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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXX China DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

210. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 6:29 a.m. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House.1

Taipei, November 21, 1966, 1111Z.

1483. 1. Acting FonMin Sampson Shen called me to MOFA 5:30 local time this afternoon to inform me officially that a GRC decision has been taken at the highest level that if Italian resolution calling for study committee were to pass, the GRC will on the same day announce its withdrawal from the UN. He said GRC had telegraphed to FonMin Wei today, telling him to convey this decision to Secretary, if in New York, and to Goldberg.

2. Shen said that decision reached after consideration of its consequences, and was taken in light of fact that USG, after supporting position of GRC in UN for many years, now felt it necessary support study committee resolution that has effect of calling into question GRC rights as founding members of UN. GRC felt it would only encounter insults if it stayed in after study committee resolution is passed. GRC would continue to work against resolution, and felt there was some possibility it might not pass.

3. I registered vigorous adverse reaction to decision, terming it hasty, ill-advised, not consonant with position taken by FonMin Wei with Secretary last week, and not in line with our agreed policy of close advance consultation and cooperation on matters of major mutual concern. I noted that step if taken would amount to abandonment of UN field to ChiComs presenting them with a major opportunity which they might seize to detriment of all allies.

4. I deplored GRC failure to give me chance to present US position again before decision taken and said I would prefer not to take decision as definitive at this stage. I put Shen on notice that GRC might receive request from me for early appointment with Pres. Chiang after I had received instructions from Washington.

5. Full report of conversation follows septel.2

McConaughy

A more detailed report was sent in telegram 1484 from Taipei, November 21. (Ibid.)2

//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco on November 21 and concurred in by Bundy. A handwritten note to Rostow on the source text states that the Secretary had made these points to the President by telephone at about 11:15 a.m.1

211. Message From Secretary of State Rusk to the President's Special Counsel (Jacobson)1

Washington, undated.

1. I will be calling President later in the day regarding Chinese representation issue. Situation is as follows.

2. Italians submitting this morning a draft resolution providing for the establishment of a Study Committee. This text does not prejudge the ultimate solution and we will vote for it. Resolution will be co-sponsored by Belgium, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Trinidad-Tobago, and possibly several others.2

The draft resolution was submitted on November 21. (U.N. Document A/L.500)2

3. At meeting late last night, Martin of Canada pressed Goldberg to include in Study Committee resolution explicit language carrying with it slight "two-China" connotation. Both Goldberg and I fully agreed that we should turn down this language since it would only cause pain not only to the GRC but to our closest Asian allies.

4. President will have seen Taipei's 14833 in which Acting Foreign Minister informed McConaughy that, if Italian resolution were to pass, GRC will on same day announce its withdrawal from UN. This line completely inconsistent with what GRC Foreign Minister Wei told me last Wednesday that GRC prepared, though publicly opposing, "to cooperate" with Study Committee which did not prejudge ultimate substantive solution. I can only assume that this latest GRC view represents last minute reaction by Gimo. Since Assembly will debate matter for at least another ten days before any propositions are voted upon, we will have time to work on Taipei to try to convince them to stay in the UN even if the Study Committee proposal should be adopted, which is probable but not certain at this point. In the meantime Goldberg is seeing Wei this morning to inform him we announcing publicly our support for the Study Committee, reminding him of statement Foreign Minister made to me last week of GRC willingness to cooperate, and telling GRC to sit tight.

Document 210.3

November 20.4

5. I sent to you late Sunday evening4 the text of speech Goldberg made at GA this morning. Both Goldberg and I have cut it back severely to take into account even more fully GRC's sensitivities and to try to avoid any public statement which would give major offense to them.

212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China1

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Bennett; cleared by Sisco, Bundy, and Meeker; and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to USUN and Tokyo.1

Washington, November 21, 1966, 9:10 p.m.

88823. To Ambassador from Secretary. Refs: A--Taipei's 1483; B--Taipei's 1484.2

See Document 210 and footnote 2 thereto.2

1. Request you make appointment with President Chiang as soon as possible to discuss with him personally our surprise and dismay at sudden GRC decision to withdraw from UN if Italian study committee resolution passed. While I leave exact language to you, I desire that in speaking to Chiang you cover these points:

2. When I was in Taipei last July, I made it clear to President Chiang that there is no need for the GRC to worry about the US policy of support but that it should join with us in focusing on contingency tactics should serious danger arise that might threaten the position of the GRC in 21st General Assembly. Until recently we had reason to hope that this danger would not arise and that need for new tactics would be avoided, at least this year. Unfortunately, early this month a decision by Government of Canada to embark on drastic new initiative on the Chinese representation question suddenly endangered our common position in GA. The Under Secretary fully reviewed the situation with Ambassador Chow November 8 and told him that we had as a result been required to support tactic of a study committee resolution phrased in such a way as not to prejudice the outcome of the committee's work. I later personally explained reasons we felt these tactics necessary to both Ambassador Chow and FM Wei. Wei and other GRC reps have subsequently indicated to me willingness to go along with simple study committee resolution to head off the Canadians.

On November 16, 11 countries including Albania submitted a draft resolution recognizing representatives of the People's Republic of China as the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and expelling representatives of Chiang Kai-shek. (U.N. Document A/L.496)3

3. The principal reason that we have told Italians and others that we would support non-prejudicial study committee resolution is to keep ROC in the UN and prevent the passage of any resolution such as that sponsored by Albania.3 We were and are convinced that without this tactical change there would be a further erosion of support for US/GRC position on both Important Question and Albanian resolution. In our minds, the supreme objective is to assure that the Important Question passes and the Albanian resolution is defeated. After having fended off an Italian initiative last year only with difficulty, we faced this year the Canadian initiative and restiveness on the part of Belgium, Chile, Italy and others. Our support for study committee resolution was to prevent support building up for Canadian resolution. Our tactic was designed to cut the ground from under the Canadian resolution, which represented a new danger this year.

4. I am sure that Ambassador Chow and FM Wei have reported to you our vigorous efforts to divert the Canadians from introducing resolution calling for one China and one Taiwan and for seating of Peiping in the Security Council. We believe our efforts are succeeding. We have also sought to eliminate from draft resolution sponsored by Italy and others references prejudicing GRC interests. Here we have succeeded.

5. Study committee resolution which has now been submitted by Italy and others does not prejudge the outcome and does not undermine GRC's basic position. I told FM Wei that we would not lobby for study committee resolution, although we will vote for it, and that we would strongly oppose a resolution like the one contemplated by Canada. This continues to be US position. There is, of course, no reason why GRC should not make its opposition to these proposals known in New York and we would understand if it did. But we ask most earnestly that GRC not take rash step of withdrawing from the UN if the study committee resolution passed. The Soviet and pro-Chinese Communist bloc will oppose the study committee resolution and Peking will refuse to cooperate with any such committee, so long as the Republic of China remains in the UN. But if the Republic of China withdraws from the UN, both Peking and its supporters will seize this opportunity to move into the vacancy. Thus withdrawal from the UN would accomplish the very results sought by the Albanian resolution.

6. Ambassador McConaughy has told me of the change in the GRC's position on the study committee and of your intention to withdraw from UN should the Italian study committee resolution pass. I am surprised and dismayed at this. You will have given Peking a major victory which would enable them to pose as the sole representative of China in the eyes of the world. Withdrawal from UN would deprive GRC of international understanding and support on which it must depend in working toward fulfillment of its own basic policies. It would deal a body blow to effectiveness of UN and make position of US and GRC allies in Asia vastly more difficult. It would encourage Peking's militancy at very time when important decisions with respect to Viet-Nam and future thrust of Peking's policies may be in balance. GRC withdrawal from the UN would in short only help our enemies.

7. I would be misleading you if I failed to make clear in advance that the US would be most deeply disturbed by a radical action on your part which would have such far reaching consequences for the US as well as the ROC.

8. FYI: We do not wish you to raise the matter of a veto in the Security Council. If President Chiang asks about our stand, you should respond there has been no change in our previous assurances. End FYI.

Rusk

213. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received at 11:53 a.m. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House.1

Taipei, November 23, 1966, 1515Z.

1515. ChiRep. Ref: State 88823.2

Document 212.2

1. Herewith report of two-hour conversation with President Chiang four to six p.m. Nov 23. DCM Hummel accompanied me and on Chinese side were Madame Chiang, acting FonMin Shen, and interpreter Frederick Ch'ien. Conversation was relaxed and friendly throughout, even during Gimo's most pointed remarks about US policy. Location was Gimo's residence, not office, high tea was served, and absence of other top GRC officials who usually sit in on important conversations (Vice President, Secretary General, Chiang Ching-kuo) made for unusually intimate atmosphere.

2. After brief discussion of Eugene Black's recent visit, for which Gimo expressed appreciation, I said that as GRC aware, we are now at very critical stage of ChiRep tactics in UN. Because of the possibility of divergence of views between our governments, Secretary Rusk had asked me to deliver a somewhat extended message, containing an explanation of where we now stand, how we got there, and our views of the next steps that need to be taken. I said I had been in close touch with FonMin Wei and acting FonMin Shen and we have had very helpful dialogues. My request to see Gimo therefore not any reflection on Embassy's excellent relations with MOFA. However at this critical stage we felt it best to convey USG views directly to President Chiang. I said I had made an outline of points Secretary wished me to convey, as well as my own views, and I proposed to make six major points.

a. The history of the tactical maneuvers we have undertaken since Secretary's visit to Taipei in July, in order to maintain the position of the GRC.

b. The reasons for our reluctant acquiescence in a simple type of study committee resolution.

c. A summary of US efforts to dissuade the Canadians, and since those efforts failed, to block the prejudicial Canadian resolution.

d. Our position on the Italian Study Committee resolution and our attitude toward the GRC reaction to that resolution.

e. The adverse consequences we see if the GRC decides to withdraw from the UN if that resolution is passed.

f. The effects on the US of a GRC withdrawal from the UN.

3. I then expanded on these points one by one, saying first that when Secretary Rusk was here in July he had assured President Chiang and others that GRC had no reason to worry about US support for Chinese position in UN. These assurances are still good today. Secretary had also said at that time US and GRC should concert their efforts closely on possible contingency tactics in case GRC position should be threatened in the UN. Until early November it seemed that the Canadians, in spite of their previous intimations that they were thinking of new moves, would adhere to past position. Then suddenly they told us they would introduce a new draft resolution, very objectionable to us, setting up a study committee and pre-judging the results of that committee's deliberations in a preamble that in effect called for one China and one Taiwan. I said everything we have done since then in this study committee situation has been directed at stopping this very destructive resolution. I recalled that Under Secretary Katzenbach on Nov 8 had explained to Ambassador Chow reason why we felt obliged to go along with some kind of non-prejudicial study committee resolution in order to maintain votes on Albanian resolution. It had been our policy from the beginning, and it remained imperative, that we defeat that Communist resolution. Secretary Rusk had also explained to FonMin Wei and Ambassadors Chow and Liu on Nov 15 that we were far from enthusiastic about any study committee but that if victory were to be assured on the two most important resolutions, some kind of study committee resolution would have to be introduced. I reminded Gimo that Secretary Rusk had understood from FonMin Wei that GRC would stand firm and would be able to go along with a simple form of study committee, in order assist in preventing Canada's harmful resolution from passing.

4. I said that our reasoning in this started from the premise that it was absolutely essential to keep GRC in UN. I said we had to take into account a trend of opinion among many nations in the UN that has been adverse to GRC interests in recent years and months, both among some ill-informed small new nations and also among some old established UN members who should know better. I said this trend was continuing, although it was illogical in view of present turmoil on mainland, excesses of Red Guards, and militant actions and statements from Pei-ping. In the face of this trend, and of Canadian initiative, USG no longer had power to muster a safe majority against Albanian resolution.

5. I said it was necessary, above all, to pass important question and defeat Albanian resolutions and that until destructive Canadian action we thought that there was probably a definite favorable, though narrow margin on both. After the Canadians began their maneuvering, several countries we had relied on hinted they might not be able to support US against Albanian resolution if no study committee resolution could be introduced. In order to assure enough votes on the major issues some new gesture was needed, although it should not, of course, undermine any vital GRC interest. I said we had to face the fact that we needed the cooperation of other countries in order to defeat the very bad Canadian resolution, and we have so far been successful in obtaining this cooperation. Canada has not yet introduced any counter-proposal. I emphasized that we now are reasonably confident that the order of voting will be first, important question, second the Albanian, and then a study committee. If we can get favorable votes on the first two, we will have definite protection for ourselves and for the GRC, and if we achieve this it will be because of the small concession we made in acquiescing in but not pushing, a simple study committee resolution. We had worked hard and successfully to assure that nothing in favor of two Chinas appears in the Italian resolution and we had been able to prevent other prejudicial language.

6. I said although we had failed to dissuade Canada from trying to pursue its course, we had effectively prevented other countries (Italy, Belgium, Chile) from going along with the Canadians. We believe that the simple study committee resolution now before the UN does not pre-judge the issue and does not undermine any major GRC interests. We do not like it and we know that it is an annoyance to the GRC. However, we believe that all of us should be prepared to suffer some minor annoyances in order to maintain vital interests, and particularly in light of the critical situation in the Far East. We understand and sympathize with the GRC's strong views against any new procedure, and we appreciate that GRC feels it must oppose the study committee.

7. Gimo interrupted at this point with assertion that any study committee resolution implies the existence of two Chinas. He said if study committee resolution is passed this can mean nothing other than that there are two Chinas to be considered.

8. I repeated we understood that GRC must oppose any study committee and that there would be no problem caused between us by GRC efforts to defeat it. I said we are not going to lobby for it ourselves and we will not be sorry if it is defeated. However, I said, in order to win on the most important issues, which are in the first two resolutions, we were forced to commit ourselves passively to support a study committee. Secretary Rusk and I wish earnestly to appeal to you not to take your government out of the UN if study committee passes. In our view such a step would be rash and its consequences would be very adverse to all of us. Their full magnitude would perhaps not be apparent at first but must be carefully considered. I said we know Communist countries will oppose the study committee and Peiping can be counted on to object strongly. We are confident that Peiping will not cooperate with any study committee so long as the GRC remains in the UN and for this reason we believe that the formation of such a committee should be without serious risk to GRC. However, if GRC is out of UN, Peiping will move into the vacant China seat, if not this year then next year. Therefore in our view the departure of the GRC would have the same deeply hurtful effect as the passage of the Albanian resolution.

9. Secretary Rusk, I said, had received my report of my talk with Acting FonMin Shen November 21. He was surprised and dismayed at the statement that GRC would withdraw if study committee passed. Secretary Rusk believes that this would constitute a major victory for the Chinese Communists who would be able to pose as the sole representative of China. We believe that some naive countries would be impressed by ChiCom gain and would believe that ChiCom influence has been greatly increased. The departure of GRC from UN would inevitably tend to deprive it of the support, understanding, communication, and assist-ance which it has received from many nations and which it needs for fulfillment of its policies. The Secretary believes such a step would deal a body blow to the UN, and would cause severe problems for the US and for the Asian allies of US and GRC. It could be expected to encourage the most militant tendencies of the Chinese Communists and would come at a most inopportune time in a critical stage of the Vietnam war, when ChiCom policy decisions are believed to be hanging in the balance. In short, we are convinced that GRC withdrawal would have effect of helping our enemies and hurting us and our allies.

10. Finally, our own concern would be profound if GRC took this step which would have far-reaching adverse consequences for the US as well as for GRC.

11. I said these are Secretary's views and he of course wants to have views of GRC. I suggested Gimo might wish to think over these points and give me his reaction later. I expressed hope that we could continue dialogue between US and GRC, concert our views, and work out a joint approach.

12. I then gave my own hope that after this difficult year in UN we might see a turn for the better. There might be more nations who would experience a revulsion against current Peiping statements and actions. I noted that Soviets were lukewarm in supporting ChiComs in UN this year and speculated that countries like Indonesia and Ghana might be able to come all the way over to our side on this issue next year. I said it is also conceivable ChiComs might take some extremely rash action that would destroy the support they presently receive from various other countries. Important thing is to get through this present year and to stand fast on the basic requirement. I said "If you can stand with us, we can win through".

Gimo said GRC had already given serious consideration to most of these points, but he thanked me for outlining them clearly. He said GRC has thought of UN as something precious, and felt the obligations and anxieties of a founding member. He said that for this reason if GRC had to make any decision damaging to UN it would be only after careful consideration of consequences. GRC does not start only today in concern for and efforts to safeguard principles and Charter of UN; it started long ago. These efforts have been not only for the UN itself, or for GRC, but for the US also, and GRC will always be mindful of sacrifices in men and treasure made by US in WWII. I said USG also treasures its long and close association with GRC in good times and in bad.

Gimo said he fully understood what I had said, and that he appreciated sincerity of Secretary's tactical efforts in the difficult problems of the UN. He said he was aware of the hard work done by USG in achieving present text of Italian resolution, and he understood the reasons for the US policy of passive acquiescence in a study committee. However, he said, whether the resolution passes or not is something the US can arrange.

I denied this emphatically, saying I wished it were true but that we simply do not have the power to ensure its defeat.

Gimo in characteristic fashion shrugged this off, saying that we are good friends, and so should not argue. Fact remains, he said, that "passive support" is in fact support, and that although USG says it is not lobbying, passive support has the same effect, as he had just seen a news report that after Amb. Johnson saw Shiina in Tokyo, the Japanese announced they would vote in favor of a study committee. This, he said, looked like lobbying to him.

I said Amb. Johnson had not asked for Japanese support of study committee but Gimo remained unconvinced, saying that although he had no report of substance of conversation he believed the events were more than coincidental.

Gimo said that while he understood what USG had tried to do to safeguard GRC position, to Chinese people in Taiwan, on mainland, and overseas, it will appear that a study committee if established shatters the GRC position, and therefore the GRC position with Chinese people cannot be safeguarded in this manner. He said it was up to the US to decide whether study committee resolution should pass or not. First two resolutions could be won, and USG has announced it will give passive support to the third. It is still in the realm of possibility, he said, for USG to maneuver to defeat the study committee and thus to reassure the GRC of the friendship and motives of the US.

I reiterated that we do not have the capability to defeat resolution, and that GRC cooperation and understanding is very important to us. I said that I thought that our friends in UN would understand quite well what we had to do in order to prevent serious reverse, and would understand we had simply chosen the lesser of evils, and had not modified our policy of full support for GRC.

Gimo said he and I were old friends, and we did not need to pursue this further, since we understood each other. He recalled that Secretary in July had emphasized the importance of upholding the UN and the UN Charter. He said the GRC was well aware of its obligations to uphold these fundamentals, and that he knew the US to be a major upholder to them. He said GRC believed that any damage to position of GRC in UN constituted damage to UN Charter and ideals because of GRC status as founding member. He said he had told Secretary that as long as any formula does not damage the legitimate position of GRC or of UN Charter, GRC will go along, but if anything damages these, GRC cannot go along.

I said we agreed with these principles, and with the importance of the Charter. I pointed out that the study committee resolution contains the phrase "in keeping with the principles and purposes of the Charter", and that we believed this to be a safeguard for the GRC. I said USG certainly did not wish to harm the interests of the GRC, and that we did not believe the resolution had that effect.

Gimo said he fully understood USG goodwill and good intentions having this inserted in the resolution as a safeguard. However he wanted to make two points: (a) the US should not take an action that would cause Chinese people everywhere to have doubt of US basic policy, or to think US has shattered the position of the GRC or has given up the GRC. He urged that US think of these effects.

I said we agreed it was very important not to mislead anyone as to our intentions, and not to cause any Chinese to misunderstand us or to believe US was abandoning GRC, since this was not the case.

Gimo expressed hope that US course would be in accordance with this idea. He went on to his second point, (b), saying that to any ordinary Chinese the passage of a study committee was tantamount to a 2-Chinas formula. Even if the first two resolutions were to pass safely, assuring one more year for the GRC, it would be widely understood that next year or the year after the ChiComs would come in. He said that rather than be expelled in disgrace later, GRC would do better to leave now. He said that if the study committee resolution is adopted, then to the general public it would mean that the US has changed to a 2-China policy, and that US is ready to give up the GRC. Even if the GRC were willing to endure for the sake of the UN and the US, the Chinese people would not stand for a government of that sort.

Gimo said that USG should understand that GRC has been in a very awkward position for a long time, particularly since the Yalta conference when GRC gave acquiescence to a damaging fait accompli, brought about without any GRC consultation or knowledge. GRC had suffered the loss of Outer Mongolia, of Manchuria, and ultimately the mainland of China. Chinese have had many bitter lessons, and now if in the face of a study committee, GRC stays in the UN the Chinese people will be disillusioned with Chinese Government as well (Comment: presumably as well as with GRC's allies). He said GRC can give up anything, and had even lost the mainland, but could not give up its legal position. After all, he said, "My government and to some extent myself must bear a heavy historical responsibility. If GRC stays in UN there would be no way to answer our responsibilities to our history, our people, and ourselves". He said he did not intend to force his ideas upon USG, but it was clear that GRC could not acquiesce in seeing UN principles and UN Charter being destroyed, as well as destruction of GRC position. He said he had appreciated close US cooperation in the past decade or so and that he wished once again to thank USG for its assistance in maintaining GRC in Taiwan. He said he was not trying to force us into any course and would try to refrain from doing damage to US. He recalled that GRC had for many years kept US interests closely in mind. He said even if GRC were not in UN, GRC would be willing to cooperate fully with USG to defeat ChiComs. He said he believed US still had possibility of maneuvering to keep Chinese Communists out of UN even if GRC were not in, and therefore he believed GRC would not be doing damage to US interests.

I expressed appreciation for his generous sentiments in regard to past US assistance and cooperation. I said I wondered if some way could not be found to make clear to Chinese people everywhere that a study committee does not change policy of US or position of GRC. I said perhaps the committee would come up next year with a favorable recommendation and even if this were not the case, we should not take it for granted that there must be a disastrous result. I said I believed this could be explained so as not to damage GRC standing.

Gimo said it would be almost impossible to explain this. He repeated that US tactics in the UN were of course up to the US and that GRC without interfering would keep in close contact to discuss such tactics. However, he said, by far the best tactic would be the defeat of the study committee.

I said I would like to make a military analogy. I believed we were engaged in a very important central battle on the first two resolutions in the UN. The study committee question, while important, was somewhere off on one flank. The major cause, on the main front, was gravely in doubt, and in order to be sure of winning there we have had to take a little strength from the non-vital flank in order to bolster the main front. We have been forced to do this in order to insure against an unacceptable defeat. We earnestly hope that none of our allies would be so upset by the position on the flank that they would desert the entire battlefield.

Gimo said he understood the analogy and agreed that the issues as far as US was concerned were tactical. GRC would cooperate with allies as long as tactics were not harmful to GRC principles.

I said I also hoped for continued cooperation. I warned that it was not likely that in event of withdrawal from UN, GRC position could be maintained and protected, as Gimo seemed to think. I said I was not prepared to go into detail on consequences, magnitude could not now be predicted, but adverse effects would surely be more far-reaching than President apparently assumed.

Gimo again said that even if GRC not in UN, USG could find ways to keep ChiComs out. He observed that anyway GRC had caused many problems for UN.

I said GRC presence in UN had been invaluable in many ways. I recalled that study committee proposal in 1950 had come to nothing, and hoped that this time it could be sidetracked also.

Gimo said that things had changed greatly since 1950 and that GRC had made careful study of the problem. He closed the conversation by saying that we must try not to let this present serious issue prevent our cooperation on other issues.

Comment: Gimo gives every evidence of having thought his course through, and being determined to proceed, in sorrow rather than in anger. There are two imponderables, however: (a) precise nature and finality of walkout, and (b) possibility, rather remote, that senior GRC officials will be willing and able to persuade Gimo to change his mind. At this point I am bearish on the prospect for a reversal of decision, but not inclined to consider it entirely hopeless.

McConaughy

#

214. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Gleysteen; cleared by Berger and by the advisers for United Nations affairs in NEA, ARA, AF, and EUR; and approved by Sisco. Sent to 30 Embassies and repeated to Kingston, Port-of-Spain, Santiago, Taipei, and USUN.

Washington, November 23, 1966, 8:40 p.m.

90629. Subj: ChiRep. Ref: Depcirtel 88129./2/

/2/Circular telegram 88129, November 19, sent to 79 Embassies, stated that the United States would support the study committee resolution but would not lobby for it; it instructed the recipient Embassies to explain to their host governments that the principal U.S. aim was to ensure reaffirmation of the important question resolution and defeat of the Albanian resolution. (Ibid.)

1. Study Committee res submitted this year by Italians and others offers opportunity to improve votes in favor IQ res and against Albanian res since this new proposition may appeal to some countries which have in past either voted affirmatively or abstained on Albanian res in absence other alternatives before Assembly. Dept considers it important that we exploit this opportunity to maximum extent that is appropriate.

2. Apart from local problems there is especially delicate aspect of any representations which posts may make to host govts. We have informed GRC that while we will vote for study committee res, we will not lobby for it. GRC is strongly opposed to proposal, and any discussions which posts undertake must in no way appear to host govts as direct or indirect effort to influence them toward favorable vote on study committee res. Our purpose is strictly limited to maximizing margin of votes in favor of IQ res and against Albanian res, in order to show that GA is opposed to extremist solutions.

3. Department strongly recommends, unless objection perceived, that representations be made urgently and at high level. Arguments given below may be drawn on selectively depending on attitude of host governments. While we desire maximum number of affirmative votes for IQ res and negative votes for Albanian res, posts authorized as final fallback in both instances to suggest possibility of abstention or absence if effect would be net improvement from our viewpoint.

4. Posts requested to report priority results of representations to Dept repeating info for USUN.

5. Following are suggested arguments:

(a) Host govt has in past supported (or abstained on) Albanian res because it favored admission of ChiComs and not because it wished to expel GRC. USG has made it clear that it has not and will not lobby for study committee res, but availability this res provides host government with an alternative that avoids extreme of Albanian res which would produce irrevocable decision to expel GRC contrary to host govt's policy. Thus we urge host govt not support (or abstain on) Albanian res.

(b) Where appropriate, also urge for same reasons that host govt re-examine its vote on important question res. Charter explicitly provides that important question must be decided by a two-thirds majority. Change in representation of China obviously important question. Aside from Charter provisions, however, there is also additional political consideration that failure to uphold important question procedure could at some future time result in expulsion of GRC, a situation both USG and host govt wish to avoid.

Rusk

215. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis; Roger Channel. Received at 11:44 a.m. No time of transmission appears on the source text.

Taipei, November 24, 1966.

1517. For Assistant Secretary Bundy.

1. I want you to know of some of the GRC atmospherics here on matters other than UN items, which may or may not be further reflections of stiffening overall GRC mood. Minister Chiang Ching-kuo has been giving [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] considerable static since he was informed of USIB's wish to phase out [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] program. In addition to adverse GRC [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reactions which you know about in general, GRC intel officials have suddenly cancelled a pre-existing joint maritime program, and Minister Chiang has been unavailable to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in the last three-four weeks, although topics to be discussed (including next ChiCom detonation) are of direct and particular interest to him.

2. We do not yet know whether above static is an integral part of overall starchiness we are now experiencing from President Chiang, or is essentially Chiang Ching-kuo-inspired pressures on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in response [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] news and in possible attempt force some modification of this U.S. intent. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has not yet received an indication of Chiang Ching-kuo's reactions to the recently delivered formal written notification and exploration of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] termination. Presumably when [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] does get such indication, and when other returns are in, we will know more about cause and effect as between the overall and the specific. A hopeful note is indication received 23 November [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that GRC has consented resume special operations.

3. This cable has been prepared with the participation and concurrence [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

McConaughy

216. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Stoessel and approved in S on December 6. The source text is "Part 1 of 10 parts." The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's dining room at the Department of State.

Washington, November 25, 1966.

SUBJECT

Secretary's Conversation with Canadian Foreign Minister Martin: ChiRep

PARTICIPANTS

US SideThe SecretaryWalter J. Stoessel, Jr., Dep. Asst. Sec., EURCanadian SideForeign Minister MartinYvon Beaulne, Minister

Referring to the Canadian proposal on Chinese representation, the Secretary said he had one action recommendation to make to the Foreign Minister. The Secretary noted that some of our Allies in the Far East who rely on us have the feeling that Canada would never have put forward its proposal without consultation and agreement with the United States. The Secretary hoped that Canadian Ambassadors in Taiwan, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia and Thailand would make clear to their host governments that this was not the case. It was urgent that this should be done as soon as possible and before November 28, if feasible.

Martin said that Taiwan certainly knew the true situation on this matter since there had already been a discussion on the subject between Taiwan representatives and the Canadians. He would undertake to instruct other Canadian Ambassadors in the countries mentioned by the Secretary to clarify the situation to the host governments.

The Secretary said he had heard a news report that the question of Communist China's entry into the Security Council might come up in January. He did not know exactly how this might arise; whether on an issue of credentials or otherwise, but in any case he wanted the Foreign Minister to know that we would vote against. We would expect that our vote in this sense would be considered as a veto; if not--if somehow the matter were considered as a procedural one--this would be intolerable for the United States. We will not be over-run on this issue. Martin said he did not see how Communist China could be considered for membership in the Security Council unless it were a member of the UN organization, but in any case he was sure that the US vote against would be regarded as a veto.

With regard to the Canadian proposal on ChiRep, Martin commented that he had told his people there were some things the Canadians had to do which Dean Rusk would not like, but nevertheless Rusk had never threatened him.

The Secretary said that Mr. Martin had to do what he considered necessary, but it was clear that the Canadian move on ChiRep had been made without the concurrence of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR, Australia and even Communist China. No one went along with it.

Martin replied that the UK wanted the Canadians to go even further than they had gone. Nevertheless he was sure that what Canada had done was right and that the US would agree to this in due course.

The Secretary said that perhaps Martin had made his point with the Canadian press--The Toronto Globe--but internationally the move had not been accepted.

Martin replied that The Toronto Globe actually did not like the Canadian proposal on ChiRep, although its view on diplomatic recognition of China was another matter. In any event, he was sure that Canada had been right. He did not feel it was useful to pursue the discussion of this subject at this time, but perhaps at some later date they could talk with the Secretary about it when things had cooled off somewhat.

On another aspect of Chinese representation, Martin noted that the Indian Ambassador to the UN was convinced that there would be no progress concerning Communist China's entry into the UN until Communist China and the United States started talking and worked out an arrangement. The UN could do nothing. The Secretary noted that we have done more talking directly with the Chinese Communists than any other member of the UN with the possible exception of the Soviet Union.

Commenting on his visit to Italy, Martin said that all of his discussions with Italian officials had been on Chinese representation. He had found Moro especially concerned to do nothing which would go counter to US views on the subject. Martin also had had a most interesting talk with Nenni. Nenni had said that he personally would like to go farther than the study resolution but he doubted the advisability of doing so, given the opposition of the United States. Nenni had noted that politics was the art of the possible and he advised against seeking more than the study resolution at this time.

217. Telegram From the White House Situation Room to President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch, in Texas/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VII. Secret.

Washington, November 26, 1966, 1631Z.

CAP 661063. For the President from Secretary Rusk.

1. As you know, Chiang Kai-shek has formally told us that he would withdraw immediately from the UN if the Italian draft study committee resolution passed. The vote on this may come as early as Monday night, so that any further action we take must be done at once.

2. We gave Ambassador McConaughy all the arguments, and he has laid them out brilliantly to the Gimo, but without apparently budging him. McConaughy has also been hitting every senior Chinese official he can reach. Finally, I have enlisted Walter Judd to write a personal message to the Gimo. However, it seems to me clear that the matter requires a personal message by you, in view of the disastrous effect of such a withdrawal and the very important impact that your personal intervention might have.

3. I have therefore drafted a fairly short and fundamental letter for your approval./2/ It stresses particularly holding off on any action until I can visit Taipei on my forthcoming trip, probably between December 5 and December 7 (well after the UN vote).

/2/A note from Bromley Smith to Rostow, attached to the source text, states that the President cleared the short version of the letter to Chiang and that the Rusk message to the Foreign Minister was also sent.

4. At same time, I have prepared a longer message from myself to the Chinese Foreign Minister in New York. It is designed to supplement your letter by repeating the more technical arguments. If, however, upon seeing the two messages together, you thought it desirable to transfer some or all of the arguments in the second draft letter to your own letter, this could readily be done.

5. I hope that you can give me your reaction so as to permit dispatch of both letters as soon as possible. This would permit the Gimo to reflect before his final decision--which as of now appears to be for withdrawal.

Attachment

1. Please deliver urgently to President Chiang following message from President Johnson:

2. "Dear Mr. President: Ambassador McConaughy has given me a full report on his recent conversation with you about our common problem in the United Nations. I appreciate your courtesy in explaining to him so fully the Republic of China's position on the question of a General Assembly resolution calling for a study committee to consider the question of Chinese representation. In candor I must say that I was profoundly concerned to learn that your government is considering withdrawal from the United Nations should the General Assembly pass the Italian-sponsored resolution now before it. We cannot at this point predict whether the resolution will pass. But, even if it should, your withdrawal from the United Nations would in my opinion be a tragedy for both our countries. Its consequences would be far-reaching and fraught with dangers, not only for China but for the free world position in Asia.

3. "I have asked Secretary of State Rusk to make himself ready to visit Taipei to consult with you about problems of mutual concern, including especially the situation in the United Nations, when he is in Asia early next month. I hope you will be able to receive him at that time and that you will defer any final decision involving an irrevocable step on your part until you and he have had an opportunity to review the situation fully. Secretary Rusk will be prepared to go over with you in fullest detail the entire background of this matter, including our strenuous efforts over the years to maintain support in the United Nations for our traditional position on Chinese representation.

4. "I am writing you in these frank terms because of the high value I attach to your friendship and because the Republic of China is one of the United States closest and most trusted allies. Continuing close cooperation between our governments is vital to freedom's cause in Asia; and, in the struggle for freedom, political actions are often as important as those fought on the field of battle. Your standing in history as one of the great leaders of the Chinese people, already secure, will gain added luster by your indomitable defense of your country's rights in the United Nations. Sincerely yours, Lyndon B. Johnson."

Please deliver following personal letter to GRC Foreign Minister:

Begin text

Dear Mr. Minister:

1. As you undoubtedly know, Ambassador McConaughy has talked at length with your President about the position of your government in connection with the Italian resolution for a study committee. Although this conversation covered most of the critical matters, I am sending you this personal letter to underscore certain points. At the same time, President Johnson is sending a personal and separate letter to your President.

2. First of all, let me assure you again that the United States decision to vote for a non-prejudicial study committee resolution was taken only after the most careful and thoroughgoing deliberation. As you know, we have maintained closest consultations with the GRC in Taipei, Washington and New York from the time earlier in the year when I and other officials discussed with your government the danger which might develop at the UNGA this autumn and the possible need for new tactics. We have had only one objective in view: to preserve the position of the Republic of China in the United Nations.

3. In early November, Canada, without prior consultation and despite our strongest protests, told us that it would introduce a resolution with "one-China-one-Taiwan" overtones and calling for the seating of Peiping in the Security Council. The situation in the General Assembly was made even more perilous by the restiveness on the question shown by Italy, Belgium and Chile. In this sudden emergency we had no choice but to fall back on the tactic of a study committee in an effort to head off Canada's dangerous initiative, which if unchecked could have lost us their support and the support of others on the important question and against the Albanian resolution. This step has now succeeded in forestalling the threatened Canadian move. I hope that it will also enable us to achieve a better vote than last year on the important question resolution and against the Albanian resolution.

4. I am sure you understand that in taking this step the United States is in no way altering its policy of firm support of the Republic of China. We remain determined to oppose with the full strength and influence of the United States all attempts to expel the Republic of China from the United Nations and to seat the Communists.

5. We have a close treaty bond with the Republic of China which is a solemn obligation. China and the United States have a history of particularly close friendship and alliance extending over many years. The cooperation and collaboration between us has had many remarkable accomplishments and successes and I am sure there will be many more. In view of this long and intimate association between our countries, I am confident that our position in this matter enjoys your understanding and that of your President.

6. Your President has suggested to Ambassador McConaughy that it might still be possible for the United States to maneuver to defeat the Italian resolution. We have told several governments who have asked us that we would not object if they were to vote against it. We have not urged any government to vote for it. As I told you last week, the United States would in fact be content if the Italian proposal were to fail, and we entirely understand your government's efforts to defeat it. We cannot go beyond this because our vote for the Italian resolution was the price we had to pay for critically needed support on the important question and Albanian resolutions.

7. In talking to Ambassador McConaughy, your President observed that to the public the study committee resolution appears tantamount to a two-Chinas formula. This is not, however, the view of the United States. Our representatives have exerted themselves with success to assure that no language is incorporated in the study committee resolution which prejudges the outcome of the study. The resolution's operative paragraph stipulates that the committee's findings be "in keeping with the principles and purposes of the Charter." This stipulation in our view was essential as a safeguard of the GRC position. There is moreover no means of foretelling at this time whether the committee will in fact ultimately arrive at any agreed conclusions; nor, if reached, what those conclusions might be; nor what action the General Assembly might take on them. Why leave the field of battle and thus precipitate the very situation we both have striven so long and successfully to prevent when the outcome has yet to be determined? This is the time to stay and fight and not withdraw.

8. There is one point your President made to Ambassador McCon-aughy which I want particularly to mention. This is the suggestion that the United States could still find means to prevent the Chinese Communists from entering the United Nations even if the Republic of China were to withdraw. If you should withdraw, we believe the voting situation would change drastically and that Peiping would be seated. Your withdrawal from the United Nations would bring about exactly what the supporters of the Albanian resolution desire.

9. Representatives from Communist China could with relative ease appear in the General Assembly and ask that their credentials be accepted as the only representatives from China. If you had withdrawn from the UN, it seems to us a foregone conclusion that the Assembly would accept such credentials. As to the Security Council, I reaffirmed our position to your President in 1964. That position stands. However, the Security Council would have to act independently on credentials of any representative seeking accreditation there. If your representatives had left the UN, there would be an overwhelming sentiment to accept representatives from Peiping, and the possibility of a veto would be far less relevant than in case of a contest between competing representatives, and indeed would in all probability no longer exist.

10. I believe the consequences of a withdrawal from the United Nations by the Republic of China would be extremely serious for both our countries. By opening the United Nations door to Peiping, the Communists would be given an important victory at no cost to themselves--and at a time when the Communist forces on the mainland of China are in deep disarray. The encouragement this victory would give to the Communists could have incalculable consequences for the struggle for freedom we are now waging in Viet-nam. It would deal a blow to the effectiveness of the United Nations, and it would make more difficult the position of our countries' friends and allies in Asia.

11. Another consequence, which I consider just as serious, is the irreparable damage that withdrawal from the United Nations would do to the world position of your own government, which for the achievement of its policies must have international understanding and support. GRC withdrawal would confuse the Republic of China's friends abroad and hearten its enemies. This step would come at a moment when the US particularly needs GRC cooperation in the difficult UN situation and would be regarded as a reverse to our common cause.

12. Finally, I would like to leave this thought with you. Communist China's aim is to get the Republic of China out of the UN by one means or other, and establish itself in the UN and in the eyes of the world as the only legitimate government of China. So long as you remain in the UN, as they have repeated again only Thursday, the Communist Chinese will not accept membership. Your presence in the UN, in effect, is the surest guarantee against a Communist China presence.

Sincerely yours,

Dean Rusk

End text.

218. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/

Taipei, November 28, 1966, 1130Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House.

1568. ChiRep. Ref: State 91770 [91771]./2/

/2/Telegram 91771, November 26, transmitted the text of Johnson's message to Chiang. Telegram 91770, November 26, sent to USUN and repeated to Taipei, transmitted the text of Rusk's message to Wei. (Both ibid.) For texts of the messages, see Document 217.

1. I had forty-five minute conversation with President Chiang at 11 this morning Nov 28 at his residence to deliver Pres Johnson's letter contained reftel. DCM accompanied me, and as before only Mme Chiang, Acting FonMin Shen, and interpreter Frederick Ch'ien were present. Atmosphere was somewhat more relaxed than on my previous call Nov 23 (Taipei 1515)./3/

/3/Document 213.

2. I made same introductory comments about the burden I knew Gimo was carrying, and hoped he had some relaxation over weekend. I said I appreciated his making time to see me on short notice. Gimo said he always took pleasure in seeing me and DCM Hummel.

3. I handed to Gimo original and copies of President Johnson's letter, and interpreter gave immediate verbal rendering, Mme Chiang and Shen reading copies as translation proceeded. Gimo said he had listened carefully, and appreciated the letter.

4. I told Gimo that it seemed likely that Secy Rusk could come to Taipei on evening of Dec 6, staying all following day and leaving about noon Dec 8.

5. Gimo said that of course he welcomed Secretary's visit. He said that insofar as UN problems were concerned, GRC still hoped Italian resolution might not pass and then GRC would need to take no action. The situation would of course be discussed with Secy Rusk. However, he said, he understood that voting in UN will take place this week and if Italian resolution passes, GRC cannot remain silent. The timing is very important. However, he said, referring to the letter from President Johnson, which he considered to be sincere and frank, he would bring the letter to the attention of officials of his govt so that they could consult further on the problem.

6. I asked if dates for Secy's visit were convenient, and Gimo replied that they were.

7. Gimo said that the most important question to study now is how to defeat the Italian resolution. He said that once it has passed the GRC "would have to make its position clear to the world." He hoped this was understood by USG.

8. I replied that I understood what he had told me on this point in this conversation and in previous conversations.

9. Gimo said that of course before he took any action he would have to consult with officers of his govt. He said that he would inform the USG of his govt's decision, would get USG reaction, and would continue consult with us.

10. I said I hoped we could keep in very close contact on this matter, and that I was available at any hour of day or night for any consultations.

11. Gimo repeated that the most important task is to defeat the Italian resolution. He said that he had studied the Secretary's letter to FonMin Wei, and that although he fully understood that USG has adopted passive attitude, it is still most important that the resolution be defeated.

12. I said I wished to give a brief resume of recent developments relative to the pending UN resolutions. I said there had been full exchanges on this in Washington, New York, and elsewhere with GRC officials and with representatives of many countries. I said we had also told US Embassies to make it clear to other govts that we are not lobbying for, pushing, or soliciting votes for the resolution. Our representatives are also making it explicit that we would not object to or hold it against any country wishing to oppose the resolution.

13. I noted that our intention to vote affirmatively on Italian resolution was based on the commitment we were compelled to give in order to obtain the very crucial votes of certain countries that were wavering on the Albanian resolution. We are now bound to honor our word but Gimo could rest assured that our vote is not an enthusiastic one. We believe that our tactical decision has safeguarded from 6 to 8 votes which are essential in order to assure defeat of Albanian proposal. It could be seen that our move would have a successful result.

14. I said we had given careful and sympathetic consideration to the diplomatic note sent to us November 26 asking us not to vote for the Italian proposal./4/ In view of commitment we have already made to other nations in order to assure defeat of the Albanian resolution, we cannot change our vote now. However, I was confident other nations understood our position and clearly realized we are not pressing any other country to vote for the Italian proposal.

/4/Not found.

15. Gimo asked if US position could be made clear to Japanese Govt. He said similar diplomatic note had also been sent to Japanese Embassy here requesting GOJ abstain. He said that what I had told him of US instructions should be made clear to GOJ and he made a direct request that we accomplish this.

16. I said I was sure that this had already been done, but would send a special message (see septel) asking that US position be explained once again to GOJ./5/

/5/McConaughy sent this message in telegram 1565 from Taipei, November 28. Telegram 92145, November 28, conveyed the request to Tokyo, and telegram 3998 from Tokyo, November 29, reported that Ambassador Johnson had spoken to Vice Foreign Minister Shimoda, who stated that he would instruct the Japanese Ambassador in Taipei to make it clear to the GRC that the U.S. Government had never asked the Japanese Government to support the Italian resolution. (All in Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM)

17. Gimo expressed his thanks. He said that my approach today, the letter from President Johnson, and Secretary Rusk's letter to FonMin Wei would all be discussed with GRC officials. He said that I would be informed of decision when it is reached.

18. I said we had carefully studied the voting prospects on all three resolutions, and that on the essential ones, which were the important question and the Albanian, we were confident of favorable outcome. We do not yet know, however, what will be the result of voting on Italian proposal. The position of many countries appeared uncertain, and we do not know whether it will be defeated or passed.

19 Gimo repeated that if USG were to support GRC in working on this, Italian resolution could be defeated. He said GRC is fully aware of the very important implications of the Italian resolution and would have to take a position based on GRC's own interests, and also those of US, UN and allies. He said all these interests will be taken into account in GRC deliberations.

20. I said we had been thinking of contingency planning in the event that the Italian resolution were to pass and of appropriate action GRC might take to make its position clear. I said I would like to suggest in rough form some language GRC might wish to consider for use in a declaration in UN in that event, along following lines: "GRC has every confidence that any objective study of ChiRep must have the result of reaffirmation of the status of the GRC as the only qualified, lawful and representative Government of China. Therefore, GRC has nothing to fear from a study of the question, although it is unnecessary. However, in the event of any objectionable recommendation by the study committee, the GRC reserves its full rights to take any action it considers necessary and appropriate under the circumstances." I said it was our belief that such a statement would be dignified, appropriate, and sufficient to safeguard GRC interests and prestige.

21. Gimo replied that my suggestion would be of value for GRC reference and discussion, but Chinese people would never understand if such a statement were made. However, he said, he would have to consult with other govt officials on this as well as other points.

22. I said I hoped the public would be enabled to understand the US position. I noted that Chinese press seems to be giving the erroneous impression that USG has been proceeding in the direction of a "two-Chinas" policy in the UN. This could be damaging to our joint interests if it should become widespread. I hoped the impression could be corrected.

23. Gimo assured me he would do what could be done to see that Chinese people understood and do not get wrong impression of US intentions. However, the Chinese people would not understand if GRC were to take any action that does not conform to its present foreign policies. He said he would carefully consider this matter. Alloted time for interview was clearly up at this point.

24. As we left Presidential residence, I told Acting FonMin Shen that I had a few additional points I wished to make and we adjourned to Shen's office for further discussion.

25. I told Shen that I wished to reaffirm the contingency assurance given by Secretary Rusk in 1964 that USG intended veto any attempt at ChiCom admission to Security Council, if veto would be effective. However, if the GRC had already left the UN, our parliamentary position in trying to keep Chinese Communists out would be vastly more difficult. We have grave doubt that veto in the Security Council would be effective under those circumstances. Most Security Council members would probably think that in absence of GRC from UN, filling of vacant China seat would be purely procedural matter of credentials, and that veto would be inapplicable on those grounds. I told Shen GRC should not assume that it would be possible to keep ChiComs out of UN if GRC withdrew. We anticipated that once GRC left, ChiComs would have relatively easy sailing. If GRC stayed firmly in UN, however, chances of keeping ChiComs out would be very good. GRC should be under no delusion that walkout could be only a temporary maneuver. Both from the viewpoint of psychological effect on vote of countries that are already wavering, and in terms of parliamentary procedures open to the opposition, walkout would likely be final, however GRC intended.

26. I noted that recent ChiCom public statements reveal a somewhat softer position on conditions for ChiCom entry into UN. I referred to November 25 column in Peoples Daily, signed "Observer" which strongly attacked Canadian proposition but which omitted any reference to the preposterous conditions that ChiComs laid down last year as prerequisites to their entry into UN. This article also carefully avoided usual intemperate language which might alienate the uncommitted. It is possible that ChiComs are now actively interested in obtaining UN entry. In any event, it is evident to us that there would be great rejoicing in Peiping if GRC walked out. GRC should give most sober and skeptical consideration to any prospective course that would play into hands of ChiComs and harm US, UN, and allies.

27. I said it was our considered view that US security position in Southeast Asia could be seriously prejudiced by GRC walkout. I asked Shen to give this his solemn consideration. Chinese Communists would be emboldened by apparent success their tough stance, and might be tempted to intervene more openly in SEA. I reminded Shen that Gimo had assured Secretary Rusk on July 3 that GRC policy was first and foremost to give help to US position in Vietnam, ahead of any other GRC obligation. If GRC did not hold fast in UN, US position in Vietnam would be affected adversely. Secretary Rusk said in letter to FonMin Wei, GRC departure would confuse GRC's friends and help its enemies. It would be interpreted as a grave setback for the US and allies, exposing allied position in Vietnam and undermining allied influence in UN.

28. I said that if GRC persisted in withdrawal move, it would almost seem that GRC was not interested in maintaining the traditional posture of a great national government, aware of its international ties and responsibilities. In self-imposed isolation from international life, GRC would have more the posture of a local regime of some kind. A GRC with no UN status would give impetus to the unfriendly argument in the UN that government here was acting as a local regime and should be considered as under the authority of Peiping. USG of course did not share such unwarranted opinion but its widespread existence in UN might make it difficult to uphold the juridical position of GRC.

29. I repeated my view expressed to Chang Chun on Nov. 26 that GRC could not really be humiliated by resolutely staying in UN and defending its principles. I said that abusive tactics of unworthy persons or nations cannot humilate those who are worthy. By remaining in UN, GRC status would by no means be demeaned, but rather would be enhanced by exhibition of GRC courage and resolve in standing up to contemptible efforts of its enemies.

30. Shen promised to convey all the foregoing representations to President immediately. He said would give final answer after further deliberations had been undertaken.

31. Shen then said with considerable asperity that the GRC had just about reached its limit in enduring insults at UN. He said GRC position in Security Council had been eroded, the GRC had been "kicked out of" Ecosoc, and with the departure of Wellington Koo for the first time there was no representative on the ICJ of a permanent member of SC. He said that most recently in course of tactical deliberation on Israel-Jordan situation, USG had not consulted GRC, that GRC was not included in any of consultative groups, and that the US officials "walked right by GRC representatives in UN lounge, without greeting or comment." He said GRC is not in fact highly regarded by UN members or even by some US officials. However, calming down considerably, he said GRC would give all these US representations very serious consideration. He said he did not know how the decision would come out, but he thought it would be reached and would be conveyed to me in a very short time.

32. In closing the conversation I urged again that no final walkout decision if Italian resolution were to pass should be taken before Secretary Rusk's visit.

33. Comment: Failure of Gimo and Shen to reiterate previous assertion that decision is final is of course hopeful sign. However, I believe crisis is far from over and it is entirely conceivable that Gimo has been somewhat stung by our references to rash and precipitous decision and is merely demonstrating to us the soberness with which GRC will consider all aspects of situation. It is also possible that representations made by me and by Embassy officers to substantial number of GRC figures may have resulted in some voices being raised against Gimo's proposed course of action. If there have been such voices, however, they have probably not been very loud and Gimo clearly has capability to override them if he remains determined to walk out. GRC mind seems a little less closed today than yesterday but situation remains precarious.

McConaughy

 

219. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/

Taipei, November 29, 1966, 1110Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent also to USUN and passed to the White House.

1589. ChiRep. Reference: Taipei's 1587./2/

/2/Telegram 1587 from Taipei, November 29, reported on McConaughy's conversation with Shen. (Ibid.)

1. Shen called me to Mofa at 4 pm Nov 29. Also present were DCM and Mofa officer Wang Meng-hsien.

2. Shen said he had been instructed to tell me that the original GRC position on what the GRC would have to do in the event of passage of Italian resolution had been changed. He said this was the result of letters GRC had received from President Johnson and Secretary Rusk and of my representations. He said that GRC had decided it could not take a position that USG considers detrimental of US interests.

3. He then read the text of declaration (now canceled) which FonMin Wei would have been instructed to make in UN after passage of Italian resolution, if GRC position had not been changed. That statement included the phrases: "This leaves GRC no alternative but to withdraw from the UN. This does not mean any loss of face for the GRC, but it does not mean GRC cannot allow itself to be sacrificed on the altar of appeasement."

4. Shen then said present instructions to FonMin Wei were to proceed with a kind of walkout, and to be absent from the GA for a time. He said that GRC position was that if nothing at all were done, Chinese people would think GRC under the thumb of USG. If GRC were to stay with no reaction, there would be no way to explain to Chinese people.

5. He then read at dictation speed full text of new declaration which FonMin Wei now instructed to make (reported septel)./3/ Shen explained that GRC intended effect of this statement to be temporary withdrawal from GA only and not from other organizations. He said GRC might even return to current session GA at any time to join debate if delegation so instructed. I pointed out that unfriendly elements in UN could still seize on GRC declaration of withdrawal and assert that Chinese seat in UN was vacant. I suggested that clearer language might be used so as to avoid misunderstanding.

/3/The text was sent in telegram 1587.

6. Shen said Chinese text only of text of this declaration had been sent to ChiDel, which would make its own English translation.

7. I suggested ChiDel should consult with USDel parliamentary experts so as to minimize possibility that language of declaration might be used to bar GRC. I said USG is fearful that hostile elements could seize on any walkout and through parliamentary tactics try to declare China's seat to be vacant. I recalled that present GA President is not sympathetic on this issue. I urged that great caution be used in wording of declaration so that no bridges could be burned. After some discussion with DCM of wording of Chinese text, it appeared that better and more accurate translation for ChiDel phrase "withdraw its presence" might be "absent itself." Shen agreed to telegraph ChiDel to consult with USDel on this point.

8. I expressed my own gratification, and that of my govt. with GRC decision. I said I appreciated that it could not have been easy and that grave and sober consideration had produced this result.

9. Shen said he had conveyed to President Chiang "every word" I said to Shen yesterday after meeting with Chiang (Taipei 1568)./4/ Shen said Gimo had called a meeting this morning at which present decision had been taken.

/4/Document 218.

10. Mofa official Wang Meng-hsien seemed quite confident that Italian resolution would be defeated, on basis of his examination of reports of statements made during last few days in GA. I expressed hope that no walkout problem of any sort would be created. Meeting ended with mutual compliments and congratulations as I expressed happiness with statesmanlike GRC basic decision.

McConaughy

[Continue with Document 220]

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