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1964-1968 Volume XXX China |
330. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, November 19, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XIII. Secret.
SUBJECT
Developments Behind the Reinforced Bamboo CurtainFor several weeks developments have moved very slowly on the Chinese mainland--or so it has seemed. We cannot be sure, because many of our sources have dried up. Wall posters are fewer and are uninformative (the Red Guard authors have been packed off to the countryside), Red Guard newspapers have disappeared, and foreigners are no longer allowed to receive provincial newspapers. Mail is being more carefully censored, and the populace is shunning travelers (Tab A)./2/ We used to receive through the British 500-600 local newspapers per month. We now receive none, and only two papers from the Capital.
/2/Tab A is intelligence report [text not declassified], November 18.
The October Central Committee Plenum was obviously designed to be a watershed between the destructive and constructive periods in the Cultural Revolution. (Both periods were promised when the movement began.) The Party is to be rebuilt under Army supervision, with "new blood" from the workers and peasants joining the revolutionary cadres. A completely revamped educational system under control of workers and peasants is to keep the revolution pure.
The forced dispatch of swarms of school age youth to the country-side for "worker experience," however, has produced resistance from the students, their families, and the hapless peasant hosts, who complain of extra mouths to feed without compensatory work input.
Meanwhile, there are signs that some sort of Great Leap Forward may be in the offing. We are receiving a growing number of reports of the curbing of private plots and other types of private sideline production, of the increase in size and authority of production brigades, and of changes in the work point system in the direction of income equalization (Tab B)./3/ Spiritual elan is again to be the substitute for material reward. The Cultural Revolution was designed to make this possible, but resistance to a new leap is likely to be intense.
/3/Tab B is telegram 9971 from Hong Kong, November 15.
Mao's basic problem is fairly obvious. While there are times when ideological motivation may serve as the prime mover of a country seeking modernization, no predetermined, fixed view of an environment can hope to cope with the galloping modern world, which is so variable in so many of its elements.
China's immense social forces moved chiefly through Mao for about a decade. But constant stimulation is proving to be no substitute for pragmatism, and the basic eclecticism of Chinese society is bound to assert itself. Mao is anti-urban (he speaks rapturously of "the quality of village life," much like a Taoist sage) at a time when urbanization is inevitable. He is anti-intellectual at a time when "knowledge is power" to a degree unique in history. China's leader is now largely in confrontation with the social forces of his country, which have striven uncertainly for a century toward modernization.
So far Mao has sufficient power, however, to make another try. In doing so he is now manifesting in extreme form a classical trait of the visionary with a corner on ersatz truth: pathological secrecy, coupled with fear of contamination from the outside. This will give us added problems in following developments.
Al
331. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, November 25, 1968, 1514Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Limdis.
5244. Ref: Warsaw 5167./2/ Subject: 135th meeting US-ChiCom talks.
/2/Telegram 5167 from Warsaw, November 15, reported delivery of a letter from Stoessel to Ch'en, the text of which was transmitted in telegram 271668 to Warsaw, November 14. The letter stated that since Ch'en's government had not confirmed the U.S.-proposed meeting date of November 20, "we must regretfully assume" that it did not intend to act on its original proposal for a November meeting; the U.S. Government remained willing to consider an alternative date in 1968 for the next meeting but suggested a meeting on February 5 or 11, 1969. (Ibid.) The U.S. proposal to meet on November 20 was made in a September 12 letter from Stoessel to Ch'en. (Telegram 236054 to Warsaw, September 10, and telegram 4490 from Warsaw, September 12; ibid.)
1. Morning November 25, Attaché Lo invited EmbOff to ChiCom Embassy and handed following letter (unofficial ChiCom translation):
"Mr. Ambassador.
I have received your letters of September 12 and November 15. I am now instructed to reply as follows:
1. The Chinese Government was serious in suggesting on May 18 that the 135th meeting of the Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial talks be held in the middle of November or late November. The Chinese Government has not indicated that it will change its view. It is most absurd for you to 'assume' groundlessly that China has changed its intention, and this is obviously a pretext.
2. You have now asked for a postponement of the meeting until February next year. To put it bluntly, this is because the United States is going to change its President and the U.S. Government is now in a stage wherein the incoming is superseding the outgoing, and you want to drag on until the present period is over.
3. Over the past 13 years, the Chinese Government has consistently adhered to the following two principles in the Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial talks: First--The U.S. Government undertakes to immediately withdraw all its armed forces from China's territory Taiwan Province and the Taiwan Straits area and dismantle all its military installations in Taiwan Province; second--The U.S. Government agrees that China and the United States conclude an agreement on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. But in the past 13 years, while refusing all along to reach an agreement with the Chinese Government on these two principles, the U.S. Government, putting the cart before the horse, has kept on haggling over side issues. We once again tell you in explicit terms that the Chinese Government will never barter away principles. If you continue your current practice, no result whatsoever will come of the Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial talks no matter which administration of yours assumes office.
4. Since your side has found it necessary to ask for a postponement of the meeting, we can agree. We hereby make the specific suggestion that the meeting might as well be held on February 20 next year. By that time your new President will have been in office for a month and you will probably be able to make up your mind.
5. Since your side has already made public statements on the further postponement of the 135th meeting of the Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial talks, our side will issue a statement to refute them.
Chen Tung
Chargé d'Affaires A.I. of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Poland"2. Original Chinese text being pouched.
Stoessel
332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/
Washington, November 29, 1968, 2338Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Kreisberg and Nicholas Platt of EA/ACA; cleared by Brown, Doyle V. Martin of EUR/EE, Shoesmith, and EUR Acting Assistant Secretary Alfred Puhan; and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, Taipei, Tokyo, and Hong Kong.
279906. Ref: Warsaw 5156./2/ Subject: US-ChiCom Ambassadorial Talks.
/2/Telegram 5156 from Warsaw, November 15, transmitted the texts of two letters from Ch'en to Stoessel. (Ibid.) They replied to two June 19 letters from Jenkins that proposed a settlement of outstanding postal and telecommunications accounts and requested information about missing U.S. servicemen and U.S. prisoners in China and requested the prisoners' release. (Airgrams 8610 and 8609 to Warsaw, June 11; ibid., POL CHICOM-US and POL 27-7 CHICOM-US, respectively; telegram 3640 from Warsaw, June 19; ibid.) The Chinese letters rejected efforts to settle such issues as postal and telecommunication accounts while the Taiwan issue remained unsettled and rejected the requests concerning missing servicemen and prisoners.
1. Department accepting ChiCom proposal February 20 meeting, but suggesting change in venue to embassies. Suggestion for change based on our desire move talks to more secure surroundings, and ascertain whether ChiComs genuinely interested in private, productive exchange of views.
2. Please transmit following written message from Ambassador to ChiCom Embassy ASAP:
"Dear Mr. Chargé d'Affaires:
I have received your letter of November 25 in which you propose that the 135th Sino-US Ambassadorial meeting be held on February 20, 1969. I accept your proposal, and I shall look forward to meeting with your side at 2:00 p.m. on that date.
It is my belief that the purposes of the Sino-United States Ambassadorial talks would be furthered at this juncture by a change of venue. Therefore, I propose that henceforth our meetings alternate between our respective embassies in accordance with the proposal by Ambassador Wang Ping-nan presented at a meeting between the representatives of our two countries on September 13, 1958. If this suggestion meets with your approval, we would be prepared to discuss with you at which of our respective embassies the February 20, 1969 meeting should take place.
If the suggested change in venue is not acceptable, I shall expect to meet you at the agreed date and time at our usual meeting place.
Sincerely yours,
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr."/3//3/Telegram 5293 from Warsaw, November 30, reported that the letter had been delivered that day. (Ibid.)
Rusk
333. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, December 5, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XIII. Secret.
SUBJECT
The Revolutionary Committee and Its Conservative InfluenceThe attack on the institutions of provincial administration and control during the early phases of the Cultural Revolution left Peking with an enormous task of reconstructing party and government authority. Considerable progress has been made in building a formal framework, but effective government still eludes Peking in many areas.
In theory, the Revolutionary Committees inherited the functions and authority of the former governing bodies, but in practice authority in most provinces rests overwhelmingly with the military. Earlier political struggles have left a legacy of factionalism in the body politic which in some provinces, notably in Western China, results in persistent disruptive activity. The new committees are especially weak in the instruments of control--police, propaganda media, etc. Lawlessness continues to pose serious problems although less so as time goes by. In most of Eastern China at least the Army's new get tough mandate has led to widespread arrests, mass trials, and often summary executions.
It took 20 months of wrangling to reach agreement on the selection of officials to run all 29 Revolutionary Committees. The first six committees were dominated by Maoist militants, but these have all given trouble and members have already been purged in four of them. With one or two exceptions, the 23 committees later formed have been headed by conservatives--military officers or "rehabilitated" old-line party officials. Military officers head 19 of the 29 provincial committees, and in 13 their first vice chairmen are also military men.
Although the Revolutionary Committee as an institution was originally created as a "provisional authority," official pronouncements indicate a general consensus that something built around the Revolutionary Committee will take on permanence as an institution of government. The committees are viewed as a core of a new structural form for the party and their conservative influence is likely to be strong in the revitalization of the party life.
The struggle between those who were on opposing sides during the Cultural Revolution is likely to be bitter and will pose a major obstacle to rebuilding the power structure. Recent reports of investigation into the "class backgrounds" of party cadres being considered for key posts reflect the intensive political infighting which can be expected over the personnel issue.
Almost every day that passes, however, brings added indication that something like pre-Cultural Revolution "normalcy" is returning to at least Peking's style. In other words, conservative provincial power realities are being reflected in Peking. Attached is one of the more interesting of these indicators./2/ The contrast between Chou En-lai's speech on the observation of Albania's Liberation Day and the Albanian presentation is interesting. The latter appears anachronistic--more suited to the Cultural Revolution climate of some months ago. In Chou's remarks, he all but ignores Mao's thought and the Cultural Revolution, and completely ignores Vietnam.
/2/The attachment, telegram 10358 from Hong Kong, is not printed.
I am beginning to think that the time may be near when we might profitably give another signal (a minor but clear one) to Peking that it has policy alternatives in our regard, when and if it is seriously ready to meet some of the prerequisites. I think the presentation at the February 20 meeting must be prepared with special care. It may be, too, that we could quietly tidy up the FAC regulations. The somewhat larger but still modest economic package contemplated some weeks ago, died with the added burden of the Czechoslovak invasion. I plan to discuss FAC again at State, unless you see fit to deflect me.
Al
334. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, December 21, 1968, 7-10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential. Drafted by Davidson. The meeting took place in Davidson's apartment in Washington.
SUBJECT
U.S.-Soviet-Chinese RelationsPARTICIPANTS
Boris Davydov, Second Secretary, Embassy of the U.S.S.R.
Daniel I. Davidson, Special Assistant to Governor HarrimanShortly before the end of an otherwise social evening, Mr. Davydov asked me if I had read the January issue of Foreign Affairs. Assuming that he was referring to the Kissinger article, I replied "Yes", and asked what he thought of that article. He said that it was the clearest exposition he had seen, but that the article which interested him most was Anatole Shub's, which while primarily discussing Czechoslovakia, concluded by advocating a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement. I told him that I had only read half of that article and had not reached the portion about China.
Davydov said that it was no secret that the Soviet Union was greatly concerned over the possibility of a U.S.-Chinese alliance. He said he could understand our desire to react to Czechoslovakia and he appreciated the ineffectiveness of any possible U.S. counter-move in Europe. Nonetheless, he stated, an attempt to form a U.S.-Chinese alliance would be extremely dangerous and he expressed the hope that I could make this point to anyone of influence I knew in the next Administration. (Davydov is aware of my current connection with Henry Kissinger.)
Davydov stated that any attempt by us to greatly improve our relations with the Chinese and move them towards an alliance with us against the Soviet Union would, of necessity, even if successful, take four to six years. During this period, any hope of progress in U.S.-Soviet relations would be completely impossible. Furthermore, Davydov claimed that we should not be as confident as Shub was--that the eventual victors in the struggle for power in China would be willing to enter an anti-Soviet alliance. He said that while Mao was capable of entering into an anti-Soviet alliance, he would not think that someone like Chou En-lai would be willing to do so.
In Asia, Davydov thought the Soviet Union would attempt to counter a U.S. move towards China by increased efforts to induce Japan to give up its American alliance. In Europe, he could not rule out the possibility of Soviet use of military force. I asked him where military force could be used and he replied, Germany. I stated that I found it hard to take this seriously since military moves in Germany would at the least bring us to the edge of nuclear war. He replied that Western analysts were not the only ones who were impressed with the efficiency of the Soviet move in Czechoslovakia--that the Soviet military was also feeling confident as a result of their success.
Davydov again told me how distressed he was at Shub's recommendation. He said he was aware that some American officials had wanted the USG to bluff a reconciliation with China in order to scare the Soviet Union, but that Shub was recommending not a bluff but a real reconciliation. While he described Shub as a brash young man, he gave weight to the fact that his article had been printed in Foreign Affairs. Davydov implied that Shub might be expelled from Moscow in retaliation for his extremely provocative article.
Davydov said that the Soviet Union had been confident that the Johnson Administration would not try to play the dangerous game of U.S.-Chinese reconciliation. He asked whether I could give him any indication of my estimate of the policy that the Nixon Administration was likely to follow. I told him that I was unable to even hazard a guess. He asked if we could discuss the matter further in the near future. (The conversation ended abruptly as it became obvious that Davydov's seven-year-old son was over-tired.)
335. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, December 30, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File--Addendum, China. Secret.
SUBJECT
Peking's Foreign PolicyThe attached Research Memorandum/2/ concerning Peking's foreign policy and especially regarding its attitude toward the United States is a very competent elaboration of the obvious--resulting in entirely appropriate inconclusiveness. In other words, it is obvious that very little indeed is obvious about the policy debate concerning Sino-U.S. relations which must be going on in Peking.
/2/The attachment, a December 23 memorandum from Hughes to Rusk (Research Memorandum REA-39), is not printed.
I cannot bring myself to believe that Peking's communications with us concerning the February 20 meeting constitute much of an invitation for rapprochement. It probably is something of a signal of readiness to listen to any interesting change in our own policy, which the new administration may see fit to bring forth. I am knitting brows with EA on this, but I suppose no one can go very far just now. I think our object should be to work out some sort of modest trial balloon with safety devices. With so little yet resolved in Peking, I do not think we can expect any constructive moves toward us from that quarter. All we can do is, at a minimum, somewhat exacerbate the policy struggle, and, at a maximum, provide a bit of ammunition for those who may be somewhat less inimical to us than the full-fledged Maoists.
Al
336. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 6, 1969, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File--Addendum, China. Secret; Nodis. A notation in unidentified handwriting at the bottom of the page reads as follows: "Walt--I don't want to rush these and do them in the last two weeks." Another handwritten notation states that Rostow had informed NSC staff member Edward Fried of the above.
SUBJECT
Recommended Change in Treasury Regulations on the Trade of U.S. Subsidiaries Abroad with ChinaAttached is Secretary Rusk's memorandum/2/ recommending you approve a change in Treasury regulations to permit U.S. subsidiaries abroad to sell a limited range of non-strategic goods to China. The change would enable these subsidiaries to engage in non-strategic trade with China as do other firms in the countries in which they are located--but on a more restricted basis.
/2/Rusk's January 4 memorandum is not printed.
The change would be made subject to soundings with the incoming Administration and with Congressional leaders. It can be put into effect administratively--without Congressional action--through publication of licensing authority in the Federal Register.
Secretaries Clifford, Barr, and Smith concur in the recommendation.
Under current Treasury regulations a U.S. subsidiary abroad is prohibited from selling any product it manufactures abroad to China without specific Treasury approval. This is part of our complete embargo on exports to China. The host countries in which these subsidiaries are located have long charged that this regulation is an inappropriate extension of U.S. jurisdiction and therefore an infringement of their sovereignty. Their position is that a U.S. subsidiary in their country, since it is subject to their jurisdiction, should operate under the same regulations as any other firm doing business in their country. They object to the "extraterritorial" aspect of our trade controls, which prohibit companies under their jurisdiction from trading with China without the express approval, on a case-by-case basis, of the U.S. Treasury.
The recommended change in our regulations would go part way toward meeting their objections. It would permit U.S. subsidiaries to sell to China those non-strategic products that can be shipped freely from the U.S. to the USSR and Eastern Europe. For all other products, the U.S. subsidiaries abroad would still have to obtain specific Treasury authorization.
The proposed change would serve two purposes:
--It would reduce an irritant in our relations with friendly countries--principally Canada, the UK, and France.
--It might serve as a modest response to the faint signals from Peking suggesting possible changes in their position. Although we would describe the change as merely a technical adjustment in our regulations designed to remove frictions with our Allies, Peking might interpret it as a sign of flexibility in our own position.
Secretary Rusk believes that it makes good sense to act on this now--as a useful move prior to our scheduled meeting with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw on February 20.
In addition, there is a tactical reason for making the change at this time. It would set a modest precedent which your successor could either follow up by extending the list of commodities or ignore. On the other hand, if he initiated the change at the outset of his Administration, too much significance would be read into it.
The main issue here is not substantive but psychological. Everyone agrees that this change has no strategic significance since:
--It does not apply to strategic goods; and
--The Chinese can and do buy these non-strategic products from other companies in the countries concerned.
Therefore, the change could in no way improve China's strategic position. Furthermore, the embargo on shipments to China from the U.S. would remain unchanged. Nevertheless there will be some in Congress who will ignore these facts and argue against any change in our regulations affecting China on the grounds that it could lead to a deterioration of the system of strategic trade controls and help China.
On the other hand there is sentiment on the Hill in favor of probing Chinese intentions. (If you approve this action, Secretary Rusk asks your advice on which Members of Congress to consult from the list he attaches at Tab C of his memo.)
This is a modest move which I believe is worth making at this time. It does not commit your successor but it could give him additional room to maneuver should opportunities present themselves.
Walt
Approve
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