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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXX China DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

240. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 20, 1967, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VIII. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the source text indicates that the President saw the memorandum.

SUBJECT
Opposition to Mao

The situation in China is so confused as to defy brief description. The accompanying map/2/ is the best that can be done by way of indicating the province-by-province situation as of today, but it does not reflect the magnitude of the confusion. It shows that most of China is still in dispute, but the significant fact is that not a single province or municipality shown as in either the pro- or anti-Mao camp is without elements of significant opposition.

/2/Not attached to the source text.

I strongly suspect that the Soviets have been instigating and aiding anti-Mao resistance in Sinkiang, Manchuria and possibly Inner Mongolia.

Ever since Mao's call to "seize power" throughout the country, there have been numerous phony power seizures, so that it has been difficult for anyone to tell who are the "genuine revolutionaries" and who the "enemy." Even local military units have difficulty in identifying which of competing rival groups actually have Mao's sanction, and which authority in the confused military chain of command to respond to.

Much of this confusion arises from the fact that the revolution itself was artificial in its inception, inasmuch as Mao imposed it from the top. Its stated objectives have been too generalized and too vacillating to afford practical guidance for consistent action, even if major elements of the society desired to further its objectives.

Mao's opposition has eagerly added to the confusion by promoting dissention, by offering economic incentives to workers and peasants, by walking off the job, and at times by feigning support. Peking complains that many groups have "used the name of revolutionary rebel organizations falsely." Furthermore, there is continued resistance to the few "revolutionary" organizations which have received Peking's blessing as genuine. It is possible that their control does not extend much beyond provincial capitals.

Mao still retains the initiative, and the opposition is not broadly organized except perhaps in Tibet, Szechuan and Inner Mongolia. The atmosphere of suspicion, mistrust, and--perhaps most of all--uncertainty, now pervades the entire unhappy country. Mao has unleashed forces which are not yet ready to listen to exhortations for moderation. The Minister of Security has called on genuine revolutionaries to "put an end to armed struggle" and to "stop using loudspeakers to insult their enemies." However, typical provincial radio comment continues to say to all "demons and monsters" that the revolutionary rebels will "resolutely suppress you and smash your dogs' heads."

Mao's grand design in foreign policy of two years ago has failed completely, and it now appears that his domestic economy may well be disrupted by the Cultural Revolution as seriously as it was by the Great Leap of 1958-59.

Walt

 

241. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, February 24, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VIII. Secret. Copies were sent to Jorden and Ropa. The source text was sent to President Johnson with a February 24 covering note from Bromley Smith; a handwritten "L" on the covering note indicates that it was seen by the President.

SUBJECT
Ascendancy of Premier Chou and His Policies

Strenuous attempts in the past ten days to reverse the alarming trend toward anarchy in China can only be interpreted as an ignominious failure of Mao's Cultural Revolution--at least temporarily, and almost certainly for the long run as well. However, this tactical backtracking, if it can be accomplished, may save the nation from literally breaking apart.

Mao appears consistently, at each stage of his grand design to restore purity and elan to the revolution, to have underestimated the strength of his opposition. The final blow was the relative unresponsiveness of the armed forces when they were called upon some three weeks ago to support the seizure of power by "revolutionary rebels." (No significant Maoist successes have been reported for over two weeks.) For the most part the Army has stepped in merely in attempts to restore order, and not to further the fortunes of the Maoist revolutionaries.

Not surprisingly, there has been a steady decline in the prestige of Defense Minister Lin Piao, identified with the more extreme measures of the Cultural Revolution along with Madame Mao and Cultural Revolution head Chen Po-ta.

As usual, Premier Chou En-lai, a moderate at least in domestic policies, has timed his moves with consummate skill. In the past week he has appeared to be virtually in charge in Peking, with important directives being issued in the names of Mao and Chou--even those which ex officio Lin Piao would be expected to sign. Chou's recent confidence, and the reinstitution of moderate policies he has advocated for the Cultural Revolution, almost certainly mean that he believes he and his pragmatic policies now have strong, and perhaps predominant, support in the armed forces.

Increasingly demonstrable damage to China's marginal economy, stemming from the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, was doubtless foremost among other factors enabling Chou and his supporters to bring about the present attempted shift away from the Mao-Lin romantically unrealistic program to remake Chinese society. The inexorable demands of spring planting are a staunch support to Chou in his efforts to restore reason.

No one can say whether he can be successful. The very respect for the central government has been seriously damaged, and regional interests have become both more insistent and more confident.

The tremendous amount of resentment engendered in all segments of society in this turbulence may be long in abating. The chief disadvantaged group in Chinese society is the emerging younger generation who have a secondary or higher education. They were first flattered and drummed up to revolutionary ferver, and now are told that they have acted immaturely and should go home and keep quiet. They are not likely to do the latter.

Basically underlying the party dissention which exploded last year has been the choice between technological growth and restoring revolutionary elan. The Cultural Revolution may have insured that neither choice will be available for a time: the likely prospect is for a period of political weakness in which policies will be contradictory and indecisive.

Alfred Jenkins

 

242. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/

Taipei, February 25, 1967, 0417Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-CHINAT. Secret; Limdis.

2547. Ref State 135828./2/ Subj: Country Team assessment of GRC intentions.

/2/Telegram 135828, February 13, suggested that the Embassy consider reinstituting its former period telegrams summarizing indications of possible GRC actions against the mainland. It suggested reporting on a biweekly basis while the current mainland turmoil continued at a significant level. (Ibid.)

1. Conclusion: There are no signs that the GRC intends to make any significant military or paramilitary moves against Communist China in the near future; on the contrary, the GRCs current stance is marked by its cautious, wait-and-see character.

2. Discussion: During the latter half of 1966, the GRC groped for a proper response to the upset of Mao's Cultural Revolution. Various intelligence and paramilitary schemes for possible exploitation of the situation were drawn up, but they consisted in the main of operations beyond GRC capabilities, or possible only with sizeable US support. The GRC apparently understands that such US support will not be forthcoming.

3. GRC intelligence units continue to formulate plans for sabotage and other small-scale operations against the mainland, but these units lack the capabilities to carry out these plans to any significant extent. Results are unlikely to be any better than in the past.

4. Since last fall there has been some shift of emphasis in the GRC's approach to the problem of mainland turmoil. President Chiang has ruled specifically against any precipitate action at this time. This decision was made explicit in the President's New Year's message, in which he called for political rather than military action. Subsequently, we have received reliable intelligence reports documenting the GRC's disinclination to take military action at this time.

5. This wait-and-see stance is largely a product of the GRC's limited capabilities for unilateral action, but it is reinforced now by real conviction that outside pressures might retard rather than accelerate disintegrative trends on the mainland. This position may shift if a real break-down of Communist authority on the mainland occurs, or if the GRC concludes that it has occurred. Even then, however, we would expect the response of the GRC to be conditioned by the amount of US support it thought it could muster.

McConaughy

 

243. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Berger) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, March 1, 1967.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Secret; Exdis.

SUBJECT
Letter from Ambassador Thompson to Mr. Bundy/2/

/2/Dated February 21; attached but not printed.

1. Ambassador Thompson, in the attached letter, would like authority to offer to pass some of our reports on developments in Communist China to a top Soviet leader. He would do it orally and informally, and has in mind Gromyko, Firubin, or Lapin, in the course of a call. The particular report he has in mind to pass would be the first twelve paragraphs of Hong Kong's 5773, also attached./3/ Alternately, or additionally, he thinks it would be useful to show Gromyko the reporting telegram of Gronouski's next talk with the Chinese.

/3/Telegram 5773 from Hong Kong, dated February 17, is attached but not printed.

2. Ambassador Thompson thinks this might help allay Soviet suspicions of our relations with the Chinese, and perhaps lead to an exchange.

3. He wanted these ideas tried out with you. He asked this be kept very close, since the Soviets would be concerned if there was any leak that we were exchanging information on China, and he wants to be able to say only two people know about it in the Department.

4. I see no difficulty in offering to give the Soviets the first twelve paragraphs of the Hong Kong telegram. It reports what may be happening in various provinces in China. If the Soviets show any interest in our reports we can then provide others, including Gronouski's report of his next talks.

5. If you agree, I will send a letter to Ambassador Thompson along these lines./4/

/4/Rusk initialed his approval on March 5.

 

244. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, March 6, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. IX. Secret. Copies were sent to Jorden and Ropa. Rostow sent this memorandum to the President with a March 7 covering memorandum noting that he was inclined to agree that "in their own peculiar way the Chinese have turned the corner towards a 'moderate' domestic and foreign policy," although he thought its emergence might be slow and tortuous. He concluded: "But they started at the possibility of famine and drew back; and that's a beginning at least."

SUBJECT
The Next Chinese Dynasty and U.S. Policy

A. Failure of Mao's Supreme (and Last?) Effort at Purification

The turning point in the Cultural Revolution in the past three weeks has probably been a decisive one. There are still many imponderables, but the following seems fairly certain:

1. Insofar as the Cultural Revolution was to be an ideological remolding campaign, it has failed. Even as a purge device it appears to have failed far short of Mao's extravagant objectives, but it may well have succeeded for Chou En-lai's.

2. The prestige and authority of the Party have been damaged, but dissolution has stopped short of wrecking the Party's machinery; the concept of revolutionary communes, which Mao seems earlier to have envisaged as supplanting the Party, has been shelved. "Three-way alliances" are a far cry from "Paris communes," and are consonant with Chou's policies of stability and reason.

3. The damage to industry and agriculture is doubtless considerable, but will probably not be ruinous if present efforts to restore order are successful. Much depends upon peasant--and Army--reaction to increased Army participation in production. We should know more about the extent of damage in another month or so.

4. As expected, the Army is playing the crucial role in the Revolution's apparent denouement. The Army earlier would not back Mao's revolutionary rebels' take-overs, but is now backing Chou's efforts at preservation of nationhood and attention to the economy.

5. "Regionalism" is not a likelihood: the Army wouldn't have it.

6. The Army's crucial loyalty proved to be not to Mao and Lin, but to stability--to the status quo. Most elements of the society seem to be preponderantly of like mind--and the status quo is "creeping revisionism."

7. However, the battle is far from over. The prestige of Mao himself is probably still high; support for Maoism is obviously less, but of unknown proportions. Clearly, however, the actions of Chou are currently eclipsing the thought of Mao, even while the two leaders are professing to be in league--an accommodation which Mao had to make, not Chou. Chou's great problem is that the state of the nation is such that even his policies will require Army insurance for their implementation. This is dangerous. He may not succeed.

B. Has the Succession, in Effect, Taken Place?

There are those who believe that Mao is still fully in charge, and that he now purposefully desires to halt at the present "Half-way House" with Chou as its major domo. I doubt the validity of both assumptions. Mao has simply been unable to carry out his announced policies, and reports of ill health are increasingly convincing. The recent Albanian report of Mao's partial incapacitation is more credible than the Mauritanian one that he is in good health. The Mauritanians, who had never seen Mao previously, could have met a double. This would not have been possible with the Albanians. Furthermore, the Albanians have no reason to invent ill-health for Mao--quite the contrary. True, Maoism, under whatever--doubtless complex--auspices, ran the Cultural Revolution as long as it ran, but it has about run down. Some elements will surely continue to push for reforms in line with Mao's doctrinal purity, but their cause has received an impressive rebuff and we may have seen the last determined effort.

Prior to the sudden ascendancy of Lin Piao, the only three contenders other than Chou for Mao's mantle were Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and P'eng Chen. The latter three seem to be no longer in the running, and Liu's status is at least problematical. Furthermore, the policies which Chou has long advocated now appear to have military backing. Mao may be able to weather this embarrassment, but Lin may not.

So long as Mao's extreme policies were in command, the Army did not assist in the purging of provincial leaders. (The Army's role in the Peking purges is not clear.) Reports from the recent trouble spots of Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, Szechwan and Kwangtung now suggest compromises, with strong hints that some of the top leadership have been replaced, with Army acquiescence or connivance. Those involved are mostly Liu and Teng men, whose political demise both Mao and Chou would probably applaud. It will be interesting to see whether Chou men take their places. The top men in running the economy now appear to be Li Hsien-nien and T'ao Chen-lin, both of whom are long-time associates of Chou. Certainly they have not secured or retained influence because of adherence to a particular policy line, for Li is far to the right within the lop-sided Chinese Communist spectrum, while T'ao was one of the most zealous of the Great Leapers. Chou himself appears lately to have a strong hand in running the military establishment.

C. Policy Implications

It is too early to decide that Chou is comfortably in the saddle and likely to remain there. The power struggle could continue for some time. Furthermore, we cannot be sure that Chou wants the top job. However, at the moment he is more in the saddle than anyone else and there is no one yet visible who is likely to challenge him successfully. Even if Chou does not want the top job he may have to rule, in fact if not in name, during a "holding in trust" period.

It is not too early to try to divine what sort of China we might have if Chou is to dominate the scene. This is a murky area in which to prophesy, for Chou has been an executor rather than an initiator, but it is worth the effort. The transition to some new course, which is now bound to come under whatever leadership, is likely to take quite a few more months. The outlines of the new course may be apparent by about May, however, and it is conceivable that we may be faced with some hard decisions by summer.

It seems to me that if Chou is running things we may expect something like the following:

1. Pragmatic, somewhat "revisionist," and increasingly effective economic policies, with heavy emphasis on agriculture.

2. An emphasis on "expertness" over "redress," with favorable effect on the economy and defense, after the effects of the Cultural Revolution can be overcome.

3. A China tending more to look to its own needs, possibly to the extent of being predominantly isolationist for a time, except for considerations of 4. and 5. below.

4. A foreign policy less ambitious, more realistic and rational, and therefore at the same time more effective. Something of the "Bandung spirit" could return.

5. Attempts to capitalize on rationality and moderation to gain international acceptance, prestige and legitimatization.

6. Continued, but less frenetic, anti-Americanism. Post-Vietnam, chance greater for some accommodation.

7. Possibly a slow papering over of Sino-Soviet differences, but short of fraternal alliance. Chou has never loved the Russians.

8. Continued support for North Vietnam, but less obduracy in the event Hanoi should want to call a halt.

9. If the Gimo should die, a wooing of the GRC toward a "deal"--in the expectation it will be softened up for such by its bleak future qua GRC resulting from Peking's successes in 5. above at Taipei's correlative expense.

If something like the above is in the offing, we have some hard policy decisions to make at some as yet unpredictable point. They all relate to two very basic decisions:

1. What sort of Taiwan (among the likely viable varieties) is it in the U.S. interest to have eventuate? How can we contribute to bringing it about?

Can the GRC, as such, survive the prospect of a "moderate" mainland regime which may be virtually universally accepted? Will it even attempt to, or will it make a deal with a moderate Peking giving promise of progress, thus yielding not only to "inevitability" but to deep Sinocentric urges--especially if it seems to be a case of faute de mieux? Would the Taiwanese permit this? Should the UN interest itself in the status of the Island if such a conceivably bloody test appeared likely?

2. What should be our posture toward a more moderate mainland China?

Since the post-Maoist regime (with or without Mao as "Chairman Emeritus") is likely, at least for a time, to continue to be anti-American and to rebuff advances from us, should we fight its acceptance by others? Should we read this putative regime's near-universal acceptance as being inevitable and make a try for the supposed advantages of early overtures, in the hope of a new day in Sino-American relations? Even if ultimate near-universal acceptance appears inevitable, is there merit in our delaying overtures until we appear to be swept along (because of GRC or other considerations)? Has the combination of China's "madness" and its growing power reached the point where we should seize upon the first good excuse to get China better articulated with international problems?

To what extent should we discuss these vital questions with certain allies before the time of decision? This applies especially, perhaps, to our Asian allies, and among them most particularly Japan. Since in the quest for a stable Asia the overriding desideratum is a reasonably promising balance of power, where does the Soviet Union, as a Pacific power, fit into the scheme?

These are some of the questions to which, it seems to me, the Government Community should now be addressing itself, and concerning which I hope to have something to say in future memoranda.

Alfred Jenkins

 

245. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 9, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations. Secret. Goldberg sent the memorandum with a covering note to the President stating that it supplemented his oral report the previous day. It is filed with a covering note of March 10 from Rostow. A handwritten "L" on Rostow's covering note indicates that it was seen by the President.

SUBJECT
Report on First Leg of Asian Trip

Because of my responsibilities in connection with the Outer Space Treaty, I was able to visit only five countries on the first leg of the trip to Asia and to spend a shorter time in each one than I would have desired: one day each in Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines, two and a half days in Japan, and three days in South Vietnam.

[Here follows discussion of South Vietnam and Japan.]

III. Republic of China (Taiwan)

I found it interesting that the Generalissimo, with whom I spent half a day,/2/ expressed fears similar to those of Sato, namely: that the Soviets would choose to take advantage of the disorder on the mainland to fulfill long harbored expansionist designs. In this very limited sense, he seemed to have something in common with the mainland regime.

/2/On March 1. Telegram 2623 from Taipei, March 2, reported the conversation; a detailed memorandum of conversation was transmitted with airgram A-595, March 4. (Both ibid., and in Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/GOLDBERG)

At the same time he has clearly not renounced hopes of overthrowing that regime. Indeed, the major portion of his discussion with me consisted of the following analysis and request, which he asked specifically be conveyed to you. Given the serious split between Moscow and Peking, the drain of Vietnam on Peking's resources, and the serious turmoil on the mainland itself, now is the golden opportunity to rid the mainland of the Communist regime and destroy the Chinese nuclear threat. Unless this is done, the war in Vietnam cannot be ended and will in fact be extended to a wider area. The people on the mainland, while not able to overthrow the Communist regime from within, have now become anti-Mao (in addition to being anti-Communist) and would rally to his cause if he were to return to the mainland with force. All that is needed to set this process in motion is the approval and logistic support--but not manpower--of the US.

I, of course, undertook to convey this analysis and request to you and avoided any substantive reply. Nevertheless, feeling it advisable to prepare the way for a rejection of the Generalissimo's request, I did note that US commitments elsewhere were onerous, that the American people were in no mood to increase their involvement in potentially dangerous situations, and that the general American mood was one wanting to reduce rather than create new tension in Asia. I need scarcely add that my own conviction is that the Generalissimo's request should be politely but categorically rejected.

As requested by the Secretary of State, I raised the question of our recognition of Outer Mongolia leaving further discussion to our Ambassador.

[Here follows discussion of Korea and the Philippines.]

 

246. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/

Vientiane, March 10, 1967, 0216Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CHINAT-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, Tokyo, CINCPAC, JCS, and USUN.

5546. 1. During wide-ranging critique of U.S. policy which it was my function to present at recent Baguio meeting, I made certain suggestions on medium and long range policies for Taiwan and the Pescadores. These suggestions were tabled "for further staffing."

2. In order provide framework for those who wish examine these suggestions further, I will spell out in this message the rather sketchy oral statement which I made at Baguio. As I said in that presentation, it is a proposal which I believe ought to be examined in further detail.

3. Moreover, it is based on two premises. The first is the assumption that Communist China's internal problems will keep it occupied for a long time and that our function is to prepare the framework into which we would like to see China fitted when and if it decides to rejoin polite society. The second assumption is that we will achieve a successful and satisfactory stabilization of the military problem in Southeast Asia which will permit us to withdraw a large portion of our armed forces from Vietnam, but which will leave us the necessity of remaining alert for possible ready reintroduction. Flowing from these two premises, would be the probability that we could thin out our U.S. troop commitments in both Korea and Vietnam to more or less "trip-wire" proportions.

4. From this base, I predicated the idea that our interests and those of Japan lay in seeing Taiwan and the Pescadores permanently divorced from Mainland China, even a Mainland China which converted to a considerable benevolence. In short, both we and the Japanese have a vested interest in a "Two China" situation.

5. My proposal, therefore, was that we move, with appropriate associates, to define the sovereignty of the GRC as limited to Taiwan and the Pescadores, in accordance with the administrative sphere assigned the GRC by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, under whose authority the GRC ultimately occupies and administers these islands. There is a sound legal case for this, well preserved in our diplomatic acts and in treaties affecting this territory.

6. This, in turn, would lead to a definition of territorial representatives in the United Nations and establish a "Two China" situation there, providing the framework into which an ultimate, reformed, Mainland China might one day be fitted.

7. It would also require the GRC abandonment of the Offshore Islands and a clear stipulation by the U.S. Government (as distinct from our current deliberate vagueness) that the so-called "Formosa Resolution" applies to Taiwan and the Pescadores only.

8. In order to give some enforcement to these measures, I further recommended the deployment of a forward ready reserve of U.S. ground forces to Taiwan. This would doubtless have to be accomplished before we went to the mat with the GRC on such matters as the Offshore Islands and the Formosa resolution. The troops would be some of those withdrawn from Korea and Vietnam.

9. In part, this deployment would have a military and psychological purpose, to give positive evidence, in the area, of our readiness to renew our presence in either Vietnam or Korea should conditions warrant. In larger part, it would have a political purpose, directly associated with China policy.

10. Its first political purpose would be to prevent a deal behind our backs and against our interest. To borrow Ed Rice's phrase "When the empire unites, it tends to divide; when the empire divides, it tends to unite". A deliberate "Two China" policy would please the Taiwanese and perhaps many of the second generation Mainlanders: but there would be many of the old Mainlanders who would rather make a deal with Peking than be subjected to permanent divorce from the Mainland. Our troop presence would be designed to inhibit this.

11. Moreover, our troop presence would be designed as a blue chip for eventual negotiations with Peking. As matters now stand, even a regenerate Mainland regime could be expected to demand the return of Taiwan before agreeing to any sort of normal relations with the U.S. In the event, there would be a great popular pressure, at home and abroad, to make this sacrifice, especially if Peking appeared less and less bloody minded. In the current circumstances, the only things we could bargain against Peking's demand would be the Offshore Islands. Now, these the ChiComs could take in any event unless we were willing to fight for them (highly dubious prospect).

12. Hence, if, when faced with Peking's demand, we have a lot of U.S. troops whose presence we can trade away against an international agreement guaranteeing the independence of Taiwan and the Pescadores, we are in a far better bargaining position. As Admiral Sharp points out, Guam is good a place as any for our ready reserve, and we would really not deprive ourselves of much military advantage if we withdrew there, especially if we could do this in return for an agreed independence for Taipei.

13. Finally, it can be argued that U.S. troops in Taiwan would obviate the GRC requirement for a large, costly standing army. If this argument is accepted, we would have less MAP costs, less effective opposition to "Two Chinas" and more resources, both financial and human, for Taiwan's economic development.

14. These, then, are the elements for a staff study. I hope it can be presented in final form for debate at next year's Baguio Conference.

Sullivan

 

247. Telegram From the Consulate General at Hong Kong to the Department of State/1/

Hong Kong, March 15, 1967, 0428Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CHINAT-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Vientiane, Taipei, Tokyo, CINCPAC, JCS, and USUN.

6436. Ref: Vientiane 5546./2/ Subject: Staffing out Ambassador Sullivan's China policy suggestions./3/

/2/Document 246.

/3/Telegram 3404 from Taipei, May 3, reported that McConaughy intended to discuss Document 246 and telegram 6436 during his upcoming consultations in Washington, and that he believed an oral exchange would be more useful than further telegraphic discussion. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CHINAT-US)

1. It is rare that anybody attacks an old problem with a brand new plan which is wholly feasible and I think this is no exception. Sometimes however the plan does contain new ideas which, perhaps with slight modifications, serve to advance such problems towards solutions. I think both these remarks apply to Ambassador Sullivan's imaginative and ingenious proposal.

2. Central to this new plan is a proposal for the future stationing of U.S. troops on Taiwan, ostensibly for the primary purpose of serving as ready reserve for reintroduction if necessary into Southeast Asia but actually to inhibit a GRC-Mainland deal behind our backs, eventually to force the GRC to evacuate the Offshore Islands, and ultimately to trade withdrawal of our troops for ChiCom acceptance of an international agreement guaranteeing independence of Taiwan and the Pescadores.

3. For reasons set forth in subsequent paragraphs I think this plan infeasible. Against background of estimates of present military balance in Offshore Islands-Taiwan Straits area, however, it does suggest means whereby U.S. forces could perhaps be used to achieve one of Ambassador Sullivan's objectives--bringing about evacuation of Offshores and consequent de facto separation of Taiwan from Mainland. If the increased ChiCom inventories of supersonic all-weather aircraft and of naval units means GRC could not successfully handle another Taiwan Straits crisis without U.S. help, then we have improved chance of successfully pressing for evacuation of Offshores. This result might be obtained prior to emergence such crisis when and if President Chiang becomes convinced military return to Mainland not possible or after he is succeeded by more realistic leadership. It might be obtained in event of such crisis by making our lending necessary military assistance conditional on GRC agreement to evacuation of the Offshores. (A case, and perhaps a better one, could be made for further modernization GRC defense establishment to give it qualitative air and naval superiority so that we would not need become directly involved in such a crisis, and I submit this too deserves staffing out.)

4. Main defect of Sullivan plan is its deviousness, which is open to objection on purely pragmatic grounds that we would not be able convincingly to mask our purposes and thereby accomplish them. The Chinese are past masters and we mere children when it comes to dissembling innocence and carrying on devious games. I do not believe we could propose bringing to Taiwan the forces Ambassador Sullivan has in mind, for the ends he contemplates, without the ever-suspicious Chinese seeing through our purposes. If their agreement were forthcoming it would be because of Chinese confidence that our designs could be thwarted, and the presence of our troops used instead to serve GRC interests.

5. Most of us who have worked full-time on Chinese affairs would disagree with assumption contained paragraph 11 reftel that evacuation Offshores is something we now could use in bargaining with Peking. (The presence on the Offshores of GRC forces suits the ChiComs because it may some day give Peking the chance to deal the GRC a devastating blow; meanwhile they like it because it helps prevent a so-called Two-Chinas solution.) It also is far from sure that ChiComs would bargain for the evacuation of U.S. forces from Taiwan. Instead they might bank on stirring up Chinese xenophobia on Taiwan against the U.S. occupation of the island and U.S. efforts to control its government. Finding that the ChiComs would not bargain for the evacuation of bases we had built up to accommodate our forces--doubtless at considerable expense--we would be tempted to retain the bases and keep our forces on Taiwan.

6. In that event we would find ourselves more deeply and perhaps inextricably involved with the two Chinese sides. As I pointed out in Baguio, our experience with past involvements in China has been anything but happy or profitable, and pursuing them is likely to prove no more fortunate and to leave us deeper in the red. If the GRC ever gives us an honorable means of ending the involvement, we should not lightly pass it up.

7. At a time well before we had a treaty with the GRC, and when we were considering what attitude we should adopt toward a possible ChiCom invasion of Taiwan, I felt that Mainland control of Taiwan was contrary to U.S. interests, and said so. I still feel that way today and believe we must stand by our obligations under the defense treaty we subsequently negotiated. However I am not convinced that the real estate the treaty is designed to protect is worth the ultimate risks for us which the treaty--which represented intervention in an unfinished civil war--may entail. Hence, if the GRC wishes to nullify the treaty by making a deal with the Mainland, we would be relieved of our moral obligation to it and should not, I think, go so far as to use force or the threat of force against the GRC in order to hold it to that treaty.

8. I doubt any regime likely to emerge on the Chinese Mainland in the near future is going to become party to an international agreement whereby it formally accedes to the permanent separation of Taiwan from the Mainland. There is a better chance it will learn to live with such a separation. It seems to me that a situation in which it did so would represent the optimum practicable goal of relevant U.S. policy for the foreseeable future.

Rice

 

248. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/

Taipei, March 15, 1967, 1004Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong.

2798. 1. DefMin Chiang Ching-kuo called on me at my residence at his own request March 14 principally to suggest regular exchanges of views on China Mainland, and policies and actions directed thereto. He thought meetings should be held at least once a month.

2. He began by giving categorical assurance that GRC major policies are "fully coordinated" with those of the US, that they have been in the past and will continue to be so in future. He said that as Gimo had told Amb Goldberg, it is important that we achieve close coordination of views and actions, and asked for my assessment of present Mainland situation.

3. I thanked him for assurance of close coordination and welcomed regular exchange of views. I outlined for him the US view that Mainland tensions were being damped down, probably for tactical and pragmatic reasons, and as at least a temporary measure to prevent economic chaos. I covered, inter alia, role Chou En-lai seemed to be playing, our puzzlement at the virtual disappearance of Lin and Liu from the stage, our feeling that Mao's views were unlikely to have undergone fundamental change, and the probability that both the power struggle and the ideological controversy are far from over. I said I would like to obtain latest assessments from Washington and Hong Kong and to continue the discussion next week.

4. CCK said he agreed with my analysis, that the Mainland situation is "highly abnormal" and that we will all need more time to observe events before we can come to firm conclusions. In response to my question, CCK said the ChiComs would not change their views on the Vietnam war, and would do their best to block any peace settlement. A settlement would not only be a sharp reverse for ChiCom foreign policy, but would have serious internal consequences as well. He said he thought the ChiComs could get through the spring planting season without too much trouble, but that there would be a critical period at the time of the fall harvest.

5. I asked for any indications of ChiCom intentions in the Taiwan Straits, referring to the recent incidents of ChiCom boat incursions near the Offshore Islands. He said that aside from these incidents there were no particular indications. Some ChiCom troops in the Fukien area had been rotated, but overall numbers remained the same. Psywar activities, however, had been stepped up, especially those aimed at Taiwanese soldiers, with Fukienese dialect replacing Mandarin as the language used in broadcasts and over loudspeakers. There had been a doubling of the number of balloon-bearing propaganda leaflets (to 380 in the past month) over the similar period last year, when prevailing winds permit such ChiCom operations. He was somewhat concerned that rumors are being spread on Taiwan that the leaflets are released here by a strong Communist underground, and to counter this, the GRC is making known that they are carried to Taiwan by balloon. The leaflets and other materials, which include books on Mao's thought and on the Cultural Revolution, are more specifically targeted toward GRC armed forces, although they use familiar themes that the US is disengaging from and will eventually abandon the GRC, that GRC troops should assist in efforts to liberate Taiwan, and exhorting troops to stage a coup and overthrow the government.

6. CCK said he was getting questions from the Legislative Yuan on the level of US military assistance, and mentioned a newspaper report that a sum of US$200 million had been earmarked for division between Korea and the GRC. I said this could not be true, since Congress had not acted on the appropriation request, and since in any case they do not earmark MAP funds by country in this manner. I assured him that the GRC's needs were put forward vigorously, but I cautioned him that Vietnam needs had priority, and that there seemed to be strong Congressional sentiment for economy elsewhere. I said that some other countries (including Korea, Thailand and the Philippines) had special requirements, and that it could be impossible to divide up a reduced appropriation among the recipients to the satisfaction of all.

7. CCK said he was sure I understood the GRC need. He said the ChiComs watch carefully all news of US military assistance, and there is a political impact caused by any change in level. I said I would try to get additional information from Washington on current prospects for MAP, although there could be no positive estimate at this stage.

8. CCK invited me to go with him on a brief visit to Matsu Island early next month, travelling by sea, without any publicity for the trip. I said I would of course like to go, but I would need to seek Washington authorization, and they might feel that Matsu was a somewhat more exposed position than Quemoy.

9. Comment: Believe we have enough information in Embassy derived from Hong Kong reports and Baguio discussions so that I can continue substantive discussions of Mainland situation next week. However would appreciate any new information or assessments that are available.

10. Re paras 6 and 7 above on MAP levels, realize there is little that can be said now, except to continue give warning of possible reductions. However would appreciate any additional guidance available.

11. Re Matsu trip (para 8), I will make recommendation at later time. Response to invitation can be deferred.

McConaughy

 

249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/

Washington, March 16, 1967, 3:43 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/GOLDBERG. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Bennett and Berger, cleared by Sisco and Jenkins, and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to USUN for Goldberg. A March 13 memorandum from Sisco and Berger to Rusk transmitting the draft telegram is attached to the source text. Although the telegram lists Jenkins as the person who cleared for the White House, it was cleared by President Johnson. A March 15 memorandum from Rostow to the President summarizing the proposed message, with a copy attached, has the President's check mark on the approval line. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VIII)

56346. For Ambassador McConaughy. Ref: Taipei 2623./2/

/2/See footnote 2, Document 245.

1. Please take early suitable opportunity to convey to President Chiang Kai-shek following oral message from the President:/3/

/3/McConaughy reported in telegram 2839 from Taipei, March 18, that he had delivered the oral message to President Chiang, who did not comment. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US 1)

2. Ambassador Goldberg has personally given the President a full report of his March 1 conversation with President Chiang. The President very much appreciates the forthrightness with which President Chiang expressed to Goldberg his views on Viet-Nam, Mainland China, and other aspects of the situation in Asia. He highly values these exchanges of views between our Governments.

3. As President Chiang had requested, Ambassador Goldberg told the President of President Chiang's belief that now is the time for the Republic of China to attack and overthrow the Chinese Communist regime on the Mainland and of the reasoning which led President Chiang to this view.

4. The President wishes to say that he has given the most serious thought to what President Chiang has said. On this subject the U.S. Government's views are known to President Chiang, and there has been no change in our position. The U.S. has long sought to bring about peace in the Taiwan Strait and to this end has for many years urged the Chinese Communists to renounce the use of force there. The U.S. agrees with the Republic of China's position that its mission of restoring freedom to the population on the Mainland is to be achieved mainly by political means, not military force, and was pleased to see this theme stressed in President Chiang's New Year's message to the Chinese people.

5. In the situation in which we now find ourselves in Viet-Nam, we do not seek or advocate any extension of the war. From the outset we have carefully defined our objective in Viet-Nam as limited to stopping the aggression. We have refrained from using our full military power, and we have sought to limit the war and terminate it by negotiations.

6. The course which President Chiang advocated to Ambassador Goldberg would run counter to the policies we are pursuing in Viet-Nam. Such a course would involve the Republic of China in risks and hazards and would give rise to the danger of a wider war with incalculable consequences for the peoples of Asia, the United States, and the world. The American Government and people would not only disapprove such an action but would oppose it.

7. The President wants President Chiang to know how deeply grateful he is personally for the generous cooperation President Chiang's Government has extended to the United States in connection with the Viet-Nam war, for its economic and other contributions in Viet-Nam, and for the airbase facilities granted U.S. forces in Taiwan. The President is also very conscious of the threat from the Mainland to which Taiwan is exposed and he wishes to assure President Chiang once again that the United States stands squarely behind the commitments made in its Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China./4/

/4/Printed from an unsigned copy.

[Continue with Document 250]

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