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130. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-652-65 Washington, August 27, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Viet 381. Top Secret. SUBJECT 1. (S) In the light of the introduction of major US combat units into Southeast Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it essential that we further formalize our concept for the future conduct of the war. Recognizing this need, they have developed a concept as set forth in the Appendix. This concept, in which the views of CINCPAC have been considered, envisions the military actions that are part of the over-all US strategy for Southeast Asia, including South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos. The correlated military actions to carry out this strategy will be conducted in concert with US major political, economic, and social programs for Southeast Asia. They also will include measures for dealing with the ChiCom threat. 2. (TS) In summary: a. The objective in Vietnam, as stated by NSAM-288, dated 17 March 1964,/2/ is a stable and independent noncommunist government. /2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 87. b. The major problems to be dealt with in the conduct of the war are: (1) The continued direction and support of Viet Cong operations by the DRV, infiltration from the north, and the apparent attendant Viet Cong capability to provide materiel support and to replace heavy personnel losses. (2) The continued existence of a major Viet Cong infrastructure, both political and military, in the RVN. (3) The greater growth rate of Viet Cong strength as compared to that of the South Vietnamese ground forces. (4) The continued loss of LOCs, food-producing areas, and population to Viet Cong control. (5) The lack of a viable politico/economic structure in the RVN. (6) The threat of ChiCom intervention or aggression in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Western Pacific. c. The basic military tasks, of equal priority, are: (1) To cause the DRV to cease its direction and support of the Viet Cong insurgency. (2) To defeat the Viet Cong and to extend GVN control over all of the RVN. (3) To deter Communist China from direct intervention and to defeat such intervention if it occurs. d. The US basic strategy for accomplishing the above tasks should be: to intensify military pressure on the DRV by air and naval power; to destroy significant DRV military targets, including the base of supplies; to interdict supporting LOCs in the DRV; to interdict the infiltration and supply routes into the RVN; to improve the combat effectiveness of the RVNAF; to build and protect bases; to reduce enemy reinforcements; to defeat the Viet Cong, in concert with RVN and third country forces; and to maintain adequate forces in the Western Pacific and elsewhere in readiness to deter and to deal with ChiCom aggression. By aggressive and sustained exploitation of superior military force, the United States/Government of Vietnam would seize and hold the initiative in both the DRV and RVN, keeping the DRV, the Viet Cong, and the PL/VM at a disadvantage, progressively destroying the DRV war-supporting power and defeating the Viet Cong. The physical capability of the DRV to move men and supplies through the Lao Corridor, down the coastline, across the DMZ, and through Cambodia must be reduced to the maximum practical extent by land, naval, and air actions in these areas and against infiltration-connected targets. Finally, included within the basic US military strategy must be a buildup in Thailand to ensure attainment of the proper US-Thai posture to deter ChiCom aggression and to facilitate placing US forces in an advantageous logistic position if such aggression occurs. 3. (S) The over-all strategic concept for Vietnam, as set forth in the Appendix hereto, provides a basis for terminating the war in Vietnam under conditions which are satisfactory to the United States and the GVN. 4. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the attached concept be approved as the basis for subsequent development of courses of action, forces, and other requirements to include the phasing of operations. Recommendations based thereon, including a current evaluation of the capabilities of approved force deployments to achieve the objectives of the concept, will be provided you at the earliest practicable date. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Appendix OVER-ALL US CONCEPT FOR VIETNAM (U) Introduction 1. (S) The RVN is a politico/military keystone in Southeast Asia and is symbolic of US determination in Asia--as Berlin is in Europe--to prevent communist expansion. The United States is committed to the defense of the RVN in order to assist a free people to remain free. In addition to the freedom of the RVN, US national prestige, credibility, and honor with respect to world-wide pledges, and declared national policy are at stake. Further, it is incumbent upon the United States at this stage to invalidate the communist concept of "wars of national liberation." 2. (S) The military operations envisioned in this concept paper must: a. Conform to the over-all US strategy and guidelines for Southeast Asia as a whole, including the RVN, DRV, Laos, and Thailand. b. Be conducted in concert with appropriate US/GVN political, economic, and social programs in order to guide and to expedite the correlated achievement of US objectives. c. Be conceived and evaluated in terms of how much and how well they will contribute to the above. Factors Bearing on the Development of a US Military Strategy for Vietnam 3. (S) The Viet Cong are directed, controlled, and supported (including heavy military support and encadrement) by their sponsor, the DRV. Viet Cong activities in the RVN are characterized by persuasion through propaganda, intimidation, and terror. Whenever possible, through armed assault and coercion, the Viet Cong destroy the capability of GVN authority to govern, thus progressively reducing the ability of the GVN to bring the population and resources base to bear on the problem. Having assumed control over an area, the Viet Cong install their own political organization and infrastructure. Then, using local manpower and logistics, the Viet Cong organize, equip, and train military units to resist GVN attempts to establish its authority and to expand Viet Cong control and influence into other areas. 4. (S) For the most part, the Viet Cong have sought to avoid a large-scale sustained battle with US/GVN forces. Instead, their tactics have been to maximize the advantages of initiative and surprise and to strike at weakness with overwhelming strength, "fading away" when the combat strength ratio is unfavorable to them. Currently, one of their major objectives appears to be the destruction, through both attrition and demoralization, of the RVNAF. 5. (TS) At present, the Viet Cong and DRV leaders appear confident that their course in the RVN promises ultimate and possibly early success without important concessions on their part. This apparent confidence may have been fostered in part by the current quest for some negotiating arrangement. They seem to believe that they can achieve a series of local military successes which, sooner or later, will bring victory through a combination of a deteriorating South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) morale and effectiveness, a collapse of anti-communist government in Saigon, and an exhaustion of the United States will to persist. 6. (TS) In coping with larger US forces employed in a more aggressive fashion, the Viet Cong would seek to avoid the kind of engagements which risked a serious communist defeat. Instead, they would probably concentrate on harassments intended to bleed and humiliate US forces, attempting to trap and destroy isolated units where possible. At a minimum, the Viet Cong would almost certainly continue present efforts to cut land communications lines and would step up the dispatch of small, expendable teams on sabotage and assassination missions designed to gain propaganda advantages. The communists might also seek to increase their activities in Laos. 7. (TS) Additionally, there is the possibility of ChiCom overt commitment of major combat forces in Southeast Asia and other areas in the Western Pacific. With the greater US involvement in the war in Vietnam, US military posture must be so oriented as to deter ChiCom intervention and defeat this intervention should it occur. 8. (S) The war in Vietnam is the single most critical international problem facing the United States today, and it portends the most serious immediate threat to continued US world leadership and national security. The development of a US strategy for Vietnam is necessarily influenced in varying degrees by the desirability to maintain amicable relations with certain other nations; by the desirability to receive from third countries a degree of support for US policy; by US objectives and alliances elsewhere; by the fact of the sovereignty of the GVN; and, by the necessity to provide an effective Free World counter or answer to "wars of national liberation." 9. (S) The situation in the RVN has deteriorated to the point where US national objectives are endangered and may not be achieved unless GVN forces are bolstered, adequate security for the South Vietnamese people is provided, and the DRV is persuaded that the risks of further involvement on their part outweigh the gains. 10. (TS) Our strategy for Vietnam should not allow the communists to keep pace with or more than match our military efforts. A program of slowly rising intensity with both sides in step carries with it the danger that it will lead to less flexibility of choice, creeping intervention by the Soviets and Chinese, first with materiel and later with troops, and the eventual engulfing of both camps unwillingly into an expanded war. 11. (TS) Briefly, the major problems to be dealt with in the conduct of the war are: a. The continued direction and support of Viet Cong operations by the DRV, including infiltration from the North, and the apparent attendant Viet Cong capability to provide materiel support and to replace heavy personnel losses. b. The continued existence of a major Viet Cong infrastructure, both political and military, in the RVN. c. The greater growth rate of Viet Cong strength as compared to that of the South Vietnamese ground forces. d. The continued loss of LOCs, food-producing areas, and population to Viet Cong control. e. The lack of a viable politico/economic structure in the RVN. f. The threat of ChiCom intervention or aggression in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Western Pacific. US Objectives, Tasks, and Basic Strategy 12. (TS) US national policy/3/ includes as an objective in the RVN a stable and independent noncommunist government. Implicit in this objective is the containment of Communist China insofar as expansion into Southeast Asia or elsewhere in the Western Pacific is concerned. Basic military tasks, of equal priority, in support of this objective are: /3/NSAM 288, dated 17 March 1964. [Footnote in the source text.] a. To cause the DRV to cease its direction and support of the Viet Cong insurgency. b. To defeat the Viet Cong and to extend GVN control over all of the RVN. c. To deter Communist China from direct intervention and to defeat such intervention if it occurs. 13. (TS) Friendly control of population and resources is essential to success in countering guerrilla warfare. In this regard, the RVN areas of major military significance are: the Saigon area and the Mekong Delta; the coastal plain; and the central highlands. It is imperative that the US/GVN have the support of the people and the control of resources in those areas. Elimination of the Viet Cong from these areas must be vigorously undertaken in order to provide adequate security for the people. Of particular importance is the need for friendly control of the main food-producing areas in order that the GVN may gain control of rice, feed the people under its control, enable exports of rice to bolster the economy, and cause the Viet Cong to import or to fight for food. A paramount requirement under this concept is the building and maintaining of a series of secure bases and secure supporting LOCs at key localities along the sea coast, and elsewhere as necessary, from which offensive operations can be launched and sustained, with the subsequent enlargement and expansion of the secure areas. 14. (TS) The US basic strategy for accomplishing the above tasks should be: to intensify military pressure on the DRV by air and naval power; to destroy significant DRV military targets, including the base of supplies; to interdict supporting LOCs in the DRV; to interdict the infiltration and supply routes into the RVN; to improve the combat effectiveness of the RVNAF; to build and protect bases; to reduce enemy reinforcements; to defeat the Viet Cong in concert with RVN and third country forces; and, to maintain adequate forces in the Western Pacific and elsewhere in readiness to deter and to deal with ChiCom aggression. By aggressive and sustained exploitation of superior military force, the United States/GVN would seize and hold the initiative in both the DRV and the RVN, keeping the DRV, the Viet Cong, and the PL/VM at a disadvantage, progressively destroying the DRV war-supporting power and defeating the Viet Cong. The physical capability of the DRV to move men and supplies through the Lao Corridor, down the coastline, across the DMZ, and through Cambodia, must be reduced to the maximum practical extent by land, naval, and air actions in these areas and against infiltration-connected targets. Finally, included within the basic US military strategy must be a build-up in Thailand to ensure attainment of the proper US-Thai posture to deter ChiCom aggression and to facilitate placing US forces in an advantageous logistic position if such aggression occurs. Principal Measures for Executing the Basic
Strategy 15. (TS) In order to gain the offensive and to seize and hold the initiative in the RVN, a major effort must be made not only in terms of direct combat action to expand the areas under US/GVN control but also to support the GVN in its rural reconstruction program and to assist that government in the creation of new military units and the rehabilitation of its depleted units as rapidly as possible. A psychological climate must be created that will foster RVN rural reconstruction progress. It will be noted in paragraph 13 above that, along with the Saigon area, the Mekong Delta is considered of primary importance. While no US land operations are currently envisaged in the Mekong Delta (IV Corps Tactical Zone) because of the comparatively inactive enemy situation now existing there, increased Viet Cong activity could later necessitate US/Third Country operations in that important area. 16. (TS) The intensification of military pressures on the DRV, PL/VM, and the Viet Cong, the destruction of military stocks, supporting facilities, and the interdiction of communist infiltration and supply routes into the RVN will necessarily require: a. An immediate acceleration and increase in the scale, scope, and intensity of air and naval actions against the DRV. These actions should be directed against key military and economic targets, the destruction of which should dissuade the DRV from supporting the Viet Cong insurgency; this would include mining of DRV ports. Targets would include these main groupings: POL, LOCs, mines (including coal), military installations, port facilities, and power stations. Attacks against population centers as such would continue to be avoided. b. Intensified land, naval, and air actions to reduce infiltration into the RVN. Such actions would include a stepped-up land, sea, and air campaign against infiltration routes, designed to minimize the flow into the RVN of personnel and materiel. 17. (TS) During the build-up phase US/Third Country and GVN forces should strengthen military and civilian control in present areas of the RVN while intensifying air and naval attacks against the DRV and communist infiltration and supply routes into the RVN. As the force build-up is achieved, a principal offensive effort within the RVN of US/Third Country forces should be to participate with the RVNAF in search and destroy operations while assisting the RVNAF in clearing and securing operations in support of the rural reconstruction effort. US/Third Country air and ground operations should be conducted on a sustained basis; attack and destruction of base areas should be directed at applying continuous pressure on the VC to keep them off balance. 18. (TS) To deter ChiCom direct intervention or aggression in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Western Pacific, and to deal with such intervention or aggression if it occurs would, in addition to the measures above, require: a. A credible strategic force posture in Southeast Asia and elsewhere to meet the ChiCom threat. b. A suitable build-up in Thailand to enable the expeditious deployment there of major US forces. This build-up would include logistic support bases, new airfields, improvement of existing airbases to increase their capacity, improvements to LOCs, and measures to increase the readiness of the Thai armed forces. Execution 19. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, as a matter of principle, CINCPAC should be given as wide latitude as possible under the circumstances in executing the above measures in consonance with the forces, support, and general policy guidance provided to CINCPAC by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
131. Letter From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) to President Johnson/1/ Saigon, August 31, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Lodge Letters to the President. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Received in the White House and delivered to the President on September 2. (Telegram 614 to Saigon, September 2; ibid.) Dear Mr. President: Herewith are some of my innermost preoccupations, which I have sent to no one else, and which I send to you in the hope that they may prevent reverses in the future. I will, of course, be glad to have this letter go to Dean Rusk, Bob McNamara and MacBundy--and anyone else whom you may choose. I am concerned about the current U.S. stress on a "settlement" and on "negotiations" to the neglect of the concept of a satisfactory "outcome" or "result". I believe that with great and sustained effort we can get a satisfactory "outcome", but it is hard for me to visualize a satisfactory "settlement". In other words, we can succeed in warding off the communist aggression, but we will not get them to admit it. If we do get a satisfactory "outcome", it will be a real achievement in which we will all be able to take pride. You should probably make an announcement about it. It must look like the true success which it most certainly would be, and it must not look like a failure because we have not achieved a "settlement"--or because General de Gaulle doesn't enthuse. We should therefore stress the need for warding off the aggression, for getting a satisfactory "outcome", and not lay so much stress on diplomatic settlements which we probably are not going to be able to get. The attempt to do so would probably make Ho Chi Minh lose face, thus causing him to fight harder, thus lengthening the war and increasing the bloodshed. If I am wrong, and we do get a neat diplomatic document in which the communists admit that they have been beaten, then we have lost nothing by following my advice--although it is hard to understand the value of such a document given the worthlessness of such a communist commitment. Let me give two illustrations: Illustration No. 1 The heartland of Viet-Nam, as is shown on a population map which I recently sent to Mac Bundy, consists of the coastal plain plus the Delta (of which I class Saigon as a part). About 65 per cent of the population is in those areas. Suppose that we and the Vietnamese: --really control the coastal plain (as we appear to be on the way to doing); --eliminate the Viet Cong from the Saigon-Delta area (which we have not done, but which could be done); and --continue to hold the 43 provincial capitals which we now hold as well as the 240-odd district towns; and Then suppose that: we are strong enough in all these places so that with our air, sea and ground power we can force the Viet Cong to stay back in the hills--or the Camau peninsula--with the snakes and the tigers because they get such a bloody nose every time they try to attack. If all these things happen, we will be in a very strong position indeed and everything else after that will be mopping up. We will be in control of areas with a total population of about 11 million out of a national total of about 15 million. (Source: Statistics Branch-USOM Public Administration Division) Neither in the Philippines nor in Malaya was every last communist guerrilla apprehended. Some of them became farmers and some of them went into the hills where they still are--and where they do no harm. Illustration No. 2 Another possibility is that the Viet Cong suddenly decides to stop fighting and that a silence falls. This has happened in other oriental countries. We would consider either of the above illustrations as a satisfactory outcome, and you would be entitled to put it out to the public as an effective warding off of the aggression--something in which all Americans could take pride. But if you make a "settlement" and diplomatic "negotiations" as a symbol of success, you are really reaching for the moon. The communists do not like to sign papers in which they admit that they were defeated. They prefer always to leave these situations hanging, with the implication that a few years later they may be back. The fact that they don't come back forcefully (as they didn't in the Philippines and in Malaya) doesn't alter the fact that they don't like to look as though they have given up. I understand fully the inestimable value of making it clear to public opinion at home that you are willing to go anywhere and try anything for the sake of peace. It is your willingness to do this which has been a major factor in the extremely skillful job which you have done in unifying American public opinion behind U.S. policy in Viet-Nam--a remarkable performance in every way. But I hope that you can keep U.S. opinion united without at the same time getting yourself into a position where you can't get credit for a satisfactory outcome once it is achieved. It is surely possible, as we have done so far, to handle U Thant carefully without over-praising him. Surely the aggression can be successfully warded off without at the same time stipulating a re-affirmation of the Geneva agreement, a guarantee of free elections, and undertakings concerning reunification of North and South Viet-Nam--which are not worth much when signed. With warm and respectful regards, Faithfully yours, Cabot L.
132. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 1, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietrnam, Vol. XI, Memos (A). Top Secret. General Westmoreland has requested and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concurred in the movement of an additional increment of forces to Vietnam./2/ This increment would be in addition to the 28 combat battalions, associated air squadrons, and logistic support forces--totalling 125,000--announced by you on 28 July./3/ The request is for six additional combat battalions (making a total of 34), associated air squadrons, and logistic support forces--totaling 85,000 additional United States personnel. /2/At the instruction of the JCS, representatives of the Joint Staff, the Military Services, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and COMUSKOREA conferred at Honolulu August 3-6 on the details of Phase I deployment of U.S. forces to Vietnam. (History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vietnam, 1960-1968, Part II, ch. 22, p. 8) On August 23, the JCS approved and forwarded to McNamara the program for deployment of U.S. troops in Phase I worked out at the Honolulu conference. The program provided for 34 battalions and 210,000 U.S. personnel for South Vietnam and 41,000 U.S. personnel stationed in other Pacific and Southeast Asian areas outside Vietnam. (JCSM 643-65 to Secretary of Defense, August 23; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 381) /3/See Document 97. I recommend that these additional forces be authorized for movement. I further recommend that no announcement be made at this time of the decision to deploy additional forces, but that announcements be made only as forces arrive in the theater. Robert S. McNamara
133. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/ Paris, September 1, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ. Top Secret; Nodis; XYZ. The source text is a copy that does not bear a telegram number or a time of transmission or receipt. For additional information, see the source note, Document 120. In United States-Vietnam Relations, the meeting described in this telegram is incorrectly dated September 3. (Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 106-107) Today's long and fumbling session with Rupert produced a very few elements useful in a diagnosis of the Hanoi position but hardly anything that would advance negotiations. Although Rupert insists he has been consistent throughout discussions he seems to fluctuate in phase with Hanoi's pronouncements and this evening he took a stiff line in an obvious effort to parallel that taken by Pham van Dong in declaration/2/ published in today's Le Monde. Principal points to emerge were: /2/Pham Van Dong's National Day report on August 31 was broadcast in English over Hanoi Radio on September 1. For excerpts from the text, see ibid., pp. 103-106. (a) According to Rupert, any "final solution would have to include a withdrawal of U.S. troops (Pham van Dong appears to call for their withdrawal now), and in any case troops would have to have left before elections could take place. This was first time Rupert had made this link. (b) U.S. bombing, especially its intensification north and south in the last fifteen days, could only be interpreted as attempt to force Hanoi to negotiate. Also, U.S. insistence on "counterpart" concessions by Hanoi was psychological warfare and unacceptable. Still, according to Rupert, bombing was unilaterally undertaken; it must be stopped unilaterally immediately, totally, and definitively; then and then only would there be a different atmosphere and a possibility for negotiations. There could be no question, he said, of accepting conditions laid down by U.S. ahead of time as price of suspension of bombing. 1. X opened by remarking that his conversations with Rupert had aroused a lively interest among his friends in Washington, of which Rupert would find evidence in TV interview of Secretary Rusk (August 23)./3/ Rupert would find some familiar expressions in this discourse and he would also find confirmation that U.S. policy was the same as that expressed in the four points which X had proposed to Rupert. /3/For a transcript of the interview, in which Goldberg and McGeorge Bundy also participated, see Department of State Bulletin, September 13, 1965, pp. 431-444. 2. X read extensively from the interview and left the text with Rupert. He noticed that the latter showed particular interest in Rusk's expression of confidence in elections in the south which Rupert seemed to find fantastic. He derided the Saigon Government as U.S. creatures and jeered at its instability and said that practically all Vietnamese, especially since Diem's oppression of nationalist elements, utterly rejected it. X observed he could not of course accept this evaluation and said whatever it was southern population wanted he and Rupert both knew that they didn't want Hanoi imposed on them. Whatever procession governments in Saigon indicated it clearly showed U.S. was not imposing a regime. Rupert retorted with the Vietnamese proverb to the effect a sorcerer can raise phantoms but after a while they control the sorcerer. Rupert indicated that that might be but Hanoi had no intention of imposing a regime in the south. 3. Discussion of bombing followed X's quotation of Rusk TV remarks on subject and was intermittent throughout the rambling discussion. X recalled Rupert's inquiry about U.S. Aide-Memoire/4/ and read excerpts from the Memoire. Also left with Rupert handwritten rough translation of pertinent paragraphs on bombing. Also referred to British White Paper/5/ and the phrase "appropriate and commensurate" in connection with desired type of response from Hanoi. /4/Not further identified. /5/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, September 13, 1965, pp. 444-447. 4. Rupert's temperature here rose to something approaching heat. He denounced U.S. proposal as psychological warfare, as an effort to impress world opinion, etc. He said that the intensification of military activity in the south and bombing north and south, particularly in the last two weeks, showed U.S. trying to compel Hanoi to the conference table. In these conditions there could be no question of Hanoi's yielding. It was left with no alternative but to continue the war. He insisted that U.S. requirement of a counterpart was unrealistic; that U.S. began the bombing unilaterally and should stop it unilaterally and stop its "aggression" as well. He claimed to believe U.S. demanding as counterparts concessions tantamount to abandoning Hanoi's entire military position (X cannot recall just what particulars Rupert cited). 5. Rupert again resorted to phrase about "allegations" re activity of 325th North Viet Division. Later when X said--you apparently now deny 325th Division in the south, Rupert said he did not deny it. He claimed, however, that the 325th not now engaged in military operations. 6. X suggested that he preferred Secretary's word "signal" to Rupert's word "counterpart". U.S. not asking Hanoi to abandon all its military leverage but wanted at least a token that U.S. gesture in stopping bombing was understood as move toward peaceful settlement. He quoted the U.S. Aide-Memoire to suggest other possibilities for a response by Hanoi, such as stopping infiltration and reducing level of incidents. On latter point X also referred to Algerian precedent when French found it easier to come to conference table when incidents dropped below certain level. X said U.S. could not be expected to halt bombing under circumstances which made it look as though it had found the going too rough and too rude and was accepting military reverse. 7. Rupert at no time rose to bait on stopping infiltration or reduction of incidents. All he would say (and repeatedly) was that if the U.S. stopped the bombing unilaterally there would be a new atmosphere and a new deal. 8. X then went so far as to ask Rupert to comment on handling the problem of a Hanoi response through device of parallel but ostensibly unlinked courses of action, i.e., U.S. to halt bombing while there would be simultaneous actions by Hanoi possibly synchronized by "third party" unspecified. 9. Rupert appeared interested but would say only in effect that if U.S. so acted one would see. However, he then repeatedly revived other Hanoi conditions, including acceptance of the program of the "Front", halting of U.S. "aggression", etc. 10. X again insisted he and Rupert losing time using words like "aggression". Rupert said he willing to substitute "war". X's reply to charge that U.S. aggressively interested [intensified?] bombing was that Hanoi had been unilaterally making war on the south for four years previously, to which answer Rupert sharply interjected accusation about Diem's activities. 11. According to X his friends in U.S. wanted some sign Hanoi understood what halt in bombing meant. Rupert should be aware restraint in U.S. bombing policy. Although it could easily do so, U.S. not interfering directly with harvest, had not destroyed Haiphong, was not at the present time breaking up industry. Of course there was a rising curve in military actions, especially as military machines on both sides took hold and passions were aroused, but this is what he and Rupert had the opportunity to prevent. 12. Rupert quite excitedly said X was wrong, that thousands were being killed, that he had the figures to show it. It was more obvious than ever before that Hanoi and VC, both north and south, are being grievously hurt. For present, however, Rupert would only say that these bombings more than ever made it inevitable that Hanoi would continue the war for as many years as might be necessary. 13. X rehearsed his earlier arguments, that Hanoi could not obtain a decision, U.S. could not be forced out, escalation could only mean stepping up foreign activity (U.S. and Chinese), north and south, and could threaten continuance of U.S. policy of restraint in bombing. 14. X then undertook to begin review of positions reached by him and Rupert in current talks. Said although we wide apart there seemed to be somewhat less difference of opinion re withdrawal of troops and unification. In reply Rupert made point, new in these discussions, that U.S. troops would have to be withdrawn before elections could take place. On being pressed to state his own understanding of what he and X discussed he affirmed that "any final solution would have to include (comporter) withdrawal of U.S. troops", but this time added that such withdrawal would have to precede elections. He claimed it was X who had introduced the idea of "stages" in conversation. (X supplied the word but Rupert if anything was ahead of him in endorsing the idea.) 15. X did not say whether this timing was acceptable to his friends but did repeat that U.S. wanted fundamental rights of Vietnam as presented in Geneva Accords agreed. U.S. wanted independent, unified, possibly non-aligned Vietnam, and were willing to put our policy to the test, including free elections without outside intervention. If U.S. troops withdrawn it could not be under conditions which left other outside forces, i.e., Hanoi, free to influence results. X observed that Rupert had not previously made this point on withdrawals, and took occasion to observe that while Pham van Dong and Rusk interviews demonstrated awareness X/Rupert conversations, Pham van Dong had taken a harder line while press widely commented on Rusk's determination to seek peace and had even used phrase "de-escalation". 16. As to reunification and X's claim that he and Rupert seemed not too far apart, i.e., with respect to international decision by free consultation, north and south, timing and supervision, Rupert said Hanoi was not imposing any decision on the south (meaning the "Front"). Therefore the timetable would be as the south and north should agree. (X again referred to fact that most South Vietnamese probably did not want unification on Hanoi terms.) 17. X asked Rupert to try to resume where he and X stood. Rupert reviewed the positions he had just taken on bombing, reunification, and claimed these represented no change in his prior position. He confirmed that he had noticed in French press account taken by Secretary Rusk and others of these discussions. With reference to internal regime he again insisted on program of the "Front". X again said it was unrealistic to expect strongest power in the world to accept adversary fiat on agenda, withdraw all its troops prior to negotiation, and accept a priori installation of "Front" as sole negotiating agent and government in south. Latter would certainly find a role to play in national life and reconstruction and could also be included in North Vietnamese delegation. (Rupert sneered at latter idea.) If, as Rupert claimed, Front represented everybody in south X said they would be triumphantly returned by elections. However, X doubted it. 18. Early in interview X had indicated desirability of meeting next week and Rupert agreed to Tuesday,/6/ at which time X promised refined French text of pertinent parts of U.S. Aide-Memoire to other governments, as well as of parts of TV interview. /6/September 7. Mai Van Bo did not show up for the meeting on September 7. DRV officials indicated that he was "sick." Gullion and Mai Van Bo held no further meetings. Paul Sturm ("Y"), who replaced Gullion, had an unproductive meeting with Mai Van Bo on November 18. (Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 107-109) At close of meeting X said he would "retain" particularly two of Rupert's points, i.e., position that cessation of bombing could not be conditioned on prior promise or performance by Hanoi of counterpart undertaking, and point that withdrawal of foreign troops must be completed before elections. He expressed obvious reservations, but said he would reflect and consult on these points, and confirmed meeting for Tuesday. Rupert said a further meeting might be worthwhile if there were anything new, but said discussions thus far had produced little that was new or useful. X said he thought talks had taken a "zig-zag" course and that last previous meeting had seemed "constructive". This clearly worried Rupert who demanded confirmation that he had always taken a consistent line. General impressions: X had stronger impression than previously that Rupert fearful of getting out of line with Hanoi. Rupert obviously worried at implication that in current talks he had ever veered. Indeed, he may already have done so in appearing on earlier occasion to be too relaxed about timing of U.S. troop withdrawals. X suspects some of Rupert's waverings reflect difference within Hanoi Government, pulling and hauling with Front, Chinese, etc. Although on surface Rupert position on halting bombing and on withdrawal U.S. troops seems notably unfruitful, Washington may wish to consider whether a third party might not be enlisted (not French) to receive from Hanoi assurances that if bombing suspended there might be some action on the part of Hanoi; also what would be time relation between withdrawal U.S. troops and: (a) popular consultation with respect to unification, and (b) with respect to voting on internal regime of South Vietnam, (c) convening of a conference, (d) putting Geneva Accords into effect; also relation of these measures to international control? Should we ask Rupert these questions? X's general impression is that talks very unfruitful at this point and unless something gives difficult to see beyond next one or two sessions. He thinks Hanoi does not want to talk at this point. In a month's time it may be different./7/ /7/The source text bears no signature.
134. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, September 4, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 2:51 a.m. 474. Reference: Department telegram 610 rptd CINCPAC unn./2/ /2/In telegram 610 to Saigon, September 1, the Department of State noted with concern the Embassy's report that General Thi believed that events in South Vietnam favored his eventual ascension to power. The Department agreed entirely with Lodge's plan to discourage Thi since it feared that the effects of further political instability in South Vietnam would have serious consequences on U.S. and international public opinion and could only disrupt the war effort against the Viet Cong. The Department asked for the Embassy's assessment of Thi's chances and methods of a possible takeover. (Ibid.) 1. Prospect of fresh political instability in Saigon which Gen. Thi's ambition may represent is merely most recent manifestation of long-term, well-known problem. It is, of course, not related simply to Thi or any other individual. Since early 1963 political instability has been a fact of life here. It does not arise or disappear because of failures or successes against Viet Cong, but it is affected by the way the war goes and changes form accordingly. Were the war to end under acceptable circumstances the problem would not disappear. As the Viet Cong find themselves increasingly frustrated and as Hanoi sees the path to military victory blocked, they may even come to regard the possibility of political chaos and ineffective govt as their best hope for ultimate success and increase their efforts in this sphere accordingly. However, if we were to find ourselves on the threshold of or involved in negotiations with the DRV, they would hope to gain in such negotiations by virtue of political weakness in the south what they could not gain because of combined US-GVN military strength. 2. The Directorate govt has so far taken the line that there must be a moratorium on political activity until the Communist threat has been dealt with. Such a policy is unrealistic by itself, but when complicated by the possible fragility of the unity of the Directorate, it becomes even more probable that we face the danger of sudden opportunistic political moves and unpredictable political change. It is in this context that the evidence of Thi's ambition or the maneuvering of Tri Quang must be examined. 3. Political instability has tended to fluctuate in intensity. Two weeks ago the political pot began to bubble in Hue with mild anti-mobilization demonstrations which developed an anti-government theme./3/ But now, due to a variety of factors, the intensity of opposition to the government and the maneuverings of ambitious individuals seem for the moment to have been checked. Moreover, the government's decision to establish a civilian advisory council (Embtel 737)/4/ could take some of the political heat off the govt for the immediate future. /3/In telegram 724 from Saigon, September 2, the Embassy reported on anti-government student demonstrations in Hue. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) /4/Dated September 3. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S) 4. The Directorate has been operating in something resembling a political vacuum when it comes to domestic politics, non-military power groupings, and individual ambitions. One of Nguyen Khanh's essential weaknesses was his failure to deal effectively with non-military political elements and eventually they brought him down. The new advisory council seems able [garble] on part present GVN to cope with such elements. 5. With these introductory remarks in the broader context the more specific comments requested in reftel can be provided. 6. Given the personality of I Corps Commander, Brigadier General Nguyen Chanh Thi, it is extremely difficult to predict with precision just how he might try to make his move or even whether he will try. By common consent, among those who have known him well, Thi is an extremely complex individual. Low-born, he has always been quite aware of the poverty of his antecedents. He has had little formal training outside the army. He is acutely sensitive to this lack. His role in the coup manque of November 11, 1960 has been cast into doubt by those who contend that he was a "late starter" who threw in his lot with coup when they seemed on the verge of victory and broke violently with them in exile in Phnom Penh, berating them for involving him in a lost cause. Exile cost him dearly in terms of pride because he was forced to accept handouts and menial jobs from those he considered inferior merely to live. During this period his wife, in Viet-Nam, took up with another officer and left him. 7. When Thi returned to Viet-Nam following coup of November 1, 1963, he felt that Military Revolutionary Council owed him something in the way of promotion and reward in view of his association with attempt of November 11, 1960 and his long exile. But he was given his old rank and shipped off to I Corps. There he associated himself with Nguyen Khanh who had himself been "late starter" in coup of Nov. 1, 1963. Through his old connections with the airborne brigade, Thi helped Khanh organize the coup of January 30. 8. In wake of January 30 coup, Thi found himself back in I Corps despite promises by Khanh that he was to be his "right hand man" in Saigon. He was First Division Commander and much later he rose to become Corps Commander. 9. At various times during past year Thi has played controversial political role in I Corps. One has only to recall embarrassment Khanh suffered at hands of hostile crowd in Hue the day that a Ngo Dinh Can henchman, Phan Quang Dong, was executed. Such an incident could not have transpired without sure foreknowledge permissive attitude Thi's part. There was also Thi's "hands off" attitude on Hue demonstrations that led to downfall of Huong. Embarrassment of Thieu during course visit to Hue just after Directorate formed is another case in point. 10. There is no doubt that Thi has often thought of himself as a potential saviour of his country. These thoughts have probably also been accompanied by grave doubt about his real ability to govern the land. He seems genuinely convinced of his own honesty and his determination to cope with corruption and bad government (according to his own lights). 11. There seems little doubt Tri Quang and his adherents have felt for some time that Thi was sympathetic and usable. There was a certain identity of interest between them, but at the same time there was also a certain condescension on the part of Tri Quang and company. Probably some of the Hue group of intellectuals around Tri Quang began talking about how Thi could be used. Whatever the means by which he learned of it, Thi appears fully aware of an effort to transform him into a deus ex machina and he resents it. 12. Articles 10 and 15 of Constitutional Charter promulgated June 19/5/ contain provisions for replacement of President of Directorate and Prime Minister respectively. These articles are concerned with death or incapacity, however, and not orderly succession for other reasons. Either could, of course, be used to cover case where either Thieu or Ky resigned and withdrew. By-laws of Congress of Armed Forces (reported in FVS-11,922)/6/ are more specific and deal with such subjects as reprimands, no-confidence and replacement by Directorate members. Thus legal machinery does exist for orderly and peaceful transfer of power to Thi assuming all parties are agreeable. Nevertheless it is not a question of legal procedures but more a problem of power groups and power plays that will determine the end result. /5/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 880-883. /6/Not found. 13. In his conversations with Mission officer regarding his destiny, Thi has come down on side of a peaceful and orderly transfer if he is to take power. He has said on one occasion that he would hope that Ky, on becoming aware of his incapacity to lead, would turn to him and say, "I tried, now it's your turn," and quietly return to his air force. Such remarks by Thi must be weighed carefully, because they were meant for American consumption with full knowledge of our anxiety that governmental stability be maintained. Given Thi's mercurial nature, one must conclude that the circumstances of the moment would determine whether he made his play within or outside the framework of the existing government. In any event, were he to assume either Thieu's position or Ky's one would have to expect many changes in personnel (Thi has always wanted his own men around him), programs and probably even in fundamental GVN policy. 14. It is our judgment that Thi would be seriously deficient in either military backing or popular support were he to try and assume power. One can imagine a situation developing within the Directorate itself through which he might be named either Chairman or Prime Minister, but he would face virtually insurmountable difficulties from outset in attempting to allay any broad base support. Your judgment is accurate that there would be sharp reaction within the northern Catholic refugee bloc. In addition, the southern mass would probably find this impossible to stomach. His only assets would probably be in the center and even these are uncertain if he were unwilling to accept guidance from Tri Quang. (Thi and Quang are possessed of personalities which are not dissimilar and potentially antipathetic.) 15. In view of foregoing, we will continue taking line proposed in Embtel 671/7/ with Thi and would hope that we can convince him that he can best serve the nation in present role as I Corps Commander and by lending his support to the principle of continued unity within the Directorate. Defense Minister Co has told us that he was sent to Da Nang while Hue protests were going on for the purpose of reaffirming Thi's support for the government about which certain members of the Directorate were worried. Co claims to have gained Thi's understanding and that Thi continues to support status quo. /7/Telegram 671 from Saigon, August 28, contains the report of Thi's statement to an Embassy official that he would eventually replace the corrupt and inefficient Thieu/Ky government. Lodge suggested, according to the cable, "that continuing exposure to Americans all voicing the same line of the need for stability and unity among the members of the Directorate will eventually convince him that he is not our man on the white horse." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) Lodge
135. Memorandum From the President's Consultant on Vietnam (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 7, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL, Memos. Secret. Regarding Taylor's role as a part-time consultant to the President, see Swords and Plowshares, pp. 358-366. SUBJECT In seeking possible ways of ending the insurgency in South Viet Nam, I have noted with some concern that some of our best friends often consider that at some early point in the procedure it would be desirable or even essential to declare a "cease-fire". Senator Mansfield in his recent speech/2/ bore down heavily on the need for a cease-fire and a stand-fast which, he indicated, might start at the outset of negotiations. /2/The text of Mansfield's September 1 speech to the Senate is in The Congressional Record--Senate, September 1, 1965, pp. 22560-22562. If the users of this word, cease-fire, mean it in the sense of a cessation of all use of firearms, it is no more reasonable to talk of a cease-fire in South Viet Nam than of one between police and criminals in a crime-wave. The hostile acts of the Viet Cong which must be brought under control--terrorism, sabotage, oppression of the rural population, recruiting and infiltration--do not depend on the use of weapons. The prevention of these acts by the government does. Hence, a cease-fire without something else would give the Viet Cong the opportunity to continue to harass the population, impress recruits, expand their areas of control and prepare for greater depredations. The "something else" which would have to be added to make the situation tolerable from our point of view must include provisions for the continued maintenance of law and order by government forces, at least outside of those areas which might be conceded to be normally under Viet Cong control. The government could offer to cease bombings and clearing operations in these Red areas and, in exchange, the Viet Cong/Hanoi would undertake to cease all incidents anywhere in South Viet Nam and all infiltration from outside South Viet Nam. Our side should retain the right of unarmed air reconnaissance of infiltration routes in North Viet Nam and Laos. In summary, instead of talking of a mutual cease-fire we should talk of a cease-fire on our side in exchange for a cease-aggression on theirs. A fair offer would be for our side to cease all bombing in North and South Viet Nam, and all new clearing operations in Viet Cong held territory, but to retain the right to use force to maintain law and order outside of specified Viet Cong-controlled areas. Additionally, we might agree to freeze foreign force levels but should retain the right of unarmed air reconnaissance of infiltration routes in North Viet Nam and Laos. Their side would cease all incidents in South Viet Nam and infiltration of men and equipment in South Viet Nam. Both sides should have the right on short notice to denounce the agreement for cause. I believe that the foregoing discussion suggests how involved a cessation of hostilities is in a guerrilla situation such as we have in South Viet Nam. In many ways, the requirements are as demanding as for the negotiating of a final peace settlement. Even, if achieved, the agreement would be susceptible to breach without warning either by a deliberate decision of the Communist leaders or by an act of indiscipline or carelessness by any of the hundreds of thousands of armed men on either side. All of these points need careful consideration before we allow ourselves to become involved in a so-called cease-fire which can be a trap. Maxwell D. Taylor
136. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ I-36114/65 Washington, September 8, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 381. Top Secret. SUBJECT In JCSM 652-65 (Tab A),/2/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff outline a concept for the future conduct of the conflict in Vietnam. In the proposed concept, the Joint Chiefs outline factors bearing on the development of a US military strategy, discuss US objectives, tasks, and basic strategy, and recommend principal measures necessary for executing the basic strategy and for achieving US objectives. The concept includes certain generalized courses of action about which there would be little or no dispute and a number of other courses that are clearly controversial and raise far-reaching policy issues (e.g., blockade and mining of DRV, US build-up in Thailand, intensified RT). /2/Document 130. The JCS state that they will submit specific recommendations to implement the concept at an early date. They recommend that the concept be approved as the basis for subsequent development of courses of action, forces and other requirements, to include the phasing of operations. In my judgment, an over-all approval of the concept proposed by the JCS is not required at this time and would not significantly increase US capabilities and planning in dealing with the situation in SEA in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, I recommend that the concept proposed not be specifically approved at this time. Instead I recommend that you indicate to the Chairman, JCS, that you have studied the referenced JCSM and agree to the use of the proposed concept in the formulation of specific recommendations for future operations in SEA./3/ /3/On September 11, McNamara informed the JCS that he had considered JCSM 652-65 and agreed that the recommendations for future operations in Southeast Asia should be formulated and considered individually as they were developed. McNamara noted that he had sent JCSM 652-65 to the Department of State and White House for use in future deliberations. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 381) Copies of the referenced JCSM have been provided to Bill Bundy and to McGeorge Bundy. John T. McNaughton
137. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, September 8, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1965. Secret. Copies were sent to Unger and McGeorge Bundy. The source text is Unger's unsigned copy; McGeorge Bundy's signed copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL, Cables. SUBJECT On my return from leave I found that not much progress had been made with respect to bombing policy in North Viet Nam. It may be useful, therefore, for me to set out briefly the proposition about which I talked with you two weeks ago./2/ /2/No record of this discussion has been found. 1. Perhaps the most firmly based proposition about the use of airpower is that its systematic and thorough application against a few target systems is geometrically more effective than its diffuse application against many target systems. 2. For this reason, there is little doubt that the most effective use of airpower against North Viet Nam would be systematically to attack certain target systems which are critical to the military supply and production capabilities of that country. The two best candidates are: oil storage and electric power. Although attacks on these target systems need not be sanguinary in terms of civilian casualties, it is evident that they raise issues which have led the President thus far to hold off. 3. This fact does not relieve us of the responsibility of insuring that the use of airpower against North Viet Nam, within present limits, is as efficient as it can be made. At the present time, from the evidence available, I believe our attacks on North Viet Nam suffer from excessive diffusion of effort with respect to target systems. We are attacking ammunition dumps; barracks; some accessible power stations and oil storage depots; transport targets; etc. The indecisive character of the results is suggested by the analyses of the effectiveness of our bombing. They indicate that we have damaged or destroyed a modest proportion of each target system (roughly 5-20%). 4. I propose, therefore, that while keeping open the question of an optimum use of airpower (i.e., systematic attack, including targets near Hanoi, on oil storage and electric power), we devote ourselves forthwith to a transport interdiction campaign with the objectives of: --isolating Hanoi from the Laos and South Viet Nam borders; --isolating particular regions of southern and western North Viet Nam from each other and from Hanoi. 5. This judgment is based on ample evidence that our transport attacks in North Viet Nam are producing a series of substantial effects on the military and civil economy, as well as on psychological and political morale; but there is also evidence that the lack of system and follow-through in those attacks is denying us their full potentialities. 6. To do this we must establish, by careful analysis, the 50 or so critical transport bottlenecks in North Viet Nam and make a maximum commitment of force to hold those cuts, if possible, by night as well as by day. In turn, this would require that we permit the use of our full sortie capabilities against this transport target system, dropping, if necessary, attacks on target systems of doubtful or lesser value--perhaps barracks and ammunition dumps. 7. No guarantee concerning results can, of course, be made. But a careful reading of the evidence suggests that the transport system of North Viet Nam has been rendered so vulnerable by bombing up to the present point that such a truly systematic interdiction effort might not only make even small military movements across the North Vietnamese borders impractical but also produce significant economic, social, and political consequences. 7. [sic] The adoption of such a program would make urgent an effort which is not lacking in our government; namely, a sophisticated and systematic effort to evaluate from all sources the various different military and civilian effects being imposed by our bombing in the North. 8. A related transport interdiction system should be considered for concurrent or later application; namely, the interdiction of Hanoi from external sources of supply. This system involves the cutting (and holding of cuts) in the rail and road system between Hanoi and the Chicom borders and the mining of Haiphong harbor. A government in Hanoi isolated from its own borders and hinterland and from regular flows of external supplies is likely to take a relatively dim view of its prospects, while still retaining its hard-won industrial and urban infrastructure.
138. Memorandum by Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff/1/ Washington, September 10, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 41-Pt. Program in Non-Military Sphere in SVN. Secret. SUBJECT Attached is a brief discussion and status report/2/ of our more important non-military programs. This represents the first in a series of monthly reports for the President. /2/Attached but not printed. The range and complexity of our non-military activities are noteworthy--from training village policemen to controlling inflation. The key elements of this comprehensive program are touched on briefly below. Security and Political Operations. An ambitious internal security program is concentrating on building national, provincial and Special Branch police forces. Recruiting, training and equipping a force of almost 80,000 men is proceeding on schedule. Important steps have also been taken to improve techniques of population control; 7 million identity cards have been issued and population checkpoints have been established. CIA-trained counter-guerrilla units are operating against the VC in its own territory. The objective of attracting popular support for the Saigon government permeates the full range of programs involved in the counterinsurgency effort. Ky has attempted to project an image of revolutionary reform, but promises have only been slowly fulfilled, and the lack of effective government ties into the villages has dulled the impact of Ky's revolutionary fervor. The Mission is encouraging Ky to give concrete meaning to his program and to build support for it among the various elements of Vietnamese society. In theory these groups welcome Ky's objectives, but his defensive attitude and the problem of enlisting the support of one group without alienating another inhibit greater progress. On the level of local action, CIA has trained and equipped various types of small, highly motivated teams which operate throughout the provinces, applying Viet Cong tactics of living and working with the villagers. The Mission is working with all important political groups to sublimate their deeply embedded historic frictions and encourage their joint effort to defeat the Viet Cong. There is greater covert than overt room for maneuver and programming in this field and CIA has initiated programs to convince both leaders and rank and file that only through cooperation and concentration on prosecuting the war can they avoid Communist domination and realize their respective objectives. The evolution of a national program which can attract their collective energies and subordinate their self-serving interests remains essential if greater progress is to be achieved. Provincial Operations--Ex Security. The comprehensive military-civilian operation in the Hop Tac area surrounding Saigon has shown progress. The political situation is stable except in Hau Nghia Province where GVN military interference with the Province Chief's operations and instances of indiscriminate shelling have alienated some of the local population. The refugee problem continues to be serious, although not critical except in the overcrowded camps at Qui Nhon where additional housing is being built. Through the Mission and Dr. Howard Rusk/3/ we are bringing maximum assistance from both U.S. private and public sectors to bear on the problem. /3/With the active encouragement of the Johnson administration, Dr. Howard Rusk was involved in creating an American Southeast Asia Foundation as a non-government fund raising and assistance program for public participation in President Johnson's Southeast Asian program. Secretary Rusk told Dr. Rusk to ignore bureaucratic obstruction with his plans as he had "a direct line to the President." (Memorandum from Thomson to McGeorge Bundy, September 2; Kennedy Library, Thomson Papers, Southeast Asia, Vietnam, Howard Rusk Project) McGeorge Bundy sent the President a memorandum on September 23, summarizing Rusk's recommendations. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Howard Rusk Mission) The recommendations of the Chieu Hoi (rally and amnesty) task force have been approved by our Mission and form the basis for current negotiations with the GVN for a much improved program. Economic and Social Operations. Economic assistance programs are giving priority to countering the growing threat of inflation, meeting serious logistic problems created by Viet Cong interdiction of land routes, and developing tactics for combatting Viet Cong economic subversion. Traditional AID programs for agricultural and industrial development continue within the limits of security, with most progress in the Delta and Saigon areas. There is special priority for establishing a light industry complex and creating a planned community in the Cam Ranh Bay area where a major port and U.S. military base are being constructed. Emphasis is being placed on improving medical facilities in the provinces and increasing the number of surgical suites staffed by U.S. and other Free World medical personnel. The GVN has initiated some limited new land reform measures. While the GVN is still moving cautiously because of landlord sensitivities, at least the initial step has been taken after a long period of inactivity in this important area. Psychological Warfare and Information. USIA propaganda directed at North Vietnam has increased considerably with the expansion of Voice of America Vietnamese language service and the initiation of extensive leaflet drops. Propaganda and psychological operations in South Vietnam have also expanded and grown more effective with the buildup of U.S. information personnel. U.S. troop orientation programs are attempting to reduce potential causes of friction between U.S. troops and the Vietnamese. There have been instances of friction in urban areas near U.S. military installations; there does not seem to be much of a problem in the countryside. Veterans benefits programs for the Vietnamese military are being developed to improve morale and sustain their commitment to the war effort and a non-Communist Vietnam. Our efforts to convince the GVN of the necessity for an effective external information program are now bearing fruit. Pamphlets and other materials have been produced for foreign distribution; newly recruited personnel for assignment abroad are being trained; foreign correspondents, at long last, are being briefed by Saigon spokesmen. The GVN is focusing on better diplomatic representation abroad; agrement has been requested for a new and effective Ambassador to Washington. C
139. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 12, 1965, 11:45 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, President's Appointment File, September 13, 1965. Top Secret; Sensitive. SUBJECT /2/See Document 140. There are several important topics that are ripe for discussion at this meeting. Most of them grow out of a long session on Saturday afternoon of Rusk, McNamara, Ball and myself./3/ /3/According to Rusk's Appointment Book, the Secretary met with McNamara, Ball, and McGeorge and William Bundy from 2:30 to 4 p.m. on Saturday, September 11. (Johnson Library) No other record of this meeting has been found. I. Vietnam 1. Bombing policy. Bob McNamara is eager to get general guidance for the next few weeks on bombing in North Vietnam. As you know, he is engaged in a running discussion with the Chiefs on this subject. His own view is that we should continue with carefully measured attacks on clearly defined military targets that do not take us into the Hanoi-Haiphong area, or into direct engagement of Migs, IL-28s, or the SAM-site systems as a whole. (SAM sites outside the Hanoi-Haiphong area would remain targets of opportunity, as I understand it.) The wider recommendations of the Chiefs have been referred back for additional study./4/ /4/See footnote 3, Document 136. Yesterday Dean Rusk felt that while the present pattern of bombing should certainly continue, we should not extend it, as Bob initially suggested, into the part of North Vietnam which is northeast of Hanoi. Bob accepted this advice, and I think the targets he will put forward will be acceptable to Dean. It was also agreed that there would be a further study of target systems in North Vietnam, with the thought that a more sophisticated analysis may permit selection of target systems that would hurt the DRV a lot more, without increasing civilian casualties. It was agreed that the target selection so far has not had this level of sophistication. 2. Diplomatic situation. We had an extended discussion also of the diplomatic situation. On this you must be psychic. I told you yesterday that the Ruppert discussions/5/ were continuing. But the fact is that Ruppert cancelled a meeting scheduled for last Tuesday, and X has come home. X got the feeling at his last meeting that Ruppert had been called up short, and that there might even be someone watching from behind a curtain which had been drawn for the first time across a doorway in the meeting room. Ruppert carefully drew back from one or two marginal positions taken in earlier talks, and even insisted that he had never taken those positions. /5/Reference is to the informal conversations between Mai Van Bo and Edmund Gullion; see Document 112. In this situation, there is general agreement that we ought not now to look as if we were very eager for more talks, and we are inclined to keep X at home and show no eagerness for further probes in the next few weeks. We will need your judgment on this also. (Discussion of this matter on Monday will be indirect and fuzzy because Red Raborn is not currently a member of the Ruppert club--and I doubt if he should be cut in right now unless for some reason you want him to be.) At the same time that we suspend private diplomatic probing, we think that we should adopt a public posture that our position on negotiations is now totally clear and that the next move is up to the Communists. While we do not like Lodge's leaks to Reston and Nixon, we are inclined to agree with his assessment and to feel that we now have a perfectly good public posture which does not need to be regilded every day. I take it from our phone conversation yesterday that this is your own general view. Our most difficult and inconclusive discussions turned on the actual program within Vietnam. Our common guess is that the Viet Cong will try to avoid major engagements with our forces and that they will be quite successful in doing so. In this situation, Rusk raised the question whether we really need to move up toward 200,000 men. McNamara continues to feel that we do, and I agree. The problem is to make sure that the role of our troops is so understood that neither the country nor the troops themselves get frustrated if the scene of major action shifts toward smaller terrorist activities in which our troops cannot play the dominant role. We finally agreed that we should ask Lodge and Westmoreland for a general assessment of the prospects for the next few months in this area. We seem to have got past the big monsoon dangers, and we need to be sure that we have an agreed program for the continuing contest of pacification. We will not have anything sharp to report tomorrow morning, but you should know that all of us feel that this is the most important area of effort for the coming weeks and months. [Here follows discussion of South Asia and Europe.] McG. B. [Next documents]
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