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1964-1968 Volume XXX China |
160. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 29, 1966, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VI. No classification marking. A handwritten "L" on Smith's note indicates that it was seen by the President. The attachment is a retyped copy of telegram 2327 from Hong Kong, June 25, and is identical in substance to the telegram as received, a copy of which is ibid. Another copy is in Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM.
Mr. President:
Consul General Rice in Hong Kong sends in a highly interesting summary of what is apparently going on in Communist China.
Bromley Smith
Attachment
From Hong Kong (2327)
SUBJECT
Mainland China: Speculation on Recent DevelopmentsAt no time in recent years have there occurred on Mainland China developments at once so important and so clouded in obscurity as those of the past few months. Part of what has been happening is on-stage drama, but the stage managers' identities have been unclear. Their purposes have been ambiguous, and the noises from the wings suggest that the most important events have been occurring offstage. I have, at least, so concluded since my return earlier this month to the vantage point provided by Hongkong. Evidently foreign observers on the Mainland enjoy no substantially better overview of events: One of them, British Chargé Hopson, remarked to me a week ago that it is impossible for those observers now to know what is really going on in China.
It may nevertheless be worthwhile at this point to draw back from reporting of daily events and speculate about what may be going on--if only to identify some of the main unanswered questions and to set up hypotheses and alternative explanations to be tested for subsequent acceptance or discard when further facts become known. Within my post there is a healthy range of opinion on which I have drawn and which should facilitate further hammering-out of conclusions on the anvil of argument.
Multiple Character of the Crisis
First of all, have we been observing an ideological purge, a dispute over policy, or a power struggle? Almost certainly all three.
In arguing over policy or in criticizing an official's performance in a Communist State, ideology provides much of the language, and ideological correctness is likely to be advanced as the main yardstick. No group of leaders could address the major problems China faces or contemplate the setbacks it has recently suffered, without arguing over policies. Even if ChiCom leaders were all selflessly devoid of individual ambition to wield power--and there is much reason to think otherwise--the outcome of policy disputes and ideological arguments will help decide who moves up, down, or out. It is the relative weight which should be assigned each of these three aspects of the present struggle which cannot be judged with any degree of accuracy.
The Internal Power Struggle
The antagonists in the power struggle must surely have in the back of their minds Mao's age (now 73) and the question of who will succeed him. And the shadow of this coming event must lend urgency to maneuverings for position among the leadership under Mao--maneuverings in which Mao may not have played a deliberate role. At the same time official statements and the atmospherics both suggest to some members of my staff that there may have been a serious challenge from within the party to the authority of Mao himself. If Mao himself unleashed the present storm, its violence--before which all China seems to be bowing down as though Mao were God--suggests his doing so was triggered by something of no mean importance. A May 4 editorial in the Liberation Army Journal about a "life and death struggle" against elements which include "Right opportunists within the Party" may have overstated the case with typical Chinese Communist hyperbole, but such circumstances as recourse to an Army journal to contradict the Party's leading newspaper suggest a serious struggle did indeed occur. In any case, political power abhors a vacuum and there will always be those who are tempted--sometimes prematurely--to seize authority from apparently failing hands. That a hard-liner, ranking Politburo member and "close comrade in arms" of Mao like Peng Chen would fall during a "cultural" purge suggests how dangerous it can be to be called--as Peng was in the talk of some Chinese--the "Crown Prince" while the Sovereign is still alive.
The Cultural Purge
The ideological purge now being attempted in China under the current "Cultural Revolution" undoubtedly is intended to be more sweeping than any which has occurred in China since about 221 B.C. It was then that the authoritarian first Emperor of the Ch'in Dynasty ordered the burning of the Confucian books, in an effort to destroy the ideological basis of Feudalism and the authority of the scholar-official class which had served the Feudal Lords.
As Chou En-lai has put it, the present objective--and it represents an unrealistically big order--is "to liquidate completely all old ideas, all old culture, all old customs and traditions which have been created in the course of thousands of years by the exploiting classes to corrupt the people." The current cultural campaign is largely directed against what might be broadly termed today's class of scholar-officials, who are or are suspected of being the carriers of that old culture--not only scholars and educators, but also newspaper editors and other Party specialists in the field of publicity and propaganda. A topmost Communist scholar like Kuo Mo-jo may perhaps escape a worse fate by publicly asserting that everything he has ever published was "rubbish," but a Peking newspaper editor like Teng T'o will not get off so easily for having at one point written, in veiled but understandable language, that one of Mao's foreign policy assessments--that the East wind was prevailing over the West wind--was "great empty talk."
A few isolated cases of double-talk might be passed over without resulting in an ideological purge, but frequent and more explicit challenges of the Party line could not. It is the official line that the thinking of Mao Tse-tung provides the basis for solving all problems. "Mao's thought" is undoubtedly intended to serve as a gyroscope, keeping the Chinese Communist ship of state away from the shoals of revisionism and on the revolutionary course he has set--now and for the future after he is gone. This line has been questioned too often of late, while he is still alive, to instill confidence it would be generally accepted after he goes. A Mao who attacked Peking University students for giving only lip-service to Communism could scarcely be expected to tolerate explicit challenge, and evidently he has not.
Who is in Charge?
We do not know to what extent Mao is in charge of the purge, and to what extent he has felt personally threatened by events leading up to it. Mr. Hopson, the British Charge, reports that the atmosphere in Peking reminds him of that in Moscow during the time of the doctors' plot. I would not blame Mao, given his suspicious and obsessive character, if he did not feel safe in Peking. In any case, he appears to have stayed away from the Capital throughout the past half-year. (The last two times we have heard of his whereabouts he was, respectively, near Canton and probably in the vicinity of Shanghai: except in political terms their climate is not all that much healthier than Peking's.)
Reports of conversations held with Mao at Canton last March pre-sent the picture of a man complaining that his subordinates do not tell him everything--which is undoubtedly true--and in the grip of what we would regard as obsessions. However, the vigor of his arguments makes it clear he has not become, as one commentator had concluded, a senile vegetable. It would accordingly be logical to suppose he is well able to fight back against his adversaries. It is not likely that he is directing the campaign in detail: that was not his habit when, a far younger man, he was directing campaigns from his cave in Yenan, so it is unlikely he is doing so today. It is also unlikely that Mao's subordinates, in carrying out operations under his authority, do not utilize it in ways which serve their own interests and discredit their rivals.
It is now clear that the campaign is being spear-headed by or in the name of Minister of Defense Lin Piao. Retrospectively, one is entitled to wonder whether the opening maneuvers of this campaign did not begin long ago. For some time Lin has been building himself up as a leading exponent of "the thought of Mao Tse-tung." The abolition of military ranks and distinctions of uniform, a reversion to practices of civil war days which created so much speculation at the time, put the leaders of the Peoples Liberation Army in position to point to themselves as exemplars or pure revolutionary orthodoxy. And the extension of the commissar system from the People's Liberation Army to industrial, financial, and commercial sectors of the economy, with many Army veterans becoming its commissars, may have inserted the influence of Lin and his associates deep into the citadels of the pragmatists and revisionists who had been challenging Maoism as the solution of all China's problems.
It is also possible that Mao may have decided to back Lin as the successor to his own position of Party Leader. A number two man like Liu Shao-chi, who is almost Mao's age, might not provide a succession which is long enough to ensure its consolidation, and Mao may remember the fate of the one really revolutionary and authoritarian Chinese Dynasty--it perished in a power struggle shortly after its founder's death. Lin Piao not only has more charisma than Lin: at 59 he is a decade younger than the average among the full members of the Politburo.
The foregoing hypothesis is open to questions based, inter alia, on long-held assumptions that Lin was in chronically poor health. However, these assumptions are drawn into question by evidence of his intense if not generally publicized activity in 1960-61, as indicated in captured documents from that period. Moreover, the veterans of the long march were a tough lot: many of them endured great hardships, survived serious illnesses such as tuberculosis, and have lived to ripe age.
Mao's most recent pictures showed him meeting the Albanian Premier, who was in China in May, in company of the triumvirate of Lin Piao, Teng Hsiao-ping, and Chou En-lai--not looking moribund. The ever-supple Chou En-lai has been acting as exponent of the Cultural Revolution and has just been entrusted with an important mission abroad. Teng also was with Mao during a recent meeting with Japanese Communist leaders. And Lin has retained the greater prominence into which he stepped, with the publication last September of his article on "People's War"; it is only he who now is being cited as having "creatively applied the thought of Mao Tse-tung."
All of this may help answer the question as to what men are really in charge of China and the purge: it suggests that under Mao the party chairman there is a triumvirate: Lin, the Head of Armed Forces; Teng, the Party Secretary; and Chou, the Prime Minister. Chief of State Liu Shao-ch'i continues to perform his representational duties, but his chance for succession to Party leadership may have been hurt by close association with the career of P'eng Chen, Mayor of Peking and only Politburo member known to have been caught so far in the purge.
The Policy Struggle
China has, within the past few years, suffered two sets of great policy failures, one internal and the other external. The first, of course, was the failure of the policies of the Great Leap towards rapid industrialization and full-scale Communism. Defense Minister P'eng Te-huai objected to them and was purged in consequence; it later failed and China was so badly shaken that the third Five-Year Plan had to be postponed for three years, and may still be the subject of dispute.
The second was the great series of setbacks attending initiatives in the foreign field which, had they succeeded, might have diverted U.S. efforts from Vietnam. (The disaster in Indonesia was the most resounding: Communist China may have intended Indonesia to serve as the southern arm of a great pincers on the two sides of Southeast Asia.)
The foregoing failures would undoubtedly have brought down the elected regime in any parliamentary democracy. They undoubtedly raised serious strains within the regime in China where, given its one-party system, policy dispute would be largely contained within the Party but could hardly be excluded from it.
It may be premature to say what the final result will be, in policy terms, of the leadership struggle and ideologic purge which have been going on. However, it appears clear that the ship of state is, internally at least, on a leftward track: the pragmatists are being discredited and there is published and other evidence of plans for another Leap Forward.
The greatest issues in the external policy sphere evidently have concerned China's confrontation with the U.S. There is reason to think Mao expressed, at a meeting late last September of the Party's Central Committee, the conviction the U.S. and the USSR would attack China within the next two or three years. Mao professed that same belief to the head of the Japanese Communist Party as recently as last March. It is doubtful all within the Chinese leadership believe such an attack inevitable or that efforts to avoid it should not be made: Chen Yi on June 9 conveyed to British Charge Hopson the impression he did not totally share Mao's apparent conviction. And even if the leadership were agreed that an early war with us were inevitable it does not follow they would be careless about precipitating it on the theory that how it comes does not greatly matter. They will greatly prefer the external and internal advantages of being the party to conflict which is the apparent victim of aggression. This undoubtedly contributes to the apparent Chinese Communist intention not to become directly embroiled with the U.S. in Vietnam provided we do not precipitate such embroilment.
To most Western minds, and undoubtedly to some Chinese Communist military and non-military minds as well, a conviction we will soon attack China--consequent to frustration in Vietnam or out of more deliberate calculations--would not be consistent with presumably reliable reports of continued Chinese Communist supply of tanks and MIG's to Pakistan. It might be assumed China would want not only to retain its present inventory of these items but also to build it to the maximum extent from current production against the day of our attack. This may leave out of account two considerations: Mao may hope Pakistan would put such materiel to good use for renewed operations against India--to the discomfiture of both the U.S. and the USSR--in case we were embroiled in a war with China. (A U.S. war on China, its leaders like to warn, would not be limited.) Moreover, Mao's defense strategy would depend primarily on the resources of manpower, space, and time rather than complex weapons--he would pit China's strengths against our weaknesses, not vice versa.
Accordingly, the ChiCom supply of tanks and planes to Pakistan is one more evidence that Mao remains in command of major decisions in China and that his strategic thinking prevails there.
Rice
161. Study Prepared by the Special State-Defense Study Group/1/
Washington, June 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China--Communist China Long Range Study by the Special State-Defense Study Group. Top Secret; Special Handling Required; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals. According to the foreword, the study was undertaken on March 8, 1965, as a result of an agreement between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The Study Group operated under the policy guidance of those two officials and the JCS Chairman. It was directed by Joseph A. Yager of the Policy Planning Council and Brigadier General Stephen W. Henry, USAF. Its mission was to examine the politico-military position of the United States vis-à-vis "Communist China and other potentially hostile or disruptive forces in the Far East" through 1976. Before preparing the Long Range Study, the Study Group prepared a Short Range Report, dated April 30, 1965; see Document 92 and footnote 2 thereto.
On October 19 the Far East Interdepartmental Regional Group (a sub-group of the Senior Interdepartmental Group) endorsed the basic policy concepts developed in the Long Range Study, as summarized by the FE/IRG China Working Group. The minutes of the October 19 meeting and the China Working Group report are filed in Department of State, FE/IRG Files: Lot 70 D 56.
COMMUNIST CHINA: LONG RANGE STUDY
[Here follow a foreword, table of contents, and introduction.]
Abstract
A. The Problem
The essence of the problem which Communist China poses for the United States may be stated very simply: The Chinese regime's objectives of regional hegemony and world revolution clash with our own fundamental interests in preventing domination of Asia by any single power and in developing a peaceful and open world society of free nations.
The Chinese must overcome formidable external obstacles and serious domestic deficiencies if they are ever to reach their ambitious goals. Nevertheless, the weakness of most of the nations East and South of China, China's own size and revolutionary dynamism, and her growing military power combine to make her a major source of difficulty for us in the present period.
B. Broad Strategic Choices for the U.S.
In seeking to cope with the problem which China poses for us, we must choose among three broad national strategies; disengagement, containment and showdown.
The first and last of these possible strategies possess disadvantages which clearly exceed their advantages:
--In the absence of a stable, advantageous balance of power in Asia--or even the prospect of such a balance in the foreseeable future--disengagement would not only be a betrayal of those Asians who have relied upon our support and protection, but would in fairly short order ensure domination of much of Asia by a single hostile power.
--Seeking an early showdown is not, given the pride and intransigence of the Chinese people and their leaders, a feasible means of bringing about a desired change in Chinese policy, but would lead to a war which would impose on us uncertain, but probably large, costs in blood, treasure and prestige for highly uncertain gains.
Having excluded both extremes, we are left with a national strategy of seeking concurrently to check the spread of Chinese Communist power and influence and to induce moderation of Peking's current expansionist policies. As will be brought out later, this strategy of containment must be applied differently in the different sectors of China's periphery. In all areas, however, containment is not a negative defensive strategy, but requires the dynamic and imaginative application of a wide variety of political, military, economic and psychological measures.
Before considering how a containment strategy should be applied, it is necessary to ask how possible developments in mainland China and surrounding areas may either facilitate or interfere with that strategy's success. For purposes of this Abstract, we will concentrate on a main- stream projection of future possibilities and ignore the contingencies which are set forth in Chapters II and III.
C. Possible Developments Within Communist China
Peking is today in the twilight of the regime's revolutionary age. How the new day which will dawn after Mao's passing will differ from the one that is now fading, no one can now say, but sooner or later important changes will occur.
All of the apparent contenders to succeed to Mao's power appear to belong to his school of hard-line, doctrinaire Communism. They were all steeled in the long struggle for power against overwhelming odds, followed by more years of stubborn effort to remake the most populous nation on earth. But even among this group of old revolutionaries, as current evidence suggests, recent failures at home and abroad may have caused differences on basic policy issues. Certainly the pressures for a policy reappraisal must already exist and may grow after Mao's death.
Outstanding among the sources of such pressures is the continued indifferent performance of the economy and the prospect that its future performance will be little, if any, better. Chinese economic growth is weighed down by the failure of the regime thus far to solve the problem of expanding agricultural output faster than population. If, as appears to be the most likely of various possibilities, the agricultural sector and population both grow by about two percent annually over the coming decade, the economy as a whole will probably not be able to expand output by more than about 3-1/2 percent annually. More rapid growth would require greater support from agriculture in the form of industrial raw materials, food for urban workers and export earnings to pay for imports of machinery and technology.
Even the modest over-all rate of growth projected above will require the recapture and investment of a substantial fraction of increases in the national product. As a consequence, per capita consumption may rise very little, if at all, and consumption levels in the country-side may actually be forced down to permit the rise in urban consumption associated with continuing industrialization. The regime may therefore be caught in a vicious circle. Increased agricultural output requires greatly expanded supplies of chemical fertilizers and probably also added material incentives. Neither can be provided in sufficient measure at existing levels of production.
This circle might be broken if industry could perform substantially better despite the constraints imposed by the slow pace of agriculture. The main difficulty here is in the heavy commitment of scarce engineering and scientific manpower to military production programs, particularly the advanced weapons program. Because military programs have top priority, non-military industry suffers and the industrial sector is unable to produce (or to pay for the import of) incentive goods and chemical fertilizer in the quantities that would give agriculture the needed boost.
Prolonged semi-failure in the economic field cannot but have adverse effects on the morale of the cadres and on the people's responsiveness to exhortations for continued effort. Nevertheless, there is no reason to expect a fatal weakening of the regime's well-organized system of control, much less the appearance of effective organized dissidence. The new generation may, as Mao fears, be lacking in revolutionary zeal, but it will also probably accept conformity to political orthodoxy as the inevitable condition of survival in a totalitarian society.
Despite serious economic constraints and a probable decline of elan among cadres at all levels, the regime should be able to carry out a limited number of military programs over the next ten years. The ground forces will probably remain at about their present size, but will be given more modern equipment. The air force will be strengthened by domestic production of substantial numbers of jet fighters, a smaller number of jet medium bombers, and possibly some jet transports. The principal additions to the navy will be in the form of fast patrol craft and submarines, probably including several capable of firing ballistic missiles with a range of about 350 nautical miles.
The most significant advance over the next decade will be in the field of nuclear weaponry. By the mid-1970s, Communist China may have deployed as many as 60 MRBMs and a few ICBMs, possibly with thermonuclear warheads. The Chinese may thus possess a significant and growing regional strategic capability and the beginnings of a counter-deterrent force targeted against the continental United States.
In external relations, Peking will continue to avoid actions involving a high risk of a direct military clash with either the U.S. or the USSR, but will probably continue to pursue policies inimical to the interests of both great powers. Even after Mao, the Chinese leaders may be expected to continue trying to subvert the USSR's leadership of the international Communist movement and to oppose "U.S. imperialism" on many fronts. Peking will also continue efforts to expand its influence beyond its borders by a combination of means emphasizing subversion, diplomatic maneuver and, when possible, support of "wars of national liberation."
However the current struggle in Vietnam comes out, Southeast Asia will continue to be an attractive area for the application of Chinese tactics and an area of prime Chinese interest. Chinese hostility toward India will probably persist and China will attempt to divert Indian energies and undermine Indian self-confidence and prestige by a combination of subversion, military threats on the disputed Sino-Indian border, and intrigue with India's enemy, Pakistan. Toward Japan, China will seek on the one hand to disrupt the U.S.-Japan alliance by arousing Japanese fears of becoming involved in a nuclear war and on the other hand to expand economic relations with Japan in the interests of her own development effort.
D. Possible Developments in China's Periphery
1. Southeast Asia
The outcome in Vietnam is of critical importance for other parts of Southeast Asia and will also have important repercussions in more distant areas. For the purpose of this study, we assume that, well before 1976, large-scale military operations will have been terminated under conditions generally favorable to the U.S. but that some Communist- inspired guerrilla warfare will continue. To guard against a renewal of Communist military activity, a substantial U.S. combat force will probably have to remain in Vietnam for some time. The Government of Vietnam will have made some progress in rehabilitating the country, but will not yet have forged strong ties with the masses of the people and will continue to be afflicted by internal factionalism.
In North Vietnam, failure of the war effort would depress the cadres and undermine the regime's credit with the people. Even with Soviet aid, the damage and disruptions of years of war could not be quickly overcome.
After failing to take over South Vietnam by force, Communist strategy in Laos might follow one of two courses. The Pathet Lao might re-enter the Vientiane government and, under cover of ostensible observance of the 1962 Geneva agreements, seek to take over the entire country by subversion. Or, with North Vietnamese support, the Pathet Lao might try to over-run non-Communist areas by military means. The former alternative appears more probable, especially if the Communists have good reason to fear a U.S.-supported Thai counteraction to any attempt they might make militarily to move up to the Mekong.
In Thailand, the problem of Communist insurgency will persist, but the projected events in Vietnam would have a tonic effect and confirm the Thais in the wisdom of their pro-U.S. alignment. The same events would probably induce Sihanouk to move Cambodia toward a more genuinely neutral position. Burma, in her self-imposed isolation, will be relatively little influenced by these or any other external events and will continue to be characterized by economic weakness and internal dissension.
2. Southwest Pacific
Indonesia will probably be ruled by a conservative government under strong military influence. Despite the persistence of highly difficult problems of economic development and political fragmentation, Indonesia's prestige in the immediate area will increase, facilitating Djakarta's efforts to take the lead in sub-regional cooperation.
Both Malaysia and Singapore will benefit from the end of Sukarno's policy of confrontation, but these two former British colonial areas will face new problems of external defense as the U.K. reduces its military presence there. Also, both will experience some economic difficulties and both may become more subject to internal communal controversy as their present leaders are succeeded by less talented men.
The Philippines may experience increasing social unrest owing to the failure of an opportunistic and often corrupt leadership to solve the country's economic problems and give its youth a sense of purpose. Leftist, pro-neutralist, nationalist, and anti-American sentiment will grow in student and intellectual circles, but the security ties with the U.S. will nevertheless be maintained.
Australia and New Zealand will continue to give us effective support and to pursue polices reflecting the broad coincidence of their national interests with our own.
3. South Asia
The chances are good that over the next ten years India will remain under reasonably effective nationalist, non-Communist and civilian leadership. Assuming that effective measures are taken to increase agricultural output and to reduce restrictions on private initiative--and that large quantities of foreign economic aid continue to be available--India should do a little better economically than Communist China. India will probably acquire a limited nuclear weapons capability within the next few years.
Pakistan should do even better economically, again assuming the continued availability of substantial foreign aid, but militarily Pakistan's ability to compete with India will probably deteriorate. Frustration over the Kashmir issue and fear of India will encourage Pakistan to continue to look to China, and possibly also to the USSR, for support and protection. Pakistan is most unlikely, however, to move into the camp of either great Communist power, and it will preserve a significant if diminishing relationship with the U.S. The present Ayub government or a similar regime based on the Army and the bureaucracy should remain in office through most of the decade.
4. East Asia
Over the next ten years, we can expect to find ourselves dealing with an increasingly strong, prosperous, confident and nationalistic Japan ruled by a pro-Western conservative government.
Japan will play an increasingly important role in Asian political and economic developments. Japan will move more cautiously in the security field, but by the mid-1970s she may alter her defense posture, become an air and naval power of regional importance and possibly assume some responsibility for the defense of South Korea. An independent Japanese nuclear weapons program is a serious possibility during the decade.
Her security and economic relations with the U.S. will remain vitally important to Japan. Termination or even renegotiation of the Mutual Defense Treaty now seems unlikely. Within the next few years, however, the U.S. may be confronted by a serious Japanese effort to regain full administrative control over the Ryukyus.
Economic relations between Japan and mainland China will probably expand greatly and Japanese recognition of Peking is likely within the decade. Japanese-Soviet relations should improve markedly, especially in the economic sphere.
The Korean peninsula will probably remain divided at the truce line, but interest in reunification may increase in both North and South Korea along with a heightened sense of political and economic competition between the two regimes. Both North and South Korea should maintain respectable rates of economic growth, but both may experience domestic political instability. The influence of Japan will be felt increasingly in both North and South Korea.
On Taiwan, the death of Chiang Kai-shek may bring power rivalries among the GRC military to the fore. A more fundamental problem will be the continued Taiwanese resentment at being excluded from political leadership. In time, however, a new and more stable balance should be struck between Taiwanese and mainlander interests, based on Taiwan's sound economy and on the fact that both groups share an interest in continued stability.
Even by 1976, the GRC will probably still proclaim recovery of the mainland as its primary objective, but will have tacitly acquiesced in a two-Chinas situation. Well before 1976, a majority of governments will have shifted recognition from Taipei to Peking and voted for Peking's admission to the United Nations.
E. General Lines of U.S. Action
In light of the possible developments in Communist China and surrounding areas, how should the U.S. apply the strategy of containment over the next decade?
1. Alternative Containment Postures
a. In East and Southeast Asia, three general containment postures are at least theoretically available to us:
(1) Close-in containment and forward defense, including maintaining a significant military presence on the mainland of Asia;
(2) Containment and defense primarily from the offshore island chain; and
(3) Remote containment and mid-Pacific defense behind buffer zones.
The last of these possibilities must be set aside for present purposes, since it presupposes greater strength and stability in the non-Communist periphery of China than appears attainable within a ten-year period.
In evaluating the remaining two strategic choices, we must distinguish between what is desirable and what is practicable. Maintaining sizable U.S. armed forces on the mainland of Asia is costly, restricts our strategic mobility and can lead to friction with the host governments and peoples. At the same time, abandonment of close-in containment in Southeast Asia is out of the question while we are locked in a struggle to preserve the freedom of South Vietnam. Even after the military phase of this struggle has been successfully concluded, we will find it necessary for some time to maintain a meaningful military presence in mainland Southeast Asia, in order to bolster the internal stability of South Vietnam and the non-Communist portion of Laos and deter further Communist aggression against those two areas of Thailand. Substantial U.S. forces may also have to remain in South Korea for many years to deter renewed Communist aggression, maintain public confidence there and still Korean fears that we might leave them alone to deal with a resurgent Japan.
We shall be able to move back from close-in containment to containment primarily from the offshore island chain only if:
(1) The likelihood of overt Communist aggression should have diminished as a consequence of a clear down-grading of expansionist goals in Peking, Hanoi, and Pyongyang.
(2) The ability of threatened non-Communist areas to cope with Communist insurgency and to meet the first shock of overt aggression should have increased substantially relative to the threat.
(3) The demonstrated capability of U.S. forces to redeploy rapidly into the threatened areas should have greatly increased as a consequence of improved air and sea lift, standby arrangements for the use of bases and other facilities, forward pre-positioning of stocks and improved strategic warning. Conditions in all mainland areas concerned are not likely to satisfy the above requirements for many years, and possibly not within the decade under study.
b. In South Asia, the option of containment primarily from an offshore island chain is not available. Close-in containment by the U.S. is not required by the nature of the threat and is also ruled out on political grounds. We are, therefore, left in this area with no choice but remote containment behind the buffer consisting of the Indian subcontinent.
2. Major Aspects of a Containment Strategy
Successful containment, whether close-in, remote or from the offshore island chain, has three major aspects, each of which will be taken up briefly below.
a. Deterring or Defeating Communist Expansionist Efforts.
(1) Overt Aggression. Ever since the Korean War, the Chinese Communists seem to have been deterred from overt aggression in areas where there was substantial risk of a direct clash with the U.S. The continued effectiveness of this deterrent depends on our continued ability to apply appropriate defensive or retaliatory military power when and where needed and on the continued credibility of our resolve to do so.
Our base structure will probably continue to be adequate for these deterrent purposes over the coming decade. We may, however, need to negotiate new standby arrangements with Australia, the U.K. and India covering possible contingencies in South Asia.
Even today, it is unlikely that we could cope with a full-scale Communist attack on Southeast Asia without using nuclear weapons or resorting to large-scale mobilization. [1 line of source text not declassified] Preservation of a conventional option in these contingencies will require increases in our ability to bring conventional military power to bear in Asia, commensurate with the present threat and the anticipated improvement in the quality of Chinese Communist conventional forces.
Credibility of our nuclear deterrent might be improved by deploying to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Guam nuclear-capable forces which would be clearly and specifically designed to cover targets in China rather than in the Soviet Union and which could reach those targets without overflying Soviet territory.
(2) Indirect Aggression. The current hostilities in Vietnam began as a classic case of indirect aggression, but even a US/GVN success there will not constitute a permanent cure for Communist-directed and supported insurgency. Laos, and more recently Thailand, are already victims of indirect aggression. Possible future targets include Malaysia, the Philippines, Burma and Indonesia. We must therefore carefully study the lessons of our experience in Vietnam and make necessary adjustments in techniques of propaganda, civic action and economic assistance, as well as in military doctrine and weapons development.
(3) Subversion and Diplomatic Maneuver. The Chinese leaders consider the underdeveloped, formerly colonial areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America as the arena in which China can best contest for world power status and influence. Subversion and disruptive diplomacy are their principal chosen instruments in these areas.
Economic aid is perhaps our major tool in dealing with this form of the Communist threat. Military aid can also play a role in helping develop forces capable of contributing to internal security. Diplomatic and psychological efforts can emphasize the lack of relevance of Chinese experience to much of the underdeveloped world, the limited ability of the Chinese to provide useful assistance, and the threat to the integrity of new and weak nations posed by Chinese-supported subversion and insurgency.
b. Strengthening Areas Threatened by Asian Communism.
Strengthening the free nations around Communist China is essential to the success of remote containment in South Asia and to any hope of moving back from close-in containment in East or Southeast Asia. We need urgently to acquire a better understanding of how relatively backward nations develop politically and how we can influence that development in desired directions.
The principal means available to us for strengthening nations under the Asian Communist threat are again our programs of economic and military aid. In most of Asia, agricultural development and population control are keys to sustained economic growth. Both should receive a high priority in our aid programs.
The fragmentation of the area around China increases its vulnerability to Communist pressures. Through our aid programs and otherwise we should do what we can to promote regional and subregional political, military and economic cooperation.
c. Additional Measures to Influence Asian Communist Behavior.
In barring the way to expansion of Asian Communism and in strengthening the non-Communist areas around China we, of course, exert a powerful influence on the Communist leaders to moderate their policies. These generalized effects of our deterrent posture should be supplemented by timely application of a number of specific measures.
(1) We should obtain the advantages of differential treatment of Communist regimes in Asia as we have in Europe. Recognition of Outer Mongolia is probably the place to begin. The day when one of the lesser Asian Communist regimes might become an Asian Poland or Romania might be closer than is now apparent.
(2) We should try to induce present or future Communist leaders to reappraise U.S. intentions by avoiding actions which irritate the Chinese without compensating benefits, by reassuring Peking publicly, privately and by our actions that we do not intend to work for the overthrow of the regime, by showing continuing interest in discussing arms control proposals, and by modifying our export controls to permit humanitarian shipments to mainland China (i.e., food, drugs, and medical equipment).
(3) We should seek to increase Peking's interest in developing a more constructive relationship by continuing efforts to develop unofficial contacts, proposing the exchange of cultural and educational materials and exhibitions and holding out the prospect of step-by-step general relaxation of our economic controls in the context of reciprocal Chinese moves toward improved relations. Gaining access to the U.S. market should be particularly attractive to the Chinese.
(4) We should expose Chinese elite groups to a wider range of information through an expanded Voice of America Chinese language service and through indirectly feeding into information channels leading into China (e.g., Japan and overseas Chinese communities) material which might add to intellectual ferment there.
F. Longer-term Perspectives.
A strategy of containment need not result in a frozen confrontation. Successful containment in fact both facilitates and takes advantage of favorable change.
At the present time, however, the national interests of the U.S. and China clash on two fundamental points:
1. The U.S. stands for orderly, peaceful evolution toward an international system based on law and respect for diversity among national societies. The Chinese Communists stand for revolutionary change leading ultimately to a Communist world.
2. The U.S. is prepared to accept China as one of many components in a peaceful Asian balance of power. The present leadership in Peking will not settle for anything less than regional hegemony and aspires, first, to acceptance as one of three global powers and, eventually to leadership of a Communist world.
Time and a more realistic assessment of the adversary's intentions and capabilities may be expected to downgrade the practical importance of the first fundamental difference between U.S. and Chinese interests. The second difference, which concerns China's proper place in the world, may prove less easy to resolve. The Chinese desire to be recognized as the equal of the U.S. and the USSR has its psychological roots in China's long history during most of which China was the center and guiding light of its own world.
The threat which China poses for us, however, is not that she may actually achieve super-power status. Realistically appraised, China's present strength and future potentialities for many decades to come are simply inadequate for the international role to which her present leaders aspire. The danger is that merely by striving to achieve the unattainable China may seriously damage our interests in Asia or draw us into a large-scale war to protect them.
China's chances of overtaking the U.S., the USSR or Western Europe in wealth and power during the present century are negligible. Even in Asia, China will not bulk as large proportionately ten or twenty years from now as she does today. Only in the field of nuclear weapons will China's claim to great power status acquire some substance, but in this respect, too, China will continue to be outmatched by the U.S. and the USSR.
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, Japan will be the great power of Asia. By the late 1970s, Japan's per capita GNP will probably be more than ten times that of China and the economic gap between the two nations will still be widening. Japan may also have become a nuclear power and, if so, her greater wealth and technical resources will permit her quickly to surpass China in numbers of nuclear weapons and sophistication of delivery vehicles. Because of greater access to foreign aid, even India may do somewhat better than China economically, and she will probably acquire nuclear weapons in the relatively near future.
If the above picture is even a rough approximation of the shape of things to come, the gap between Chinese aspirations and Chinese capabilities must become increasingly apparent to all thoughtful Chinese. In time, the disparity between goals and reality should induce a fundamental reappraisal and change in Chinese policy.
No responsible Chinese leadership can escape the task of social, political and economic modernization. But given China's size, huge population, cultural conservatism and limited natural resources, the question of whether any leadership can succeed in this task remains open. Prolonged semi-failure is almost certain to wear down both the morale of the Communist cadres and the responsiveness of the Chinese people to exhortations for greater effort. Material incentives as a means of stimulating economic performance may become an imperative necessity. But the wherewithal for such incentives can be found only by reducing the priority accorded expenditures for military purposes or by seeking foreign economic assistance. A future Chinese leadership may be compelled to do both.
Chinese could turn for economic assistance to either the Soviet Union or to one or more non-Communist nations. Our long-term problem may well be how to ensure that, as containment succeeds, China will turn toward the free world rather than toward the Soviet Union.
The answer may lie in two directions. On the one hand, as Chinese policy moderates, we should try to draw China into activities on the broader world scene where, through exposure to outside reality and successful assumption of international responsibility, she might gain a degree of status and respect which could substitute in part for the unattainable goals of regional domination and super-power status. On the other hand, by gradually shifting as circumstances permit from a military policy of close-in containment to containment largely from offshore island positions, and by demonstrating in other ways that we are not committed to a policy of hostility or military "encirclement", we might ease the tension between China and ourselves, thereby facilitating a decision that Chinese interests were better served by normalizing relations with us rather than risking another betrayal at the hands of Russians. In any event, over the next decade and beyond, the dealings between China, the Soviet Union, and increasingly, Japan will form one of the most important sets of relationships in the world, in which our own security and position in Asia will be heavily involved.
We might over the very long run hope for a situation in which containment in China, insofar as it remains necessary, is left largely to Japan and the Soviet Union with our power and influence held in reserve to rectify any imbalances which might arise. If we achieve the advantageous regional balance of power which is among our major objectives in Asia, and if we draw China increasingly into a cooperative relationship with ourselves and other free nations, the strategy of containment will truly have succeeded.
[Here follow Chapters I-V and Appendices A-C. Volume II contains Annex I, "Economic Trends and Prospects," and Volume III, "Military and Political Factors," contains Annexes II-X.]
162. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, July 1, 1966, 1110Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Canberra and Manila for the Secretary and Bundy.
22. Re: Deptel 1383./2/ Chinese Representation.
/2/Telegram 1383 to Taipei, June 24, reported that there had been a further high-level meeting on the Chinese representation question and that Rusk wanted to "make major pitch on this new tactic himself" when he was in Taipei. It instructed McConaughy to initiate talks on the subject promptly but to limit himself to the line taken by Bundy and Sisco in a June 15 meeting with Chow and GRC UN Representative Liu. (Ibid.) The June 15 meeting is summarized in telegram 2901 to USUN, June 16; Sisco and Bundy expressed concern that past tactics would not work and said U.S. policymakers were reviewing the problem. (Ibid.) Telegram 1384 to Taipei, June 24, approved by Rusk and Goldberg, conveyed guidelines for Rusk's use. (Ibid.)
1. I saw Pres. Chiang yesterday afternoon for hour and a half discussion at tea at his Yangmingshan residence. Also present were DCM Hummel, FonMin Wei, Secy Gen Chang Chun, Vice FonMin Sampson Shen, with James Shen interpreting.
2. I opened official conversation with statement of reasoning that had led USG to bomb POL storage in North Vietnam, as contained Depcirtel 2568./3/ Chiang expressed hearty agreement with US decision and said he disagreed with Canadian and British critics who had "selfish motives" and whose views, he said, would be different if they were able to consider this problem objectively.
/3/Dated June 25. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
3. I then repeated in abbreviated form some of factors I had outlined to FonMin June 29 (Embtel 1523)/4/ that led us to believe that past ChiRep tactics might not serve in upcoming GA. Chiang indicated he had already had report from FonMin on our conversation yesterday. He minimized problems of UN tactics, saying that power of decision lies with USG. If US held firm and did not waver, there would be no problem this session. He referred several times to statement he said made recently by unidentified "US Delegation spokesman at UN" in which US support for GRC seat reaffirmed, but no mention made of opposition to ChiCom entry. This conspicuous omission, he said, could only encourage countries such as Canada, which already were wavering, to become even more unpredictable.
/4/Dated June 25. (Ibid., UN 6 CHICOM)
4. He then made following points forcefully, with some reiteration:
A. On mainland, GRC had consistently refused to agree to a coalition government with ChiComs.
B. Any sort of "two Chinas" resolution, if passed and accepted, would amount to a kind of Chinese coalition situation in the UN, which GRC absolutely could not agree to, and which would compel GRC promptly to withdraw from UN.
C. Chinese tradition for many centuries has required that there be no truckling, surrender to or compromise with a rebel regime. This was epitomized in statement by third century statesman Chu-ko Liang who said, "the legitimate government cannot agree to coexist with a usurper". (han tsei pu liang li 3352, 6329, 0008, 9357, 4539.)/5/ This typifies Chinese national spirit in time of crisis.
/5/The numbers are standard telegraphic code for the Chinese characters.
D. As long as GRC exists, it will seek the destruction of ChiComs as a usurper regime; it is better to go down to defeat fighting than to compromise a principle so deeply rooted in basic tradition and morality of Chinese people. This is fundamental to the honor of the GRC. With integrity preserved, the lawful government can rise again, even from the ashes of defeat.
E. Canada probably cannot understand how important this is to Chinese, but USG should be able to appreciate the principle, because of its long and close ties with China. It is up to USG to make Canadians understand that under no circumstances will GRC compromise its UN position, and that GRC will certainly walk out of UN if any adverse vote occurs.
F. GRC has suffered many insults in UN and has derived little benefit from membership. For the UN "to allow the ChiComs to enter" would be the last straw and GRC would definitely get out.
5. I said I was authorized to assure GRC that USG will continue strongly oppose entry of ChiComs into UN. I noted that he is assuming more influence on part of US over actions of other UN countries than we possess. We are determined not have a defeat on this issue but it is essential for two governments discuss and agree on tactics best calculated to keep GRC in and ChiComs out.
6. It was imperative in our view for the GRC to resolve to hold fast to its UN seat and not allow unpalatable debate or language in resolutions to cause GRC to walk out. I understood the traditions he referred to, but there was also a Chinese tradition of not abandoning the battlefield to the enemy. I hoped GRC would not act impulsively or out of any sense of outrage; if GRC would stand fast then ChiComs almost certainly would be precluded from coming into UN. In no event should GRC allow contest to go wrong way by default. If seat became vacant, danger would become great that ChiComs would move in.
7. Chiang said we could count on GRC not acting impulsively. It would not be an impulsive decision but would be an inevitable and correct one that if GA votes to allow ChiComs to enter, then regardless of whether the resolution also has a provision retaining the GRC seat, the GRC would have to walk out. GRC will never even consider doing otherwise, and would never agree to do otherwise. To stay in UN under such circumstances would not only cause disillusionment in Taiwan (both among Taiwanese and mainlanders, he said) but would also be a betrayal of the majority of the people in mainland China who look to GRC as a symbol of hope and steadfastness. Chinese representation shared with Communists could not be explained or reconciled.
8. I set forth that problem is how to deal with dangerous contingencies which USG believed likely to arise in the UN this fall. We hoped GRC would help us keep ChiComs out of UN by accepting the tactics which a changing situation might demand. Secretary Rusk would want to discuss means of dealing with this problem in upcoming GA. We had not yet come to any final conclusion as to what tactics would be best.
9. Chiang replied pointedly that FonMin Wei would be ready for a full exchange of views with Secy Rusk on matters of UN tactics.
10. Chiang closed conversation with assertion that since UN Charter was clear on GRC membership as one of principal five, it should not be difficult for USG to adopt procedural tactics, such as insisting on two-thirds important question formula, so that any hostile resolution could be defeated. He said that GRC believed in determination of USG to hold line against ChiComs, and that if USG does not waver, but demonstrates its determination, then there should be no danger. If USG wavers, then attitude of other countries would weaken, and attitude of GRC would also change (presumably attitude toward USG). If an adverse resolution were to pass, GRC would certainly withdraw. USG could convey this position to Canadian Government or any other government, if it wishes, since this was a public stand.
11. This morning during course of protocol call on Secy Gen Chang Chun (DCM present, with Protocol Director Shah interpreting) I said I was concerned that President might not understand that USG influence on other countries was limited. The days were gone when US could force others to conform to US views. Situation in the UN, therefore, was not one where simple US determination could prevail. Chang said he thought Gimo understood this, but that GRC believed necessary votes could still be maintained on old formula, and certainly on important question, if we all worked hard and if US attitude did not waver. Gimo intended, he said, first to make clear that GRC could not stay in UN if UN "voted to allow" ChiCom entry. Second, Gimo wanted to say that GRC believed no change in tactics needed, but GRC willing to discuss tactics if USG had new ones to offer, providing new tactics in line with first point. GRC thought that important question formula should suffice. I reminded Secy Gen that on two occasions last fall UN organ had by simple majority vote overturned requirement for two-thirds vote on matters which were clearly "important questions" within meaning of Charter. We were not confident that "important question" rule would hold.
12. Comment: Not unexpectedly Gimo attempted take initiative in following respects: (A) he attempted rule out further discussion of new tactics at his level; (B) he was seemingly adamant in insistence on walking out of UN if any kind of "two Chinas" resolution passes; (C) he professed to believe that USG holds simple key to UN procedural problems if it will continue strongly support traditional tactics; (D) he contended USG needs only to use its influence with countries such as Canada to get them to fall in line. These positions tend to limit further discussion, and if Secy is to achieve meaningful exchange of views with Gimo he will have to deal with them quite directly. It is still unclear whether Gimo really believes USG has capability to hold traditional line; this could be genuine or it could be based on belief that USG should make a unilateral declaration that US would leave UN if ChiComs voted in. In any event best course is for us to hope, until convinced otherwise, that all these points are tactical maneuvers that will turn out in due course to be negotiable.
13. New FonMin Wei so far not very impressive figure, and it is doubtful that he has great influence on Gimo. This will make it doubly difficult to have meaningful discussions with GRC, since Gimo may not fully understand, or may not wish to understand, dangers in using old tactics in UN, and FonMin may not be able to exercise effective influence even if we can convince him.
14. One topic not touched on, which Secy should consider exploring with Gimo, is seriously adverse consequences to entire common cause if GRC walks out and gates thus opened wide to ChiCom entry. This places heavy obligation on GRC.
15. I have carefully refrained from giving any hint as to nature or language of any prospective new resolution. Hence I have not gone into the matter of the great difference between a mere left-handed invitation to ChiComs and actual entry of ChiComs into UN. Way is open for Secretary to assume that Chinese are saying they will walk out if and only if ChiComs actually appear to take UN seat. He can say that we are confident this will not happen, and ChiComs will not be able to accept any invitation so long as GRC remains in its seat. Gimo will probably try to close this off promptly by strong assertion his intention to withdraw as soon as UN "votes to allow ChiComs to come in", but argument can be pressed with some hope of progress.
16. I plan no further explorations before Secretary's arrival July 3. Believe subject these discussions being held closely to small group within GRC (as they are within Embassy). Vice Pres. Yen and DefMin Chiang Ching-kuo have probably been filled in. Believe Secretary may wish to raise this question in preliminary way with Vice President during his call July 3.
McConaughy
163. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, July 5, 1966, 0645Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. 6A. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo for the Secretary and Bundy.
42. Uncleared draft resume. Secretary's discussion of ChiRep with GRC./2/
/2/Memoranda of Rusk's conversations in Taipei on July 3 and 4 are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 60.
1. Secretary accompanied by Ambassador and Bundy July 3 and 4 discussed ChiRep situation separately with President Chiang and FonMin Wei Tao-ming who in one session accompanied by DefMin Chiang Ching-kuojo.
2. In first session with FonMin and other Foreign Ministry officers July 3, Wei presented in detail GRC analysis of ChiRep prospects which at this point indicates increased support for GRC position over 1965 UNGA vote. Wei counted Dahomey, CAR and Congo (Kinshasa) as sure to support GRC against background on basis first two cases of severed relations with ChiComs and in third case (Congo) of assurances recently conveyed by visiting Cabinet Minister that GOC would not permit repetition 1965 situation when delegate at UN disobeyed instructions. Wei described GRC also as encouraged by ChiCom policy reverses in Africa and in Afro-Asian world and by disadvantage to ChiComs which would result from current internal problems and Vietnam escalation. Wei also believes margin on important question may be increased as to as much as ten this year. Wei strongly and repeatedly urged US reach and announce early decision strongly support GRC ChiRep position using past tactics, said early decision would be instrumental maintain strength in GRC position while delay could cause doubt and confusion among GRC supporters. Wei believes lateness of introduction of important question resolution at last UNGA and shortness of time between votes on important question and on substance may have cost GRC some votes and he requested the US introduce at early point in session and strongly support important question resolution.
3. Secretary told Wei that although he hopes GRC assessment correct, US much less sanguine about prospect for making past tactic again produce desired result. Said GRC need not worry about basic US policy support but instead should focus on thinking on contingency basis about possible need for new tactics and what form such new tactics might best take. Secy said neither Canada nor Italy can be depended on to continue support past tactical formula and in case of Canada, likelihood of some new initiative in direction two Chinas formula very high. Pointed out that US unable deter such development.
4. In second session July 4, Wei expressed GRC doubt that defection by Canada, which he termed not major power, and by Italy, which he said without influence in key area which is Africa, would take away other votes from GRC. Wei also argued that Canada defection would not detract from such other Commonwealth support as GRC enjoys. Wei again expressed confidence in GRC estimate of prospects, again urged US at early date announce decision support GRC on past tactics. Wei stressed belief that GRC friends in Africa, who appreciative GRC efforts help them with economic development, would not desert them in showdown or make them a scapegoat for dissatisfaction with other US or Western policies.
5. At this session Secretary again spelled out US worry and concern that past tactics may not again produce desired result, reiterated that given attitude SYG, Britain, France, etc. some of whom have greater influence in key areas such as Africa than US is able to wield, need for contingency thinking is clear.
6. Secretary asked if GRC has recent information re position Indonesia and India. Wei and Vice FonMin Shen replied that GRC has been advised India would support but not lobby for ChiComs, and that contacts with Indonesians are being restored but abstention would be the best to be hoped for.
7. Secretary told Wei that many countries would support continuation GRC membership in UN. At same time, there is considerable sentiment in favor of opening possibility of ChiCom membership. If situation developed in this direction, with ChiComs unwilling to accept while GRC remained in, would be disaster if GRC felt it had to withdraw, thus leaving field open to ChiComs. Wei did not reply directly, but reiterated GRC confidence.
8. Secretary told Wei that USG would have great difficulty in giving commitment at this stage to any particular tactics on ChiRep, without better idea of prospect for successful outcome.
9. Secretary and Wei agreed important respective representatives keep in close touch and compare assessments in detail soon so that difficulties in estimates can be examined and effective action decided.
10. Final session with Gimo devoted mostly to other matters, but Secy brought up ChiRep, saying there is no question of our policy or of objective we wish to achieve. However, he said, situation could develop where there would be danger of turbulent and undisciplined GA overturning two-thirds vote requirement on important question. Said we must not be exposed to defeat on keeping GRC seat both in GA and in SC.
11. Gimo replied he had already given his views to Amb McCon-aughy, and that he thought so long as US insists on legality of procedures under UN Charter, particularly Art 18, the problem would not be serious. He said he hoped Secy while in Japan would not say anything to dampen prevailing Japanese enthusiasm for supporting traditional tactics in UN.
12. Secy said trouble was that President Chiang was honorable man, but that there were so many cynics in unpredictable UN that sound legal position might not suffice.
McConaughy
164. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, July 5, 1966, 0815Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Top Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo for Rusk.
45. 1. One statement by Secretary in conversation with Pres Chiang is being reported only by this telegram, and will be omitted from airgram containing MemCon. Occasion was during last meeting with Gimo 1100 a.m. July 4.
2. Secretary said that if US becomes involved in any part of an attack on the Chinese Communist mainland then USG must see the conflict through to a conclusion and cannot be half in and half out. He said he could not imagine any general engagement between US forces and ChiComs being limited to conventional weapons. He reminded Pres Chiang that they had discussed this before (during Secy's visit April 1964).
McConaughy
165. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, July 5, 1966, 0930Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. 6A. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo for Rusk.
50. 1. This is uncleared summary of major topics in discussions during Secy's visit Taipei. ChiRep and exchange of resources under PL 480 are subjects separate messages./2/
/2/See Document 163. Telegram 38 from Taipei, July 4, reported a proposal for an "exchange of resources" under PL 480 to support GRC aid programs in Africa. (Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) 15 CHINAT)
2. Gimo emphasized following points:
A. The major powers have a responsibility to assist in seeing that 600 million on China mainland do not remain indefinitely under Communist tyranny.
B. The GRC is determined to regain control of the mainland, but particularly in view of recent purges, and the restiveness that the purges show, GRC can afford to wait for an opportunity that will surely come.
C. Support to US in the Vietnam situation has first priority with GRC, and return to the mainland second priority.
D. In Vietnam, the ChiComs will probably not intervene in force, although they are undoubtedly now considering what to do to react to the raids on POL installations. They are in a dilemma: If they do nothing, they run a risk of losing control of Hanoi. On the other hand, they do not want to risk a frontal clash with the US.
E. If war goes on in present form US must consider what to do. It will not be advisable for US forces to go north of the 17th parallel, for if they did they would face serious guerrilla actions in North Vietnam, and if necessary the Vietcong would retreat all the way to China and continue fighting from Chinese sanctuary.
F. The US must cut the lines of communication between North and South Vietnam, and equally important, between China and North Vietnam. In view of dissension and division within Communist China, we should think what steps, perhaps military or paramilitary, to take to achieve the results we want.
G. The ChiComs are counting on weariness and on criticisms of US policy by US Congressmen and other prominent Americans to force a US decision to withdraw eventually, after a long war of attrition.
H. The ChiComs feel fairly confident; they know they have overcome serious problems in the past and they believe they can survive anything. The ChiComs believe that US will not send its troops to North Vietnam and that the US will not support a GRC return to the mainland. They are therefore confident they will be able to wait until forces of dissatisfaction in the US cause a withdrawal.
I. The GRC still believes the ChiComs are capable of airdropping enough troops on Taiwan to seriously cripple GRC's military capability. Although the ChiCom troops would be wiped out, they would inflict enough damage so that ChiComs would not have to worry for some time about a GRC attack.
3. The Secretary made following observations:
A. US commitment in Defense Treaty is strong and well known. Even in statements by private US citizens on China policy there has been no suggestion that Taiwan should be turned over to ChiComs.
B. US determination to curb Communists is entirely firm. US has a million men overseas to do this, and has suffered 170,000 casualties since end of World War II, mostly in Asia.
C. ChiCom extremism combined with isolation has produced concern even among European Communist countries over how to curb Peiping. Soviets and Poles, among others, much worried over this. It is even possible (and the Gimo expressed agreement) that Sovs would welcome seeing Communist China split into regional Communist regimes.
D. However, the US believes that any attack on ChiComs likely to cause Sovs to bring Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 into force. On other hand, if ChiComs chose to enter into war on ground in Southeast Asia, Sovs possibly would not invoke that treaty.
E. The US will not allow indefinite continuation of "neither peace, nor war" situation in Vietnam; there will be "either more peace or more war." US determination is clear, and is supported by majority of Americans.
McConaughy
166. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, July 7, 1966, 0755Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC.
70. 1. During a call by me on DefMin Chiang Ching-kuo July 6 he raised subject of high level consultations and of Blue Lion Committee referring to points conveyed to him by Chargé Hummel in October last year (Deptel 396)./2/
/2/See footnote 3, Document 108.
2. He said he would like to broaden scope of Blue Lion Committee so that I, with TDC chief and DCM, would participate with him and a very limited number of associates, in general and wide ranging discussions in very small and secure group on problems of mutual interest. He indicated that these discussions would probably not involve any plans for return to mainland, but would include situation on mainland, ChiCom capabilities and intentions, Vietnam war, general Far East and world strategic and political problems, etc. insofar as they affected our joint interests here.
3. I said that I heartily agreed we should make occasions for such discussions but that I would like a few days to think over whether Blue Lion Committee was best framework. He said that of course we would have other means and occasions for discussions in addition to Committee, but that he was following USG proposal (para B of Deptel 396) to use Blue Lion framework.
4. It seems likely that Gimo has instructed him to proceed to carry out long delayed consultations and that Gimo has decided to keep to the letter of US proposal, notwithstanding DefMin's statement to Hummel in October (Embtel 489)/3/ that consultations would not require any formal mechanism or committee. It is encouraging that GRC apparently does not, at least at the present time, intend to revive request for joint contingency planning for attacking mainland.
/3/Document 108.
5. On balance it seems advisable to follow original formula, and at least for the time being accept the Blue Lion label. For one thing, GRC seems to take it for granted that we should use this framework as we said we would last year. For another, if these talks become known to ChiComs it would be better to have them named "Blue Lion" which, if ChiComs have capability to penetrate GRC military, they should know is under strictly limited ground rules. Furthermore, Chiang Ching-kuo envisages very informal, rather personal setup, with flexible procedures, no fixed meeting dates and no set agenda or agreed minutes.
6. I shall proceed, along with Adm Gentner, to explore GRC ideas further and arrange a preliminary meeting./4/
/4/Telegram 4843 to Taipei, July 11, reported that Chiang Ching-kuo's approach, especially his indication that plans for return to the mainland would not be among topics for discussion, seemed to be encouraging evidence the GRC was prepared for talks that could be beneficial "both substantively and psychologically." The Department did not object to the Blue Lion label for discussions but was anxious to avoid raising their visibility "from Peiping viewpoint" and favored informal, flexible procedures. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US)
McConaughy
167. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, July 8, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, 303 c.41, August 5, 1966. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Peter Jessup of the NSC staff on July 9.
SUBJECT
Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 8 July 1966PRESENT
Mr. Rostow, Ambassador Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. Helms
Mr. Bill Moyers and Mr. Cord Meyer were present for Items 1 and 2
Mr. Leonard Marks and Mr. Robert Kintner were present for Item 1[Here follow participants for items not printed here.]
1. Radio China
a. The discussion on the possibilities of creating a "Radio China"/2/ opened with a statement by Ambassador Johnson to the effect that he felt that the United States could accomplish "most of what we want to do" through the existing framework of USIA.
/2/A CIA memorandum of October 7, 1965, for the 303 Committee proposing that CIA be authorized to proceed with a plan for a "gray" radio targeted at Communist China is ibid., 303 c.29, Oct. 28, 1965. Records of 303 Committee discussions and related memoranda are ibid., 303 c.37, May 5, 1966, 303 c.38, June 9, 1966, 303 c.39, June 24, 1966, and 303 c.40, July 8, 1966. A Radio Study Group, established at the direction of McGeorge Bundy in November 1965 to examine this and other issues concerning the Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Europe, endorsed the proposal with one member dissenting; its report, April 28, 1966, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Special Group Memoranda.
b. Mr. Marks confirmed the statement in his paper dated June 30, 1966,/3/ that he knew of no legal restrictions on his programming and that he anticipated no problems in finding material and/or personnel.
/3/A copy is in Department of State, INR Files, 303 Committee Files, 303 c.40, July 8, 1966.
c. Mr. Helms reminded the committee that originally the concept had been a Chinese voice rather than a U.S. official voice.
d. Mr. Moyers stated that he had welcomed the concept of a gray radio at first, but he found that (1) all China hands with whom he was conversant were against the idea; (2) the margin of benefit by "going gray" appeared very slim; and (3) VOA should be given a try at it. Mr. Kintner interposed that at first he leaned toward an unofficial voice, but he now thought VOA could undertake the job.
e. Mr. Helms noted that the Agency was prepared to undertake the job if there was demonstrable enthusiasm but, in the absence of same, he had no intention of pressing for the project in the face of opposition.
f. Mr. Vance said he felt that undertaking such a new venture was not worth the major costs at this time.
g. Mr. Rostow summed up by saying that a private or CIA venture would be uphill work in the current atmosphere with all the recent publicity. He added, however, that he could not buy the prejudices of the China experts about their exclusive expertise in the field of broadcasting to China. Everything pointed to letting VOA beef up their broadcasts via the new Philippine transmitters, he added.
h. The Executive Secretary noted that with this consensus for USIA to shoulder the responsibility, the subject would no longer be of concern to the 303 Committee.
i. Mr. Meyer itemized three matters of contents which should not be overlooked in any programming aimed at China: (1) regular reporting on cross currents in the communist world; (2) news commentaries which included emphasis on Chinese foreign policy failures; and (3) emphasis on traditional Chinese culture.
j. Mr. Marks noted that he would need the help of various agencies, and Mr. Helms replied that the CIA was ready to cooperate in any way.
k. It was pointed out that the original CIA proposal remained extant and could be resurrected at some later date.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
Peter Jessup
168. Editorial Note
On July 12, 1966, President Johnson discussed U.S. policy in Asia in an address to the American Alumni Council broadcast on radio and television. He stated in part:
"There is a fourth essential for peace in Asia which may seem the most difficult of all: reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies.
"A peaceful mainland China is central to a peaceful Asia.
"A hostile China must be discouraged from aggression.
"A misguided China must be encouraged toward understanding of the outside world and toward policies of peaceful cooperation.
"For lasting peace can never come to Asia as long as the 700 million people of mainland China are isolated by their rulers from the outside world.
"We have learned in our relations with other such states that the weakness of neighbors is a temptation, and only firmness that is backed by power can really deter power that is backed by ambition. But we have also learned that the greatest force for opening closed minds and closed societies is the free flow of ideas and people and goods." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pages 721-722; for the complete text, see ibid., pages 718-722)
169. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, July 19, 1966, 0900Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to USUN and Hong Kong.
200. Subject: Reaction to President's July 12 speech. Ref: Depcirtel 9794./2/
/2/Dated July 18. (Ibid.)
1. First high-level official GRC reaction (other than press) to President's speech on Far East was elicited by Ambassador from President Chiang July 18 during tea the President gave for Gen. Waters. Following discussion of military situation in Vietnam and related subjects, President asked Ambassador about recent developments in general. Ambassador took occasion to mention President's speech and to reiterate that speech did not represent change in basic US China policy, but that it did reflect a somewhat different approach in line with essential US posture of not foreclosing possibility for settling any and all differences by non-military means. If ChiComs should rebuff these gestures, it would be they rather than we who would lose by such a confirmation of their intransigence.
2. President Chiang said he had studied President's speech closely, as had many others. He said it had created concern in some circles. Chiang said he was glad to hear that speech represented no basic change in policy. He would accept this and not criticise speech. Excitement and unhappiness stirred up by speech in some quarters around world were due to lack of understanding of President Johnson's situation. Chiang noted that Ambassador's assurances were in line with statements by Secretary Rusk. Chiang conjectured (without any assent from Ambassador) that motivation for speech "may have been largely domestic."
3. Comment: Suggestion that President's speech was designed assuage domestic critics is one of prevalent GRC rationalizations designed to minimize importance of US foreign relations developments (the other being GRC conviction that ChiComs will in any case not respond to US overtures). Fact that GRC officials so far have reacted relatively mildly should not, however, be taken to mean they are not deeply disturbed and that there is not an influential group within the GRC urging a "counterattack" against what they fear is a serious softening of US policy toward ChiComs. However so long as developments occur in limited context and without immediate practical effect, moderate reaction probably will continue to prevail, with criticism focused chiefly on "tactical" aspects (such as effect on ChiRep). Given Chiang's favorable expression of view, Embassy expects that reaction that will eventually be forthcoming from Foreign Ministry will be generally along relatively moderate lines of aide-memoire on Secretary's testimony before Zablocki Committee. Dept's attention is called, however, to CAS report FCT-9275,/3/ which illustrates view of those within GRC who would take stronger position.
/3/Not found.
McConaughy
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