NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
150. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 23, 1965, 3 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV. Secret. RE General Westmoreland has requested a reaffirmation of authority to use certain riot control agents in Vietnam, and Secretaries Rusk and McNamara join in recommending that he be given clear authorization to use tear gas (CS and CN), but not the more violent nausea-producing gases (DM and CN-DM), either alone or in combination. As you know, Ambassador Goldberg has had reservations about this recommendation, and in deference to his wishes, the recommendation has been held up until after his initial speech. But now Westmoreland wants to use the tear gas in an operation on Saturday, and we all think it is time to go ahead. If this recommendation is approved, our plan would be to have no announcement in Washington, but to have Westmoreland make it clear in due course after the Saturday operation that tear gas (and tear gas only) is authorized in cases where it is more humane, and especially with respect to civilians. There will be some international criticism, but even the New York Times is resoundingly with us on this. I do not worry you with the pros and cons because it seems to me that the common sense of the matter is so clear. Secretary McNamara's letter is attached./2/ Can we go ahead?/3/ McG.B. /2/Apparent reference to Document 147. /3/Next to the "Yes" recommendation on this memorandum is a handwritten note that reads: "Returned per our conversation."
151. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 23, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV. Top Secret. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the memorandum. SUBJECT A recent review of the situation in Vietnam by key officials of State and Defense and myself indicated that the emerging situation there required some hard thinking on future U.S. military and political actions. We posed several questions to Lodge for comment./2/ /2/See Documents 141 and 144. U.S. Ground Operations. In the light of our military build-up we felt that the VC may be avoiding major unit actions and reverting to a strategy of small-scale actions over a prolonged period. The problem arises as to how we use our substantial ground and air strength effectively against small-scale harassment-type action, whether we should engage in pacification as opposed to patrolling actively, and whether, indeed, we should taper off our ground force build-up. Lodge agreed that VC may seek to avoid large-scale operations but felt that the Vietnamese must deal with small-scale actions through an effective military-political campaign. U.S. forces should undertake "thorough pacification" within their own areas. Lodge endorses Westmoreland's current strategic concept which calls for the deployment of all troops now scheduled for Vietnam. Westmoreland's concept: 1. Halt the VC offensive. 2. Destroy VC units where they can be found and pacify selected high priority areas. 3. Restore progressively the entire country to GVN control. 4. Support "rural reconstruction" with comprehensive attention to the pacification process. 5. Continue the air campaign against the DRV and infiltration routes into Laos. Lodge and Westmoreland feel VC "lie-low" tactics will become increasingly a police-social action problem. They expect increased VC terrorism, subversion and economic warfare. Thus far, there is no evidence of significant GVN resentment of U.S. ground actions. Use of Airpower. We noted and endorsed a recent directive by Westmoreland concerning civilian implications of U.S. air operations, but we still felt a need for a better overall analysis and evaluation of our air operations. We suggested the possibility of sending a military-civilian survey team (similar to those of World War II) to Vietnam. Lodge replied that Westmoreland is already looking into the problem of using our increased air capability more effectively and is opposed to a group coming out from Washington at this time. Pacification. We asked Lodge to develop a specific plan for our joint consideration which would involve the concentration of GVN forces on pacification and the reliance on U.S. forces to handle large-scale VC actions. We suggested that he propose a system of priorities and a definition of clear objectives in the pacification program. Lodge reports that the Mission has started to grapple with this whole problem. The Hop Tac operation (pacification of provinces bordering Saigon) is getting priority attention and Lodge is encouraging Ky to concentrate GVN efforts on pacification. Westmoreland is working up a joint U.S.-GVN campaign plan and will be prepared to brief Washington on this by the end of this month. Lodge believes this will be responsive to our desire for a definition of the respective roles for U.S. and GVN forces. Acheson Plan. We posed the possibility to Lodge of getting the GVN to apply some of the key elements of the Acheson Plan (land reform, Chieu Hoi, etc.) and to select one or more areas for the application of the plan as a whole, including local elections. Lodge feels that GVN is already giving attention to land reform and Chieu Hoi. He agrees with our desire to get an electoral process started and has been talking to Ky about having the provincial councils elected last May elect, in turn, representatives to a national assembly. The assembly would concentrate on working up a national constitution. Negotiations. Lodge and we both agree that we have sufficiently stressed our willingness to negotiate and any further public emphasis, except as necessary in the UN, might be misunderstood by the Communists. Internal Political Situation. Lodge and we agree that Ky's government seems to be settling down. We also agree on the necessity to keep a watchful eye on any potential coups and to encourage Ky to generate more positive popular support. McG.B.
152. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 24, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL, Memos (A). Secret. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw this memorandum. SUBJECT /2/The text of the memorandum is printed in FBIS, Daily Report, Far East, September 24, 1965, no. 184. On September 24, the Office of Current Intelligence of the CIA prepared an intelligence memorandum, OCI No. 2324/65, assessing the DRV memorandum. (Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 251, NV/SV Negotiations Sept-Dec 1965) The Director of Intelligence and Research sent the Secretary of State, also on September 24, an intelligence note on the DRV memorandum. (Ibid.: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam INR Studies, 64-65) The DRV memorandum rejected unconditional discussions and solutions seeking U.N. intervention, insisted on recognition of the NLF's right to have a "decisive say" in negotiations, and asserted that the DRV's four points were the "sole correct basis for a settlement." Hanoi has now responded to U.S. policy statements on settling the war with an official government memorandum detailing their own current "views". This statement, in the form of a Foreign Ministry paper, is the most extensive pronouncement on Hanoi policy since the four point proposal of 8 April./3/ Hanoi probably regards the document as its side of a dialogue with Washington on terms for negotiation. The memorandum also serves as a response to the many recent proposals by free world leaders on ending the war. Its timing may have been set by a Hanoi desire to go on record prior to the opening of the UN General Assembly. (Incidentally, the paper flatly rejects the use of the UN in settling the war.) /3/See vol. II, Document 25. The memorandum offers no new proposals for settling the conflict, and no explicit concessions. It does, however, by dint of its phraseology on several points and by its omission of several hard-line concepts contained in prior statements, convey an impression of greater flexibility than has been present overall in any past policy pronouncements. It is apparently not a signal that Hanoi is now ready to step to the negotiating table, but rather that the North Vietnamese have reviewed their bidding, made some adjustments, and are waiting to hear the response of the other principals, most notably the United States. The statement follows other indications, both public and private, that Hanoi is now more interested in hearing what U.S. officials and friends of the U.S. have to say about negotiations, and that Hanoi is also trying to be more explicit in outlining its own position. CLC
153. Memorandum From the National Security Council Executive Secretary (Smith) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, September 24, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL, Memos. Top Secret. Mr. Bundy: Califano told me the following Friday afternoon:/2/ /2/September 24. 1. The President asked him to discuss with McNamara the McNamara memo/3/ on increasing the number of US forces in South Vietnam. The President wanted to know whether a decision had to be made immediately. /3/Document 147. 2. Califano said McNamara told him a decision did not have to be made today. 3. Upon reporting this information to the President, the President asked that a meeting be set up Tuesday to include McNamara, Secretary Rusk, you and Califano to discuss any increase in the current level of forces. The President appeared reluctant to contemplate going above 200,000 and asked Califano to ask McNamara to be prepared with an alternative ceiling. 4. McNamara will be ready with an alternative proposal on Tuesday, including a phased movement of forces spread over a longer period of time so that a decision could be taken at any time to stop further increases. Marvin Watson has scheduled a luncheon for Tuesday at 1 p.m. at which time this subject can be discussed./4/ BKS /4/A note on the source text in Smith's hand reads as follows: "Later: Luncheon cancelled. Reason not given. Meeting now being set up for noon Wednesday. BKS." See Document 155.
154. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, September 26, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/AL on September 27. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Dobrynin asked if we had really made clear to the North Viet-Namese what our position was for a settlement. I said that we had been in touch with the North Viet-Namese through various channels but so far had found no disposition on their part to have any serious discussion. He urged that we make clear to them our exact position on their four points. I said I thought we had done this in our many public statements as well as some indirect private ones. Upon being pressed by him, I said the one point that gave us the most trouble was that concerning the role of the National Liberation Front. Dobrynin said that including dependents, about eight hundred thousand people supported the Viet Cong and our position left them no way out. I disagreed with this and said that if peace were established, they could participate in elections and obtain representation. I said that in dealing with this matter, however, we had to take account of the attitude and position of the South Viet-Namese Government. I said it seemed clear that the Chinese Communists were pressing Hanoi not to negotiate. Dobrynin asked if I did not think there was some difference in the positions of Peking and Hanoi. I said I was not an expert in this field but it seemed to me that there was always a slight difference in the public statements of Peking and Hanoi and that Hanoi always seemed to want to keep the door open just a bit, whereas Peking's position was absolutely rigid.
155. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, September 29, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, President's Appointment File, Sept. 29, 1965. Top Secret. Prepared by Califano. SUBJECT /2/The meeting was held from 12:29 to 1:20 p.m. in the Cabinet Room of the White House. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) An agenda for the meeting is ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV. Level of Forces in Vietnam McNamara reviewed his memorandum of September 22, 1965, (attached)/3/ concerning the need to increase the level of forces in Vietnam. He said that the original estimate of 175,000 was now increased to 210,000. The proposed 35,000 increase did not involve any increase in combat troops; they were support troops, such as communications personnel and refugee relief units. McNamara requested an interim authorization to go to 195,000 men and indicated that he would be back to the President about November 15 with a request for the remaining 15,000 men. The President commented that it was a situation in which he had no choice but to approve the increase. McNamara confirmed the President's comment and the President approved the increase to 195,000 men. /3/Document 147. McNamara said that the public announcement of increased troops would be made from Saigon as the troops arrived there. While he admitted that this would encourage rumors, he said that this was important for the security of our men and in line with previously announced policies. Tear Gas Bundy noted that Secretary McNamara had authorized a one-time use of tear gas by General Westmoreland./4/ He said that the question of the continuing use of tear gas was still up in the air, although the authority to use tear gas technically remained with the field commander, General Westmoreland. Ball said it would be desirable for Westmoreland to use tear gas before the end of the week because of the Red Cross conference next week in Geneva, which might make some statements opposing the use of tear gas. McNamara said that the use of tear gas must be handled carefully in the right operation and that he was opposed to pushing Westmoreland to use it within the next few days unless Westmoreland felt such action was desirable. Bundy said that the President might get a press query about tear gas if he held a press conference tomorrow. McNamara suggested that the President respond by stating (1) tear gas is a humane way to restore order under certain circumstances and (2) Westmoreland is authorized to use it in those circumstances. Bundy underscored the importance of using the words "tear gas" rather than "non-lethal agents" or "riot control agents". Moyers said that we had been too defensive in our public handling of the tear gas situation, that we should remind the world that the Viet Cong slit throats and bomb children and that any human being in one of the Vietnam caves would prefer to cry from tear gas rather than be killed by hand grenades. Ball and Raborn agreed. /4/See Document 150. Rice Shipments Bundy said Lodge had requested 100,000 tons of rice as fast as possible. Bundy proposed to make the rice available in four shipments of 25,000 tons each, rather than in a single shipment. The President approved this. McNamara said that no matter how we were shipping the rice, we were not sending enough rice to South Vietnam and that we should be sending three or four hundred thousand tons of rice. The President agreed and Bundy said he would make sure there was a continuing program for the purchase and shipment of rice to South Vietnam. Possible Press Conference Statement Bundy said he was inclined to the view that the President should make a statement at his press conference about the non-military elements of our Vietnam effort. Bundy said that only when the President makes such statements did they get any substantial coverage. He believed it was important to obtain such coverage in view of the world opinion and forthcoming student demonstrations. Bundy said he would submit a statement to the President for his consideration this afternoon./5/ /5/At 7:30 p.m. on September 29, McGeorge Bundy sent the President a statement that he entitled, "The Works of Peace in Vietnam." Bundy stated that he had learned from Bill Moyers that a press conference was unlikely, but Bundy thought the President might be interested in reading the statement and might consider releasing it in conjunction with publicity for Dr. Howard Rusk's mission to Vietnam. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV) The statement was not issued. [Here follows discussion of the Dominican Republic, foreign visitors to Washington, India-Pakistan, foreign aid, and Cuba.] The Shipping Question The meeting adjourned to the President's office with McNamara, Ball, Moyers, Bundy and Califano./6/ McNamara presented the proposed Rolling Thunder program./7/ He also discussed the question of Hanoi's hardening attitude. He noted that there was a National Intelligence Estimate indicating that Hanoi's attitude was hardening, largely because we were not rough enough in our bombing./8/ McNamara pointed out that the estimate was made without the benefit of advice from experts in the government such as Llewellyn Thompson, Maxwell Taylor, et al. He urged a special study of the problem of Hanoi's hardening attitude and the reasons for it. Ball concurred and pointed out that it may well be that some aspects of the bombing program were responsible for Hanoi's hardening attitude. The President approved the Rolling Thunder program proposed by McNamara as well as the recommended study by Taylor, Thompson, McNamara, Ball, Bundy, et al. on the reasons for Hanoi's hardening attitude. /6/This portion of the meeting took place in the Oval Office from 1:22 to 1:30 p.m. Despite the heading, this discussion had nothing to do with shipping 50 percent of U.S. wheat to Communist nations in U.S. carriers, which was the item on the agenda. /7/Rolling Thunder 34/35 (Oct 1-Oct 14). (Memorandum from William Bundy to Rusk, September 28; Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1965) /8/Apparently a reference to SNIE 10-11-65, Document 148. Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
156. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, September 30, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 2:02 a.m. A retyped copy of this telegram indicates that the President saw the telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV) 1100. For the President. Politico-Military. 1. Progress along strictly military lines appears to be considerably ahead of progress along civil and political lines. Yet civil-political progress is utterly indispensable to a successful outcome. 2. For one thing, the majority of Viet Cong are probably still in small groups rather than in main force units and will thus not be reached by the planned military offensives. These small VC groups cannot be overcome without the support of the population, organized on a precinct basis. If these VC are not overcome, the worst of the aggression will still be going on, requiring continuing presence of American ground troops. 3. It seems clear that U.S. military can prevent the Viet Cong from taking over the state, can destroy or neutralize main force units, and can destroy hitherto impregnable redoubts. These are very big achievements indeed. But they do not prevent the Viet Cong from continuing to have a disruptive and debilitating effect on the country which would mean that as soon as we left, the Viet Cong would take over again. In other words, a durable result would not have been accomplished. 4. In order to hasten the day when a true precinct organization exists which will destroy the Viet Cong in small groupings, I called a meeting on Monday and presented a working paper for illustrative purposes which was discussed in detail paragraph by paragraph. As a result, there is in the U.S. Mission an organized effort under the chairmanship of Ambassador Porter to help the GVN create their own precinct type structure which will enable it to overcome the VC in small groups. 5. The text of the working paper is as follows: "In each city precinct and each rural hamlet immediately adjacent to a thoroughly pacified city (i.e. the smallest unit from a public safety standpoint) the following program should be undertaken in the following order: A. Saturate the minds of the people with some socially conscious and attractive ideology, which is susceptible of being carried out. B. Organize the people politically with a hamlet chief and committee whose actions would be backed by the police or the military using police-type tactics. This committee should have representatives of the political, military, economic and social organizations and should have an executive who directs. C. With the help of the police or military, conduct a census. D. Issue identification cards. E. Issue permits for the movement of goods and people. F. When necessary, hold a curfew. G. Thanks to all those methods, go through each hamlet with a fine tooth comb to apprehend the terrorists. H. At the first quiet moment, bring in agricultural experts, school teachers, etc. I. The hamlet should also be organized for its own defense against small Viet Cong external attacks. J. When the above has been done, hold local elections. End text of working paper 6. I believe that all Americans here are pulling together on this--which is the indispensable first step towards getting the GVN to move. We now await appointment of a Minister of Rural Construction (Pacification) by Prime Minister Ky--at which time we are prepared to move in. 7. After the Viet Cong has been overcome by force, both in its large and small grouping, there must be a certain degree of indigenous political development. Otherwise, our defeat of the VC by force could be followed by a Communist takeover by political means. It could then well be said: the operation was a great success, but the patient died. Tran Van Do, the sagacious Vietnamese Foreign Minister, says: "If peace were suddenly to return to the land and if elections were to take place soon afterwards, the results would be catastrophic. What would happen if there were to be a cease-fire? The Communists would simply step in to fill a political vacuum." 8. The United States must thus leave no stone unturned politically, working through both the official and the unofficial (but highly influential) Vietnamese to insure that our victory over the Viet Cong by force is not followed by a Communist takeover by politics. End of politico-military. Government of Vietnam 9. The government shot three VC ringleaders at Danang on the night of September 22. The VC subsequently shot two American military prisoners. U.S. Mission actively studying implications of this tragic subject. Separate telegram coming./2/ /2/The Department of State publicly condemned the execution of U.S. military prisoners Captain Humbert R. Versace and Sergeant Kenneth M. Roroback; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 901-902. In telegram 1109 from Saigon, September 30, the Embassy offered courses of action in response to these executions. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-7 VIET) See footnote 2, Document 167. 10. Prime Minister Ky went to Hue on September 23 and shared the platform with General Thi, I Corps Commander, who castigated those who caused trouble on the home front while troops were dying in the field. This represents a change in Thi's public attitude. 11. We hear that Ky is planning to make a number of changes in key military posts and in the Cabinet in the interests of increased efficiency. The military changes may in fact reflect a response to sentiments expressed by junior officers during the recent armed forces convention in Saigon. 12. While waiting for the Korean Prime Minister's arrival at the airport Ky talked at length and quite freely with the press. He probably did some injudicious ad libbing, but the overall impression he gave was one of complete self-assurance. 13. The Viet Cong became considerably more active militarily during the week particularly in central Vietnam, but so far have taken heavy losses. They seem to be making a major effort along Highway No. 1 north of Qui Nhon. Economic 14. The Prime Minister and Chief of State put out a decree increasing custom duties on a wide range of goods which should increase annual customs revenues on the order of some 1.8 billion piasters. 15. I have appointed a small economic warfare working group to recommend policy measures to deny needed resources to the VC and to monitor the execution of such denial programs. This has great potential importance. 16. The rice situation in central Vietnam is improving with the arrival of PL-480 and Thai rice. Last week I signed a PL-480 Title I agreement with the Prime Minister providing for shipment of an additional 100,000 metric tons of rice to meet November and December needs. This too is vital. Psychological 17. Field reports and Vietnamese newspaper coverage reflected considerable optimism, perhaps almost over-optimism, among Vietnamese regarding the progress of the war. Added note: 18. Since writing the above, I have just learned that Prime Minister Ky sent for Lansdale Wednesday morning in Lansdale's capacity as Chairman of the U.S. Liaison Committee to the Vietnamese Agency for Pacification./3/ Lansdale arrived with members of his committee. Ky kept them for five hours, provided lunch and went over his ideas for pacification which appear to be in harmony with ours. Encouraging is his awareness of the psychological factor. He discussed places to receive priority for pacification. He wants our views. He announced his intention of appointing Le Van Tien as Minister of Pacification--an appointment he said he had thought about a great deal, and a man whom he considers very able. Tien has reputation as a brilliant braintruster and idea man. A Catholic, he is said to "retain Buddhist tenets". /3/See Document 157. 19. Ky said that he will run pacification himself--which he should do, as its importance to Vietnam and to the U.S. is absolutely central. 20. I called a special meeting of the U.S. Mission Council so that we can all take fullest advantage of this unusual and promising opportunity. 21. I am advising Ky that he must not have his pacification plan known as the "Ky plan" because this will automatically put a lot of people to work to sabotage it. He must manage to get credit for many others and to involve all the leading men in Vietnam personally in the plan's success. Lodge
157. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, September 30, 1965, 6:40 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:27 a.m. and passed to the White House, Department of Defense, and CIA. 1111. 1. I am glad to be able report that pacification has taken an encouraging new step forward. 2. Yesterday Prime Minister Ky asked Lansdale in his capacity as chairman of the US-Liaison Committee to the GVN Agency for Pacification to bring his committee members from MACV, USOM and JUSPAO and join him and some of his staff in a wide-ranging informal five-hour discussion (including lunch) of a revitalized pacification program. 3. Program has three main elements: (A) General Co will be appointed Deputy Prime Minister for "War and Peace" with overall charge of pacification. Le Van Tien will be appointed Minister of Pacification--an appointment he said he had thought about a great deal, and a man whom he considers very able. Tien has reputation as brilliant braintruster and idea man. A Catholic, he is said to "retain Buddhist tenets". (B) Special pacification emphasis will be placed on three selected areas. (C) Cadres will be reorganized. 4. Ky also intends discuss his ideas with General Co and chiefs of certain selected provinces tomorrow. He asked that Lansdale's group meet with him again on October 2 to give him benefit of U.S. views. Accordingly, I called special meeting of Mission Council this morning to discuss new program and to enable us to respond constructively. 5. Ky's program calls for mounting major pacification effort in following selected areas: (A) Prime areas--Danang-Quang Nam area: Binh Dinh Province; Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh area; (B) Possible additions: Phu Yen area, Cai Son resettlement area (part of An Giang-Ken Giang Province), Phu Quoc island. Pacification efforts now under way other areas should continue. 6. Secondly, he intends to reorganize existing 25,000 cadres in such a way that they would be operationally responsible to Deputy PM for War and Peace to whom new Minister for Rural Construction (Pacification) would also report. Cadres would only receive technical guidance from other interested Ministries. Teams of perhaps 100, composed of 40 PATs and popular forces and 60 public admin, health, works, education, info technicians, would be tailored to needs of each district in Vietnam. Furthermore, he plans establish 4 training centers, [garble] per zone, and give cadres one month of motivational and basic military training. He also plans revitalize concept of national institute of administration and give selected cadres periods of training there, interspersed with periods of duty in districts. 7. Following emerged from U.S. Mission Council discussion: A. Selected areas. While Council generally concurred in concept and location of 3 selected areas, believed that one area from IV Corps should be added to prime targets. Was noted that Danang-Quang Nam and Binh Dinh targets, while in contested areas, are places where increasing U.S. and allied presence will afford solid shield. It is presumed greater Saigon area will correspond roughly to Hop Tac area and that latter will probably be gradually dropped as a separate concept or operation. In sum, Council endorsed idea of a few well-aimed rifle shots rather than buck-shot approach; first emphasis should be on worth and durability of programs in selected areas rather than on number of areas. Hopefully these successes would spread. B. Cadre. Essential that cadres be drawn from local areas whenever possible in order inculcate local responsibility. Existing cadres should be used and reorganized rather than imposing yet another layer of officials. Employment in this cadre should be a substitute for army draft. Council endorsed idea of integrating PAT teams into 100-man teams. District-based mobile cadre should be broken down and assigned to villages. Although it is not clear how Ky sees role of province and district chiefs in this set up, Council believes it best to try use them as part of chain of command, thus helping get government apparatus reestablished in countryside. Relationship to these teams of U.S. military and civilians in field will have to be studied in order best weave together our joint efforts and put resources where they most needed. C. General observations. Important that Ky put over this new program in statesmanlike manner, trying to ensure adhesion all important leadership groups. At same time, in light jaundiced press reaction to somewhat similar schemes that failed in past, publicity on this program should be handled with great caution until some tangible results are actually in hand. Advance notice of areas to be pacified should not be given. In general we all hope this [garble] an historical date for getting more lasting pacification accomplished while taking advantage of the presence of allied combat forces. Weaving all the strands together is complex. 8. Lansdale will present Ky with two papers along foregoing guidelines. After Ky returns from trip to Malaya on October 10 or 11, he plans convene meeting of province chiefs and one elected from each provincial council for discussion of these pacification plans. 9. Comment: These developments are encouraging and are responsive to our long standing desires. Ky has taken a sensible approach to this all-encompassing problem of pacification, notably his awareness of crucial psychological factor. His designation of a Deputy PM for War and Peace in overall charge of pacification, his concept of telescoping our joint efforts in a few areas (while normal pacification is continued elsewhere along present lines), and the consolidation of cadres with a more clearly defined line of authority to Saigon, are all steps in the right direction. Finally, we are pleased that Ky has seen fit to engage in this fruitful exchange of views and to seek our advice before his ideas jelled any further. Lodge
158. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ New York, September 30, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV. Top Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. Also sent to Acting Secretary Ball. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw this memorandum. Rusk and Gromyko were at the United Nations for the 20th session of the General Assembly. We had our first dinner this evening with a second meeting scheduled Friday/2/ evening when he returns hospitality. I will report separately on the dinner table discussions on Kashmir and disarmament matters. /2/October 1. Before dinner Gromyko and I had a private talk with no one else present. I told him that following Harriman's discussion with Kosygin,/3/ we had taken Kosygin's suggestion and had been in contact with Hanoi for the purpose of exploring possibilities of peaceful settlement and counter proposals on Hanoi's four points./4/ He was much interested, appeared to have been uninformed by Hanoi, and did not press for details on the nature of the contact beyond asking whether a third government was involved--to which I replied no. /3/See Document 68. /4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 245. Gromyko refused to acknowledge the basic fact of North Vietnam's infiltration and other action against South Vietnam, but it was quite clear that he surely understood that we knew about such things even if on policy grounds he could not admit it. He said it was his impression that Hanoi could not possibly enter into discussions on negotiations while bombing was going on. His point was that Hanoi looked upon discussion during the bombings as a plea from a position of weakness. I told him that Hanoi was not denying to us the facts of their intervention or the presence of regular units of the North Vietnamese Army. I told him we were not asking for conditions because we were prepared to talk while the fighting continued or were prepared to have preliminary discussions about circumstances which would permit more formal negotiations to occur. I told him that we had been unable to get from any communist capital the slightest indication as to what would happen if the bombing stopped. We were not asking this question to raise a condition but were simply asking for a simple factual statement as to what consequences any one could see in the direction of making peace. Obviously, if we stopped the bombing and nothing else happened this would be unacceptable. Gromyko was much interested in whether contacts with Hanoi had been definitively concluded without result or whether such contacts remained open. I told him that it was my impression that both sides were prepared to renew contact if there was anything interesting to say. His attitude seemed to indicate a hope that whatever channel that was involved would remain open. He did not confirm but did not contradict my remark that there seemed to be some differences of views in Hanoi and that some debate might be going on in that capital. Under the impact of Chen Yi's Press Conference/5/ he seemed less reticent about acknowledging that Moscow has a real problem with China than he personally has been with me in the past. For example, in response to a question from me, he stated "very flatly" that he was confident that if Hanoi came to a conference at which the Soviet Union and the United States were present that Peiping would not use force to prevent it. /5/Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi's uncompromising answers to questions on the attitude of the People's Republic of China to the question of a negotiated peace in Vietnam are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 902-903. It was significant to me that he showed no bluster or threats about the matter of Soviet support for Hanoi that he reflected in Vienna in May./6/ /6/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 303. [Here follows discussion of Soviet propaganda attacks on the President and India-Pakistan.] My general impression was that Gromyko did not bring with him any instructions to heat up crises on particular points with us, that he did not expect any major break-through in the direction of agreements on important matters, and that he was prepared to be relaxed but direct and businesslike in discussing any matters in which we both are involved. He did not attempt to apply pressure nor did he use threats or any of the normal language associated with the rugged discussions of 1961 and 1962.
159. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton)/1/ Washington, October 1, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Top Secret. McNaughton passed a copy of this letter to the JCS on October 6. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 381) Dear John: This is in reply to your letter of September 28./2/ I am not in a position to comment further at this moment on the question of locks and dams, but I would like to respond immediately to your last paragraph referring to the language in paragraph 2 of the State dissent to SNIE 10-11-65./3/ /2/Not found. /3/Document 148. I have not attempted to go through all of the public statements and press conferences, but it certainly would be my impression that--even though there might not have been specific statements on the question--the various responses indicated generally that we would continue, as far as we could then see, the policy we have been pursuing, which of course does not include attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong. I am confident that our statements have been interpreted in this sense by diplomatic observers and sophisticated newspapermen, and that if Hanoi has any eyes and ears at all the overwhelming reading that has been reported to it is that we were not planning to hit H-H at any early time. I say this despite the fact that the general line of response in all our public statements has been not to exclude such action. As to private indications, I think you know that we have repeatedly been asked point-blank by the British, Japanese, and others whether we intended to extend our bombing to H-H. We have always replied with some care that we had no such current plan, although the time might come when it would be necessary as a part of the over-all pattern of pressure on the DRV. I do not know whether these diplomatic conversations get back to Hanoi, but I would suspect strongly that some of them do. More broadly, the question of hitting H-H has repeatedly come up in background conversations and briefings with Congressional groups and newspapermen. We have taken the same line as with the diplomats, but on occasion, notably with Congressmen, I myself--and I am sure others--have necessarily argued the pros and cons in such a way as to indicate that we certainly did not exclude this but had doubts, as of the time of the statements, that it was likely to bring the DRV to accept a solution. Again, I think the net of all these discussions must have been an impression that we would weigh hitting H-H as a very major step and that we were not inclined to do it except for grave reasons or unless there were a clear basis to believe it could significantly help in effecting a favorable resolution of the problem. I cannot help but believe that discussions with these groups necessarily percolate into the bloodstream of Washington, and reach Communist ears which in turn pass them to Hanoi. On one specific point, I would like to flag that we have seen one TDCS, brought to our attention by Andy Goodpaster, in which a CAS representative was quoted as telling his Soviet contact that we had no plan to hit the SAM sites because Soviet personnel were present. This was not an authorized statement, and we have flagged it to CIA. On the basis of all this, I do not suppose any of us can say what the DRV leaders really think we intend. The massive air defense effort in Hanoi strongly suggests the assumption that we will eventually hit H-H. But I do think that the statement in the paragraph in question--that there have been many "official indications, public and private," to the contrary, at least for the present--does represent the fact. It may be that the sentence is a shade overstated, in light of our consistent refusal to exclude such action at some time, but I think the inevitable thrust of all our statements has been in the direction indicated. In any case, whether the sentence could have been improved or not, those of use who saw the INR dissent--and this included Ambassador Thompson, Alex Johnson, Len Unger, and myself--would still agree with its essential point, namely that the Communists (and non-Communists) would feel that the program discussed in the Estimate would in fact represent a very major change in our level of action. I am writing this to meet your deadline of October 1, and without having dug up the relevant memoranda of conversations and briefing notes in any detail. But I am confident that I have summed up fairly what has been said. I do want to conclude by assuring you and General Wheeler that we have no intention of changing the line we have taken consistently, basically that we are not excluding this or any other action. Obviously, we must not say anything that could impair our freedom of action or the President's freedom of choice on future actions. Sincerely, William P. Bundy/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. [Next documents]
|
