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Ambassador Michael Sheehan, Coordinator for Counterterrorism Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee Washington, DC, July 12, 2000

Mr. Chairman: Thank you for this opportunity to discuss our counterterrorism efforts with you. Ongoing consultations with Congress are key to our efforts to protect American lives and interests abroad. Today I want to respond to your request for a detailed description of a significant trend in international terrorism--namely, the geographical shift of the locus of terror from the Middle East to South Asia. In our annual report to Congress, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999 (Patterns), we described this shift in some detail. In fact, this was one of the two trends we identified as the most important recent developments in terrorism, the other being the shift from well-organized, localized groups supported by state sponsors to loosely organized, international networks of terrorists. I purposely addressed these trends on the very first page of my introduction to the report. The increased willingness and ability of terrorists to seek refuge in South Asia are disturbing developments, and they require us to refocus our diplomatic energies and policy tools as well. I. Why South Asia? Let me begin by outlining why South Asia has become a new locus for terrorism. Understanding the causal factors at play is a fundamental step in developing an effective counterterrorism policy for the region. Regional instability To examine the role of regional instability in fostering terrorism, we can start with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the decade-long civil war which followed. This war destroyed the government and civil society of Afghanistan, at the same time bringing arms, fighters from around the world, and narcotics traffickers to the region. The Soviet withdrawal left a power vacuum, leaving the country in the hands of warring groups of mujahidin as well as outsiders seeking to further their own interests. Many of the current leaders of Afghanistan came of age in training camps designed to create a generation of combatants to fight wars inside and outside Afghanistan. These camps in turn fostered relationships with Afghan Arabs and others fighting wars or involved with terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere. Eventually, the Taliban, a radical group with a world-view informed by the experience of war, gained power over much of the country. Fierce conflicts still flare up in South Asia. The Taliban continues to fight the Northern Alliance, and the border conflict over Kashmir causes instability and bloodshed. South Asia also finds itself serving as a support area for conflicts further afield, such as those in the Caucasus and in the Middle East. The proximity of terrorists to such sources of regional instability is a mutually reinforcing relationship. Terrorists can contribute to such instability by lending a hand to other terrorist groups intent on destroying peace processes. Conversely, instability draws more weapons into the region, increasing the chances that terrorists will get their hands on them. In addition, governments otherwise occupied with wars are less likely to root out terrorists operating within their borders. Improvements in the Middle East Another factor in the shift of the locus of terrorism to South Asia is the progress we have made in reducing terrorism in the Middle East. In the Middle East, by designating state sponsors of terrorism, by criminalizing support to groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), and through intense bilateral discussions with various states, we have stimulated other countries to confront terrorism within and across their borders. And even though terrorism remains a threat in the region, our efforts have brought results. Many Middle Eastern governments--with some notable exceptions--have strengthened their counterterrorist policy and improved international cooperation. Jordan and Egypt are examples of Middle Eastern countries that took positive steps last year. Jordan remained particularly intolerant of terrorism on its soil, arresting extremists reportedly planning attacks against U.S. interests, closing HAMAS offices and arresting some of its members, and responding vigorously to a variety of other terrorist threats. Egypt continued carrying out counterterrorism measures in 1999 by arresting, trying, and convicting a number of terrorists threatening its own interests and those of the U.S. and our allies. Also in the Middle East, the Palestinian Authority mounted counterterrorist operations last year designed to undermine the capabilities of HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to use terrorism to disrupt the peace process. We cannot take credit for all improvements in the counterterrorism sphere in the Middle East, but our diplomacy played a major role. Make no mistake, I do not mean to suggest we can let down our guard in the Middle East. Recent threats in Jordan both during the millennium and a few weeks ago demonstrate that continued vigilance is warranted. Of course, Iran remains an active state sponsor, and Syria, Libya, and Iraq remain on our list because they provide safehaven and material support to terrorist groups. But their direct sponsorship of terrorist acts has diminished. Unfortunately, as we work to neutralize terrorism in the Middle East, terrorists and their organizations seek safehaven in other areas where they can operate with impunity. South Asia is one of them. Ideological extremism There is unfortunately a misperception among some people that terrorism is driven by belief in Islam. In fact, terrorism is a perversion of the teachings of Islam. That being said, another factor contributing to the shift of the locus of terrorism to South Asia is the intersection of regional instability and weak political and economic systems with ideological and militant extremism. For instance, the Taliban practices an austere, extreme brand of Islam. While this is not threatening in and of itself, the Taliban has proven sympathetic to other radical groups, some of which distort religious ideas and principles to justify terrorist acts. In addition, Pakistan's political and economic difficulties and the resultant damage to Pakistan's institutions have provided fertile ground for terrorism. One of the great failures has been in education. Pakistan's government-sponsored educational system has been unable to meet the needs of Pakistan's people. As a result, many poor Pakistanis are drawn to free education provided by madrassas, or religious schools. Many of these schools perform a needed service in imparting such education. Some schools, however, inculcate extremism and a violent anti-Americanism in their students. In these schools, a rigid condemnation of Western culture, coupled with the local conditions of failing societies, produces young men inclined to support the same causes championed by Usama Bin Ladin and other terrorists. The Government of Pakistan is aware of this problem and has stated that it intends to ensure that madrassas provide a proper education for their students. Financing terrorism When discussing the various causes of increased terrorist activity in South Asia, we must address the ability of terrorists to raise funds to support their activities. One of the most important ways to combat terrorism is to disrupt the financing of terrorist groups and activities. We have already made this a priority and are working hard--with unilateral and multilateral sanctions, bilateral diplomacy, and through the UN and G-8--to disrupt the financing of terrorism in South Asia. One notable success was the adoption by the UN General Assembly in December 1999 of the G-8 initiated International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Full implementation of this important new counterterrorism treaty by the largest number of governments is essential, and we hope to submit it to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification shortly. But we must keep up the pressure. The ability of terrorists operating in Afghanistan, for example, to obtain funds and other material support is a symptom of the other primary trend in terrorism that I described in Patterns: the shift from terrorist groups sponsored by states to international networks of terrorists not affiliated with particular governments. This shift has profound implications for our policies in South Asia. The capabilities of Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida network, which has centered itself within Afghanistan, demonstrate why this is the case. Bin Ladin's organization operates on its own, without having to depend on a state sponsor for material support. He has financial resources and means of raising funds, often through narcotrafficking or the use of legitimate "front" companies. He enjoys international financial support. Bin Ladin and other non-state terrorists also benefit from the globalization of communication, using e-mail and Internet websites to spread their message, recruit new mem-bers, and raise funds. These capabilities allow Bin Ladin and other terrorists to extend their tentacles around the world. Terrorist networks outside the context of the international state system provide everything that is needed for groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) to survive and become stronger - even when they are based in friendly states with vigorous counterterrorism policies. The threat posed by this group, a faction of which is closely allied to Bin Ladin, illustrates the challenges we face as non-state terrorism becomes more prevalent. The role of the Taliban The ability of groups such as al-Qa'ida to plan and carry out terrorist attacks with impunity brings us to the final causal factor in the shift of terrorism to South Asia: the Taliban's refusal to crack down on terrorists. Afghanistan has become the primary swamp of terrorism, harboring terrorists from the region and around the world. The Taliban, which controls most Afghan territory, provides safehaven for Usama Bin Ladin and his network. Because of the room which the Taliban gives him to operate, Bin Ladin has created a truly transnational ter-rorist enterprise, drawing on recruits from across Asia, Africa, and Europe, as well as the Middle East. The Taliban has also given logistic support to members of other terrorist organizations, such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Algerian Armed Islamic group, Kashmiri separatists, and a number of militant organizations from Central Asia, including terrorists from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. II. Foundations for progress I reiterate that the shift of the locus of terrorism to South Asia has serious implications, not only for the work that I do as Coordinator for Counterterrorism, but for our foreign policy towards South Asia in general. Because of the growing momentum behind this trend, and the threat that it poses to Americans and others in the region, terrorism is a top priority on the agenda whenever the President, Secretary Albright, or other officials sit down with their South Asian counterparts. But when engaging other nations on these issues, we do not rely solely on periodic reminders of the threat of terrorism. We actively pursue--using a number of tools--our counterterrorism policy goals with all of the key countries in the region. And by no means do we believe it inevitable that the U.S. make enemies in the region, despite the spread of religious extremism. Most religious conservatives, despite a profound distrust of Western values and culture, are not involved in violent activities in general, much less specific anti-American violence. The good news is that we believe we are laying solid foundations for progress on counterterrorism in South Asia. Unlike previous (and some ongoing) efforts to counter terrorism elsewhere, the primary countries we are concerned with in the region are not hostile to the United States, and they do not sponsor terrorism directly. Allow me to describe for you our current bilateral, regional, and multilateral efforts to counter terrorism in South Asia, beginning with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan We have taken a number of steps to address the Afghan Taliban's dangerous conduct. Last year the President issued Executive Order 13129, imposing sanctions on the Taliban. This action deepened the international isolation of the Taliban and limited its ability to support terrorist groups and activities. We also designated al-Qa'ida, based in territory controlled by the Taliban, as an FTO for the first time last year. In addition, in October 1999 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1267, deploring the Taliban's continued provision of safehaven to Usama Bin Ladin and imposing mandatory sanctions prohibiting Taliban-controlled airline flights and freezing Taliban-controlled assets. These international sanctions will remain in place until the Taliban turns Bin Ladin over to a country where he can be brought to justice. Unfortunately, despite the increasing pressure, the Taliban has taken no positive steps towards this end. We will continue the pressure, and we are also exploring ways to exert further multilateral pressure on the Taliban. When I spoke with the Taliban's Foreign Minister, I used this analogy to describe our approach: "If there's a criminal in your basement and you are aware that he has been conducting criminal activities from your house, even if you are not involved in the crimes you are responsible for them. In fact, your willingness to give him refuge makes you complicit in his actions, past and present." For this reason, we support sanctions on the Taliban, and we will hold them directly responsible for any terrorist acts undertaken by Bin Ladin while he is in Afghanistan. We have tried to engage the Taliban in a serious dialogue, and some members of the Taliban have told us that they would like to improve relations with the U.S. They have even taken a few somewhat feeble measures to demonstrate their willingness to work with us, including cutting off Usama Bin Ladin's links with foreign media. However, we have seen no indication that they are ready to take the actions - on Bin Ladin and other issues - that would be necessary for normalization of U.S.-Afghan relations. Pakistan Any discussion of counterterrorism in South Asia must take Pakistan's role into account. As we stated in Patterns, Pakistan has a mixed record on terrorism. The Government of Pakistan has cooperated in some areas, particularly in arrests and renditions of terrorists and supporters of terrorism. In recent weeks, Pakistan has arrested a number of foreigners suspected of connections with terrorism, and the Government is expelling them. Nevertheless, Pakistan has tolerated terrorists living and moving freely within its territory. Numerous Kashmiri separatist groups and sectarian groups involved in terrorism use Pakistan as a base. Pakistan has also frequently acknowledged what it calls "moral and diplomatic support" for militants in Kashmir who employ violence and terrorism. Additionally, the U.S. has received continuing reports of Pakistani material support for some of these militants, including the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM), a group that we have designated as an FTO. We have repeatedly asked Islamabad to pressure the Taliban to end terrorist training in Afghanistan, to interdict travel of militants to and from camps in Afghanistan, to prevent militant groups from acquiring weapons, and to block financial and logistical support to camps in Afghanistan. We have also urged Islamabad to address the issue of misuse of religious schools, and the Pakistanis have told us that they will attempt to reform and modernize these schools. We are looking hard at current developments and continue to be intensively engaged with Pakistan on improving cooperation. President Clinton and, most recently, Under Secretary Pickering both traveled to Pakistan to reinforce tough messages on terrorism and other key concerns. Again, Afghanistan is not our enemy, and neither is Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan is a long-time friend and ally, albeit one that bears some responsibility for the current growth of terrorism in South Asia. That we are allies makes it all the more important that we cooperate to rid the area of terrorism. Pakistan itself is also a victim of terrorism and understands that this threat undermines its own security. Aside from the people of Afghanistan, the citizens of Pakistan suffer the most because of the terrorism problem in South Asia. The Government of Pakistan also understands that the "Talibanization"--or radicalization--of their country and of the region is something to avoid. Pakistan seeks to build political and economic bridges with other Central Asian nations, and the Pakistanis realize that the presence of terrorists in Afghanistan and South Asia is a serious obstacle to regional cooperation and stability. While Pakistan's leaders understand these things, and our engagement is beginning to yield progress, there is a lot more to do. Our efforts must reflect our desire to help Pakistan confront this problem directly. To the extent that our policies help Pakistan keep the pressure on terrorists, and enable Pakistan to counter this threat in South Asia, then we will continue to move forward. III. Building an international coalition While we are focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan, there are a number of other countries that have much at stake in our counterterrorism efforts in South Asia. These are the "front-line" states: the countries of Central Asia, as well as India, Russia, and China. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation with these states is crucial to the effort to rid South Asia of terrorism. We must make this a collective effort: after all, even if we are tough on terrorism, if other countries are not, we remain at risk. I envision the U.S. building an international coalition to confront terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region. The foundations for such a coalition, including front-line states and others, are already in place. Central Asia The U.S. and Central Asian countries took a positive, tangible step last month when we hosted a Central Asia counterterrorism conference here in Washington. This conference yielded significant progress, and I can say with confidence that all the attendees left convinced that terrorism represents a growing challenge and a potential threat to all of Central and South Asia. Specifically, participants agreed that to combat terrorism, individual nations and the international community must block financial, logistical, and moral support for organizations and people engaged in international terrorism. Representatives from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan agreed on the importance of increasing multilateral, regional, and bilateral cooperation and fostering political will in the international community to deny sanctuary and support to terrorists. The participants specifically denounced the Taliban for allowing terrorists to destabilize the region. The conference also gave us the opportunity to stress to our partners in Central Asia that countering terrorism and protecting human rights and civil liberties are not inconsistent goals. In fact, the development of a healthy civil society and the strict preservation of the rule of law for all citizens are essential elements of a successful counterterrorism campaign. We look forward to following up on all of these issues in further consultations with Central Asian countries. Other front-line states Our bilateral relationships with India, Russia, and China are also crucial elements of our South Asia counterterrorism strategy. In February, the U.S.-India Counterterrorism Working Group (CTWG) met for the first time. This initiative reflects the shared interest of the U.S. and India in enhancing our joint efforts to counter international terrorism. The working group is already playing an important role in reducing the terrorist threat in South Asia. For example, the group facilitated renewed opportunities for antiterrorism training of Indian officials and the establishment of a Legal Attache Office at Embassy New Delhi. These efforts will make cooperation in a future crisis much easier, while at the same time helping to prevent and deter the further spread of terrorism in South Asia. Just as we are moving forward with India on counterterrorism issues, we have taken positive steps with regard to Russia. President Clinton and Russian President Putin recently agreed to form a bilateral working group on Afghanistan. The new working group should serve to improve diplomatic cooperation with Russia through multilateral and regional channels. This initiative will also complement ongoing efforts with Russia on counterterrorism objectives in South Asia. The first meeting of the working group will take place in the very near future and will focus on joint means to counter the threat emanating from Afghanistan. Russia continues to confront terrorism on its own. Russia has legitimate interests in fighting terrorism, especially with regard to Islamist mujahidin movements in Central Asia. The Russians understand the destabilizing threat of terrorism, and therefore have come together with other governments in the region in joint efforts to combat terrorism. These include the recent announcement of the establishment of a CIS Counterterrorist Center based in Moscow with members from most of the former Soviet Union states, joint military exercises with terrorist incident scenarios, and terrorism discussions among Central Asian countries and Shanghai Five members. To the extent that these initiatives reduce the terrorist threat in Central and South Asia, they will complement our policies in the region. With regard to China, I look forward to developing a dialogue with Chinese officials on counterterrorism issues. The initial foundations for such a dialogue have already been established. We fully expect that the Chinese will be willing to work with us to eliminate the threat of terrorism from South Asia, especially in light of their continued interest in a secure and stable subcontinent. As long as Bin Ladin and other terrorists put such stability at risk, the Chinese will join with us in countering this threat. IV. What next? Now that I have described the causes of the shift of the locus of terrorism to South Asia, as well as what we are doing currently to counter this threat, let me address what I see as the next steps in U.S. counterterrorism policy in the region. Of course, in the short-term, the protection of American lives and interests remains our top priority. Also, we will continue to work to bring to justice those terrorists who have perpetrated terrorist acts, including Bin Ladin. Political will With regard to long-term goals in South Asia, I would like to reiterate that it ultimately takes political will on the part of other governments to confront terrorism. Our overarching approach to countering terrorism is to drain the "swamps" where terrorists are hiding. These swamps, where governments either are unable or unwilling to crack down on terrorists operating or living within their borders, are places where terrorists have room to move, plan, and raise funds. We use a variety of tools to drain these swamps, including international agreements, domestic legislation, vigorous law enforcement, designation of terrorist groups, and diplomatic isolation. But in the long run--and we must think in terms of the long run when considering efforts to combat terrorism--it will be our political and diplomatic efforts that reduce the space in which terrorists can operate. When terrorists see that terrorism is not a legitimate means of expression, that it will not be tolerated by any country, and that perpetrators of terrorist acts will be punished, then they will think twice about using it as their voice. But to demonstrate this to terrorists requires sustained political will on the part of our allies. This is why our efforts to build an international coalition will be important. Sustained engagement with Pakistan and pressure on the Taliban must be geared towards neutralizing the terrorist threat in the region. And for this effort to be effective, our policy has to include consideration of what needs to happen more generally in the region. I am aware that overall U.S. policy in South Asia is not my responsibility; however, the broader political context affects my work directly. Specifically, neutralizing terrorism in South Asia will necessitate lasting peace in Afghanistan as well as radical reform in Pakistan. With regard to the former, the most important counterterrorism policy in the Middle East has been the peace process and the progress made in bringing parties to the table. The Administration is not suggesting we have the will or national interest to make a comparable effort in Afghanistan, but we need to find a way forward. With regard to Pakistan, a country in deep political and financial crisis, continued emphasis on democratization and economic and social development will give Pakistan the tools it needs to counter terrorism effectively. Resources Along with political will on the part of South Asian countries, success is also contingent on the U.S. devoting sufficient resources towards our objectives. Support for the counterterrorism elements of the President's budget request is crucial to our efforts. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you and the members of this committee for their continued support for these programs, especially the training and rewards programs. One example is our Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, which gives us access to other governments and improves their counterterrorism capabilities. Training foreign officials in bomb detection, hostage negotiation, and crisis management protects American lives overseas. In addition, as part of our ATA program we are completing a training curriculum for foreign judicial and financial officials designed to help these officials disrupt the financing of terrorist groups and activities. The Administration requested $38 million for ATA in FY 2001. I seek your support for full funding of the ATA program. Another important counterterrorism initiative is the new Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), which would hinder terrorists from easily crossing international borders. TIP would provide databases, communications equipment and training to help vulnerable nations identify terrorists trying to enter their territory or transit through their airports. We hope the Congress will approve the full $4 million requested for TIP in FY 2001. A final component of the President's counterterrorism budget request is funding for a Center for Antiterrorism and Security Training (CAST). Such a center would allow us to consolidate ATA and other security training at a location near Washington. At this facility, foreign officials could work more effectively with U.S. Government officials and security specialists, including Diplomatic Security agents and Capitol Hill police. Also, we would be able to eliminate long delays in providing such training, currently due to a shortage of time slots at facilities contracted to us by other agencies. We need this 21st century facility for meeting 21st century terrorist threats. We need your support to make sure funding is included for CAST--as well as the President's full FY 2001 Foreign Operations request--when the Congress considers the final versions of FY 2001 appropriations bills. V. Conclusion In conclusion, I remind you that our efforts to combat terrorism in South Asia and around the world start with support from Capitol Hill. Carefully calibrated counterterrorism legislation, sufficient resources, and public discourse in hearings such as these are key. Your support, coupled with the force of our sustained diplomatic and political efforts, will help us drain swamps in Afghanistan and wherever else states are not mustering the political will to confront terrorists. We have had success over the last 20 years. This success can be attributed to our commitment to stay the course on a tough counterterrorism policy, and to rally international support. Applying diplomatic pressure, raising political will, levying sanctions--these actions have made many corners of this world intolerable for terrorists. We must continue to stay the course, while adjusting to new geographic threats and the changing face of terrorism. We must maintain strong political will here on the Hill and in the Administration to be tough on terrorism and push our allies to do the same. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before your committee today. I look forward to answering any questions members of the committee may have. [end of document] Remarks Index | Counterterrorism | South Asian Affairs | Department of State | Secretary of State