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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXX China DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

21. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, April 2, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, Folder 7, DCI Mtgs with the Pres, Jan-Apr 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.

SUBJECT
NSC Meeting/2/

/2/The meeting was held from 12:10 to 12:35 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diaries)

1. I briefed the NSC on the following items as per the attached briefing notes:/3/

/3/Attached but not printed.

[Here follow a list of subjects of the briefing and discussion of matters not related to China.]

5. Rusk stated that it was his and the Department's opinion that CIA was in no way overstating the depth of the Sino-Soviet split, indicating that the Department was studying carefully any evidence of actions by one party of the controversy against the other. He said no physical actions were discernible as yet but Rusk raised the question of the possibility of the abrogation of the Soviet-ChiCom Mutual Defense Treaty./4/

/4/The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, signed at Moscow on February 14, 1950; for text, see UNTS 226:5.

Action: We should continue to study this problem in depth and confer from time to time with State. I should be kept informed for personal discussions with Rusk.

[Here follows discussion of matters not related to China.]

 

22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/

Washington, April 2, 1964, 8:59 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dean and Green, cleared by Popple and U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by Green.

1533. EmbTel 1622./2/ We believe the Chinese Communists will seek to avoid any move that would make it appear that they responsible for breaking off Warsaw talks in view of considerable propaganda advantage that would accrue to our side. Moreover, ChiComs may well wish to continue talks, bearing in mind that Chou En-lai and Chen I during recent African tour made several public references to Warsaw talks to illustrate reasonableness of their position.

/2/Telegram 1622 from Warsaw, April 1, requested any thoughts the Department might have about Cabot's response in case Wang should "throw the book at me and then stamp out without waiting for my reply." (Ibid.)

Although it appears unlikely, possibility nevertheless exists that ChiComs, perhaps carried away by bitterness of their dispute with Soviets, may decide break off talks or to have them indefinitely deferred. In that event, Wang might behave in manner you suggest hoping to provoke us to suspend talks (Deptel 138, July 26, 1963, para 10)./3/ Also possible ChiComs, without necessarily intending to break off talks, may instruct Wang to dramatize ChiCom charges and punctuate his departure by in effect throwing book at you and stamping out.

/3/Telegram 138 provided guidance for Cabot's meeting with Wang on August 7, 1963. (Ibid.)

If any of these situations arise, we want to leave you free to play it by ear as you are so able in doing. For your general guidance, however, you should make it clear the Chinese Communists are responsible for any break or interruption in talks and that the US, in its search for a peaceful settlement of dispute, has been willing and continues willing explore every avenue to this end. We welcome Warsaw talks as effort reduce tension in Far East and lessen threat of war. As relevant to situation, you authorized make statement to press along above lines. If you are asked by press for US position on continuation of talks, merely state US awaiting word from Wang's side concerning talks.

If ChiComs have decided to break off or suspend talks, it seems most likely that they would do so by delaying naming replacement for Wang. This bridge we will cross when we come to it. If Wang does not agree re date of next meeting, you should not press but merely state US presumes his side intends continue talks and that we await proposal from his side as to date.

Rusk

 

23. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/

Warsaw, April 8, 1964, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Geneva, Moscow, Stockholm, Hong Kong, and Taipei.

1684. Cabot-Wang Talks./2/ Deptel 1509./3/

/2/The meeting was the 120th in the series of Ambassadorial talks. Cabot commented in telegram 1686 from Warsaw, April 9. (Ibid.) He reported the meeting in detail in airgram A-900, April 9. (Ibid.)

/3/Telegram 1509 to Warsaw, March 30, provided guidance for the meeting. (Ibid.)

(1) Wang opened saying he was being recalled and this would be last meeting this series of talks in which he would participate. Wanted to review Chinese efforts over nearly nine years he has been representing his government in talks. Said his side had made five reasonable proposals for relaxation tension, on October 27 and December 1, 1955, on May 11, 1956, and on September 15 and September 22, 1958. In addition his side presented series of draft agreements designed remove obstacles to trade and travel, exchange newsmen, promote judicial systems and lifting nuclear threat from China. Today he wanted present yet one more effort his side in form of draft agreed announcement (text next following telegram)./4/ Essence is mutual agreement for peaceful co-existence, renunciation use of force against each other, and withdrawal US forces from Taiwan area. Repeated position agreements of principle must be reached before concrete issues can be solved. Accused us not only lacking sincerity in talks but throughout talks carrying on hostile acts. Enumerated these in substantially same form as in many previous meetings. Asked USG study draft carefully saying five principles conform to UN principles and should be acceptable to all peace-loving peoples.

/4/Document 24.

(2) I responded with expression appreciated Wang's personal courtesy and regret this was last meeting with him. Said his remarks, however, seemed in their contradiction to echo same differences between words and deeds noted during my Shanghai service, record of which I recently reviewed. Same twisting of facts and concealed aggressions attributed to others. Chicom record throughout had been one of aggression around perimeter of territory they hold. Said while talks not wholly fruitless certainly no spectacular results. Nonetheless peace has been preserved within measure in Far East except for aggression in Korea which was before talks started. Said I could not give categorical answer to proposal before referring my government but pointed out we could hardly renounce certain treaty responsibilities which in effect proposals called for.

(3) I continued with attack on duplicity re talk of adherence to five principles peaceful co-existence and other statements and actions expressing intention aid revolutionary movements against legitimate governments non-Communist countries. I continued with bulk of paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 reference telegram/5/ with slight deletions and additions. I called particular attention last sentence Rusk quote/6/ reminding Wang we had consistently advocated renunciation force but his side would not agree.

/5/Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 set forth U.S. views in general, declaring that the United States sought a lessening of tensions and that the major problem in Asia was "Peiping's expansionist aims." Paragraph 5 stated that Chinese nationals were free to leave the United States, but that U.S. nationals were not permitted to travel to Communist China because the U.S. Government was unable to extend protection to U.S. citizens in China.

/6/Telegram 1509 to Warsaw quoted at length from a February 25 speech by Rusk. The reference is to the following sentence: "When mainland China has a Government which is prepared to renounce force, to make peace, and to honor international responsibilities, it will find us responsive." For text of the speech, see Department of State Bulletin, March 16, 1964, pp. 390-396.

(4) Wang attempted explain Chicom double talk by saying while they believed socialism would eventually triumph in entire world it was matter for given country to decide whether its revolution should be violent or not. No foreign country can ever concoct revolution in another country nor can revolution in given country be stopped from outside. Claimed one principle in foreign policy his government called for peaceful co-existence between countries of different social systems. Said Secretary Rusk revealed hostility toward China even in speech quoted. Said if USG willing, as Chinese Government is, practice five principles peaceful co-existence between us, he was sure we could find common ground and could have peaceful and friendly relations. Said dispute between China and US must be settled and he saw no other way except to agree on draft such as presented today.

(5) I referred to statements his authorities indicating they considered peaceful transition to socialism impossible. Bearing this out was long record trying export revolutions. This has forced on USG its policies in the Far East. Korea had led inexorably to present condition existing Taiwan Straits. Said I believed his side could stop the fighting immediately in Laos and South Vietnam if it chose.

(6) Wang quoted American constitution re right of people institute new government. Said they stand for revolution but object to export of revolution and it was USG which conducted subversion throughout world. Said they had not sent single soldier to South Vietnam. It was United States carrying on inhuman war there to convert South Vietnam into colony and in disregard Geneva agreement.

(7) I said presence North Vietnamese troops in both Laos and South Vietnam had been proved. They were there in defiance Geneva accords and with obvious Chicom connivance because supplied to substantial extent with Chinese weapons. Said their polemics with Soviets made clear their reliance on violent resolutions. Quoted from paragraph 4 CA-4523/7/ and from June 14 letter/8/ to effect it was wrong make peaceful co-existence generally line of Socialist countries.

/7/Circular airgram CA-4523, October 23, 1963; not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, CSM 1 CHICOM)

/8/Reference is to a letter of June 14, 1963, from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. The text was transmitted to Warsaw in circular airgram CA-1789, August 13, 1963. (Ibid., CSM 1-1)

(8) Wang said quote was correct--there was difference between opposing peaceful co-existence and in advocating it not be made general line. Point was foreign policy Socialist countries should contain something more than peaceful co-existence.

(9) Wang said it not known exactly when new Ambassador would arrive and it would take him some time to familiarize self with previous negotiations. I offered let him suggest date and accepted July 29.

Cabot

 

24. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/

Warsaw, April 8, 1964, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, Geneva, Moscow, and Stockholm.

1685. Cabot-Wang Talks. Embtel 1684./2/ Following is text draft agreed announcement mentioned reference telegram.

/2/Document 23.

Begin Verbatim Text.

Agreed announcement of the Ambassadors of the Peoples Republic of China and the United States of America on easing the relations between China and the United States and promoting their normalization (draft) in order to ease the relations between China and the United States of America and promote their normalization, and also to safeguard peace in the Far East and the world,

Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the Peoples Republic of China, and Ambassador John M. Cabot, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, have agreed to announce the following:

1. The Governments of the two countries agree that the two countries will co-exist peacefully on the basis of the five principles. The five principles are:

Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity,
Mutual nonaggression,
Noninterference in each others internal affairs,
Equality, and
Peaceful coexistence.

2. The Governments of the two countries agree that they will settle their disputes through peaceful negotiations without resorting to the threat or use of force against each other. Consequently, the Government of the United States of America undertakes to withdraw all its armed forces from China's Taiwan province and the Taiwan Straits area.

The Ambassadors of the two countries will continue their talks on the concrete implementation of the two above-mentioned agreements of principle.

April 8, 1964.

End verbatim text.

Cabot

 

25. Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Council/1/

Washington, April 14, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. I. Top Secret. Filed as an attachment to an April 22 covering memorandum from Rostow to Bundy. The source text does not indicate the drafter, but Rostow's memorandum states that it was prepared by Robert Johnson of the Policy Planning Council with the help of informal comments from State, CIA, and DOD and that it had been revised to reflect the consensus of an interdepartmental discussion in February. No record of the discussion has been found. Copies were sent to Rusk, McNamara, McCone, and ACDA Director William C. Foster.

AN EXPLORATION OF THE POSSIBLE BASES FOR ACTION AGAINST THE CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEAR FACILITIES

I. Conclusions

1. It is evident on the basis of analysis in this paper and the basic paper on the implications of a ChiCom nuclear capability/2/ that the significance of such a capability is not such as to justify the undertaking of actions which would involve great political costs or high military risks.

/2/See Draft Policy Planning Statement on "A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability", October 15, 1963. [Footnote in the source text. The October 15 draft statement is cited in footnote 2, Document 14.]

2. Direct action against the Chinese Communist nuclear facilities would, at best, put them out of operation for a few years (perhaps four to five).

3. A general threat of overt U.S. action to destroy the ChiCom nuclear production facilities in the event of major Chinese aggression would probably not be desirable. Threat of action in response to a specific instance of actual or threatened Chinese aggression would be preferable to a general threat, but would also have significant disadvantages. Whether it would be desirable would depend a good deal upon the circumstances surrounding a particular situation. If, for example, the ChiComs were threatening nuclear action, a threatened response limited initially to nuclear production facilities might be desirable.

4. Action against the ChiCom nuclear facilities which was incidental to other military actions taken against Communist China in response to Chinese aggression would generally be preferable to actions directed against nuclear facilities alone. Similarly, threats designed to deter ChiCom action should probably not be directed solely against nuclear facilities. (However, as stated in par. 3 there may be circumstances in which action limited to nuclear facilities may be preferred.)

5. It seems most unlikely that we can develop, through negotiations in the arms control field, a politically viable basis for action against the ChiCom nuclear facilities. The USSR is also most unlikely to agree explicitly or implicitly to U.S. action against ChiCom facilities or to cooperate in helping lay the political basis for such action. But arms control negotiations can further isolate the Chinese on this issue and can thus help prepare the way for possible action taken in other ways and on other grounds against the ChiCom facilities.

6. Covert action seems to offer the politically most feasible form of action. Such action would present least problems if undertaken as part of a reaction to Chinese Communist aggression. Political costs of action in the absence of ChiCom aggression are difficult to estimate. They could be considerable if Peiping reacts strongly; small, if it does not. [3 lines of source text not declassified] Technical feasibility continues to be a real question and requires continued analysis.

7. There are a number of technical and technical-related questions which would require an answer before a decision for any of the possible forms of action were made. These include the following:

a. It is doubtful whether, even with completion of initial photographic coverage of the mainland, we will have anything like complete assurance that we will have identified all significant nuclear installations. Thus, even "successful" action may not necessarily prevent the ChiComs from detonating a nuclear device in the next few years. If an attack should be made, some installations are missed and Communist China subsequently demonstrates that it is continuing to produce nuclear weapons, what is likely to be the reaction to the half-finished U.S. effort?

b. It seems to be the case that a relatively heavy non-nuclear air attack would be required to put installations "permanently" out of business (i.e., destroy them so completely that any rebuilding effort would have to start virtually from scratch). If complete destruction is unattainable without a large attack, how effective a job could be done with various alternative levels of attack?

c. Could the U.S. mount an effective counterforce operation, should that prove necessary, without employing nuclear weapons?

[Here follow 28 pages of discussion.]

 

26. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Taipei, April 16, 1964, 4-6 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2384/E. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough, and approved in S on May 6. The meeting was held at President Chiang's Shihlin residence.

SECRETARY'S VISIT TO TAIPEI
April 16-17, 1964/2/

/2/Rusk visited Taipei April 16-17. He sent a telegram briefly summarizing his visit as Secto 60 from Saigon, April 17. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 1 CHINAT-VIET S) A record of his initial conversation with Chiang Kai-shek on April 16 is ibid., POL 15-1 CHINAT. Other documentation pertaining to his visit is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2375, 2380, and 2384/E. A record of an NSC meeting on April 22, during which he reported on his trip to Manila, Taipei, and Saigon, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, pp. 258-262.

SUBJECT
U.S. and GRC Policies in East Asia

PARTICIPANTS
President Chiang Kai-shek
Madame Chiang
Shen Chang-huan, Minister of Foreign Affairs
James Shen, Director, Government Information Office, Interpreter

The Secretary
Ambassador Jerauld Wright
William P. Bundy
Ralph N. Clough

After an exchange of pleasantries, the President remarked that the time was short and suggested that the Secretary open the conversation.

Sino-Soviet Dispute

The Secretary responded that he appreciated the opportunity of meeting with the President and wanted to hear him speak on the questions that were on his mind. But, the Secretary said, at the top of his own mind now was the feeling that we were at the beginning of large events in the world. The situation was beginning to show mobility. It was too early to see what the final results of this would be, but it appeared that important changes were in the making. He therefore very much wanted to discuss with President Chiang what was going on inside the Communist world, the implications of the dispute between Peiping and Moscow, and what all this means to the security problems which we and the GRC have in the Western Pacific.

The Secretary said the quarrel between Moscow and Peiping seems to us very deep. Personal relations between Mao and Khrushchev could not be worse. They were using stronger language about each other than the Communists had ever used regarding free world leaders.

In one sense this was a quarrel over the leadership of the Communist world, but it also affected state relations, border problems, trade and security questions. It must, of course, be kept in mind that it is always possible for two dictators to reverse their positions completely and come together as Hitler and Stalin had done prior to the Second World War. In another sense, the Moscow-Peiping dispute may be a family quarrel which may not affect relations with the free world. If one or the other came into military conflict with the free world, there was still a question whether either could afford not to support the other. This is a question we cannot yet answer. However, we may get the answer in the course of this year.

The Secretary said that he knew the President had given a great deal of thought and study to Soviet affairs, including recent developments between Peiping and Moscow and would be much interested in hearing the President's analysis of the situation.

The President said that the Secretary had briefly outlined two possibilities. First, that Peiping and Moscow might each go its own way, and second, that this was a family quarrel and the two might come together again. Which development did the Secretary consider most likely?

The Secretary replied that he frankly didn't know the answer to that question. As late as yesterday Khrushchev had said that this quarrel would bring no benefit to the free world and that the Communist bloc would come out of it stronger than ever. U.S. experts on Communist affairs believe that the dispute goes much deeper than personal relationships. It involves party relations, ideology, state relations and questions relating to nuclear weapons. This combination of differences points in the direction of a complete break. However, the Secretary said he didn't think we could predict now what would happen. The whole problem of what to do about the dispute is now being discussed within the Soviet world. There is a great reluctance to permit a complete break to occur. A complete break would be a great advantage to the free world, but we cannot yet say what will happen.

The President said he was glad that the Secretary had mentioned Khrushchev's statement. He said his own general yardstick for interpreting Communist statements was to look for the opposite meaning from what was said. If the Communists alleged there would be no split, then there probably would be one. The words of Communist leaders cannot be taken at face value. The more they talk in terms of possible rapprochement, the more likely there is to be continued conflict.

The President said it was also significant that Khrushchev should have referred to his conflict with Mao as a family affair. Historically Communists would rather compromise with an outside enemy than one inside the party. The cases of Trotsky, Hitler and Molotov all demonstrated this. A struggle inside the party would be fought out to the very end. The President concluded that since the Secretary had indicated to Ambassador Tsiang that he would like to discuss Sino-Soviet affairs, he had put down some of his ideas in writing, and would have an English translation read (see Document A attached)./3/

/3/See A-942 attached--Tab 2, page 3. [Footnote in the source text. Airgram A-942 enclosed GRC records of Rusk's three conversations with Chiang, which the Foreign Ministry had provided to the Embassy. The four documents that Chiang and his interpreter read during this session were incorporated into the GRC record of the conversation.]

The Secretary commented that these were interesting observations concerning the largest problem we had before us in the world today. He inquired whether there was any evidence of traditional regional differences within the Peiping regime, or was the leadership relatively united?

Possibility of GRC Operations Against China Mainland

The President responded that there were ample signs of distrust among middle echelon cadres in the provinces toward the Central Government. There was not the same degree of confidence as before between the regions and the Central Government, but things were kept under control by stringent measures. The President said he knew that within the central leadership a small number of persons had come increasingly in recent years to distrust Mao, but there was still no outward manifestation of this.

The Secretary said that elementary arithmetic demonstrates that the problem of feeding the Chinese people is becoming more difficult year by year. The situation must eventually develop to the point where these strains will become almost impossible to handle.

The President said this was but one of the Communists' numerous weaknesses. In addition to economic weakness, there were political and social weaknesses too numerous to cite. There were also signs of wavering and disloyalty within the armed forces, whose rations were being steadily reduced.

As evidence of differences within the regime, the President referred to the liquidation of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, and the opposition to Mao of Peng Te-huai and his associates. Lin Piao, the present Chief of Staff of the armed forces, was practically paralyzed by illness. The President said he knew that Lin in his heart was opposed to Mao. Lin was a graduate of the fourth class of the Whampoa Academy, where he had been a classmate of General Liu An-chi, commander of the GRC Army. During the Japanese War, Lin had lived for some time in Chungking.

The Secretary said he would like to comment on the question of possible operations against the mainland which the President had raised. He would like to repeat his opening remark that we were at the beginning of a period of great change and could not be certain what the outcome would be. But his judgment today would be that in the face of the large Chinese Communist forces on the mainland the GRC could not establish itself militarily on the mainland without large-scale assistance from other countries, particularly the United States, and involving U.S. military forces and possibly nuclear weapons. He said, if he had to make a judgment today--who knows what might happen in six months--he would say that Khrushchev would have to support Mao. This could lead to the whole Northern Hemisphere going up in flames.

Nevertheless, the Secretary said it was essential to follow most closely the Sino-Soviet dispute because of its implications for the security situation in Asia, as well as Europe, Africa and Latin America. If either Khrushchev or Mao should die the situation could change suddenly and dramatically. There might be a complete reshaping and realignment of the situation.

The President said that he was opposed in principle to the use of nuclear weapons, particularly in settling the China problem. He didn't want to give the impression that he was advocating immediate action against the mainland. He had a concept he would like to explore. It was not his intention to request U.S. aid to go back to the mainland right away.

The Secretary said it was important for the United States and the GRC to keep in close touch in assessing the situation so as not to miss an opportunity which might be provided by the rapidly changing situation. Think of the difference if the free world had done what was needed in China in 1931! Subsequent history would have been entirely changed.

The President said, as he had stated, he had a concept as to how to proceed against the China mainland which he would have read in English translation (see Document B attached)./4/

/4/See A-942 attached--Tab 2, page 8. [Footnote in the source text.]

The Secretary commented that these were very important and far reaching proposals. He was sure the President would not wish him to comment on them offhand, as they were deserving of careful study. The Secretary went on to say that the reason he had asked the President about the possible existence of regional differences within the Communist regime was related to the President's own interest in South China. A major crisis could develop with Communist China in Southeast Asia. He wanted to tell the President seriously that if the situation in Vietnam deteriorated, the United States course of action would not be to pull out, but to take additional measures. These additional measures might very well involve danger and damage to South China. In view of the pressing internal economic problems in South China, perhaps something could be offered if that area wished to pursue a policy of peace. A combination of opportunity, pressure and danger might cause South China to break away and cooperate with the GRC. The Secretary said he didn't know whether this was possible, but these are things we should be thinking about.

The President responded that he felt very strongly that without the active participation of the GRC no movement in China's southern provinces could arise. The people in these provinces might suffer from bombing and other measures, but the end result would only be more hatred of the United States rather than a move for independence. The key factor would be participation of the GRC.

The President said he had mentioned earlier that the GRC would need U.S. support and assistance in initiating a large-scale anti-Communist movement on the mainland. Opportunities must be created rather than waited for. Guerrilla activity in certain provinces needed to be started. All this must be done first. Any help given by the United States would involve no risk to the United States. The President felt opportunities could be created in the southwest provinces bordering Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Burma and India. This area was too far away for the USSR to take any interest in and therefore there should be no concern regarding Soviet intervention. The President then said he would like to know exactly what U.S. policy, strategy and tactics were in South Vietnam.

U.S. Policy in South Vietnam

The Secretary replied that the most immediate purpose is to help South Vietnam deal with the Viet Cong insurrection which is supported by and to some extent supplied by North Vietnam. We estimate there are 25 to 30 thousand hard core Viet Cong and 60 to 70 thousand irregulars. The Viet Cong have more strength than these numbers would indicate because they interfere through terror with the villagers' cooperation with the government. They come by night, terrorize the villages and leave the people fearful of cooperating with the government. North Vietnam is providing four types of assistance to the Viet Cong. These are (1) full support in stimulating and agitating through political and propaganda means to try to create the impression that the Viet Cong are the winning side. (2) We have very good information demonstrating that the operating control of the Viet Cong forces is centered in Hanoi. (3) Relatively small numbers of cadres are being infiltrated from the north into the south. Last year perhaps 1800 of such highly trained individuals were sent. Each is worth 25 to 30 times his own weight because of his ability to train and organize local bands. (4) The north is also supplying relatively modest amounts of arms, particularly some of the most sophisticated weapons introduced to deal with the tactics of the Vietnam Army. These include anti-aircraft machine guns for use against helicopters, a few 75 mm recoil-less rifles and communications equipment. Arms are not being supplied in large amounts. Most arms used by the Viet Cong come from the stock of English, French, Chinese, U.S. and other weapons accumulated over the past 20 years.

Vietnamese Government forces are much larger than the Viet Cong forces, consisting of 200,000 regular troops and 170,000 irregulars. Government forces have superior weapons and equipment, mobility and unlimited economic support. Nevertheless, their task is very difficult because they need not only to deal with the Viet Cong but also to pacify areas. The Viet Cong hit and run tactics are very hard to cope with.

The President interjected "You say, in other words, the Chinese Communists are not directly involved?"

The Secretary replied that no Chinese Communist personnel had ever been found in South Vietnam. There was not even evidence of large numbers of Chinese Communist military or technicians in North Vietnam. Some weapons had been captured which were made in China in 1959, 1960 and 1961, but there was no evidence of direct Chinese Communist involvement in South Vietnam at present.

The Secretary referred to the substantial Chinese community in South Vietnam and said we were very grateful for the work the GRC had done with this community. There might be a few of these people who have been influenced by Peiping, but on the whole, they support the government and are no problem.

The Secretary said that we were trying very hard on the political front to deny Laos as an infiltration route from North to South Vietnam. All signatories to the 1962 agreements on Laos agreed that Laos would not be used as an avenue for this purpose. Of course, this agreement has been violated. We have been working with the signatory countries trying to get compliance with the agreements. If Laos could be stabilized the situation in Vietnam could be improved. Not all of our action is political. We are also engaged in certain activities on the ground to increase the difficulty of using Laos as a route to South Vietnam. Not all of these activities appear in the press. We are working very hard on this problem.

The President said with regard to the situation in South Vietnam, the important thing is to know the real enemy. The enemy is not the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, but the Communists in North Vietnam. This must be recognized before tactics to be used can even be discussed. To move a step further, we should know that the real masters of North Vietnam are the Chinese Communists. They pull the strings. If there were no Chinese Communist regime on the mainland there would be no North Vietnam, and if there were no North Vietnam there would be no Viet Cong. Regarding the question of how to win the war in Vietnam, the President said he had put his thoughts down in a paper which he asked be read (see Document C attached)./5/

/5/See A-942 attached--Tab 2, page 11. [Footnote in the source text.]

Madame Chiang said she understood the strategic hamlets had not been very successful.

The Secretary said it depended on the area. In the south the GVN had tried to go too far too fast. Its tactics were now being changed. The Secretary assured the President that his suggestions would be given very careful study. The United States was deeply concerned regarding the security of Southeast Asia. We could assure the President that we did know who our real enemies were. A great deal of sober thought would be given to this problem in the weeks ahead, and as the President knew, he was himself going to Saigon the next day for a first-hand look. He said we would be in touch with the GRC concerning the President's suggestions.

The Secretary continued that since World War II the United States had taken over 160,000 casualties in the cold war against the Communists, most of these in the Far East. We are not going to deal with large masses of men on the Asia mainland with conventional U.S. forces. We cannot ask that of our people. This means frightful destruction if the United States becomes involved militarily in this area. Consequently, we are not prepared to move too far or too fast in the direction of precipitating that kind of war. It may be that Southeast Asia cannot be made secure unless the Chinese Communists are hurt and hurt badly, but this would build up a legacy of hate against the United States. Even many of those who hate Castro advise us not to invade Cuba and kill 40 or 50 thousand Cubans, because of the scar this would leave on our relations with Cuba.

The Secretary said he could not quarrel with the President's identification of the enemy and his analysis of cause and effect. The question is, at what point do we face up to the costs involved, costs which may be frightful? This we must consider most carefully.

The President said he had earlier indicated his objection to the use of nuclear weapons in this part of the world. He was also sure that other people in this area would object. Their use was wholly unnecessary. Vietnamese manpower should be used in Vietnam, and Chinese manpower in China. U.S. military manpower would not be required. Even to think of using nuclear weapons was open to question. It was unwise. It would hurt the United States more than anything else and it was unnecessary. He said he was speaking very frankly to an ally and his desire was to be helpful./6/

/6/This is apparently the exchange that Rusk described in As I Saw It, pp. 288-289, although Rusk states that it occurred in his "final meeting with Chiang Kai-shek" in 1968. Rusk's last meeting with Chiang was in December 1966; he did not visit the Republic of China in 1968.

Chiang's Views of U.S. Policy

The President added that it was for the sake of the real interests of the United States that he spoke the way he did and he had also put down on paper some thoughts regarding U.S. policy. He was afraid these were rather critical, but if the Secretary did not object, he would have them read.

The Secretary said that we value the criticism of a friend.

The President said he had taken into consideration the real interests of the United States. He hoped the criticism would be taken in the spirit it was offered, as the views of a friend. He wanted to emphasize that only the armed forces of the GRC could liquidate the Chinese Communists (see Document D attached)./7/

/7/See A-942 attached--Tab 2, page 16. [Footnote in the source text.]

The President said he was afraid he had overdone his criticism. The Secretary replied that he took no offense, because the President's criticisms were directed at some very fundamental questions. He said the United States does not want to take any action on behalf of others if others are able to take care of their own independence and security. If you scratch the skin of any American you find beneath it an isolationist who would rather be home than anywhere else, but we feel we have learned since 1931 that aggression, if unchecked, becomes a threat to all, and free peoples must stand together to resist it. It was not until 1948-1949 that we began really to learn the lesson of the period beginning in 1931. We now have 48 allies in various parts of the world. Yet we don't control one of them. Sometimes we have the feeling that others control us.

The President said the Secretary must not misunderstand. It was Chinese Communist propaganda which alleged that the United States controlled the policies and actions of others. Take, for example, the United States presence in Taiwan. The United States certainly did not control things here, but this was the Communist propaganda line and it was sometimes taken seriously. Neither did the President have the slightest intention of suggesting that the United States return to isolationism. The world needs the United States, but the United States need not be directly involved in fighting. It should support others to do the fighting.

The President continued that it seems to be present U.S. policy to help nations fighting Communism to maintain the status quo. This indirectly enables Communist regimes to maintain control of the people. The resentment of the people that the U.S. is taking no steps to free them is bound to increase. Chinese Communist propaganda can then exploit this resentment against the United States by accusing the United States of aggression.

The Secretary said that if what the President had in mind was the capability of engaging in military action against the Communists without U.S. participation, this needed to be looked at with great professional competence to determine the capability. However, the United States cannot escape responsibility for assisting such action. No United States Government could accept supporting such an action and then backing away in the face of failure.

The President said he was glad to hear the Secretary's comments. To make a long story short, the results would depend upon U.S. policy and the methods employed. He hoped in the evening to have an opportunity to discuss the matter further. He also wanted to take up certain questions which President Johnson had said in his letter could be taken up with the Secretary.

The Secretary expressed his appreciation at the great thought which the President had put into his preparation for today's meeting.

[Continue with Document 27]

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