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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
351. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, June 15, 1966, 0758Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-8 US-INDIA. Secret; Exdis. The Embassy suggested that the cable be repeated to Rawalpindi, Karachi, and CINCMEAFSA as desired. 3462. Ref: Deptel 2447./2/ /2/In telegram 2447 to New Delhi, June 10, the Department expressed concern over the Indian Government's apparent lack of understanding of the impact of its extensive arms procurement program on the military policy of Pakistan. The Embassy was instructed to discover what the Indian Government proposed to do about a situation that could lead to China becoming Pakistan's major supplier of military equipment. The Department suggested that India should recognize that it would be far better for Pakistan to maintain its existing U.S.-supplied forces from either U.S. or other Western sources of supply. (Ibid.) 1. As reftel points out, the US has a major interest in heading off arms race in subcontinent and in containing Chinese threat to both India and Pakistan. The guidelines for discussion with GOI regarding Indian military expenditures and relationship to Paks outlined in reftel impress me as both useful and sound. As previously reported we have been pressing GOI on this subject and will continue to do so. 2. Thus far informal response by GOI officials to proposition that both India and Pakistan should agree to discuss a ceiling on their military budgets has been generally affirmative. Although there is considerable uncertainty in regard to procedures I believe, as a starting point, that GOI would agree to a confidential inquiry by the World Bank to establish the facts in regard to defense budgets of both nations. 3. The critical difficulty would be the development of an acceptable formula for limiting military establishments on both sides. As Indians see it they have four-and-one-half times the population of Pakistan and well over four times the GNP. More than that they face two formidable military threats along a land frontier of over 9000 miles: First in importance are the Chinese who attacked in 1962 and second are the Paks who attacked in 1965 against an obligation [sic] of Chinese ultimatum. Although most moderate Indians agree that Pak fears of an Indian attack on Pakistan may be genuine, they believe such fears to be utterly irrational and hence unlikely to be significantly affected by what Indians may say or do at the negotiating table. 4. In regard to the current flow of Soviet equipment the Indians point out that they turned to the USSR in August 1964 only when it became clear that they could not secure the military equipment they needed from the US. Of the $396 million that the Indians anticipated from US and Western sources in the first three years of the 1964 agreement only $140 million was made available. In a conversation at my home last week, General Chadhury suggested that the difference of $256 million is roughly comparable to the amount that India has since committed for equipment from the USSR. (Chadhury stressed that we had inadvertently forced India to turn to the Soviets which they did not want to do.) 5. There are two steps that might persuade India to cut back on its current defense spending, both of which present difficulties: (a) clear recognition by the US of the Chinese threat to India and a pledge within limits imposed by our Constitution that we would provide all feasible assistance to India in event of another ChiCom attack (possibly as a reaffirmation or extension of the air defense agreement); (b) a statement by GOP that it is prepared to sign a no-war agreement as the first step toward the limitation of respective military establishments. Because both of these assurances appear unlikely under present circumstances, I am not particularly hopeful that India will agree to a further reduction below the levels to which we and they agreed to in June 1964. However, if Paks were willing, it may be possible to work out some reductions in that portion of Indian military establishment for defense against Pakistan in return for reductions in Pak establishment. 6. Despite these difficulties I believe Mrs. Gandhi will continue to seek some kind of dialogue with Paks on all problems of mutual interest; indeed I suspect that this may be the next item on her agenda once devaluation-liberalization program is on tracks and Punjab situation settles down. Major question within GOI now appears to be appropriate level of the talks. After failure at Rawalpindi Mrs. Gandhi is genuinely anxious to assure forum which will be potentially most productive or, at a minimum, least risky. 7. We have already pointed out (Embtel 3281)/3/ the damaging impact we will face in India if US provides lethal military supplies to Pakistan regardless of how they may be financed. Further conversations with GOI officials, talks over the weekend with Indian military at Defense Staff College in south India, and widespread evidence of all-out Communist-Mennonite campaign to destroy Mrs. Gandhi because of her growing relationship with US confirm our belief that these forebodings have not been overdrawn. Thus we continue strongly to support conclusions reached in Pindi's 675/4/ and our 3281. /3/In telegram 3281 from New Delhi, May 31, the Embassy recorded its objections to the resumption of the supply of lethal weapons to Pakistan. (Ibid., DEF 19-8 US-PAK) /4/Telegram 675 from Rawalpindi, May 26, transmitted the Embassy's assessment that the sale of lethal spare parts to Pakistan would not win enough points with the Pakistani military to counterbalance the anticipated cost to the U.S. relationship with India. The Embassy recommended no direct sales of lethal spare parts or equipment to either India or Pakistan. (Ibid.) 8. As a consequence of the war last August and September against an American-equipped Pak army and air force we are dealing here in India with an emotional, highly charged, gut issue which will not respond to reason. Even such sympathetic and sophisticated GOI officials as L.K. Jha could not be persuaded that US is serving long-range Indian/US interest by resuming its old role as supplier of lethal military equipment to Pakistan even on a moderate scale. Without exception such individuals are deeply convinced that any US move in this direction would again encourage unreal expectations in Rawalpindi and consequently greater inflexibility on part of Paks, while simultaneously undercutting US relationship with India at a time when they have personally staked their positions within GOI on improved understanding. 9. A large majority of Indian public, prodded by shrewd and far-reaching left wing campaign, would react with the utmost vigor to the resumption of lethal US spares for Pak fighter planes which even our best friends within GOI and press point out can only be [garble--used?] against India. Our loss in public esteem and distrust of US policy and judgment would be massive. 10. Adverse Indian reaction underscored by emotional political attacks and an extremely bad press would create counter reaction in the US with further danger to the excellent relationship developed during Mrs. Gandhi's visit. 11. At the same time resumption of US lethal military supplies to Pakistan would undermine for some time to come our capacity to foster an accommodating Indian attitude toward Pakistan. An essential element in the delicate exercise of persuading India to consider a limitation on its military establishment vis-à-vis Pakistan is India's trust in both reliability and good judgment of USG. 12. Another likely casualty of US lethal equipment to Pakistan would be whatever ability we may still have to keep India on non-nuclear path at least long enough to offer some hope of a world-wide non-proliferation agreement. Mrs. Gandhi's government would never accept credibility of US assurances regarding nuclear threat if we appeared at same time to be joining Communist China in arming Pakistan against India. 13. I agree with Rawalpindi's 675 on wisdom of our standing aside when Paks seek to buy elsewhere in the West the equipment which they feel they need. There is no good reason why we should discourage these purchases as long as they come within previously acknowledged budgetary limits, hopefully set in agreement with India. 14. I believe that for foreseeable future we must choose between two courses of action regarding arms policy toward India and Pakistan: A. We can resume a lethal military supply relationship with Pakistan and as a consequence see a sharp deterioration in our position in India which because of its size and political orientation is the only realistic starting point for the building of an indigenous Asian counterweight to China. B. We can limit our military supplies to both countries to non-lethal categories (if anything at all) and continue to press both India and Pakistan to focus their energies on economic development and to move toward a realistic and tolerable mutual accommodation with regard to their respective military establishments. 15. We are now striving to make B. work. I strongly urge that we continue to do so. Bowles
352. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-403-66 Washington, June 15, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, Pakistan 091.3, MAP. Top Secret. SUBJECT 1. (U) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-23952/66, dated 8 June 1966,/2/ subject as above. /2/On June 8 John T. McNaughton sent a memorandum to McNamara, attaching a study prepared in DOD/ISA on "The Problem of US Military Assistance to India and Pakistan." McNaughton noted that the study concluded that a policy of lethal sales to either India or Pakistan would produce major disadvantages for the United States and no clear advantages. (Ibid., OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Pakistan 091.3 MAP-MAAG) 2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed a review of the staff study forwarded by the reference and do not concur in the thrust of the study nor in its conclusions and recommendations except as noted in the Annexes/3/ hereto. /3/Annexes A-G are not printed. 3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that there is a segment of international influence which contends that as a result of a more amicable Soviet/US relationship, together with the apparent Soviet/ChiCom ideological split, the US policy should be based on cooperation with the Soviets. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that it must be kept foremost in mind, and as the basis of US objectives and policy, that the USSR is still the primary adversary of the United States and that US efforts throughout the world should not encourage or accommodate the Russian design or goal any more than that of the ChiComs. 4. (S) In developing US policy objectives for the subcontinent, it must be recognized that what the United States may consider as illogical or irrational attitudes and policies on the part of India and Pakistan are, in fact, the controlling elements upon which US actions will have to be predicated. These include the following: a. Pakistan's fear that the fundamental Indian goal is the conquest of Pakistan. b. India's intransigence on the Kashmir issue for fear of losing face before the world (as opposed to acquiring face in accord with its support of international goals for peaceful settlement of issues). c. Maintenance of armed forces by India and Pakistan in excess of their legitimate needs which neither country economically can afford. d. Refusal of India and Pakistan to realize the great advantages that would accrue to them (and the world at large) if they both could agree on a policy in the subcontinent which would provide for their national security and economic-sociological development. 5. (TS) The United States also must correlate its role in the subcontinent with other areas. With Pakistan, the United States must consider not only its bilateral agreements, particularly regarding critical, special facilities in Peshawar, but also its position in relationship to CENTO, SEATO, and the Moslem world. With India, the United States must take into account Indian/ChiCom hostility and the attitudes and policies of both India and Communist China in relation to Southeast Asia, to include Indo/Soviet and Soviet/North Vietnam relationships and the positions of each nation toward world peace. A US strategy of assistance to India which results in ChiCom expansion into Pakistan, with a concomitant weakening of CENTO and SEATO and a loss of US special facilities in Pakistan, would be self-defeating. The losses thereby incurred would exceed any anticipated gain to the United States and India--particularly if India should become encircled with a ChiCom-dominated Sino/Pak alliance. It, therefore, is in the national interest of both the United States and India to make every effort to improve relations with Pakistan so that Chinese ingress in the subcontinent may be pre-empted. 6. (S) US national interests are best served by maintaining a stable, economically sound, and secure subcontinent. The military postures of both India and Pakistan prior to the 1962 ChiCom aggression reflected an acceptable military situation from the US point of view. However, significant change now has been induced, and reversion to the status quo ante 1962 is highly improbable. Therefore, a new balance for the subcontinent must be achieved. The most desirable is one wherein: a. Pakistan maintains its CENTO role and serves as an anchor on the "containment" flank of the West. b. Pakistan co-exists with India and rejects any close relation with the ChiComs. c. India rejects closer ties with the Soviets and continues to deter the ChiComs. d. India achieves a modus vivendi with Pakistan. 7. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the following military assistance policy be adopted to further US objectives in the subcontinent: a. Expand the present policy on sale of nonlethal items to permit cash and credit sales of spare parts for US-supplied equipment in both countries without regard to lethality. b. Offer a grant-aid program of in-country and CONUS training to India and Pakistan. c. Resume grant-aid selectively on a case-by-case basis for projects which are in the US strategic interest. d. Attempt to gain, as a long-term US strategy, Indo/Pak agreement on the minimum force structures, military manpower ceilings, defense spending limitations, and foreign exchange diversions. The United States should use all available and potential leverage to promote this strategy. e. Be prepared to discuss modernization of the forces of both countries in the interest of security of the subcontinent provided India and Pakistan achieve a mutual agreement, as set forth in subparagraph d, above, acceptable to the United States. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: /4/Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.
353. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, June 24, 1966, 8:53 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15 PAK-US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Laingen; cleared by Laise, McCracken, and in substance by Spain; and approved by Hare. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to New Delhi and Moscow. 701. Following is summary memcon. It is FYI, Noforn, and subject to amendment upon review. 1. Pakistan Ambassador Ghulam Ahmed called on Secretary June 23. Assist. Secy. Hare also present. Ambassador stated he was under instruction to clarify personally to Secretary GOP's position on question reopening AEDS stations Lahore and Karachi. Cited problems in political, psychological, and military areas which reopening could cause for Pakistan vis-à-vis Soviets; presentation virtually identical Shahi demarche to DCM June 7 (Rawalpindi's 737)./2/ Ambassador added that Soviet Ambassador Washington continually questions him about "American bases" near Peshawar; said Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Mazurov had raised this specifically with Ayub and said he hoped AEDS stations would not be reopened. All this raised considerable dilemma for Paks, both in context Kashmir issue and in area military supply where Pakistan had no indication US intention resume deliveries and Soviets had at least indicated they willing discuss supply to Pakistan. Added he did not know whether actual talks had begun with Soviets this subject. /2/See footnote 3, Document 344. 2. Secretary said he was glad to have Ambassador's clarification. Said some of considerations cited by Ambassador were peripheral to small stations in question which primarily concerned with detection process serving nuclear test ban treaty requirements. Secretary said we would be considering problem further, and would be discussing with Ambassador Locke prior his return Rawalpindi. 3. Secretary asked Ambassador re prospects for Indo-Pak talks. Ambassador stated he not fully informed; thought talks likely to take place although Mrs. Gandhi's Moscow visit might delay them a bit. He understood there had been considerable amount US persuasion on both parties to get talks going. Secretary said we hoped very much talks could begin and that there would not be undue delay for discussion agenda. Cited our own experience with Russians where we had found it often useful not have any agenda but simply to start talking. Ball
354. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 31/32-66 Washington, July 7, 1966. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organization of the Departments of State and Defense, NSA, and AEC. All members of the United States Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate on July 7 except the representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction. THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN The Problem To examine possible developments, over the next year or two, in the relations between India and Pakistan and between them and the major powers. Conclusions A. In view of the mutual suspicions and animosities on both sides, there is little prospect of any substantial improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations in the foreseeable future. India will remain basically unyielding on Kashmir, while Pakistan will continue to seek movement toward a solution. Pakistani pressure on this issue probably will involve some infiltration into Kashmir, but Pakistan, recognizing Indian military superiority, will be careful to avoid actions which it thinks might develop into major fighting. B. Pakistan considers that it must improve its forces to be able to defend at least West Pakistan in any future hostilities. India is determined to be able to cope simultaneously with Pakistan and China. In the current year, both are spending substantial sums on defense--$569 million or about 5.5 percent of GNP in the case of Pakistan and $2.1 billion or four percent in the case of India--and both will continue to give defense requirements a very high priority. C. India will remain hostile to China and will seek to remain non-aligned between the US and USSR. India has already made a number of economic reforms urged by the US, in order to get renewed economic aid. It is concerned by the Soviet Union's gradual move away from uncritical support of India. To inhibit further movement, and to continue receiving economic and military aid, New Delhi will take pains to avoid offending the Soviets whenever possible. D. Pakistan will continue to try to balance its relations with the US and China. It is aware that a close association with the latter would jeopardize its relationship with the US. At the same time, it needs arms, and China appears to Pakistan as the one country which is willing to provide, apparently at modest cost, the types and amounts necessary to rearm and improve Pakistan's military posture. E. Both India and Pakistan are aware that US provision of economic aid will be tied to performance on matters of importance to the US, such as limiting military spending and giving priority to economic development. In a general way, we believe that India will probably meet US requirements somewhat better than will Pakistan. [Here follows the 9-page Discussion portion of the Estimate.]
355. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, July 9, 1966, 0953Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PAK. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Karachi, New Delhi, and Dacca. 82. Separatist Movement in East Pakistan. 1. During July 7 call on S.M. Yusuf in his new capacity as Foreign Secretary, I called attention to accusations of American involvement in East Pak separatist movement being given currency in Pak press and also in public statements of GOP officials, and cited: A. Articles in Dacca newspaper, Paigam, of April 30 and May 1, 1966 in which headlines alleged "Unholy Alliance of American Circles with Advocates on "[Six?] Points" and "Six Points Nourished by American Injection" and in which assertion was made that U.S. "has purchased one particular party in West Pakistan" and given this party its six points; B. East Pak newspaper Janata June 23, 1966 alleging that U.S. is "creating a secessionist trend in East Pakistan" and that U.S. "wants to use East Pakistan as a springboard in world strategy"; C. A resolution of ad hoc working committee of East Pak Muslim League of June 23, 1966, alleging that "certain foreign elements" attempting to fan autonomy movement in East Pakistan "with a view to serving their own global interests"; and D. National Assembly speech on June 29, 1966 by Communications Minister Sobur alleging that East Pak "autonomy movement could not conceal its own alliance with some hostile powers, those who for their global interests want to drive a wedge amongst the solidarity of the people." That these indirect accusations were also against the U.S. was clear, I said, from use of expression "foreign powers with global interests." I noted, and Foreign Secretary indicated agreement, that in Pakistan "power with global interests" meant the United States. We had no doubt on basis of reactions we had received that people of Pakistan clearly understood such articles and statements were intended to be charges against U.S. 2. I said such allegations were completely false, and that to give them currency in press and in public statements by GOP officials could only have a depressing effect upon efforts to maintain and develop atmosphere of collaboration and understanding which would strengthen US-Pak relations. I developed at some length illogic of any assumption that U.S. policy would now seek to fragment Pakistan when we had devoted extensive efforts and resources over period of years, and were so now doing, to help build, in collaboration with GOP leaders, strong and unified Pakistan as source of stability in subcontinent and as barrier to Communist penetration. I noted that, with this basic and long-standing policy, U.S. could not conceivably favor separation of East Pakistan from Pakistan, process which would occasion political strife, economic dislocation, and popular unrest, promoting serious instability in sub-continent and offering temptations and opportunities for Communist China. it would not be reasonable to assume U.S. would work against its own interests and its own policy objectives by seeking to press [for] political disintegration of Pakistan. Nor could it be alleged that the right hand did not know what the left hand was doing and that U.S. was in fact pursuing two policies with respect to East Pakistan. I said U.S. policy in Pakistan is policy of the President of U.S. and that he and his representative in Pakistan, the American Ambassador, have responsibility and authority to assure U.S. policies and objectives are supported by all branches and agencies of U.S.G. I told Secretary that this in point of fact was the situation in practice and would continue to be the situation governing American actions in Pakistan. I summarized by saying that U.S. policy toward Pakistan continues to be based on need for an independent, strong, and unified Pakistan; that U.S. does not support separatism in East Pak; and that constitutional arrangements for the two wings and question of greater autonomy for East Pakistan are internal matters to be worked out by Pakistan in accordance with its own processes. 4. Secretary Yusuf said he welcomed assurances as to U.S.G. policy with respect to unity of Pakistan and our attitude on question of separatism in West Pakistan. He then referred to the conversation between Ambassador Locke and President Ayub on June 16/2/ at which he had also been present. Yusuf noted that Ayub had initiated this topic and had cited reports which GOP continued to receive about conversations between American officials in Dacca and opposition political figures. Foreign Secretary said there were numbers of such reports. He admitted there was high degree of sensitivity about East Pakistan on part of GOP officials which he attributed to GOP conviction that India is promoting East Pak separatism. Amplifying this point, Yusuf said that radio stations from India were beaming separatist propaganda into East Pakistan seven or eight hours each day and also that pamphlets and leaflets urging East Pakistan separatism were printed in India and brought into East Pakistan for distribution. (According UK HICOM Pickard, East Pakistan Governor Monem Ekhan cited these same points in discussion with him last week in Dacca.) /2/Locke's meeting with Ayub on June 16 was reported in telegrams 803, 805, and 806 from Rawalpindi, all June 17. (Ibid., DEF 19-8 US-PAK, AID (US) PAK, and POL INDIA-PAK, respectively) 5. Yusuf wondered whether American officers in East Pakistan were on all occasions as discreet in their choice of contacts as they should be. He said GOP did not take position that all opposition leaders were beyond the pale. GOP considers an opposition necessary. Some opposition figures accepted the premises of Pakistan's constitutional system. (Yusuf in fact referred to them as the "loyal opposition.") However, other opposition leaders were "disruptionists," seeking to promote disintegration of Pakistan and separate existence for East Pakistan or a Bengali state. Yusuf said he was making no assertion as to facts, but that if American officials were in frequent contact with opposition leaders of the disruptionist type, this would certainly give rise to misunderstanding. 6. I responded that I was certain there was not such a pattern of contacts by our people in East Pakistan, that they of course talk with opposition political leaders as part of their normal functions as political officers of U.S.G., but that in such conversations they did not take positions on controversial domestic issues, much less lend support to separatist elements in East Pakistan. I said that the pitfalls with respect to kinds of reports he had been talking about were well known to both of us as were pressures which might affect their credibility. Yusuf acknowledged this and remarked that Ayub "did not credit all these reports." 7. Foreign Secretary said Secretary Rusk in Canberra had raised topic of allegations about American activities with respect to East Pakistan in conversation with Additional Secretary Shahi. Secretary Rusk had suggested joint inquiry into this problem. Yusuf quickly added that GOP did not think joint inquiry would be useful approach. 8. Foreign Secretary undertook to explain rationale by which some Pakistanis might believe that U.S. "global interests" would be served by separatist movement in East Pakistan. He entirely disassociated himself from such view, but said was useful to broad understanding of problem. Rationale which he developed was that U.S. support of India was basic U.S. policy, part of its global strategy; India was now in great difficulty because of its limited access to Assam, routes across East Pakistan being not now open to India; Indian position vis-a-vis China would be strengthened by more ready access to Assam; therefore U.S. might be prepared encourage East Pakistan separatist movement. I said that such line of reasoning was fantastically erroneous, adding that I had noted Foreign Secretary did not accept it. As I had outlined earlier, our estimate was that separate East Pakistan would be great factor of instability in South Asia. 9. Foreign Secretary again stated his belief that Indian policy is directed toward detaching East Pakistan. I said I found it impossible to believe Indian policy in fact pointed in this direction, that persons following this view would be clearly misguided, since, if successful, it would result in enormous pressures being brought to bear on India with respect to Bengal and would be advantageous only to China. I added that so far as I could see only one country would stand to benefit, in terms of its known goals, from East Pak or Bengali separatism and that country was Communist China. Yusuf made no comment on this remark. 10. I told Secretary Yusuf that Embassy was acutely aware of sensitivity to GOP of issues relating to East Pakistan and that we had very responsible officers serving in East Pakistan. I said we would be ready at any time to discuss with Foreign Secretary any reports of charges as to alleged American actions in East Pakistan. I reiterated again our concern as to harmful effect of press charges and public allegations by GOP officials and asked him to let this be known to appropriate authorities of his government. 11. Comment: Allegations that U.S. is fomenting separatism in East Pakistan are extremely difficult to deal with effectively because of: A. Politically tense situation there and in Pakistan generally which moves Pak officials to be sensitive, suspicious, alarmist; B. Short-run utility to Pak political leaders of being able to attribute pressing difficulties to nefarious foreign influence; C. Pattern and style of government and society which assume deviousness and anticipate intrigue; D. Vulnerability of U.S., which is widely accepted here as having capability for large-scale under-cover manoeuvre. For these reasons, such allegations are to certain extent inherent in situation which can be expected to continue. 12. Nonetheless, I believe there are measures which we can take with some prospect of blunting these allegations. This is particularly true to extent such allegations reflect concerted campaign of defamation, instigated or abetted at various levels of Pak Government. In my judgment, best tactics in private discussion are: A. Unreserved assertions of the complete falsity of the allegations; B. Confident statements that there is no evidence to support them; and C. Persuasive arguments that they are totally illogical. The core counter-argument here is that East Pak separatism would be entirely contrary to United States interests, and inconsistent with United States policy toward Pakistan. 13. My discussion with Foreign Secretary took place in good atmosphere and, I believe, illustrates the utility of getting this subject out in the open in discussions with GOP officials. It is also evidently much more possible to have a reasonable discussion on this question with the present Foreign Secretary than with his predecessor. Cargo
356. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 11, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VI, 1/66-9/66. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates it was seen by the President. SUBJECT Attached is an interesting message from Secretary Freeman./2/ /2/A retyped copy of telegram 221 from Karachi, July 11, was attached to the memorandum. The telegram, sent eyes only for the President from the Secretary of Agriculture, is ibid. In telegram 221 Freeman reported on his July 11 conversation with Ayub in which they discussed agricultural developments in Pakistan and prospects for a new P.L. 480 agreement in addition to the East Pakistan discussion summarized by Rostow. Freeman arrived in Pakistan on April 11 for a 3-day visit. That visit was followed by a 2-day visit to Afghanistan and a 3-day visit to India. The Embassy in Rawalpindi reported on what it saw as a successful visit by Freeman to Pakistan in telegram 167, July 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 7 AGR) The Embassy in New Delhi offered a similar assessment of Freeman's visit to India in telegram 1155, July 22. (Ibid.) The Pakistanis are having problems with food prices in East Pakistan. Drought has cut production about 5% and there is a price push because food stocks are lower than usual at this time of year, the opposition is badgering the Government, and the administration has not handled what stocks it has on hand to best advantage. Ayub has brought the price pressure to Freeman's attention, and they have discussed the possibility of diverting to East Pakistan several ships waiting to unload at Indian ports. Our specialists in Agriculture are hard at work reviewing the figures to see what East Pakistan's real needs are. They are also looking into the logistical problems of diverting ships from Indian to East Pakistani ports. State is for it as a helpful political gesture. Freeman would like to explore the matter further, which is fine. He also asks authority to make a prompt announcement of whatever agreement he reaches after discussions with the Indians. In our view this is premature. The politics of Indo-Pak relations are so tricky that nothing must be said until we are sure it is feasible; and if they can work it out, it may be better to have the Indians and the Pakistanis make their own announcement, without our being publicly engaged. State has therefore told him to explore the matter, but to make no public announcement until further clarification. Walt
357. Memorandum From Secretary of Agriculture Freeman to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 19, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Indian Famine, Vol. V, August 1966-February 1967. Confidential. SUBJECT [Here follows the section of the report on Japan.] Pakistan
President Ayub Khan, as reported in my cable from Pakistan,/2/ was cordial and friendly. He recalled his visit with you with pleasure. He realizes how important agricultural development is to Pakistan. The Pakistani agricultural minister is weak, so I plan to communicate directly with Ayub. /2/See footnote 2, Document 356. Foreign Minister S.H. Yusuf. I had two long talks with this career public servant of wide experience and now the ranking man in the Foreign Ministry following Bhutto's departure./3/ He seemed friendly and reasonable. He reflected genuine fear of India, citing the Goa takeover. He seemed to be more relaxed about Kashmir than I expected, although bitter that the Indians would not permit a plebiscite. The fact that after twenty years India hadn't earned the loyalty of the people was frequently repeated. Reference to the Chinese was guarded, but he evidenced no great enthusiasm. The India-Chinese clash he described as a border confrontation. The merits of each side he described as confusing. When I asked about the Russians at Tashkent, he said they had performed earnestly and well. He described Kosygin as running back and forth from Shastri to Ayub like an errand boy, spending an hour or two repeatedly with each. On balance, I would evaluate his attitude as "let bygones be bygones and go on from here." As he put it, the fact we can't agree on everything shouldn't mean that we must be unpleasant. /3/Foreign Minister Bhutto resigned on June 19. Ayub and Yusuf expressed high regard for you. It would be my judgment that personal communication with Ayub should be maintained to the extent possible.
As I cabled you in my "eyes only" cable, I had hoped we might please Ayub--bring Pakistanis and Indians closer at no cost to the United States. Ayub reportedly has a nasty political problem in East Pakistan, triggered now by a crop shortage from flood and drought with sharply rising rice prices. Immediate relief could be had by diverting 50,000 tons of wheat to East Pakistan in ships now waiting to be unloaded in India. Replacement can be made to India from wheat committed but not yet shipped to Pakistan. It was my estimate that maximum U.S. benefit would come from the U.S. openly arranging the switch. Otherwise, I feared the Pakistanis would be too sensitive to accept help from India. I was advised that the U.S. should stay in the background and let the Indians and Pakistanis come together. I proceeded accordingly and got Subramaniam to agree to make the 50,000 tons available immediately provided that Pakistan would ask for it publicly. Our Embassy at Rawalpindi has been so informed. At this writing, Pakistan is unwilling to ask. We are urging them to do so. I fear the United States has lost a good opportunity.
U.S. arrivals under PL 480 have been cut in half, dropping from 1.5 million tons in 1963 and 1964 to about 660,000 tons in fiscal 1966. Pakistan has suffered drought and flood and has experienced a crop short fall. Supply figures and crop estimates are still fuzzy. I arranged for the necessary joint U.S.-Pakistan procedures to review them and develop the best possible members so some solid judgment can be reached quickly. Negotiations for a PL 480 agreement for the balance of calendar 1966 should be undertaken very soon. I hope to send negotiating instructions to Rawalpindi within a week. I am also reviewing the possibility of promptly increasing the current 300,000 ton wheat agreement to 400,000 tons. This would please Ayub and as a practical matter would be charged against the amount to be negotiated for the current calendar year. A final judgment on this should, I think, be withheld until we see what happens on the wheat exchange between Pakistan and India.
The Pakistanis have made encouraging progress. SCARP, the salinity reclamation project developed and supported by the United States near Lahore, which I believe you visited, is an unqualified success: (1) water table lowered 10 feet, (2) 425,000 acres reclaimed, (3) yield up 30 to 150 percent (wheat 15 to 55 bushels, corn 16 to 70 bushels per acre), (4) land value up from $50 to $1,000 per acre since I visited it in 1961. The Pakistan agricultural growth rate has climbed to 3.5 percent annually, but with a 2.7 percent population increase and an expanding economy the increase is soaked up each year. They must reach 4 percent to hold and 5 percent to gain ground on the food problem. The Pakistanis realize this. They have a vigorous program, have sharply increased agriculture's share of the budget, and made more foreign exchange available. Ayub asked us for a list of chemical firms because pesticides are very short. A new 200,000 ton fertilizer plant has been contracted with ESSO. Fertilizer is in short supply. The agricultural sector of the economy is vigorous and in my judgment currently meets the self-help standard of the Food for Freedom Act./4/ I believe we should keep the pressure on and provide all the technical assistance that can be effectively used to help them. However, we must be alert to ensure that the agriculture sector in their economy continues to command first priority (after defense) on the nation's resources. PL 480 ought not to be extended at this time beyond the calendar year. /4/President Johnson requested this legislation in a February 10 message to Congress. (Department of State Bulletin, February 28, 1966, pp. 336-341) Congress enacted the Food for Peace Act on November 11, 1966. (P.L. 89-808; 80 Stat 1526) [Here follows the section of the report on Afghanistan.] India
The Prime Minister's absence (she was visiting the Soviet Union) inhibited conversation on the world political situation. They are, of course, anti-Chinese. S.K. Patil (Boss of Bombay) went way out of his way to be seen with me publicly. He is a former Minister of Agriculture and an old friend. His primary message was that the climate is good to improve U.S.-India relations. He emphasized his strong support for the Prime Minister (heretofore he has been cool) and even praised Subramaniam (a decided change). Patil is one of the top Congress party political operators (allegedly the No. 1 money-raiser), so I was pleased at his outspoken support for the current Indian Administration. It would be my evaluation that it is correct as generally reported that Subramaniam is very close to and extremely influential with the Prime Minister. He described for me privately (not bragging or name-dropping) the agony of that decision on devaluation. Clearly, he was a strong prime mover in accomplishing it. President Radnakrishnan sends his warmest personal regards. He urges that the United States unilaterally and without any commitment cease bombing North Vietnam. Then, he argues, the rest of the world would, through the force of world opinion, bring about negotiations. I questioned him fairly closely about this, but could detect no basis for his estimate other than his own subjective opinion. As we prepared to leave him he asked that I carry a message of sympathy to you for the burdens you carry and the extreme difficulty of the situation in Vietnam. He described his feeling of the situation in terms of the Hindu god Shiva--the Power god who takes many poses. One pose is called Nila Kantha or Blue Throat; to wit: the god has a blue throat--if he throws it out he will destroy the world--if he swallows it he will destroy him- self. A public statement I made on arrival in Delhi commanded a lot of attention and dominated my press conferences. To my surprise the Indians have been of the opinion that they would have a five-year grace period under the current soft currency sale terms of PL 480 before shifting to the long-term low-credit conditions of the Food for Freedom program. I think they understand now that although exceptions can be made they will be in extreme circumstances only such as a localized disaster or where the United States itself needs local currency. This has caused some apprehension by the authorities worried about India's debt load, but even they acknowledge that it makes sense. They are requesting that we make an exception for India, but I was very firm in insisting that the time had come when India must pay in dollars but at generous terms. I think they understand.
The shortfall of food caused by the monsoon estimated last December to be 18 million tons has proved accurate. When Subramaniam came to Washington he said that India would tighten its belt to the extent of 5-6 million tons, and he asked 11 to 12 million tons of grain. As of this date the United States has committed 8 million tons. We have exceeded one-million ton a month arrivals several months. India with our help has raised 1.2 million tons of grain from other sources and the equivalent of 1.5 million tons of grain in money, fertilizer or other commodities for a total value approximately $150,000,000. If the 11 million ton figure requested was a minimum to be reached it will be necessary to make available yet this calendar year 1.8 million tons more of food grain. Subramaniam asked for 2 million tons of wheat and strongly urged that we make several hundred thousand tons of rice available by September plus some vegetable oil and cotton. I carefully outlined the current wheat supply situation in the U.S., emphasizing the loss of an estimated 150,000,000 bushels by drought and frost this spring. The contrast between 1961 when I first visited India as Secretary of Agriculture with 1.5 billion bushel carryover, and now with 500 million bushels made the point that we must be frugal. Last December we set down three requirements if the United States was to give India the necessary assistance. First that the grain be handled expeditiously and reach the needy. Second, that strong and effective steps be taken pursuant to the Rome agreement to strengthen Indian agriculture. Third, that a real effort be made to get help from other countries. It was emphasized that the self-help requirement would be a stern one. On all three counts it is my judgment that India has lived up to her commitments. One of the greatest food movements of all times taking almost 600 ships is being accomplished. Not all of the agricultural development targets set out last fall have been reached, but the specific actions agreed on have been taken. I am impressed with Subramaniam's top staff. They are sharp and hard driving. Although very much remains to be done yet by any reasonable standard, I am pleased to report that Subramaniam has fulfilled the economic development commitments he made in Rome. I am not as satisfied with the effort to get help from other countries. France, a wheat surplus nation, denied help. The USSR's contribution is only 5 million dollars. However, it does appear that a real effort was made and 150 million contribution from some 35 other nations is a creditable accomplishment. It would be my recommendation then, that the United States promptly begin negotiations to meet the needs of India for the balance of this calendar year. Our supplies of wheat are adequate for this amount. We should withhold agreement for the last half of the current fiscal year to be certain India continues to give agriculture top priority in her economic planning. Then we will have a more clear picture of the Indian need and our supply, both of which are currently subject to uncontrollable contingencies.
358. Summary Notes of the 562d Meeting of the National Security Council/1/ Washington, July 19, 1966, 11:45 a.m.-12:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 3, 7/19/66. Confidential/Sensitive; For the President Only. An attached list shows that 18 attended the meeting in addition to the President, including Humphrey, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Helms, Fowler, Freeman, Bell, Gaud, Rostow, and Hamilton. The World Food Problem The President: This discussion on the current world food problem was called because: 1. The war on hunger is as important as any national security problem we face; 2. The size and urgency of the problem requires us to move rapidly to organize a worldwide attack on hunger; and 3. U.S. public opinion polls show a resistance to our assisting foreign countries in the fields of health, welfare, education, and food. Secretary Rusk: The Development Assistance Committee is meeting in Washington this week. We plan to alert those who are assisting foreign countries to the urgency of the food problem. Up to now, the food producing countries have been looked to to solve the serious world food problem. However, the fight on hunger must include nations other than the food producing nations. We must work out a combination of means to fight hunger. We are disappointed in what the developing states have done to increase their food production. We have also been disappointed by what the donor states in DAC have done in providing food aid. AID Director Bell: Summarized the Aid paper (copy attached)./2/ He used the charts attached to the paper to illustrate the magnitude of the problem and to emphasize that an agricultural program must be integrated into the national economy of every developing country. /2/Reference is to a discussion paper entitled "The World Food Problem," signed by Bell on July 15. Secretary Freeman: India is doing what it said it would do in improving seed, developing water resources, and increasing the use and production of fertilizer. Famine is not likely now in India but we must get tough with the Indians to ensure that they achieve a five percent agricultural growth rate. As to U.S. domestic production, we should return additional U.S. acreage to food production. We need enough food to ensure that famine will not occur in the future. The Indians have lived up to their commitments and we must live up to ours. (Secretary Freeman's paper and table referred to are attached.)/3/ /3/A July 19 paper entitled "Review of the World Food Situation," and eight tables illustrating the U.S. wheat situation were attached. The Vice President: We should increase the amount of wheat carried over into the next year in order to block the speculators and to use it as a means of holding down inflation. Secretary Freeman: A final decision on the increase in U.S. acreage must be taken no later than Labor Day. The President: Every official taking part in the Development Assistance Committee meeting this week (the Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary Freeman, Ambassador Bell) should make clear that the United States is deadly serious about a worldwide effort to fight hunger and that it is in the interests of all advanced countries to help to the fullest extent that they can. Secretary Rusk should prepare plans for a State-AID-Agriculture-BOB effort to prepare studies and recommendations as to the next steps to be taken in the war on hunger. A major objective of this Administration is the export of food, health, and education. Top priority must be given to getting Congress to authorize adequate resources for this purpose. Secretary Fowler: The export of U. S. goods and services is desirable if it is done in such ways as to avoid displacing commercial markets. The export of cash is not. We must get on a burden-sharing basis with other countries because of the effect on our balance of payments position of the movement abroad of U.S. resources. We must insist that international organizations find ways to transfer abroad our resources with the least effect on our balance of payments. Bromley Smith
359. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 25, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 355. No classification marking. SUBJECT In accordance with NSAM 351/2/ there is transmitted herewith a report on the Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem./3/ The report has been approved by the Senior Interdepartmental Group, by the Secretary of Defense and by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. /2/Document 347. /3/This undated report, prepared by the Senior Interdepartmental Group, is summarized in Document 363. Documentation on the preparation of the report and its consideration by the Senior Interdepartmental Group is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, SIG, Vol. I, 12th Meeting, 7/15/66. The report recommends no dramatic steps to discourage the Indians from starting a nuclear weapons program; this is because we have been unable to devise anything dramatic which would not cost us more than any anticipated gain. The report does, however, recommend that a number of further studies be made, as this is a developing rather than a static situation. We have all agreed that our purpose with respect to the Indians is to buy time during which, hopefully, we can move forward on broader fronts to bring under more permanent control the dangers inherent in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Dean Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
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