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1964-1968 Volume XXX China |
50. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, September 15, 1964.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 11 Sept-31 Oct 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone on September 17.
SUBJECT
Memorandum of Discussion at Luncheon--September 15th Secretary Rusk's Dining Room/2//2/See also Document 49.
ATTENDING
Secy. Rusk, Secy. McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone1. Reviewed the needs for photographic [intelligence on] Lop Nor Chinese Communist nuclear test site./3/ I explained the need for the U-2 mission as discussed and recorded in USIB meeting of September 10th./4/ Rusk took the position that finite intelligence on when a ChiCom test might be made was not of importance to him from a policy standpoint, as he knew it was inevitable and he knew of no political action he would take if finite information was given to him. Bundy seemed to agree. After extended discussion, I stated that I could not conceive of our failing to take some actions if finite information was in our hands, i.e., Rusk might contact Gromyko or Dobrynin; the President might communicate with Khrushchev privately; we might discuss the subject with our Allies, both in Europe and the Far East; and we might take some position in the press through leaks or planted information. Certainly we should discuss the subject with Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam. It was agreed that the embarrassment and consequences of failure outweighed the advantages and therefore, while the final decision was up to the President, Rusk would not recommend the mission. Bundy agreed. McNamara indicated his concurrence but was non-committal.
/3/In a September 12 meeting with Rusk, as recorded in McCone's September 13 memorandum for the record, McCone stated that the "status of the Lop Nor site and certain clandestine reports indicated a test was imminent." Rusk told him that "Dobrynin had told Thompson at lunch that the ChiComs 'would get off a test at any time.'" (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 11 Sept-31 Oct 1964)
/4/No record of the meeting has been found. In the September 12 meeting between Rusk and McCone cited above, Rusk told McCone that he opposed the proposed mission because the political consequences of the loss of a plane outweighed the advantages.
Note: In a 5:00 o'clock meeting, I suggested that the mission could be accomplished [3 lines of source text not declassified]. All immediately agreed that this plan was a good one and should be approved. Subsequently at a meeting with the President (which I did not attend because of another appointment) the President approved the Takhli-Lop Nor plan and this was reported to me by McGeorge Bundy in a telephone call.
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]
51. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, September 18, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Nuclear Testing--China. Top Secret. A marginal note in Bundy's handwriting reads: "Very interesting. McGB."
Mac--
September 17 Planning Lunch (regular members only) again took up question of how to cope with ChiCom nuclear explosion./2/ Rowen gave a powerful counter-argument to the "temperate" approach proposed by the interdepartmental planning group chaired by Bob Johnson. Rowen saw many people taking an "excessively cheery" view, primarily because they were thinking too much in short-run terms. True, the ChiComs wouldn't have much of a nuclear capability for a long time; true, they wouldn't suddenly launch new aggressions simply because they had a rudimentary capability; true, there might not be any profound panic reactions from other Asians.
/2/Rostow's report of the meeting is in a memorandum of September 21 to Rusk. (Ibid.) A paper by Robert H. Johnson entitled "Some 'Unorthodox' Approaches to the Problem of Nuclear Proliferation," drafted on May 28, was sent to Planning Group members with a September 11 memorandum from Rostow. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files: Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, Chronological File, Schedules and Briefing Material) Rostow's memorandum states that a memorandum by Henry Rowen of the International Security Affairs Office in the Department of Defense was to be circulated. A copy of Rowen's paper, entitled "Doing Something About Communist China's Nuclear Program," September 15, was sent to Rostow on September 16. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, China)
But the longer term implications, say over a 15-year period, were horrendous. Harry noted that the first Soviet nuclear explosion had occurred 15 years ago this month; look at the growth in Soviet power in the following 15 years. Even the first Soviet test might have affected Stalin's decision to launch the Korean war. In any event, the staggering growth in Soviet capabilities over the last 15 years had had an immense effect on our policies, postures, defense budget, etc. Granted that China today has a much feebler resource base than the USSR had in 1949; on the other hand the ChiComs might be even more adventuresome once they went nuclear than the Soviets had been. There was no reason why the ChiComs could not develop even crude ICBMs in 15 years. As for the external effects of Peiping's going nuclear, these would entail greatly increased pressure on us for new aid commitments, and major counter-efforts on the part of those Asians who felt themselves menaced. Most immediately, India could probably go nuclear in a year. As for the US, a growing ChiCom capability might be the deciding factor driving us into a $30 billion AICBM program or a huge civil defense effort. Yet another risk was that the ChiComs might be freer than we or the Russians in handing around nuclear technology; they had already hinted at this to Nasser.
What could we do? Rowen thought it technically feasible to destroy the two key ChiCom installations by a limited non-nuclear air attack. We could (a) handle this as a completely open matter and justify it at the time; or (b) seize on any opportunity created, say by a major blow-up in SEA; or (c) make a secret attack. In the latter case, it was quite possible that Peiping would prefer to say nothing about it. Such a spoiling operation would gain us a 2-5 year delay, and also deter ChiCom rebuilding. How valuable were 2-5 years? To Rowen they could be quite important.
What about reactions? The Soviets would approve privately, but might have to raise a to-do publicly. However, there was a chance we could bring them around in advance. The ChiComs might go for a tit-for-tat response, though it wasn't clear where they could do so effectively. In the rest of the world there would be considerable fear--also some feeling that the US was punishing a smaller power for getting into the nuclear business. Was this necessarily bad, however? Moreover, initial fears might quickly turn to relief once the crisis seemed to pass.
Rostow suggested that if we and the Soviets had just moved toward some big arms control agreement (say an unlimited test ban), the fact that we were going in this direction would create an optimum atmosphere for US pre-emption to forestall nuclear proliferation by Peiping.
Bob Johnson's rebuttal was that the Soviet-ChiCom analogy was weak; the ChiComs were a lot less further along today than the Soviets were 15 years ago. Moreover, the ChiCom explosion wouldn't change much, except psychologically. The US would still have great nuclear superiority as a deterrent, and perhaps an effective counter-force capability. The ChiComs would have to take into account possible pre-emptive US action if they brandished missiles in a crisis or at the least assume a disproportionate US retaliation if ChiComs used nucs. He queried whether US decisions on civil defense or ALCBMs were so sensitive to a ChiCom capability as Rowen indicated. (I commented that the more likely problem was that a ChiCom capability might trigger Soviet CD or ALCBM programs, which in turn might trigger us.)
Johnson found the stimulus to proliferation the strongest argument for pre-empting the ChiComs. But we should look at what other options we had besides pre-emption. Various arms control and propaganda programs, as well as new US commitments, could greatly limit the ChiCom impact. Moreover, would pre-empting the ChiComs prevent proliferation by other powers? Countries such as Israel would have their own reasons for going nuclear regardless of what China did. Finally, a one-time attack wouldn't do the job. It would only buy us some delay. To repeat the performance two or three times would be very difficult for the US.
Harriman's contribution was that we ought to have serious discussions with the Soviets on the ChiCom nuclear problem right after the election.
It was also brought out that the ChiComs already have overwhelming conventional superiority over their neighbors. So would other Asians be materially more scared of ChiCom power than they are already? Rostow and I mentioned the "precedent" problem. Would preemption of ChiComs encourage Nasser to take out Israeli nuclear facilities? Would it encourage the Soviets to play similar games?
Rostow questioned Rowen's proposition that the ChiComs might become much more aggressive once they had A-bombs. With nuclear weapons comes caution. The Soviets advanced less after they had gone nuclear than before. They were more cautious in the 1959-61 Berlin crisis than in 1948-49. As soon as the ChiComs got nuclear weapons, they'd have to worry lest we might be more inclined to use nucs against them in a local conflict. So a ChiCom nuclear capability might actually operate to make the ChiComs more cautious. Others present thought Rowen had taken the best case for our pre-emptive capability, and the worst case for what the ChiComs would do if we didn't pre-empt. Rowen gladly conceded the point.
Rostow summed up by saying that if the ChiComs attacked in SEA, then we had an overwhelming case for pre-emption. As to the other case, we should keep looking at it, particularly in the context of whether we could arrive at a broader modus vivendi with the Soviets about Germany, arms control, etc. If we and the Soviets could isolate the ChiComs in this way, by getting world opinion on our side, then the reaction to pre-emption would be considerably less. However, WWR didn't see Khru-shchev prepared to go this far for quite a while yet.
There was an interesting aside when WWR asked Helms his view. Dick said he had raised this question several times at the White House and had been told to "keep his mouth shut." He pointed the finger at me and I said that I'd in effect been shut up too, but that you seemed to have no objection to PG discussion. I suspect that several of those present concluded that some planning was probably afoot on this matter. If so, or if there ought to be, the best cover for it might be simply to put out the word that we've taken a negative decision on the matter.
RWK
52. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, September 23, 1964, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, Geneva, Moscow, and Stockholm.
645. Cabot-Wang Talks./2/ Deptels 557, 568, 581, 582./3/
/2/This was the 122d meeting of the Ambassadorial talks. Cabot reported the meeting in detail in airgram A-363 from Warsaw, September 28. (Ibid.)
/3/Telegram 557 to Warsaw, September 18, transmitted guidance for the meeting; telegram 568, September 19, and telegrams 581 and 582, September 22, provided supplementary guidance. (Ibid.)
(1) Wang opened by reminding me I had said at last meeting we were well aware of serious consequences which could come from extension war beyond borders South Vietnam and seek avoid it. Yet we had fabricated second Tonkin Gulf incident as pretext expand war in Indo China. US surprise attack against DRV had met head on blow and even so-called allies failed give US active support in Vietnam. This illustrative of isolation in which we find ourselves in world. Said virtually every day US aircraft, warships invaded territorial waters other nations in Far East and large reinforcements being sent South Vietnam. It is well known USG working on operational plan for North Vietnam in further expansion war. Particularly serious that on September 18 we concocted another alleged Gulf of Tonkin incident as excuse to expand war. CPR strongly supports serious warning already served US by DRV. Alleged trend of opinion in US assumed Chinese reaction to August 4 incident was not strong and so there was suggestion we could "try it again". Debt of blood to DRV not yet repaid. Should we make another adventure, it could be said with certainty the situation in Vietnam and whole of SEA would be beyond repair. Mentioned recent serious warnings saying he directed to launch serious protest against such unscrupulous violation sovereignty of China. Mentioned increased support Taiwan and visits there of US "brass hats". Said Secretary Rusk was calling white black when he said China and DRV must come to decision leave neighbors alone. Trick of thief shouting "stop thief" can fool no one. He said if we bent on war then Chinese people have no alternative but to keep us company to the end. Hoped USG would take note of this.
(2) I said I shared hope he had expressed that peace could be reestablished in SEA but regretted say did not think his statements today had in any way contributed to that result. Spoke of detailed account first two incidents Tonkin Gulf as taken from log books American vessels involved. I gave facts of incidents and emphasized Hanoi should be made to realize its actions must inescapably involve other powers. Then restated at length our policies SEA adding our response would continue to be restrained but it was important his side not misread our intentions.
(3) Wang repeated at length his accusations our words inconsistent with our deeds, saying Chinese knew true facts Tonkin Gulf incidents and futile for me try argue otherwise. Called second Tonkin Gulf incident "a lie" saying on August 4 DRV did not have single war vessel in waters where US ships were and whole world knows this attack never occurred. Announcements by US Defense Department officials contradictory and full of loopholes and description so called encounter contrary to elementary military sense. Spoke further of alleged intrusions and claimed US on 30 July shelled two DRV islands. Alleged USS Maddox on 2 August intruded into territorial waters DRV. Concocted incident September 18 was attempt repeat farce of August 4 with view creating fresh excuses expand aggression. Since we had not been able piece together coherent story how did we expect fool others. Repeated it was clear USG simply lying. Implied we could not [be] well aware serious consequences extending war as we had said since our recent actions appeared designed to expand war in SEA. Gave long tirade about alleged US aggressive action in Far East and whole world saying PRC supported national liberation movements in world because these movements are just ones. Communists have never tried to conceal their position. Had always stood by side with oppressed nations and people throughout world. This was honorable and no attack could ever check their determination. Spoke at length of the law of the development of history saying revolutions could neither be exported nor imported but it was also impossible for anyone to put down by force a genuine revolution. Said he thought it was a fraud when I said we would be restrained and would take limited action. Asked whether it could be said aggressive action became legitimate if limited.
(4) I said I considered his remarks a deplorable contribution to our talks. I said Wang seemed imply that any US presence in Tonkin Gulf impermissible. I denied American warships had penetrated what we considered under international law to be territorial space or waters of any nation Wang mentioned. Certainly three incidents in Gulf all took place many miles from territorial waters. I then reviewed in greater detail facts first two incidents. Also denied US warship attack on islands. I referred to ChiCom Central Committee statements supporting liberation movements, saying could not see how this could be reconciled with support of five principles, one of which was noninterference internal affairs other countries. Fact was North Vietnam had interfered in both Laos and South Vietnam long before we extended help to either. Mentioned North Vietnam prisoners captured Laos and assured Wang North Vietnam Government was playing very dangerous game.
(5) Wang then lectured on sovereign right establish territorial limits and launched into tedious but vitriolic repetition most of themes he had broached earlier, including pious lecture on nature of revolution in modern times, emphasizing theme it was international duty as well as a right for all fair minded people in world to support just cause (national liberation struggles).
(6) I assured Wang that search lights, torpedos and automatic weapons aimed at our vessels were not imaginary and that second Tonkin incident was not "lie" as he alleged. Said must insist on right my government question excessive claims to territorial waters. Objected to Wang's reference to "puppet regime" of South Vietnam, pointing out that government recognized by overwhelming number governments of world and if there is puppet regime in that area, it is Government North Vietnam, which he said at last meeting was closely connected to China as teeth and lips. Again spoke of unreconcilability support of liberation movements and support five principles. Mentioned confirmation North Vietnam troops in Laos according Peking Radio. Referred to his lecture on resist-ance to oppression and asked whether enormous numbers Chinese liquidated by his side did not constitute oppression.
(7) Wang followed with long lecture of "facts" in South Vietnam situation centering around theme government there hated by broad masses South Vietnamese people. Alleged I had again referred to his government as a "regime".
(8) I denied I had used word regime in connection with his side in this meeting./4/ (Wang was reading from prepared statement when he made this accusation.)
/4/Telegram 557 to Warsaw suggested that since Wang seemed sensitive over Cabot's use of the word "regime," he should substitute "your side."
(9) There followed several exchanges re Vietnam mostly tedious repetition on Wang's part and I finally said his statements were so ridiculous I saw no reason to continue argument. Wang blandly stated difference was his statements were in accordance with facts, and facts are facts. I reviewed points on which we simply disagreed as to facts almost as much as we disagreed on conclusions to be drawn from them. Wang closed saying of course we held different views but USG should be held responsible for tensions SEA at present. Next meeting November 25.
Cabot
53. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, September 24, 1964, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, Geneva, Moscow, and Stockholm.
650. Cabot-Wang Talks. Reference: Embtel 645./2/ Comments and recommendations following 122 meeting.
/2/Document 52.
1. This was one of longest and on Chinese side by far most vitriolic meeting in many months. Wang was loud, tendentious, impolite and arrogant, virtually spitting out his accusations, often with finger wagging. We were subject to lengthy lectures delivered from an offensively professorial height. He almost invariably referred to me as "you," whereas long habit in the talks had been use "Mister Ambassador" or "Your Excellency." He used such phrases as "I want to tell you." He called not only me, but USG "liars." He expressed cocky contempt for our allegedly unavailing efforts in SEA, and made clear he thought we were seeing beginning of end for us there. After I pointed out that while he objected to use of word "regime" as applied to Peiping, he used it re SVN and "Chiang clique" for GRC, he seemed to take pleasure in using those terms more frequently. On side rustled papers quite unnecessarily while I was talking.
2. There was a "Panmunjom" flavor to this meeting. Repetitious sermons, full of invective and pompous Communist "axioms" were delivered with no regard for factor logic, in a spirit of contemptuous one-upmanship seemingly designed to arouse anger. I answered firmly but not provocatively, and was careful not to let my anger show. Wang obviously wanted to prolong the meeting and engaged in lengthy ad libs before and after his prepared papers ran out--one of which he used twice. We believe he hoped I would leave the meeting with angry or at least glum mien. I therefore emerged to meet the larger than usual number of newsmen with relaxed, smiling aspect. Last evening one reporter told Narding press consensus based on length meeting and aspect two principals on emergence was that we had read riot act to Chinese due Tonkin Gulf incidents, and had derived satisfaction from meeting.
3. The new Wang was entirely different in comportment from his first meeting in July. To limited extent this may be attributable his settling in saddle and hence emergence his own nature as provincial, blindly dedicated cadre who has made good through intelligence and loyalty with "know nothing" contempt for reason or logic. I am inclined believe, however, temper of his approach largely set by direction Peiping and doubtless had ChiComs worried. Notable that our retaliatory actions per se scarcely mentioned by Wang. Instead he assumed posture of heady confidence combined with threatening warnings. Believe this is his character. This is not time to expect them mention our successes or their weaknesses, even if they saw chance needling us in process. (Not surprising defector Tung not mentioned, even to advance excuse of kidnapping charges.)
4. Particularly interesting is fact Wang readily admitted ChiComs supported "just" revolutions in other countries, implying all true communists should do so. He saw no inconsistency in this and coexistence line, since revolutions could not be exported, but inevitably arose indigenously in the face of local or foreign imposed oppression. In such instances, he maintained, communist support was "honorable."
5. Wang pointedly denied both second and third Tonkin Gulf incidents took place, claiming we had concocted them as pretext more aggressive plotting against NVN. When I pointed out Wang had not denied first incident took place in international waters, Wang did not return to this point.
6. Wang made no response on subject NVN prisoners Laos, despite fact their assignment would come under his label of "honorable" support.
7. I believe at next meeting we should continue phraseology of confident great power, rather than swapping invective for invective, at least yet. If character of exchange is to alter for worse it should be of their making. At same time within this frame there is room for bluntness, and among other things we may wish indicate we not interested in elementary course in Marxist maxims in these serious talks.
8. Wang has penchant for ad libbing, and I may be forced to do more of this myself than has been necessary in past, although I have all along tried to tailor my remarks to the requirements of the moment.
9. Vientiane's 491 to Department/3/ arrived after meeting.
/3/Dated September 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)
Cabot
54. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, September 25, 1964, 1-3:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, 11/63-4/68, Vol. I. Secret.
Memorandum of conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin, Friday, September 25, 1964, 1:00-3:30 p.m.
I had a long and cordial lunch with Ambassador Dobrynin in which we touched lightly on a large number of topics of only casual interest. The points of principal importance are as follows:
[Here follows discussion not related to China.]
3. My own principal effort was to direct the Ambassador's attention to the problem of Communist Chinese nuclear weapons. I made it very plain that in our judgment the Chinese nuclear weapons would be real dissemination, while the MLF was nothing of the sort. I also made it plain that we would be ready for private and serious talk on what to do about this problem if there were any interest in the Soviet Government. The Ambassador gave no direct reply, but he gave me clearly to understand that in the thinking of the Soviet Government the Chinese nuclear capability was already, in effect, taken for granted. He argued that Chinese nuclear weapons had no importance against the Soviet Union or against the U.S., and that therefore they had only a psychological impact in Asia, and he implied that this impact had no importance for his government.
4. On China in general, the Ambassador admitted and indeed emphasized the depth and strength of the existing split between Moscow and Peking, but he took the view that the primary cause of this split was the personal megalomania of Mao. He said that Stalin at his worst had never insisted upon the kind of personal worship which was now accorded to Mao. He said that while in the Soviet Union younger men (like himself) were coming into positions of responsibility, and were able to argue openly and honestly with Khrushchev, in Communist China the older generation and, above all, Mao himself, were still in full charge and were inaccessible to reasonable argument. He told me at some length of the dismal experience of Soviet advisers trying to warn against the technological nonsense of the Great Leap Forward. But he asserted calmly, but strongly, his conviction that in the long run there would be a restoration of harmony between the two countries. And at one point, in discussion of our American differences with Communist China, he gently remarked on the continued existence of the treaty between the USSR and the ChiComs.
[Here follows discussion of an unrelated subject.]
McG. B.
55. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, October 5, 1964.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Mtgs with the Pres, May-Oct 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on October 7.
SUBJECT
Discussion with the President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and Mr. McGeorge Bundy--Monday, 5 October--4:45 p.m.[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
3. The Takhli-Lop Nor flights were discussed. I presented KH-4 photography and stated that U-2 photography would give us more precise information on the final stages of construction at Lop Nor from which we might estimate the probable time of a nuclear detonation. I said that unless information concerning the time of a detonation was of significant importance to the President and Secretary Rusk, I could not recommend the flight, pointing out it was a deep penetration extending the U-2 to the full limit of its range during which time no other important targets would be traversed. Secretary Rusk opposes the flight on the grounds the information is not of significant importance to him and the flight carried us over Burma and India which was undesirable./2/
/2/CIA telegram ADIC 5332 to Taipei, October 8, stated that the primary reason for cancelling the Lop Nor mission was the risk of an incident in the month preceding the presidential election. In addition, information obtained from a satellite and a September 29 statement by Rusk that a Chinese nuclear explosion might be imminent had both tended to diminish the importance of the mission. (Ibid., Job 80-B01676R, DDCI Trip to the Far East, 17-31 October 1964)
4. I then said that the units were deployed [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and suggested we fly some southern China missions covering critical targets. This was agreed.
Action: Mr. Bundy asked that we present flight plans and other information through the usual Special Group (303) channel, which I agreed to do promptly.
56. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency (Chamberlain) to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carter)/1/
Washington, October 15, 1964.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01676R, DDCI Trip to the Far East, 17-31 October 1964. Top Secret. Concurred in by the Deputy Director for Science and Technology, with the notation that a memorandum to holders of the estimate was planned for the following week. A paper entitled "Indications Relating to a Chinese Communist Nuclear Test in the Near Future," neither signed nor dated, is attached to the source text, along with a second memorandum of October 15 from Chamberlain to Carter entitled "The Chinese Atomic Energy Program."
SUBJECT
Estimated Imminence of a Chinese Nuclear Test1. This memorandum is for your information.
2. In a Special National Intelligence Estimate issued in August 1964/2/ it was concluded that, on balance, a Chinese nuclear test probably would not occur before the end of 1964. At that time available information indicated that the Chinese nuclear test site near Lop Nor was under active construction and could be ready for a nuclear test by about October 1964. On the other hand, continuing construction in September 1963 at the only known Chinese plutonium production site indicated a probable startup of the reactor at that site in early 1964. This in turn indicated a date around mid-1965 for first availability of sufficient plutonium for a nuclear test. Although neither the possibility of an earlier startup of this plant nor the existence of an unidentified plutonium production facility could be wholly discounted, it was felt unlikely that plutonium would be available in 1964. The U-235 plant at Lanchou is only partially complete and thus could not contribute fissionable material for a nuclear test in the near future.
/2/Document 43.
3. More recent information on the Lop Nor test site has confirmed the earlier estimate of its probable readiness date. Preparations for a test were essentially completed at the Lop Nor nuclear test site by October 1964. Included in these preparations is a 340 foot shot tower that was installed prior to April 1964 and is now surrounded by a double fence. Arrays for instrument emplacement are located around the tower. These include arcs at 9,800, 16,000, 23,000 and 33,000 feet respectively and a number of radial lines from the tower with bunkers and platforms emplaced along the lines. Two small towers, approximately 50 feet high, are located on the arc at 9,800 feet from the shot tower and at 905 from each other. Available information does not permit determination of whether or not instruments have actually been emplaced on the platforms and towers. The high priority apparently given to the completion of site construction suggests that a test is scheduled in the fairly near future since it would not be desirable to establish the parameters of an initial nuclear experiment much in advance of the test.
4. A high level of flight activity to and from the area was noted throughout this very active construction period. The activity halted in September 1963 when the site was essentially complete. Subsequent resumption of this activity in late September may reflect final preparations for testing.
5. A restudy of the Pao-t'ou reactor site indicates that adequate primary and backup electric power circuits for reactor operation had been installed by March 1963. Thus, our confidence has been reduced in the August 1964 judgment that the reactor probably did not start operation until early 1964. Another prospect for a fissionable material supply is a facility in a large complex near Chih-Chin-Hsia (Yumen) which might contain a small operational reactor, but this identification is uncertain.
6. We no longer believe that evidence on plutonium availability justifies the on-balance judgment reached in August 1964. We believe the Lop Nor evidence indicates that a test could occur at any time. In any case we believe a test will occur sometime within the next six to eight months.
Ernest J. Zellmer/3/
/3/Zellmer signed for Chamberlain above Chamberlain's typed signature.
57. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, October 16, 1964.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Mtgs with the Pres, Oct-Dec 1964. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Meeting of an Executive Group of the National Security Council, 16 October 19641. A special meeting of a small group of members of the National Security Council was convened at the White House at 1030 on 16 October 1964 to discuss the change of government in Moscow. In attendance were the President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Ball, Under Secretary Thompson, McGeorge Bundy, the DCI, and the undersigned. [Here follows the remainder of paragraph 1 and paragraphs 2-5 on other subjects.]
6. During this meeting preliminary reports about the explosion of a nuclear device in Communist China arrived, and there was a good bit of discussion over the kind of statement that should be released from the White House. Bundy had a draft of a "stand-by statement" which had been prepared in an interdepartmental committee earlier,/2/ and this was revised during and shortly after the meeting for release,/3/ along with the preliminary views provided by JAEIC as to the size and location of the explosion. There was a general discussion of the meaning of the Chinese Communist acquisition of a nuclear capability and a recollection of Secretary Rusk's statement of 29 September/4/ based upon new data provided by the Intelligence Community concerning the test site that had pretty well prepared the world for expecting this event and not becoming unduly alarmed by it.
/2/Read sent a copy of the draft statement to Bundy with a covering memorandum of September 30. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-1 CHICOM) A copy of a draft program of action to minimize the impact of the anticipated Chinese nuclear test, prepared by the interdepartmental committee, is filed with a September 25 covering memorandum from Rostow to Bundy. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing, China)
/3/The statement that Johnson read to the press at 1:20 p.m. that day is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book II, p. 1357.
/4/For text of Rusk's September 29 statement, see Department of State Bulletin, October 19, 1964, pp. 542-543.
Ray S. Cline
Deputy Director (Intelligence)
58. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, October 17, 1964.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, Folder 10, DCI Mtgs with the Pres, Oct-Dec 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone.
SUBJECT
Meeting of the National Security Council--Saturday--12:00 o'clock--17 October 1964/2//2/Summary notes of the meeting by Bromley Smith are filed in Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 3, Tab 25. For AEC Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg's notes of the meeting, see Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961-1971, Vol. 9, pp. 254-258.
With the President--all members present (except Secretary Dillon) plus Secty. Vance, Secty. Ball and Amb. Thompson
1. DCI opened the meeting with a briefing on the background of ChiCom nuclear capability. I reviewed briefly the Soviet-Chinese collaboration in the mid- and late '50's,
(a) the nuclear energy institute at Peiping with a small heavy water reactor, duplicate of one which I had seen in Moscow (Seaborg had also seen it);
(b) the existence of a suspected U-235 plant at Lanchow which was not completed and we did not expect would be in operation for 2 to 3 years;
(c) the existence of a small air-cooled reactor at Pao Tou with capacity to produce about 10 kilograms of plutonium per year which we thought went into operation in late '63 or early '64 or it might have gone into operation earlier though that is unlikely;
(d) the existence of a suspected graphite-moderated water-cooled reactor in the vicinity of Yumen which was first photographed in 1962 and again in February 1964; at the latter date the reactor apparently was not operational however I stated it may have been shut down for change of fuel elements and hence it was possible, though by no means certain, that the reactor might have been operational in 1962.
I said that the existence of the reactor was not surprising as both we and the Russians had built a small graphite-cooled reactor prior to the construction of our large reactors at Hanford. This reactor had a capacity of between 30 and 35 kilograms plutonium per year.
The test site at Lop Nor which we have observed over the past 2 or 3 years, during recent months had seen considerable activity on the basis of photography of this site, that I had stated in my briefing of the heads of eight Western European Governments that we could expect a nuclear test based on the evidence of the completion of this site within 30 to 60 days from the time of my briefing which was mid-September, and the activities we noted just prior to the explosion such as the stand-down of all aviation in the area and unusual sampling of weather.
2. I then said the known facilities could, if one assumed the earliest operational dates, produce plutonium for the device and some more. Pao Tou alone could not do so, but Pao Tou plus Yumen would give them sufficient plutonium. The two reactors could produce between 40 and 45 kilograms of plutonium per year which would be enough for 6 or 7 crude devices. I noted that both the United States and France had used about 6 kilograms or more plutonium in their initial devices and assumed that the Chinese Communists would use about the same.
3. With reference to delivery capability, I said that the ChiComs had 290 IL-28's with a range of 600 nautical miles and a lift capacity of about 6,000 pounds. The bomb bay however was limited to a 36" diameter bomb although it was 14' long. I said we must wait the diagnosis of the radioactive debris to determine the degree of sophistication of the Lop Nor device and thus make a judgment as to whether the ChiCom present technology would permit them to develop an implosive device small enough to fit into the IL-28 bomb bay. Pointed out they had a few "B-29" types and that they had made a considerable effort in missiles and had an elaborate missile range but it was our observation that their success had been marginal. Therefore it seemed to us that many years would pass before the ChiComs would have a sophisticated delivery capability against nearby territory and we did not see them developing any intercontinental capability at this time.
4. I stated that while we had extensive U-2 and satellite photography over ChiCom, there was an important area in and about Chungking and east on the Yangtze River on which the photography was unsatisfactory and hence there might exist there or elsewhere in China, a reactor or a production complex which we did not know about.
Note: Action: Information received from NPIC on Sunday evening was in sharp variance with this above statement given to me by Jack Smith and Wally Howard on Saturday morning. It is important that I receive a comprehensive evaluation of this situation prior to briefing Leadership.
[Here follows discussion not related to China.]
6. There followed a general discussion and adoption of the general line followed by the President's speech./3/ It was agreed that the President should withhold political trips for a few days; that he should address the public; that he should meet the Leadership and that he should meet with the Cabinet. The sequence of these events to be decided after careful consideration by Messrs. Bundy, Rusk, McNamara and the President himself.
/3/For text of Johnson's radio and television address of October 18 on the Chinese nuclear explosion, the Soviet change of leadership, and the British elections, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book II, pp. 1377-1380.
[Here follows discussion not related to China.]
59. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, October 19, 1964, 11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF l2-1 CHICOM. Secret. Repeated to Hong Kong, Tokyo, and CINCPAC for Polad. Received at 1 p.m.
328. Met President this afternoon [1 line of source text not declassified]./2/
/2/[text not declassified]
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified], present were President, Madam and interpreter. President asked if I had any news for him. I stated that at Saturday meeting with FonMin I had passed all available information and guidance on ChiCom atomic event and on Soviet change of leadership./3/ I said no developments but we were evaluating carefully statements of Izvestia and Pravda and world reaction. I then gave him sanitized version of State and CIA analysis.
/3/On October 15 Khrushchev was removed as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and replaced by Alexei N. Kosygin.
I then asked him if he could give me any views these two events I could pass USG.
President passed by specific comment on Soviet shift and concentrated on ChiCom event.
President stated that event of such far reaching importance that he had been unable up to the present to make any detailed or specific statement or comment. He stated however that he would like to pass to me "as US Ambassador and friend" his own personal views on impact on Asian peoples. He said that psychological reaction was enormous and far reaching. He said it was a turning point in the attitude of people of this part of the world and that their views on world affairs would henceforth be different from those of the past. He said the psychological effect could not be overestimated.
President stated that Americans at home and abroad were not capable of truly appraising the psychology of Asian people. He said this event required special efforts by US to see the change in its true light and urged that we do all possible to this end.
I said the US was studying the situation with all resources in Asia and at home. I agreed with inadequacy of Americans in true appraisal of Asian thought and stated that we respected his judgement more than any other in his position as true leader of Chinese people.
President then said that Asia henceforth would never be the same as it was in the past. He said the United States and the Republic of China should at this point reevaluate their policy toward Mainland China based not on the past but the present and future and work jointly for a new solution. This latter point emphasized by the Madam.
Wright
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