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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
266. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 15, 1965, 5:20 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2569. Secret. Drafted by Handley. The memorandum is marked "Draft" and includes handwritten additions and corrections. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. According to the President's Daily Dairy, the U.S. advisers present included Ball, Hare, Handley, McConaughy, and Hand. The Pakistani advisers were Bhutto, Faruque, Aziz Ahmed, Ghulam Ahmed, Gauhar, Salman Ali, and Iftikhar Ali. The time of the meeting is also taken from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) President Johnson said that he and President Ayub had rehearsed and reviewed problems of both countries. He was very happy that President Ayub had been able to visit him and he wished that this visit had taken place earlier, a year or two before. He hoped that there would be another visit in the months ahead. He said that there was no leader with whom he had more rapport, understanding, or friendship. President Johnson said he and President Ayub had discussed in a completely frank way a number of serious matters which were of deep concern to both countries. For its part, the United States would do what it can do. He was praying that the upcoming Tashkent Conference would be successful. He was sure that there is nothing that Pakistan wants to do that is inimical to the United States. He had made it clear to President Ayub that if the Pakistani people are in danger of being "gobbled up" the United States would be there just as they are in Viet-Nam. The President said that President Ayub had come asking for nothing but was going away with everything--with our friendship, our confidence, and our trust. "Indeed, everything we have got". President Johnson said that he would like Mr. Arthur Dean to go to Pakistan, "as I did," to visit heads of government, and to make recommendations on how to improve the machinery. He repeated that he believed and would say so to our people, that Pakistan would not do anything that is inimical to the United States. He said that although nothing specific had been discussed or decided, he had told President Ayub that we are not going to let Pakistan say that we cannot feed India, adding that Pakistan had not asked any such thing. Nor were we going to let India think that we cannot protect Pakistan. He did not know how two heads of State could leave each other with more feeling of brotherly love. He recalled his visit to Pakistan and said that he had never visited any country where he was treated better or that he loved more. Speaking directly to President Ayub, he said that "If your life (Pakistan) is threatened, ours will be also threatened". President Ayub replied that he wished the United States had felt the same way a few months ago when Pakistan's life was being threatened. He went on to say that the conversation had done his soul a lot of good and that in spite of what he had read in the press, he and President Johnson had been able to have frank and friendly talks. He knew that Pakistan had no right to dictate United States policy to India or to other countries but that he hoped we would understand Pakistan's position. All Pakistan expects is an understanding of its position. Pakistan would never have any intention of doing any damage to the real interest of the United States. Pakistan is very deeply concerned about Viet-Nam because Viet-Nam is in Asia. He hoped that the Viet-Nam problem will come to a satisfactory end. Pakistan would be a force for moderation. He had stated in "sensitive places" (Peking) that the United States has a legitimate stake in that part of the world. At the same time Viet-Nam was of deep concern to Pakistan because it did affect its own security. He said that because of Viet-Nam and Chinese actions in Asia there seemed to be at the moment a strange coalition between India, the United States, and the Soviet Union. In reiterating his deep satisfaction about his meeting with President Johnson he stressed the hope that the President could visit Pakistan sometime in the future.
267./Record of Meeting/1/ Washington, December 15, 1965, 5:40 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2569. Secret. Drafted by Handley. The memorandum is marked "Draft" and contains handwritten revisions. The meeting took place in the Oval Office of the White House. The time and place of the meeting are taken from the President's Daily Diary; the memorandum itself indicates that Ayub and Johnson met between 4:30 and 5:30. (Johnson Library) The Daily Diary also indicates that the advisers present included Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Hare, McConaughy, Komer, Handley, Arthur Dean, Chief of Protocol Lloyd Hand, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs David Popper. PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS TO US ADVISERS CONCERNING The President initially addressed his remarks to Mr. Arthur Dean. He said he wanted Mr. Dean to "go out there", and to see what has to be done. He should realize that Ayub felt himself threatened by India and was deeply afraid that Pakistan would be "gobbled up". In discussing his afternoon's conversation with President Ayub, the President said that Ayub had told him that Pakistan's first obligation was to the United States. Ayub had no agreements of any kind with the Chicoms but what if the Indians were to try to gobble up Pakistan. The President replied that we would do what we did in Viet-Nam. We were not going to let anybody overrun them. Ayub said that was all he wanted to know. He did not want any economic or military aid at this point. Only the reassurance "you have given me." The President philosophized about the spot in which Ayub seemed to find himself. Ayub felt hemmed in by powerful neighbors on all sides--China, Russia and India. At home he had his domestic problems with the Bhutto group and others. Ayub seemed almost to have a psychosis about India. On Kashmir the President said he had told Ayub to do his best at Tashkent and that if Tashkent failed we would try something else as Goldberg indicated last night. But he should not be under any illusions that we can force a settlement. If we were able to we would have done so already. The President told Ayub that we were not going to let Pakistan tell us how to handle India. We will give India food or anything else we want. Our Indian policy is our business. Ayub said he fully understood this but what if the Indians tried to knock us off? The President said we would not let them. The President indicated that if Pakistan wanted close relations with us there could be no serious relationship with the Chicoms. We could not live with that. At the same time we understood certain relationships just as a wife could understand a Saturday night fling by her husband so long as she was the wife. Ayub got the point. On aid, when the President started to talk about the possibility of providing some starters for Pakistani planes to deliver food to remote mountain areas and about the release of $40 million in 1965 loans for the Mangla transmission line, Ayub stopped him by saying he didn't want to talk about aid just now. Ayub said, "I don't want to ask for any aid, that's up to you." The President said that Ayub had spoken at length about Pakistani public opinion which thought that the United States had stabbed Pakistan in the back and that the Americans favored India. The Paks thought this began when the United States gave military aid to India in 1962. Ayub mentioned that this had begun under President Kennedy and that he was reluctant to say anything bad about a decision made by a man who was now tragically dead. The President told Ayub that Pakistan ought to give some of its rice surplus to India and open its ports to help relieve famine in India. If Pakistan would ship rice, we would replace it with wheat. Ayub said that the rice export was a possibility and that Pakistan had some of the world's finest rice. He also said that the two big Pakistan ports were already clogged with a backlog of ships, but thought that Chalna could be used although it would require lighters. Chalna was near Calcutta. If the Indians came to the Pakistanis and said that the United States wanted to use this port to help relieve famine in India, Ayub would approve, but the Indians would have to ask. Ayub had said, "I know you won't believe it but those Indians are going to gobble us up." President Johnson had replied that if they tried this we would stop them and that he believed we could do this simply by telling India we would not allow it. We cannot believe that India would attack Pakistan if the United States were opposed. The President said that we would like to have Pakistan troops in Viet-Nam under their SEATO Treaty but that we would not ask for them. The President thought that Ayub was much chastened. He had gone on an adventure and been licked. He felt very uncomfortable now, so much so that the President commented that he hated to see a proud man humble himself so. Ayub was subdued, troubled, pathetic and sad. So much so that even Mrs. Johnson had commented on it. The President told Ayub he would never try to upset him. Did Ayub believe it. Ayub said, yes, he did. The President said that Ayub had better be more concerned about his own people and not about us. Ayub defended Bhutto and said that Bhutto had wanted him to come much sooner to the United States. The President commented that anything Ayub had said about Bhutto would not offend Bhutto if he read it. Ayub had complained that our Government officials were always more sympatico toward India. We always sent our best people to India, especially those who were closest to the White House e.g. Galbraith. The President recalled that in 1961 Ayub had begged him to ask President Kennedy to send one of the Bundy boys. The President commented that it would help a lot if we could send a good new Ambassador to Pakistan. The President then emphasized how close he felt to Ayub. He understood him, his fears, his problems. He was impressed that Ayub had asked him for nothing specific and felt that good groundwork for the visit had been laid by Prime Minister Wilson and by our people in the field. Recognizing President Ayub's need for reassurance the President had told him that he would no more think about injuring Lady Bird than he would Ayub. There ensued some discussion about the timing of the Dean mission, i.e. whether it should be before or after the Shastri visit. The general sense was that it should be after Shastri had visited Washington and that it should be to both India and Pakistan.
268. National Security Action Memorandum No. 339/1/ Washington, December 17, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 339, Critical Indian Food Situation. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT I am deeply concerned on humanitarian grounds with the near famine conditions which are developing in India, and which may require a dramatic rescue operation on the part of those nations able to assist. As you know, I have already announced that the United States would participate in such an effort. I further understand from my discussion with you that the key bottleneck may be less the availability of sufficient foodgrains from abroad than lack of available shipping, inadequate Indian port facilities, and inefficient food distribution facilities within India. These factors could critically hamper any international effort to get enough food to India's hungry. Therefore, I request that you establish a special committee, including representation from the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, the Agency for International Development, and such other Departments and Agencies as you deem necessary, to examine urgently how to cope with the looming Indian famine problem. I want you to regard all available resources of the U.S. Government as being at your disposal in planning for such an effort. After assessing the likely dimensions of the crisis and what would be required to meet it, you and your group should recommend whatever imaginative emergency techniques and devices which may be necessary to help prevent mass starvation in India. I would like personally to review your recommendations as soon as they can be made available, before deciding what action I will take along with other interested governments./2/ /2/Komer and Bundy recommended the text of NSAM No. 339 to the President on December 16, noting that it "puts the bee on Freeman to mastermind any famine rescue effort," drawing on the government's resources as necessary. (Ibid.) On December 27 Freeman sent a memorandum to the heads of the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, the Agency for International Development, the Bureau of the Budget, and to Presidential Assistant Donald F. Hornig reporting on progress in response to NSAM No. 339. He noted that two inter-agency task forces had been established in response to the crisis in India. A food shipment operations task force was chaired by C.R. Eskildsen, Deputy Administrator of the Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA, and an agricultural productivity task force was chaired by Walter G. Farr, Jr., Deputy Assistant Administrator (NESA/AID). In addition, Freeman appointed Dorothy Jacobson, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs, to chair an executive committee to monitor progress, consider policy questions, and issue progress reports. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, India 1966) Lyndon B. Johnson
269. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey/1/ Washington, December 17, 1965, 6:08 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 9 PAK. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted in the White House, cleared by Komer, and approved by Hare. Repeated to Karachi. 509. You should deliver following personal message from President direct to President Ayub during his stopover Ankara 3 pm tomorrow: "Mr. President: After reflecting on our candid talks I am convinced that we are back on an upward track in US-Pakistan relations. As a mark of my confidence, I have told David Bell to proceed with five loan agreements for the Mangla Dam Transmission Lines, the Lahore-Multan Highway, Sui Gas, Diesel Locomotives for your western railway, and a major loan for investigation and consulting services for the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority. We will not announce these now, but can do so at the time the loan agreements are signed. We are also looking urgently into the matter of starter motors and spare parts for your C 130's to deliver food in your northern areas. Again I must say that I regard our talks as a major step toward re-establishment of mutual confidence, and am very glad that you came./2/ Signed Lyndon B. Johnson." /2/The Embassy in Turkey reported that the message was delivered to Ayub at the Ankara airport on December 18. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2569) On December 20 Ayub expressed his gratitude for the swift action on the loan agreements in a letter to Johnson. (Ayub's letter was conveyed in a letter from Ambassador Ahmed to Secretary Rusk, December 20; ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 476, Lebanon thru Pakistan) The Embassy in India was informed of the decisions taken on these loans in telegram 1088 to New Delhi, December 20. The telegram noted that the loans had been previously authorized out of FY 1965 funds, and did not represent a new FY 1966 commitment. (Ibid., Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 9 PAK) Rusk
270. Memorandum for Record/1/ Washington, December 20, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VI, Cables/Memos/Misc., 1965-1966. Secret. SUBJECT /2/Subramaniam was in Washington at Freeman's invitation to discuss the food crisis in India. Subramaniam also met with Freeman, Bell, Rusk, Vice President Humphrey, and a group of Congressmen. In his meeting with Rusk on December 22, Subramaniam said that the drought was the worst India had known since the 1890s, and that unless special measures were taken starvation was inevitable. (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, SOC 10 INDIA) PRESENT The President Minister Subramaniam The President cordially welcomed Subramaniam, saying that he had looked forward to Subramaniam's visit. Secretary Freeman had filled him in on the Rome discussions and Subramaniam's program; in fact, Freeman was a wonderful public relations man on this matter. Subramaniam said he brought the best wishes of Prime Minister Shastri, who looked forward to his February visit. Subramaniam too thought there had been good discussions in Rome. He felt that Agriculture now had first priority in India's Fourth Plan, and he appreciated the US support. The President replied that he too looked forward to Shastri's coming. By then he would have submitted to Congress various proposals on food, health, population and other fields which would be of mutual interest. Freeman had reported how Subramaniam had exerted real leadership on India's food problem. This was very good. Perhaps Freeman should go out to India soon to see the situation for himself. The President then mentioned the Ayub visit. He said that Ayub had made no criticism of anything we were doing for India. The President had deliberately authorized the $50 million fertilizer loan before Ayub came so that he wouldn't misunderstand our policy. In fact, Ayub realized that he couldn't write our Indian policies for us. Ayub didn't indulge in any ancient history, which made the meeting much easier. The President had asked him if he could use some of Pakistan's ports if necessary to move in food for India. Ayub had replied that if this was practicable, it would be manageable. The President thought that something along these lines would be an excellent means of promoting Pak-Indian rapprochement. Subramaniam agreed. The President then developed his own thinking on how to help meet the Indian food crisis. We ought to look at everything we could do to help, not just at making food available. The whole problem of shipping, port facilities, transportation and internal distribution "ought to be attacked just as if we were in a war". He asked Secretary Freeman to move as fast as possible on these matters--and to talk to our best people in such fields. The President remarked that he had seen a press story about extensive storage losses in India. Subramaniam replied that this was overdone; it had actually been a local problem. He described the new "safe grains" movement to cope with this problem. At this point the President described the motivations behind US policy. We were not interested in disciplining anyone, in becoming the masters of anyone, or in dominating anyone. All we wanted was India's friendship. Nor were we cocky about our own economic successes, because 25% of our people still had all sorts of needs. We had a poverty problem, a Negro problem, an urban problem, a health problem, etc. The President explained how he was trying to do something about all of them. And our interest did not stop at our boundary. We wanted to do something about health, education and poverty all over the world. One of the key things the President was going to try and do during his term of office was to achieve new results in the field of food and agriculture, health, population, and education abroad as well as at home. We would exercise whatever persuasion we could toward these ends. We wanted to provide incentives too. He told Subramaniam that "you gave us an incentive in your new program. If you can keep this program going we can help you more." Subramaniam thanked the President. He then raised the special importance of taking extra care of children. They were the future. He felt that India should have a separate children's program in this crisis, so that India could say that children had equal opportunities. The President responded warmly to this idea. The President then explained how his postponement of the Shastri and Ayub visits had nothing to do with Indian and Pakistani criticism of the US. He simply wanted to have his money in the bank before he talked aid matters. However, the postponement had led to misunderstandings. Both Subramaniam and B.K. Nehru assured the President that these were matters of the past and that there was no residue of concern at all. The President mentioned three points which he thought were important to US-Indian collaboration. First, if we could find some way to get Kashmir considered and out of the way, this would help us to get on with much more important things. Second, he hoped that India would get other countries to help meet the food crisis. The more that others could do in some kind of international consortium the more helpful we could be. Third, he had to give the US people some hope that India would be able to take care of itself and even to help others in due time. So the President urged that the Indians and ourselves put a food consortium together. This would help mightily with Symington and others in Congress. He was proud of the way in which he had gotten the aid bill through with fewer cuts than at almost any previous time. In fact, he had gotten about 85% of his legislative program through, but the honeymoon was over. The President also pointed out that he had never criticized Shastri. Indeed, the whole American press was remarkably free of criticism of India. The President summed up by telling Secretary Freeman to see what we needed in a crash program, to see that our wheat and that of others got all the way to the Indian people who needed it most. We must try to avoid any holdup because of inadequate ports or distribution. He told Freeman to follow every sack of wheat from the US silo to the Indian stomach. Second, he said "let us get others in the act. Let us tell others what they can contribute." He thought that he might raise this matter with Erhard, and described his difficulties in getting the British and Germans to contribute to the Asian bank. The President ended by urging Subramaniam to meet the press in the West lobby. He and Freeman should describe the general tenor of the discussions and also indicate that we had discussed some of the problems which would be taken up at the President's meeting with Prime Minister Shastri. RWK
271. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 20, 1965, 5:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. V, Memos, 9/65-1/66. Top Secret; Eyes Only. We have a fascinating up-to-the minute report/2/ [1 line of source text not declassified] that: (a) Bhutto seems to regard Ayub as having sold out on his US trip; (b) Bhutto may be planning to use some papers relating to a secret Pak/Chicom deal against Ayub; (c) Bhutto thinks he'd better quit--he actually dictated a letter of resignation to Ayub; (d) Bhutto believes that Aziz Ahmed has been won over to the American side, and that G. Ahmed is also on that side. The only mention of you is that Bhutto says you "back-patted Aziz Ahmed" a great deal (and apparently to good effect). /2/Not found. This report suggests that the visit (plus our hard line posture leading up to it) have really shaken the Paks, that changes in Pak policy are in the offing, and that Bhutto may be on the way out/3/ (we don't know, of course, whether he actually did send his resignation to Ayub). This report also tends to confirm some older reports from the same source on a secret Pak/Chicom understanding. /3/President Johnson discussed the subsequent resignation of Bhutto in a telephone conversation with former President Eisenhower on November 4, 1967. Johnson said that he had discussed Bhutto with Ayub during Ayub's visit to Washington in December 1965. [text not declassified] He told Eisenhower that he warned Ayub about Bhutto: "I just said to him--now, Mr. President, I know you rely on Bhutto just like I rely on Dean Rusk and like Eisenhower relied on Dulles, but you can't rely on him that way and I am not entering your internal affairs, but this man is damn dangerous as far as you are concerned and you are my friend and I am going to give you this warning and I know whereof I speak. [text not declassified]" (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and President Eisenhower, November 4, 1967, 10:05 a.m., Tape 67.14, Side B, PNO 40) R.W. Komer/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, December 23, 1965, 6:13 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 INDIA. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by E. T. Olson (USDA); cleared in USDA by Brown, Vickery, Eskildsen (FAS), and Freeman; cleared in State by Sober (SOA), and in AID/NESA by Donovan; and approved by Handley. Repeated to Karachi, London, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. 1122. For Bowles from Freeman. Reference our tel re Freeman-Subramaniam December 22 summary/2/ letter text follows: /2/Reference is to telegram 1121 to New Delhi, December 23, which summarized Subramaniam's meetings in Washington, and characterized them as "very useful." (Ibid., SOC 10 INDIA) Dear Mr. Minister: We were pleased that you could accept our invitation to come here on such short notice to discuss the food situation in your country. Your visit has made us intensely aware of the serious difficulties faced by your people and of the means by which our governments might cooperate in meeting these difficulties. As you make your plans to speed the movement of grain into India, it would be most helpful if you could provide on a weekly basis information on the arrival of grain by ports as well as supply and distribution information on grain under the control of the Central Government. We also need more detailed information on a monthly basis, including the supply and distribution of grains held by the states. I understand that representatives of your Government and mine are in agreement as to the detailed format for this reporting. We would hope to be advised of any unusual situations which would affect the movement of grain. We understand that you would welcome a team of US specialists to make a quick survey of the port and internal transport system, along with storage facilities. We are prepared to send such a team within a few weeks. The leader of the team, someone well acquainted with Indian agriculture and food problems, might be stationed in New Delhi working closely with you./3/ I might designate a Special Representative who would be on a more permanent basis. He would keep me posted on progress in implementing your longer-term agricultural development plans. If he could have access to you and be privy to your plans it would be very helpful. /3/On December 30 Freeman sent another telegram to Bowles in which he indicated that he planned to send a team of specialists to India for a 3-week survey beginning January 9. Freeman named C.R. Eskildsen, Associate Administrator of the Foreign Agricultural Service, to head the team. (Telegram 1155 to New Delhi; ibid.) After current crop prospects, the short-fall in 1966 and the potential 1967 short-fall have been reviewed once more, we believe that an appeal should be made for external assistance to the "Community of Nations." This appeal should be made as quickly and dramatically as feasible. It would be well if it preceded the meeting between Prime Minister Shastri and President Johnson in early February. This might even take the form of an appeal by the representative of India to the United Nations. It is also my understanding that you have begun to examine the possibilities of using large bulk carriers to discharge grain in midstream into smaller vessels and lighters for ultimate delivery to ports. In our discussion, there appeared to be certain problems in connection with the registry of the "liberty" type or smaller vessels which might be used for this purpose as well as the availability of such vessels. I trust you will be examining this situation further with the objective of increasing the overall discharge capacity at your ports as rapidly as possible. We would like some help from you in overcoming certain problems we face in the United States. Internal rail transport and some ports are already in full use. If shipping requirements are increased, we may need to use facilities not normally used for shipments to your country. Your cooperation and that of your purchasing mission here in Washington in meeting these problems and limitations we face will be appreciated. We are pleased with the progress that we have been able to make during our talks this week and we hope that we can continue our further close cooperation during the months ahead. Please keep us informed of any way in which we can be of further assistance. You have done a splendid job here and left a strong favorable impression with everyone. I have enjoyed coming to know you personally and look forward to a close and enjoyable personal and working relationship. Sincerely yours, Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture Rusk
273. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, December 30, 1965, 8:02 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, SOC 10 INDIA. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by R.H. Johnson and Handley; cleared by Farr (AID/NESA), Deputy Assistant Secretary Walter M. Kotschnig (IO), Laise, Terrell E. Arnold (E/TEP), Jacobson (USDA), and Special Assistant to the Secretary for Food for Peace Richard W. Reuter; and approved by Hare. Repeated to London, Ottawa, Canberra, and Karachi. 1170. Deptel 1071,/2/ Cirtel 1242./3/ /2/In telegram 1071 to New Delhi, December 16, the Embassy was informed that U.S. readiness to provide special assistance to India over and above P.L. 480 assistance was related to the willingness of the Indian Government to inform the international community of the seriousness of the problem and the vigor with which it sought international help. The Embassy was instructed to make the U.S. position clear. (Ibid.) /3/Circular telegram 1242, December 30, addressed to 13 posts in Europe and Asia, summarized Subramaniam's visit to Washington and emphasized the importance of a broad international effort to meet the food crisis in India. The Department indicated that it intended to call in representatives of the 13 countries to which India had made informal soundings asking for help. The Embassies were instructed to weigh in in support of that approach. (Ibid., AID (US) 15-8 INDIA) The Department sent additional messages to London, Ottawa, and Canberra stating that the United States considered that the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia would play major roles in helping India meet its critical food needs. (Telegrams 3744 to London, 717 to Ottawa, and 504 to Canberra, all December 30; ibid., SOC 10 INDIA) 1. Top levels here continue to view early organization by GOI of international effort to help India with food situation matter of highest priority. Request that you follow up with appropriate GOI officials this aspect Subramaniam visit immediately, discussing subject with them along following lines. 2. As President and Secretaries Rusk and Freeman made clear to Subramaniam, our readiness to provide food assistance over and above current level related to GOI willingness frankly to inform international community seriousness Indian food situation and to vigor with which it seeks international help. Organization of international effort will require considerable initiative and ingenuity. Subramaniam indicated that he recognized importance of such an effort, that he would discuss FAO role with Sen of FAO during Rome airport stop and would take up subject with PM and President upon return. We would be interested in results of such consultation. 3. As to how GOI effort should be organized, most urgent need is bilateral follow-up with countries in best position to provide help with respect immediate food needs. Especially important is effort, through diversions and other means, to utilize Indian port capacity to maximum possible extent next six weeks. As indicated septels, US is backing up Indian effort this regard through own bilateral approaches. 4. However, GOI should begin now effort to provide broader international framework for food and agricultural aid. This important to provide (a) framework within which countries unable to provide immediate food or shipping but able to provide fertilizer, seed and other aid for 1966 crop can be given reasonable assurance their contribution related to longer-term Indian effort deal with its basic agricultural problems; (b) means of coordinating international effort to ensure proper priorities and time phasing; (c) means of dramatizing international support. In broad terms emergency effort should be seen as means of dramatizing and moving toward international effort to support GOI solutions to longer term problem. 5. After having considered alternative approaches to organization of international effort, we believe best mechanism would be creation by GOI of coordinating committee of potential donor governments and donor international agencies, sitting in Delhi and including representation from FAO and World Bank. Indian designated to head international effort should be person of prominence, preferably Subramaniam himself. Other representatives on committee might be ambassadors in Delhi or special representatives sent to Delhi for purpose. Job of committee would be to support GOI efforts, as detailed para. 4, to muster international help of all kinds relevant to immediate crisis and next year's crop; to coordinate effort; and to dramatize international aspect. Chairman would play leading personal role. 6. In order achieve its important and urgent objectives, such an arrangement should be promptly established, hopefully within a week. With convening of US Congress, upcoming Presidential messages to Congress, etc., it essential that we have soonest some indication of GOI plans and initial actions so that US effort can be placed in broader international context. 7. Most important to any effort that GOI make clear to potential donors urgency of situation. Rusk
274. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 4, 1966, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VI, Cables, Memos, Miscellaneous, 9/65-1/66. Secret. Here is another brilliant, though awfully wordy, report on India famine by Freeman./2/ It boils down to the fact that the most efficient and cheapest way to minimize famine (there will be some in any case) is to schedule an optimum flow into Indian ports before their capacity drops sharply when the rainy season begins in May. Otherwise we and other donors will have to resort to expensive emergency measures at that time. /2/Reference is to a January 4 memorandum from Freeman to President Johnson with a subject line that reads: "Follow up on Indian Food and Agriculture Situation." (Ibid., Cables, 9/65-1/66) The 1.5 million tons have already been purchased and are being shipped as fast as possible. But there will be a gap in the pipeline and a sharp shortfall from the million tons a month we'd like to get in before the rains come unless we either (a) authorize at least another 500,000 tons shortly, or (b) at least tell the Indians privately we will, so they can firmly book shipping ahead. Freeman reports that India is urgently requesting help from others, and getting some responses, but the evidence is that no one besides ourselves and Canada has much wheat (and Canadian ports get frozen over). Frankly, one problem is that Freeman and the rest of us hesitate to hit you so soon again on Indian food./3/ However, would there be some appropriate place in the series of messages you are planning for a new dramatic announcement shortly? /3/McGeorge Bundy sent this memorandum to the President with an attached note that reads: "Bob Komer was scared to frame the specific recommendations on his covering memo here, but I told him that you were bolder than he on serious matters and that you were an admirer of honest advice. So here it comes with my courage and his wisdom." (Ibid.) Freeman is sending a technical mission to India Thursday and would like to go briefly himself around 20 January (perhaps en route to Vietnam). Would this merit a White House announcement along with another 500,000 or million tons of food? Draft WH announcement /4/Johnson wrote in the margin, in response to these recommendations, "See me." R.W. Komer
275. Letter From Prime Minister Shastri to President Johnson/1/ Tashkent, January 6, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Shastri Correspondence. No classification marking. The letter was conveyed to the White House on January 6 under a covering note from Chargé P.K. Banerjee. Dear Mr. President, I was happy to get your message/2/ which was conveyed to me by your Embassy in New Delhi just after Christmas. Minister Subramaniam told me about the warmth of the reception he had in Washington and of the generous offer of additional help to meet the critical shortage of foodgrains which we in India are facing due to the extremely poor monsoons that we had last year. We are doing everything possible to mobilise whatever assistance we can get from other countries, so that the entire burden does not fall upon you. /2/In a message to Shastri transmitted to New Delhi in telegram 1133, December 24, Johnson indicated that he was looking forward to Shastri's visit to Washington and expressed his confidence in Shastri's determination to deal with India's food crisis. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 294, Johnson/India 1964-1965) The signed letter, subsequently sent to Shastri, is dated January 4. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, India, 4/15/65-2/28/66) 2. Ambassador Harriman saw me in Delhi/3/ on the eve of my departure for Tashkent. I am greatly impressed by the determined effort which you are making to bring about a peace in Vietnam. Ambassador Harriman recognised that our own relationship with Hanoi was not such as to enable us to make a positive contribution by making any direct approaches to the Government of North Vietnam. He was, however, anxious that I could speak to Mr. Kosygin and I had a talk with him on the subject last night. /3/Harriman saw Shastri in New Delhi on January 2 and Ayub in Peshawar on January 3 to discuss Vietnam. Documentation on Harriman's brief visit to the subcontinent is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 HARRIMAN and POL 27 VIET S. 3. Mr. Kosygin's attitude was not negative. He emphasised, however, that the important thing was to find a basis for talks which was acceptable to Hanoi also and he welcomed the approach which Ambassador Harriman had made to the Government of Poland. He also indicated that the visit of Shelepin to Hanoi was intended to help the cause of peace. 4. My talks with President Ayub have just started. We are facing many difficult issues. I am hoping that both of us would subscribe to the principle of not having recourse to force for resolving them and I feel that once this has come about, there will be a different atmosphere in which it will be easier to resolve and reconcile our differences. 5. My wife and I are looking forward to our visit to the U.S.A. I hope that even before that, there will be substantial progress towards lowering of tensions in Asia. 6. May I once again express my deep appreciation for the timely and generous help you have offered in dealing with our food problem? With warm personal regards, Yours sincerely, Lal Bahadur/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
276. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 6, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VI, Cables, 9/65-1/66. No classification marking. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by the President. SUBJECT I have been reading the history of the last great famine in India--in 1943--and discussing with experts the timing of various aspects of the Indian food situation this year. Three facts emerge. 1. During February and March of this year there will be about 500,000 tons of unutilized Indian port capacity which could be used to build stocks if grain shipments get there on time. From April on port capacity will be tight. 2. If chemical fertilizers are to be applied in time to raise output in the November 1966 harvest, they must arrive in India by June. 3. If the food situation is as serious as all our experts tell us it will be, there will be certain signs of malnutrition and famine in the spring; but the most dangerous period will come in the months August-October 1966. From these facts, it seems clear that we ought to make a maximum effort now to use the 500,000 tons of idle port capacity available during February and March. That would be enough grain to feed something like 10 million people in the three critical months before the November harvest. Although we will be exploring with the Indians the possibility of extraordinary methods for food delivery, it is possible that what we lose in February and March will be lost for good. So far as the U.S. is concerned, it may take a prompt decision by you to proceed with a PL 480 agreement beyond the 1.5 million tons in order to mobilize the wheat and the shipping in time to exploit the idle port capacity available in February and March. In addition, it may be necessary for the Indians to put direct, very high-level pressure on the Canadians and Australians to divert some ships from their commercial traffic to Indian ports. I suspect only decisions by the Prime Ministers could force the special arrangements required to divert cargoes. We may wish Chet Bowles to call this possibility to Shastri's attention when he returns from Tashkent. Frankly, what worries me, as a planner, is that a good many human beings may starve in those critical months before the next harvest because all of us didn't make the special urgent effort necessary to use the idle port capacity briefly available in the next several months./2/ (Probably 3 million Indians starved to death in the 1943 famine.) /2/Komer sent a memorandum to President Johnson on January 8 in which he also stressed the importance of taking advantage of the opportunity to ship grain to India before Indian port capacity was cut by the onset of the rainy season in late May. (Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18, January 1-8, 1966) A similar sense of urgency will be required to round up the chemical fertilizers and get them there by June. If they don't lay the fertilizer down in time, we could have a second thin harvest in 1966-67. In the case of fertilizers, pressure will probably have to be exerted on Japan, Germany and Britain, since I am told that our fertilizer production and shipping capacity are committed to the hilt. Again, the Indians should be leaning on them; and we should be backing their play. Walt
277. Memorandum From Secretary of Agriculture Freeman to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 7, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VI, Cables, 9/65-1/66. Administratively Confidential. SUBJECT 1. McGeorge Bundy has relayed to me your instructions./2/ The technical team will not leave as scheduled. /2/Bundy sent this memorandum to the President on January 7 under cover of a memorandum that reads: "I had a talk with Orville this morning after my conversation with you, and this is the result. I hope you may find it more nearly what you want from him." (Ibid.) 2. The team will stand by for further instructions. Bundy informs me that it is not your intention to cancel the team but rather to delay it until the Pakistan India Tashkent conversations have concluded./3/ /3/Freeman sent a cable to Bowles on January 7 informing him that the survey team would be delayed. (Telegram 1227 to New Delhi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, SOC 10 INDIA) On January 8 Bowles replied to Freeman that the Indian Government, and Subramaniam in particular, were "severely let down" and concerned by the last-minute postponement for unspecified reasons. (Telegram 1173 from New Delhi; ibid.) Komer sent a cable to Bowles on January 8 in which he explained: "Might be helpful if I underline privately that failure GOI as yet to mount all-out effort to get famine aid from other countries is impeding our own response." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles) Telegram 1247 to New Delhi, January 11, informed the Embassy that the trip had been rescheduled and the Eskildsen team was planning to be in India January 14-16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, SOC 10 INDIA) 3. It is important that we keep as much pressure on Shastri in particular and the Indian Government in general as possible. To date they have conformed to our wishes in general terms. Public announcements implementing your expressions in your conference with Subramaniam and the Rome agreement have been made and a number of actions have been taken and instructions issued in New Delhi. However, that does not mean that the Indian Bureaucracy and the Indian States are acting. To the extent that we can measure the real commitment of the Indian Government and the Indian people by actions taken as well as announced, this should be done prior to the Shastri visit. We can make such judgments only from detailed information verified on the spot, not from generalizations. Hence the importance of getting the team to India and back as quickly as possible. They have been instructed not only to review and survey the Indian capacity for handling various volumes of grain (no commitments implied), but also to check thoroughly plans for the 1967 crop and how the long term Indian agricultural program is moving. The team will be headed by Clarence Eskildsen, the Deputy Administrator of the Foreign Agricultural Service. He is a highly competent, experienced man. His rank is such that the team is clearly on a professional technical not a policy mission and there will be no basis for reading any commitment into it. 4. The Indians have been following up the possibility you suggested to Subramaniam that I might visit India before the Shastri visit. They have sent a number of inquiries this week about my plans. I expect I owe them a response one way or the other fairly soon. Advantages (1) Obviously I would be able to advise the President more solidly after following up the technical team's conclusions personally on the ground. (2) Attention will be focused world-wide on the generosity of President Johnson and the U.S.A. where India's food needs are concerned. (3) It may be that I could put more pressure on the Indians to take actions we might think are necessary prior to the Shastri visit rather than after. Commitments we may conclude are necessary which I could not get the President might require from Shastri at the time of the visit. Disadvantage An appearance by a Member of the President's Cabinet might well be interpreted as an overall commitment of the United States to provide whatever food is necessary in India in 1966. As you are well aware there has been considerable speculation to this effect already. We have done our best to prevent such speculation and to make clear that there is no commitment. Yet the very process of planning the logistics for the future (which we cannot afford to postpone) tends to stimulate speculative stories of U.S. commitment no matter how cautiously we proceed. Recommendation On balance I would recommend my visit to India wait until after the Shastri visit. Additional pressure that we might be able to build up by a pre-Shastri visit would on balance, I think, be negated by the inevitable publicity which would carry an implication of a far-reaching commitment by the United States Government should I visit India this month. On the basis then that we will keep the most pressure on the Indian Government by withholding my visit until after the Shastri visit I would so recommend. Action/4/ /4/Options 1 and 4 are circled on the memorandum. It is not clear that the President made the markings, but the choices reflect the decisions that were made. 1. Postpone your visit until following Shastri.
278. Editorial Note President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri met at Tashkent in the Soviet Union January 4-10, 1966, to discuss the conflict that had recently grown out of the long-standing Kashmir dispute. Soviet Chairman Kosygin played an active role during the talks in promoting the agreement that was signed on January 10. By the terms of the "Tashkent Declaration," India and Pakistan agreed to the complete withdrawal of all armed personnel of the two countries to the positions they held prior to August 5, 1965, this withdrawal to be achieved by February 25, 1966. Both countries reaffirmed their obligation under the UN Charter "not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means." Against the backdrop of that statement, Kashmir was discussed, a discussion in which each side "set forth its respective position." Both countries expressed a "firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations," including commitments to repatriate POWs, restore normal diplomatic relations, consider measures aimed at restoring economic, trade, communications, and cultural relations, and "to discourage" propaganda directed against the other country. Both countries agreed to continue meeting as necessary "on matters of direct concern." For text of the Tashkent Declaration, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pages 680-681. Indian Prime Minister Shastri died in Tashkent on January 11 of a heart attack. Minister of Home Affairs G.L. Nanda was sworn in as interim Prime Minister. Nanda was not regarded in Washington as likely to maintain the position in the contest that would develop within the Congress Party to succeed Shastri. (Memorandum from Hughes to Rusk, January 10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 4) [Continue with the next documents]
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