The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001.  Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date.  This site is not updated so external links may no longer function.  Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXX China DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

270. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/

Warsaw, June 14, 1967, 1815Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, London, Moscow, Taipei, USUN, and to Luxembourg for the Secretary. Passed to the White House and USIA.

2985. Wang-Gronouski Talks./2/ Ref: State 204093./3/

/2/The 133d meeting, scheduled for June 7, was postponed to June 14 at Chinese request, made by a telephone call to the U.S. Embassy on June 6. (Telegram 2950 from Warsaw, June 6; ibid.) A detailed report of the meeting was sent in airgram A-800 from Warsaw, dated June 15. (Ibid.)

/3/Document 268.

1. Meeting lasted three hours but produced absolutely nothing new from ChiComs. Wang insisted next meeting take place no earlier than November and Nov. 8 agreed upon. I issued press statement regretting extension of meetings to 4-5 month intervals after meeting concluded.

2. I opened with statement in reftel. Wang, labeling his opening remarks as pre-statement comments, attacked U.S., U.K. and Sovs for colluding with Israel against Arabs and stated CPR firmly support Arab people. He returned to this theme later in meeting alleging U.S. and Sovs working in league to control destiny of Arabs and that U.S. support for Israel another grave war provocation.

3. Wang devoted substantial portion of opening statement, as well as later rebuttal remarks, to Taiwan. Occasion apparently 17th anniversary (June 27) of U.S. 7th Fleet separation of Taiwan mainland. He repeated usual charges of U.S. occupation, oppression of people on Taiwan, collusion with Chiang Kai-shek. Emphasized ChiComs would eventually liberate Taiwan and that U.S. sooner or later would be forced withdraw. Later in meeting he repeated there no possibility of improving U.S.-ChiCom relations or resolving any concrete problems unless U.S. withdraws from Taiwan and Taiwan Straits. He said all U.S. initiatives would be rebuffed until this problem dealt with. He raised visits by U.S. officials to Taiwan and C.K. Yen visit to Washington, charging this prep-aratory to new U.S.-GRC moves against mainland. I rebutted Wang's arguments and asked whether ChiComs wished reconsider "renunciation of force" agreement discussed in early years of talks. Wang did not respond.

4. Wang reiterated in completely standard language ChiCom positions on incidents involving ChiCom territorial air and water, alleged U.S. attack, and on Vietnam. No new warnings of ChiCom intervention or involvement in Vietnam. During latter part of meeting in context of referral to possible U.S. extension of war to include territory of DRV, Wang simply said ChiComs had made preparations in event U.S. "imposes war on Chinese people."

5. He emphasized in rebuttal that at Warsaw talks "which have dragged on for 11 years," U.S. had refused settle basic differences between U.S. and ChiComs, i.e., Taiwan. He reiterated rejection of joint investigations of incidents as unnecessary and intended by U.S. to cover up "crimes" and "deceive people."

6. Wang attacked U.S. use of Thailand as base aimed at CPR as well as NVN and rejected my retort that ChiComs themselves were threatening Thailand through subversive organizations based on ChiCom territory.

7. I repeatedly pressed ChiComs on whether they would support DRV in seeking negotiated settlement if latter decided to do so, noting that ChiComs seemed more anxious than DRV to see war continue. Wang's only reply was that ChiComs believed DRV agreed with them and that U.S. should not try to sow discord between Chinese and DRV.

8. No mention of Hong Kong or suggestion that talks be ended other than Wang's insistence that no point in more frequent meetings than every 4-5 months.

9. General atmosphere about as at previous meetings. Wang, as at last meeting, appeared to labor intentionally to drag meeting out to [apparent omission] hours. He seemed to lose his temper only at one point, in referring to U.S. expansion of war. He referred to me as "liar" and "gangster" at one point and I responded by rejecting such epithets as unworthy our roles in Warsaw talks. He did not repeat them. ChiCom opening statement such propaganda potboiler I was sure Wang intended it for public release and must admit to surprise he made no mention of intention to do so. As was anticipated, meeting essentially served merely to keep line of communication open and this about all that could have been hoped for at this point.

Gronouski

 

271. Editorial Note

On June 26, 1967, President Johnson met with Romanian Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer, who was visiting Washington and was about to visit Peking. According to a memorandum of the conversation prepared in the Department of State, Johnson told Maurer the United States did not want war with China, did not seek to change China's system of government, had no designs on Chinese territory, and wanted only to trade with China and get along to the extent that China would permit. He stated that he would like to talk to the Chinese about a non-proliferation treaty and to "work out ground rules so that we can avoid nuclear war." He stated also that it would be "the height of folly" for the United States to want to go to war with China; nothing could be further from his mind. Noting that Maurer was about to visit other countries, Johnson stated that he was at liberty to describe their conversation and to quote anything Johnson had said, if it would be useful. For text of the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XVII, pages 430-435.

The Embassy in Bucharest reported on July 15 that Maurer had told visiting Austrian Chancellor Josef Klaus that he had found the Chinese preoccupied with the idea the United States was preparing to attack the China mainland and had told them what Johnson had said to him, but that they were not convinced. (Telegrams 61 and 62 from Bucharest, both July 15; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ROM)

 

272. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 13-5-67

Washington, June 29, 1967.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 90 D 110. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor and prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on June 29, except the Assist-ant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR COMMUNIST CHINA

Conclusions

A. Economic activity in China, especially in the industrial sector, is being slowed by the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, military production and development continue to enjoy a high priority, and have been considerably aided by imports from the Free World.

B. Foreign trade has grown, and the non-Communist world now accounts for three-fourths of China's trade. China's balance of payments position has improved over the past two years. Support of North Vietnam has been substantially increased during the past year, but imposes no undue strain on the Chinese economy.

C. The economic outlook depends heavily upon the development of the political situation. During the next year or two, assuming a continuation of the present level of political turmoil, the economy seems likely to deteriorate somewhat, though probably not to the point of causing a sharp decline in industrial production, widespread unemployment, or acute food shortages. The weapons programs could be continued, though some stretch out in particular items might be necessary.

D. We think it unlikely that Mao will achieve sufficient political success in the Cultural Revolution to permit him to embark upon a new economic initiative similar to the Leap Forward. When Mao disappears from the scene, there will probably be a period of confused contesting for power during which economic recovery will be neither rapid nor sure.

E. The unfavorable food-population ratio, the economic costs and imbalances inherent in the military program, and the shortcomings of the educational system are problems likely to persist for at least a decade. A pragmatic regime could probably surmount them, but any successor to the present regime will also inherit some of the ambitious political goals of its predecessor. These will strongly affect the allocation of resources, probably at the expense of laying foundations for self-sustaining economic growth.

[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]

 

273. Memorandum From the Republic of China Country Director (Bennett) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Berger)/1/

Washington, July 11, 1967.

/1/Source: Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 74 D 25, POL 27 Offshore Islands, 1968-1969. Secret.

SUBJECT
U.S. Presence on the Offshore Islands

Recalling your interest in having the facts about the U.S. presence on the offshore islands, I took the opportunity while in Taipei to ask Art Hummel to have the Embassy put together an inventory for our reference. The attached letter from Art and its inclosure/2/ is the result.

/2/The letter from Hummel to Bennett, July 3, is not printed.

To me the striking thing in this report is the extent to which the GRC has committed its effective forces to the offshore islands, including six of the GRC's fourteen forward-look divisions plus supporting armor and artillery. According to the report this constitutes nearly half of the best ground forces available to the GRC.

While in Taipei and at CINCPAC, I asked the military their assessment of the defensibility of the offshores. The general consensus was that except for one small island held by irregular forces (Wu-ch'iu Hsu), the other large islands would be very difficult and costly for the Communists to take. However, those with whom I spoke acknowledged that the Communists, were they willing to pay the cost, would probably be able to establish air superiority over the islands, thus putting themselves in a position to interdict resupply operations. The garrisons under these circumstances would be unable to hold out indefinitely, the effect on their morale would be severe, and pressures for U.S. military involvement would be very high. On the other hand, there was general agreement that any frontal assault on the islands would be almost prohibitively costly and that in any air battle over the Strait the kill ratio would probably be heavily in favor of the CAF. There was also general agreement that there is no sign of increased ChiCom activity in the offshore island area.

Attachment

U.S. ACTIVITIES ON THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS/3/

/3/The report, not dated, was drafted by John A. Froebe, Jr., on June 30.

The most visible relationship of the U.S. with the Offshore islands is the MAP support given almost all GRC troops stationed there. A small but significant economic aid program has also been carried on in the Offshores, and USIS loans books and tapes to a GRC military reading room on Kinmen. In addition, the U.S. and the GRC participate in joint (secret) contingency planning for possible U.S. participation in the defense of the islands. The GRC has actively sought to enliven the interest of individual Americans in and out of government in the islands, especially Kinmen, by encouraging their visits there. Top GRC officials may hope that these visits together with the present (small-scale) U.S. involvement on the Offshore islands will influence the U.S. to assist in their defense in the event of another Communist attack.

1955 Conditional Commitment

The Congressional Resolution of January 1955 authorized the President to use U.S. forces for the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus and for "the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores." The Executive view of defense of related positions and territories was outlined in President Eisenhower's message to Congress asking the authority conveyed in the Resolution. Eisenhower said he would act "only in situations which are recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries to, an attack against the main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores."

The U.S. intent has since been publicly reaffirmed in high level statements at least seven times during both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations, most notably during the 1958 Kinmen crisis and most recently by President Kennedy in June 1962. In each instance we have made clear that a U.S. defense of the Offshores would depend on our evaluation of the Chicom attack at hand. Of significance, nonetheless, was the public development of the doctrine in the 1958 crisis. Secretary Dulles, with the intensive bombardment of Kinmen two weeks underway, warned Communist China in a statement September 4 that the defense of the two island groups had "increasingly become related to the defense of Taiwan." President Eisenhower in a radio-TV address a week later was more explicit: "If the present bombardment and harassment of Quemoy should be converted into a major assault, with which the local defenders could not cope, then we would be compelled to face precisely the situation that Congress visualized in 1955."

U.S. Military Assistance and US-GRC Planning for Joint Defense of the Offshores

The most important U.S. relationship with the Offshores is the MAP support extended to most of the GRC forces stationed in the Offshores and U.S. participation in secret, joint contingency planning for US-GRC defense of the islands. MAP support was originally not given to GRC forces in Kinmen and Matsu, but was gradually extended as a result of MAP supported units on Taiwan being rotated to the islands. Military assistance for these forces can also be viewed as preparation for the contingency in which the U.S. might undertake to defend the islands.

All 64,500 troops in the Kinmen complex (including five Forward Look infantry divisions and supporting units and one Air Force anti-aircraft regiment) are MAP supported. Of the 24,800 GRC troops in the Matsu complex, 21,800 (including one Forward Look and one light infantry division and their supporting units along with one Air Force anti-aircraft regiment) are MAP supported. The remaining 3,000 non-MAP supported troops in Matsu are the para-military Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps. Thus, about one-sixth of the 544,000 MAP supported GRC forces are deployed on the Offshores. Altogether six of the 14 Forward Look divisions plus supporting armor and artillery, the GRC's most modernized and combat ready ground forces, are in the Offshores. The GRC's allocation of nearly half of its best ground forces to these islands is perhaps the clearest manifestation of the importance it attaches to the Offshores. The figures in this paragraph are those compiled by MAAG, which frequently differ somewhat from those compiled by the Ministry of National Defense, the source of the Embassy's quarterly troop strength reports.

Advising the GRC commands in the Offshores is a MAAG team of five officers and one enlisted man on Kinmen and a MAAG team of three officers and one enlisted man on Matsu, although additional MAAG advisers are frequently brought in temporarily to assist in more specialized problems. (One MAAG adviser on Kinmen [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].) The U.S. presence at both locations is made somewhat more prominent by the MAAG teams' flying the American flag.

Contingency U.S. participation in the defense of the two island groups is provided for in Plan Rochester, the comprehensive plan for the joint US-GRC defense of Taiwan and the Penghus pursuant to the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. Taiwan Defense Command first drafted the plan with the Ministry of National Defense in 1955 and together with the Ministry has kept it updated. The current plan's premise for contingency employment of U.S. forces in the defense of the Offshores envisages possible provision of U.S. naval and air forces to supplement those of the GRC with the objective of gaining air and naval superiority in the Strait. No deployment of U.S. ground forces to the islands is contemplated by the contingency plan, the land defense being left to GRC ground forces then in place.

Officers of the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command who are engaged in joint planning find their Chinese counterparts well aware of the conditional nature of the 1955 Congressional Resolution. Many Chinese officers seem convinced, however, that the Presidential determination has already been made for a number of hypothecated contingencies, and they frequently try to sound out U.S. officers concerning these assumed decisions. Some Chinese military officers also argue that a future contingency would not be materially different from the 1958 crisis, and that the U.S. response would therefore be the same.

U.S. Economic Assistance in the Offshore Islands

U.S. economic assistance in the Offshores constitutes a small but still significant part of the current U.S. involvement in the islands. Total direct assistance has amounted over the years to about US$2.3 million, which while comprising only a fractional 0.15% of the total US$1.5 billion of U.S. economic aid given the GRC, is on a per capita basis higher than that for Taiwan proper. Direct U.S. aid for FY67 amounted to about US$133,000, the bulk of which went to Kinmen. Almost half the islands' population is estimated to have been reached by these programs. Assistance now is divided between two projects: first, PL480 agricultural surplus commodities channeled through voluntary agencies, which came to about US$70,000 in the current fiscal year but which is scheduled to be terminated after FY68; and second, the school lunch program totalling about US$63,000 for the current school year. (Financed from SAFED GRC owned SAFED funds, and administered by the GRC, the JCRR program in FY67 funnelled better than US$400,000 into irrigation, reforestation, crop improvement, livestock, fishing and sanitation.)

Miscellaneous Activities in the Offshores

Two other minor items round out U.S. activities on Kinmen and Matsu. USIS about a year ago began loaning to a small Chinese military reading room on Kinmen a limited quantity of books (about 300), rec-ords, and films along with a tape recorder and projector. Secondly, TOEFEL tests (the English language test required of Chinese students headed for study in the States) have since last year been administered several times a year by a consular officer who visits the islands for this purpose. Only a small number of students have taken the tests there.

Visits to the Offshores

For a number of years the GRC has actively encouraged a wide range of Americans, official and unofficial, to visit Kinmen (similar visits to Matsu, to which access is more difficult, are infrequent). The GRC's probable purpose is to try to enliven U.S. interest in the Offshores and create an identification with them which would strengthen the sense of U.S. commitment to their defense. The Kinmen visits are intended to impress Americans in the short space of a day with the formidable defense works and the economic development program the GRC has brought into being on Communist China's doorstep. News coverage which frequently follows the visits tends to add to the impression of U.S. identification with the Offshores.

 

274. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, July 27, 1967, 12:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on July 25. The source text is labeled Part II of V.

SUBJECT
Communist China

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary Deputy Under Secretary Kohler
Amb. Anatoliy Dobrynin, USSR

During luncheon today Ambassador Dobrynin asked the Secretary's opinion about the evolution of events in China. The Secretary replied that we had the impression that Mao Tse-tung had not been able to establish the unity he was apparently seeking. The Ambassador replied that he quite agreed. The Secretary then said that he realized this might still present problems on the Soviet side, but that he felt that it would be useful if the two of us could before long exchange views and have discussions about China. He would think that the Soviets would not be too comfortable about this neighbor of theirs with its teeming population and food problems, with the longest common frontier in the world between the two countries, with Chinese development of thermo-nuclear weapons and MRBMs. Dobrynin's attitude seemed to indicate some agreement with these remarks, but he was noncommittal. He commented only that Viet-Nam made impossible meaningful discussions between us on a great many subjects.

There then ensued a certain amount of inconclusive discussion of Viet-Nam along familiar lines during which Dobrynin said that the United States had not been very helpful to the Soviet Union in this connection and that it was the impression in Moscow that Secretary McNamara's trip to Viet-Nam and new proposals for increasing our force strength there followed directly on the termination of the Glassboro talks between the President and Chairman Kosygin.

 

275. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, July 26, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. X. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Jorden. Rostow sent the memorandum to the President with a covering note of the same date; a handwritten "L" on the note indicates that it was seen by the President.

SUBJECT
Defiance of Peking

Our Consul General in Hong Kong reports his doubt "that the writ of any particular group in Peking necessarily extends beyond the handful of cities where so-called power seizures occurred last winter."/2/ The reported detention of Vice Premier and Minister of Interior Hsieh Fu-chih in Wuhan from where he has just made his dramatic return after the personal intercession of Premier Chou En-lai, is the most open defiance yet against central authority.

/2/Telegram 554 from Hong Kong, July 26. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM)

Both the People's Daily and Peking Radio earlier today warned local authorities in Wuhan to surrender or face destruction by the Chinese Army. The interesting thing is that none of our sophisticated intelligence gathering means have given any indication that the Army is planning to do anything of the sort. Wuhan's defiance has gone on long enough now for there to be evidence of planned military action against the city, if the threat to Peking's authority is to be met with force. It is very possible that the Mao-Lin faction is unsure whether the Army would act.

This is the first clear test case of serious defiance on the part of top local authorities, prompting a threat of military action by Peking. There are at least seven other Yangtze Valley provinces which will surely watch the outcome of this test. If Peking is unable to bring this situation under control, other local authorities will decide that it is safe to be defiant, and that could mean the beginning of the end for the Mao-Lin combine.

Meanwhile, there is a rising tide of reports from all over the country indicating that the disorder is getting worse. One is tempted, in fact, to believe that Peking's indignant listing of Liu Shao-chi's erroneous policies has helped increasing numbers of the populace to realize that they prefer Liu's policies to Mao's, and are prepared actively to support anti-Mao forces.

The battle is by no means over but the downward trend in Mao-Lin fortunes, which I believe has been steady if slow since last summer, has in the past week accelerated markedly.

Al Jenkins

 

276. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/

Taipei, July 31, 1967, 0915Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CHICOM-CHINAT. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. Repeated to Hong Kong and to CINCPAC for POLAD.

229. Subj: Country Team assessment of GRC intentions. Ref: State 135828; Taipei 3662./2/

/2/See footnote 2, Document 242, and Document 266.

1. This message discusses the problem of the GRC's maritime incursions, and indicates briefly what they are and what they are not.

2. The incursions are small-scale. We know of no GRC plans to mount any large-scale military or paramilitary operations now or in the near future, such operations are unlikely and beyond GRC capabilities. The last incursion of any size was the disastrous one of August 1965 in which the GRC lost two ships near Tungshan Island. Since that time there have been seven known incursions--in rubber rafts, M-5 class fiberglass speedboats, and an outboard-powered catamaran. These have generally comprised 6-10 people, the largest being a team of about 15 men in two speedboats used in the Shuntung raid on 29 May 1967.

3. GRC intentions are small-scale. These relate to military intelligence, small-scale sabotage, occasional interdiction of fishing boats, infiltration of agents into mainland China, at least, psychological impact.

4. Various GRC entities conduct incursions, including units from the Chinese Navy, Chinese Army, the Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense and irregular forces from the anti-Communist National Salvation Army, (an aging group of some 5,000 irregulars primarily stationed on Tung Yin Island). The particular units used do not use MAP equipment in raids and are not MAAG-supported. There is however, some occasional U.S. support to certain GRC intelligence collecting efforts.

5. There is no effective central GRC direction and coordination of these incursions. These incursions are often run without the coordination or foreknowledge of other GRC offices. There have even been cases where Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo has been unaware of the actual operation before the fact. We know that his present position remains somewhat ambivalent between the traditional GRC interest in "back to the mainland, "and the recent general GRC emphasis on political actions. Recently, the GRC has been attempting to make NSB and J/E MND responsible for coordinating small-scale maritime operations but it remains to be seen whether this coordination will be effective. In any case, in the main the incursions remain poorly coordinated and poorly executed.

6. We know that there is a slightly heightened high-level GRC military interest of late in continuing various incursion attempts, and we must assume that they will so continue. We estimate that they will continue to use the available types of boats in incursion attempts. In addition, the GRC will have two midget submarines, each capable of landing up to six people, in operation at some future time and will probably commit them occasionally to such activities.

7. Although GRC maritime incursions over the years have for the most part been unsuccessful, GRC leadership views them as psychologically necessary both for morale and propaganda purposes within Taiwan, and to give hope to remaining GRC adherents on the mainland.

8. GRC news treatment of these incursions is for the most part misleading, in that public GRC accounts picture the operations as being large and more successful than they are in fact.

9. Appropriate U.S. authority has had foreknowledge, but not control, of certain of these incursions; the GRC, nevertheless, has capability to launch such incursions without prior U.S. knowledge. Our knowledge after the fact is generally quite good, from special intelligence sources in particular.

10. Such incursions are in part understandable not in empirical result, but because they are one of the few avenues of independent capability actually open to the GRC, a GRC dedicated to the return to the mainland which tries to prove to itself and to its subjects that its goal can be achieved. This situation exists notwithstanding the fact that the top GRC military knows full well that the military balance is constantly shifting, to the disadvantage of GRC, with reference not only to advanced weapons, but to the respective ChiCom and ChiNat conventional military potentials in Taiwan Strait area.

McConaughy

277. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 13-8-67

Washington, August 3, 1967.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 90 D 99. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on August 3. An April 4, 1968, memorandum to holders of NIE 13-8-67 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Miscellaneous CIA Intelligence Memoranda.

COMMUNIST CHINA'S STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAM

The Problem

To assess China's strategic weapons policy and programs and to estimate the nature, size, and progress of these programs through the early 1970's.

Conclusions

A. It is clear that China aspires to great power status and that its present leaders have given high priority to developing a substantial strategic capability as essential to such status. With wise management of their limited resources, the Chinese could continue to make steady progress toward the achievement of these goals over the next decade.

B. The probable extent of actual progress will remain in doubt, however, so long as fanaticism and disorder continue to infect China. Some adverse effects on the advanced weapons program are probable in any event; serious disruptions could result from pressures to do too much too soon or from a general breakdown in central authority.

C. China probably now has a few fission weapons in stockpile deliverable by bomber, and has demonstrated the capability to produce thermonuclear weapons with megaton (mt) yields. It will soon have the plutonium available to aid in reducing such weapons to missile warhead size as well as to facilitate the development of more compact, light weight fission devices. For the next year or two, the limited availability of fissionable material will place significant restraints on warhead production, but this will ease significantly in the following years as the Yumen plutonium production reactor reaches full output.

D. We believe that limited deployment of an MRBM with fission warheads is likely to begin in the next six months or so. After 1968 when increasing numbers of warheads could be made available, deployment will probably proceed at a higher rate. This deployment would be designed to threaten US bases, and major cities from Japan through the Philippines, Southeast Asia, and northern India.

E. We estimate that the Chinese can have an ICBM system ready for deployment in the early 1970's. Conceivably, it could be ready as early as 1970-1971. But this would be a tight schedule, and should the Chinese encounter major problems, the IOC would be later. In any event, we will almost certainly detect extended range firings once they begin, and monitoring of these tests will probably provide about one year's advance warning of IOC.

F. We have no basis at this time for estimating how far or how fast the Chinese will carry deployment of their first-generation ICBM. Assuming political and economic stability, China will probably have the resources to support a moderate and growing ICBM deployment through 1975. Beyond that time frame, there is the possibility of significant improvements to this first system.

G. Other strategic delivery means have received less priority but China may begin production of some TU-16 medium bombers this year in the plant at Sian.

H. China will probably not push ahead vigorously with the now semidormant diesel-powered missile-firing submarine program. The one G-class submarine launched in 1964 does not yet have a missile. It would probably be at least 1970 before additional missile launching submarines could be available. China has shown some interest in nuclear propulsion technology, but even if design on a nuclear submarine is already underway, the first unit probably could not be operational until the late 1970's.

I. For political effect, China will probably attempt to launch an earth-satellite as soon as possible. This might be accomplished this year using an MRBM with an added stage or a heavier payload might be orbited using an early test vehicle from the ICBM program.

[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]

 

278. Memorandum From Donald S. Macdonald of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to the Director of the Bureau (Hughes)/1/

Washington, August 18, 1967.

/1/Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, 1967 FE Weekly Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Stuart.

SUBJECT
Mr.Bundy's Meeting with Mr. Colby, August 17, 1967/2/

/2/Agenda at Tab A. [Footnote in the source text. Tab A is not attached.]

PARTICIPANTS
Messrs. Bundy, Berger, and Habib for EA; Messrs. Colby and Ford for CIA; Mr. Stuart for INR/DDC; and Mr. Hamilton of EA for Laos item

China

Mr. Ford [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reported that the current mood of the GRC leadership is one of pessimism growing out of frustration. The GRC prediction of a divided leadership on the mainland has come true--by chance--and the US is not interested in taking advantage of it. The uncertainty of status within the UN is continual. Communist China's nuclear power is growing and the Gimo feels strongly that the Communists intend using it against Taiwan. Because of the Vietnam war, the US is paying less attention to the defense of the Taiwan Strait. Yet the GRC has no alternative to the US for support.

While the fact of dependence on the US is accepted by the Gimo and other GRC leaders, the resultant pessimistic and somewhat resentful atmosphere is not an easy one in which to work. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is effectively closed out of planning for maritime excursions and agent operations against the mainland. Nevertheless, knowledge of these activities comes to the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] through a number of sources.

The fact that unilateral GRC collection against the mainland is ineffective makes the GRC dependent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. A number of highly sophisticated operations are being carried on with full GRC cooperation. At the same time, however, the GRC shows its independence whenever it can. Recent operations in cooperation with Koreans, renewed interest in the Yunnan border areas, and intelligence liaison with the South Vietnamese are illustrations of this attempt to assert independence.

In reply to Mr. Bundy's question concerning Taiwanese nationalist sentiment, Mr. Ford characterized Taiwanese nationalism as insignificant politically because there is no organized movement--nor is there likely to be, because of close GRC surveillance of prospective leaders. Mr. Ford characterized GRC control methods as an astute combination of force and shrewd political moves.

Mr. Stuart asked Mr. Ford if, in view of difficulties with the GRC over phasing out of a joint collection operation last year, he could forecast how the GRC would react to withdrawal of an additional project in which the GRC played the major role. Mr. Ford said that he would regard the closing down of an additional operation as politically unwise and a threat to some of the more sophisticated--and more useful--joint operations unless the withdrawn project were to be replaced immediately by another in which the GRC would participate actively. The GRC otherwise would seize upon the withdrawal as an indication of a change in US policy toward Taiwan, and probably as a move in the direction of coming to terms with Communist China.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

 

279. Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/

Washington, August 24, 1967, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. X. Secret.

SUBJECT
Will China Go Back to Warlordism?

There has been much speculation that the current chaos in China will result in the collapse of central authority and the rebirth of regional warlords. Attached is a cable from Ed Rice, our Consul General in Hong Kong, on this possibility./2/ Briefly, Rice believes that the current disorders have already put regional military commanders under pressure to behave in a more autonomous way. However, he does not expect the relapse of the country into the warlord system of the 1920's because:

/2/The attachment, August 24, is a paraphrase of telegram 1126 from Hong Kong. Telegram 1126, August 23, is ibid. and in Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM.

--The regional military commanders are not, generally speaking, local figures, but men with a strong sense of the army as a national institution.

--China's modern military is dependent for its existence on the national industrial sector, and the continued flow of material requires each regional commander to recognize interdependence with other regions.

In short, the regional army commanders are not potential warlords, and warlordism is not likely unless the army dissolves into the general chaos.

Bill

[Continue with Document 280]

Return to 1964-1968, Volume XXX index
Return to the U.S. Department of State Home Page

This is an official U.S. Government source for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S. Government links does not imply endorsement of contents.