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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXX China DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

290. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/

Taipei, December 5, 1967, 0855Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-CHINAT. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC.

1569. Ref State 78711./2/

/2/Telegram 78711, December 2, reported that Congressional reductions in military assistance programs made it almost certain that FY 68 military assistance to the GRC would be reduced to the $50 million grant level, and requested the Embassy's views as to the impact of this. (Ibid.)

1. When DefMin Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) came to my residence yesterday (Dec 4) at his own request to brief me on his recent trip to Japan (reported septel), I took opportunity to prepare him for prospective substantial MAP cut and to suggest possibility of reducing size of GRC ground forces as one means of reducing military expenditures.

2. I reminded CCK that I and US military representatives here had already told him of probable sizeable reduction in map funds for the current fiscal year. I said that while the final appropriation has not yet been passed, it now appeared highly likely that the world-wide map program would be significantly reduced. I said that the GRC would have to take its essentially proportionate share of a rather drastic reduction along with most other recipients. It appeared that military assistance to Korea and Thailand, for compelling reasons, would not be affected as much as the GRC. I told him that COMUSTDC VAdm Chew and MAAG Chief MGen Cicolella had been for some time discussing with me ways to cushion the adverse effects and offset part of the program losses that seemed almost certain. I hoped that Gen Cicolella's constructive ideas for economies and greater combat efficiency within the GRC military establishment would help, and I thought his suggestions for enabling the GRC armed forces to earn revenues for military purchases by rebuilding and overhauling US combat equipment used in Vietnam might also hold considerable promise. I said we all hoped that the reduction would be instituted for a single year only, but we could not be sure of this, because once Congress makes deep cuts it is possible they will be inclined to follow the newly established level as a precedent in future years. I emphasized that the impending cut did not represent any change in US policy, and that the defense needs of the GRC were well appreciated in Washington and at CINCPAC. I pointed out that the cutbacks of major investment items including F-5 aircraft would not be felt for two years or more because the procurement pipeline was very long. If the cuts are not restored in future years, I said, there could eventually be a heavy adverse impact in the essential categories of modern weapons unless we plan carefully, and coordinate closely to make the best use of the resources that are available. I said there would of course be an immediate impact on operating funds. I knew that his officers had been in close contact with Gen Cicolella, and I believed that I had kept Washington well informed of the GRC needs and of the effects of the proposed reductions.

3. CCK said that any deep cuts would be a very serious and important matter to the GRC. He intended for his senior MND and service officers to keep in close touch with Gen Cicolella on this problem. He said that as a matter of policy it was necessary to keep up the combat effectiveness of GRC forces at a time when ChiCom military effectiveness is increasing steadily. He asked that USG pay close attention to the pressing need for implementation of this basic policy.

4. CCK observed that in past years the significance, although not the magnitude, of military assistance to Korea and to the GRC has been very similar since the role of the two countries as vital parts of the system of deterrence of ChiCom aggression was comparable. He said that although he realized Korea was making a troop contribution in Vietnam he hoped that "in principle" MAP for Korea and for the GRC would be considered together, although the amounts furnished the two countries would of course differ. I said I understood his point and I would make sure that Washington understood also.

5. I then said that the question has been raised as to whether the GRC should not consider reducing its ground forces, while at same time upgrading their effectiveness and firepower. I asked for his reaction to this thought, which might have effect of saving needed funds during a period of stringency resulting from MAP reduction.

6. CCK paused, considering his reply and said carefully that it would of course be necessary to confer closely with MAAG about the best means of maintaining the combat effectiveness of GRC forces. However, he said, "any reduction in the size of our ground forces is something we cannot consider (pu neng k'ao lu)." He said any such move would be essentially a political one, with grave political repercussions. He pointed out that while the reduction in MAP would have some adverse impact in the GRC, if it did not affect the status of capability of the armed forces, it would not be misunderstood by "the average person" on the GRC as signifying any change in basic US-China policy, especially since it was a Congressional rather than an administration action, and would be of general and impartial worldwide application. On the other hand, any reduction of the force levels in the GRC would lead people to think there had been a change in policy, attributable to US action and affecting the security of the GRC. Anyway, he said, reducing the ground forces would not result in much saving. He said he realized and understood the difficulties the USG is having with MAP, but that the GRC also has its difficulties. Any reduction of forces would have misleading implications and would also have a bad effect on morale of GRC forces. Even raising the subject for general discussion would have adverse repercussions. Since any saving would be small, and the repercussions great, it would be very much better not to pursue this proposal at all. He again said he would discuss carefully with MAAG the best means of maintaining and improving the combat effectiveness of existing GRC forces with available resources.

7. I observed that we on the US side all hope that the GRC can ensure that the impending MAP cut will not have an adverse effect on the economic development of the country. We are deeply impressed with the remarkable progress made in the economic field in Taiwan, and we earnestly hope that the GRC can avoid any diversion of resources from economic development to defense that would impede economic growth. I realized it would not be easy to meet essential requirements in both sectors, but it was important that a major effort be made to do so, and we hoped we could help.

8. CCK replied that he understood my point very well. He wanted to state that what he had said earlier was put forward in the light not only of GRC interests but also the security interests of the US. He said that approaches other than reduction of forces would have to be found. He said he and his government believed that us problems are also those of the GRC, and those of the GRC are also US problems. We would consult closely in seeking solutions. We felt that basically money is a secondary factor, the most important element being the underlying spirit and attitude of the cooperating countries.

McConaughy

 

291. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/

Taipei, December 14, 1967, 0310Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 CHINAT. Secret. Repeated to Tokyo.

1634. Ref: State 82115; Taipei 1594./2/

/2/Telegram 82115, December 9, requested information for a follow-up report to Senator Fulbright about the early fall security sweep mentioned in telegram 1594 from Taipei, December 7. (Both ibid.)

1. Tight security precautions and continued state of martial law have long been considered by ROC as absolutely essential to its protection against the threat posed by Communist China. Legalistically, GRC looks upon Taiwanese independence movements as secessionist in nature, and like all other such threats to political status quo, as merely variant forms of "rebellion", designed to weaken it in the face of the Communist threat. Practically speaking, GRC probably estimates that without strict security controls a mainlander government could not effectively control a population which is over 80 percent Taiwanese.

2. Police sweeps of various types are a periodic exercise on Taiwan. For example, prior to Chinese New Year's there are local sweeps directed against petty criminals. A more general sweep is also an annual occurrence. Such a sweep was conducted June 8, 1965. On May 14 and 18, 1966, there were two sweeps in anticipation of Chiang's inauguration for fourth term. This fall there seems to have been two sweeps: a small one in late August directed at Taiwanese independence advocates or their associates, and a general sweep on October 5, timed to catch potential security risks by double ten.

3. Only the pattern for the general police sweep seems at all established. Reportedly, the garrison command sets a quota of persons to be picked up for each municipality or county and mobilizes all available regular military police, and special security forces. Curfew is put in effect about 1:00 a.m. on an unannounced day, and no one except police is allowed to move until 6:00 a.m. Trains are stopped at their nearest station. During this period everyone, at home or in public places, has his household registration and identity card checked for irregularities and against lists of wanted criminals. In this year's general sweep, the press reported the next day that about 100 were arrested in Taipei. According to one Embassy source in the garrison command, 80 out of the 100 detained in Taipei in October were picked up from the wanted list of habitual bad check passers. Only part of the remaining 20 (a "handful" according to garrison command source) were detained as "threats to social stability". The exact number detained in the two sweeps late this year is unknown: 230 is the largest island-wide estimate the Embassy has heard. Presumably this excludes temporary detention.

4. One reason that the exact number detained in such sweeps is not particularly significant is that certain police subdivisions, finding it hard to meet their assigned detention quotas, apparently detain a few of the local social misfits (petty racketeers, vagrants, etc.) for a few days just to fill out their list. The percentage of Taiwanese detained in this year's sweeps is not accurately known. The Embassy has, however, heard complaints from Taiwanese in the past that police sweeps pick up an even larger percentage of Taiwanese than their proportion in the general population would make likely.

5. Martial law on Taiwan is justified by GRC as necessary consequence of existence of a state of hostilities with the Chinese Communists. It covers a wide variety of threats to public safety and public order. Any case considered to involve either rebellion or sedition would fall under its provisions. Article 5 of the rules regarding the punishing of rebellion and sedition provides for ten years to life imprisonment for "participation in a rebel organization or meeting." Article 6 provides for 7 years to life for "spreading a rumor or disseminating untrue information which might endanger public peace or order or disturb the mind of the people". Article 7 provides 7 years to life imprisonment for a person who "uses written articles, pictures, books or speeches for publicity purposes for the benefit of a rebellious organization." Article 4 provides for the death penalty, life or imprisonment for not less than ten years for a series of actions such as sabotage, espionage, etc., but also including the "collecting of funds or supplies for or furnishing money or properties to a rebel", "providing protection to or hiding a rebel", " instigating a labor, student or market strike or disturbing public peace and order . . . under the instruction or for the benefit of a rebel".

6. Despite stringent nature of law, very few of those picked up in this year's sweeps are likely to be tried under its provisions. For example, those passing bad checks probably were forced to pay up or their family made to provide guarantees for release. To Embassy's knowledge, there have been no trials or political grounds of any of the persons picked up during either August or October sweeps; but under martial law, trial need not be public.

7. Embassy strongly doubts that large number of Taiwanese active in independence movement or other anti-KMT activities were picked up during August and October police sweeps. Story of sweeps has been common topic of discussion among U.S. students studying here and among Taipei correspondents. It has also been heard in Hong Kong and in Tokyo, where it has been covered in Taiwanese independence movement periodicals. However, only seven names have come to attention of Embassy from all these sources as persons who may have been arrested on political grounds and two of these names appear to refer to same person. As a result, Embassy is inclined to believe that only a handful of those arrested in general sweep were arrested on political grounds.

8. Taiwan's security system is closely related to maintenance of minority government rule over Taiwanese population, ramifications of this issue are very great, and totally beyond purview of MOFA or any other Ministry. Long established U.S. policy of encouraging broader Taiwanese participation in government has produced little effect, since policy is established by top leadership which firmly believes strong centralized control is absolutely essential, especially during period of national emergency. If United States representations were to be made on this subject, they would have to be made to President Chiang himself. What we know as to recent sweeps would not justify any demarche to him based on conduct of those sweeps.

9 Case of Kuo Hsi-lin, recent deportee from Japan, appears to be one that would give Japanese some opportunity to make representations if GOJ should feel warranted. Iijima, First Secretary Japanese Embassy, called on Embassy Taipei on Dec. 12 to ask what U.S. knows of Kuo's probable future. Stated that Japanese immigration service was given assurances Kuo would not be tried for political crimes and that GRC Embassy Tokyo also gave Kuo a written statement to that effect. Kuo case could easily fall under martial law as interpreted here. In such an event, prosecution of his case would probably follow lines of Huang Chi-ming case. (A-193/3/ and previous.) Exit from and entry into Taiwan are responsiblity of a department of the garrison command. (There is no separate immigration service.) Violation of immigration laws might be treated as security offense. Even without such a decision, if maximum penalties sought for all laws broken by Kuo in his illegal entry into and exit from Taiwan, sentence could probably be as severe as if membership in Taiwanese independence movement were charged.

/3/Airgram A-193 from Taipei, September 13. (Ibid.)

10. Several specific details in this report come from very sensitive sources and should not be released in any public manner. Embassy hopes, however, that background will be of some value for briefing interested parties in U.S.

11. FYI. Embassy is preparing a series of airgrams on internal security and political stability situation on Taiwan that should begin appearing next month./4/

/4/A series of six airgrams on this subject, sent between March 1 and May 17, is ibid., POL 2 CHINAT.

McConaughy

 

292. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/

Washington, December 15, 1967, 0059Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-CHINAT. Secret Drafted by Shoesmith and approved by Bundy. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, CHIEF MAAG CHINA, and COMUSTDC.

84908. 1. Chinese Ambassador Chow at his request called on Bundy December 14 to discuss grant MAP prospects. Bundy noted agreement of House/Senate conferees December 13 setting overall grant military assistance total at $400 million ($220 million below Administration request), and commented that, given relative fixity other MAP programs, this figure will mean major reduction in grant MAP for GRC. He also observed that in view overall Congressional climate on spending, it probably will be difficult to avoid similar lower grant levels in FY 69. Bundy noted, however, that Congressional action on military sales would not have significant impact this year on possibility such sales to GRC.

2. Chow indicated understanding of situation and special considerations involved in Korean MAP, but expressed hope that reduction in grant MAP for GRC would not be proportionately larger than cut in overall total. He also inquired as to possibility recent events in Greece might increase availability grant funds for GRC. Referring again to difficulty of making substantial reduction in a number of programs, Bundy stated that cut in China MAP probably will be greater than approximate 37 percent reduction in Administration's original request. He acknowledged that Greek situation might release some funds, but stated that amount not likely be large.

3. Bundy emphasized urgent importance we and GRC together consider frankly how to weather these hard facts of life. He noted our concern to maintain GRC defense capabilities and suggested that GRC consider usefulness to visit by U.S. team to consult on how make best use of resources available for this purpose. Bundy indicated that we must first obtain clearer picture of FY 68 and FY 69 situation, but we should soon be in position work together with GRC on problem. Chow indicated agreement with this suggestion but offered no specific comment.

4. Chow did not appear under instructions to make specific representation on this subject. Throughout conversation, he evidenced realistic appreciation of situation and did not urge that GRC be given preferential treatment; nor did he refer to possible adverse political and economic impact of major reduction in grant MAP.

Katzenbach

 

293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Hong Kong/1/

Washington, December 27, 1967, 0115Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 CHINAT-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by T.L. Ridge of OSD/ISA; cleared by Shoesmith, Richard H. Donald of ACA, Steadman of OSD/ISA, Captain Alldredge of the Joint Staff, and Lieutenant Colonel Lively of the Air Force; approved by Berger. Also sent to Taipei. Repeated to JCS, CINCPAC, Bangkok, PACAF, SAC, and COMUSMACV.

89597. Subject: KC-135 Deployment to Ching Chuan Kang Air Base. Joint State/Defense Message.

1. Increase in B-52 sortie rates in SEA, which has been approved at high level, has necessitated relocation of KC-135's which provide PACAF fighter support. We are considering a proposal to base ten PACAF support tankers (five from Takhil and five from Kadena) and five U-Tapao based radio relay aircraft at Ching Chuan Kang by approximately February 1, 1968. It is necessary to redeploy these KC-135's in order to permit increased B-52 operations at U-Tapao and F-111 deployment at Takhli. U-Tapao and Takhli are extremely crowded and could not accommodate new deployments without reduction in number of KC-135's. Move of KC-135's from Kadena to Ching Chuan Kang will increase their effectiveness since they will be based nearer to SEA refueling areas. Operation from Ching Chuan Kang will require 432 additional US personnel. No new construction would be needed. As you know, GRC has previously approved KC-135's use of Ching Chuan Kang as weather alternate, and it has been so used.

2. For Taipei: We would like the Ambassador's comments on the proposal and assessment as to what the GRC's reaction would be if we approach them with a request to deploy 15 KC-135's (10 tankers and 5 radio relay) and approximately 430 personnel to CCK. The aircraft would be utilized for fighter refueling and radio relay operations at rate of approximately one sortie per day per aircraft./2/

/2/The Embassy commented in telegram 1743 from Taipei, December 28. (Ibid.)

3. For AMConsul HK: Request your comments on above proposal, particularly regarding likely Chicom reaction to specific deployment under consideration and increasing Taiwan role in Viet Nam./3/

/3/The Consulate General commented in telegram 3676, December 29, that any reaction beyond a propaganda blast was unlikely. (Ibid.) Telegram 96329 to Taipei, January 10, authorized the Embassy to request GRC approval to base 15 KC-135's plus approximately 450 additional personnel at Ching Chuan Kang. Telegram 1945 from Taipei, January 22, reported GRC approval. (Ibid., DEF 15 CHINAT-US)

Rusk

 

294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/

Washington, January 4, 1968, 0105Z.

/1/Source; Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Kreisberg on December 27. Cleared by Bundy, Aldrich, Alan F. Neidle of ACDA/IR, Herman I. Chinn of SCI, Harriman's Special Assistant Frank A. Sieverts, SCA Deputy Administrator Nathan Lewin, and Morton Halperin of DOD/ISA, and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Taipei, London, Saigon, Moscow, Hong Kong, and CINCPAC.

92930. Subj: 134th Ambassadorial-level US-ChiCom Meeting.

1. Assuming the meeting materializes as scheduled on January 8,/2/ we anticipate another sterile tirade from Ch'en Tung/3/ focussing primarily on Vietnam, air incidents, possibly disarmament, and again Taiwan. We believe it unlikely Ch'en will break any fresh ground. We do not ourselves present any new initiative other than to suggest the possibility of bilateral discussions on Astronaut Assistance and Return but will reiterate our existing offers on contacts, etc. Text of proposed guidance as follows:

/2/The meeting, originally scheduled for November 8, was postponed to January 8 at Chinese request. (Telegram 1268 from Warsaw and telegram 61850 to Warsaw, both October 30; ibid.)

/3/A telephone message from the Chinese Embassy in Warsaw on January 1 stated that since Ambassador Wang could not return to Warsaw for the January 8 meeting, the Chinese Government proposed as a temporary measure that Charge Ch'en Tung take part in the meeting; the United States agreed to the arrangement. (Telegram 1704 from Warsaw and telegram 91928 to Warsaw, January 1 and 2, respectively; both ibid.)

2. "Mr. Charge d'Affaires. This meeting marks the end of the second year in which I have been participating in these discussions. During this period, I have attempted to the best of my ability to communicate to you my Government's views and attitudes on a variety of issues. I have particularly emphasized the willingness of the United States to proceed constructively to discuss a variety of matters which I had hoped were of mutual interest to the Govts and peoples of both of our countries. These have included, as I am sure you recall, Mr. Charge d'Affaires, proposals to facilitate

--the travel by doctors, scholars, scientists, newspapermen, and other persons of our two countries;

--the exchange of scientific and other types of data, information, and material;

--the exchange of types of agricultural samples which would benefit the development of scientific research and agronomy in your country and mine;

--joint investigation of incidents on the high seas;

--disarmament and the control of nuclear weapons.

3. I have on other occasions expressed my regret that your Government has rejected these suggestions, all of which I take this opportunity to reiterate in their entirety. Some of these we had believed, from the past record of our meetings, at one time had been of interest to your Government but to date I am sorry to see no indication that your Government has considered the benefits and advantages they might bring to both our countries.

4. Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, it might be useful for me to review for you my Government's views on the purpose of our meetings. Our objectives are threefold: First and foremost, we view them as a forum through which our two Governments can work gradually toward greater mutual understanding and begin to break down the barriers and antagonisms which have stood between us. Secondly, we see in them a point of contact where urgent and critical matters relating to the national interests of our two countries and to world peace can be communicated in private and with full frankness. Thirdly, we see in them an opportunity to exchange views on other problems and issues which either of us may feel it useful to raise with the other.

5. We succeeded, in the opening meetings in this series in 1955, in reaching agreement on the return of civilians to their own countries. In retrospect and even in spite of our many disagreements over the implementation of that initial agreement, it represented a significant step forward toward the resolution of specific problems. As I have noted before, we have never seen why, after gradually releasing so many of the American citizens being detained in your country, you drew the line at the handful who still remain.

6. To date, however, that has been our only agreed understanding in this forum. And in recent years, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, despite the efforts of my Government to pose various means of improving relations between the peoples of our two countries, your Government has limited itself more and more to repetition of editorials, commentaries, and general statements on international affairs already given wide publicity by your radio and news media.

7. Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, I and my Government are indeed interested in the views of your Government on matters of general international concern. But let us also get on with the substantive, and we would hope productive, business of our meetings.

8. Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, your Government is aware, I am sure, of the existence of the International Telecommunications Satellite Corporation (INTELSAT) established in 1964. I would at this point like to call your Government's attention to a message addressed by President Johnson to the US Congress on August 14, 1967 on membership in INTELSAT. The President stated: 'We support a global system of commercial satellite communications which is available to all nations--large and small, developed and developing--on a non-discriminatory basis . . . We seek no domination of satellite communications to the exclusion of any other nation--or group of nations.'

9. Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, the scientists of your country have demonstrated their skill, ingenuity, and competence in many fields. Conceivably, one day in the not too distant future astronauts of your country will join those of other nations in venturing into the exciting and enormously important exploration of space. In this connection, my Government believes that it would be in the interest of both our countries for us to reach an understanding on the question of rescue and return of astronauts and space vehicles. I would be interested in the views of your Government on this subject.

10. Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, as your country continues to carry out nuclear tests, I am sure that the enormous power and destructive potential of nuclear weapons is becoming increasingly clear to the political, military, and scientific leaders of your country. The need to control these weapons, to avert their use, and to move gradually toward disarmament can hardly be open to doubt by anyone today. We have sought repeatedly, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, to have your Government clarify and spell out in detail its views on controlling nuclear weapons and on constructive moves toward disarmament which would preserve the security of all states. Unilateral declarations on the use of nuclear weapons and calls for uncontrolled and uninspected disarmament obviously do not answer the real problems of security and assurance in a world in which mutual trust and confidence are imperfect.

11. Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, my Government, together with other nations, has been engaged in serious negotiations designed to conclude an agreement barring the further spread of nuclear weapons. On July 31, 1963 your Government issued a statement on disarmament, part (2) C of which specifically called for 'the prohibition of the export and import of nuclear weapons and technical data on their manufacture.' As I understand your language, its spirit is precisely in keeping with the purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to which I just referred. I would hope your Government will be willing to look at the Treaty in this light and join with many other states in seeking by practical and progressive steps to deal with this and other problems of disarmament.

12. FYI: If Ch'en raises ABM question, you should make statement below, but not otherwise. Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, I am sure your Government has noted the various public statements in recent months about the United States decision to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system, but I would like to underscore one or two points. In the first place, it is clear that it is purely defensive. It employs components which cannot conceivably in themselves present a threat to any nation. In the absence of mutual assurances that offer hope for an end to the arms race and the spread of nuclear weapons, we reluctantly felt that prudence demanded we make the deployment. Our interest in putting an end to the arms race and the huge expenditures of human and material resources that it entails remains undiminished. We would much prefer ourselves to devote our resources to the enormous tasks that remain unfinished, both in our own country and in others, in housing, education, transportation, health and welfare. Is this not a common goal we both share and toward which we should both be able to work and cooperate?

13. Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, I mentioned earlier the achievements of your country's scientists in many fields. I would like to take particular note of your achievements in the field of insulin chemistry. Such progress, like that in heart surgery recently achieved in South Africa, and that in synthesizing a protein virus in my country, should be shared with all scientists without regard to politics. We regret that, at the present time, the PRC is the only major scientific country in the world which is unwilling to permit open, widespread exchange of scientists and scientific, unclassified research and information with the US. We would like to see such exchanges and I am prepared to discuss with you now or at a subsequent meeting means of remedying this situation, and assure you of the USG's desire to encourage exchanges of visits between your scientists and ours.

14. Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, I have discussed with you at length on previous occasions my Government's views on the Vietnam conflict, our reasons for involvement in that conflict, and our limited objectives and willingness to withdraw our forces from Vietnam when the threat to the security of SVN has ended. I have made it clear that we do not seek to invade North Vietnam or to destroy or change the Government in NVN and, in the same context, made clear we do not seek a wider war, that we do not intend to attack your country, and do not have any territorial aspirations in that entire area. We sincerely hope your Government understands this. (FYI: If in his opening statement, Ch'en includes direct threat against US, you should note that this is a matter of gravest consequence you can only report to your Govt and follow with remainder of para 14. End FYI.) We also hope your Government has considered--as we have--the grave consequences which a war between our two countries would have. To wish to avert such a conflict is not cowardice or a sign of being what your Chairman calls a 'paper tiger'. Secretary Rusk responded on October 12 to a question whether the main US objective in Asia was the so-called 'containment' of your country with an emphatic 'No. The central objective is an organized and reliable peace.' But we will assist those countries that feel themselves threatened and to whom we have pledged our support and friendship. There should be not the faintest germ of doubt in your Government's appreciation of that fact.

15. It is sometimes difficult for one country to understand the psychology, the 'style' of another. And because the American system permits all views to be expressed openly, allows all kinds of dissent and debate, it is sometimes possible for other countries with different patterns and traditions of political and social behavior and action to mistake the workings of the democratic process and the free expression of diverse opinions in the US for weakness or lack of determination.

16. It is true, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, that we are periodically confronted by incidents involving ships or aircraft of our two countries. We are convinced that you know these are not purposefully and intentionally precipitated. But despite our most persistent efforts, it occasionally happens that as a result of malfunction or navigational error, US aircraft do intrude briefly and shallowly into your territorial airspace. We will continue to take every practicable measure to prevent such occurrences.

17. The serious warnings your Government issues with such regularity, I have noted before and reiterate today, with rare exception, cannot be verified. Many, of course, relate to the Paracel Islands--what you call the Hsisha Islands. As you know, sovereignty over this island group is in dispute. On your claims of US naval violations of your waters, our rec-ords consistently show that US Navy ships have not entered your territorial waters, even if measured by the 12-mile sea limit your Government claims rather than a 3-mile sea limit.

18. Conceivably, there may be some genuine misunderstanding on our part of the charting of your coastal waters. We would welcome receiving more up-to-date cartographic charts of your offshore waters, if you believe our plots are inaccurate, or your marking off your territorial water claims on generally available older charts for our information.

19. If it would be of interest to you, I would also at our next meeting be prepared to provide you with more detailed information on the actual positions of specific US naval vessels to clarify any question relating to their entry into your territorial waters. My Government would welcome similar information from your side including the name or hull number of the ship, time, and coordinates of the position involved. Perhaps this might clarify our respective positions and possibly resolve some of our differences. FYI: Following para to be used only if this specific subject is raised by Wang. End FYI.

20. On your figure of 125 air intrusions by US aircraft over a one-year period, I am unable to accept your figures without specific documentation. I would, however, be interested in receiving any specific plottings by your authorities of specific air intrusions you believe have occurred (excluding, of course, those of whose existence we have already publicly indicated our awareness).

21. Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, I would like to express my appreciation for the release of Mr. David J. Steele, whose sailboat apparently crossed into your territorial waters near Hainan, at the HK border on September 19, 1967. I also note that your authorities on June 17, 1967 released to HK an American citizen named Leon James, otherwise known as Holden Johnson, who had crossed over into your territory without permission. I regret, however, that your Government has not as yet responded to my letters dated August 27, 1967 and September 12, 1967/4/ requesting information on Lt. Robert Flynn (USN) and other crewmen of two US Navy aircraft shot down over your territory on August 21, 1967. (FYI: If Wang deals with this question in his opening statement, but rejects requests for return of Flynn, change preceding sentence to regret rejection.) These planes, we acknowledge, crossed into your territory but with no hostile intent and inadvertently. We note that Lt. Flynn has thus far not been permitted to write his family. Major (formerly Captain) Philip Smith, on the other hand, was permitted to write his family almost immediately and to receive mail and packages. While, as in the case of Major Smith, we continue to hope your authorities will release Lt. Flynn, we strongly urge that he be permitted to write and receive letters and packages while he is under detention by your authorities. I also reiterate my request that you facilitate arrangements for the return of the bodies of the dead crewmen for burial in the US."

/4/The texts of the letters were transmitted in telegrams 25858 and 34505, dated August 23 and September 8, respectively; both ibid., POL 31-1 CHICOM-US. A similar letter was delivered to the Chinese Embassy in Warsaw on November 7. (Telegram 65293 to Warsaw and telegram 1340 from Warsaw, November 6 and 7, respectively; both ibid.)

22. FYI: We assume Ch'en Tung will again try to postpone the next meeting for 4-5 months or even longer. You should propose a date in mid-April and see how much you can whittle down Ch'en Tung's reluctance. We are, however, if need be, prepared to delay until June.

23. Response to contingencies authorized for 132nd and 133rd meetings on break or suspension of talks remain in effect.

24. Para 8 should be used only if subsequent specific authorization received./5/ End FYI.

/5/No such authorization was sent.

Rusk

 

295. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/

Warsaw, January 8, 1968, 1725Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, London, Moscow, Saigon, Taipei, and CINCPAC for POLAD.

1763. Subj: 134th Gronouski-Wang meeting./2/

/2/Gronouski sent a detailed report of the meeting in airgram A-417 from Warsaw, January 11. (Ibid.) Rostow sent a brief telegram to the President at the LBJ Ranch on January 9 stating that the meeting was "clearly better in tone and atmosphere than the previous session" and commenting: "It appears that the professional diplomats have recaptured the Foreign Office from the Red Guards." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Gronouski-Wang Talks)

1. Meeting lasted 2 hours 15 minutes. ChiComs had no new points to make. Atmosphere of meeting clearly an improvement over last session in June when Wang may have been intent on making good record for himself before returning for "cultural revolutionizing" to Peking.

2. Charge Ch'en Tung's opening statement (which very brief, however) devoted to subject of US-CPR relations centering on Taiwan as key obstacle to improvement in US-CPR relations. (This in itself represented major relaxation from height of cultural revolution when ChiCom public statements appeared reject idea that Taiwan overriding issue dividing US and CPR in favor of thesis that Viet-Nam and whole question of US opposition to world revolution more important than Taiwan alone.) Ch'en referred to President's statement Dec. 19/3/ and Secretary's press conference remarks Oct. 12/4/ on living in harmony with ChiComs and peaceful coexistence, but characterized them as baseless. Said "peaceful coexistence" between US and Peking out of question while US "occupying" Taiwan. ChiComs during 12 years of talks with US had repeatedly sought get US to withdraw all its armed forces from Taiwan and stop aggression against mainland so that "peaceful coexistence" on basis "five principles" (panchshilla) could be established between US and CPR. China had exhibited much patience and made many efforts but nothing had been achieved. Ch'en referred to GRC claims to fight back to mainland "with US support" and noted it was particularly grave that US directed GRC to send [garble] over mainland. Said GRC had been launching military provocations against mainland with US cooperation.

/3/Reference is to remarks made by President Johnson in a television interview on December 19. For the transcript, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book II, pp. 1158-1173.

/4/For the transcript of Secretary Rusk's October 12 news conference, see Department of State Bulletin, October 30, 1967, pp. 555-564.

3. I made statement on basis Departmental guidance (Deptel 92930)/5/ and added language on attacks on Chinese ships along lines that used in US reply to Soviets on bombing "non-hostile" vessels. Rejected ChiCom charges on Taiwan and urged we bypass this issue and [move?] on to other matters of interest to our two governments. In rebuttal, Ch'en took up numerous other issues, restating standard ChiCom positions on Viet-Nam, disarmament, including Non-Proliferation Treaty, prisoners. He described Lt. Flynn (USN), who shot down in incident over south China Aug. 21 this year, as criminal to be dealt with as ChiComs decided and refused reply to my requests for further information on him or other prisoners. (I rejected Ch'en's contention in response. Ch'en said US clamoring to invade Cambodia and to send troops to Laos. Did not, however, mention ChiCom support for Cambodia. Soviets mentioned only once in passing reference to US-Soviet "collusion" on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. No reference to ABMs or Secy McNamara speech on this subject./6/ Recent freighter incident covered as part of long recital of all incidents involving US aircraft intrusions and ChiCom shipping since last June but not singled out for particular emphasis or made object of particular warning.

/5/Document 294.

/6/McNamara stated in an address before a convention of United Press International editors and publishers at San Francisco on September 18 that a decision had been made to proceed with a "Chinese-oriented" deployment of anti-ballistic missiles. For text of the address, see Department of State Bulletin, October 9, 1967, pp. 443-451.

4. General tone of ChiCom presentation was sharp but polite and not especially belligerent or provocative. Repeated "grave and serious warnings" were included in referring to past incidents and possibility of expansion of war but all in highly generalized and formalized language identical with that used by Chinese in public statements. Ch'en did note US "clamoring" for "hot pursuit" into China but did not add any specific warning in this context other than that we would meet with "thorough and ignominious defeat" if we should expand the war.

5. Current meeting conspicuously lacking in repeated references to Mao and quotes from Mao that dominated June meeting. Mao mentioned only once, and sole reference to 700 million Chinese omitted June's routine (and repeated) addition that these "armed with thought of Mao Tse-tung". General language used less pejorative than at last meeting and more in keeping with pre-cultural revolution Warsaw meetings.

6. Obvious that Charge Ch'en somewhat ill at ease on his first venture into "dangerous" area of US-ChiCom contacts. There unusual amounts of paper shuffling and confusion as to what documents to use and in what order on Chinese side. On several occasions, Ch'en clearly used guidance prepared for his use without regard to whether it applicable in context of our comments. For example, he belabored me for lodging unjustified charges against Chinese in my opening statement (I had made no charges at all), referred to US call for "disarmament conference" (I had made no such reference), and said it was false for me to allege there no US troops on Taiwan (I had made no such claim). On several occasions, Chinese interpreter Ch'ien clearly had to bail Charge out of confusion he found himself in.

7. Next meeting date set for May 29, seven weeks after date I had suggested but earlier than I had thought they would agree to. They continued be vague about when Ambassador Wang returning but I made it clear we saw these meetings taking place at Ambassadorial level and I expected next meeting would be at that level.

Gronouski

 

296. Letter From the Ambassador to Poland (Gronouski) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Warsaw, January 11, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XII. Confidential; Official-Informal.

Dear Dean:

It has been some time since I felt it worthwhile to bother you with a separate personal reaction to one of our meetings with the Chinese. As you know from the formal reporting of the last two or three meetings, the Chinese posture of sterility and rigidity did not encourage me to believe that a new initiative on our part would have any significant impact.

The atmosphere and substance of the January 8 meeting, however, was enough improved over the preceding two or three sessions to raise my hopes a small notch. The "signals" that intrigue me include the following: (a) By holding this meeting, despite the absence of Ambassador Wang, by volunteering that the Charge contact is a temporary exigency, and by readily agreeing to a reasonable date for the next meeting, the Chinese made clear their desire to maintain their contact with us; (b) They reverted to their pre-cultural revolution position that Taiwan is the sole issue poisoning relations between China and the U.S., as against their position over the past couple of years that their conflict with us involved differences encompassing the whole world revolutionary movement; (c) They devoted their entire opening statement to strictly bilateral issues--Taiwan and an itemized listing of air intrusions, attacks on ships, etc.--and during rebuttal made only perfunctory references to Viet-Nam, avoiding the several issues which I expected them to vigorously exploit, including the current Cambodian troubles and McNamara's ABM speech; (d) There was a sharp downturn in invective as compared to each of the other meetings in which I have participated, and a complete absence of reference to the cultural revolution and the sayings of Chairman Mao; (e) The routine follow-up meeting the next morning between Kreisberg and Anderson (my counselor and interpreter) with their Chinese counterparts/2/ was pervaded by a surprising atmosphere of relaxation. There was an unusual engagement by the Chinese in conversation on general interest subjects such as American balance of payment problems, the source of our oil supply, and details of their interpreter's vacation in China (including his labor experience on farm and in factory), all in a tone of genuine interest rather than criticism.

/2/At these follow-up meetings, both sides exchanged the texts of their opening statements. A memorandum of the conversation at the January 9 meeting was transmitted in airgram A-421, January 11. (Ibid.)

Lord knows, one swallow does not make a summer, and tone and atmosphere are no substitute for action. Yet I cannot help but think that the items catalogued in the last paragraph add up to a significant departure from the past performance. Why I do not know, although one can hypothesize that this has something to do with the improved position of Ch'en Yi and the Chinese Foreign Ministry professionals and a corresponding downgrading of the influence on foreign policy of hard-nosed Cultural Revolution types.

I believe, therefore, that this would be the appropriate time for the President or you to again make a major speech designed to appeal to and encourage the moderate element in Communist China. If the Chinese posture at this meeting was designed to signal a positive change in China's policy toward us, and I do not believe we can lightly discard this hypothesis, it is important for us to quickly respond. Such a response would implicitly let them know that we recognize and appreciate this change, and could emphasize the clear benefits that would accrue to them were relations between China and the United States improved. Aside from a general reiteration of the theme of your statement to the Zablocki Committee in 1966 and the President's State of the Union message last year, I would hope that the speech I am suggesting could offer some additional areas in which we could move without serious political risk or weakening significant U.S. interests./3/

/3/The source text is filed with a January 18 covering memorandum from Jenkins to Rostow stating that Jenkins agreed with Gronouski's basic thesis but did not think the timing was right for a top-level speech. He suggested that a speech by William Bundy scheduled for February 16 might be "a good vehicle to satisfy Gronouski's desire to probe a little." He concluded: "It seems to me that affairs on the mainland are still much too messy for us to use our bluest chips in the game. Let's save 'em a while longer."

Best regards.

Sincerely yours,
John

 

297. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, February 2, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Meeting Notes File, February 2, 1968, Meeting with China Experts. No classification marking. Prepared by Jenkins on February 2. Copies were sent to the President, Rostow, Roche, and Jorden.

SUBJECT
China Experts Meeting with the President, February 2, 1968 (Sponsored by the National Committee on United States-China Relations)

PARTICIPANTS
The President, Professors Edwin O. Reischauer, Harvard, Robert A. Scalapino, Univ. of California, Alexander Eckstein, Univ. of Michigan, Lucian W. Pye, MIT, A. Doak Barnett, Columbia, and George Taylor, Univ. of Washington; Messrs. Carl F. Stover, National Institute of Public Affairs, Cecil Thomas, Executive Director of the National Committee, Walt Rostow and Alfred Jenkins

Mr. Rostow said that the visiting China specialists had examined three subjects for discussion with the President: (1) the situation in China; (2) alternative future directions of the evolving situation; and (3) policy considerations for the United States. They expected to concentrate on the last of these.

The President welcomed the participants, saying that he valued the opportunity to hear their recommendations on policy alternatives concerning China. He said that we had been following two channels in our China policy: bridge-building on the one hand and necessary deterrents on the other. The President invited comment from the participants in turn around the table.

Ambassador Reischauer said that he was especially heartened by the President's reference to China in his July 12, 1966 speech. He felt that this time of disorder in China might be a good time to show our flexibility. In doing so, we would look beyond present crises. We should lay out our reconciliation approach now.

The President observed that we do not, in fact, hold to a rigid course of action. We are keeping our options open.

Professor Eckstein said he thought it encouraging that we had offered an exchange of agricultural expertise, of seeds, etc., and that in recent times we had broadened considerably our efforts at contact. He thought we should go further and relax our embargo against Chinese goods. This would not be of much economic importance, but would have political value in indicating more flexibility. He thought it would entail no serious risks concerning China's war-making potential.

Mr. Thomas said that he was not a China specialist, but he would like to direct to the President's attention what he thought to be public concern about China. Recently, under National Committee on U.S.-China Relations sponsorship, a Norwegian journalist, Mr. Munthe-Kaas, had spoken in 22 cities throughout the country. Without exception, audiences were anxious to hear and talk about China. the predominant opinion seemed to be in favor of a more flexible approach to that country, including trade.

The President observed that we have to keep hammering away at this. He said that he would like to get a "Presidential commission" to keep at it. East-West trade was only one thing the public was interested in, however. It was also interested in Vietnam. That is the great cost of Vietnam--because of it we do not get the chance to do some of the other things which would be desirable.

Professor Pye said that we must look beyond Vietnam to China, the really big problem. The reporters may be provocative, but we must not let that affect our perspective. We should approach China at the big-problem level. We should discuss with China such issues as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament, etc. There should be a dialogue on that sort of thing at Warsaw. We should try to get China to see the nature of the world to come. It is true that we cannot negotiate with China today, but we should engage in this kind of discussion just as we did with the Soviets.

Professor Barnett said that the group held differing views as to the need for considering initiatives just at this time. China is going through a period of great change and is very disrupted. Even now, however, he himself felt we should look beyond Vietnam. He, too, liked the flavor of the President's July 1966 speech. We should even now be working out the steps implied in that speech. He agreed with Professor Eckstein that we should keep going beyond consideration of Vietnam. We should remove trade restrictions except for the basic COCOM list. We should get China into the international community. We should work actively toward achieving dual Chinese representation in the United Nations. Professor Barnett said he was impressed by the value of an advisor like Bohlen on the Soviet Union. He felt that we needed a man of similar seniority to advise on China.

The President asked the group to submit nominations. He said he needed at his elbow an advisor on the Soviet Union, and he had had both Thompson and Bohlen in that role. He needed the same for China. There has been a failure to communicate with the Chinese. The President said he had asked Gronouski to go to Warsaw to carry on the talks because he thought he had the qualifications which would make it possible to communicate. Unfortunately, however, the Chinese have continued to insist that they are interested in discussing nothing except Taiwan. The President said he had tried hard to bring about communication but he had failed. He said that he was, of course, ultimately responsible for such a failure, just as President Kennedy took the responsibility for failure in the Bay of Pigs. We have made a truly major effort to communicate and to keep our policy flexible. We are not hidebound. Since there has been no response to our efforts, we must be doing something wrong.

Professor Barnett maintained that we had not failed, because as long as Mao was there we simply could not expect any response. He thought it important, however, to keep making attempts.

The President thought perhaps we were not searching enough. Competent men were needed to put on assignments of this kind. Also needed just now were a dozen men for ambassadorships and for some other posts throughout the government. Actually, we need Reischauer in a dozen places.

Professor Eckstein said we need people, for instance, at the deputy assistant secretary level, who know a great deal about China. As for China, there is more hope of change than there has been for a long time. There is transition to something quite dissimilar--perhaps in time to be compared to the changes in the Soviet Union. The dialogue which is possible now may be minimal, but our policy of reconciliation should go right along (sic). It is very important that we focus a great deal of attention on China because that situation could get quite messy, and later China may contain a third of the population of the world. We should get China into the United Nations. Public discussion is one way to get around present pressures. The Charter should be revised. Professor Eckstein further expressed the belief that every country calling itself a state should accept the responsibility of a state and should automatically be in the United Nations. That would mean North Korea, North and South Vietnam and all other entities acting as countries. If such a position were taken, it might even lead to the acceptance by both Peking and Taiwan of the presence of the other in the UN. He said that he detected a changing mood in the country; in the business community, in labor circles, in civic groups and in churches. He said the Committee represented by this group constituted an answer to the rigidities represented in the Committee of One Million. The time has come to engage in more open discussions.

The President said we were going through a dangerous period in this respect. It is hard to wage a major war against one communist group without having the public oppose all communists. It is amazing, however, that we can go through the Vietnam experience and not have more clamor against the Soviet Union. The President said he thought Professor Eckstein was right in his evaluation of the openmindedness found among various groups in the country. This is surprising when we look at the contributions of the McCarthy period. We would expect emotions now to be even higher in view of the Pueblo capture, and talk of cutting off the head of President Park and of killing the American Ambassador. Perhaps people are too busy wanting to stop the bombing to think of these things. We must carry on an endurance contest in Vietnam in such a way as not to lead to inflexibility on other issues.

Professor Scalapino cautioned that in the case of China we are dealing with exceedingly complex issues. If we are to count on moderation in the American people's viewpoint, we will have to keep reiterating that these questions are indeed complex and not subject to simple formulae for resolution. The American people today can grasp a high level of complexities if they are led to do so. They can, for instance, understand the import of so-called "people's wars" if they are explained. The real problem is that so long as the Maoists are in control they will try to cause trouble such as in Burma, other parts of Asia (the President interjected "and the Dominican Republic").

The President said he fully agreed that the American people were ready to understand complexities and that complex issues did not have to be put in simple terms which might be misleading.

In concluding, the President said that, firstly, he very much appreciated the fact that the group had come to talk with him. Secondly, he had profited from the discussion and, thirdly, he wanted to ask of the group two things:

--that two or three members of the group write for him a directive as though addressed to the Secretary of State, asking him to take steps "A through F"--things which ought to be done concerning China;

--recommend someone who could serve as a counterpart to Bohlen.

The President also said that he would welcome hearing from any member of the group at any time on suggestions concerning the Warsaw talks, or any other suggestions concerning China. The President then briefly reviewed recent events leading up to an atmosphere of crisis, which built up all through January. In closing, the President invited the professors to "play President" in preparing for him the memo, and also to write him their full thoughts in letters within the next six weeks or so.

Alfred Jenkins

 

298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/

Washington, February 13, 1968, 0250Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CHICOM-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Shoesmith, cleared by Kreisberg, and approved by Bundy.

114300. From Bundy for Ambassador.

1. I am scheduled to address Cincinnati Council on World Affairs February 16 on subject US policy toward Communist China. I regret final draft not completed in time provide you with full text but believe you should be aware of general thrust and particularly those portions dealing specifically with our policy toward GRC.

2. Principal objectives this speech are to clarify certain misconceptions and misunderstandings regarding US policy toward Chinese Communist regime on mainland and GRC, to relate both these aspects of our China policy and attempt to remove some of ambiguities which have arisen in this area, and to reiterate our willingness to continue to seek reconciliation with mainland China. Speech does not announce any new departures in specific courses of action which would alter actual substance of our relations with GRC or Communist China. It details at some length record of Chinese Communist self-isolation, persistent hostility toward US, and threat posed by its aggressive posture toward outside world. It also reiterates fact that US commitment to GRC not open to negotiation and that US cannot accept Chinese Communist demand for participation in any international body to exclusion of GRC.

3. However, although noting that Peking's refusal to expand and improve contacts between US and Communist China makes unrealistic any suggestion that US recognize Peking, speech acknowledges possibility for movement in that direction at some point if Peking's attitudes change. In addition, speech makes clear that US has been treating, and is prepared to continue to treat, separately with government of mainland China and GRC. In so doing speech employs somewhat more restrictive definition of substance of our relations with GRC than has been used in past. Portions of draft which bear on these points and others which we anticipate will be especially sensitive with GRC are as follows:

4. US recognition of Chinese Communist control of mainland: ". . . it must be perfectly clear to anyone who has looked at this history of last 18 years that USG does not doubt existence of Communist China. We fought against its soldiers in Korea. We have negotiated with its representatives in international conferences in Geneva twice. We have maintained regular bilateral contact with it on an Ambassadorial level for 14 years, first in Geneva and now in Warsaw. Territory controlled and administered by Peking is well known to Government of US and when matters arise which pertain to this area and involve interests of US or American citizens, obviously our approach is to Chinese Communist authorities. This is reality and it fully acknowledged by this Government."

5. Relations between US and GRC: "What is this relationship? It is one of friendship going back many years, of mutual respect, and of common security interests in present circumstances in Asia. The United States recognizes the Government of Republic of China and deals with that Government on matters which, for most part, relate to areas over which it exercises actual control. Demands of Chicoms, accompanied by threats of force and use of force, for control of Taiwan are, of course, totally unacceptable. There can be no bargaining with lives of more than 13 million people who have made clear their rejection of Chinese Communist control. Under our treaty of 1954 with the Republic of China, we have a commitment to help it defend itself against an armed attack.

6. Whatever final resolution there may ultimately be to question of Taiwan, it should, in all events, meet with approval of GRC and its people, whose interests are most directly affected. Given present posture of Peking, including its totally unfounded allegation that island is under US occupation, there is at present no means of resolving this issue. Therefore, our best hope is to see whether progress can be made on other issues and problems creating strain between the United States and Communist China."

7. Trade embargo: "I noted earlier situation in Korean war under which our present restrictions on trade and remittance of funds to Communist China were put into effect. Certainly while Korean war continued there could have been no question of trade with a country with whose soldiers we were engaged in fierce conflict. In years since then, admittedly situation has changed very considerably. Peking itself has grown increasingly able to produce many industrial materials which it needs. And gradually more and more states, including many such as Japan, Australia, and West Germany which do not recognize the Peking regime, have in fact entered into active trade with mainland China in non-strategic goods and commodities. Peking has consistently, however, for many years given no hint whatsoever of any interest in trading with the United States. Rather it has rejected even the vaguest hints that such trade might be possible. . . . In recent months USG has been reviewing this trade policy to determine if it would be feasible and in our interest to remove barriers on our side to mutually beneficial trade in non-strategic goods with mainland. We are doing this in belief that such peaceful trade should be possible without harming our strategic interests in area."

8. US-Chinese confrontation: "We are convinced that no war is inevitable. Seen in terms of national interests of our two countries, there no fundamental reason why United States and Communist China should come into conflict and every reason for us both to exert every effort to avert such a disaster. . . . US hopes for better relations with mainland China. It recognizes as I have said earlier that major differences exist in our political, social, and economic systems as well as on many concrete issues. Their resolution will be difficult and probably slow. Interests not only of US but of many other states deeply concerned over security, economic development, and political and social progress in Asia are involved. US recognizes that major interests of Chinese both on mainland of China and on Taiwan are also involved. There is need for all concerned to work toward lessening of tensions without abandoning or surrendering values and interests. United States intends to continue to strive toward this goal. We hope that Peking will alter its absolute opposition and resistance to these efforts on our part. We hope also that it will change its dedication to violent revolutionary overthrow of governments and social structures which do not match its image of society. We recognize that our abilities to influence rate at which this occurs are limited and that such changes will fundamentally be result of changed perceptions derived from within Chinese society and leadership itself. But we convinced that these changes will occur. When they do, United States will be prepared to respond positively to them."

9. We recognize likelihood that statement of US policy along above lines may provoke strong negative reaction by GRC and could make our working relations more difficult. In our judgment, however, such reaction will not damage basic structure of our relationship with GRC. We also feel that such statement, in addition to providing clearer basis for and greater flexibility in our China policy, might possibly open way for more frank and realistic dialogue with GRC concerning possibilities for long-range accommodation to its position on Taiwan in manner which will meet both our national interests. Please comment urgently.

10. Full text will be forwarded ASAP.

Rusk

 

299. Editorial Note

At 2146 EST on February 13, 1968, a U.S. Navy A-1H was shot down by a Chinese MIG about 5 miles off the coast of Hainan. The plane was one of two unarmed aircraft that had strayed into Chinese air space while en route from the Philippines to Danang. The pilot of the other plane reported that he had seen a parachute and heard a beeper after the plane was shot down. (Memoranda for the record by Brigadier General James A. Shannon, USAF, and Rear Admiral S.D. Cramer, Jr., USN, of the National Military Command Center, both February 14; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XII)

Secretary of Defense McNamara called President Johnson the next morning to inform him that the plane had been shot down. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, recording of a telephone conversation between Johnson and McNamara, February 14, 1968, 7:53 a.m., tape F68.02, side A, PNO 5) The President's Special Assistant Walt W. Rostow reported in a February 14, noon, memorandum to the President, that the Seventh Fleet wanted to launch a rescue helicopter from the USS Kearsarge at 0400 Vietnam time, with fighter aircraft from the carrier Coral Sea providing protection. Rostow's memorandum states that Secretary of State Rusk opposed the operation, arguing that the risk to the helicopter crew was too great and that the man was in Chinese territorial waters, and that Secretary of Defense McNamara also opposed it. JCS Chairman General Wheeler and Secretary of Defense-designate Clark M. Clifford advocated making a rescue attempt. (Ibid., Intelligence File, Plane Downed in Hainan Territorial Waters, Feb. 1968) A second Rostow memorandum of 12:40 p.m. states that the fighter aircraft were to remain 25 miles off shore unless the helicopter was attacked and that the entire rescue party was under strict instruction to initiate no hostile action. (Ibid.)

President Johnson met with his advisers at 1:14 p.m. to discuss whether or not to undertake the rescue attempt. At this time, Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, and Clifford all recommended against it. Rusk, McNamara, and Clifford expressed concern about the risk of conflict with the Chinese as well as the risk to the helicopter crew. Wheeler proposed launching an electronic aircraft outside the 12-mile limit to determine if beeps from the pilot's beeper were drifting out to sea, and the President approved this action. (Notes of Meeting; ibid., Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, February 14, 1968--1:14 p.m., Foreign Policy Advisors on Violation of Chinese Airspace) A brief memorandum of February 15 from Rostow to the President stated that no beeper had been heard. (Ibid., Intelligence File, Plane Downed in Hainan Territorial Waters, Feb. 1968)

A February 14 memorandum from Rostow to McNamara states that the President wanted a full but very prompt investigation of the reasons for violation of Chinese Communist air space during the previous year, including a complete report concerning the latest incident; it had been reported to him that there had been nine such violations. He wanted the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a matter of high and urgent priority, to undertake steps to eliminate, if possible, the likelihood of further such violations. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, China Reds 360) A February 19 memorandum from McNamara to the President states that there had been eight confirmed violations since January 1, 1967, but that there might have been other unconfirmed violations. He forwarded a February 17 memorandum from General Wheeler summarizing the reasons for the violations and steps that had been and were being taken to avoid such incidents, including efforts to keep aircraft away from Chinese territory and improvements in radar and communications. (Filed with a February 20 covering note from Rostow; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XII)

A February 15 letter from Ambassador Gronouski to Chinese Charge Ch'en stated that the aircraft had inadvertently strayed into the "territorial airspace claimed by your country," requested information pertaining to the pilot's welfare, and urged his release at the earliest possible time. (Telegram 115499 to Warsaw and telegram 2106 from Warsaw, February 15; Department of State, Central Files, POL 31-1 CHICOM-US) A March 5 letter from Ch'en to Gronouski called the violation of Chinese air space in this incident a "ferocious war provocation" by the United States and stated that he had been instructed to issue a "serious warning and firm protest." It gave no information concerning the pilot, nor did several subsequent efforts elicit any information. (Telegram 2284 from Warsaw, March 5; memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winthrop G. Brown to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, February 13, 1969; ibid.)

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