Saudis and
Egyptians will buy their solution, but prospects have improved.
The coup was led by moderates, some of whom were under
house arrest in Cairo until recently. The coup leaders have so
far succeeded in keeping the Republicans united, and opposition
to the coup has been weak.
Because the new government isn't pro-Nasser, it will deal more
easily with those anti-Republican tribes which have been
motivated primarily by anti-Egyptian rather than pro-Royalist
sentiments. The coup leaders are already claiming some success in
winning over these people, who contribute significantly to
Royalist strength. One factor which could limit Republican
ability to make progress with lukewarm Royalists, however, is the
natural reluctance of the coup leaders to share their power with
their potential allies.
The hard-line Royalists, as far as we can tell, still think
they can win the civil war and haven't yet shown any interest in
negotiating. The cease-fire reported in the press this morning
was a local deal around Sanaa, not a general arrangement
involving all Royalists.
Both Egyptians and the Saudis are becoming less involved.
Nasser is acting as if he has given up on controlling Yemen,
although he clearly expects to have close relations. Over half
the Egyptian troops have already been withdrawn, and plans still
call for the remainder to leave by the end of the year. There's
some chance that the Saudis--who never liked the Yemeni Royal
family--might decide that they can live with the Republican
moderates. We have one report that Faisal has already suspended
his financial support of the Royalists, but the Saudis are
keeping their own counsel for the moment. Faisal would face a
tough decision in cutting off those who have carried on the fight
these five long years.
The coup may have been a temporary setback for the USSR
since the coup leaders are basically "conservative"
Republicans. However, the new crew, while somewhat more moderate,
is not so much so as not to turn for help wherever it can be
found. There will be a vacuum to exploit, and I see no signs of
anyone else hurrying to fill it.
We aren't rushing to pat the new fellows on the back.
This time, we want to hold our blessings until we're sure how
completely the government represents all Yemen and how acceptable
it is to the Saudis and Iranians. We also want to avoid a
situation where the Yemenis ask us to pick up the bill the UAR
may no longer pay. With relations suspended and us still smarting
from ill-treatment even before the war, we are generally inclined
to sit back. This makes the Communist-watchers jittery, but given
our aid resources I can't see our rushing in even if we thought
it was wise before we are a lot surer of Saudi support for the
new regime.
Hal
JWF
462. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Saudi Arabia/1/
Washington, November 22, 1967, 2104Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN.
Confidential. Drafted by Dinsmore, cleared by Root, and approved
by Brewer. Repeated to Kuwait, London, Aden, and USUN.
73272. 1. Yahya Jaghman, senior Yemeni UN delegate, lunched
unofficially at own request with Dept Off in Washington November
21. Jaghman clearly had two objectives: (1) reestablish informal
low key contact, and (2) seek USG assistance vis-a-vis SAG to
cease assistance to Royalists. During extended discussion,
DeptOff noted it our impression Saudis, as their part of bargain
struck in Khartoum, no longer assisting Royalists. Royalist
leaders who had fought Egyptians so long nevertheless represented
clear power element in situation. Yemen had suffered enough and
all factions should seek compromise, since they owe country
opportunity settle down peacefully.
2. Jaghman said his understanding had been that Saudi policy
one of opposition to foreign army in Yemen. Said he was under
impression SAG opposed "occupiers" but not particularly
concerned about Yemen's internal situation. Over past five years
YARG had relayed messages to SAG saying "recognize us and
your problems with Egyptians in Yemen will disappear". SAG
had refused. Now that Egyptians going, what is holding Saudis
back from making peaceful gesture of recognition? DeptOff noted
that problem is one between two peninsula countries and ought be
solved by them.
3. Jaghman called attention recent public statement made by
FonMin Hassan Makki re Yemen "disturbances" and YARG's
adherence to "positive neutrality and non-alignment".
He read from personal letter from PriMin al-Aini which stated
"situation serious and confused," that "communists
and harakiyin" (which Jaghman defined as ANM)
"influenced by Chinese" are playing devious game
trading on situation as at an auction (muzayid) to escalate
confusion. Jaghman professed see connection between al-Aini's
concern and Makki's reiteration of YARG non-alignment.
(Department notes that if al-Aini's letter genuine both Saudis
and Aini have reservations over ANM activities. Also possible
al-Aini's Baathi sentiments involved.)
4. Jaghman professed but did not stress YARG desire resume
relations with USG "on same basis" as previously.
DeptOff referred to difficulties YARG created for Embassy,
reminded him that YARG, not USG, had broken relations, that US
property had been burnt and wrecked, and that private American
plane still held in Yemen. Said that YARG initiative to return
plane and make amends for losses would be evidence of good will.
5. Comment: Jaghman's comments are further evidence
YARG reluctance deal with Saudis on any basis other than
Republic. We are reminded of Numan's claim to Embassy Taiz some
18 months ago that Faisal reportedly would not tolerate anything
except monarchy in Yemen. Jaghman was unspecific on question
resumption USG/YARG relations and we surmise USG intervention
vis-a-vis Saudis was a more important objective. As indicated,
we gave him no encouragement.
Rusk
463. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Italy/1/
Washington, December 5, 1967, 2123Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN.
Confidential. Drafted by Dinsmore, cleared by Arthur R. Day
(IO/UNP), and Rush W. Taylor, Jr. (EUR/AIS), and approved by
Brewer. Repeated to Jidda, Aden, London, and USUN.
79591. 1. Italian Counselor informed Department December 4
that their Charge in Sanaa had met with former PriMin Hassan
al-Amri, now member of Republican Council and Commander of Armed
Forces, on November 30 (PriMin al-Aini in North Africa and FonMin
Makki in Moscow). Al-Amri reportedly received Charge cordially,
expressed regret over action which led to departure US Embassy
from Sanaa last June, condemned "dirty actions" against
us by predecessor government (Sallal's). Al-Amri asked Charge to
convey on behalf of himself and Yemeni people Yemeni desire to
resume diplomatic relations with US. Amri further stated he
prepared release US mission aircraft immediately (septel)./2/
/2/Not further identified.
2. Amri expressed appreciation and gratitude to Italians for
Ambassador Ortona's discussion with Assistant Secretary Battle
(State 77503 pouched USUN)./3/ He
told Charge that YARG willing give King Faisal full assurances of
YARG's good intentions and of its determination to be good
neighbor with Saudi Arabia. YARG would be grateful if US and
Italy would use their good offices with SAG to that end. As for
Soviet influence, Italians and US could assure Saudis that YARG
would not allow any foreign state to interfere in its internal
affairs. YARG is presently obliged to accept Soviet help in order
to protect its frontiers, but Yemen is prepared accept help from
any side, "especially from US" and even from Saudis.
Amri concluded by suggesting that best way to circumscribe Soviet
relations with Yemen is for US to resume diplomatic relations.
/3/Dated November 30. (Ibid., POL
US-YEMEN)
3. DeptOff expressed appreciation for Italian role in
foregoing. Noted we had offered meet with YARG representatives
informally to discuss outstanding problems but had not yet seen
any specific Yemeni response. We also watching situation as
closely as possible and will be most interested note developments
next few days including final withdrawal UAR troops. Italian
Embassy's report (State 79142 pouched USUN)/4/
seemed indicate that widespread civil war is about break out
again. DeptOff repeated willingness of Department to engage in
informal talks with Yemeni representatives and said we would be
willing send DeptOffs to New York on these occasions to meet with
Yemenis there in YARG UN delegation.
/4/Telegram 79142 to the U.S. Mission at
NATO, December 4. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)
4. Re Saudis, DeptOff noted we had on occasion privately
counseled moderation on SAG re Yemen and would always do what we
could to facilitate settlement. However, we pointed to unique
position Italians currently have for using their influence with
SAG, since they represented both in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
DeptOff suggested GOI might consider passing al-Amri's remarks to
Saudis through Italian Embassy Jidda. Italian Counselor said he
would report this suggestion. He wondered whether USG would take
further action with SAG should situation in Yemen worsen. We
commented that Italians' own reports suggested situation
deteriorating and indicated it would be preferable have clearer
picture of events on the ground before considering any formal
approach to SAG.
5. Counselor phoned later and told DeptOff that his Foreign
Office had contacted PriMin al-Aini in Rabat regarding informal
discussions with us. Al-Aini had stated he fully agreed regarding
contacts in New York and would immediately instruct YARG
delegation accordingly. Counselor later called to report that
YARG del had on December 4 asked for appointment with Italian del
New York on December 5 on means arranging contact with US
officials.
6. Comment: Department plans move cautiously with these
talks. Our main interest will be to show good intentions toward
Yemen, while seeking YARG commitment on property claims which we
shall make. With Yemen situation obviously in turmoil, Department
not prepared at this time positive steps toward resumption
diplomatic relations.
Rusk
464. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis and Harold H. Saunders
of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special
Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, December 8, 1967.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Saunders Files, Yemen, 4/1/66-1/20/69. Secret.
At day's end, we want you to know what the Intelligence
Community is doing on Soviet activity in Yemen. OCI this
afternoon is putting the finishing touches on its memorandum on
the subject. ONE is doing a more estimative memo which will be
ready early in the week. INR is writing an all-sources memo to
bring together a complete record of the intelligence./2/ Luke Battle has long been concerned
about this situation and is watching it closely but still sees
nothing more that we should be doing.
/2/None of these documents has been
found.
You will be interested in some of the preliminary observations
which the authors of these papers have made:
--The Soviet airlift since November 17 looks dramatic but we
ought to remember that this is the only way the Soviets can get
to Yemen with the Suez Canal closed. Compared to the airlift to
the UAR last summer, this one is relatively modest. While about
100 flights to Yemen are now scheduled compared with 300 to the
UAR over the summer, we have to remember that the resupply to the
UAR also included 2-3 dozen shiploads of equipment. The total so
far moved to the Yemen amounts to the equivalent of about one
shipload.
--The evidence clearly points toward the direct involvement of
Soviet pilots in combat--although the Intelligence people are
still not willing to say they are sure. Flights by Soviet pilots
may have been a stop-gap measure pending the arrival and
readiness of the Syrian pilots who have been flown in. (Soviet
pilots also flew sorties in Yemen in 1963 during the Egyptian
campaign, when the Egyptians were not yet combat effective.)
--The Soviets look to us as if they are out on a limb.
However, we have not had people on the ground in Yemen for more
than six months, and they may know more than we about the balance
of forces there. However, they may simply have decided along with
the Egyptians that they just could not let the Republicans down
without trying to help.
--If the Yemen's Republicans lose, the Soviets have lost their
stake. They may figure that this additional effort is at least
worth a try. They may also calculate that the stakes vis-a-vis
the United States are not very high, and their vigor in
supporting an Arab friend will offset the
"neo-colonialism" aspect of the matter.
--People do not appear to be thinking in terms of any Soviet
commitment of ground forces. The shuttle flights are carrying
personnel, but their nationality is not clear and they may be
advisers, trainers, etc.
When the intelligence papers are all in early next week, we
will sit down with Bob Ginsburgh and see if they provide any new
insights. Meanwhile, today's developments on the ground do not
take us much beyond where we were when we talked this morning.
Nathaniel Davis
Harold H. Saunders/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these
typed signatures.
465. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Saudi Arabia/1/
Washington, December 8, 1967, 2102Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN.
Secret; Priority. Drafted by Brewer and approved by Davies.
82430. 1. In course your coming audience with King Faisal we
hope you will be able discuss in some detail recent Yemen
developments. You should express our growing concern at
indications increasing Soviet involvement and make clear to him
USG has no intention in present circumstances resuming relations
with present YARG regime. Insofar as we have had contacts with
Yemenis of various groups, we have taken line with them all that
the Yemen problem cannot be settled from outside nor by force.
Both Royalists and Republicans have their sympathizers and their
tribal levies. No clear-cut military solution seems likely.
Royalists should not expect turn clock back to unpopular Imamate
nor should YARG insist on republican concept and refuse to
negotiate with Royalist leaders who clearly command significant
support in certain areas. Both sides should accordingly make
renewed efforts to move their differences from military to
political arena by finding some formula (e.g. State of Yemen
concept; revitalized Arab Tripartite Committee) which would
permit meaningful negotiations to get under way. We would hope
all those with interests in seeing Yemen problem gradually
de-escalated would see things in similar light./2/
/2/In telegram 419 from Dhahran,
December 13, the Ambassador reported that he discussed the
Department's concerns with Faisal that day and asked the King for
his assessment of the situation. Faisal noted that if his earlier
warnings had been heeded, the situation might be different now.
He had only one suggestion. The U.S. Government should talk to
the Soviets and try to make them understand that their
intervention would only keep the parties apart and perpetuate the
Yemeni civil war. (Ibid.)
Rusk
466. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Acting
Secretary of State Katzenbach/1/
Washington, December 11, 1967.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN.
Confidential. Drafted by Dinsmore and Brewer and cleared by
Davies.
SUBJECT
Yemen: Prime Minister's Letter to Secretary
In line with our willingness to meet informally with officials
of the Yemen Arab Republic Government (YARG) to discuss
outstanding problems, Ambassador Goldberg and NEA/ARP officers on
December 8 met with Yahya Jaghman, YARG delegate to the United
Nations, in the New York office of Italian Ambassador Vinci, who
heads his country delegation to the UN. Ambassador Goldberg was
present for an initial few moments with the conferees. The
substance of the talks with Jaghman was reported in State 82442,
which is attached at Tab A./2/
/2/Telegram 82442 to Rome, December 9,
described the December 8 meeting with Jaghman, who alleged that
the Saudis were currently providing "massive"
assistance to tribes supporting the royalists
and indicated that the U.S. Government could, if it wished, limit
Saudi support of the royalists. A Department officer noted that
U.S. information about the situation in Yemen was not reassuring,
especially concerning the use of Soviet pilots. He pointed out
that the Yemeni Government's refusal to meet with the royalists
offered the opposition no alternative but military action.
(Ibid.)
During the meeting Jaghman delivered a letter dated November
30 addressed to the Secretary from YARG Prime Minister Muhsin al
Aini. The letter, and a Yemeni translation thereof, is attached
at Tab B./3/
/3/Not attached.
Al Aini was YARG Ambassador to Washington and to the UN until
October 1966. During al Aini's incumbency in these positions the
Secretary apparently developed respect and regard for him. Thus,
al Aini writes as to a close acquaintance.
The Prime Minister, writing from outside his country (he has
been on a trip to North African capitals) states his government's
aim to establish peace, stability and unity in Yemen and asserts
his surprise over what he alleges is a new "deluge of money,
arms and supplies flooding the country." Al Aini declares
that this effort cannot "force the monarchy anew upon
Yemen" but that it will cause "war and strife."
The Prime Minister asserts that the Yemeni civil war "is
about to become a war among bigger powers" and refers to
Viet Nam. He then asks the Secretary to "give the matter the
consideration it deserves . . . for the sake of world
peace."
We do not believe that a formal reply is necessary. The United
States has no diplomatic relations with Yemen at present and the
military situation within Yemen is highly confused, with
Republicans and Royalists fighting fiercely for control of Sanaa.
A reply at this time would be misinterpreted as implying USG
support for the YARG at a time when it is receiving active
military help from the Russians and Saudi support of the
Royalists is continuing.
Nevertheless, in view of the Secretary's personal regard for
al Aini, we believe it would be appropriate to convey a brief
oral acknowledgment to Jaghman in New York. We would simply plan
to acknowledge al Aini's letter on the Secretary's behalf,
express the Secretary's continuing personal friendship for the
Prime Minister and note our own view that compromise among
contending Yemeni elements seems the only sure way of ending the
country's five-year civil war. We would note confirmed reports of
Soviet activity, deny Egyptian and Yemeni controlled press
stories indicating that the United States is in any way involved,
and express regret that Yemen continues to lend itself to false
propaganda campaigns against this government.
Recommendation
That you approve an oral response along the foregoing lines./4/
/4/Katzenbach initialed the approval
line on December 13. A handwritten notation reads: "Action
taken 12/13/67. See outgoing telegram." Reference is
presumably to telegram 84379 to Rome; Document 467.
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