NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
1964-1968 Volume XXX China |
320. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, July 25, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XIII. Secret.
Walt:
Attached is the study you wanted of the political implications of China's deteriorating economy./2/
/2/The attachment, entitled "Political Implications of Communist China's Deteriorating Economy," unsigned and undated, is not printed.
In sum, your instincts were pretty sound. It is State's judgment that the economic disruption is "approaching crisis proportions."
--Agriculture--The 1967 crop was the best in years, and served to insulate the regime from the effects of the Cultural Revolution. This year, however, the weather is bad. There is a drought in north China and serious floods in widespread areas in the south. The Yangtze may be on a rampage.
Domestic fertilizer production is way down, perhaps as much as 50%. Record fertilizer purchases from Japan and Europe will arrive too late to help the 1968 crop much.
--Industry--Production dropped about 15% in 1967. Production is way down in coal, the major energy source. The transportation system and the major industrial centers have been particularly hard hit by Cultural Revolution disorders.
--Foreign trade--The troubles with the industrial sector are strongly reflected in foreign trade figures. There was a 12% drop in exports in 1967, and in the first half of 1968 exports to Japan were down 32%.
--Political implications--The political impact of the declining economy will be magnified by the breakdown of Communist China's effective control. The prospects are for an economic mess approaching that which followed the Great Leap Forward, but without the strong central control which enabled the regime to diffuse the problem evenly throughout the country. Local famine--perhaps widespread famine--is possible. This should lead to a strengthening of pragmatic elements both in Peking and in the provinces. If widespread famine becomes a reality, there will probably be cause for international assistance. Without a major reorientation of policies, however, Peking is not likely to be responsive to offers of assistance from the United States.
Marshall
321. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 13-3-68
Washington, August 1, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 90 D 110. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A note on the cover sheet states that it was submitted by Helms and prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate on August 1 except the FBI representative, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S GENERAL PURPOSE AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES
The Problem
To assess the impact of Communist China's political turmoil on its military establishment and to estimate the capabilities of the general purpose and air defense forces.
Conclusions
A. Communist China's armed forces (known collectively as the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)) have been drawn deeply into the political turmoil that has afflicted China for the past two and a half years. The PLA has taken on heavy responsibilities for police and public security work and has acquired a wide variety of administrative and control functions in the economy and government.
B. The PLA has also undergone a heavy purge, especially of its top echelons. Line combat units have so far largely escaped the purges. The PLA itself has been divided at various levels and buffeted by the politics of the Cultural Revolution. Thus far the PLA has taken its cue from the political leaders of the country, but in general it has emerged as a moderate force loosely aligned with the government bureaucracy and others whose primary concern is with order, stability, and national security.
C. Political factionalism, the general deterioration of social order in China, and the many extra duties that have been imposed on the PLA have degraded Chinese military capabilities largely in terms of readiness, morale, and discipline. But in situations where China's vital interests were at stake, many of the ill effects of the Cultural Revolution could probably be fairly quickly overcome. Units, equipment, and the command structure remain intact, and defensive dispositions are largely unimpaired. Thus the PLA could provide a strong defense of the mainland and would be capable of effective military operations should the exist-ence of the Communist regimes in North Vietnam and North Korea be threatened.
D. Conceivably the political, social, and economic situation could deteriorate to the point where the PLA's combat effectiveness would suffer severe damage. On the other hand, a consistent trend toward moderation could enable it to regain full effectiveness within a fairly short time. On balance, we believe that the situation will not get so bad that the PLA would be unable to maintain a capability to function as a fighting force; nevertheless, much of its time and energy will continue to be diverted by nonmilitary activity and political stress. For the coming year at least, the power and authority of the PLA are likely to increase. Peking will be dependent on the PLA as the only effective instrument of control, and the military will probably play a significant role in the political reorganization currently in process.
E. Except for the disruption caused by the Cultural Revolution, there have been few developments in China's general purpose and air defense forces of great significance during the past year. Positioning of Chinese forces has changed little and continues to reflect concern with defense. The Chinese have not given a high priority to equipment programs that would improve China's ability to project its power over long distances outside its borders. The limitations of China's economic and technical capacities are such that conventional forces will remain deficient in modern equipment at least until well into the 1970's.
F. Nevertheless, the modernization program for the air defense and general purpose forces is moving ahead gradually on a fairly broad front along the following lines:
1. The Army. Chinese combat units vary considerably in quality and strength, but their firepower is increasing with the addition of more medium tanks and artillery. The levels of equipment the Chinese seem to be aiming at cannot be reached throughout the army much before 1975. No significant increase in the number of combat units is anticipated, although some increase in manpower might occur in response to the army's assumption of widened civil responsibilities.
2. Air. A growing inventory of Mig-19 fighters, addition of better radar, and a slow deployment program for surface-to-air missiles are improving China's air defense. We continue to believe that the Chinese will produce a new fighter, and we now believe that the chances are about even that it will be the Mig-21. If the Chinese do not intend to produce this aircraft, it would be four or five years before a fighter significantly more advanced than the Mig-19 could be available. There has been no significant change in the tactical strike and air support capabilities of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Air Force.
3. The Navy. Production of R-class submarines and guided missile patrol boats continues, but at a slower rate than had been anticipated. Other types of patrol and torpedo boats are being turned out in considerable numbers and deployment of a coastal defense cruise-missile system seems to be picking up pace.
[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]
322. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, August 3, 1968, 0910Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 CHINAT. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and to the Department of Defense.
3967. Subject: Conversation with President Chiang on MAP matters. Ref: Taipei 3963./2/
/2/In telegram 3963 from Taipei, August 2, McConaughy reported a conversation that day with Chiang Ching-kuo, who for the first time had intimated willingness to discuss the possibility of reduction of GRC military forces. Chiang stated that he had been holding important discussions with General Ciccolella in which he had recognized the need to review the strength of GRC armed forces; he thought modernization of military equipment might make it possible to maintain a high state of combat capability while decreasing force levels. (Ibid.)
1. During call General R.H. Warren, Director Military Assistance ISA, on President Chiang on August 2, to my disappointment President did not take up matter of reduction level of GRC armed forces. Instead he concentrated exclusively on major pitch for one squadron F4C planes, following up original request made to me on July 15 (Taipei 3761)./3/ Gimo asked that decision be made by U.S. "within few weeks", terming matter one of highest priority and great urgency.
/3/Document 319.
2. Gimo asserted repeatedly that maintenance of GRC air superiority over ChiComs in Taiwan Strait area was an imperative necessity. He was convinced that air superiority once lost could almost certainly never be regained, even with later U.S. assistance. He recalled that air superiority had enabled GRC to emerge victorious in Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958. Loss of air superiority now would have serious psychological and morale repercussions, apart from purely military considerations. Communists would be emboldened if they no longer feared GRC Air Force and almost certainly would embark on new aggressions, most likely against Offshore Islands or main island of Taiwan itself. If the Communists should achieve the capability of interdicting the supply lines between Taiwan and Offshores, consequences would be highly prejudicial to GRC defense.
3. Gimo observed that ChiComs already have three very disturbing capabilities which they are reserving mainly for use against Taiwan, viz.: short range missiles, submarines capable of operating effectively in Taiwan Strait, and MIG-21s. He asserted that ChiComs are now building MIG-21s in increasing numbers and balance of air power will soon be shifted in their favor if GRC Air Force not strengthened with some high capability ultra-modern planes, namely F4Cs. Gimo noted that while F5 remains principal reliance Chinese Air Force, it cannot match the MIG-21, and he feels a few higher performance planes are essential to spearhead CAF capability to counter MIG-21, threat and maintain deterrent posture toward ChiComs.
4. Gimo emphasized favorable geographical situation of Taiwan as central point along China periphery. Strength based on Taiwan can be readily redeployed either to S.E. Asia or to Korea. He would think of F4Cs on Taiwan as being an asset for overall allied position, and not solely for benefit or GRC.
5. Gimo said that GRC forces on Kinmen, Matsu and Taiwan itself directly tie down 500,000 ChiCom troops along coastal areas opposite Taiwan Strait and indirectly one million additional forces farther inland. The neutralization of this large Chinese Communist force could not be maintained if air superiority is lost. Also CCK and other air bases on Taiwan which would be essential for use of U.S. Air Force in event of general area hostilities could be readily knocked out by ChiComs if they obtained air superiority.
6. Gimo concluded that all these considerations added up to compelling need at earliest possible date for supplying GRC Air Force with squadron of F4Cs and he pleaded for an expeditious decision by Departments of Defense and State.
7. General Warren expressed sympathetic understanding of President Chiang's interest in highly modern aircraft as a means of maintaining needed air superiority. At same time he pointed out difficulties related to funds, availability of planes, Congressional attitudes and undeferrable requirements of S.E. Asia and other high priority exposed areas. All of this made it unlikely that planes so costly and scarce as F4Cs could be allocated to GRC in present circumstances. However he promised to relay President's request to Washington and see that it was carefully examined in Defense.
8. General Ciccolella in response to query from the President said he agreed with the President's analysis of military situation and need for maintaining GRC air superiority. (He did not have opportunity to spell out his reasons for believing that delivery of F4Cs to GRC is not a realistic possibility at this stage. But he intends to elaborate his views fully to Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo next week.)
9. I told President Chiang that without debating merits of F4C request at this time, I felt compelled to express my strong misgivings at the development of a requirement so appallingly expensive that if filled it would leave little or no GRC resources for agreed high priority items of military materiel--many of which have already been programmed after careful planning. I felt there was need for maintenance of a balanced defense structure and that one exceedingly expensive new item should not be allowed to exclude many other high priority items which were essential to a balanced defense force structure. I said the pressing problem before us was to determine how to cover the most essential defense requirements for all services within the strict limits of U.S. and Chinese resources available for defense purposes.
10. The President replied that according to an old Chinese proverb, "First things first." He considered that air superiority took priority over everything else and he would not himself go into the matter of priorities for competing items which in his view would not have the same urgency as the F4C.
11. At close of meeting, President made formal request that as an interim measure while F4C request is being considered, U.S. station one squadron of USAF F4Cs on Taiwan as a deterrent to ChiComs. While he would want these planes based on Taiwan, they would of course be available from this central point for use wherever needed in the East Asian area. (N.B., later in evening Minister Chiang Ching-kuo sent word to Gens. Warren and Ciccolella that Pres. Chiang had not meant to insist that any USAF squadron stationed on Taiwan must consist of F4Cs. Any type of plane chosen by USAF would be welcome.)
12. General Warren is telegraphing to Sec Def a supplementary report of this conversation, with a fuller summary of his remarks to President Chiang.
13. Embassy will submit analysis, comments and recommendations next week after I have seen Chiang Ching-kuo again and endeavored to get force reduction back on the tracks.
McConaughy
323. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs (Barnett) to Harry E.T. Thayer of the Office of Republic of China Affairs/1/
Washington, August 7, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 CHINAT. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Study in Anticipation of Foreign Crises: Taiwan Straits/2//2/An undated paper entitled "Studies in Anticipation of Foreign Crises: Taiwan Strait Crisis," drafted by ROC Country Director Thomas P. Shoesmith, was sent to the East Asia and Pacific Interdepartmental Regional Group on November 9 and discussed by the group on November 20. The discussion reached no conclusions except that further studies on the subject were needed. The paper and the record of discussion are ibid., FE/IRG Files: Lot 70 D 56. The memorandum printed here comments on a draft that has not been found. Memoranda by Brown, Barnett, Clough, Kreisberg, Greene, and Oscar V. Armstrong of EA/P, dated between August 2 and 13, commenting on the same draft are ibid., Central Files, DEF 1 CHINAT and DEF 6 CHINAT.
1. Tom Shoesmith has put together an excellent first draft on the Offshore Islands.
2. Tom's assumptions stated on page 7 serve his purpose. I believe, however, that the Offshore Islands present awkward and even dangerous problems under some contrary assumptions. I mention, illustratively:
a. A GRC attack; or,
b. A Taiwan in which the Generalissimo's control of the GRC is challenged by effective opposition.
Under these and still other assumptions, we would not, I think, be deflected from the conclusions to which Tom's general analysis leads.
3. As to one of Tom's recommended courses of action, I doubt the wisdom of a U.S. attempt, under any circumstances, to persuade the GRC to remove its forces on Quemoy and Matsu. If this is done, the GRC should do it itself and for its own reasons. United States pressure would invite a process of bargaining in which the United States could be trapped into paying a price to the GRC, financially, politically, and in degree of strategic involvement, that might not be desirable or necessary to pay.
4. I do not believe that to establish, credibly, United States indifference to the future of the Offshore Islands would stimulate Peking to take them over. Peking and Taipei view the Offshores in an identical historical and strategic context, seeing them as the linchpin that locks the future of Taiwan into the future of the China Mainland. Both capitals know that a change of status of the Offshores--limiting effective jurisdiction of the GRC at Taiwan and the Pescadores alone and putting 100 miles of ocean between that area and the Chinese Communist territories on the Mainland--would become powerful justification for the people of Formosa--and advocates of peace everywhere in the world--to proceed, in terms of both recognition and UN representation, from the present de facto "One China"/"One Taiwan" situation towards de jure arrangements which would make notion of a "One China", including Taiwan, appear even more fanciful than now. Neither Peking nor followers of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in the GRC could welcome that development./3/
/3/The following paragraph is handwritten on the source text following the typewritten text: "While I remain somewhat skeptical about this argument, it is difficult to discount entirely. It certainly is relevant to the question of whether a sign of U.S. unwillingness to defend OSI would encourage CC to attempt to seize islands by force." This paragraph and other marginal notations on the source text and some of the memoranda cited in footnote 2 were apparently written by Shoesmith.
324. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, August 26, 1968, 1305Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XIII. Secret.
CAP 82146. Herewith summary of an analysis by Al Jenkins of the swing to the right in China./2/
/2/Reference is to an August 21 memorandum from Jenkins to Rostow. (Ibid).
For the past six weeks or so, and most clearly in the past ten days, there has been the most country-wide shift toward the conservatives yet seen in the past two years. Matters have, in fact, gone so far in the provinces in the direction of the old-liners and under military auspices that one must wonder what is happening to the position of Lin Piao himself. Current policy is certainly different from what he has espoused since 1964.
Revolutionary committees have been set up in the last few days in both Yunnan and Fukien Provinces. Both are completely dominated by the military and each of the chairmen have in the past been under Red Guard criticism.
The Red Guards, on the other hand, have fallen on lean days indeed.
These moves have been accompanied by the strongest measures taken to date by the Army to stop factional fighting. Summary executions have been resorted to in a number of instances. A back-to-work movement appears to have met with limited but perhaps slowly growing success.
Increased army patrol activity has been noted in Peking in recent days, and an important army unit long stationed on the Korean border has been moved into Peking.
There is nothing new on the harvest, except that Peking has entered into urgent negotiations with Australia for wheat deliveries after December. Peking is expected also to negotiate with Canada for further purchases.
There has been speculation that the heavy rains and the natural peak (from melted snows far to the west) might cause devastating floods.
325. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, August 28, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XIII. Secret. A copy was sent to Jorden.
SUBJECT
The Gimo's Latest WorriesThere was a paragraph in Monday's evening reading for the President putting Ambassador Chow's call on the Secretary, in which he asked urgently for a squadron of F4C's,/2/ in the context of the Gimo's worries as set forth in the two attached cables./3/ I think that was adequate under present circumstances for the President, but I believe I owe you a bit more comment.
/2/Ambassador Chow's August 26 meeting on the Secretary is summarized in telegram 228356, August 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CHINAT-US)
/3/The attachments, telegram 4233 from Taipei, August 23, and CINCPAC telegram 241143Z to CJCS, reported conversations on August 22 between McConaughy and Chiang Kai-shek and Admiral McCain, Admiral Sharp's successor as CINCPAC, and Chiang.
You were probably shown these two cables. The gist of Chiang's reasoning is:
--Mao will construe the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia as a warning and threat to him; i.e., the Soviets will now be likely, in Mao's mind, to install anti-Mao leaders as administrators of border areas of China, laying the groundwork for the downfall of Mao;
--Mao will attempt to consolidate a strong position in South China, hence will need control of flanking areas in Southeast Asia and in the Taiwan Straits area;
--accordingly, Mao will get more deeply involved in the Vietnam war, and apply pressure to the Offshore Islands--with the possibility of at least air attacks on Taiwan.
Chiang reminded McConaughy of his belief that the five southern provinces should be subtracted from Mao's control and that the Soviet Union would permit this gladly, but he said he did not wish to raise this again officially with Washington. He merely reiterated his conviction that he must have air superiority over the Chinese Communists. Ambassador Chow's call on the Secretary Monday morning, asking for a squadron of F4C's or, failing that, the stationing of U.S. sophisticated planes on Taiwan, is part of his present ploy.
As you know, we have no evidence of Chinese Communist preparation for action against the Offshore Islands or for increased participation in the Vietnam war. While under circumstances of both the Soviets and Chinese Communists being in very difficult straits may raise the possibility of completely irrational action, Chiang's reasoning as to likely developments still appears to be very far out indeed.
One is tempted, in fact, to wonder whether Chiang is losing his grip on reality. I do not think that this is the correct interpretation. All reports indicate that he is both mentally alert and well informed. I think the explanation for the remarkable line of reasoning outlined in the attached cables lies in his anxious grasping at straws at this particular juncture, and that he fully recognizes that they are straws. I believe that basically his request for highly sophisticated aircraft (a squadron would cost about $50 million) and the tortuous justification is a result of his very deep concern at the prospect of:
--President Johnson's retirement from office and uncertainty as to the degree of our continued presence in East Asia;
--the likely retirement of Secretary Rusk, whom Chiang considers an exceptionally staunch supporter of the GRC position;
--indications from several Presidential aspirants of a desire for further movement toward contact with Peking;
--our sharp cut in MAP support;
--talk of disturbing initiatives in the UN by Canada, Belgium and Italy, etc.
In other words, there is considerable sanity in the Gimo's "madness" if what he is doing is trying to get a new, high-silhouetted U.S. commitment of support in the later days of the Johnson Administration, which would be difficult to overlook by the new administration. He probably reasons that a new administration may well attempt new initiatives in East Asian policy before the career bureaucracy is given a chance to help with the new administration's homework. He probably wants to make it awkward for new departures to be taken hastily before the "lessons," which he believes might emerge from that homework, can be applied.
It makes no sense to give Chiang a squadron of F4C's and they are committed for many months ahead in any event. Nor would it be wise to "station" a squadron of our own sophisticated aircraft on Taiwan. We should avoid anything which could be called "bases" as such on Taiwan. We might, however, "deploy" to Taiwan a few planes from the area, briefly and intermittently. State and Defense will look into this.
In short, if we can find a way of reaffirming our present commitments to the GRC without escalating them, but possibly with the added increment of a new gesture, it is probably in our interests to do so--partly for some of the reasons which I suppose to be in Chiang's own mind. We should not, however, humor his present needs beyond the confines of U.S. interests per se. His true needs are not that great--at least as we can now see them.
Al
326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/
Washington, September 13, 1968, 2338Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas H. Walsh of IO/UNP; cleared by Gleysteen, Shoesmith, and Rufus Z. Smith of EUR/CAN; approved by Sisco. Repeated to USUN and Ottawa.
238678. Subj: US-Canadian Talks on UNGA.
1. Following FYI are excerpts concerning China from Embassy Ottawa report of Ball-Sisco talks with Canadian officials Sept.10.
2. ExtAff Min Sharp said Canadian Government's objective was mutual recognition between Ottawa and Peking. Road would not be easy, and Canada did not want to jeopardize interests of others and was troubled about contribution to world peace. It would be a little while before contacts were made, and in meantime contacts would be made with friends around world.
3. Sharp said that his Government was not intending to make any direct contacts with Peking at present time and procedure for pursuing objective was not yet firm. He said he saw no reason to change Canadian posture on China at this GA. Canadians recognize that if they do achieve mutual recognition between Peking and Ottawa, they would have to show consistency in UN. But matter would not arise this session. Amb. Ball stated that US policy remained same as at previous sessions: Viet-Nam figured importantly in this matter for us. Sharp then said that CanDel at UN would support Important Question resolution, would abstain on Albanian-type resolution, and would give no encouragement to any Italian Study Committee proposal. Ultimate intention was to change position, but it would not happen at this session. Ambassador Ball estimated that Italy could well be expected to put up again its Study Committee resolution in view of former Moro government's having done no less. He thought voting pattern would remain about same. He said that if mutual recognition should transpire, Canadian Ambassador ought to be provided with file and loaf of bread. Sharp responded by saying that Canadians would also have to provide more police to follow Chinese Representatives in Canada. But he went on more seriously to say that Canada hoped it could promote communications with Peking, which would make effort worthwhile. Canadian public supported Government's position.
4. Dept officers briefed GRC Embassy Sept. 13 concerning talks, noting that while Canadians made no commitments, we conclude they do not intend change their ChiRep policy during GA this year.
Rusk
327. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/
Washington, September 20, 1968, 1903Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Shoesmith; cleared by Kreisberg, Dennis F. Aughavin of G/PM-MASP, Barnett, Godley, Steadman, Lieutenant General Warren in DOD/ISA/OMA, Colonel Ridge in DOD/ISA, Major General Orwat in Joint Staff/J-5, and Brigadier General Banning in Joint Staff/J-3; and approved by Brown. Also sent to CHMAAG, USTDC, and Hong Kong, and repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, CSAF, CNO, CMC, CSA, 327 AD, and 5th AF.
242120. Joint State/Defense message. Refs: (A) Taipei 4374;/2/ (B) Taipei 4363;/3/ (C) Taipei 4130;/4/ (D) Taipei 4047;/5/ (E) Taipei 4044;/6/ (F) State 228356;/7/ (G) CINCPAC 250955Z Aug 68 (NOTAL), (H) CINCPAC 082315Z Sept 68./8/
/2/Telegram 4374 from Taipei, September 5, reported that despite the concern manifested by Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo of a possible Communist attack on Quemoy and Matsu, there was little hard intelligence confirming any basis for this fear. (Ibid., POL CHICOM-CHINAT)
/3/Telegram 4363 from Taipei, erroneously dated August 5, reported a September 3 conversation between McConaughy and Chiang Ching-kuo. (Ibid., POL CHINAT-US)
/4/Telegram 4130 from Taipei, August 16, reported receipt of a message from President Chiang asking if there had been any response to his August 2 request for a squadron of F4C's. (Ibid., DEF 1 CHINAT)
/5/Telegram 4047 from Taipei, August 10, reported an August 8 conversation between General Ciccolella and Chiang Chiang-kuo. (Ibid.)
/6/Telegram 4044 from Taipei, August 10, was a summary report of the August 8 conversation between Ciccolella and Chiang Ching-kuo. (Ibid.)
/7/See footnote 2, Document 325.
/8/Neither found.
1. Reftels and other reports of USG officials' conversations with President Chiang and MinDef Chiang Ching-kuo make clear importance GRC leadership has placed on obtaining at least a minimum USG gesture of concern for strengthening air defense capabilities in Taiwan Strait area. Defense Minister Chiang's Sept. 3 remarks to Ambassador (ref B) pinned rationale for request for F-4's on GRC's assessment of increased threat to Offshores, with CCK estimate that threat would begin lessening in November. Other conversations, however, have not limited rationale exclusively to Offshores situation.
2. We concur entirely in Country Team and CINCPAC (ref H) judgment that GRC concern for possibility Chicom attack on Offshores is unsubstantiated by any hard intelligence. At same time, we agree with Embassy recommendation (ref C) on desirability of some minimal positive response to GRC demarche, particularly in view actual and psychological effect of reduced MAP on maintenance GRC air defense capability.
3. We concur therefore in responding to GRC along lines of Country Team and CINCPAC's recommendation (ref G). We believe that intermittent and temporary rotation of limited number of high performance fighters during remainder of 1968 should be sufficient to meet situation created by GRC representations in recent months. In any event, it is maximum possibility in view other requirements.
4. In making this gesture, it is essential that we ensure that GRC does not misconstrue our response as implying either (a) agreement with its estimate of the likelihood of a Chicom attack or (b) any commitment to defend the Offshore Islands. Rather, our response must be within context of our intention and ability to meet our treaty commitment to defense of Taiwan and Pescadores. We also wish continue to avoid any increase in US military presence which suggests we regard Taiwan as permanent base.
5. We believe it appropriate that our response to President Chiang's personal concern for this matter be conveyed to MinDef Chiang. In absence Amb. McConaughy, we leave to your discretion choice of channel for that purpose. Subject to Amcon Hong Kong's comments (para 6 below), you requested make following presentation of US position, with details to be coordinated directly with CINCPAC:
a) USG has given close attention to assessments of current situation provided us by President Chiang and Minister of Defense. As we have previously stated, we would welcome receiving any indications GRC may obtain of increased Communist threat in Strait area, but on basis of evidence available to us, we cannot conclude that any significant increased threat now exists. We will, of course, keep this situation under closest scrutiny.
b) We appreciate, however, problems posed by reduction grant MAP, particularly for CAF, and wish to continue to work closely with GRC to make most efficient possible use of resources available to both sides. We have, therefore, carefully considered President Chiang's requests in light of our mutual concern to maintain and strengthen air defense of Taiwan and Pescadores.
c) As already indicated by CHMAAG and Ambassador McCon-aughy, as well as by Secretary Rusk, we unable to provide squadron of F-4C's to CAF as requested, not only because of high cost this aircraft in relation to limited MAP funds and already heavy burden GRC defense budget, but in view fact that existing undeferrable requirements for this aircraft already exceed availability of F-4C's.
d) It also not feasible to provide US rotational F-4C squadron in Taiwan. We are prepared, however, to provide temporary and intermittent presence in Taiwan of high performance fighters at less than squadron strength during the remainder of 1968. We would anticipate that during this three-month period from four to eight such aircraft would be present for approximately six days a month for training with the 327th Air Division subject to agreement with the GRC for utilization of GRC missile, gunnery and bombing ranges and other related facilities such as emergency jettison area and air space for GCI training. We are prepared to discuss necessary arrangements for such deployment at earliest GRC convenience.
e) We would not wish to give any publicity to this temporary and intermittent deployment and believe that it should be treated in low key as routine procedure with GRC agreement that US respond to any public inquiries concerning this matter.
6. For Hong Kong--We do not believe that limited action we have in mind will evoke any significant Chinese Communist reaction, recalling that similar and somewhat more visible action in 1966 created no problem in this regard. Would appreciate your comments soonest, however./9/
/9/Telegram 8800 from Hong Kong, September 21, agreed that the proposed deployment was not likely to provoke any significant Chinese Communist reaction. It noted, however, that this and other steps could have a cumulative effect and observed that the U.S. interest "in preserving status quo Taiwan problem" would be best served by avoiding any suggestion that, in the absence of indications of Communist preparations for hostile action, the United States was developing Taiwan into a U.S. operational base. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US)
Rusk
328. Paper Prepared by Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff/1/
Washington, October 9, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XIII. Secret. Jenkins sent the paper to Rostow with a covering memorandum of the same date, stating that it was the sequel to Document 303 that Rostow had requested and that its delay was primarily due to "agonizing over its basic theme and pondering contrary advice from some whom I respect."
FURTHER THOUGHTS ON CHINA
A Rebalance of Power
The U.S. Dilemma
The Timing of Policy Departures
The Dog-eared Shopping Lists
The Dubious Case for Movement
China is our central problem in Asia, and in some ways the knottiest on earth. Under present circumstances, however, progress in solving that problem cannot be made by direct approach, as some would have us try. Any approach must be in the context of Asia-wide revolutionary pressures, and with attention to the persistent Asian power imbalances which make the region unstable.
A Rebalance of Power
The last three wars in which the United States has been directly involved began for us as Asian wars. While the origins of all three were complex, a major factor in each instance was a neglected imbalance of power in the area which made for fundamental instability. In each case the United States finally had to fill the vacuum. Many argue that we did so belatedly each time--after war was inevitable. It is true that we gave signals prior to each conflict which could be, and doubtless were, interpreted by the adversaries as indicating that we did not plan to provide a counterbalance, and therefore that expansionist moves could be made with impunity. Then when aggression took place, we found it necessary to oppose it, at great cost.
Some of this cost may be laid at the door of our relative ignorance--at least until fairly recently--of the nature and importance to us and to the rest of the world of the various revolutions in Asia, peaceful and otherwise. New political institutions, forced economic modernization, and rapidly shifting social patterns have been superimposed on the old ways, and power centers have shifted, with the creation of explosive tensions. Americans have not been very familiar with the old ways, which has complicated the job of understanding the reasons behind present-day actions and reactions.
Still, in recent years our understanding of these intrusive Asian developments has grown rapidly. It is ironic that just at the time when we have achieved fuller appreciation of what must be done in Asia, both the willingness and the capacity of the United States to continue to carry the major burden there has come into question (quite apart from the correctness of our having carried it thus far).
We cannot allow another Asian power vacuum to arise. The fact remains that the next war in which our forces will be directly involved, if it comes, is more likely to come in Asia than anywhere else. Berlin, Hungary and Czechoslovakia underline the reluctance of the superpowers for a test of force in Europe, and another Near East conflagration would stand a good chance of being a proxy war. Not so in Asia. There we are intricately engaged, and must continue to be, though at a reduced level as soon as this is possible. The present balance of power, by courtesy of very heavy American presence, is unnatural to the area. If it persists for much longer, we will be asking for cumulative trouble. We must contrive a rebalance, with China principally in mind.
Japan and China, the key countries of East Asia proper (excluding the two superpowers whose interests in Asia are great) are both in an unnatural state of affairs, which cannot last.
Japan, though the third largest industrial power on earth, is all but unarmed. It is unthinkable that, considering the enormous bulge of its economic muscles, Japan will for many more years accept a situation where others can say "No!" and Japan cannot say "But, yes!" When the psychological and constitutional blocks to the inevitable transformation in Japanese defense doctrine start to give, they may dissolve more rapidly than now seems likely. Japan is bound increasingly to resent our filling its defense needs, even if we do so by insistent invitation while Japan is gleefully obsessed with the economic advantage which our defense affords. Despite the present easily documentable demands of efficiency and economy for bases in meeting our commitments in the area, we will do well in our long-term interest to insure that we act a bit harder to get: that we are sought, rather than tolerated until we are not tolerated. Until Japan rearms, as it will, we must use our leverage to press for very sizeable economic and indirect military contribution to the non-communist Asian balance. This is not only necessary in the overall East Asian context, it is also the very essence of a sensible China policy--especially so long as the China problem is not subject to direct approach.
The second of the great Asian nations, too, is in a highly unnatural and unstable state. China has already become powerful in Asian terms, but it is "contained." That containment has been necessary, given China's advertised intentions and demonstrable actions in line with the Maoist prescription for world revolution. However, China when strong has always had a sphere of influence on its periphery not unlike that which other strong nations throughout history have insisted upon. In China's case this natural penchant is strengthened both by its historical "center-of-the-universe" syndrome and by its determination to overcompensate, if possible, for the "century of ignominy" which it suffered at the hands of western predators. A century ago China failed to provide itself with gunboats, so it had to take alien semi-masters, both theological and secular--and both bearing a monopoly on truth to a Kingdom which had considered itself the source of truth and righteousness for at least four thousand years! Unmistakable paranoia understandably results.
Post-World War II events have decreed that this weary problem--China and the attendant regional power imbalance--is excessively ours. However, even if Asian self-interest should demand it, and even if both our will and our resources were abundant to the task, a long-term overweening American presence would become an affront to Asian sensibilities of perhaps irreparable severity.
The U.S. Dilemma
We cannot afford to lessen our support prematurely; likewise we cannot afford to project present clear requirements very far into the future. We must reduce the problem (principally China) or further share the burden of coping with it--or both.
We are making progress--too slowly to dissolve the dilemma, but not without success--in sharing the burden. The positive aspects of our Asian policies post-World War II have been directed to this end. We have successfully bought time for non-communist Asia, and more has been made of that time than we had any right to expect from the tatterdemalion array of weak, inexperienced, mostly newly-independent nations scattered around China in the wake of World War II. Regional strength and cooperation are growing, but not fast enough to ease the faster growing insistence of our dilemma.
Diminishing the problem itself is the more attractive tack. But our would-be leverage with China remains unfeared. So long as the Maoists are in control, there is no meshing of gears to be had. In the Maoists we are confronted by secular religionists, who have insistently cast us in the devil's role for their own purposes. No compromise is possible with a set of absolutes; and logic is irrelevant in negotiating with a faith. Taiwan is a major practical issue between us, but if we could hand it over gratis the Maoists would still lock us in their "inimical embrace," because of the ideological demands of their continuing revolution and their simplistic faith.
The Timing of Policy Departures
The immediate question with respect to United States policy toward China is whether the supposedly inevitable, definitive failure of Maoist policies has now set in, to the extent of presaging a "change of dynasty." The answer, unfortunately, is that we do not know, and may not know for months to come.
What we do know is that the two great erstwhile strengths of the Maoists--Mao's prestige and the loyalty of the masses--have suffered deep erosion during the past two years of lunacy. We know from the reports of individuals from the mainland and from the cries of the regime's press and radio that cynicism, despair and simple exhaustion are left in the trail of Mao's second major attempt to remake Chinese man and re-invigorate his revolution. We know that the intellectuals and many students are fed up, and that vast numbers of cadres who worked hard to make Mao's kind of China work are angered at being bitterly struggled against. We know that Mao was virtually deified in the anxious attempt to make failure impossible, yet he has not succeeded. And when a god fails, business as usual thereafter is improbable.
On the other side of the coin, the vast country has not come apart. Economic and social damages have been serious but not catastrophic, and could be recouped if order and authority are restored. Most of the Army seems responsive to central direction. And most importantly for our purposes, there is no sign yet of meaningful change in either domestic or foreign policies--only in tactics, which have become less frenetic.
China is desperately trying to re-establish its old position and stature in a nuclear world. In a sense it is trying to do what the rest of the world is so anxious about its not having done: become a part of the modern world. The tragedy is that it is not doing so cooperatively. So far it has been unwilling to join the world except on its own terms, which are absurd. It wants literally to become the "center of the universe" again, and to refashion the rest of the world in its own image. Its efforts to regain its central position have produced crazily compressed time schedules, costly disruptions, and superhuman requirements for discipline and austerity.
An original purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to frighten, goad and inspire the populace into meeting these rigorous requirements. The movement got out of hand, policy differences and power struggles intensified, and a crisis of authority resulted. The Army was reluctantly brought into play and hundreds of thousands of fractious Red Guards packed off to work in the countryside. The biggest casualty to date is the self-confidence of the cadres and officials. The regime now intends to rebuild the party, chastened and cleansed, with the Army maintaining discipline meanwhile. That is where we are today, and it is still premature to attempt judgment on the future.
Such is the recognized importance of China in our scheme of things, however, that Americans have tended not to forgive those who later prove not to have been prophetic, even prescient, about developments in Chinese affairs. A number of Foreign Service Officers put out to pasture can attest to this fact. We cannot well weather another orgy of national self-flagellation at having seemed to guess wrongly as to the likely course of a quarter of mankind, or as to the appropriate United States response.
We have long said that at the propitious time we should insure that Peking is aware that it has policy options other than continued rabid anti-Americanism and anxious self-isolation from world currents. We have rightly attempted some steps toward that assurance. But it is not yet time energetically to woo China into the world.
The satisfactory articulation of China with the rest of the world is conceivable only on terms consonant with the sort of world envisaged in the United Nations Charter: one of cooperative diversity. That sort of world cannot be created in safe durability without the participation of the quarter of mankind which is Chinese, but Maoist China will not join that sort of world.
In recent years, as our policy toward China has become less rigid, there have been three circumstances in which it would make sense for the United States seriously to seek accommodation with the mainland regime.
1. A "matured" communist China, post-Maoist whether post-Mao or not, without pretentions of leading global revolution, and sufficiently "revisionist" in its dogma to permit of greater articulation with the rest of the world.
2. A true "change of dynasty" wherein the successor regime would follow policies consonant with the sort of world we seek to build.
3. A China still Maoist-Stalinist but so militarily powerful that extraordinary efforts must be made to bring about those restraints which greater articulation with the rest of the world might afford.
None of these situations has yet come about, although the first may be slowly developing, and the second is, for the first time, barely conceivable for the future.
As for the third, it is true that the Chinese Communist armed forces remain a formidable force, despite Cultural Revolution preoccupations. They pose a potential threat to other Asian nations, but not directly to us. If China's nuclear potential develops as expected, its world status and its blackmail potential toward some may be enhanced, but it is not likely to pose a significant threat directly to the United States until it develops a strong naval tradition. This may come, but it will take a long time. We have a fairly comfortable grace period in which we do not, for instance, have to allow Peking to "shoot its way into the United Nations" or make other comparable forced accommodation, come what may.
Nor is there any reason compelling us to wink at the true nature of this regime:
--By any measure it is tyrannical. It has made little pretense of developing a legal system of any sort. Both truth and justice have been what the vagaries of central doctrine have dictated at any given time.
--While in some ways the "common man" has seemed to be remembered in favorable contrast to earlier times, there has been in fact little human dignity and virtually no freedom. Not only has there been no freedom of expression, there has been no freedom of silence. All have had to be vocal in worshiping the "thoughts" and the person of a deified leader bent on sinocentric world revolution.
--In the so-called land reform movement of 1951-52 the regime put to death, or allowed "the masses" to put to death untold millions (best estimate 12-15 millions) of its own people; and a great many have lost their lives in Mao's self-serving Cultural Revolution.
--The regime massively supported North Korean aggression and materially backs North Vietnamese aggression. It raped Tibet with near-genocidal thoroughness, and attacked India.
--It has done all within its limited power to further communist revolution in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It continues to train guerrillas for "people's wars," particularly in Southeast Asia.
--Like the Soviet Union, as we have recently been reminded, Peking puts the "laws" of global "class struggle" above the tenets of the United Nations and of international law. Any act which is "anti-imperialist," such as the seizure of the Pueblo in international waters, is by simple definition "correct."
It is understandable that there is a wringing of the hands that China is not yet brought into the family of nations. But how is it to be done? China, under present management, is the first to say that such is inconceivable--except on terms so provincial and anachronistic, so hostile to all that has been built toward world order since World War II, so antithetical to the true revolution in human freedom of the past two centuries, that the very resignation of these positive traditions would seem to be involved in the acceptance of Chinese terms.
There are sincere and able people in the United States Government and in the academic community who say that we must try harder. Some seem to think that if we would only turn the other cheek we would get kissed. Unlikely. Others do not expect early response, but believe we should go the extra mile as a test.
I, myself, favored more attempted movement in our China policy up to the summer of 1966. But that was:
--before the Cultural Revolution reversed the earlier trend in China toward more rationality;
--before acute policy differences surfaced within China--differences which greater U.S. policy flexibility might have helped induce, had such been necessary;
--before Mao began to destroy Maoism (it now seems) more effectively than the rest of us could contrive;
--before China was weakened at least temporarily, giving the rest of the world a chance to watch its writhings in relative safety for a time, and hope with some realism for a change;
--before Czechoslovakia; and the simple reaction of home-spun wisdom: "You can't trust those communists!" That sentiment reaches to China in today's climate, and must be heeded by policy makers.
The Dog-eared Shopping Lists
The deal-with-China shopping lists of those of us who are Sinophiles, or those who are simply very worried about China's isolation, have been passed around town and the academic community for years. It seems that each time serious thought has been given to some of the more meaningful of the proposed steps, Peking has comported itself in such a way as to make the steps appear not to be in the U.S. interest. The present period of extreme Maoism would seem to be an especially unpromising time for forward movement. The situation is fluid, however, and could change fairly rapidly, or it could simmer along for some while.
The shopping lists vary with advocates, but they variously include:
Recognition? Peking would not recognize Washington. It would cheerfully accept our compliment, but keep us cooling our heels outside the Gate of Heavenly Peace.
Entry into the United Nations? Under present Peking management, this as a minimum would be at the cost of the seat of a well-behaved member and ally, and as a maximum at the cost of warping the United Nations out of recognition.
Unrestricted travel? This should probably be accepted now in any case, but especially since the Supreme Court has taken the teeth out of this sort of travel restriction. It could be done at any time, if there were sufficient excuse through some particular turn of events. It probably should be done quietly next March, when the annual listing of restricted countries automatically comes up. It will not enhance our relations, since Peking fears an exchange of people. It is in the category of harmless tidiness, with an eye for the future.
More contact between newsmen, scholars, scientists, etc.? On balance, this could only be to our advantage, for we are the stronger society with the more viable ideology. We pushed contact belatedly, not in the post-Bandung period when it might have worked (or if not, might have proved an interesting embarrassment to Peking) but prior to and during the Cultural Revolution, when it had no chance. We will have another chance, but the time is not yet here.
Trade on the level of that with European communist countries? This deserves more thought. Some of the arguments in favor, with comment:
--The Cultural Revolution is wearing itself out, and more practical people are coming to the fore in China. They should be encouraged by tangible moves such as lowered trade restrictions. (It is premature to make the judgment concerning the emergence of more practical leadership. U.S. top-level statements expressing hope for eventual reconciliation and our conduct at Warsaw should be adequate signaling to "the more practical people.")
--We should bring our treatment of Asian communist nations in line with our treatment of European ones. (But the communist-fed war we are now fighting is in Asia.)
--The majority of State's China Panel members believe that timing is not important; there seems never to be a "good" time to alter our policy on trade, but it must be done in the long-term U.S. interest. (To do it now would be ill received in America and most of Asia.)
--President Johnson is well known for standing firmly against communist advance in Asia, and he could take this step without being accused of being soft on communism. (During Vietnam? and post-Czech occupation?)
--We would not be announcing the resumption of trade, but simply removing impediments, to influence the "good guys" in China. (So long as the Maoists are in control, it could actually discourage the good guys.)
--This step would reassure Hanoi that the rigidities of our stand do not flow from any doctrine of blanket hostility to Asian communism, but relate to North Vietnamese aggression against South Vietnam. (We are not hostile to Asians, but we need not apologize for being hostile to the policies of Asian communist nations.)
--China gets everything it needs anyway from Japan and Western Europe; American business is at a disadvantage. (There is considerable truth in this, but there is little clamor in American business circles for trade with China--presumably because of recognition of the larger issues involved.)
--It is important, through contact, to make inroads into the dangerous provincialism of China's leaders. (So it is, but we have tried in other ways, and been rebuffed.)
We should keep clearly in mind that the very degree of success of our present policies toward China recommends caution in altering them, until the nature of China itself is more clearly altered:
--So far we have "contained" Chinese expansionist tendencies remarkably well, thereby buying valuable time for non-communist Asia.
--Although not subject to documentary proof, we can be sure that our firm stand in Vietnam and our reasonable posture of desiring contact and eventual reconciliation with mainland China have combined to exacerbate policy differences in Peking, contributing to the disunity and weakness of our self-proclaimed adversary.
--In its 19-year history the regime has never had such fundamental troubles at home, or stood so low in international esteem. It is no longer a model for developing countries.
--We have prevented Peking from ousting the Republic of China from the United Nations, and from entering itself, where, particularly in its recent mood, it would have been a disrupting influence of serious and perhaps disastrous proportions.
--For the first time there is a better than fair prospect that the very nature of the regime, because of its failures, will have to change.
Until the nature of the change is more evident, it is a time for close scrutiny rather than overtures.
The Dubious Case for Movement
Nevertheless, those who advocate movement in China policy now have a case which should not be lightly shrugged off. Essentially, they argue that we are already very late in being more forthcoming, and we take insupportable risks in not seeking accommodation more actively.
Many of Communist China's leaders who oppose Mao (including house-arrested President Liu Shao-ch'i), if not exactly pro-Soviet are at least pro-Soviet aid, which they view as the only hope of a rapid regaining of China's position in the world. While even after Mao a return to the fraternal Sino-Soviet collusion of the 1950's is unlikely, a papering over of differences involving some Soviet aid in return for an acceptable degree of political docility on China's part would have its attraction to both parties, and is not inconceivable. If this should happen, we would be accused because of our "rigid" policies of missing the chance to influence at the right moment the supposed "good guys," or even of "blind dedication to the fortunes of Chiang Kai-shek."
So long as China is unarticulated with the world mainstream, the problems posed in the areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and a more workable security mechanism, in or outside the United Nations, are obvious. Sooner or later the weight of these considerations is bound to increase.
The argument that we lose the respect of important friends through our "rigidity" is less cogent than it was before Peking scandalized itself at home and abroad in the Cultural Revolution. Post-Vietnam, and further away from the Czech crisis, if Peking should become appreciably more reasonable we should take stock again.
The death of either Mao or Chiang would also call for careful weighing of possible developments and appropriate responses, depending on the timing and the context.
In sum, our policy toward Communist China in recent years has accomplished in good measure about all that could be expected, short of bilateral accommodations which are just not yet in the cards. Our policy has been consistent but not static. It has steadfastly opposed Chinese meddling and aggression; but it has moved toward seeking contact. The ground is well laid to move further when China is ready, if it seems in our interest.
Meanwhile, the best policy toward communist Asia, beyond containment, is concentration on strengthening non-communist Asia, with a view to ultimate reduction of the U.S. component in the balance of power in the region.
The other side of China policy is Taiwan and its ramifications. I should like to address those tangles, including the offshore islands problem, in another paper./2/
/2/No such paper has been found.
Alfred Jenkins
329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/
Washington, November 2, 1968, 1908Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-CHINAT. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Shoesmith; cleared by Admiral Shepard, Colonel Ridge, and Lieutenant General Warren of DOD/ISA, Brigadier General Glick and Colonel Mayland of the Joint Staff; and approved by Winthrop Brown. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, CHMAAG Taiwan, COMUSTDC, and Hong Kong.
266124. Joint State/Defense. Ref: A. State 242120;/2/ B. Taipei 4806;/3/ C. Taipei 4822;/4/ D. CINCPAC 191150Z, Oct. 68 (NOTAL)./5/
/2/Document 327.
/3/In telegram 4806 from Taipei, October 11, Charge Dean reported that Chiang Ching-kuo had reiterated the GRC request for a squadron of F-4C's and for the stationing of a U.S. squadron of F-4C's on Taiwan as an interim measure. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-CHINAT)
/4/Telegram 4822 from Taipei, October 14, conveyed the Country Team's recommendation that President Johnson send a letter to President Chiang reiterating the U.S. commitment to the defense of Taiwan but explaining that other requirements made it impossible to provide a squadron of F-4C's to the GRC or to station one on Taiwan. (Ibid.)
/5/Not found.
1. Despite President Chiang's personal involvement in GRC request for F-4C squadron, we do not think Country Team recommendation Para 3 Ref C advisable. We agree with Country Team observation that Chiang's interest may be motivated more by reasons of prestige and desire to obtain some reaffirmation of US defense commitment, than by anticipated military needs. We do not believe, however, that present circumstances or specific issue Chiang has chosen make it advisable or appropriate for President to be responsive to such interest.
2. You are requested therefore to convey to MinDef Chiang following USG response to President Chiang's specific requests:
(a) USG has given most careful and high-level consideration to President Chiang's request that F-4C squadron be provided GRC. USG fully shares President Chiang's desire maintain and improve air defense of Taiwan and Pescadores and wishes to continue consult closely with GRC on best means of meeting that priority requirement within resources available to both sides. In view strict limitation on grant MAP funds, USG unable on that basis provide F-4C squadron to CAF. Moreover, the USG cannot advise purchase by GRC in view of exceedingly high costs of F-4C aircraft and the resultant impact such purchase would have on GRC defense budget. Further, other less costly additions to the air defense system are more readily available in the near term, e.g., F-5's and package of 34 F-100's.
(b) With respect to President Chiang's request that USAF station F-4C squadron on Taiwan on permanent basis, USG does not consider that at this time the situation relating to air defense of Taiwan and Pescadores would justify such deployment, particularly in view of current operational requirements. Proposal to provide temporary and intermittent presence in Taiwan of high performance fighters through remainder of 1968 was made after careful study in an effort to be as responsive as possible to GRC's concern. If GRC does not believe this would serve our mutual defense purposes, USG would of course not wish proceed further with plans for such deployment.
3. At time you convey our response to MinDef Chiang, we believe it would be useful to provide him opportunity for detailed review of points previously made to him and President Chiang by Ambassador and CHMAAG. For that purpose, suggest you consider a joint representation to include CHMAAG and COMUSTDC. Additionally, based on General Warren's conversation with the President, it appears that he may not be fully informed on aircraft characteristics and performance. In your conversation with the MinDef, it is suggested that you invite his attention to the fact that the US has provided three squadrons of F-104G interceptor aircraft, and in June of this year provided seven additional F-104G's to maintain the air defense capability which President Chiang discussed as the basis for his F-4 request. In this regard, these have a MACH 2 speed and are designed to support the very air defense mission which apparently constituted the basis of the President's concern./6/
/6/Dean reported in telegram 5093 from Taipei, November 8, that he, accompanied by COMUSTDC Admiral Chew and General Ciccolella, had delivered the U.S. response to Chiang Ching-kuo on November 8. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-CHINAT)
Rusk
Return to 1964-1968, Volume XXX index
Return
to the U.S. Department of State Home Page
This is an official U.S. Government source for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S. Government links does not imply endorsement of contents.
