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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXX China DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

60. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, October 19, 1964, 1:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Miscellaneous Meetings, Vol. I. Secret. The memorandum is dated October 20.

SUBJECT
President's meeting with Congressional Leadership, Oct. 19

The President met with the bipartisan Congressional Leadership on Monday, October 19, at 1:30 p.m. The President worked from the attached briefing memorandum (Tab A),/2/ and the discussion at the meeting generally followed the attached agenda.

/2/The tabs are attached but not printed.

The President opened the meeting by giving his welcome to the Leadership and his thanks for their return from their homes and whatever else they were doing. He then asked Director McCone to explain what we know of the Chinese nuclear effort.

Director McCone gave a general explanation of the capabilities of the United States in satellite reconnaissance, and then described our current understanding of their capabilities. A copy of the notes from which he worked is attached (Tab B). The Director was followed by Chairman Seaborg who gave a general discussion of the problems of the technology of nuclear weapons. Chairman Seaborg indicated the probability but not the certainty that the Chinese weapon was made of plutonium (an assumption that was challenged by evidence from debris later in the day). He indicated his belief that the Chinese would begin with a device and that it would take sometime to "weaponize" such a device. Chairman Seaborg indicated that the speed of the Chinese development would depend on how much the Chinese knew about the technical details--quality of material and design details--in weaponmaking. He thought that if they had been fully cut off from what the Soviets knew for several years, it might be a matter of about 4 or 5 years before they would have a thermonuclear device. On the other hand, if they wished to make a thermonuclear explosion simply for its political and psychological impact, they could use the bulk of their production for this specific purpose and produce such an explosion considerably sooner.

The President asked Secretary McNamara to give an account of the military position of the United States vis-a-vis the Chinese bomb. Secretary McNamara began by discussing the dangers in the spread of nuclear weapons. He pointed out that there are half a dozen countries which could move rapidly in this direction if they made the political decision to do so, and that the cost of developing a nuclear device was now on the order of $120 million--not a prohibitive figure. He underlined the importance of finding ways and means to limit nuclear spread.

Secretary McNamara then turned to the strategic position of the U.S. and pointed out that Chinese targets as well as Soviet targets were included in our strategic planning. He explained that we had 2700 nuclear weapons in our survivable alert force, and said that 800 of these weapons would suffice to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union. The additional weapons were important for their damage-limiting capability.

Ambassador Thompson discussed the developments in the Soviet Union, along the lines of the attached memo of his talking notes (Tab C).

Senator Hickenlooper asked if the immediate meaning of the Chinese bomb was not more important in its psychological impact than in its military meaning. Secretary Rusk replied that we were taking every possible measure in consultation with interested nations to limit this psychological impact. We had given important assurances in the President's statements. The Secretary reported that a number of Ambassadors had told him that his warning of September 29 had been very useful in limiting the impact of this event.

[Here follows dicussion not related to China.]

McG. B.

 

61. Memorandum of a Conversation/1/

Washington, October 20, 1964, 6:10 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-1 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Polansky. The conversation took place in the Secretary's office. A handwritten notation on the source text reads "Uncleared. Never distributed." The source text indicates it is Part 3 of 4.

SUBJECT
Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin—USSR
The Secretary
Ambassador Adlai Stevenson--USUN

After discussing other matters, Ambassador Dobrynin asked what else could the US and USSR do to improve relations. Mention was made of the explosion of a nuclear device by the Chinese Communists. Ambassador Dobrynin stated that it would take some time before the Chinese Communists would become a nuclear power. He suggested the extension of the test ban treaty to all environments as a possible next step. The Secretary stated the US position with respect to the need for adequate and effective verification. Ambassador Dobrynin reiterated the standard Soviet position.

 

62. Report of Meetings/1/

Taipei, October 23-24, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Central Intelligence Agency. Secret; Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on the source text. Filed with a covering note of October 24 from McCone's Executive Assistant, Walter Elder, to McGeorge Bundy stating that McCone asked that it be brought to Bundy's personal attention.1

Report of Meeting Between Chinese Nationalist Officials and Dr. Ray S. Cline

Dr. Cline held two briefings in Taipei/2/--one on 23 October was attended by Foreign Minister Shen, Defense Minister Yu, and Chiang Ching-kuo. The second session on 24 October was with President Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Foreign Minister Shen, and Chiang Ching-kuo./3/ Both briefings were extremely well received. Ambassador Wright and Mr. Nelson were present at both sessions.

/2/According to a record of a telephone conversation between McCone and Ball on October 20, McCone gave Ball the gist of Carter's report of his conversation with Chiang and told him Cline was planning to go to Taipei, stating that because of Cline's "background and relationship with those people, it would be useful to get his appraisal of the attitude of the people." (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, China (Taiwan))

/3/The Embassy reported Cline's meeting with Chiang Kai-shek in telegram 347 from Taipei, October 24, and in more detail in airgram A-358, October 27. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-1 CHICOM and POL 1 CHINAT-US respectively)

At first Shen made strong point of the anxiety of the ordinary man in Taipei who feared that three small bombs could destroy Keelung, Taipei, and Kaohsiung. It would be small consolation to him to know that after he was dead, U.S. would retaliate on ChiComs. Yu warned that nuclear deterrent credible assurance only when facing rational men and ChiComs were not rational. All Chinese in first briefing concerned re U-235 content of test blast and implication that ChiComs might have much greater production capacity of fissionable material than first estimated. Gimo also said this information most important.

Gimo after briefing in fairly emotional response said U.S. assurances for defense of Taiwan inadequate to calm fears aroused by explosion. U.S. policy of isolation of ChiComs was no longer enough. ChiComs merely felt immune to this policy which would enable ChiComs perfect their nuclear capability undisturbed. He said primary ChiCom aim was to destroy him and GRC and when this happened all of Asia would be threatened. In reference to ChiCom atomic bombs which could be carried in present ChiCom air force planes, he said "we are the target". He brushed aside stated U.S. assurances of defense support and probable ChiCom reluctance invite retaliation. U.S., he felt, would be deterred from nuclear retaliation by European allies. It would be useless come to support of GRC once it destroyed. He said explanations of how U.S. would come to GRC aid left him "unconsoled".

He said if U.S. real friend it would [2 lines of source text not declassified]. Present U.S. assurances could have adverse reaction toward U.S. on part of people. They would believe that American friends asking that they wait for death. He said if Chinese Communists successful in destroying GRC, they might well compromise with Soviets. In past U.S. worried about GRC counter attack for fear of Soviet reaction and subsequent world conflict. No matter who in power in Russia, they know only Gimo can bury Mao Tse-tung. Russians know this. Do Americans know it? Now time for U.S. to review its policy and choose either Mao or Gimo as friend.

 

63. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, October 28, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. II. Secret. A copy was sent to Komer.

SUBJECT
The U.S. and Communist China in the Months Ahead

I return to my Far Eastern cable traffic with some thoughts on China policy that may well derive from the heady brew of speech-writing for an optimist. I pass them on to you not because they are particularly original, but because recent events seem to me to give them new validity.

To begin with, I am struck by the quantity of the U.S. Government's time, energy, and resources now focused on South Vietnam/Laos, as against all the rest of Asia. This is perhaps an inevitable consequence of our preoccupation with the major Communist challenge at hand. But the fact of our concentration on the tail of the dog, rather than the dog itself, has been dramatized anew by recent developments. (I might add that I am not even sure that this tail belongs to that particular dog; there is danger in pushing too far the thesis of Peking's responsibility for the South Vietnam crisis.)

Given the Chicom nuclear blast, the new Soviet leadership, de Gaulle, Wilson, et al, we are now moving into a period when Communist China's world position will probably change quite rapidly, regardless of what we do. To what extent can we influence these changes so as to minimize the damage to our security? Also, to what extent can we preserve appearances--i.e., not seem to lose our shirts in the process of these changes?

I have in mind, of course, two virtual certainties: that Communist China will be voted into the United Nations sometime during the life of the new Administration--probably not this year (although that still seems to me an open question), but very probably next year; and that Communist China will soon--one way or another--be brought into international negotiations regarding the control of nuclear weapons. I also have in mind the fact of fast increasing free world trade and travel contacts with mainland China.

Faced with these developments, we can either sit tight in increasingly lonely isolation; or we can seek ways to cut our losses.

So far, we have chosen to sit tight, waiting for Peking to "shape up." The Kennedy press conference response of last November 14 and the Hilsman China speech of December 13 are the clearest articulation of this approach at its best. During 1963-4, our gradual detente with the USSR certainly gave it added impetus; our Kremlinologists have urged us not to rock the boat.

It seems to me increasingly clear, however, that our present approach actually serves Peking's interests--and that Peking has no intention of "shaping up" in terms of taking tension-relieving initiatives with us, either now or in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, Peking is seriously intent on isolating us--while we, in turn, are generally blamed for trying (unsuccessfully) to isolate Peking.

I would therefore urge consideration of a different approach--one designed to cut our losses, to reduce our isolation, and to improve our look as a confident, realistic, and responsible world power.

My objective would be to try to bring our China policy into line with both reality and our long-term interests. Our aim has always been the "domestication" of Communist China. A strategy of containment plus moral preachment has achieved little success in this regard. So why not try modified containment--plus subversion? By the latter, I simply mean the careful use of free world goods, people, and ideas--instruments which have proven their long-term corrosive value in our relations with other totalitarian societies.

The following ingredients seem to me appropriate to a revised China policy over the next several months:

1. After the election, we should indicate anew our willingness and even desire to discuss the problem of nuclear arms control in a forum that includes Communist China sometime during 1965-6.

2. At the UNGA session in December we should base our opposition to Communist China's membership primarily on Peking's threat to the independent existence and UN seat of the 12 million people of Taiwan. (Our aim would be to hold the line on Chirep during the present session but to prepare for acquiescence in a "one-China one-Taiwan" seating arrangement at the next GA.)

3. Sometime in January the Secretary of State should find an occasion, ideally during a press conference, to note casually that "of course, the United States has accorded de facto recognition to the Peiping regime ever since President Eisenhower authorized the Geneva and Warsaw conversations of 1954-5; our real problem, however, is Communist China's continuing threat to Formosa and to its neighbors." Such a low-key remark would move us toward "one-China one-Taiwan" without igniting public concern over imminent de jure recognition of Peking (a move that I would regard as of little value and of very low priority as long as we maintain our commitments to the security and independence of Taiwan).

4. Early in the year, the Department of State should announce revised travel regulations for American citizens which would in effect permit them to journey to nations we do not recognize, on the understanding that the U.S. Government cannot provide protection for such travellers. (As you know, this travel package was cleared through State last January; the one chief difficulty seems to relate to Cuba, a point on which I have no views.)

5. Depending upon responses here and abroad to the above moves and depending upon new international developments, we should move quietly to place our trade in non-strategic goods with Communist China on the same basis as our trade with the Soviet Union.

6. At the time of the next UNGA meeting in the autumn of 1965, we should focus our energies on the retention of Taiwan's seat in the General Assembly (and perhaps on preventing Peking from occupying a seat in the Security Council). If we play our cards right--and if the Chinats don't commit political suicide--we might even succeed in shifting the onus for Peking's continued exclusion to the Chicoms.

At the same time that we take the above moves, we should maintain all aspects of our present military containment of Communist China--our assistance to Vietnam, Laos, India, and other nations of the region; also, our resistance to Chicom activities in Africa, etc. In other words, we should move toward treating the Chinese much as we treat the Russians: an appropriately tough response wherever or whenever they seriously cause us harm; but otherwise, a groping toward coexistence on the basis of mutual self-interest.

I am under no illusion that the above moves would produce a change in Communist China's behavior or its view of the United States. I strongly believe, however, that these moves would give us a greater look of maturity and self-confidence, far greater rapport with our major allies, increased respect from the "third world," a greater degree of maneuverability, and the basis for long-term leverage with the Chicoms. We would also have less the look of a defeated obstructionist by the end of 1965.

I would argue, in addition, that the U.S. political climate can bear the weight of such moves--particularly if the President wins big next week. (Press and Congressional reaction to the Hilsman China speech last year revealed a dramatic ebbing of passions on the China issue over the past decade.)

I might add that I am well aware that much of this strategy is dependent upon early decisions that must be taken with regard to the situation in South Vietnam. I assume that we will have to choose roughly between escalation towards negotiation on the one hand, and a muddle-through towards negotiation on the other.

Even if we were to elect the first alternative, my China suggestions might still make sense. On the basis of my own limited knowledge of the Vietnam situation, however, I would hope that our choice would be the second alternative. If so, my suggestions would hardly run counter to this strategy.

Jim

 

64. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, November 5, 1964.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that it was seen by the Secretary.

SUBJECT
China and the UN

After some consultation around here, and a good deal of brooding, I offer the attached analysis of the Chinese representation issue and its ramifications into Southeast Asia and a good many other related subjects.

This is not a "solution" but an essay which tries to take a fresh look at a tired old problem. I think it would be worthwhile to have a small seminar with a very limited number of people, to discuss how we tackle our ChiRep problem before we are dragged to unsatisfactory outcomes by some of our best friends and allies.

I have given copies of this only to George Ball (who originally asked for it), Averell Harriman, Llewellyn Thompson, Bill Bundy, and Walt Rostow./2/

/2/Cleveland sent a copy of the attachment to Ball with a covering memorandum of October 31, a copy of which is attached to the source text but not printed.

Attachment/3/

/3/Drafted by Cleveland. The drafting date is October 31.

THE TAMING OF THE SHREW:
COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

There is a good deal of talk these days about the erosion of support for excluding the Chinese Communists from the United Nations, and about the related problem of how to accomplish U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia. On both situations we are in something of a box. This paper will argue that the same box contains both problems; and while it is something of a Chinese puzzle, we can escape from the box we are in.

I.

Erosion and Opportunity

Contrary to widespread belief, the central problem in the Far East is the military and political behavior of the Chinese Communists, not our military and political response to that behavior.

On the military side we are doing what we can to contain ChiCom power without expanding the Southeast Asian war or unleashing the Chinese Nationalists for an invasion of the Chinese mainland. We have created something close to a stalemate around the whole periphery of Chinese power from Korea to India. But the Viet Nam salient of that stalemate is precarious in the extreme.

The ChiComs do not yet have reason to believe they cannot win in Southeast Asia by applying patience, pressure, and the principles of indirect aggression. They know how fragile the Saigon government is--they are helping make it that way. And they hear vocal elements in American politics proposing that we get out of Vietnam, and get the United Nations in.

On the political side, the most recent soundings place the vote on Chinese representation in the 19th General Assembly on the ragged edge of losing by simple majority. Of our friends in this battle we can say only, as Thurber said of his early colleagues at The New Yorker, that "some of them helped, with left hand and tongue in cheek."

Canada, Italy and many others are impatient to get on some new track that is not vulnerable to the political charge they are "ignoring" the world's most populous nation. The Africans are increasingly wobbly. The French are increasingly unhelpful. Even so strong an opponent of ChiCom admission as Paul-Henri Spaak has now told us this Assembly is the last time around for him in the face of mounting public and parliamentary pressure at home.

If we make enough of an issue of it, the British and a few others who recognize Peking will probably stick with us in insisting a two-thirds majority is required to change the representation of China in the UN. But at best we can hope to hold the line on the traditional basis only through the present General Assembly. If the line up of power in the Far East remains about the way it is, and we do not change our UN tactics, we face a serious defeat on the issue in the 20th General Assembly.

Studying these facts, virtually every government in the world now believes that we are gradually losing both the guerilla war in South Viet Nam and the parliamentary trench war in the UN.

And a growing number of governments now seem convinced (a) that there is a better chance of taming the aggressive behavior of the ChiComs if they are admitted to the UN and subjected to peaceful persuasion in its precincts; and (b) that the rigid posture of the United States is somehow preventing an accommodation with the ChiComs.

(The evidence that the ChiComs can be tamed by the application of sweetness and light is wholly lacking. They are still mobilizing on India's northern border, stirring up the Pathet Lao, subverting Cambodia, supporting the attack by North Viet Nam on South Viet Nam, and threatening Formosa--and they are still at war with the UN itself in Korea. They have exploded a nuclear device and will doubtless now add nuclear blackmail to their kit of tools.)

This picture of our friends and allies leaving the sinking ship of U.S. policy is not overdrawn; but what it reveals is not their defection from the anti-Communist cause, but their defection from our existing policies. After all, most of the relevant political leaders in the world do not favor Chinese Communist influence; they fear it. They do not want Southeast Asia to become a peninsula of China; they just don't believe we can prevent that outcome in the way we are trying to prevent it. They do not look forward to the day the Chinese enter the United Nations; they merely regard it as historically inevitable.

In other words, what is eroding is not the opposition to Communist China's behavior, but the support of our traditional tactics for dealing with it.

[Here follows Section II, "Military Firmness and Political Flexibility," and the first 9 pages of Section III, "Political Perspective."]

Even to get started on this political escalator would require enormous changes in the attitudes and ambitions of the Chinese Communists. In steps 2 and 4, it would also require far-reaching changes in the attitudes and ambitions of the Government of the Republic of China--in return for the maintenance of its name and identity, and its control over Formosa, it would be abandoning the "return to the Mainland," liquidation of its own Security Council veto, and acceptance of the People's Republic of China as, in effect, the senior one of the two Chinas.

It is not likely that we will have to cross many of these difficult bridges any time soon. Indeed, the danger of getting started down this somewhat slippery road at all is made remote by the implacable hostility of the Chinese Communist leadership. They will surely insist for quite a while that they won't come into the UN unless Taipei is thrown out and Peking gets not only the China seat in the General Assembly but the veto in the Security Council as well. Moreover, the Chinese Communist leaders, who are still the veterans of the Long March, have some reason to believe that their kind of toughness pays off: French recognition, Western trade credits, Khrushchev's fall and the political fall out of their own nuclear test all bear witness.

But if we were to indicate to the world our willingness to move down a peaceful road by negotiated steps at a negotiated speed (while increasing our military pressure to demonstrate that we do not regard fighting and talking as alternatives but as mutually reinforcing policies), we would place on the Chinese Communists, where it belongs, the onus for delaying its own acceptance into the community of nations and the United Nations peace system.

Indeed, we should not at first have to do more than (a) insist that changes in Chinese behavior are an essential to an accommodation of the ChiComs on its relationship to the UN; and (b) indicate that Laos and the Nuclear Test Ban are the obvious places to start testing China's willingness to be in fact a part of the world community. Later, while the ChiRep item is being discussed in the 19th General Assembly, we could (c) indicate our willingness to join in setting up a "study committee" on ChiRep, to report to the 20th General Assembly in 1964. (Such a tactic was approved for possible use in last year's General Assembly, but was not used since we clearly had the votes to beat the Albanian resolution on its merits.)

Clearly the traditional structure of the ChiRep issue, which has (remarkably) served us well for a decade-and-a-half, is eaten away at its very foundations. Our major allies, France and Britain, will not help us maintain it and most of our other significant allies, from Italy and Belgium around to the Philippines and Japan, are hanging on only for fear of what it would do to their relationship with us if they were to let go.

Our cue, surely, is to find a way of mobilizing all of the world's nations that oppose the way the Chinese Communists are using their power, in a new strategy that puts the primary stress on future improvements in Chinese behavior.

 

65. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 14, 1964, 4:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Cobb and approved in S on January 5, 1965. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

SUBJECT
Canadian Views on Chinese Representation at the UN

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Charles S.A. Ritchie of Canada
Mr. Gary R. Harman, First Secretary, Embassy of Canada

The Secretary
Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary, IO
William B. Cobb, Jr., EUR/BNA

Ambassador Ritchie began by saying that he had talked with the Canadian Foreign Minister and had been asked by him to convey to the Secretary the Foreign Minister's present thinking on the problem of Chinese representation at the UN. The Canadians, on the basis of extensive checking, are of the opinion that on an Albanian-type resolution the General Assembly would vote 53 in favor, 45 against, with 15 abstentions. This possibility argues for taking a long look at the China representation question between now and the beginning of the General Assembly session rather than between the 19th and 20th sessions of the General Assembly, as had been suggested earlier. The Canadians are aware of the importance of America's relations with the free countries of Asia and, of course, recognize domestic sentiment in the United States. They are also aware of domestic considerations in Canada which are more favorable toward the ChiComs. Because of these factors, the Canadians feel that they would not oppose an Albanian-type resolution as they had in the past. With respect to the "important question," Canada would vote affirmatively despite uncertainties that the resolution would carry. The Canadians under the circumstances are considering the possibility of introducing a declaratory resolution which would support a two-China solution at the UN.

The Secretary said that he would like to speak with the President about the Canadian views and accordingly would withhold full comment until after he could do so. Nevertheless, he thought it should be pointed out that the problem is not so much with the domestic reaction in the United States or the UN reaction as it is with Peiping. If the ChiComs continue on their present aggressive course, there will be war in the Pacific. Unless they realize there is opposition to their present course, they will conclude that they are doing fine. So far as we know not one of the free world countries represented in Peiping has expressed to the ChiComs criticism of their actions during the past two years. Paradoxically, it is now argued by some that the Chinese explosion of a nuclear device is a reason for admitting them to the United Nations, yet the same voices would loudly condemn the United States and seek to throw us out of the UN had we done so.

Ambassador Ritchie said that the problem in part was based on the mathematics of the vote. The Secretary noted that in this connection Article 19 comes into play since a number of votes counted one way or another by the Canadians "have to be paid for." Ambassador Ritchie gave the Secretary the Canadian analysis of the country-by-country vote. The Secretary said that we would check the Canadian figures against our own for there may be different views on certain ex-French-African countries and others. Our assessments can be compared on November 17 when Assistant Secretary Cleveland goes to Ottawa for discussions there. The Secretary again emphasized that the reaction in Peiping was in our view of central importance. Looking ahead we could see the possibility that the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries could work out their problems without war. We are not so sure about Peiping.

Assistant Secretary Cleveland asked if the views expressed by Ambassador Ritchie reflected the joint Belgian-Italian-Canadian assessment. The Ambassador said that they did not and that, in point of fact, the Canadian view reflected the Minister's present thoughts on the subject rather than a firm policy decision of the Government of Canada.

 

66. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, November 18, 1964, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Memoranda of Conversation, Bundy. Secret. Prepared by Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council staff.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON UNITED NATIONS MATTERS

PARTICIPANTS
The President, Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland, Ambassador Stevenson, McGeorge Bundy, George Reedy, Samuel Belk

[Here follows discussion not related to China.]

Chinese Representation

Stevenson then told the President that we faced a difficult problem with ChiRep. This year our position was badly eroded; next year it would be irretrievable. The Canadians, for instance, were deserting us for the first time. As of now, we had a slight simple majority on our side, and we might have to revert to asking for a 2/3 majority ("important question").

Bundy then reminded the President that there was more to it than just what we might do this year: Could we get support for a 2-China policy? What was to be done about the seat in the Security Council where the U.S. has the veto? Peiping certainly would not come into the UN unless it got the Security Council seat. This was the matter of seeing how things look that are not going to happen this year.

Stevenson said that unless we start to shift our policy this year, Taiwan would be, at any rate, totally replaced in a few years. We could just allow this to happen or we could begin to shift toward a 2-China policy. The ChiNats might withdraw on their own initiative. He recalled that the ChiNats refused to accept recognition from France when France recognized Communist China.

Stevenson thought we must study the alternatives: admit the ChiComs and throw the ChiNats out; adopt a 2-China policy; get somebody to propose a study group (which is bitterly opposed on Taiwan as the beginning of the end); get the ChiComs into disarmament talks. Stevenson told the President that we would need guidance as to how to go about it. He did not think we should continue frozen, which would in the near future damage our prestige. We could move toward a 2-China policy, which the ChiComs won't accept anyway.

The President asked what would happen to the Security Council seat if Communist China got into the UN. Ambassador Stevenson said the ChiComs would get it.

Bundy reminded the President that we could keep the ChiComs out by using the veto which was what President Kennedy had said he would do. But the U.S. never had used the veto and did we actually want to use it in the Security Council year after year to keep the ChiComs out.

The Secretary stated to the President that the matter of war and peace lay in the Pacific. If we appeared to falter before the Soviet Union and Communist China this would be interpreted as a reward for the track they have been following, and this would increase the chance of war. If we were to make a move that would signal to Peiping that we were weakening, this would increase our danger. The Secretary agreed with Stevenson that something must be done--perhaps the establishment of a study committee that would allow the matter to fall into complete confusion for an indefinite period.

Stevenson said the sooner we moved the better. He recalled President Kennedy had said that President Eisenhower had told him that "the only thing that will bring me back into politics is to bring China into the UN."

Bundy suggested that President Kennedy might have been using President Eisenhower's remark as an umbrella for his own policy.

The Secretary thought that it might be necessary for the President to telephone Prime Minister Pearson and impress upon him that we must not make a move that will be interpreted as weakness in the Far East.

The President agreed. He then turned to the Philippines and recalled that there had been offers from the Philippines to give us support in South Vietnam, but that our military leaders had regarded this offer as embarrassing because, if it were accepted, the Chinese would come in. The President recalled that we had been appealing for more flags and more units instead of ambulance units and that this was an offer of what we wanted and the military had turned it down.

Bundy and the Secretary remarked that Max Taylor and McNamara would be very disappointed to hear this.

Stevenson repeated that the U.S. must be prepared for a loss of prestige unless we were willing to move forward on a 2-China policy in this session--the ChiComs would not accept it anyway. To stand fast with people dropping away right and left--especially the French Africans--was not right. We should not stand still and be overwhelmed by the waves. Stevenson noted, however, that the matter would not come before the UN until January.

The President said that Secretary Rusk's remarks impressed him; that perhaps better than abandoning our policy and inviting strong partisanship in Congress, the President said that what gave him pause was Secretary Rusk's statement that to change would be a pay-off for the Soviet and ChiCom hard line.

Stevenson said that he and others had felt for a long time that we should get the ChiComs into the community of nations--then you could manage them better.

The President noted that he did not pay the foreigners at the UN to advise him on foreign policy, but that he did pay Rusk and that he was inclined to listen to him.

The Secretary noted that there was no real basis for some of our allies wanting to get the ChiComs in the UN. There had been no effort on the part of our friends to level off with the ChiComs on the problems that we jointly faced with Peiping. There had been no effort on the part of the French, for instance, to get at the heart of the matter.

Stevenson said that nevertheless there were 700 million people not represented in the UN as against a few million of the Kuomintang on Taiwan.

Cleveland pointed out that, while it was true that our position in the UN was eroding, it was important to remember that it had lasted for fifteen years. The Secretary said this was correct; that he had invented it fifteen years ago.

Cleveland thought one approach we should make would be to go to those who favor admission and emphasize the behavior of the ChiComs on the international scene and say, in effect, "unless your behavior is better, you can't get in." Many UN members say we are standing in the way of ChiCom admission but it is the Chinese Communists themselves.

The President remarked that it was just as we are being blamed now for denying the USSR its vote in the GA.

Secretary Rusk agreed that this would be the last General Assembly in which we could use the standing tactic on ChiRep.

Cleveland thought we could succeed this year only if we indicated that there was movement in some way toward a new approach.

The President wondered why Martin would wish to change the Canadian vote. Both Bundy and Cleveland said it was because it would be politically popular.

Stevenson said that he had travelled into nine states during the fall and that he had found the people far ahead of the Congress on ChiRep. Rusk thought it a far less domestic problem than an international one. Stevenson said that, as he travelled through the country, the people asked him about Article 19 and ChiRep. He said it was difficult to give out all the old answers--there were often bad editorials. Stevenson recalled that there had been movement on ChiRep under President Kennedy when he agreed to abandon the Eisenhower position of a moratorium and, instead, to discuss the problem--this had been a step forward. He said he did not know how much longer we could hold the line.

Samuel E. Belk

 

67. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/

Washington, November 20, 1964, 4:21 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 CHINAT. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Bennett on November 17; cleared by Fearey, Samuel L. King of O/CPR, Sisco, Llewellyn E. Thompson, Green, and Komer; approved by William Bundy. Also sent to USUN.

493. Embtels 393/2/ and 381./3/ Department considers Chiang Kai-shek visit to US inadvisable at this time. Chiang clearly plans seek stronger US support for GRC activities against mainland than we could agree to and would go home disappointed. Visit prior to 19th GA vote on Chirep would stir unhelpful speculation and could appear as desperate step taken in weakness. Effect on GRC position during upcoming critical GA could be seriously adverse.

/2/Telegram 393 from Taipei, November 10. (Ibid.)

/3/Telegram 381 from Taipei, November 7. (Ibid., DEF 12-1 CHICOM)

Chiang visit to attend inauguration (Embtel 393) not feasible. White House seeking restrict attendance inaugural ceremonies to diplomatic Chiefs of Mission resident Washington in accordance past practice.

Suggest you take appropriate opportunity tell Chang Chun we pleased to learn President Chiang might be prepared come to US to confer with President Johnson and that we of course share desire for closest possible top level consultation between our two Governments, especially in difficult days that may lie ahead. However, timing of visit of utmost importance. We fear that Presidential visit US when crucial Chirep vote impending in GA would be misconstrued as sign of weakness and hurt GRC position. If Chang Chun presses matter, you might tell him it difficult to foresee at what precise time it will be possible to extract maximum advantage from visit but this should be clearer after 19th GA over./4/

/4/Wright reported in telegram 468 from Taipei, November 26, that he had given Chang the Department's views. (Ibid.)

Ball

 

68. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, November 23, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. II. Secret. Filed with a covering memorandum from Komer to Bundy, also dated November 23, noting that for reasons of space he had not discussed the Quemoy/Matsu problem but that "This little time bomb is still there ticking away, and none of us know how to defuse it." He concluded, "In short, a close look at Quemoy/Matsu bidding better be on our agenda too."

Mac--

ChiRep Thoughts. The real problem we face on ChiCom policy is far less one of substance than of tactics.

Most people agree that, after 15 years of sustaining a rigid policy against Peking (and rather successfully at that), the erosion of our position is forcing us to take a different tack. Even the general nature of this tack is not really at issue--we want to retreat gracefully from an increasingly isolated position toward a stance which puts the onus for continued friction more on Peiping and less on us. In effect, we want to make our ChiCom policy more like that toward the USSR--tough where they push us but flexible where there's something to be gained, if only in terms of willingness to talk.

So the real question is no longer whether to disengage from the more rigid aspects of our China policy but how and when. On this essentially tactical question, the two extremes are either to take the initiative ourselves in order to minimize the loss and maximize our control over the consequences, or to let ourselves be pushed reluctantly by the pressures of the international community. By and large, however, it is simply unrealistic to expect us to say boldly we were wrong about our China policy. This isn't good domestic politics, and great nations don't win kudos abroad by admitting mistakes and saying mea culpa. So our posture must be one of saying that, although we haven't changed our views on the ChiCom threat, we reluctantly accept the verdict of the international community that China should be admitted to the club. Even so, we're still confronted with the question of how long to hold out before confessing, and what terms, if any, we can exact in return. Our decision on this when and how should take into account a whole series of factors, including those discussed below.

A. How much domestic backlash? I'm one of those who feel that the China question has tended to become de-politicized with time. It's hard to tell how much residual emotion it can yet arouse, or how much the Republicans could exploit it. Not only does the President's new mandate itself give him some room to maneuver, but this mandate was partly a vote for cautious responsibility in a nuclear world. So what the President does under the "peace" rubric generally nets out at a big plus. In this sense Peiping's nuclear test actually serves as a reason why we should enter into a dialogue with Peiping on such issues as arms control.

Peiping's test also dramatically underlines that Red China is here to stay. It destroys what's left of the Gimo's thesis that the civil war is still on (he knows it, too, poor man). Even Time has read this lesson. Moreover, the Sino-Soviet split (which will continue even if in muted form) provides further public justification for dealing with both Communist centers, not only one.

Despite all this, however, there's no blinking the fact that a shift in our policy will look like a defeat--whenever it occurs. This is the price we have to pay for having successfully maintained a fixed position for so long. Peiping is wholly unlikely to change its spots sufficiently to justify our shift on these grounds. To the contrary, one of the best arguments for shifting our policy is to pin the onus for its own intransigence more squarely on Peiping.

B. So the real issue is when and how to shift our China policy in a way which will minimize our losses--both domestically and abroad. And the real argument against doing so is that we can't afford it when we face a crunch with Peiping over Vietnam. To me, this was the central point in LBJ's 18 November talk with Rusk and Stevenson. Rusk's argument was that easing up on ChiRep now would make us appear to "falter" in the Pacific at just the wrong time.

C. Thus our decision on ChiRep, etc. turns largely on how we play Vietnam. If we appear to cut and run or to be losing, it will be domestically and internationally impossible to "make concessions" on ChiRep too. Nor would it be possible if we were "negotiating" (except theoretically as additional frosting on a negotiated settlement). But isn't the corollary also true? If we take a tougher stance in VN, if there is widespread fear abroad of US escalation--it can hardly be taken as a sign of undue weakness to be flexible on ChiRep. In fact, we could use this counterpoint as a justification for our VN policy; it would demonstrate that while we were determined to resist Communist aggression, we were simultaneously prepared to deal with the ChiComs wherever there was some peaceful purpose to be served.

In effect, I see increased pressure in VN as permitting greater flexibility on ChiRep--as supporting our contention that we don't seek a US/ChiCom war, and even that we are "escalating to negotiate." Paradoxical as it might seem, we could walk both sides of the street, thus helping to protect ourselves both from accusations we're seeking to do in Peiping and from complaints we're faltering in the face of the enemy.

D. How does the Article 19 Fight fit in? If we succeed in facing down Moscow on this issue (which means stemming panic among the neutralists), we will have started off the 19th GA with a crashing victory. To a degree at least, this too would provide a shield behind which we could be more flexible on ChiRep without seeming to falter. Indeed, the bigger our Article 19 victory, the more the neutralist majority will want to demonstrate non-alignment by voting against us on something else. Let's not ask too much.

E. How do we best preserve the position of Taiwan? To be coldly realistic, Taiwan is our ultimate card in any eventual modus vivendi with Peiping, and by the same token the bargaining counter to be preserved at all costs. But we can no longer tell ourselves with any conviction that trying to ostracize Red China is the best way to protect Taiwan. To the contrary, the longer we insist on an "either-or" choice, the more we will force the wrong choice from our point of view. What we need to do is to stem the rapid erosion of Taiwan's international position by getting it internationally recognized that China is a divided country (like Germany, Korea, and Vietnam). To do this we have to pay the price. I'm not suggesting we opt for "Two Chinas" yet;/2/ what we want to do is to get others on a "Two China" kick as the tacit price for our ostensible willingness to let Peiping into the UN. It's the only real counter to an Albanian-type resolution.

/2/The word "yet" is a handwritten insertion on the source text.

Peiping has recently made clear again that it won't come in unless Taiwan goes out. Fine--this will buy us another few years of maneuvering room if only Taipei will play it smart and not withdraw. I'm not optimistic, however, as the Gimo (at his advanced age) is more interested in face than in practical politics. So appealing to Chiang's finer sensibilities would get us exactly nowhere. Ergo, once we decided to move, I'd put it hard and cold to the Gimo--if he pulled out of the GA, we'd regard ourselves as relieved of our commitment to veto ChiCom admission to the SC.

The above doesn't really get to the tactics of when and how to alter our China policy. It merely gives my slant on some of the key variables. I have some thoughts on tactics and timing but I'll not overload the circuit for the moment. My main point is that our ability to be flexible on ChiRep may well turn largely on our decisions re Vietnam. Since the latter will almost certainly be upon us first, time enough for the latter later.

RWK

 

69. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 25, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, China, Vol. I. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the source text indicates Johnson saw it.

When Chiang Kai-shek handed the attached long rambling letter/2/ to our Ambassador he asked that you be told of his feeling that with the ChiCom test the situation in Asia had entered a critical stage--more critical than at any previous time.

/2/Telegram 452 from Taipei, November 23, transmitted the text of the letter. Telegram 456, November 24, reported Chiang's comments to Wright when he gave him the letter. Both are attached to the source text. Copies are also in Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON.

The gist of the letter itself is that (1) the ChiComs, not the Soviets, are the greatest threat today; (2) they are engaged in a protracted war of attrition in Southeast Asia, the only answer to which is a quick US victory; and (3) the ChiCom nuclear test poses a new dimension of threat, chiefly to the morale of Free Asians.

The Gimo then calls on the US to: (1) urgently develop a strategy for quickly winning the war in Vietnam; (2) take leadership in developing an "overall plan" for concerted action by the Free Asian peoples themselves to overthrow the ChiComs before it is too late (e.g. equip and unleash the GRC); and (3) if this is not possible just now, immediately give the GRC the wherewithal to destroy the ChiCom nuclear installations. He asks for an urgent reply.

We see this letter as essentially aimed at reminding you of the Gimo's well-known views at a time when he senses we must be rethinking our China policy. While he couches his letter in terms of a series of proposals he knows we can't accept, his chief aim is probably to forestall any weakening of our position on the ChiRep issue in the UN. State will draft a proposed answer.

R.W. Komer
McG. B.

[Continue with Document 70]

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