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1964-1968 Volume XXX China |
220. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Popper) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, November 29, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Gleysteen and Popper. A handwritten note on the source text reads: "Secretary Saw."
SUBJECT
The Vote on Chinese RepresentationToday's votes on Chinese representation were even better than we had anticipated, doubtless due in large part to the existence of the study committee alternative to the Albanian resolution. The important question resolution was carried 66-48-7 as opposed to last year's vote of 56-49-11. The Albanian resolution was defeated 46-57-17, in contrast to last year's tie vote of 47-47-20.
By a surprisingly large vote of 51-37-30 the Assembly decided that the study committee resolution fell under the important question procedure. Syria's unexpected initiative, which produced this vote, undoubtedly contributed substantially to the overwhelming defeat of the study committee resolution, 34-62-25.
The voting on the procedural question and the Italian resolution reflected the strong desire of the Communist countries and their non-aligned supporters to ensure defeat of the study committee resolution. Ironically, the Syrian move also served the interest of the GRC--to bury the study committee idea. The absence of a roll call on the Syrian motion was helpful to us in not highlighting our negative vote.
You might be interested in a few significant points which we have noted in our first reading of the results. The most striking was Canada's decision to abstain on the Albanian resolution while voting in favor of the important question and the Italian resolution. Other interesting results were:
1) Japan voted in the same manner as the U.S. on all three resolutions;
2) The U.K. abstained on the study committee resolution;
3) Indonesia acted in accordance with its assurances by voting in favor of the IQ resolution, in favor of the Albanian resolution and abstaining on the study committee;
4) Disappointingly, Ghana voted "no" on the important question and "yes" on the Albanian resolution;
5) Sierra Leone managed to keep its delegate in line; he voted "no" on the Albanian resolution;
6) Senegal, in spite of our efforts, voted against us on both the IQ and Albanian resolutions;
7) Iran proved obdurate to the end by abstaining on all resolutions;
8) Saudi Arabia shifted from their threatened abstention to a negative vote on the Albanian resolution as we urged;
9) Australia, the Philippines and Thailand all voted against the Italian resolution; and
10) Chile voted along with us on all three resolutions.
The effect of today's decisions is for the time being to strengthen the GRC's position in the UN and to increase the difficulty of either replacing the GRC by Communist China or of moving toward a two-China alternative. In this context our handling of the events precipitated by the Canadian initiative has been successful. The GRC, too, dealt with the situation skillfully.
221. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy), the Legal Adviser, and the Acting Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (Heymann) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, December 1, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 104. Secret. Drafted by Heymann and Kreisberg, and cleared by Stoessel, McCloskey, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Robert A. Stevenson, and MacArthur, who added the following handwritten note: "I concur in the substance but believe that we should inform the Democratic and Republican leadership of what we intend to do and why before we make a public announcement. This would help avoid misunderstanding on the 'Hill'. DMacA."
SUBJECT
Removal of Passport Restrictions for Travel to Communist ChinaDiscussion:
A. The Requirements of the New Regulations
1. We have carefully considered the language of Section 51.72 of the Department's new passport regulations (Tab A)/2/ in terms of its relevance to Communist China. The regulations authorize us to impose area restrictions on travel of American citizens only in the event of hostilities or in cases where we find that unrestricted "travel would seriously impair the conduct of United States foreign affairs". This rather strict standard for restricting travel paraphrases the even more limiting language of the Supreme Court's decision in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, authorizing restrictions only "when it can be demonstrated that unlimited travel to the area would directly and materially interfere with the safety and welfare of . . . the nation as a whole". Under the terms of the regulations, if we are to maintain travel restrictions, we must publish by December 19th the names of the areas which meet this standard "along with a statement of the circumstances requiring the restriction".
/2/Attached but not printed. On October 20 the Department of State published revised regulations on nationality, passports, and travel controls; for text, see 31 Federal Register 13537.
2. We have strong doubts that a persuasive case can be maintained that removal of the current restrictions on travel to Communist China would "seriously impair the conduct of United States foreign affairs". In a very real sense, we have already taken the position that the travel of American citizens to Communist China does not in fact "seriously impair" the conduct of our foreign policy toward that country. The categories of American citizens whom we are prepared to allow to visit mainland China have, over the past year, been expanded to the point where literally tens of thousands of individuals can qualify/3/ (although only about 300 have applied and been granted passport validations). Moreover, our general position, as formulated by the President on July 12, 1966, that "the greatest force for opening closed minds and closed societies is the free flow of ideas and people and goods" also makes it difficult for us to argue in public that restrictions on travel to Communist China are necessary or desirable.
/3/For texts of statements issued by the Department of State on March 10 and on July 11, see Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1966, pp. 491-492, and August 15, 1966, pp. 234-235.
B. Foreign Policy Considerations (for additional memo from "L" on this subject, see Tab B)/4/
/4/The memorandum from Meeker to Rusk, December 1, is attached but not printed.
3. The benefits and risks of removing the present restriction on travel to Communist China depend (a) upon how Peking responds to our action and (b) upon the timing of our actions.
4. We have little doubt that our national interests would be served in an important way by the travel of some thousands of Americans to Communist China each year. As is indicated by the President's statement referred to above, the gradual expansion of the categories of American citizens whom we are prepared to allow to visit mainland China, and our efforts at Warsaw, our interest in increasing the number and scope of our peaceful relationships with Communist China is as much a part of our long-range policy for China as is our firm commitment to resist that country's aggressive actions vigorously. Opening a wide and mutually profitable range of peaceful contacts is a necessary complement to resist-ance to Communist Chinese aggression. Both have the same end of eventually persuading mainland China to turn its energies into non-aggressive, responsible channels.
5. There are, we believe, several risks of unrestricted travel to China which should be considered.
(a) First, there may be significant effects on the flow of intelligence. For example, China might attempt to make use of ethnic Chinese in the United States to obtain classified information which is not now available to them. We believe that the prospective gains to the U.S. in intelligence about China, a closed society, would be greater than those which would be realized by China. Much of the information we lack about China would be filled in by ordinary observation. The information they lack cannot be obtained without a security clearance.
(b) Second, unrestricted travel would, to a small extent, increase Peking's power to harass the United States by imprisoning Americans, if this were its desire. The increase in power would, however, be small. It has ample opportunity for harassment today in the form of the exceptions for newsmen, doctors, scientists, scholars, and people prominent in commercial, cultural, athletic and other fields. The experience of other nations whose citizens travel to China suggests that this risk is not excessive, despite such recent events as the detention of the Dutch Charge and the excesses of the Red Guards. On balance, we believe that Peking will accept responsibility for any Americans that it permits to enter. More important, its opportunities for harassment are almost as great today as they would be after restrictions were removed. We would, of course, issue a written warning of the risks to any American indicating an intention to travel to Communist China and could review at any time the desirability of a reimposition of travel restrictions if this seemed warranted.
(c) The complete removal of travel restrictions to Communist China would enable the Chinese to selectively invite individuals and their invitations might focus on persons who have extreme political views. This could well create a flow of traffic which might not only increase the ability of the Chinese to influence "left wing" political groups in the United States but also create a body of one-sided propaganda advocates for Peking in the U.S. who could boast they "had been there". We believe that Peking would quickly find itself on untenable propaganda grounds if it pursued a policy of admitting only advocates of the "far left". Their policy toward other countries has been to allow a reasonable cross-section of public opinion to visit the mainland even though they have attempted to channel visitors from the "left". In any event it is now and will continue to be possible for American communists or other sympathizers with the Peking regime to clandestinely visit Communist China and return to the U.S. It is probably in the U.S. national interest to try and surface such visitors in public by permitting or even encouraging them to apply for passports.
(d) A total dropping of the present travel restrictions might be interpreted as a far more significant political move than the earlier partial relaxation of our travel restrictions and as indicating a qualitative shift in the U.S. attitude toward Communist China. We believe, however, that the present palpable strength of our posture in Vietnam provides us with an ideal opportunity to take this step without undue risk of misinterpretation that we are changing our fundamental position on communist aggression. The Republic of China has expressed its misgivings about the relaxation in U.S. travel restrictions in the past but in a very low key. In the immediate context of the ChiRep debate in the 21st UN General Assembly, however, this reaction would probably be considerably stronger to the presently proposed move.
6. In contrast to the limited risks we believe there is a real foreign policy gain to be realized by removing the restriction on travel to China. In much of the world the U.S. is regarded as blind to the need of an eventual accommodation with the most populous country of the world and one that will soon be a nuclear power. Our policy of resisting Chinese aggression is confused with an alleged policy of unwillingness to face the realities of the future power of China. We can eliminate this confusion and make clear our desire to reach an eventual accommodation with a non-belligerent Communist China by opening every avenue of peaceful relations that is consistent with our national security and our opposition to Chinese belligerence. Removing all prohibitions on travel of Americans to China--and thus assuming the same posture in this regard as the great majority of our NATO and SEATO allies--would be an important step in that direction.
7. Despite our liberal exceptions to the travel ban, at present in the eyes of much of the world we share with China the responsibility for preventing informal contacts. For example, Peking is reportedly telling foreign visitors that, by validating passports for travel to mainland China in a discriminatory manner, the United States is attempting to dictate to the Chinese whom they may invite to their country, and that the Chinese will not accept such dictation. This is obviously a subterfuge but, considering the breadth of our present exceptions to the travel restrictions, there would be very little cost in calling Peking's bluff by eliminating all restrictions on travel to that country. Only in this way can we make it wholly clear that mainland China's isolation is of its own making.
C. Domestic Political Considerations
8. To a surprising extent the American people and the Congress regard travel restrictions, not as a barometer of our feeling toward a country, but as an interference with an inherent right and freedom of American citizens. This has become apparent in the surprising Congressional opposition to the Willis and Eastland bills which were intended to impose penalties for violation of our travel restrictions. An explanation by the Department of State that we are recognizing and respecting the freedom of American citizens to travel abroad wherever they wish except where our foreign policy absolutely requires travel restrictions may very well prove to be entirely acceptable to a substantial majority of the public, the press and the Congress. Certainly there is reason to suspect resentment of the present situation where we authorize chosen categories of Americans to travel to China but forbid everyone else.
9. This public justification for removing the restrictions ties in perfectly with the occasion presented by our new regulations. For the first time in these regulations we formally recognize significant limitations on our power to restrict travel in the interests of respecting the freedoms of American citizens. We could and would explain that, like Albania, Communist China was dropped from the restricted list simply because we could not meet the new strict criteria--i.e., we could not justify a continuing imposition on the freedom of American citizens. This may well be an extremely popular approach.
10. In addition, we would propose to explain it simply as a logical extension of the wide exceptions to the restrictions on travel to Communist China already in force and to emphasize that the dropping of these restrictions was completely consistent with the views already expressed by the President and yourself on the desirability of the freer exchange of ideas among nations and the U.S. hope that the Chinese will agree eventually to respond to these U.S. initiatives.
D. The Problem of Timing (for additional memo from "L" on this subject, see Tab B)
11. There are advantages and disadvantages to dropping the remaining restrictions on travel to Communist China at this time. The most serious problem is presented by the close juxtaposition of our action to the debate on Chinese representation in the United Nations General Assembly. In view of recent misunderstandings with the GRC, our action might be over-interpreted and could possibly result in an exacerbation of U.S./GRC relations.
12. On the other hand, the overwhelming GRC success in the General Assembly appears to have secured the GRC position in the United Nations for some time to come and should enormously strengthen GRC self-confidence. Under these circumstances it may be that the U.S. move to drop travel restrictions will be no more of a problem for the GRC than it has been on the occasion of our previous relaxations of travel restrictions. We recommend, therefore, that you assess the climate of U.S.-GRC relations in the light of your forthcoming visit to Taipei, and that our final decision on timing depend upon your on-the-spot instructions.
Recommendation:/5/
/5/The source text bears no indication of approval or disapproval. On December 16 the Department of State amended the passport regulations by extending all area restrictions until March 15, 1967. For text, see 31 Federal Register 16143. For text of the Department's statement concerning this, issued on December 23, see Department of State Bulletin, January 16, 1967, pp. 102-103.
That depending upon your instructions after visiting Taipei, the Department either
A. Publish the names of the restricted areas on December 19 omitting Communist China as well as Albania, or
B. Publish an announcement in the Federal Register stating that the Department has not yet completed its review of the areas for which travel should be restricted and extending currently existing travel restrictions for a further 90-day period.
222. Memorandum for Secretary of State Rusk Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR Files, 1966 FE Weekly Staff Meetings. Secret. The memorandum, unsigned and undated, is attached to an unsigned covering December 1 memorandum to Bundy. Both are attached to a December 5 memorandum from McAfee to Hughes recording a December 1 meeting between Bundy and Colby, at which the memorandum was given to Bundy for his use in briefing the Secretary for his forthcoming trip to Asia.
This memorandum describes the current state of CIA-GRC relations in the context of their historical development, and cites the critical CIA-GRC intelligence activities that deserve special attention.
1. In the early 1950s the fundamental CIA-GRC relationship was established under circumstances in which CIA appeared to be the only U.S. agency in a position to assist the GRC in their ambitions, among other things, to conduct operations against the Mainland. After the Korean War, this assistance shifted from unproductive paramilitary operations to the development of highly productive and valuable technical operations involving communications intelligence and low and high overhead reconnaissance aircraft flights. The development of these very useful programs was facilitated by the position of Chiang Ching-kuo as the chief of all GRC intelligence activities, by CIA's support to media operations of great interest to the GRC, and by the apparently stable international position of the GRC. Chinese Communist reverses, particularly economic, and the GRC's belief that the Vietnam war might make possible their involvement in some sort of counterattack, also contributed to the GRC's motivation in cooperating with CIA in consolidating and expanding the productive comint and overhead reconnaissance activities.
2. In 1964 the growth of CIA-GRC relationships began to level off and then deteriorated slightly as CIA minimized its support to unproductive, infeasible GRC Mainland operations, particularly paramilitary, and reduced the size of its Taipei Station. While both actions were taken essentially for reasons of marginal productivity, tight budgets, and security, the GRC apparently chose to believe that these actions were somehow connected with a larger U.S. intent to "disengage", which they seem to read as being reinforced by, among other events, reductions in the Military Aid Program, and by the U.S. efforts to prevent Chinese Communist involvement in the Vietnam war. Nevertheless, the GRC maintained good fundamental relationships with CIA by continuing to give full support to the critical comint and high overhead reconnaissance programs and by facilitating the establishment of an over-the-horizon radar site on Taiwan designed to monitor Chinese Communist missile firings.
3. In late 1965, CIA determined that the commercial passenger activities of the Civil Air Transport (CAT) airline should be terminated because CAT was no longer essential to the support of CIA clandestine activities and was not intended to compete commercially with other airlines. Although the intent to terminate CAT was conveyed to the GRC through the CAT organization and was accompanied by reassurances of assistance in establishing the GRC's own national flag air carrier, the GRC has prolonged the phase-out negotiations partly because they are aware of CIA's equity in CAT and consider termination of CAT, again, as part of "disengagement."
4. In mid-1966, the United States Intelligence Board decided the Grosbeak program would be terminated because the product did not justify the risk of crew losses and the men, money, and equipment involved could be better used elsewhere in the context of the Vietnam war. This decision was made after an extensive analysis of the program's value and was conditioned by the fact that in the preceding two years only two Grosbeak flights had been made. The two flights reflected CIA and GRC concern over crew losses versus the flight's product. Therefore, it was calculated that, while the GRC might challenge the termination decision as a further example of U.S. "disengagement", they would eventually accept it because they privately and fundamentally did not want to make any more flights.
5. Contrarily, however, the GRC's reaction, expressed by Chiang Ching-kuo, was to challenge directly CIA's right to terminate an established joint project and to demand a letter of termination intent before any phase-out negotiations could be begun. This letter was delivered to the GRC on 17 November and has not been answered. Subsequent unilateral GRC actions have terminated a joint maritime collection team and the Joint Operations Office without explanation. Neither activity is important to CIA-GRC collection interests. To date, the three critical collection activities--comint, high-level reconnaissance, and over-the-horizon radar--have not been seriously threatened by the GRC. At one point, however, the GRC did suggest that the high-level reconnaissance program might be canceled but they have since flown one mission.
6. An analysis of the reasons for the GRC's adverse reaction to the Grosbeak termination strongly suggests that their reaction was not motivated solely by the Grosbeak decision. Rather their reaction is motivated partly by their strong pique at the U.S., particularly for CIA's very lukewarm response to their resurrected ambitious paramilitary schemes directed at the Mainland's turmoil, and partly by their distrust of U.S. intentions in the recent UN Chirep action. The GRC's adverse reaction has been further conditioned by their recognition that the special relationship with CIA, which they believed existed as a means of facilitating ambitions with or without reference to U.S. policies, was in reality a relationship fully and officially governed on the U.S. side by U.S. interests and needs as determined by the policy-making levels of the government.
7. A forecast of the GRC's likely further action bearing on its joint activities with CIA is difficult to make because of the variety of the governing factors. It is anticipated, though, that the GRC's action will be less adverse than might have been expected prior to the UN Chirep vote. On the other hand, should CIA for budgetary reasons have to reduce further its support to non-critical joint operations, particularly the media operations, the GRC may actually respond by moving against one of the three critical activities. In any case, it is unlikely that the GRC will move adversely against any of the three critical activities except as a desperation measure, since they also receive highly useful intelligence benefits from these activities.
8. CIA does not intend to challenge any further adverse GRC unilateral action against non-critical joint activities. The critical programs will continue to receive essential CIA support for their own value and, should the GRC unilaterally act against any of them, CIA will seek to ameliorate the GRC's action. CIA does not wish to continue non-critical activities solely as the GRC's price for the critical programs.
9. During your visit to Taipei we suggest that you not raise the subject of CIA-GRC relations with the GRC leaders. Should the GRC raise the topic however, we suggest that you restate U.S. interest in continuing the three critical activities of comint, high-level overhead reconnaissance, and over-the-horizon radar.
10. Mr. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], CIA Taipei Station Chief, has kept the Ambassador fully informed of the current CIA-GRC relationship.
223. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 11-12-66
Washington, December 1, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Helms and prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on December 1 except the AEC Representative and the Assistant FBI Director, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
THE OUTLOOK FOR SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
The Problem
To examine current developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute and their possible significance for the future relations of the two Communist states.
Conclusions
A. We believe that Sino-Soviet relations will continue to deteriorate so long as the Mao Tse-tung-Lin Piao leadership group retains authority. But we do not foresee a deliberate break in state relations; the Soviets are apprehensive about the costs of such a development within the Communist movement and the Chinese probably fear its possible impact on Hanoi.
B. Even so, we cannot completely exclude a sudden explosion of the dispute into a new and more virulent form in the near term. The Vietnamese war has added to the uncertainties and the urgency of the dispute, the emotions of the principals involved could come to have greater relevance, and unplanned incidents could provoke greater hostility and more forceful retaliations. Moreover, the situation in China is fluid; it is possible that domestic requirements or pressures might cause the leadership to force a severance of all remaining vestiges of contact with the USSR.
C. In the longer term, prospects for major changes leading either to a further deterioration or an easing of the dispute appear to rest mainly on what happens in China after Mao. The emergence of a Chinese regime even more anti-Soviet than its predecessor is certainly one of the possibil-ities. In this event, hostility could reach new levels of intensity. All forms of cooperation, including even the transit across China of Soviet supplies for North Vietnam's war effort might cease. Though serious military incidents along the Sino-Soviet border are also possible, both sides would almost certainly seek to avoid war.
D. The emergence of a more flexible leadership in Peking could lead to some easing of tensions. We do not believe that any Chinese regime would offer the Soviets substantial concessions, but in exchange for certain benefits, such as renewed economic and military assistance, new Chinese leaders might be willing to damp down the dispute. Even a limited Sino-Soviet rapprochement would be likely to have some important effects on the international scene since world opinion has come to expect active discord between the two. An easing of the dispute could also lead to greater Sino-Soviet harmony vis-a-vis the Vietnamese war, assuming its continuation.
E. Nevertheless, any Sino-Soviet rapprochement in either the short or longer term is likely to have definite limits. We expect little or no positive cooperation at the party level and a continuing general atmosphere of barely suppressed suspicion and mistrust. Moreover, the Sino-Soviet relationship would remain highly vulnerable to clashes of national interests over a broad range of issues, and if China's power began to give punch to its national assertiveness, serious trouble could develop, particularly over the frontiers.
Discussion
I. Introduction
1. The Sino-Soviet dispute has greatly intensified in recent months. Peking has stepped up the frequency and fury of its attacks on the USSR. Moscow, which for almost two years sought to convey an image of reason and restraint in the dispute, has since August begun to reply forcefully in kind. China accuses the USSR of acting in collusion with the US, and Moscow charges that Peking serves the imperialist cause by refusing to cooperate with the rest of the Communist world. China claims that the Soviet leadership is deliberately transforming the USSR into a bourgeois society, Moscow asserts that current developments and policies in China have "nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism." And each side now publicly contends that the other is beyond redemption so long as its present leaders are in control.
2. Hostility between the USSR and Communist China has, of course, existed for many years. Serious, though concealed, differences arose even during periods of relative harmony in Stalin's time, and open antagonism dates back at least to 1960. The reasons for Sino-Soviet friction and for the long decline in the relationship are complex, and over the years a substantial number of issues have been involved in the dispute. Underlying everything have been conflicts of national interest and ambition, some of a largely traditional nature, such as Sino-Russian competition in Mongolia and Korea, and others which have assumed a largely Communist character, such as the rivalry for political and ideological preeminence within the "socialist world." Different stages of internal development and great disparities in wealth and power have helped to create conflicting attitudes and a general feeling of ill will between the two countries. Doctrinal disagreements and quarrels over Communist strategy, cultural antipathies, and even personal enmities (as between Khrushchev and Mao) have all played important roles. Certain key moves made in the dispute have also stimulated discord and helped to give the contest a momentum of its own: for example, the USSR's refusal in the late 1950's to satisfy China's demands for the wherewithal to achieve a nuclear weapons capability, and Peking's decision in the same period to challenge Moscow's dominance in the Bloc.
3. Three developments appear to have contributed the most to the current sharpening of the dispute. First, China's internal quarrels have been accompanied by the mounting violence in polemical attacks on the USSR and its adherents in the movement. The campaign against domestic revisionists and anti-Maoists, part of an apparent struggle within the Chinese leadership, has evidently encouraged comparable attacks on Mao's principal enemies abroad as well. Secondly, China's growing isolation within the Communist movement--it is now virtually without significant allies--has frustrated and embittered Peking, and this seems to have reinforced its determination to remain arrogant and intransigent vis-a-vis the USSR. Finally, the war in Vietnam has become a key area of dissension, since it involves the most fundamental differences over Communist strategy and tactics.
II. Recent Background
4. The present Soviet leaders decided late in 1964, shortly after their assumption of power, that Soviet policy toward China was sorely in need of repair. They apparently believed that Khrushchev had caused unnecessary damage to Soviet prestige and leadership of the Communist movement by his insistence on engaging polemically with Peking and his efforts to commit other parties to a formal repudiation of Chinese views. They did not wish to compromise the USSR's basic political and ideological position in the dispute, and probably had no strong expectation that relations with China could be significantly improved. But they did hope that a new approach could reverse growing support for the Chinese within the movement and eventually help to isolate Peking from the rest of the Communist world.
5. To this end, Khrushchev's successors acted with calculated restraint, avoiding polemics, retreating from demands for an anti-Chinese international Communist conference, and, in general, seeking to shift the blame for the continuing dispute onto Peking. At the same time, partly to disprove Chinese charges of Soviet unreliability and softness, and partly to contest actively with Peking for influence in Hanoi, they also sought to reestablish the USSR's credentials as a major Asian power and publicly committed themselves to increase their support of North Vietnam. And, in support of this general line, they placed stricter limits on negotiations with the West and reintroduced a number of cold-war themes into their propaganda.
6. The Chinese Communists seem initially to have misread Khrushchev's fall from power as a blow against revisionism and as a further vindication of their own harsh revolutionary line. They soon rebuffed the efforts of the new Soviet leadership to mute polemics, and were apparently unprepared for the effectiveness of the new Soviet tactics. They were also unprepared for the series of setbacks they encountered abroad: for example, the failure of their efforts to form an Afro-Asian front in 1965 without Soviet participation, highlighted by the fiasco over the Algiers conference; the loss of their position in Indonesia; the characterization of their trade policies by the previously friendly Castro as political blackmail; and, in general, their growing unpopularity among Afro-Asian neutralists.
7. The Chinese became aware that things were going against them and that some of their early supporters, such as the Japanese Communists and the North Koreans, were beginning to drift away from their camp. But rather than change course, they persisted in unyielding policies and insisted that "temporary set-backs" could not deflect them from long-term objectives. Even their growing vulnerability to Soviet allegations that only China stood in the way of unified Communist support for North Vietnam did not persuade them to modify policies. Last spring, in fact, Peking adopted a domestic line which could hardly have been fashioned to do it more harm in the movement or render it more susceptible to Soviet ridicule and cries of alarm. Indeed, all of the world's Communist Parties have been mystified by the course of events in China, and virtually all have been alienated by the antiparty aspects of Red Guard rampages, the appearances of Maoist megalomania and Chinese chauvinism, and the general turmoil which seems to have swept over China.
III. Current Problems and Developments
8. The USSR and Communist China today find it difficult to maintain even the pretense of a meaningful political and military alliance. Party contacts practically do not exist. State relations are minimal, formal, and often not polite. Cultural contacts are kept up, but on a very small scale. Trade, which reached a peak of over $2 billion in 1959, sank to about $400 million last year and will probably decline even further this year. Only negligible quantities of military supplies are still shipped from the USSR, principally certain spare parts contracted for earlier and items of equipment which the Chinese could produce themselves or obtain elsewhere. The 1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance has not been formally renounced, but both sides have expressed doubt as to its continuing validity; Peking has indicated that it does not count on--or even necessarily want--Soviet military assist-ance, and the USSR has clearly implied that in many circumstances it would not feel at all bound to extend such assistance. The two countries do not even cooperate easily or well on problems associated with the provision of military assistance to North Vietnam. Peking has in various ways hampered the delivery of Soviet equipment to North Vietnam.
9. The Situation on the Border. Tension has existed along the Sino-Soviet frontier since at least 1962 (when some 50,000 border tribesmen in Sinkiang, apparently stirred up by the Soviets, emigrated en masse to the USSR). Since 1963, Moscow has undertaken some modest reinforcement of its military and security forces in regions near China, especially opposite Sinkiang and eastern Manchuria. It has also stepped up its military assistance to Mongolia and this year began the construction of an air defense system in that country. The Chinese have apparently begun to give some attention to air defenses in areas of Sinkiang bordering the USSR. They have also sought to impose stiff new regulations governing the use of border rivers and have apparently harassed the Soviets along the land frontiers as well.
10. Condition of the Communist Movement. Sino-Soviet rivalry within the world Communist movement is still bitter and intense. The Chinese glorify Mao, vilify the USSR, and define their views as "universal truth;" the Soviets allow the Chinese to discredit themselves in this way and try, for the most part successfully, to block Peking's maneuvers. The character of this competition, however, has changed greatly over the past two years. The USSR must still reckon with the split, partly because of the maneuverability it gives parties which are anxious to avoid Soviet domination, and partly because a number of parties maintain a neutral posture in the dispute, including, most notably, the North Vietnamese. But while Moscow was confronted only two years ago with a serious challenge to its leadership, today it faces a China which can count on full support only from Albania, the Communist Party of New Zealand, a handful of tiny splinter groups, and a small number of front groups which are obviously Chinese controlled.
11. Impact of the Vietnamese War. The Soviets have increasingly sought to use the Vietnamese war as an issue against China. They have charged, for example, that Peking's failure to cooperate had prolonged the war by preventing a "quick end" to US "outrages." And they have employed their aid to North Vietnam as a means to increase their influence in Hanoi at Chinese expense, and in this they have apparently had some success. But while thus offering the Soviets an effective tool to use against the Chinese, the war also tends to limit the USSR's maneuverability in the dispute. Moscow must contend with Hanoi's refusal to choose sides, which means also that North Vietnam is unwilling to accept Soviet political guidance on the conduct of the war. Moreover, Chinese control over direct land and air supply routes to North Vietnam is a factor limiting Soviet influence in Hanoi.
12. The eventual outcome of the war will clearly have a major bearing on the further course of the Sino-Soviet quarrel. The Soviet attitude toward the war appears to be mixed. The effect it has had in imposing strains on American resources and burdens on American relations with Europe and friendly countries elsewhere must be seen as advantageous. On the other hand, the Soviets are aware also that the situation carries some risk of direct confrontation which, in that area and under present circumstances, they must wish to avoid. For them, the optimum outcome would be one which, by a political process perhaps including a negotiation, gave Hanoi a good prospect of achieving its aims in South Vietnam and thus inflicted a major reverse on US policy. Evidently the Soviets do not think that the moment has yet come when they can set in motion a scenario which would end in this way. But should they be able to, in the face of continuing Chinese opposition to a political solution, they would strike a major blow at Peking's influence among the Asian Communists which would also go far to reestablish Moscow's ascendancy throughout the Communist movement.
13. For their part, the Chinese apparently wish for the present to see the Vietnam struggle continue. They see it as a prime example of a "people's war" waged against their main enemy, US imperialism. They hope for an outcome which would support their claim that this Maoist strategy is essential to revolutionary advance and at the same time diminish Soviet claims to give authoritative guidance to the revolutionary struggle.
IV. Short-term Prospects
14. No clear pattern emerges from the most recent developments in the dispute: the mutual expulsions of the few remaining students, the Chinese demonstrations against the Soviet Embassy in Peking, the exchanges of diplomatic protest notes, the rising pitch of invective, and the hints from both capitals of growing difficulties over the transshipment of Soviet supplies to North Vietnam. Ordinarily, an accelerating deterioration of relations such as this might be expected to lead to a complete and final break. Neither China nor the USSR, however, has allowed matters to get completely out of hand.
15. Peking seems willing to run the risk of provoking a formal break in diplomatic relations, but seems reluctant to take the final step itself. It almost certainly wants to avoid the onus for doing so. It may, in addition, wish to avoid a total rupture because of a concern that this would complicate the Vietnamese war and relations with Hanoi, and, perhaps, because of a fear that Hanoi, if forced to choose, might align itself with the USSR.
16. The Soviets probably hope to avoid a formal break in state relations. They probably find their presence in Peking useful for a number of very practical reasons, including the maintenance of a listening post. They may also feel that the continued show of the Soviet flag provides some encouragement to any elements in the Chinese Party which oppose present Maoist policies and some opportunity for contacts with such elements if future conditions permit. More important, they continue to be impressed with the probable costs of initiating a break in terms of their relations with other Communist parties.
17. A further deterioration of relations appears to be the most likely near-term prospect in Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviets for their part will wish to exploit what they perceive to be growing Chinese weaknesses. They may, for example, state publicly what they have already suggested privately: the Mao-Lin Piao regime is abandoning communism and becoming, in essence, a Fascist dictatorship. Some rise in the frequency, though probably not the magnitude, of incidents along the Sino-Soviet border also seems likely. Continued difficulties associated with the transit across China of Soviet supplies for Vietnam seem almost certain. Forced reductions in the size of diplomatic missions are possible. But we do not foresee a deliberate formal rupture in state relations between the two countries; the Soviets will probably remain generally apprehensive about its possible costs in the movement, and the Chinese will probably continue to fear its possible impact in Hanoi.
18. The Soviets are genuinely concerned about the trend of events in China. They also wish to capitalize on the apprehensions of others and to insure China's isolation in the Communist movement. For these reasons, Moscow will probably continue to seek some form of international Communist condemnation of Chinese extremism and obstructionism. But the Soviets know that many parties, though hostile to Peking, would not favor an international conference explicitly called for that purpose, or any enterprise which threatened to expel the Chinese from the movement.
19. A further intensification of the dispute is not itself likely to alter China's bellicose international stance or its foreign policies generally. It might, however, have some effects on the USSR's foreign policies. We do not believe that growing Sino-Soviet friction automatically assures a commensurate Soviet effort to improve relations with the West. But, as China has become more and more isolated and discredited, the Soviets have become less sensitive to Chinese accusations and perhaps less responsive to Chinese pressures for militancy. Since August, for example, there have been a number of signs that the USSR has become more interested in some movement in its relations with the US. In any case, as a simple matter of prudence, Moscow's inclination to avoid crises in the West would probably be reinforced by a fear of possible major difficulties in the East.
20. We cannot completely exclude a sudden explosion of the dispute into a new and even more virulent form, even in the near term. The Vietnamese war has added to the uncertainties and has no doubt increased the sense of urgency associated with the contest. The emotions of the chief actors in the dispute could come to have even greater relevance, and unplanned incidents could provoke even greater hostility and lead to new forms of mutual retaliation. Moreover, the internal situation in China is fluid; it is possible that domestic requirements or pressures might cause the leadership to force a severance of all remaining vestiges of contact.
V. The Outlook After Mao
21. Prospects for significant changes in the Sino-Soviet relationship--either a further, radical deterioration or an easing of the dispute--appear to rest in the main on what happens in China. We cannot foresee, however, what is most likely to emerge from the present turmoil in Peking, nor can we estimate the timing of possible developments.
A Radical Deterioration of Relations
22. The emergence after Mao of a Chinese regime even less flexible and more nationalistic than its predecessor is certainly one of the possibilities. Such a regime, either for its own purposes or because of miscalculation, might bring matters to a head with the USSR. The ways in which this could be done, and the consequences of such an act, are beyond counting. Hostility so intense as to lead to a severance of all forms of cooperation concerning Vietnam is certainly one possibility. Serious military incidents along the Sino-Soviet frontier are also possible, but both sides would almost certainly seek to avoid war. China probably would be constrained by its military inferiority and the USSR by its anxieties over the military and political costs.
Prospects for an Easing of the Dispute
23. The present Soviet leaders--and any likely successors to them--would look to Peking for improvements in the Sino-Soviet relationship. They are not of a mind, and see no need, for any substantial changes in their own position. While thus convinced that most of the movement toward compromise must come from China, they surely do not expect this from the existing Chinese leadership. They may calculate, however, that the successor regime will be dominated by men less anti-Soviet than Mao. The Soviet leaders may even believe that the present radical course of Chinese policy will hasten the day when there will be a reaction against the radical Maoist line.
24. Should such a reaction occur, Moscow might then hope for some kind of grand Communist unity under Soviet sponsorship, but it almost certainly would not count on a restoration of the close relations it enjoyed with Peking in the early and middle 1950's. The Soviet leaders probably would try, however, to encourage a new leadership in Peking to end China's overt anti-Soviet campaign and its competition with the USSR in the Third World, in Vietnam, and in the international movement. As part of this program, they almost certainly would offer the Chinese economic aid.
25. A successor leadership in Peking might be interested in an improvement of relations, but we do not believe that any Chinese regime would be likely to offer substantial concessions to this end. Mao's personality certainly played an important role in setting the tone of the Sino-Soviet polemic and his views also contributed to the substance of the dispute, as did Khrushchev's. But Mao's departure from the scene and his replacement by a more flexible leadership would not heal all the wounds or remove basic issues. The Chinese leadership as a whole--not just Mao--seems genuinely to feel that it is the aggrieved party in the dispute and that it has been the victim of a double-cross, specifically, the USSR's failure to fulfill promises to give China extensive technical, economic, and especially military assistance. More important, any conceivable new leadership in Peking is likely to retain strong feelings about Chinese national independence, cultural and ideological superiority, and perhaps racial superiority as well. Divergent Chinese and Soviet national interests are likely to remain a source of friction and distrust for many years to come.
Consequences of an Improvement
26. Nevertheless, we believe that a future Chinese leadership might see advantages in a damping down of the dispute and in a resumption of some forms of cooperation with the Soviets. It might see benefits, for example, in a resumption of Soviet economic, technical, and military aid programs. It might see some virtue in attempting to revive the credibility of past Soviet commitments to defend China. And it might be willing, in exchange for such benefits, to reduce polemics and to agree to cooperate with the USSR in Vietnam if the war was still in progress.
27. Such an agreement might even include harmony among Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi concerning overall strategy and the question of the war's continuation or settlement. If, in these circumstances, the decision were made to continue the fighting, Hanoi would benefit from the establishment of Sino-Soviet cooperation in a number of ways. It would probably receive military supplies somewhat faster and perhaps in greater quantity; the establishment in China of supply bases for Soviet materiel, for example, would expedite shipment and perhaps allow an improvement in the mix of weapons delivered. Finally, a greater degree of unity would give Hanoi's political statements and warnings somewhat more force than in the past.
28. Even a very limited rapprochement between the USSR and Communist China would be likely to have an effect on the international scene as a whole. World opinion has come to expect active discord between the two, and world politics rests in part on the assumption of its continuation. The changes in opinion and politics which would probably flow from any such adjustment in the Sino-Soviet relationship, however, are not easily foreseen. They might be subtle and very gradual: a slow renewal of confidence within the Communist movement, for example, or a growth of anxiety in Europe about the USSR's intentions in the West, now that its frontiers in the East were more "secure." Or they could be more substantial, as in Vietnam, and perhaps as in India, which might fear that any trend toward Sino-Soviet harmony would seriously threaten its security interests. Some of these effects would probably be present even though, as we believe likely, a limited rapprochement failed to hide all evidence of continuing basic differences and clashes of interests.
The Long Term View
29. Over the long term, to the extent that China proved successful in realizing economic, technical, and military progress, Soviet fears of a strong China on its borders are likely to grow. The prospect of a powerful China is probably some way off in Soviet calculations, and would not, in any case, necessarily prevent Moscow from seeking to normalize relations. But it would serve, we think, to limit the USSR's inclination to consider China as an ally and to reinforce other alternatives in Soviet foreign policy. These alternatives will probably include continuing interest in good relations with Japan and India, as potential checkmates to Chinese influence in Asia, and, over time, a more urgent interest in a European settlement.
30. On the Chinese side, while changes in the regime and its policies may produce an interest in normalizing relations with the USSR in order to obtain economic and military assistance, Peking is not likely to be willing to pay much of a political price for such aid. It almost certainly would not accept Soviet leadership in the world Communist movement, renounce its traditional interests in border areas, or forgo its claims to a leading role in both Asian and world affairs. China's requirements, political and economic, are likely to cause any non-Maoist successor regime to look to Japan and the West as the major source of the necessary capital and technology for China's development.
31. Thus, while we believe that the Sino-Soviet relationship could come to be characterized by improved state-to-state relationships and a relaxation in the bitter ideological struggle, we expect little or no positive cooperation at the party level and a continuing general atmosphere of barely suppressed suspicion and mistrust. Moreover, the relationship would remain highly vulnerable to clashes of national interest over a broad range of issues, and if China's power began to give punch to its national assertiveness, serious trouble could develop, particularly over the frontiers.
224. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, December 10, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 2:09 a.m. Passed to the White House. Rusk was in Taipei December 7-9. Memoranda of his conversations with Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, Foreign Minister Wei, Vice President Yen, and Economic Minister K.T. Li are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 103.
13023. Secto 35. Eyes only for the President and the Acting Secretary. There was no major surprise in my brief visit in Taipei. It was clear that spirits had been greatly boosted by the good vote in the United Nations. I encountered no complaints or recriminations from any officials, including President Chiang, about our handling of the matters or about our vote for the Italian resolution.
Before my arrival the South Vietnamese had put in some requests for additional assistance from the Republic of China and I found a generally sympathetic attitude on the part of officials in Taipei. It seems to me that this is now a matter of expediting specific arrangements and getting Chinese technical personnel in position to go to work.
President Chiang spoke at considerable length about the mainland, details of which will be furnished through memorandum of conversation. He expressed concern to see the problem of Taipei become involved in the problem of Viet-Nam. Apparently, he had in mind the possibility that if the two were intermingled, concessions would be made to Peking with respect to Taipei in exchange for peace in Viet-Nam. This led him to indicate that it would be a mistake for Chinese combat troops to be in Viet-Nam but I was not completely clear that he might not have been fishing for a request for such troops from me.
More interestingly, he developed at some length the thesis that he, his government and his armed forces are considered by Peking to be their no. 1 enemy. He said that in the "past few days" he had become concerned about the possibility that Peking would launch a nuclear strike on Formosa with "ten or twelve weapons" and reduce that island to ashes. He said that Peking would probably feel that the Americans might not retaliate because world opinion would consider that Peking has a perfect right to bomb a part of its own territory but that, in any event, Peking would expect to survive any such retaliation and its main enemy on Formosa would be gone. I told him that I would not wish to comment offhand on such a serious and far-reaching matter, that I did not believe the contingency he had in mind would in fact occur although no one can guarantee what the future might hold, that such developments seemed to me to lie in the realm of the insane and irrational, but that the U.S. considered its Mutual Security Treaty with the Republic of China fully in effect. I did not draw him out on what conclusions he drew from his fears because I rather thought that he would immediately recommend a first strike against mainland Chinese nuclear installations.
President Chiang rather expects that Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao will establish their full control on the mainland and will follow a militant policy dangerous to all of us.
I was once again tremendously impressed with the performance of the Republic of China on Formosa and I am bringing back some quite exciting material about their technical assistance to other countries which will be useful for Congressional briefings as a good sample of how a successful aid program can multiply itself in many directions.
225. Letter From the Charge in the Republic of China (Hummel) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/
Taipei, December 16, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Top Secret; Nodis; Official-Informal.
Dear Ben:
Prior to leaving Taipei on December 9 the Secretary requested that the record of his remarks concerning Gromyko's views on mainland China be recorded in two copies only, one for him and one for the Embassy. In accordance with his instructions, we forward this separate record of the Secretary's remarks, which have been deleted from our airgrams A-406 and A-409, both dated December 14./2/ The Embassy has retained the only other copy of this separate record.
/2/Not printed. (Ibid.)
One of the Secretary's references to Gromyko's views was included by error in Taipei's A-405, dated December 14 (conversation with Foreign Minister Wei)./3/ This was on page 3 of the enclosure, second paragraph, fourth sentence which begins "He had merely said that irrationality had entered the scene . . .". We have sent you a telegram today requesting deletion of this sentence. It is included on the attached record.
/3/Not printed. (Ibid., POL CAN-CHICOM)
Sincerely,
ArtAttachment
The following remarks have, at the Secretary's request, been deleted from the Memcons of the Secretary's conversations in Taipei, December 7-8, 1966.
The Secretary and the Gimo, December 8, 1966
The Gimo asked if the Soviets ever interpret to US officials events in Communist China. The Secretary said Gromyko is always unwilling to talk about the Chicoms. On one occasion the Secretary had asked Gromyko what is happening on the China mainland. Gromyko had replied that to tell the truth he did not know. Gromyko said that there is now an element of irrationality in Peiping, and this irrationality makes it difficult to interpret events.
The Secretary said that he wished to tell the Gimo in great confidence that Gromyko had once observed with regret that there is no provision in the Test Ban Treaty to enforce its provisions on non-signer nations. The Secretary said that the US would follow up this remark, and it is a very important development that the Soviets should worry about the Chicoms in this connection.
The Secretary said he had once asked Gromyko whether, in the event that Hanoi did come to the conference table, the Chicoms would intervene with military force to prevent Hanoi from making peace. Gromyko had replied that that would be inconceivable.
The Secretary and DefMin Chiang Ching-kuo, December 8, 1966
The Secretary said he had recently asked Gromyko what is happening on the China mainland. Gromyko had replied that he simply did not know. Gromyko said that the irrational quality of present activities prevents any rational analysis.
The Secretary and Foreign Minister Wei, December 7, 1966
He (Gromyko) had said that irrationality had entered the scene in mainland China, making analysis very difficult.
226. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, December 30, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Kreisberg.
SUBJECT
Instructions for 132nd Warsaw TalksDiscussion
1. Attached at Tab A/2/ are the draft instructions we have prepared for the 132nd Warsaw meeting with the Chinese Communists scheduled to take place January 11, 1967.
/2/Attached at Tab A is a copy of telegram 111764, January 3, 1967 (Document 228).
2. We have broached no major new themes in the current instructions. Paras 2-4 reiterate general US policy in Asia and toward Peking. Paras 5-7 discuss our policy in Southeast Asia and the Manila Conference. Para 8 expresses the hope that Peking will subscribe to the Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Paras 9-10 discuss communication with and travel to Communist China. Paras 11-17 include a major review of our position on the Americans still being held by Peking. Paras 18-24 respond to anticipated ChiCom accusations against the US for provocations and alleged incidents against ChiCom territory and ships. In Para 26 we suggest that the next meeting take place between March 22 and April 12.
3. The major contingency we have allowed for is that Peking will take the initiative to move the talks or to suspend them. Paras 27-34 provide guidance for Ambassador Gronouski in dealing with several alternative actions the Chinese might take. I call your attention particularly to the proposal in Para 32 that we offer to hold a higher-level meeting (at the Under-Secretary level) with the Chinese in the event they move to suspend or break the talks. A memorandum on this proposal is attached at Tab B.
Recommendation
A) That you approve the draft instructions except for Para 32 on an Under-Secretary level meeting. (This would permit dispatch of the instructions without delay, in the event you wish to deliberate further on the desirability of Para 32.)/3/
/3/Rusk approved this recommendation on January 2 with the handwritten note, "W/o par 32 at this point. DR."
or
B) That you approve the draft instructions to Amb. Gronouski, including paragraph 32. (The instructions in either case would be cleared with the White House.)/4/
/4/Under "Recommendation" all the text in parentheses was written in by hand as was all except the first two words in recommendation B.
Tab B/5/
/5/Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Richard H. Donald of EA/ACA on December 21.
IMPLICATIONS OF A HIGHER LEVEL SINO-US MEETING
1. The basic purpose of suggesting a higher-level (Deputy Under Secretary, Under Secretary or Secretary) meeting with the Chinese Communists, in the event of a move by the latter to suspend the Ambassadorial level talks, is to further assure that world public opinion unequivocally understands that the breakdown in communications is the responsibility of the Chinese. We strongly doubt Peking would agree (they publicly denounced a suggestion by Senator Mansfield earlier this year for a US-ChiCom Foreign Minister conference). Acceptance by the Chinese would strengthen the impression Peking may be most anxious to avoid, that the ChiComs are acting in collusion with the US.
2. In the unlikely event that the Chinese would agree, the talks would serve to provide a mechanism capable of restoring the suspended lines of communication between the Chinese and ourselves. In addition, there is the possibility--however slight--that the talks, on their own merits, could further our communications with the Chinese in terms of peace in Southeast Asia and increased understanding of the basic premises of our China policy.
3. The announcement that the US had proposed such a meeting, and in greater degree the holding of such a meeting if it in fact took place, would have important repercussions in a number of areas of primary concern to the United States.
(a) US Domestic--Such a move would probably be favored by a majority of Americans, as reflecting the Administration's efforts to increase contacts with Communist China and to seek a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.
(b) World Public Opinion--It should increase the credibility of our China Policy and our desire for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam, and effectively place the onus on Communist China for not only the suspension of the Warsaw talks but for China's overall isolation as well.
(c) The Soviet Union--The US initiative to "up-grade" our communications with China would probably increase the uncertainty of the USSR over what the US is up to with China. This would be true even if Peking rejects the proposal.
(d) The Republic of China--The US move would tend to be interpreted by the GRC as containing the seeds of a US deal with Peking at the cost of Taipei and as further evidence to support their suspicions that the US is prepared to "accommodate" the communists. A great deal of this potential damage to GRC confidence can, however, be avoided by frank discussions in advance of our motives and by disclosure of the bulk of the substance of the meeting if it takes place. This formula has worked well in respect to the Warsaw talks.
(e) Other East Asian Governments such as the GVN, Thailand, etc.--Same as (d) above, only to a lesser degree.
227. Memorandum From William McAfee of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to the Bureau's Director (Hughes)/1/
Washington, January 3, 1967.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR Files, 1966 FE Weekly Staff Meetings. Secret. Also sent to Denney and Evans. Drafted by James R. Gardner of INR/DDC.
SUBJECT
Regular CIA-EA Meeting, 29 December 1966PARTICIPANTS
EA--Messrs. Bundy, Berger, Lakeland, Hamilton (Laos), and Pickering (Thailand)
CIA--Messrs. Colby and Smith
INR--Mr. GardnerNationalist China
Mr. Colby said that during his recent trip to the Far East he had spent some time in Taipei and while there had had a two hour talk with Chiang Ching-kuo, the Generalissimo's son./2/ Most of the talk had had to do with the suspension/cancellation of the Grosbeak operation and Chiang, Mr. Colby said, had given it to him with "both barrels."
/2/An unsigned December 15 memorandum to Bundy conveyed the text of a cable report from Colby, who met with Chiang Ching-kuo on December 12. (Ibid., China, 1966)
Mr. Bundy noted that during his own recent visit he too had been put under fire by Chiang, on the same cause.
Mr. Colby went on to recount some of the details of his own experience. Chiang had asserted that cessation of the operation was "unacceptable", and he rejected flatly as unnecessary Mr. Colby's thought that perhaps representatives of the GRC and the US might conduct a joint review of the matter and the effectiveness of the Grosbeak operation. The decision to end the exercise, Chiang said, was his reward for having relied upon the United States and particularly on CIA. The GRC had lost some 120 men in the Grosbeak incursions and he simply could not see how, with that investment in human lives, he could confront his Air Force with the decision to end the program. It was with extreme difficulty that he had succeeded in establishing tenuous authority over the older army generals; he had achieved this only by pointing to Air Force support, and the decision to suspend thus would cost him not only Air Force fealty but also would thereby gravely endanger his position with the Army.
Mr. Bundy here interjected that this was a pretty serious comment on the solidity of Chiang Ching-kuo's authority, and Mr. Colby agreed.
[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]
Further, the Grosbeak decision had come on top of a number of other depressants. There had been a turn-down of General Yeh's list of proposals for operations against the mainland, there had been the abrasions of the Chirep issue in the UN this year, there had been the withdrawal of F-104's from Taiwan, etc. The effects were becoming noticeable. The Nationalists were no longer pushing the idea of a joint GRC-US intelligence office, or of a joint planning group to consider actions against the mainland. Nationalist cooling on these, Mr. Colby said, was some cause for relief. A slow-down in U-2 operations could be considered as slightly more serious, but only if there were a choking off the SI operations on the island would we suffer palpable damage to our intelligence interests. Mr. Bundy agreed.
Mr. Colby went on to say that from Chiang Ching-kuo's point of view recent developments had been unfortunate, but that it was time he faced up to issues. It was important that his thinking be brought back to the realm of the real world and off the level of fantasy, and that ideas of invading the mainland and reassuming control there be abandoned. Bringing the Nationalists to face reality was bound to be a laborious and difficult process, but it was necessary.
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]
228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/
Washington, January 3, 1967, 7:07 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Kreisberg on December 28; cleared by Vietnam Working Group Director Robert H. Miller, Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asian and Pacific Affairs George H. Aldrich, Bundy, J. Stapleton Roy of EUR/SOV, Holland and Anderson of DOD/ISA, Jacobson, and Jenkins; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Moscow, Saigon, Taipei, and Hong Kong.
111764. Gronouski-Wang Talks: Guidance for 132nd Meeting, January 11, 1967.
1. It is Wang's turn to open. We anticipate rigid and hard presentation from him focusing on allegations of US provocations against Chinese territory, ships, and ChiCom Embassy in Hanoi. Wang will almost certainly refer to Vietnam and the increase in US forces and may refer to US alleged intention to further "escalate" war by sending B-52s to Thailand. He will probably repeat ChiCom intentions to "fight side by side" with Vietnamese but we doubt he will make more specific ChiCom threat of intervention. Wang may also return to point made at last meeting that US-Soviets colluding on Vietnam and against ChiComs. We believe we must respond to some but not all these allegations. Wang may refer to US press reports of our offer at last meeting to exchange seed samples and again charge US violation of integrity of talks in effort to forestall comment by us on his unilateral publication of opening statement at last meeting. It possible that Wang may again move to release text of his opening statement after present meeting in order to further degrade significance of meetings and provide ChiComs with defense against Soviet innuendos at US-ChiCom collusion. We also do not exclude possibility that the Chinese side may take an initiative to propose a shift in the talks to another site. Even more seriously, they could take some action to suspend the talks although current evidence continues suggest they still find these meetings of some value. We have, however, included specific contingency guidance for such developments. Following is approved guidance for your opening presentation.
[Here follow paragraphs 2-26.]
27. FYI. In view rumors circulating over last few months of ChiCom desire move talks to Rangoon or elsewhere from Warsaw, believe we should be prepared respond to any ChiCom initiative this regard but should not ourselves at present time take initiative to suggest change in venue if ChiComs do not raise subject. Following is contingent guidance in event issue arises:
28. If ChiComs suggest move in acceptable manner either during regular meeting or in private discussions afterwards, you should probe as far as possible for their motivations in suggesting change and their suggested alternatives for meeting site and agree take subject under advisement without indicating US reaction. Our present thinking is that we would be willing move talks in order obtain greater security of contact if agreement could be reached on mutually acceptable site. We will want, however, to consider our specific response to ChiComs in context their approach.
29. We do not exclude possibility ChiComs may wish find some way to suspend present series of meetings without accepting public responsibility for breaking contact. One approach could be direct move to suspend talks on pretext that they unable talk with us in Warsaw while we "bombing" their Embassy in Hanoi. Alternative might be to launch ad hominem attack on you (as suggested by Geneva's 1466 rptd Warsaw Deptel 80795)/2/ and refuse further discussions while you US representative.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 208.
30. Basic US objective is to maintain Ambassadorial contact with ChiComs if this at all possible but, if talks suspended, to endeavor place responsibility for suspension clearly on ChiComs. If ChiComs express intention suspend talks on basis US bombing their Embassy in Hanoi, you should first reject their charges along lines para 22 above, refuse accept such charges as pretext for suspending talks, emphasize US willingness and desire continue meetings, and continue with presentation of guidance. If ChiComs indicate intention walk out of meeting or refuse agree to set date for next meeting, you should emphasize seriousness of move, emphasize importance of maintaining communication in times of stress citing 1958 and 1962 Taiwan Strait crises as examples, urge them reconsider, and, if they persist in their position, express deep US regret and your intention make statement to press on subject. Press statement should follow line outlined in this para. Specific language left to your discretion in particular context of ChiCom action.
31. If ChiComs lodge personal attack on you, we would expect you strongly repudiate charges, emphasize unprecedented nature of accusation, and demand an explanation for ChiCom action. We believe you should then complete delivery of prepared guidance but move immediately thereafter to end meeting and suggest date for next meeting if ChiComs in rebuttal return to their allegations against you. We would propose two week interval on this occasion and emphasize that purpose of this to provide opportunity for ChiComs to reconsider allegations they have made. Emphasize as in para 29 above US desire continue talks and willingness do so in Warsaw or elsewhere if there genuine and reasonable grounds for shifting site but that such discussions cannot take place in context unjustifiable accusations made by Wang.
32. We anticipate that if the ChiComs have decided to suspend the talks there is little we can do to affect their decision other than maximize their embarrassment. We would assume such a ChiCom decision would be based on their desire be relieved of political embarrassment of dealing with US in confidential talks at same time that they attack Soviets for doing same thing and warn Hanoi against negotiating with US.
33. If ChiComs choose break or suspend talks, approaches outlined above obviously do not exhaust possibilities. We cannot provide you with exhaustive responses to all possible ChiCom gambits but believe line outlined above provides sufficient general guidance handle other situations which may arise.
Rusk
229. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 9, 1967.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VIII. Secret.
SUBJECT
China's Vaulting ChaosMao's regime is in serious difficulty, to a degree that civil war has become a distinct possibility.
Months of growing chaos in the top leadership are now followed by widespread resistance to pro-Mao elements in Central, South and East China, as Mao's Red Guards and other "rebel" groups have attempted to move the Cultural Revolution to farms and factories. You have noted reports of violent clashes in Canton, Foochow, Shanghai, Nanking, the Chusan Islands and Peking itself, and of the breakdown of rail service in several sectors. In Nanking large-scale arrests (apparently of pro-Mao elements!) by Army and public security forces have been reported.
The source of most of our information on this highly confused situation remains press reports of "wall newspapers" in Peking. However, both Peking and Shanghai broadcasts have now confirmed serious resistance, and have warned of adverse effects on production. At the same time the Peking broadcast insists "It is an erroneous point of view that the Great Cultural Revolution antagonizes the development of production!" Mao forces are evidently determined to go through with their attempted "proletarianization" of the nation despite mounting costs now threatening the regime itself.
Most of the clashes have occurred in areas where Propaganda Chief T'ao Chu, number four in the Peking hierarchy, retains strong support of the party machinery. Much of this resistance has doubtless been triggered by recent official attacks on T'ao, principally on the part of Mao's wife. Attacks on T'ao were probably in turn prompted by his attempts to protect provincial party cadre who are opposing the Mao-Lin line.
The battle is clearly drawn. On Mao and Lin's side appear to be:
--a small and seemingly dwindling minority in the party;
--probably the bulk of the seriously divided Red Guards; and
--an indeterminate percentage of the armed forces.
Ranged against these are, apparently:
--the bulk of both the leadership and the lesser party apparatus;
--a goodly portion of the worker groups so far tested by Red Guard revolutionary activity; and
--an unknown portion of the Army.
Much more resistance from workers and peasants seems sure to come, as Mao's revolution is carried further into the provinces.
The big question mark is the direction in which the Army will finally lend its predominant support. It cannot stand aside much longer, if present chaos continues. If it proves to be as divided as other major elements of the nation have been, the "Mao dynasty" is in for more bloody convulsions, and almost certain demise.
Premier Chou remains the best hope of achieving a compromise in the interest of preserving the nation and the regime's hard-won, limited accomplishments. However, Mao has made his war one of veritable "religious" fervor, and compromise now appears highly unlikely. We must expect one side or the other to win out. As of now the anti-Mao forces appear the stronger, and gaining. It is curious that Mao's heir apparent, Lin Piao, has not appeared since November 26. Mao-Lin interests in Peking appear to have been left primarily in Madame Mao's hands, and the precarious condition of those interests is underlined today by wall posters announcing the dissolution of the capital's anti-Mao public security forces, and--perhaps the most significant straw in today's East wind--other posters accusing National Defense Council Member, General Liu Chih-chien, of siding with the anti-Maoists.
Walt
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