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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia Department of State Washington, DC

234. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 5, 1965, 8:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15, Sept. 23-Oct. 14, 1965. Secret. SUBJECT India and Pakistan This is one subject on which I think you may wish to have a brief meeting before you go to Bethesda. There are storm signals in both countries and we can do better in the next two weeks if all hands have up-to-date guidance from you. Moreover, your stay in Bethesda obviously puts off the time at which Shastri could come here, and, along with Ayub's unreadiness to move in a continued state of crisis, reduces the prospect that we can move forward by pressing for early conversations with you--although the Shastri possibility remains important and hopeful, perhaps for late October. Meanwhile, there is a real danger that both Pakistan and India will misread our policy. The Paks may wrongly believe that their alternatives are crude pressure on us or a crude bargain with the Red Chinese--this is the way they are talking and acting. The Indians may wrongly feel that we are using food as a blunt instrument and that the only safe reply in Indian political terms is to move publicly and proudly toward isolation from the West. The Indians may also feel--again quite wrongly--that we intend to try to trade our assistance for their "surrender" on Kashmir. These problems are compounded by the fact that our channels to Ayub and Shastri are clogged, both in Asia and in Washington. Except at the moment of truth on the ceasefire, your government has not succeeded in communicating sharply just what we do and do not want. In part this is the inevitable result of our decision to hold everything until Shastri and Ayub get here. But in part it is also the result of the very rapid changes in Pakistani and Indian thinking because of the enormous national crises into which they have steered themselves. We have not yet adjusted our responses to this new situation. All of this, I suspect, is at least as clear to you as it is to us. But what we now need to do is to sort out our own thinking, and then make some sober and straightforward noises to the Asians. Not as final answers, but as indications of the shape of the problem, we suggest the following principles and the following tactical conclusions: A. Principles 1. India is more important than Pakistan and there is enough hope in India to justify continued support by food and economic aid if the Indians in turn are reasonable with us. 2. Within this priority we still need not lose Pakistan if we can show the Paks the emptiness of the Chinese route and the reality of continued Western economic support. 3. We should not kid ourselves about any early Kashmir settlement. American fidgeting over Kashmir will only make us trouble with India and arouse false hopes in Pakistan. The most we can do is what Goldberg is doing: press for acceptance by both sides of the process of peaceful discussion as against the process of trial by arms. (We emphasize this point because it would help wonderfully in this town if you were to announce this conclusion as your own. Kashmir-fixers are a plentiful and dangerous commodity.) 4. We cannot tie our economic aid to positive progress on Kashmir. We can tie it to reasonable progress in the observance of the UN ceasefire resolution and to the acceptance of political process. We can also tie it to other basic US interests such as: a. Keeping the Paks out of Chinese arms; b. Keeping the Indians from unbalanced surrender to the Soviets (although Soviet help in itself is not intolerable); c. Keeping the Indians away from nuclear weapons; d. Pressing both countries toward better economic and agricultural policies. B. Tactics 1. The thing which is giving us most trouble right now is the absence of dialogue. We are inclined to think that someone clearly speaking for you should be sent to these two countries within the next two or three weeks. This could be Arthur Dean, who begins work tomorrow, but if you want to give him more time to learn, you might want to send one of your own team. There is great advantage in sending someone who really speaks for President Johnson; whatever our other failings, we play your tune, and most people know it. 2. In due course, we should defuse the explosive issue of food as a political weapon. At the same time, we should not get back into long-term agreements. A shift in a couple of weeks from the current one-month basis to a quarterly basis, with appropriate agricultural assurances attached, would do us a lot of good and cost us nothing in terms of leverage. 3. The burden of our song to Ayub and Shastri should be a judicious mixture of firmness, concern, and continued readiness to help on reasonable terms. Specifically, to Ayub: a. We should drive home to the Paks the folly of threats and the still greater folly of switching to Peking. b. On Kashmir, we should maintain our commitment to a process, but make it crystal clear that the only real hope the Paks have here is in conciliation and not conflict with India. This is a fact of life, and their adventure this summer proves it. c. If the Paks are responsive, we are ready to start talking renewed economic aid, but as a simple fact it will be a long time before military assistance can begin again to either party. (These are warnings and expressions of willingness to negotiate--they should not be commitments, since these ought to be reserved both for a later time and a higher level.) 4. To the Indians, we would make it quietly clear that we accept and indeed support their primary role in the subcontinent, and that in particular we are not agents for Pakistan or supreme judges on Kashmir. But, within this basic premise, we could and would press the Indians to recognize the necessity for political process and the advantage to them of gradual conciliation, since they too would lose if the Pakistanis made a fatal plunge toward China. 5. With respect to the UN Resolution, and political process, we should emphasize to both that unless there is a return to the methods of peace, it is a fact and not a theory that the whole future of US assistance will be gravely jeopardized. How can the American Congress justify long-range, large-scale efforts to people who cannot do what is needed to keep the peace? It is this test, not the test of a specific Kashmir settlement, which the American Congress will apply. We have sketched these outlines of a policy, not because we are convinced it is the only one, but because we see a prospect of grave losses in both countries if we go forward in the coming weeks with no policy at all. It is this prospect which makes us urge a meeting even in these last hectic days before you go to Bethesda. McG. B. R. W. Komer Set Up a Meeting Speak to me/2/ /2/The memorandum contains no indication that Johnson responded to these options.   235. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, October 7, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret. Mac-- Pak Gamesmanship. In addition to closing all our smaller facilities, some Paks have been up to other shenanigans of interest: (1) Our Pak friends have sent pictures to Turkey of the way the Karachi mob damaged our USIS installation (show Turks how to deal with US facilities?). (2) We know that in the hands of Karachi mob were handbills containing the Victor Anant Daily Telegraph article about how CIA started the war in an effort to get rid of Ayub. (3) We have at least two indications that Bhutto himself fathered the Anant story (against Ayub?). (4) Another report that Bhutto distributed 300 copies of The Invisible Government in the GOP. (5) A report that the GOP originated a newspaper story in Pakistan claiming that the State Department instructed the US press to play down Indian defeats in an effort to make Congress think India could stand up to China. [1 paragraph (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]/2/ /2/[text not declassified] McConaughy is in at long last with his evaluation of our facilities./3/ It doesn't tell us anything we didn't know. McConaughy doubts whether the GOP has an exaggerated idea any longer of the importance of Peshawar to the US, since the recent record of our aid hold-ups must convince them that they can't use Peshawar as a decisive lever on the US. McConaughy believes that the GOP will not now follow up against Peshawar though its prospects are directly linked with the outcome of the US/Pak relationship and Kashmir. He concludes that the smaller installations were apparently closed because of petty irritations, with no thought that they would strike at the heart of essential US interests in Pakistan or precipitate any Pak/US crisis. /3/Telegram 727 from Karachi, October 6. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15 PAK-US) I grant the risk that strong reaction to closure of our small facilities (actually 6 not 3) might convince the Paks that they are much more important than previously realized and that Pakistan had a larger lever than McConaughy thinks they believe. On the other hand, we are not going to convince the Paks to play ball unless we confront them continually with the prospect of losing all US support. Thus I see the small closings as an opportunity to drive this point home again. However, the tactics are tricky. If we quietly clamp down on the aid pipeline, it might be some time before the Paks connected the two events. Therefore, it might be better to tell the Paks simultaneously that we felt they had committed an unfriendly act and were compelled to respond in kind./4/ /4/Bundy added a handwritten marginal notation at this point that reads: "I'm not very keen on this now." This could be done when Rusk sees Shoaib/5/ this weekend. /5/Shoaib was in Washington for meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. No record of this meeting has been found. RWK/6/ /6/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.   236. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 19, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 16, Oct. 15-Nov. 19, 1965. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. SUBJECT Shastri visit and the Indian food pipeline 1. The attached cable from Bowles/2/ shows that a great deal has been accomplished with Shastri by your policy of the last 3 or 4 months. It also shows Bowles doing a good job of representing the U. S. and not India. It confirms what we have heard from B. K. Nehru and others--that Shastri is very eager to come and see you in December. In my judgment, it also confirms the prospect that such a meeting would be productive for us. /2/Not printed. Telegram 1025 from New Delhi, October 19, reported on a conversation between Shastri and Bowles on October 16. Shastri indicated that he was considering a brief visit to the United States following the adjournment of the Indian Parliament on December 10, if President Johnson wanted to see him. Shastri asked Bowles if it was true that U.S. policy toward India had changed, and if so why. Bowles responded that U.S. support for India was solid, but the Johnson administration was examining its aid program to all countries, and particularly its aid program for South Asia, which absorbed so much U.S. assistance. President Johnson wanted to know what the aid programs were accomplishing, how they could be improved, and whether the recipient countries were doing what they could to help themselves. Bowles stated that the only reason the flow of U.S. grain had been on a month-to-month basis was a concern that India was not doing enough to increase its own agricultural output. (Ibid., 9/23/65-12/23/65) 2. I have told Nehru that, for obvious reasons, no definite plans are now being made, and I think this will keep until you are ready to decide it. 3. The one thing which does need to be watched is the food pipeline. On September 23 you authorized a one-month extension, and by the end of this week we will face that same problem again. While there is some sentiment in the bureaucracy for a longer agreement, my own feeling is that it is much better simply to renew for another month, on the same basis, thus keeping the situation as it is, with a short rein. The Indians understand increasingly that they really have not performed on their own side of the agricultural bargain, and as long as the pipeline does not actually break, I see no harm in this month-to-month process. I have discussed this matter with Clark Clifford, and he asked me to tell you that he strongly agrees with the month-by-month procedure for the present. 4. I am sending this memorandum by Jack Valenti so that he can get your judgment at the time most convenient to you. McG. B.   237. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 31-1-65 Washington, October 21, 1965. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate on October 21 except the representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction. INDIA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY The Problem To estimate India's nuclear weapons policy over the next few years. Conclusions A. India has the capability to develop nuclear weapons. It probably already has sufficient plutonium for a first device, and could explode it about a year after a decision to develop one. (Paras. 1-3) B. The proponents of a nuclear weapons program have been strengthened by the Indo-Pakistani war, but the main political result has been a strengthening of Prime Minister Shastri's position. We believe that he does not now wish to start a program and that he is capable of making this decision stick for the time being. (Paras. 4-14) C. However, we do not believe that India will hold to this policy indefinitely. All things considered, we believe that within the next few years India probably will detonate a nuclear device and proceed to develop nuclear weapons. (Paras. 15-20) [Here follows the 5-page Discussion section of the Estimate.]   238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, October 21, 1965, 8:24 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Confidential. Drafted by Laingen, cleared by Sisco, and approved and initialed by Hare. Also sent to Rawalpindi, and repeated to London, New Delhi, USUN, and CINCMEAFSA. 704. Following summary of conversation FYI and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review. Pak Foreign Minister Bhutto called on Secretary at Bhutto's request October 21 to discuss progress within UN on Indo-Pak situation./2/ Ambassador Ahmed and Counselor Farooq present Pak side; Ambassador Hare and Assistant Secretary Sisco on U.S. side. Bhutto appeared primarily interested get USG views on desirability further UNSC meeting, indicating Paks in favor. Meanwhile Paks prepared defer UNGA approach. Bhutto also emphasized desirability SYG visit to subcontinent. Secretary said we would want further reading from SYG before commenting on desirability SC meeting but reaffirmed that USG prepared join in maximum effort to give effect to entire September 20 resolution. End summary. /2/Bhutto was in the United States for the meeting of the UN General Assembly. His meeting with Rusk took place in the Department of State. 1. Bhutto said Paks still sorting out thoughts on further SC meeting. Said he thought French position on "constitutional problems" not too difficult and in any event had assured Paks this had nothing to do with substance of issue. Soviet position less clear and meeting might not be too good if Soviets were going to be sticky. All things considered he thought another SC meeting would be useful solidify cease fire, get progress on withdrawal and "perhaps a bit more." Bhutto agreed with Secretary on importance maintaining unanimity already achieved within Council. 2. Bhutto said unfortunately Indian position meanwhile was hardening and yesterday Paks had heard Indians intend launch new offensive in Rajasthan sector, probably similar earlier one in Tithwal. Indians had turned down proposal by UNSC President that Bhutto and Swaran Singh lunch together in New York. Indians' objective was to get the entire problem frozen again. Secretary commented September 20 resolution made it clear issue could not be frozen. 3. Bhutto concurred but asked how we proceed. In response to Secretary's query regarding Soviet Tashkent proposal, Bhutto said proposal still there but Soviets now saying it better for parties to talk directly. Added that Gromyko had invited him to visit Moscow en route back to Pakistan. Secretary said he thought Bhutto should know about comment he had made recently to Gromyko; telling him, when Gromyko had referred to Tashkent proposal, that for 17 years U.S. had had one dog chewing on one leg and another dog chewing on other and if Soviets wanted find out what it was like that was all right with us. Bhutto commented Paks would chew a little higher if they tried it on Russians. 4. Secretary said he hoped our position clear on Tashkent proposal. He had been somewhat negative in earlier comment on proposal with both Bhutto and Gromyko, but this had been with respect to outlook for settlement through that route and not to Soviet role in current consideration of problem. Secretary said that as prophet he could not be hopeful on ultimate outcome talks in Tashkent. On other hand he wanted Paks to understand we would not object to any step that might further prospects ultimate settlement; indeed U.S. would be happy to see talks in Antarctica if that would settle the matter. If Soviet proposal meant some forward movement on Soviet position from previous rigid stand on Kashmir issue that was all to the good. 5. Bhutto said he thought U.S. position clear and had also been emphasized previous day in talk with Ambassador Goldberg. 6. Secretary went on to say that for many reasons we see advantages proceeding within UNSC, especially if permanent members can continue act in unison. As of present, however, Secretary thought we did not have very precise indication what was in Soviet mind. Sisco commented it fairly clear Soviets not keen on four-power proposal idea but we not very clear on Soviet position over-all. Bhutto then inquired about possibility actions by SYG in context "in the meantime" clause of resolution; specifically visit by SYG to subcontinent. Sisco commented SYG focusing now on GOI and GOP replies to his message of October 14 on withdrawal; Bhutto said Paks thinking more in terms resolution as a whole, adding he felt it clear that SYG had independent mandate to proceed without further meeting UNSC. However if French and Russians felt it better to arm SYG with specific mandate there was no harm in that either from Pak viewpoint. Sisco interjected that we see effective cease fire as first requirement and withdrawal as next step, noting that "in the meantime" clause referred to what parties themselves might be able to do on underlying political problem, and that after first two steps implemented SC consider how to assist peaceful settlement. 7. Bhutto responded that even for purposes speeding withdrawal, visit by SYG to area may be needed. Paks had accepted resolution in its entirety and were prepared to fulfill their commitment. Unfortunately Indians were not, and there were many examples over the years to point to as evidence. GOP had made clear its willingness cooperate on withdrawal. Indians keep talking about need for effective cease fire and at same time go on violating cease fire on one pretext or another, nibbling away at Pak territory they could not get by war. There was limit to Pak restraint. All this emphasized further desirability of SYG visit since he could see problem for himself. Since withdrawal would have to be negotiated at very high level, could also get views top-level GOP and GOI. Would also help put curb on "genocide" Indians practicing against Muslim villagers on their side CFL Kashmir. It also important that some UN movement take place before Soviet attitude hardens still more. 8. Bhutto noted Paks had been considering approach to UNGA, not as way of stymying things but to give stimulus to negotiating process. He had told Ambassador Goldberg Paks would not move to GA unless U.S. felt it useful. But if all concerned felt it best Paks wait, then there would very soon need to be some further endeavor in UNSC. Secretary said he could understand that if SC approach blocked then there would be some point in having UNGA throw its weight behind Council and he would think UNGA would be strongly inclined do so. Sisco said that if SC remedies exhausted, there would probably be considerable support in UNGA for kind of approach already taken by SC. Bhutto added that Paks had made fairly extensive analysis situation and thought they could get fairly good UNGA resolution, though not perfect one. 9. Bhutto wondered what Secretary would recommend if progress thwarted completely in UN forum. Secretary responded this was one of those questions where answer was so unsatisfactory he could only say that all concerned must work so that progress not thwarted. Prospect of renewed Indo-Pak hostility so appalling there must be progress within UN. In response further Bhutto question whether Secretary would then conclude that SC meeting now would be best thing to do, Secretary said U.S. would like to get further reading from SYG as to how he saw situation in light responses he has received to Oct. 14 proposal. It might well be that some meeting would be necessary at some point. In response Bhutto said Paks would cooperate and would do their best ensure that unanimity continued prevail in Council. Pakistan was not asking for the moon; all it wanted was some forward movement./3/ /3/In an October 22 memorandum to President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy reported that Bhutto had also raised with Rusk the issue of an Ayub visit to Washington. Bundy noted that Johnson had told Ayub in a telephone conversation that he wanted to meet with Ayub before Shastri. With Shastri also indicating a desire to visit Washington in December it became a question of which leader to see first. "Ray Hare and Bob Komer think Shastri first is better, both because India is more important and because if you see Ayub first, he is bound to press you to mediate Kashmir--and that is something we can't do in 1966." Bundy added that his feeling was that because the United States had so little to offer Ayub he ought to enjoy the small comfort of the first visit. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 16, 9/23/65-12/23/65) Rusk   239. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, October 27, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15 INDIA. Confidential; Nodis. Prepared by Rusk. The President approved extension of the present food shipments to India for an additional 30 days. In doing so, however, he emphasized very strongly that we should make it clear to the Indians that we are not satisfied with their performance on their own agricultural program on their previous and existing commitments. He referred to a report he had received from Under Secretary Schnittker of the Department of Agriculture/2/ which emphasized that (a) India has failed to live up to a commitment to this Government and to her own people in failing to reach her food production goals (b) India is not giving fertilizer and food production nor the investment promised in her plans and required by her people (c) India's key failures have been in fertilizer, pesticides, producer incentives, credit and seed varieties (d) fertilizer production is the crucial factor and (e) that the U.S. must use all possible leverage to improve India's performance. /2/Schnittker's memorandum to the President is dated October 23. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. IV, Memos and Miscellaneous, 9/65-1/66) The President noted the fact that the U.S. has been sending to India 20% of our wheat production and that India's relative position has been slipping back. These are matters which he will want to have some answers for and on which he believes the Indians should make some commitments with respect to actual performance.   240. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, October 29, 1965, 3:26 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15 INDIA. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Handley, cleared by Hare, and approved and initialed by Rusk. 800. Personal for Ambassador from Secretary. You will be receiving telegram authorizing you to negotiate thirty-day extension of food shipments to India./2/ I know this will be disappointing to you but I would like you to know that this decision has been made at the highest level and that limited extension is result solely of our grave misgivings regarding past performance and present plans of Government of India for increased food production. The decision to extend food shipments for only thirty days has nothing to do with Kashmir and is not to be construed in any way as political leverage to force India into a political settlement with Pakistan. It is based on evidence available to the highest authority that a longer term extension, or a new agreement on PL-480, should not be undertaken until such time as the USG has convincing evidence of the GOI's determination to put its food house in order./3/ /2/Telegram Aidto 598 to New Delhi, October 29, authorized the Embassy to negotiate an amendment to the Title I P.L. 480 agreement of September 30 to provide for an additional 500,000 tons of wheat/wheat flour. (Ibid., AID (US) 15-8 INDIA) /3/On November 5 Bowles cabled that he had done his utmost to persuade the Shastri government that U.S. reluctance to negotiate a long-term P.L. 480 agreement was not an effort to bring political pressure to bear on India, but that "knowledgeable Indians do not find this line of argument persuasive," and "we ourselves are perplexed by it." Bowles noted that since the appointment of Subramaniam as Food Minister in 1964, the Indian Government had been very responsive to the Embassy's urgings that agriculture be given top priority among development goals. (Telegram 1201 from New Delhi; ibid.) In a short companion cable to Rusk urging him to read telegram 1201, Bowles stated that he understood the dilemma the Department faced, but "I badly need your guidance." (Telegram 1202 from New Delhi, November 5; ibid., AID (US) 15 INDIA) Rusk   241. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 30, 1965, 3 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 16, Oct. 15-Nov. 19, 1965. Secret. Pak/Indian Roundup. While the two sides are still glaring at each other and sticking to rigid propaganda positions, there is considerable movement behind the scene. There are many signs that the Paks are finally hoisting aboard that they have gotten themselves into a pretty mess, and that if hostilities resumed they'd take a licking. As a result they are now more eager for a withdrawal than for simultaneous talks on settling Kashmir. This has also led to increasing Pak eagerness to get back in our good graces. Now Shoaib as well as Bhutto are signaling that Ayub is eager to come here soon; indeed Shoaib says Ayub now realizes that a considerable shift in Pak policy will be necessary to get back on a firm footing with us. We even have a report that Ayub intends to sack Bhutto in time. So the Paks are moving our way. If we sit tight, Ayub should be ready to hear sweet reason within another month or two. However, the Paks are still threatening to move toward the Chicoms (and have leaked that Peiping has offered a tank factory). They also are still hinting that we must give Ayub something first, so he doesn't have to come here as a beggar. The Indians, who regard themselves as victors, show less flexibility. Knowing they have the upper hand, they've been scaring the Paks with threats to reopen the war if Pakistan won't lay off Kashmir. Meanwhile, they are refusing to even discuss Kashmir in New York on the grounds that the issue is closed. Their private and public utterances still indicate acute suspicion that the US and UK are trying to pressure them into giving up the fruits of victory. My own reading is that this mood will last until Shastri can hear from you personally where we stand. According to recent envoys, he's still eager to come around 10 December. R. W. Komer   242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, November 5, 1965, 7:21 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Schneider, cleared by Buffum, and approved by Handley. Repeated to Karachi, London, and USUN. 841. We note that on same day Security Council has adopted new resolution/2/ strengthening appeal for effective ceasefire and strongly supporting SYG proposals for arranging withdrawals, Shastri (according Reuters) told Parliament ceasefire agreement "cannot stand in way of our troops regaining territories treacherously occupied by Pakistan after ceasefire came into effect." Shastri also quoted as saying "our taking remedial measures cannot be considered violation of ceasefire agreement." Other tickers report All India Radio and PTI as saying Pakistan troops "massing" on Rajasthan border. All this suggests Karachi's concern that Indians contemplating action along Rajasthan border may be well justified. /2/On November 5 the Security Council adopted Resolution 215, which reaffirmed the September 20 resolution, requested the two parties to the conflict to observe fully the cease-fire, and demanded that representatives of India, Pakistan, and the Secretary-General meet to work out plans for withdrawal. (UN doc. S/RES/215) We believe GOI should be made aware in no uncertain terms our view that Shastri's position if accurately reported by Reuters, clearly inconsistent with SC resolution and Indian actions of type Shastri seems to contemplate would demonstrate India not now interested in reestablishment of peaceful conditions in which economic development of subcontinent can move forward. This would have inevitable effect upon current USG policy review regarding subcontinent. Indian failure respond to SYG proposal to send Sarmento to arrange withdrawal plans another indication that Indians not meeting their obligation to re-establish peace on subcontinent. We count on you to get across these ideas soonest at place where it will do most good./3/ /3/Bowles reported on November 7 that he had instructed a member of his staff to discuss Shastri's speech with L.K. Jha, using telegram 841 as a basis for his approach. Jha expressed surprise at the U.S. reaction to the speech, which he said was meant for domestic consumption and did not signal expanded hostilities. He stated that immediately after the cease-fire Pakistan had occupied a number of military posts in Indian territory in Rajasthan, and Shastri's speech was merely a "retrospective review" of Indian efforts to regain the territory. Jha said that India fully accepted the November 5 Security Council resolution. (Telegram 1207; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK) Rusk   243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, November 10, 1965, 4:31 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PAK-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Laise; cleared by Handley, Hare, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Rawalpindi. 808. For Ambassador from Secretary. 1. I hope to be sending you instructions shortly about an Ayub visit. I agree fully with your recommendation that above all we must retain flexibility in our dealings with Ayub in period before visit and believe that you should know how we see things here. 2. While there are some signs of dawning Pak appreciation of their present plight and their need for improving their US relations, we agree with your assessment (Embtel 1011)/2/ that even Shoaib's proposition represents lopsided view of realities in our relationship, i.e., GOP has no rational or comparable alternative to US political, economic and material support. As Ayub must be well aware, there are few foreign leaders anywhere to whom we have been more attentive and whom we have supported more consistently. /2/Dated November 2. (Ibid., POL 27 INDIA-PAK) 3. It is precisely to establish firm relationship based on such realities that makes it in Ayub's interest to have a meeting soon with President. While we recognize, as do you, that Ayub may seek some prior reassurances to reduce his political risks, it is up to Ayub to cope with visit's domestic implications which are after all his own creation. You have most patiently warned Ayub for years of danger inherent to his freedom of action in guiding Pakistan press and public opinion along a pro-Chinese and anti-US line. 4. We would expect summit meeting would encompass very fundamentals and future course of US-Pakistan relations. President desires to develop personal sense of what kind of relationship best serves our mutual interests. Concern here is to develop understanding of what constitutes workable relationship between aid donor and recipient. Aid is not a state of nature which US is bound to respect. We have obligations to our citizens to demonstrate our aid is achieving concrete results in terms of objectives aid is designed to serve. In Pakistan's case, what needs to be demonstrated to our satisfaction include the following: a. Actions showing Pakistan attaches priority to US and free world relationship. Pakistan must disabuse itself of any notions that threat of turning to Chicoms will cause us to come running. This won't work and the sooner Paks stop using the tactic the closer we are to reaching a better understanding. What we seek is cooperative stance toward US. This does not rule out "correct" relations with China, but it does foreclose cozying up to China. In particular, positive steps to lower decibel count in Pakistan's denunciations of US policies are long overdue. Bhutto's distortions in New York re meetings with Ambassador Goldberg (USUN's 1753 repeated Karachi 174)/3/ yet another example of GOP willful distortion of facts which has left sour taste here all too frequently over past years. /3/Dated November 4. (Ibid., POL 15-1 PAK) b. Actions showing economic development has priority over dead-end policy toward India. Past US policies of support were based on premise that Pakistan attached sufficient priority to economic development that Indo-Pak differences would not be allowed to escalate into war. This assumption was proved wrong. Until both countries take steps to defuse present explosive situation and start some processes to keep their tensions under control, we don't see possibility of fruitful long-term relationship with either country. What we want from Ayub is an indication that he is prepared to follow a course of reason on Kashmir, moderating his demands on India, so that economic development will not be sacrificed to a new Pak offensive on Kashmir and so that progress can be made toward settlement of Indo-Pak differences. 5. On broader subject of aid resumption, etc. we want it to be unmistakably clear to the Pakistanis that regardless of the actual and as yet unknown economic costs of their recent bout of warfare, it is widely accepted here by public, as reflected on the Hill and in the journals, that two nations we have helped considerably are frittering away scarce resources, both economic and military, as they bicker and fight. Aid resumption is going to be possible only if we can convince the Congress and the public at large that this is not going to happen again, and by "we" I include the Pakistanis as well. Rusk   244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, November 10, 1965, 4:32 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Laise and Handley; cleared by Hare, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Rusk. 861. For Ambassador from Secretary. 1. Embassy's reporting on attitudes of GOI leaders regarding next steps in Indo-US relations, and particularly on Shastri's visit to USA, suggests that message we want to get across to them is just not getting through. Consequently believe you should know how we see things here as background for your negotiations re visit. 2. It appears that GOI leadership, in its present militant and go-it-alone mood, may have developed mistaken notion of relative weight of elements in equation of our relationship. While we do not discount either intrinsic importance of India to us or importance at this juncture in our relations that Shastri come here, we are not prepared to make overtures to get him here or to bargain with Shastri over conditions under which he will come. Given purpose of visit, it seems to us that it is of greater importance to Indians than to us that it takes place, and it is going to be a long, cold winter in our relationship unless he gets over here to sort things out with the President. We do not wish to encourage Indians to delude themselves regarding this basic point by our posture and our actions in period before meeting takes place. Moreover, while we recognize Shastri's narrow writ on Kashmir, it would seem from your reporting that he does have enough additional political strength these days to cope with any domestic political risks which he feels he may run in visiting US without prior understandings. 3. Our central concern will be to develop understanding of what constitutes workable relationship between aid donor and recipient. Aid is not a state of nature which US bound to respect. We have obligation to our citizens to demonstrate our aid is achieving concrete results in terms of objectives aid is designed to serve. In India's case, what needs to be demonstrated to our satisfaction includes following: a. Actions to turn swords into plowshares. Present twilight state of no-war, no-peace threatens progress of economic development. Since India is larger country, special responsibility falls upon it to make every effort to restore peace and maintain security of subcontinent, along lines of SC Resolution of September 20. While movement toward reconciling Indo/Pak differences may be extremely difficult at this juncture, nevertheless there is in present situation an unparalleled opportunity for India to steer Indo/Pak relations into new and more hopeful direction. At present time Pakistan is facing up to kind of hard realities and choices that would dispose it to come to terms with India on something less than plebiscite on Kashmir if India could provide way out. This means an honorable retreat for Pakistan into negotiations that will hold promise of easing its fears of Indian threat to Pakistan's security. Clearly this will involve Kashmir as well as other outstanding issues, and sorting out may take a long time. However, what is at stake is security of subcontinent and India's own larger interests vis-à-vis China. A serious and sustained process to find solutions to issues that divide India and Pakistan and to minimize thereby prospect of future war or exploitation by China is not too much for a friend interested in India's future to ask. And we intend to ask for such an effort while recognizing that settlement may be a long way off. b. Actions to translate economic promises to Indian people and to US into economic performance. Most critical issue here is question of food production. My 800/2/ and other messages have already spelled out nature of our concern over India's record to date and how this relates to future of PL 480 assistance. /2/Document 240. 4. On broader subject of aid resumption, etc. we want it to be unmistakably clear to the Indians that regardless of the actual and as yet unknown economic costs of their recent bout of warfare, it is widely accepted here by public, as reflected on the Hill and in the journals, that two nations we have helped considerably are frittering away scarce resources, both economic and military, as they bicker and fight. Aid resumption is going to be possible only if we can convince the Congress and the public at large that this is not going to happen again, and by "we" I include the Indians as well. As I told S.K. Patil when he came to see me, it was only by my assurances to the Congress that I was able to prevent legislative prohibitions on aid to South Asia. 5. As great Asian country, now alert to threat of expansionist Communist China, we believe India should be able understand and, indeed, give more support to efforts US and others making in Vietnam to thwart China's ambitions. We recognize GOI's difficulties, particularly with Soviet Union, in taking strong public position on this and that privately it does not wish see US pull out of Southeast Asia. But we consider that India's position and actions to date fall considerably short of what is possible. 6. In sum, Shastri should understand that President is interested in talking to him on wide variety of subjects in order to develop a personal sense of what kind of relationship between our two countries will best serve our mutual interests in years ahead, and that until this is accomplished we will not commit ourselves on numerous operational problems our two countries face. We do not intend to start out on journey until we know where we are going./3/ /3/Bowles responded that all of the issues raised in telegram 861 merited exploration during the proposed Shastri visit. He added, however: "if the tone of the message faithfully reflects the atmosphere in which the visit would occur I believe it would be a disaster." (Telegram 1270 from New Delhi, November 13; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDIA-PAK) Rusk   245. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, November 11, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret. To add to our problems we may have a major Indian food crisis on our hands. Poor rains are apparently resulting in a very bad fall/winter crop. Last year's record production of 88 million tons was estimated earlier to be only 85 this year; new estimates are that it might be even less. Freeman's man, Brown, now in Delhi, has sent in Delhi 1244/2/ attached, estimating that 10-15 million tons more grain imports from all sources may be needed to sustain India's millions to the next harvest. (I believe this figure includes our present shipments, which if continued at present rate would make up six million tons of this.) /2/Telegram 1244 from New Delhi, November 10, drew the conclusion that a poor monsoon pattern nationwide presaged a major food crisis, perhaps the most serious in recent history. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AGR 12 INDIA) In telegram 1248 from New Delhi, November 11, the Embassy reported that Food and Agriculture Minister Subramaniam had publicly estimated that the fall crop would be 3 million tons lower than the previous year's harvest, but the Embassy noted that independent observers had estimated the decline as closer to 6 million tons. (Ibid.) The Baltimore Sun has been running a good series. Latest article attached./3/ /3/Not found attached. Am running this down and will be ready shortly to advise a course. RWK   246. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, November 12, 1965, 0330Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 INDIA. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 1247. Yesterday at his request I called on L. K. Jha who said he wished to discuss the Prime Minister's visit to the United States. After careful consideration it had been decided that any thought of a December visit should be abandoned. Parliament will not adjourn until the 10th of December and with the heavy agenda the session may drag on beyond that date which would leave almost no time before Christmas. Therefore, the most convenient timing from the standpoint of the Prime Minister would be the first half of January, early enough to enable him to return by January 15 for the annual meeting of the All India Congress Committee in Jaipur on the 16, 17 and 18 of January. Jha added that while the Prime Minister was anxious at some future date to spend more time in the US, he felt the current situation in India placed heavy demands on the Prime Minister and the visit should be a purely business occasion; he contemplated staying two or three days in Washington with possibly a day in New York. This would suggest the Prime Minister's arrival in Washington around the 10th of January and his return to India around the 14th, provided of course this fits the President's convenience. The Prime Minister was anxious that there not be any announcement of the suggested visit until a mutually agreed time in the future. Jha then rather hesitantly stated that the Prime Minister and indeed the whole cabinet was deeply concerned about the outcome of the visit. India badly needed the US and if there is to be an independent non-Communist Asia with an effective block on Chinese expansionism the US also needed India. With so much at stake, Jha pointed out that the failure of the President and the Prime Minister to reach an understanding would have a catastrophic effect on the politics not only of India but of Asia at a very critical historic moment. Therefore, did I see any discreet way of exploring on a preliminary basis the key questions that might arise and thus determine in some measure to what extent a meeting of the minds in Washington was likely? I said that I fully understood his concern but that I felt that with good will on both sides we can approach the meeting with confidence. India's basic objectives and ours are very similar, i.e., India and America are equally anxious to block Chinese expansionism, and help maintain stability in Asia and Africa, to strengthen the UN, etc. The US also recognizes that a stable, economically viable, and democratic India with one-seventh of the world's population is absolutely basic to a stable and peaceful Asia. For nearly twenty years we have been striving to create an Asian balance of power with almost no help from the major nations of Asia such as Japan, Indonesia, India and Pakistan. This suggested a very key point of critical interest to us all: because we had no mass support for this essential effort we have been forced to fall back on relatively minor Asian powers such as South Korea, South Viet Nam and Taiwan and because these nations represented only 5 per cent of Asian peoples there has been no alternative but to introduce massive American military power into the equation. One of the first questions the President might ask would be India's willingness and ability to work towards a more effective balance of power vis-à-vis China and thus to relieve some of the present pressures on the USA. To this Jha responded in a generally affirmatively although quite naturally non-committal manner. Comment: We believe that it is of the utmost importance that this meeting go forward and I hope that the dates mentioned will be generally accepted. We also assume that we are as keenly aware as are the Indians that the failure of these discussions would have a profoundly adverse effect on US as well as Indian interests. It is my belief that in order to create a favorable and receptive mood the following steps are important: 1. As much as our policy will permit we should seek to relieve India of any reasonable suspicions that we are trying to take advantage of their food dilemma. We have made a vigorous rebuttal to these suspicions and in the effort we have had the powerful and effective support of Subramaniam. It would be a master stroke for the USG to invite Subramaniam in the next 2 or 3 weeks to come to the US to discuss the Indian agriculture program and outlook. This suggestion would be received with warm approval in India and would put the Indian Government in a receptive mood for the kind of discussion which I am sure the President has in mind. If at the same time, we could release the non-profit fertilizer loans so that India could order the fertilizer urgently needed for the spring planting, Indian appreciation would be profound. 2. Here in India we could continue to impress on the Indians the need for curbing the careless and sometimes irresponsible statements of such Indian leaders as Indira Gandhi, Chagla, etc. 3. In New Delhi and in the UN we should press the Indians fully to carry out the cease-fire in spite of Pak provocation and to meet Pakistan more than halfway in regard to withdrawal. This will help lay the basis for a discussion of the long-term political problems facing the two countries without running head on into India's absolute determination not to give up the strategically important Kashmir Valley. 4. With the advice and guidance of the Department we would like gradually to proceed with more substantive discussions with Shastri and his advisors such questions as India's continued willingness to stand up to China, India's defense requirements under varying situations, the willingness of the Indians to give economic development the highest priority and the economic moves by India which encourage us to give India the support she requires to become self-sufficient in ten years. There is every evidence that thoughtful Indians in and out of government are deeply conscious that many Indian criticisms of the US during the past months have been grossly unfair and there is evidence on every side of a desire to bring the situation back into balance. With careful handling in both Washington and New Delhi, we are confident this mood can be strengthened and a basis for successful negotiations in Washington established. We would appreciate Department's response as soon as convenient, particularly in regard to Subramaniam visit/2/ which will require some planning all around. /2/McGeorge Bundy relayed Bowles' suggestion concerning an invitation to Subramaniam in a November 14 memorandum to President Johnson. Johnson indicated his approval. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VI, Memos and Miscellaneous) Bowles [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXV Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State