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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXX China DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

China

 

1. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/

Washington, January 15, 1964, 6:01 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Director of the Office of Western European Affairs Francis E. Meloy, and approved by Harriman.

3539. For Ambassador Bohlen. Alphand called on Harriman under instructions 2:15 pm January 15. Said he was instructed see Harriman because Secretary not available.

Alphand reviewed recent history US-French conversations regarding possible French recognition Communist China recalling fact de Gaulle had told Secretary French would be in touch with US before carrying out any decision/2/ and mentioned January 7 Bohlen-Couve conversation/3/ where Couve said decision made to recognize Red China but this would be confirmed later. This was reason Alphand now seeing Harriman.

/2/Rusk reported the conversation in telegram Secto 25 from Paris, December 16, 1963; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXII, pp. 409-410.

/3/Reported in telegram 3177 from Paris, January 8. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 CHICOM)

Alphand said French Cabinet has decided to recognize Communist China. Announcement will be made in "next several weeks". Exchange of Ambassadors will take place three months after communique. Alphand said he had been instructed to stress:

(1) France would not accept conditions from Peiping. This means France will not break relations with Taiwan. He professed not to know what would happen but said there will probably be a unilateral statement from Peiping saying that government represents all of China. France does not accept this version but is not required to make a public statement. French relations with Taiwan will remain unchanged unless Taiwan chooses to break relations.

(2) France made no concession or decision regarding the position it will take in the UN. France has reserved its freedom of decision on this matter although clearly a position must be taken in the next General Assembly.

Alphand emphasized Paris had not "yielded to any demand from Peiping" and requested the matter remain secret until public announcement made.

Harriman said report had just been received from Ambassador Bohlen of his talk today with Couve on this same subject./4/ Bohlen had made clear and Harriman wished to underline this decision by France was very disturbing to the US and to other governments as well. Harriman emphasized he was speaking personally and without instructions but as well-known long-time warm friend of France. Response of President and US government would no doubt be forthcoming in due time. French action would be in direct conflict with fundamental US interests. It could not help having cooling effect on US popular feeling towards France. This was not an action we would have expected from an ally. It would seem the only gain to France is the assertion of its independence for the sake of asserting independence. This was an act on the part of France which can do no good to anyone and can do great harm to many.

/4/Bohlen reported the conversation in telegram 3344 from Paris, January 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 FR-CHICOM)

Harriman continued still on personal basis saying de Gaulle must have known the effect of such a decision on the US. There was little to gain for France and there would be great damage to the US. The Ambassador must realize what the effect would be if US and French roles were reversed.

Alphand said he did not understand Harriman's reaction. Others have recognized Communist China. Harriman reminded him these actions had been prior to Korean war.

Alphand said he also would speak personally and unofficially. He failed completely to understand this reaction. Harriman said Alphand was one of ablest and cleverest diplomats he knew. Alphand knew exactly what he meant. Harriman said French action would create doubt in Asia and would give a boost to Communist China. French action would create great difficulty for people and government and President of US. It was clear decision had been taken with total disregard of important US interests. France will be throwing away a great deal of good will and affection here in the US only for the sake of demonstrating its independence of US policy.

Harriman pointed out US has great responsibilities in the Far East, although we welcomed France taking more responsibility in such places as Laos and Cambodia. However, basic problem is containing Communist China and France can contribute very little as far as this basic problem is concerned. Burden rests squarely on US and France is strengthening our enemy. The Korean war has never been settled. Other areas of Asia are seething with Communist-supported conflicts. France has chosen the moment when our enemy is weak to help him.

Harriman closed by reminding Alphand his reactions had been personal and unofficial but he felt they would be shared by many Americans.

Rusk

 

2. Editorial Note

In a telephone conversation between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell at 4:30 p.m. on January 15, 1964, Johnson told Russell that "de Gaulle's going to recognize Communist China" and that the question was whether he should send a personal message to de Gaulle with a strong protest or send a lower-level protest for the record. His inclination was to do the latter. Russell told the President he "wouldn't go too strong on it" because de Gaulle would not pay much attention. Russell added, "The time's going to come when we might well--can't talk about it now--the time's going to come when we're going to have to recognize them." Johnson replied, "Yeah, I think so--don't think there's any question about it." Russell went on, "I ain't too sure but what we'd have been better off if we'd recognized them three-four years ago." Johnson replied, "I think so. It's the only thing Bill Douglas [Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas] said--" Russell broke in, "Politically, right now it's poison, of course." The conversation then turned to other subjects. At the end of the conversation, Johnson returned to the subject of how to respond to the French action: "About this de Gaulle thing, you just think we ought to play it as low key and just make a little protest for the record." Russell agreed. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Russell, January 15, 1964, 4:30 p.m., Tape F64.06, PNO 1)

In a conversation between the President and his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy later that day, Bundy told the President, "The one chance that we can frustrate de Gaulle is to get Chiang to stand still for a week or so. If he would not break his relations with the French, which is what he's always done when people recognize Peking before, this would put the monkey right back on Peking's back, because they have maintained a position that they can't recognize anybody who also recognizes Formosa. What the French hope is that Chiang will break relations right away, and that is probably what he'll do. We want to advise him to stand still for a week. Is that all right with you?" Johnson agreed. (Ibid., Recording of a Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Bundy, January 15, 1964, 6:30 p.m., Tape F64.06, PNO 2)

 

3. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/

Washington, January 16, 1964, 5:46 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Green and Officer in Charge of Republic of China Affairs Paul M. Popple, cleared by Harriman and the President, and approved by Rusk.

587. Please deliver soonest following letter to President Chiang from President Johnson:/2/

/2/Telegram 600 from Taipei, January 18, reported that Ambassador Wright had delivered the message that day. Chiang told him that he was awaiting a message from de Gaulle responding to a message Chiang had sent asking whether there was any truth to rumors that France might establish a trade mission in Peking or recognize the Communist government. (Ibid.)

"My dear Mr. President:

Your Government has been informed of reliable indications we have that the French Government intends to recognize the Chinese Communist regime in the near future. We have also learned that the Chinese Communists are prepared to accept French recognition without imposing any condition and that France intends to maintain its diplomatic relations with your Government.

I want you to know that the United States has done everything possible to deter the French Government from this ill-advised action. We have told the French at the highest levels that French recognition of the Peiping regime can only damage free world interests. We have asked France to reconsider its intention. We know that other governments are doing the same.

Despite our efforts, there is no indication of change in France's attitude. We understand that Paris and Peiping intend to exchange Ambassadors three months after announcing diplomatic ties. In this situation it is vitally important for our two Governments to work closely together to reduce by all means the ill effects of this event.

It is clear that the Chinese Communists will strongly resent continued French relations with your Government, and hope that your Government will take the initiative in severing relations with France as a result of French recognition of their regime. Mao Tse-tung is undoubtedly gambling on your Government doing just this, thereby relieving him from the burden of appearing to accept a 'two China' situation. Therefore, I believe it would be extremely wise for you to refrain from retaliatory action against France at this time. Your patience will cause Mao Tse-tung the greatest possible embarrassment. It will greatly reduce the advantages which the Chinese Communists expect to gain by the establishment of relations with France.

Finally, I wish to give you my personal assurance that we shall continue to stand by you and your Government and to provide all possible support in our common endeavors.

Warmest personal regards.

Lyndon B. Johnson"

Rusk

 

4. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/

Washington, January 18, 1964, 3:28 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CHICOM-FR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Meloy on January 17, cleared by Tyler, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, Tokyo for the Attorney General, Taipei, Brussels, Ottawa, and Saigon.

1291. For Ambassador. Alphand called on Secretary at his own request 6:30 PM January 17. Alphand said US had presented note previous day saying French decision recognize Communist China "against security and political interests of free world."/2/ He had note in response (which he presented) saying France thinks its action not against interests of free world./3/ In Harriman/Alphand conversation January 15, Harriman had said he saw no reason for French action except assert independ-ence and embarrass US. This was not so. Alphand pointed out Western nations which recognized Communist China prior to Korean war had not broken relations during war. It was now twelve years later and France believed it should act. First point he wished to make was France did not consider recognition meant approval. Second point was Soviet Union and Communist China no longer monolithic bloc. Previously there was no need to talk to Peiping. One could talk to Moscow as the master of Peiping. There is now a split in the bloc and one must talk directly to Peiping. Contrary to US belief France may be able to achieve something useful through this channel, speaking especially of Asia and Southeast Asia in particular. Alphand stressed establishment diplomatic relations France has in view is without commitment. There is no requirement to break relations with Taiwan and nothing is said about the United Nations.

/2/Dated January 16; the text is quoted in telegram 3545 to Paris, January 15. (Ibid., POL 16 CHICOM)

/3/Filed as an attachment to telegram 3614 to Paris, January 18. (Ibid.)

Alphand said he was surprised by text of US note. France hopes US will not think its action done as a gesture against US but that there are other reasons.

Secretary said Harriman had pointed out he was speaking personally and as old well-known friend of France. Secretary would now speak officially. Recognition will increase the prestige of Peiping. Since Korean war no country comparing in prestige to France has recognized Communist China. France must consider the effect of its action. If France finds American people react strongly, France must realize we are taking casualties every day. Just a short time ago we found 7 tons of Chinese Communist made arms south of Saigon. We are spitting blood.

Secretary continued we do not believe agreement can be reached with China through means adopted by France. Communist China does not respect its agreements. President Kennedy felt we took French views into full account over Laos. We expect our views to be considered by France now.

Secretary said Alphand had claimed recognition does not mean approval but it will be so interpreted. He had reviewed with Alphand many times our views on Communist China. US is aiding India resist Chinese Communist aggression. Chicoms are active in subversion in Latin America. Secretary pointed out if French action leads to Chinese Communist subversive centers in Africa, this will be more of problem for France than for US.

Secretary said Alphand had mentioned no conditions imposed on France by Peiping. He emphasized there were also no conditions imposed by France on Peiping, such as even minimum requirement for Chinese Communists to honor commitments in Southeast Asia.

Alphand protested French position not taken to oppose US. France believed its action might be beneficial to all. France was doing only what others have long since done. French recognition might be useful in obtaining agreement at conference to neutralize Cambodia. Secretary said 1954 Agreement already exists which Chicoms are not honoring. It is possible to have contacts with Chinese Communists without recognizing them. There is very slight chance US would attend a conference on Cambodia.

Tyler asked if French Government had assessed probable effect on Taiwan. Alphand said relations with Peiping did not prevent relations with Taiwan. Secretary said Peiping may be gambling on Taiwan breaking relations. If Taiwan does not break relations is France not exposing itself to rebuff by Peiping?

Secretary said he would not judge how France regards its national interest, but he would think French relations with NATO, SEATO, the United States and Southeast Asia would be worth more than its relations with Peiping because all these other relations would be affected.

Alphand said he could not control US press, public or congressional reaction, but US Government could at least say French action not taken against US. As to timing there comes a time when one must do what one has long felt is right.

Secretary inquired how France intends to handle Africa. Alphand said France does not intend to dictate but does not know if French African states will follow example of France.

Secretary said two things will erode attitude of American people toward alliance in coming months: 1) recognition of Communist China; and 2) Western European trade with Cuba. If Western European countries consider these problems as matters for each alone to decide, then US attitude will be seriously eroded. Secretary was very much concerned over alliance in next three months.

Secretary said we can understand that our allies do not give same priority as US to matters in Pacific. US however is bearing burdens both in Europe and in Far East. If we find in carrying out our responsibilities our position is being weakened or undermined, this is bound to affect our relations. Secretary said if French decision irrevocable then it is duty both governments to circumscribe and attempt to limit damage which will inevitably be caused.

Alphand said he would report Secretary's views to Paris.

Rusk

 

5. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/

Washington, January 18, 1964, 5:01 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CHICOM-FR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Popple, cleared by Bacon and Tyler, and cleared and approved by Don T. Christensen of S/S. Repeated to Paris and Tokyo.

607. Following is FYI Noforn subject to amendment upon review based upon uncleared memcon:

1. Secretary called in Amb. Tsiang January 18 to discuss French intention recognize Chinese Communists. Secretary told Tsiang:

a. That it our impression de Gaulle has made personal decision which not likely be changed, although we have not completely abandoned hope.

b. That USG regards de Gaulle's action this matter almost intolerable for many reasons, but particularly in light Chicom involvement South Vietnam where US troops incurring almost daily casualties.

c. That USG had lodged strong protest with France requesting reconsideration and had asked allies do same. In this connection, Secretary cited support from Germany and Italy, but particularly emphasized vigorous efforts Japanese had made on behalf GRC and in attempt to forestall French recognition Chicoms. Secretary told Tsiang it was most important that GRC aware these Japanese efforts and that it would be helpful if GRC could find some way express its appreciation, particularly in light recent acrimony over Chou Hung-ching case which has led to deterioration GRC-GOJ relations.

d. That there was absolutely no two-China sentiment in USG. That to cast doubt on USG firm opposition two-China concept could have most serious repercussions at this stage, particularly in Africa.

e. That USG understood GRC concern over two-China connotations, but felt best course for GRC to follow at present juncture was to stand fast and to take no immediate retaliatory action against France.

f. That if GRC sits tight, Peiping may find situation intolerable, since there good chance both French and Chicoms gambling on provoking GRC into breaking off relations with France.

g. That USG not suggesting GRC make definitive decision at this time but merely put Chicoms to maximum test.

h. That should Chicoms go ahead with exchange of Ambassadors without GRC-French break, then GRC would have to make own decision in light prevailing circumstances.

i. That GRC should avoid giving France any normal pretext, e.g. anti-French demonstrations in Taipei, for severing relations with GRC.

2. Ambassador Tsiang said he agreed that GRC should stay its hand for the moment.

3. In reply to question on level of GRC representation in Paris, Tsiang said GRC for many years had been unsuccessful in effort get French to accept GRC Ambassador. Most recent request made last fall during ForMin Shen's visit France. Secretary suggested GRC give thought to renewing such request now as means testing French. If France refused we would then be in a position puncture bubble of French willingness give GRC and Chicoms equal treatment. Secretary pointed out that it may be two or three months before exchange of Ambassadors between France and Chicoms took place, and that in meantime France may have to put certain conditions on Peiping in connection with French plans for South Vietnam. In any event, Secretary stressed it was important to make the recognition matter as difficult as possible for both Paris and Peiping.

4. In reply to Amb. Tsiang's question re French motives, Secretary said very difficult to answer but felt motives could be found more in peculiar psychological make-up of de Gaulle rather than in serious analysis French interests.

Rusk

 

6. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, January 24, 1964, 11-11:28 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-JAPAN. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Acting Deputy Director of the Office of East Asian Affairs Robert A. Fearey. Approved by Rusk on January 27 in Tokyo. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)

SUBJECT
Japanese Political Questions; French Recognition of Communist China

PARTICIPANTS
Tingfu F. Tsiang, Chinese Ambassador
Yi-seng Kiang, Chinese Minister
Johnson Cheng, Counselor of Embassy

The Secretary
Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Robert A. Fearey, Acting Deputy Director for East Asian Affairs

Ambassador Tsiang said that he had been instructed to take up with the Secretary two matters relating to Japan.

First, his Government wished him to call the Secretary's attention to certain developments in Japanese politics. During the last several years Prime Minister Ikeda had, willingly or unwillingly, associated himself with and promoted the political influence of Ichiro Kono, Kenzo Matsumura, Tatsunosuke Takasaki and Takeo Miki. As a result, the political influence of these individuals had increased. With the development of trade with the mainland, Kono particularly had been able to acquire considerable funds for political purposes. Kono was building up a political organization of his own in hopes of promoting a different type of governing coalition in which he, Kono, would be the Prime Minister while Ikeda became the honorary chief of the coalition. The GRC wished to warn the Secretary that Japanese trade with the mainland would not only help Communist China but would also, on the Japanese side, corrupt Japanese politics in the direction of the left. The Secretary said that he would bear in mind what the Ambassador had said.

Second, Ambassador Tsiang said that the Japanese Government was considering establishing a permanent trade mission in Peiping, reciprocated by a Chinese Communist permanent trade mission in Tokyo. The Ambassador said that his Government hoped that the Secretary would use his influence to prevent this. The Secretary said that he planned to discuss the mainland trade question in Tokyo and would see what could be done.

The Secretary said he was very disappointed and disturbed over news of the manner in which the GRC is handling the French-Communist Chinese recognition matter./2/ There appears to us to be overwhelming evidence that if the GRC refuses to break relations with France this would have a major impact on Peiping in its attempt to establish diplomatic relations throughout the world. The Secretary said that we have no wish to interfere in the GRC's business in giving them advice. However, the United States' future relations with the GRC, its relations with NATO and Southeast Asia are all very much involved. We need the cooperation of the GRC. If there were only a 50 percent or even a 33 percent chance that the French-Communist Chinese move could be frustrated it would be of the greatest importance that that chance be taken. The consequences of failure are such that we should take any step that might assist in frustrating the Paris-Peiping action. If France succeeds in establishing relations with Peiping in circumstances where the GRC has made it easy for them to do so, we will not be able to commit our prestige in other cases, in other capitals. We need maximum assistance from the GRC to deal with this problem.

/2/Telegram 616 from Taipei, January 21, reported that Foreign Minister Shen had told Wright that Chiang had received a letter from de Gaulle that had convinced him that de Gaulle intended to formalize relations with Peking swiftly and that it would be impossible to keep an Ambassador in Paris even for a short time. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 FR-CHICOM)

The Secretary said that the GRC should not only continue to protest France's action--the GRC should in addition make it just as hard as possible for Paris and Peiping to carry their plan out. Our information and strong belief is that France would be unwilling to take the initiative in breaking relations with the GRC. The Secretary said that he hoped the GRC and people of Taiwan saw the gravity of the matter as we see it in our own national interest. As he had said, ours is not just the advice of a friend. We too have an important stake and need the GRC's help. If it becomes clear that we are not able to work together in an effort to make the establishment of relations between France and Communist China as difficult as possible, the loss of interest in the U.S. in the effort to support the GRC will be very severe. The Secretary said that he had been reading records of Congressional discussions of the matter which clearly confirmed this. This is an extremely important matter. If we cannot work together on this, it would be very difficult to work together effectively as we have for so many years in support of GRC interests. He was not pointing a finger at the Ambassador personally since he knew the Ambassador had correctly reported their discussions. But he wanted to be sure that the Government at Taiwan understands the utter gravity of the problem. He understood that Ambassador Wright had not been afforded opportunity to discuss the matter personally with President Chiang.

Ambassador Tsiang said that his information was scanty. He was not personally familiar with all aspects of the problem and was not in a position to say anything at the moment. He would report with all clarity to his Government what the Secretary had said.

The Secretary said he wished to add a further point. There had been intimations that in Taiwan there were some who suspected that we were trying to booby-trap the GRC into a false position. This was not true. Such an interpretation would be very badly received here.

Ambassador Tsiang said that it was hard for the GRC to distinguish official from unofficial views and comment in Washington. So many people wanted to speak their minds on the problem, including, for example, Mr. Lippmann. The Secretary said that Mr. Lippmann had held the same position for 15 years. He could understand the difficulties President Chiang had in dealing with a man like deGaulle. He could show the Ambassador his own wounds. DeGaulle is a very complex man, almost impossible to persuade. The Secretary reiterated that our information is that Paris is very worried over the possibility that the GRC will not break relations.

Ambassador Tsiang said that his personal recommendation to Taipei had been that the Government should sit tight through the announcement of recognition, but should withdraw after completion of an exchange of ambassadors. He had warned his Government not to talk about future steps. The Secretary said that the GRC should give no indication of intention to withdraw in any circumstances. He made plain that the GRC should not give any indication that it would withdraw its Paris Embassy if a Chinese Communist Ambassador arrived, or the GRC's whole position will be undercut.

The Secretary said that looking ahead, we are in a major battle of a long campaign. If Paris goes ahead we will be faced probably quite soon with a danger of recognition of Peiping by some African countries, by Belgium, by Canada, by Japan and by other countries. It is true that 42 UN nations recognize Peking. But France is a special case--if this hole is made in the dam the prospect is that the water will flood through. The Secretary said that he could not emphasize too strongly the importance of doing all we can to frustrate Paris' and Peiping's move./3/

/3/Wright reported in telegram 648 from Taipei, January 26, that he had reviewed Rusk's conversation with Tsiang in detail with Chiang that morning. (Ibid., POL CHINAT-US)

 

7. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 25, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Recognition of Communist China, Vol. II. Secret.

Here are the instructions we've sent out to Ray Cline in our backdoor effort to bring the Gimo around. You'll note we've gone no further than to say he's coming at your request.

His instructions (attached)/2/ take a fairly tough line, as Rusk did with the GRC Ambassador. This includes implied threat that if GRC won't listen to us, we may not be able to work so closely with it

/2/Telegram 648 to Taipei, January 24, stated that Cline was going to Taipei at Johnson's request to talk to Chiang Ching-kuo and, if it appeared desirable, to President Chiang; he was to explain the U.S. position and give advice but not to make deals or negotiate. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CHICOM-FR)

McCone favors a softer line, even promising the Gimo again what Kennedy did at the time of the 1962 Outer Mongolia flap, i.e. that we'd use every means, including the veto, to keep Chicoms out of the UN./3/ But State thinks this would rob us of any freedom of action if things went sour and we wanted to pursue a flexible strategy at the UN./4/

/3/Reference is to an oral message to Chiang, delivered by Ambassador Drumright on October 17, 1961, in which Kennedy stated that "if at any time a U.S. veto is necessary and will be effective in preventing Chinese Communist entry into the U.N., the U.S. will use that veto." See telegram 259 to Taipei, October 16, 1961, in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXII, p. 160.

/4/McCone stated his views in a January 24 telephone conversation with Harriman and in messages that Acting DCI Carter transmitted in letters of January 24, 25, and 27 to Harriman. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, Subject Files, Cline, Ray S.; also Central Intelligence Agency, McCone Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 5, Folder 3, DCI European Trip, January 1964) Harriman told Ball in a January 26 telephone conversation that McCone was "quite upset" but that Harriman, Rusk, and Komer agreed that it was impossible to give Cline any negotiating authority. (Johnson Library, Ball papers, China (Taiwan))

R.W. Komer/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

8. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/

Taipei, January 27, 1964, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CHICOM-FR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo for the Secretary.

658. Deptel 648./2/ Department pass CIA. Following from Ray Cline:

/2/See footnote 2, Document 7.

Following my early morning talk with Chiang Ching-kuo [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]/3/ Ambassador, DCM, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and I went over file and Deptel 648 instructions. At 1130 Chiang requested another meeting with me where he said he had briefed Gimo on basic points of earlier talk and also discussed subject with Premier and FonMin.

/3/The message under reference, January 27, along with two January 28 messages from Cline concerning the other two meetings reported in this telegram, are filed with a memorandum of McCone's January 24 telephone conversation with Harriman; see footnote 4, Document 7. A copy of the first message is in Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-FR.

He said Gimo understood US view that GRC should lodge protest when French recognize Peiping and should issue strong statement against "two China" policy but should await further developments before breaking off relations. Gimo felt that GRC action and its timing would depend on content and timing of French announcement. If de Gaulle announced he breaking with GRC nothing could be done. If French statement equivocal GRC would consider possible responses aiming at US objectives.

Chiang said in any event GRC and US mutually affected by French action and grave consequences likely to follow made it essential GRC and US work together on Asian problems. GRC plans to recover mainland would have helped prevent this situation if they had been carried out. Now necessary to talk about how to save GRC and US position in Asia, not just in Paris. He felt serious political troubles would arise in Taiwan if prospects for return to mainland become remote.

Chiang said Gimo wanted to know what US would do if GRC maneuvers in Paris won some time before GRC ouster. Replied that time would permit moral and political pressure on France not to consummate full diplomatic relation, would assist in urging other nations not to follow French lead, and would permit strong US effort to rally support for defense Southeast Asia and free China against Chicom thrusts to dominate area.

Chiang said he hoped all points made in our talks would be got across to Gimo. At this point upon request of Ambassador I said Ambassador would want to accompany me for talk with Gimo and we would be ready anytime. Chiang said he would report to his father and get in touch with me later.

In third meeting with me on January 27, Chiang said he had reported second meeting to Gimo. Gimo wished me to know that GRC reaction to French recognition had been thoroughly discussed between two countries and given deep consideration by Gimo. The Gimo's decision had been passed to Ambassador Wright. Up to this point the GRC still held to this position in principle but the government was willing to study French recognition statement and reconsider their decision if nature of statement allowed it. Gimo did not deem French recognition as most important point but rather effects it would have on world situation, in Asia and particularly Southeast Asia. He hoped that while I was here I would discuss fully implications of French recognition especially on US and GRC interests in Asia. The Gimo felt that two matters of principle should be discussed after the French announcement:

1) The future of the GRC and

2) This future as related to the recovery of the mainland.

The President had therefore instructed FonMin Shen to discuss these problems with Amb Wright and me. After these discussions the President would be happy to meet with me.

In ensuing discussion Chiang Ching-Kuo expressing his own views hoped US would consider GRC problems. He catalogued restraints placed by US on GRC action against the mainland. He said GRC would never "sell the soul of its people" on the mainland. Later in emotional voice he said "We may smile on the surface but our hearts are heavy." The GRC would not go against US interests but they were afraid that Taiwan might fall to Chicoms without a fight.

He said news stories from Washington that the US pressuring GRC on French recognition issue were giving government bad time in party.

I said GRC can count on support from US but that support would be stronger if it clear that de Gaulle to blame for breaking relations, not GRC. I emphasized that US not asking GRC to accept "two-China" policy but to stay and fight at same time forcing de Gaulle's hand to take responsibility if he made it impossible for GRC to continue in Paris.

Chiang said he would get in touch with me after French statement available./4/

/4/Telegram 660 from Taipei, January 27, reported that after the French announcement that evening, Chiang Ching-kuo gave Cline a draft statement protesting the French action but with no indication that the GRC would break diplomatic relations. Telegram 662, January 28, reported that Chiang Kai-shek had approved the draft statement with only minor changes. (Ibid., POL 17 CHICOM-FR)

Wright

 

9. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 13-64

Washington, January 28, 1964.

/1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, NIE 13-64. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on January 28. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of the estimate. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST CHINA

The Problem

To assess the problems and performance of Communist China's economy, and its prospects over the next few years.

Note

Firm information on Communist China remains so sparse that precise economic analysis is not possible and even broad judgments are subject to error. The Estimate should be read in the light of this general caution. Annex A/2/ gives a brief description of our information on the Chinese Communist economy.

/2/Attached but not printed.

Conclusions

A. The Chinese economy has recovered somewhat from its 1960-1961 low, but its prospects are considerably worse than in 1957./3/ Any Chinese government would face monumental economic problems resulting from the huge and growing population, inadequate arable land, and the low level of technology. The problems of the Chinese Communists are compounded by their own past errors, their ideological compulsions, the break with the Soviet Union, and extreme nationalism. (Paras. 1-10)/4/

/3/In the following discussion we use 1957 as a base year for comparison because it was the eve of the Great Leap Forward, and because the per capita grain output in that year represents a level of production that provided farmers and factory workers an adequate diet, made grain imports unnecessary, and permitted the export of modest amounts of grain and other agricultural products. [Footnote in the source text.]

/4/The paragraph numbers refer to the discussion portion of the estimate, which is not printed.

B. Grain output in 1963 was no greater than in 1957, when there were some 75 million fewer people to feed. Peiping's mismanagement and the post-1960 decline of Soviet support have grievously hurt the industrial sector; total output in 1963 remains far below the 1959 peak. A few priority industries, such as those supporting agriculture and the petroleum industry, are operating at close to capacity, but many suffer from unbalanced development, technological deficiencies, and shortages of parts and raw materials. Foreign trade is at the lowest point since 1954. That with the Soviet Union has declined more than 60 percent since 1959, and China has become a substantial importer of food from the Free World. (Paras. 11-26)

C. We believe that the Chinese Communists will seek and obtain additional credits and technical assistance from the Free World, but in relatively modest amounts. We do not believe that diplomatic recognition by France and other Free World countries will alter this picture substantially. (Para. 27)

D. We believe that agricultural production in the next few years is unlikely to grow much faster than the population, and that industry will grow at a rate well below what was achieved in the mid-1950s. The Chinese are likely to continue to devote more attention to agriculture in both their domestic and import programs, but will probably not divert enough resources from industry and the arms program to put agriculture on a sound footing. We believe that the Chinese will be anxious to revert to a policy favoring industrial development, and will be prone to do so prematurely. We believe that difficulties will accumulate in the economy, within the leadership, and between the regime and the people. We thus do not believe that China can become a modern industrial state for many years. China's direct military threat to the West will remain limited, but China will continue to be a major force in Asia, and a crucial menace to its Asian neighbors and to Western interests in the area. (Paras. 29-39)

[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]

 

10. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/

Warsaw, January 29, 1964, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Taipei, Hong Kong, Stockholm, Moscow, and Geneva.

1273. Cabot-Wang Talks. 119th meeting 1 hour 45 minutes./2/ Deptel 1150./3/

/2/Cabot commented on the meeting in telegram 1277 from Warsaw and reported it in detail in airgram A-630, both dated January 30. (Ibid.) For records of previous meetings in the series of Ambassadorial talks between representatives of the United States and the People's Republic of China, see Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, volume III; 1958-1960, volume XIX; and 1961-1963, volume XXII.

/3/Telegram 1150 to Warsaw, January 21, transmitted guidance for the meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)

(1) I opened along lines paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 reference telegram followed by substance all numbered paragraphs reference telegram plus inquiry re Blue Goose./4/

/4/Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 stated that the United States sought to promote a relaxation of tensions and to seek a just and enduring peace and that it had refrained from responding in kind to the hostility which appeared daily in the Chinese press. Paragraph 2 stated that the "United States cannot tolerate a situation where your side continues to introduce arms into Viet-Nam and seeks to increase the level of insurrectionary activity in South Viet-Nam." Other numbered paragraphs requested release of four U.S. nationals held as prisoners in China and gave Wang information on three deportee cases. The Blue Goose was a plane missing since October 1, 1958; information concerning it had been requested at several previous meetings.

(2) Wang expressed disappointment nothing new or positive in my opening statement. Said hope for relaxation tensions Taiwan Straits and Far East and improvements in our relations in the New Year depend on Washington not Peiping. Said China was victim of aggression. Said USG must [garble] change in its erroneous China policy of aggression and mil encirclement. This policy leads to blind alley. US seizure Taiwan by armed force is root of bad relations. If this key issue were resolved other questions would not be difficult. Converse all attempts resolving side issues of no avail until key issues solved. Two-China policy will not be tolerated. Quoted recent statements Secretary and Undersecretary Harriman in attempt prove we had assumed proprietary air in saying US would never "turn over" Taiwan. Wang complained of trade and travel restrictions, our UN policy, mentioned 272nd through 276th serious warning, complained of spy aircraft penetrating deeply into mainland and support of Chiang attempt invade [or] harass mainland for which we held answerable. "Big Dipper" exercise was military provocation. Complained our activities South Vietnam and Laos and masterminding of aggression and subversion in Cambodia, of military bases Thailand, and alleged we were resurrecting Japanese militarism to use for our purposes. Complained of aid to India and activities attempting encirclement in crescent from India to Japan.

(3) I pointed out once again we were not occupying Taiwan but fully intended fulfill our treaty obligations to GRC. Gave brief examples historical sequences indicate our posture in Asia was reaction to Chicom hostility. Said if his side believed any Chinese being prevented from returning to Mainland we would like to know of case. Followed with paragraph (G) paragraph reference telegram serious warnings/5/ plus some of third paragraph Deptel 1154/6/ and paragraph (B) reference telegram re Seventh Fleet./7/ Gave obvious rebuttals to South Vietnam and Laos charge staying it was Chicoms who were aiding Pathet Lao and sending arms to South Vietnam.

/5/It stated that serious warnings 270-275 (concerning alleged U.S. violations of Chinese territory or territorial waters) related for the most part to the Hsi Sha islands and that the United States did not recognize Chinese Communist sovereignty over those islands but would be willing to check into claimed violations in other areas.

/6/Telegram 1154 to Warsaw, January 22, provided additional details for Cabot's guidance. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)

/7/It stated, with reference to Seventh Fleet maneuvers in the Indian Ocean, that U.S. fleet maneuvers on the high seas were a matter of U.S. concern.

(4) Wang gave standard upside-down version post-war history FE ending with assertion Chicom policy was winning sympathy and support all over world.

(5) Refuting charges our insistent hostility to China I pointed out warm feelings American people had had for Chinese for many decades, when we had helped China in its need on more than one occasion including in World War II when we fought as allies. I said it was clear from recent public statements Wang's side felt free to subvert governments which did not happen to like. Chicoms had urged Soviet Union intervene in Hungary and there were more recent examples to be noted. Asked whether his side believed in non-intervention or whether it believed in toppling other governments which it may not agree with.

(6) Wang gave as proof of our constant hostility lack of diplomatic recognition, blockade and trade embargoes, UN policies, and occupation Taiwan. Said his side believed in ability each country manage own affairs and was against outside interference. Much of world's trouble due to interventionist policies of US. Said had no information re Blue Goose. Said our intention toward other interested parties re disarmament discussion was matter for us to entertain.

Date of next meeting April 8.

Cabot

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