

**ARE THE PEOPLE VICTIMS OR ACCOMPLICES?**

**THE USE OF PRESENTS AND BRIBES TO INFLUENCE OFFICIALS IN  
EASTERN EUROPE**

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## INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES

The development of democratic and effective government at subnational levels remains one of the central tasks of transition in Central and Eastern Europe' and the former Soviet Union. The sharing of expertise between countries **can** contribute significantly to the reform process in the region. Pursuing this goal, the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI) has **launched** a series of discussion papers, which **will** be distributed widely throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

The series will report the findings **of** projects supported by LGI and will include papers written by authors who are not LGI grant recipients. **LGI** offers assistance for the translation of the papers into **the** national languages of the region. The opinions presented in the papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative.

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## Introduction

‘Thank God they’re corruptible. They’re human and after money like the rest of us. They’re not wolves. As long as there’s corruption, there’s hope. Bribes! They’re man’s best chance. As long as judges go on taking money, then there’s some chance of justice.-Bertolt Brecht, ***Mother Courage and Her Children***, Scene 3.’

Mother Courage clearly felt that bribery and corruption had their advantages for ordinary people. But Brecht’s point was that although she seemed so worldly wise in the **short** term, she was completely and tragically wrong in the long term. Our purpose is to explore public attitudes toward low-level corruption in Eastern Europe--to see how many praise it with Mother Courage and how many condemn it with Bertolt Brecht.

We focus on the way ordinary citizens use presents and bribes to influence the **officials** they meet in day-to-day life. Our principal concern is not with high-level corruption involving senior politicians and officials or top businessmen, but with the role of corruption in the everyday interactions between citizens and the state. We look in particular at Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and the Czech ‘Republic-near neighbors with a common commitment to democratization in the’ 1990s but with very different historical and bureaucratic traditions. Our findings are based on 4,778 interviews conducted between November 1997 and February 1998 with representative national samples of the public: 1,003 in the Czech Republic; 1,056 in Slovakia; 1,519 in Bulgaria; and 1,200 in Ukraine. Where appropriate we, have illustrated these findings with direct quotations taken from twenty-six focus-group discussions. and 136 in-depth interviews that we commissioned in the summer and autumn of 1996.

For every bribe-taker there must be a bribe-giver, but the relationship is not necessarily an **equal** one. If citizens take the initiative, pressing their bribes-and their demands-n reluctant but perhaps badly paid officials, then we might describe citizens as the source of corruption. If the opposite happens, and officials abuse their position to extort **unofficial** payments from weak, powerless, and reluctant citizens, we might describe citizens as victims. And if the relationship is more equal, if **citizens** want to give and officials are happy to take, then we might describe citizens as accomplices.

### Victims of the Transition

In all of the countries included in our study, ordinary people felt that they were the victims rather than the beneficiaries of the transition to a market economy. That, is not to say that they opposed the changes in principle: “**The path** we have taken is correct. . . . We should go the way . all Europe is going. Despite the present difficulties, that is the only path for the **country**” (Tenevo, **IDI-4**).<sup>2</sup> But ordinary people had a strong sense of being pushed aside or cheated by powerful groups and individuals during the postcommunist years: ‘A small group of **people will** live well thanks to the privatization of state property. Privatization is a ‘big swindle’ (Kyiv, **IDI-3**): “As far as plants and factories are concerned, it seems to be more likely not *privatizatsia* [privatization] but *prikhvatizatsia* [to grab more]” (Rybinskoe, **IDI-5**). Only around 13 percent of the **respondents** in our surveys claimed they had personally benefited in any way from the processes of **restitution** (see table 1).

In the Czech and Slovak Republics, around half of the public thought that the chief beneficiaries of the transition had been politicians **and officials**, about one-fifth thought that the beneficiaries had been the former communist nomenklatura, and another fifth thought that the **beneficiaries** had been the vaguely defined **Mafia**. In Bulgaria and Ukraine, how-

Table 1

Percentage of Respondents Who Benefited from the Process of Restitution

(Q12: Have you or your family benefited personally from the process of restitution?)

The Czech Republic	13
Slovakia	16
Bulgaria	14
Ukraine	9

Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations. Q12 indicated question number twelve in the questionnaire. The text of each question is given in full when first cited; thereafter, the question number is used to identify the question briefly but precisely. "Restitution" was defined in Q11 as "giving land or property back to the families of people who owned them before they were taken over by the state."

ever, over 40 percent thought the chief beneficiaries had been the Mafia, over 30 percent politicians and officials, and rather less the former communist nomenklatura. "It's clear that [the, transition] is being affected by the old Soviet methods-the same special shares, special distributions, and special privileges everywhere" (Sevastopol, FG-4).<sup>3</sup> The numbers that thought ordinary citizens had been the chief beneficiaries never exceeded 4 percent in any country (see table 2).

Table 2

Respondents' Views regarding Who Benefited Most from the Transition

(Q9: Who do you think benefited most from the move to a market economy?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
Politicians and officials	49	56	30	35
Ordinary citizens	3	1	4	1
Former communist nomenklatura	23	21	19	13
Mafia	20	19	41	44
Foreigners	6	3	6	7

Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

Looking to the future, people were a **little** more optimistic about the transition **benefiting** ordinary citizens, but only a little: the percentage of people who thought ordinary citizens would eventually benefit most ranged from just **3** percent in Slovakia to a maximum of 17 percent in Bulgaria. Politicians and officials were still regarded as the most likely long-term beneficiaries in the Czech and Slovak **Republics**, and they came a close second to the **Mafia** in Bulgaria and Ukraine (see table 3).

**Table 3**  
Respondents' Views regarding the Beneficiaries of the Transition

(Q10: Looking ahead, who do you think will eventually benefit most from the move to a market economy?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
Politicians and officials	4	7	61	3
Ordinary citizens	8	3	17	7
Former communist nomenklatura	11	9	8	9
Mafia	20	22	34	40
Foreigners	14	5	10	9

*Note:* "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

Two out of three-citizens in the-Czech Republic said most of their politicians now behaved worse than they did under communism, so did 82 percent in Slovakia and 87 percent in Ukraine, though much less in Bulgaria. People in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic were evenly divided on whether-officials who deal with ordinary people and their problems now behaved better or worse, than they did under communism; but 66 percent in Slovakia and 89 percent in Ukraine claimed such **officials** behaved worse (see table 4).



Table 4

Respondents' **Views** regarding the Behavior of **Politicians** and Officials(Q54: Do you **think** that most politicians now behave better or **worse** than they did under communism?)**Q55:** Do you feel that **most** of these **officials treat** people better or worse than they did under communism?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
Most politicians behave <b>worse</b> now	65	<b>82</b>	40	87
Most <b>officials</b> behave <b>worse</b> now	47	66	45	89

*Note:* "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations. "Under Communism" was replaced by "during the Soviet period" in Ukraine and by "before 1989" elsewhere.

## A Climate of Petty Corruption

People in all countries were inclined to **suggest** that even when a person asks an **official** for something to which he or she is entitled to by law, they would **probably** have to approach the official through a contact or offer something **in** order **to get** a successful outcome. Perhaps they **exaggerated**, in casual gossip, the need to use contacts, presents, and bribes. As we shall see, in their **own** personal experiences, they tended to report rather less need to use presents and bribes..

Nonetheless, the **figures** are very high: **between 76** and 90 percent of the people surveyed in **different countries** said it was **likely** that a person would have to approach the official through a **contact**. Between 62 and 91 percent said it was likely that a small present would be necessary. And between 44 and **81 percent** said it was likely that money **or, an** expensive present would be necessary. These gifts were considered most necessary **in** Ukraine and **least** necessary in the Czech **Republic**; the difference between Ukraine and the Czech Republic **grew** from 14 percent **on contacts**, to 29 percent on small presents, to 37 percent on money or an expensive present: (see **table 5**).

Generally speaking, people seeking **something** to which **they** were entitled to by law were thought most likely **to** have to **offer** money; a present, or a favor to officials in state ministries **or** to hospital doctors. They

Table 5  
The Need to Use Contacts, Presents, and Bribes

(Q85-7: Suppose a person asks an official for something to which he or she is entitled to by law. To get a successful outcome, is it likely or not likely that he or she would [Q85] approach the official through a contact, [Q86] offer a small present, or [Q87] offer money or an expensive present?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine. (%)
Approach officials through a contact	76	76	86	90
Offer a small present	62	80	84	91
Offer money or an expensive present	44	62	72	8

*Note: "Don't km" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.*

were thought **least** likely to have to make such offers to school teachers or to **workers** in the private sector. But perceptions varied sharply **across** different countries. **At** one **extreme**, around half or less of the **participants** in **the** **Czech Republic** thought such offers would be **necessary** except in the case of **officials** in state ministries. At the other extreme, over 80 percent **s&eyed** in Ukraine thought such offers would likely be necessary, **except** in the case of school teachers and workers in the private **sector** (see table 6).

Tony **Verheijen** and **Antoaneta Dimitrova** refer to **Hunt&ton's** **argument** **that** "democratisation can bring corruption in the short term by temporarily weakening **the** state and loosening social inhibitions. . . . By bringing into question authority in **general**, democratisation can bring confusion about standards of morality in **general** and promote anti-social **behaviour**."<sup>4</sup> We might add that the **transition** to a market economy—quite **separately** and independently from the transition to a democratic system—may also bring about an increase in **monetary corruption** as a system based **on** n&-monetary privileges is replaced by a system 'in which everything has its price.

There was a wide consensus that people would be more likely to **use** contacts, presents, **and** bribes now than they did under communism. Once again, such claims were most frequent in Ukraine and least **fre-**

**Table 6**  
**Likelihood that Bribes Must Be Offered to Different Officials**

(Q60-70: Now think of a **person seeking** something to which **they** are entitled to by **law**. Is it likely or not likely **that** such a **person** would have to offer money, a present, or a favor to get help from each of the following-1 mean **offer** more than the **official** charge?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
(Q63) officials in <b>state ministries</b>	70	85	82	87
(Q60) Hospital <b>doctors</b>	47	89	93	94
(Q67) <b>Customs officials</b>	53	71	92	86
(Q65) Court <b>officials</b>	44	75	80	87
(Q68) <b>MPs</b>	54	74	74	80
(Q62) University <b>staff</b>	34	78	73	89
(Q64) <b>Officials</b> in local government <b>offices</b>	49	58	79	87
(Q66) <b>Police officers</b>	42	64	72	89
(Q69) Elected <b>officials</b> on local <b>councils</b>	44	52	69	80
(470) <b>People</b> working in the private <b>sector</b>	42	55	63	61
(Q61) School <b>teachers</b>	10	36	45	68

Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations. The rows are arranged in descending order of average likelihood.

quent in the Czech Republic. Over 80 percent of those surveyed in Ukraine said people were more likely to offer officials money or an expensive present now than they were during the communist period (see table 7).

**Table 7**  
**Are People Now More Likely to Offer a Bribe?**

(Q93-5: Compared to the communist period, do you think it is now more or less likely that people in your country would [Q93] approach an official through a contact, [Q94] offer a small gift, or [Q95] offer money or an expensive present?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
Approach the official through a contact	77	87	79	88.
Offer a small present	64	83	72	88
Offer money or an expensive present	50	69	76	80

Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

- Around three-quarters or more in every country thought their **respective officials** were more **corrupt** than people who worked in private businesses: Similar numbers were convinced that their officials were more corrupt than officials in Germany. But people in different countries had very different impressions about whether their **officials** were more or less corrupt than officials in **Russia** or other countries of Eastern Europe. Only 25 percent of the participants in the Czech Republic, but 80 **per-**cent in Ukraine, thought their **officials** were more corrupt than in most other Eastern European countries. More shockingly, only 8 percent in the Czech Republic, but 65 percent in Ukraine, thought their officials were more corrupt than in Russia (see table 8).

Table 8  
**Respondents Who Believe Their Officials Are More  
 Corrupt than in Other Places**

(Q149-52: Do you **feel** that officials in government **offices** in **your** country are more or less **corrupt** than [Q149] people who work in private **businesses**, [Q150] officials in **Russia**, [Q151] officials in **Germany**, or [Q152] officials in most other Eastern European countries?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
<b>People</b> who work in private businesses	72	75	<b>78</b>	84
<b>Officials</b> in Russia	8	16	31	65
<b>Officials</b> in <b>Germany</b>	79	74	83	85
<b>Officials</b> in most <b>other</b> Eastern <b>European</b> countries	<b>25</b>	34	76	80

*Note:* "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

In gossip at least, there was a climate, an atmosphere, of petty corruption. At one extreme, there were limits to allegations of official corruption in the Czech Republic; but at the other extreme, perceptions of official corruption **were** pervasive and unqualified in Ukraine.

## Alternative Perspectives on Corruption

The public in the former Soviet Union is notoriously more intolerant and authoritarian than in Central and Eastern Europe.’ But they are not necessarily more law-abiding. Authority, morality, and law were separated from each other much more clearly under the Soviet regime than in Western, and even Eastern, Europe. To some extent, Soviet laws were part of the propaganda battle with Western liberal democracy, rather than codes to be followed whether Convenient or inconvenient.<sup>6</sup> It was the party line rather than the Law that had to be respected. Thus, Mikhail Gorbachev’s emphasis on a “law-bound state” in the 1980s was a radical idea in the Soviet context, though it seems banal in a Western liberal context.

If the Soviet regime did not respect the law, there was no reason why its citizens should do so either. Reflecting this tradition, we found that people in Ukraine were far less willing than those in the Czech Republic to say that people should obey a law they considered very unreasonable or unjust rather than try to ignore or avoid it. By their own account, three out of five people in Ukraine said they should try to ignore or avoid laws that they felt were very unreasonable or unjust. A large majority simply did not equate law with morality in Ukraine (see table 9).

**Table 9**

Percentage of Respondents Who Believe They Should Obey Unreasonable Laws

(Q41: Which comes closer to your view? If people think a law is very unreasonable or unjust, should they [1] obey it or [2] try to ignore it?)

The Czech Republic	68
Slovakia	53
Bulgaria	63
Ukraine	41

Note: “Don’t know” and “mixed/depends” answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

We asked whether people considered the use of money, presents, favors, or contacts to influence **officials** (1) bad for the country and for those involved; (2) bad for the country but unavoidable for people who have to live here; or (3) beneficial because when you need a favor from an official, you can get it. The first answer corresponds to simple and unqualified condemnation of corruption, whether on moral, egalitarian, economic, or other grounds. “I do not approve of bribes” (Dolny Kubin, FG-3). “It often happens that an unhelpful [official] gains even more than the one who is willing to help. . . . I mean that someone may force it out of you. . . . I am basically against it; things should work even without [gifts]. Those people are there to help, they are paid for it, it’s their duty” (**Bratislava-2, FG-6**).<sup>7</sup> “Corruption . . . causes a distinction, . . . [but] every citizen is equal **before any** administrative official. . . . That is what equality should mean” (Sofia-1, FG-6).

The second answer combines condemnation of corruption with some excuse for those who practice it. “You can’t do anything another way in this situation” (Horodok, FG-2). “I think that the majority of those who take bribes are also compelled to do the same because they do not get [enough] **salary**.” (**Striy, FG-5**).

And the third expresses a positive preference or approval: “In any situation, whatever amount **of** money [the citizen] pays, it is normally more important that the problem is solved ‘than-that money is paid for it’” (Striy, FG-5). Presents **may** usefully encourage flexibility: “Someone needs a passport in two months and someone else in two days. For the first person, **it’s not** so important to give a gift, but for someone else it may be crucial if he **or** she needs it immediately” (Hradec Kralove, FG-3). But that does make citizens at least accomplices and **often corrupting** agents: “**We’ve just** taught **them** this. We ourselves are-guilty. We ourselves take them things. The first and the second person bring something, and the third can’t not bring something” (Khartsysk, **FG-3**).

Faced with these three options, however, relatively few people expressed a positive preference for a corrupt system, but a large minority was willing to excuse it. **Taken** together, 31 percent of the people surveyed were, willing to excuse or approve corruption in the Czech Republic, 40 percent in Slovakia, and 42 percent in Bulgaria or Ukraine (see table 10).

**Table 10**  
**Respondents' Opinions regarding the Use of Money, Presents,**  
**or Contacts to Influence officials**

(Q153: Which comes closest to your view about the use of money, presents, favors, and contacts to influence officials: [1] It is bad for the country and for those involved; [2] it is bad for the country but unavoidable for the people who have to live here; or [3] you prefer it that way because when you need a favor from an official, you can get it?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
Bad for the country and those involved	69	60	58	58
Bad for the country but unavoidable for citizens	25	28	34	31
Prefer it that way	7	12	8	11

*Note:* "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

Another question **sharpened** the cross-national differences. Faced with the **sharp choice** between an austere system where officials never accepted **presents** and never did favors for people and one where **officials** sometimes accepted **presents** and in return did **favors** for people, only 9 percent in the Czech Republic and 19 percent in Slovakia opted for a system of reciprocal presents and favors, but 41 percent in Bulgaria and 48 percent in Ukraine preferred such a system. The Weberian model of a well-oiled but inhuman machine was the ideal for the overwhelming majority in the Czech Republic, but for only half the people in Ukraine (see table 11).

Table 11

Percentage of Respondents Who Would **Prefer** a System of Presents **and** Favors

(Q156: Which would you **prefer**: a **system** where **officials** [1] never accepted **presents and** never did **favors** for people or [2] **sometimes** accepted presents and in **return** did **favors** for people?)

The Czech Republic	9
Slovakia	19
Bulgaria	41
<b>Ukraine</b>	<b>48</b>

*Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.*

### Attempts at Extortion

Even those people who are unwilling to excuse the use of presents and bribes may have to, submit to extortion. "They put you in a situation where you have to" (Horodok, FG-6). "In this situation, you understand that you have to give" (Horodok, FG-2). "Of course. [officials] want to use you. . . . They **want** to use their position as a source of income" (Khartsyisk, FG-4).

At one level, people may feel that the use of money, presents, and favors is part of **their** national tradition, part of their culture. Surprisingly, we found that people in **the** Czech and Slovak Republics were by far the most willing to accept that corruption was a permanent part of their culture. By contrast, only 16 percent of those surveyed in Ukraine saw it as a permanent part of Ukraine's culture; most **people** blamed the use of **presents**, bribes, and favors on a moral crisis in a period of transition (see **table 1 2** ) .

We should recall, however, that people in Ukraine were far more **critical** than those in the Czech Republic of falling standards in public life: 87 percent **of** the Ukrainians surveyed said most politicians now behaved **worse than** under communism, and 89 percent believed that most officials now **behaved worse** than under communism. "In comparison to the communist regime, people get worse help because at that time control



Table 12  
Respondents' **Views** regarding the Origins of Bribery

(Q187: Which comes closest to your view: the use of money, presents, favors, and contacts to influence officials in the country is [1] a product of the communist past, [2] a moral crisis in a period of transition, or [3] a permanent part of the country's culture?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
A product of the communist past	23	23	17	23
A moral crisis in a period of transition	31	30	49	62
A permanent part of the country's culture	46	47	34	16

*Note:* "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

was more rigid. . . . The party controlled the people **more**. Now everybody interprets the law in the way he or she wants. Nobody is afraid anymore" (Horodok, **IDI-3**). "During the communist regime [we got] better assistance. There was more order. . . . [Officials] were afraid of something" (Sholomia, **IDI-2**). "There was more order in the administration, even in the use of connections. Everything was more orderly. Now the economic situation is poor and the state officials are really badly paid, which has an effect on their relations with citizens" (Kyiv, **IDI-10**). Such a very recent fall in the standards of behavior of politicians and officials could not be attributed to a permanent national culture; it was explicitly attributed to the postcommunist transition. Right or wrong, the people we interviewed in Ukraine were at least consistent in their views.

We asked, "What was the, main reason why officials take money or presents? Was it because (1) the officials are greedy, (2) the government does not pay officials properly, or (3) **people** are desperate to buy favors from officials?" In the Czech and Slovak Republics, **our** respondents most frequently blamed the people themselves for seeking to buy favors. In Bulgaria, they most frequently blamed the government for not paying officials enough. But in Ukraine, respondents most frequently blamed the extent of low-level bribery and corruption on extortion by greedy officials (see **table 13**).

**Table 13**  
**Respondents' Views regarding the Reasons for Accepting Bribes**

(4177: Which comes closest to your view: the main reason why officials take money or presents is [1] the officials are greedy, [2] the government does not pay officials properly, or [3] people are desperate to buy favors?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
Officials are greedy	37	30	39	4
Government does not pay officials properly	12	19	47	23
People are desperate to buy favors	51	50	14	30
Difference: % "officials" - % "people"	- 14	- 20	t25	t18

Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

If we exclude those who blamed governments for paying **officials** badly, the balance of public opinion between blaming bribe-giving **citizens** and bribe-taking **officials** was firmly on blaming corrupt citizens in the Czech and Slovak Republics, but on blaming corrupt **officials** in Bulgaria and Ukraine.

Similarly, we asked for the most important reason **why** people 'might be more willing to give money or a present to an official now **than under** communism. People in the Czech Republic were most likely to complain that **people** push harder for special favors now, while, a **large** majority in Bulgaria and Ukraine, along with a narrow majority in Slovakia, **complained** that **officials** now expect more (see table 14).

Officials may extort presents and bribes by making direct and explicit demands: "Sometimes it happens that an official you visit can tell you approximately in what, form he prefers to receive [a gift]" (Sholomia, **FG-2**). "He **directly** said how much" (**Horodok, FG-4**). "**They** told me straight out" (Khartsysk, FG-5). "**They** say what the price of each thing is" (Sevastopol, FG-1). " 'Give me **500,000 (Karbovantsy [coupons])** so that **I** can make a labor card for you' I never heard that you must pay for a labor card!" (Volnovalcha, FG-2). "**The housing office** [made explicit demands]-we could have had a flat but only if we 'had given 30,000

Table 14  
 Respondents' Views regarding the Reasons Why People Are Now,  
 More Willing to Give Bribes

(Q107: Here are some reasons why ordinary people might be more willing to give money or a present to an official now than under communism. Which do you feel is the most important?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
People are more able to pay now	12	10	7	5
People push harder for special favors now	50.	38	21	3
Officials expect more now	38	52	72	63

Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

crowns; that is, **30,000** crowns [as a bribe] to the officials there" (Zvolen, FG-1). "My daughter was raped a year ago at the age of seventeen. Three months ago, she was taken away again. When I went to the police, they told me I had to have **2,000** levs for the petrol and then we could go search for her" (Straldja, FG-5). After experiencing problems and delays in receiving property seized by the communist regime, one family finally went to their MP: "The MP found the guts and told them [his constituents] how **much** it would cost them for the favor [restitution]-[a bribe **of**] **10** percent of [the value **of**] the real estate: The sum is fixed" (Yambol, F G - 4) .

More subtly-and more safely for them-officials can convey their expectations or demands by **hints**, by complaints about their workload, or by **comments** about the special efforts they are making. "**Officials** did not say anything directly, but they were making hints" (Striy, **IDI-5**). "In the case involving the-militia, their hints made me do it" (Horodok, **IDI-4**). "One [police officer] . . . not very explicitly but clearly enough named a price" (Sofia, **IDI-4**). "I think every government official from top to bottom is likely to expect a present" (Sofia-2, FG-2). "They make you feel you should go down on your knees, bring a bottle, or offer 500 levs, so that they **look at** you, pay attention to you" (Sofia-1, FG-5).

According to our respondents, officials made direct demands relatively infrequently, although 11 percent in Ukraine, as compared with only 2 percent in the Czech Republic, reported that they had been asked directly for money or a present. But one way or another, officials often managed to convey the impression that they expected a special gift for their trouble. Almost half of the people in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria and two-thirds in Slovakia and Ukraine had either been asked directly or were made to feel that some gift was expected (see table 15).

Table 15  
Respondents Asked by an Official for a Bribe

(Q144: In these last few years did an official ever ask you or your family directly for money or a present or not ask directly but seem to expect something?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
Asked directly	2	4	7	11
Seemed to expect something	44	64	39	56
Neither	54	32	54	33

Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

And we are not talking about mere 'body-language: almost half of the people surveyed in the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria, over half in Slovakia, and two-thirds in Ukraine reported that officials had made unnecessary problems in order' to get money or a present for solving them. "Bureaucrats propose to do it '**unofficially**'—**mentioning** the **difficulties** of solving the problem" (Kyiv, **IDI-9**). Contrast, for example, the reports of **respondents** in Straldja and Khartsysk: "I got refusals because I could not afford to pay?" (Straldja, **IDI-2**); but "For each paper, you have to pay illegally, then they find the -right forms, and no more refusals. **Bureaucrats** treat us like puppets. Extort a lot" (Khartsysk, **IDI-5**).

Many respondents reported that this invention of unnecessary problems had happened only rarely to them or their families, but it had happened more than rarely to 19 percent in the Czech Republic, to 24 per-

cent in Bulgaria, to 30 percent in Slovakia, and to 42 percent in Ukraine (see table 16).

**Table 16**  
 Respondents Who Experienced Unnecessary Problems

(Q132: How often did these **officials** make unnecessary **problems** for you or your family in **order** to get money or a present for solving them?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
<b>Usually</b>	3	8	<b>4</b>	14
Sometimes	16	22	20	28
<b>Rarely</b>	25	27	25	2.5
Never	56	<b>44</b>	52	33

*Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.*

**Remarkably large numbers** of people were ready to admit that they would submit to extortion if they had the resources. We asked, "If you had an important **problem** and an official asked you directly for money to solve it, would you (1) pay if you could afford it or (2) refuse to pay even if you **could** afford it?" Only 2 percent of the people in the Czech Republic said they had been asked directly, and only 9 percent said that they would prefer a system of presents and favors; but, nonetheless, 37 percent said they **would** pay, if asked, and if they could afford it. Their willingness to submit to extortion far exceeded both their actual experiences of extortion or their preference for a **system of presents and favors**. In comparative terms, the **37 percent** who were willing to submit to **extortion** in the Czech Republic was still a low figure, however, since 57 percent in Slovakia, 58 percent in Bulgaria, and 74 percent in Ukraine would also **give bribes** if asked directly.

The qualification to these findings, "if you could afford it," is important. Bulgarians, especially, had a tendency to explain that they simply could not afford to pay bribes. "The Bulgarian is used to offering presents when contacting an official. **The** official may ask for something

[more than a present] as well, and you will give it, if you can afford it. In this case, you'll be attended very well" (**Sofia-2**, FG-2). "Sometimes you are sorry. I knew the price of my case in the hospital, but **I** didn't have the money" (Sofia-2, FG-2). "When I was in the hospital, a guy whose father had to undergo an operation was told he had to give 20,000 levs. He said he could afford only 10,000 levs. He couldn't give the money, and two days later his father died" (**Tenevo**, FG-5). "**I** got refusals because I 'could not afford to pay" (Straldja, **IDI-2**). "Roughly speaking, we all here cannot afford it. If you have enough money, you won't have any difficulties. . . . **Lots** of money can make it" (**Yambol**, FG-2). So although they would not refuse if they could afford it, many people, particularly in Bulgaria, did not pay simply **because** they did not have the means to do so.

**Later** we asked, "Imagine you were **an official** on a low salary and a person **who came** to **you** with a problem offered money or a present to you. Would you be (1) tempted to give better service or (2) offended by the offer?" Our respondents were almost as willing to admit to temptation as, to submit to extortion: between 35 percent (in the Czech Republic) and **61** percent (**in** Ukraine) said they would be tempted rather than offended (see table 17).

**Table 17**  
 Respondents Who Would Give and Accept Bribes

(Q145: If you had **an important problem** and **an official** asked you directly for money to solve it, would **you** [1] pay if **you could afford it** or [2] **refuse** to pay even if you could **afford it**? 4155: Imagine you were **an official** on a low **salary** and a **person** who **came to** you **with** a problem offered you money or a present. Would you be [1] tempted to **offer** better service or [2] offended by the offer?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
Would pay if <b>asked</b>	37	57	58	74
Would be tempted	35	45	38	61

*Note:* "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

## The Actual Experience of Giving Presents and Bribes

So we have found that a majority of the people surveyed in every country condemned the use of presents and bribes to influence **officials**. But, at the same time, a majority in every country except the Czech Republic said they would give a bribe if asked and they would be tempted to take one if it was offered to **them**. These are hypothetical questions, however.

What did they actually do? We asked a battery of questions about their actual experiences, using eight different strategies for dealing with **officials** in the last few years—approximately the last four or **five years**. This time span **was designed** to focus attention on the mid- to late **1990s**, well after the fall of the communist system. Two of these strategies are relevant here: Had they actually offered an **official** a “small present” or “money or an **expensive** present?”

Many who admitted to offering a small present claimed they had done no more than that, and, they denied ever giving money or an expensive **present**. But almost all those who had offered money or an expensive present had also offered small presents. So we can usefully divide people up into those who had offered an official (1) nothing, not **even**, a small present; (2) a small present, but nothing more than that; or (3) money or an expensive present.

The majority surveyed in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic **claimed** to **have** offered **nothing**, but the majority in Slovakia and Ukraine **admitted** they had offered **at least** a small present and perhaps more. The **numbers** admitting that, they had offered money or an **expensive** present ranged from 11 percent in the Czech Republic, to 19 percent in Bulgaria, to 31 percent in Slovakia, to 36 percent in Ukraine (see table 18).

Some gifts might be considered more an act of human politeness or gratitude than bribes, to influence the **officials**. “There are situations where [an **official**] does not ask or demand anything from you, but you do it for him just out of gratitude” (Striy, FG-3). Most people would **consid-**

Table 18  
 Respondents Who Had to Give Bribes

(Q141-2: In dealing with officials in the last few years, did you or your family usually, sometimes, rarely, or never have to [Q141] offer a small present or [Q142] offer money or an expensive present?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
(Q141-2) Nothing	76	42	66	43
(Q141-2) Small present only	13	27	15	21
(Q142 only) Money or an expensive present	11	31	19	36

Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

er a modest box of **chocolates** or a bunch of flowers presented to the **nurses** as a patient left a hospital such an act of politeness or gratitude. "If the doctor did an operation that rescued a person from death and his relatives . . . bring a box of sweets, a bottle of cognac, and flowers, that is not a bribe" (Khartsysk, FG-6). "It wouldn't be very decent not to offer chocolates or a bottle of something, as gratitude after you have had a **major** operation" (Sofia-2, FG-4). "A box of candy, with gratitude, because he's done his job" (Khartsysk, FG-5).

But even the gift of a box of candy imperceptibly shades from gratitude into extortion and bribery: "I had to do it. . . . Just to make the bureaucratic machine work faster, I brought a box of candy" (Striy, FG-4). "I am not buying -him [the official], I am just giving him something for his work. **Because** he receives something, he does everything faster" (Nikolayevka, EG-2). Even gratitude **itself** is an elastic concept in the minds of some citizens: "He's very 'sick, my son, **he** misses a lot of school. So purely **from** gratitude, I give something to the teachers, so that they'll compromise", (Khartsysk,, FG-2).

Boxes of candy soon become bottles of brandy, while voluntary gifts may be voluntary in form but extorted in content as the party' would have said. "I had to get the external passport, and I needed it urgently. Then he said, '**You** want it to be done faster, take a bottle of cognac and go to the militia.' He told me the name and said that I have to tell [the, **militia**



officer] that I came from so-and-so and put the bottle right on the table. I came and as soon as he saw the bag, he understood why I came. . . . I put the bag on the table; Then [he] told me to come the next day to get the passport” (**Horodok, FG-4**). Such gifts are **voluntary** only in form.

Money or expensive presents, given in advance, are usually payments designed to influence officials to **give** favors or to avoid causing **unnecessary** difficulties. Whether or not they are given voluntarily, they are not signs of gratitude. “I gave him 20 dollars and he signed it. . . . I did it in **order** for him to receive me and sign everything sooner. . . . Yes, just to make him give me a reference. I paid him, got a permission for a subsidy, and that was it” (Striy, FG-2). “That office works fine. If I pay some extra money, they have it ready for me in an instant” (**Hradec Kralove, FG-4**). “The assistant who was to pin the [university] entrance exam marks on the wall . . . was given money, and she ‘made mistakes’ deliberately in the computer. Later if things became serious, she would confess-‘I am sorry, I’ve made a mistake.’ The student was already admitted, he couldn’t be expelled, and she [the assistant] couldn’t be fired” (**Sofia-2, FG-1**). Money was paid to **influence** officials everywhere, but people in Ukraine were not **only** the most likely to give large rather than **small presents**, they were by **far** the most likely to give before rather than after the official had solved their problem (see table 19).

The timing of gifts correlated with their size. Those people who had offered money or expensive presents had usually given them in advance, while those who had only offered small presents were as likely to offer them afterwards. Yet the correlation was far from perfect. Half of those who had only offered small presents said they had usually done so before the **official** had solved their problem,” which suggests an element of bribery even if the gifts were small.

There was also an element of extortion even in gifts given after **problems** had been solved. We asked, “When, people give something to an official before their problem has been solved is it usually because (1)

Table 19

### Respondents Who Gave Bribes Before and After Their Problem Was Solved

(Q146: If you or your family ever gave money, a present, or a favor, was it usually before or after the official solved your problem?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
Gave before (rather than after)				
Among all who gave	52	57	37	69
Gave <b>before</b> (rather than <b>after</b> )				
Among those who gave small presents only	48	55	28	58
Among those who gave money	70	69	54	76

Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

officials ask for something; (2) officials expect rewards, even if they do not ask directly; (3) people feel it would be impolite not to; or (4) people want to give something?" Then we asked a similar question about giving something to an official after the problem has been solved, with a similar set of possible answers, except that we reworded number four to read "people just want to express thanks for the help they have received" and added a fifth choice: "people feel they might need help again from the same official."

In every country, people thought gratitude was two or three times more likely to be the motivation when the gift was given after the problem had been solved. Simple extortion was a much less likely motivation for gifts given afterwards than those given beforehand. But this reduction in simple extortion was almost balanced by the intrusion of a more complex version of extortion—the fear that the person might need help in the future from the same official and therefore could not afford to take the risk of disappointing or offending him or her now. Taking both simple and complex variants of extortion together, extortion was only a little less likely to be the motivation for gifts given afterwards than for gifts given beforehand (see table 20). In short, neither small presents nor gifts given afterwards were entirely free from the taint of bribery and extortion.

## Feeling Happy, Angry, Worried, or Ashamed?

In every country, people were far more angry' about corruption amongst top government officials than amongst officials who deal with ordinary people. Nonetheless, up to 26 percent were annoyed most by corruption amongst officials who dealt with ordinary people. And in every country, they were more annoyed by corruption amongst these low-level officials than they were by corruption amongst top businessmen (see table 21).

Table 20

### Respondents Motivations for Giving Bribes, by Timing of Gift

(Q72: When such people [those seeking something to which they are entitled to by law] give something to an official before their problem has been solved is that usually because [1] they want to give or express their thanks, [2] it is impolite not to offer, [3] officials ask for or expect rewards, or [4] they might need help again? 473: When people give something to an official after their problem has been solved is that usually because [1] they want to give or express their thanks, [2] it is impolite not to offer, [3] officials ask for or expect rewards, or [4] they might need help again?)

	The Czech Republic (%)		Slovakia (%)		Bulgaria (%)		Ukraine (%)	
	Q72	Q73	Q72	Q73	Q72	Q73	Q72	Q73
They want to give or express their thanks	17	33	13	32	11	32	7	21
It is impolite not to offer	25	20	2	2	1	1	9	1
Officials ask for or expect rewards	58	27	65	27	77	35	77	47
They might need help again	—	20	—	30	—	25	—	18

Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

Table 21

### Respondents' Feelings about Corruption amongst Officials and Businessmen

(4161: Which of these makes you most angry: corruption among top government officials, officials you have to deal with personally, or top businessmen?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
Top government officials	66	59	60	71
Officials you have to deal with personally	17	26	26	24
Top businessmen	17	-16	15	5

Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

This is not entirely unexpected. Officials are public servants; businessmen are not. Officials have more power over the lives of ordinary citizens than private businessmen competing with each other in the marketplace. **In his** study of rampant corruption in Hong Kong, Wing Lo found wide support for repressive measures against corruption amongst junior civil servants. He found **much** less public support for similar actions **against** corrupt millionaire businessmen. “The public do not always feel as threatened by corrupt businessmen as they do by corrupt public servants. . . . Public sector corruption is often related to extortion **and** solicitation of bribes by civil servants, . . . [which is] far more annoying and disturbing to the daily lives of the **people.**”<sup>9</sup>

People had complaints about the officials other than corruption, however. We asked people what, in their own personal experience, made them most angry? Was it **officials** who (1) wanted money or presents; (2) were incapable; (3) were lazy; or (4) did not provide enough **information**? **Officials** seeking bribes came at the **bottom** of this list of irritations in all countries, Incompetence or failure, to provide enough information came out on top., Indeed, only 4 percent of the people surveyed in the Czech Republic and 6 percent in Slovakia were most angered by bribe-seeking officials; although, this figure rose to **10** percent in Bulgaria and’ 21 percent **in Ukraine** (see table 22).

Table 22  
 Respondents’ Opinions regarding the Characteristics of Officials  
 that Angered Them Most

(Q148: And which made you most angry: officials who want bribes, are incapable, are lazy, or gave inadequate information?)

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
Want bribes	4	6	10	21
Are incapable	3	3	35	<b>37</b>
<b>Are lazy</b>	16	14	20	20
Gave inadequate information	<b>48</b>	45	35	23

*Note:* “Don’t know” and “mixed/depends” answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

People also suspected that many of their fellow citizens who gave bribes would be happy enough if they got what they wanted. In all countries a majority thought that people who gave money or a present to an official and got what they wanted would be most likely to feel happy rather than angry, worried, or ashamed. Indeed, they sometimes expressed their own pleasure at a successful outcome achieved by bribery: “[Under communism], if they **told you ‘no,’** you went away and it was ‘no.’ Now you give someone a bribe; and you go away and it’s ‘yes.’ I think it’s easier now. Now you go with money right away, give it **to someone,** and they solve your problem. . . . It’s more expensive, but it’s easier” (Khartsysk, FG-2). **“[The official says]** ‘We’re not giving you any kind of death certificate’ [for her brother who had died as a vagrant, without proper identification]. Well, what could I do? I brought champagne, chocolate, mandarin oranges, some candy. . . . I gave her the plastic bag. She said, ‘Thank you. Wait five minutes. Everything will be done. **No** problems.’ I’m happy, glad, because they gave [the certificate] to **me**” (Khartsysk, FG-4). **“Officials** were ready **to** break the rules-it was profitable for all of us” (Striy, **IDI-1**). “What I usually do is ask ‘haw much,’ then go to another official and try **him,** and so on-until I finally pick the one who has demanded the least. I pay after the **official** has provided the service to make sure my job will be done for me” (Sofia, **IDI-3**).

But a large minority did think their fellow citizens would be angry, worried, or ashamed. Some people objected to bribery on moral grounds: **“I** am ashamed to give. . . . I am not ashamed to thank somebody. . . . I am ashamed to give a bribe” (Striy, **FG-3**). But others felt it was simply undignified and degrading to give bribes and left them in a **powerless** position: “You have to take up your cross, go there; **give** presents. **When** the **official** wants, he takes it, but when he does not want it, he does not. I feel dependent and helpless” (Straldja, **IDI-1**). “If there were some price lists showing how much everything costs, I would **go** to a doctor **and** receive a receipt. Having a receipt, I could demand something. But the way we pay

now, . . . you don't know to whom you give the money and for what. People are right when they say that we pay **twice**" (Sholomia, FG-6).

If bribe-givers thought very few other people gave such things to **officials**, however, they would be much less likely, to feel happy. In these circumstances, the percentage expected to, feel happy dropped from 50 to 15 percent in the Czech Republic, from 63 to 18 percent in Slovakia, from 66 to 36 percent in Bulgaria, and from 55 to 22 percent in Ukraine.

In every country, this new situation would increase the anger, worry, and shame of **bribe-givers**—but not by the same amount in each country. In Ukraine, worry increased more than anything else. In every other country, shame increased more than anything else.. Thus, 34 percent of our respondents in the Czech Republic, 31 percent in Slovakia, and 29 percent in **Bulgaria** b u t only 20 percent in **Ukraine**—thought **bribe-givers** would then be most likely to feel ashamed (see table 23).

**Table 23**  
**Respondents' Feelings about Giving Money or a Present**

(Q103: Suppose people gave money or a **present to an official** and got what **they** wanted, **would** they be **most likely** to feel happy, **angry, worried**, or ashamed? Q104: But if they thought very **few other** people **gave such things** to officials, would they then be most likely to feel happy, angry, **worried**, or ashamed?)

	The Czech Republic (%)		Slovakia (%)		Bulgaria (%)		Ukraine (%)	
	Q103	Q104	Q103	Q104	Q103	Q104	Q103	Q104
Happy	50	15	63	18	66	36	55	22
Angry	25	36	23	37	13	20	11	24
Worried	7	15	5	14	11	16	18	34
Ashamed	18	34	8	31	11	29	16	20

Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

Similarly, a majority of the people we surveyed in all countries thought that **officials** who accepted money or a present would be most likely to **feel happy** rather than angry, worried, or ashamed. However, if bribe-takers thought very few other officials accepted these things, then these corrupt officials would be much less likely to feel happy. The per-

centage expected to feel happy dropped from 48 to 17 percent in the Czech Republic, from 59 to 21 percent in Slovakia, from 81 to 54 percent in Bulgaria, and from 72 to 32 percent in Ukraine. In Ukraine and Slovakia, worry increased more than anything else. In Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, shame increased more than anything else. Thirty-one percent of our respondents in the Czech Republic, 29 percent in Slovakia, and 26 percent in Bulgaria—but only 8 percent in Ukraine—thought bribe-taking officials would then be most likely to feel ashamed (see table 24).

Table 24  
 Respondents' Views regarding officials' Feelings  
 about Accepting Money or a Present

(Q103: Suppose an official accepted money or a present, would that official be most likely to feel happy, angry, worried, or ashamed? Q104: But if that official thought very few other officials accepted these things, would that official then be most likely to feel happy, angry, worried, or ashamed?)

	The Czech Republic (%)		Slovakia (%)		Bulgaria (%)		Ukraine (%)	
	Q103	Q106	Q103	Q106	Q103	Q106	Q103	Q106
Happy	43	17	59	21	81	54	72	32
Angry	3	3	4	7		12		24
Worried	35	49	22	43	9	17	17	56
Ashamed	14	31	15	29	10	26	9	

Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations.

Imagining a hypothetical situation where few others gave or accepted bribes, people in Ukraine thought both bribe-givers and bribe-takers would be most likely to feel worried. In the Czech and Slovak Republics, they also felt that bribe-takers would be more likely to feel worried than ashamed. But, in contrast to Ukraine, people in the Czech and Slovak Republics felt bribe-givers would be, more likely to feel ashamed than worried—and that they would be even more likely to feel angry. Feelings

about bribe giving and taking in Ukraine were therefore characterized by a singular lack of shame and an excess of fear.

### **Does** Condemnation Matter?

Earlier we found that a majority in every country condemned the use of money, presents, contacts, or favors to influence **officials** as bad for the country and bad for those involved. Whatever their grounds for condemning corruption, did condemnation really matter? Did people really mean it? Were their answers merely ritual condemnation without much thought or much connection to their actual behavior?

**There** was some consistency in their **answers**. **People** who condemned the use of presents and bribes were much more likely to opt for an **austere**, rigid, Weberian system in which **officials** never accepted presents and never did favors **for others**, rather than one in which **officials** sometimes accepted presents and in return did favors for people. En Ukraine, for example, the austere option **was** chosen by 64 percent of those who condemned the use of presents to influence **officials**, by **46** percent of those who excused it, and by only 27 percent of those who preferred it that way. Of course, for perfect consistency these percentages should have ranged down from 100 to 0, instead of from **64** down to **27**. **The** degree of consistency was far less than perfect but it was nonetheless significant (see **table 25**).

Moreover, those who condemned the use of presents and bribes to influence **officials** were **much** more inclined to refuse to pay them and much less tempted to accept them. Although some of our percentages are based on fairly small numbers of respondents, they suggest that condemnation increased resistance to paying bribes by 36 percent in the Czech Republic; **by** 30 percent in Slovakia, and by 29 percent in Bulgaria, though by a **mere** 3 percent in Ukraine. Amongst those who condemned the use of bribes, two-thirds in the Czech Republic, and half



Table 25  
 Respondents Who Prefer a Rigid System, by Condemnation

(Q156: Do you prefer a rigid system [without presents and favors]? [By Q153])

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
Bad for [specific country] and for those involved	95	85	71	64
Bad for [specific country] but unavoidable for people	85	79	53	46
Preferable because you can get favors	(68)	(52)	23	27

*Note:* "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations. Percentages enclosed in parentheses indicate that the figure is based on less than one hundred, but at least fifty, respondents.

Table 26  
 Respondents Who Would Refuse to Pay Bribes, by Condemnation

(Q165: Would refuse to pay a bribe if asked. [By Q153])

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
Bad for [specific country] and for those involved	67	48	51	27
Bad for [specific country] but unavoidable for people	53	38	31	23
Referable because you can get favors	( 3 1 )	(18)	(22)	(24)

*Note:* "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations. Percentages enclosed in parentheses indicate that the figure is based on less than one hundred, but at least fifty, respondents.

in Slovakia and Bulgaria- but only a quarter in Ukraine-said they would refuse to pay even if asked **directly and** even if they could afford to pay (see table 26).

Similarly, condemnation increased resistance to **accepting** bribes, by at least 35 percent in the **Czech** and Slovak Republics, by **33** percent in Bulgaria, and by 18 percent in Ukraine. Thus, although three-quarters of those **in** Ukraine who condemned the use of bribes would nonetheless

pay them if asked directly, **half** Would be offended by the offer of a bribe. Condemnation had almost no effect on the willingness to submit to extortion in Ukraine, but it had a significant effect on the willingness to accept bribes. That seems to **indicate** moral sensitivity combined with a sense of powerlessness in the face of authority (see table 27).

**Table 27**  
**Respondents Offended if Offered a Bribe, by Condemnation**

(Q155: Would be **offended** if offend a bribe. [By Q153])

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
Bad for [specific country] and for those involved	71	61	73	45
Bad for [specific country] but unavoidable for people	49	49	53	33
Preferable because you can get favors	n/a	(26)	(40)	(27)

*Note:* "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations. Percentages enclosed in parentheses indicate that the figure is based on less than one hundred, but at least fifty, respondents.

These questions about the willingness **to** pay or accept bribes were **hypothetical**. Rut condemnation alsd correlated with actual **behavior** over the past five years. In practice, condemnation increased the numbers who **never gave** even a **small** present to an official by 37 percent in the Czech Republic, by 18 percent in Slovakia, and by 29 percent **in** Bulgaria-but by only 10 percent in Ukraine. And condemnation increased the numbers who had never given money or an expensive present to an official by 23 percent in the Czech Republic, by 20 percent in Slovakia, and by 24 percent in Bulgaria-but by only 7 percent in Ukraine (see table 28).

Condemnation, whether motivated' by moral, ideological, **or** economic considerations, did matter. It mattered in terms of actual **reported behavior**, as well as in terms of what people **would** do in hypothetical **sit-**

**Table 28**

Respondents Who Have **Never Given** a Bribe, by Condemnation <sup>4</sup>

(Question 141-2: Respondents who have never given anything or have never given money or an expensive present. [By Q153])

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
<b>Have never given anything</b>				
Bad for [specific country] end for those involved	81	45	74	46
Bad for [specific country] but unavoidable for people	64	33	60	35
Preferable because you can get favors	(44)	27	45	36
<b>Have never given money/expensive present</b>				
Bad for [specific country] end for those involved	91	73	87	66
Bad for [specific country] but unavoidable for people	84	60	77	60
Referable because you can get favors	(68)	53	61	59

Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations. Percentages enclosed in parentheses indicate that the figure is based on less than one hundred, but at least fifty, respondents.

uations. And it mattered in every country, **though** it mattered less in Ukraine than in the other countries. If people condemned the use of presents and bribes to **influence officials**, in **Ukraine** they were much less willing to take bribes themselves, and they were somewhat less likely to have actually given presents or bribes. But they were scarcely any less willing to submit to extortion if an **official** asked directly.

### **Did Attempts at Extortion Succeed?**

Earlier we **found** that between 37 percent (in the Czech Republic) and 74 percent (in Ukraine) said they would pay a **bribe** if asked directly and if they could afford it. But what happened in practice? How many of

those who had real experiences with attempted **extortion** did actually submit to it?

There was a remarkable **similarity between** the numbers who said they had actually given something when an **official** either asked directly or seemed to expect something and the numbers who said they would do so if asked. Some people had given voluntarily without pressure, of course, but the effect of this pressure was to increase the numbers who had actually given something by 27 percent in the Czech and Slovak Republics, by 42 percent in Bulgaria, and by 38 percent in Ukraine. Such pressure also increased the (smaller) numbers who had actually given money or **an** expensive present by 18 percent in the **Czech** Republic, by 21 percent in Slovakia, by 29 percent in Bulgaria, and by 34 percent in Ukraine (see table **29**):

Table 29  
Respondents Who Gave Presents or Money, by Whether **Officials**  
Asked for or Seemed to Expect a Bribe

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
Q145: Would pay if asked	37	57	58	74
Q141-2: Gave presents or bribes by Q144				
Gave something				
Amongst those who said officials did one of the following:				
Asked for directly or seemed to expect something	39	68	58	74
Neither asked for nor seemed to expect something	12	41	16	36
Gave money or an expensive present				
Amongst those who said officials did one of the following:				
Asked for directly or seemed to expect something	21	39	35	56
Neither asked for nor seemed to expect something	3	18	6	16

Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations. Percentages enclosed in parentheses indicate that the figure is based on less than one hundred, but at least fifty, respondents.

Similarly, those who felt officials had created unnecessary problems in order to extort presents and bribes were much more likely to have given them. Unnecessary problems increased the numbers who had given something to an official by 28 percent in ~~the~~ Czech Republic, by 34 percent in Slovakia, by 33 percent in Bulgaria, and by 35 percent in Ukraine. And unnecessary problems increased the (smaller) numbers who had given money or an expensive present to an official by 17 percent in the Czech Republic, by 31 percent in Slovakia, by 26 percent in Bulgaria, and **also by** 26 percent in Ukraine (see table 30).

So although citizens' condemnation of bribery had relatively little, if any, effect on their actual behavior in Ukraine, **officials'** attempts at extortion clearly had as much effect in Ukraine as anywhere else. People

T a b l e 3 0

'Respondents Who Gave Presents or Money, by Whether **Officials** Caused Unnecessary Problems

(Q141-2: Those who gave small or large presents. [By Q132])

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
Gave something				
Among those who said officials caused unnecessary problems in order to extort a bribe:				
Usually, sometimes, or rarely	40'	73	51	70
Never	1	2	18	35
Gave money or an expensive present				
Among those who said officials caused unnecessary problems in order to extort a bribe:				
Usually, sometimes, or rarely	21	45	32	46
Never	4	14	6	20

Note: "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations. Percentages enclosed in parentheses indicate that the figure is based on less than one hundred, but at least fifty, respondents.

in Ukraine were responsive to pressure from officials and frequently found themselves under such pressure.

### Did **Official** Pressure Outweigh Condemnation?

Clearly, both condemnation and **extortion seem** to have influenced actual behavior to varying degrees in different countries. We can usefully summarize our findings up to this point by calculating (Pearson) correlation coefficients between giving presents and bribes, on one hand; and condemnation or extortion, on the other hand.

In a highly compressed way, these correlation coefficients show what we have **already** discovered from the more detailed tables: condemnation sharply reduced bribe giving in the Czech and Slovak Republics and in Bulgaria but had much less influence in Ukraine. The correlation declined in power&from -0.25 in the Czech Republic to -0.09 in Ukraine. Correlations with preferences for a rigid Weberian system (no presents and no special help) showed a/broadly similar pattern-significant in every country except Ukraine." By contrast, the correlation between giving presents and bribes, on one hand? and our indicators of extortion by officials, on the other, was strong in all four countries. It ranged from a **minimum of** 0.26 up to a maximum of 0.43 (see table 31).

Indeed these correlations with attempts at extortion are so strong that they **raise** the question **of whether** anything else mattered. But tabulating the numbers giving bribes by a combination of condemnation and pressure from **officials** shows that both condemnation and pressure **had** an independent influence on behavior. The effect of condemnation (visible in the columns, **of** the table) **was** clearly, less than that of pressure (visible in the rows of the table) but nonetheless significant (see table 32).

Amongst those who had been put'under pressure by officials seeking gifts, condemnation reduced overall giving by at least **16** percent in the Czech Republic, by 13 percent in Slovakia, and by 17 percent **in**

**Table 31**  
**Correlations between Giving, Condemnation, and Extortion**

	The Czech Republic (%) Slovakia (%) Bulgaria (%) Ukraine (%)			
	<u>r x 100</u>	<u>r x 100</u>	<u>r x 100</u>	<u>r x 100</u>
Correlation between Q141-2, "gave bribes," and . . .				
(Q153) Bribes are bad	-25	-17	-21	-9
(Q156) Prefer a rigid system	-16	-17	-21	-5
(Q144) Official asked for or expected a bribe	33	26	43	39
(Q132) Official made unnecessary problems	36	40	36	33

*Note:* The (Pearson) correlation coefficient times 100 is indicated by "r x 100." The following codes apply: gave bribes: 0 = not, 1 = gave only a small present, 2 = gave money or an expensive present; prefer a rigid system: 0 = prefer reciprocal presents and favors, 1 = prefer no presents or special help; bribes are bad: 0 = prefer a flexible system, 1 = the system of bribes is unavoidable, 2 = system of bribes bad for country and those involved; officials asked for or expected bribes: 0 = neither, 1 = expected, 2 = asked directly; officials made unnecessary problem to extort a bribe: 0 = never, 1 = rarely, 2 = usually or sometimes.

**Table 32**  
**Respondents Who Gave Bribes, by Condemnation and Pressure to Give**

(Q141-2: Those who gave small or large presents. [By Q153 by Q144].)

	The Czech Republic (%) Slovakia (%) Bulgaria (%) Ukraine (%)							
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Did <b>official</b> ask for or seem to expect a gift?								
Percentage who gave anything								
Amongst those who said bribes are								
Bad	32	10'	6 5	3 6	51	12	71	32
Unavoidable	48	(16)	75	(45)	61	19	75	(42)
Preferable	n/a	n/a	(78)	n/a	(68)	da	(78)	n/a
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Did <b>official</b> ask for or seem to expect a gift?								
Percentage who gave money/expensive present								
Amongst those said bribe-s are								
B e d	17	3	35	14'	28	4	47	17
Unavoidable	24	(3)	46	(23)	36	7	51	(15)
Preferable	n/a	n/a	(52)	n/a	(51)	n/a	(58)	n/a

*Note:* "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations. Percentages enclosed in parentheses indicate that the figure is based on less than one hundred, but at least fifty, respondents.

Bulgaria-though by only 7 percent in Ukraine. Typically, one Czech respondent (**Prague IDI-15**) felt that 50 percent of officials expected to be given something but their salaries were adequate, and she did not feel she should give them anything. Condemnation also reduced the (smaller) **numbers** giving money or expensive presents by at least 7 percent in the Czech Republic, by 17 percent in Slovakia, by 23 percent in Bulgaria, and by 11 percent in Ukraine (see table **33**).<sup>11</sup>

Similarly, amongst those who had **experienced** officials creating unnecessary problems in order to get a present or bribe, condemnation reduced overall giving by at least 22 percent in the Czech Republic, by 9 percent in Slovakia, and by 33 percent in Bulgaria, though by less than 4 percent in Ukraine. And it reduced the (smaller)- numbers giving money or expensive **presents** by at least 11 percent in the Czech,

**Table 33**

Respondents Who Gave Bribes, by **Condemnation** and Unnecessary Problems  
(Q141-2: Those respondents who gave small or large presents. [By 4153 by Q132])

	The Czech Republic (%)		Slovakia (%)		Bulgaria (%)		Ukraine (%)	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Did the <b>official</b> ever make <b>unnecessary</b> problems?								
<b>Percentage who gave anything</b>								
Amongst those who said bribes are								
<b>B a d</b>	32	10	72	32	40	16	68	28
Unavoidable	54	(15)	77	(51)	58	21	74	(48)
Referable	n/a	o / a	(81)	n/a	(73)	n/a	(72)	n/a
	<u>Yea</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Did the <b>official</b> make <b>unnecessary</b> problems?								
<b>Percentage who gave money/expensive present</b>								
Amongst those said bribes are								
Bad	16	3	41	9	25	4	44	14
Unavailable	27	(3)	52	(20)	35	9	48	(25)
Preferable	n/a		n/a	(57)	n/a	(55)	n/a	(46)

*Note:* "Don't know" and "mixed/depends" answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but they were never prompted. These answers have been excluded from the above calculations. Percentages enclosed in parentheses indicate that the figure is based on less than one hundred, but at least fifty, respondents



Republic, by 16 percent in Slovakia, and by 30 percent in Bulgaria—though by less than 4 percent in Ukraine.”

Amongst those who condemned the use of bribes and who had not experienced attempted extortion by an official making unnecessary problems, only 3 percent in the Czech Republic, 4 percent in Bulgaria, 9 percent in Slovakia, and 14 percent in Ukraine had given money or an expensive present to an official in the last five years.<sup>13</sup>

We can usefully summarize these multivariate findings by calculating multiple regressions predicting the numbers giving presents and bribes, on one hand, from condemnation and extortion, on the other. The multiple regressions confirm that extortion had a powerful independent influence on bribe giving in all countries. But they also show that the effect of condemnation on actual behavior declined slowly from the Czech Republic to Slovakia and Bulgaria and then dropped sharply in Ukraine where it was weak, possibly negligible.<sup>14</sup> For example, if we use condemnation and officials' expectations of gifts as two predictors of actual behavior, the relative weights of condemnation and extortion are 19 versus 31 in the Czech Republic, but only 5 versus 38 in Ukraine. In the Czech Republic, therefore, condemnation had two-thirds as much influence as extortion (in opposite directions, of course) on actual bribe giving, but in Ukraine extortion had almost eight times as much influence as condemnation (see table 34).<sup>15</sup>

Table 34  
Regressions Predicting Giving from Condemnation and Extortion

	The Czech Republic (%)	Slovakia (%)	Bulgaria (%)	Ukraine (%)
	Beta x 100	Beta x 100	Beta x 100	Beta x 100
Multiple regressions predicting Q141-2, "gave bribes," from...				
(Q153) Bribes are bad	-19	-15	-14	-5
(Q144) Official asked or expected a bribe	31	2 6	41	38
RSQ	15	9	20	15
(Q153) Bribes are bad	-20	-17	-18	-10
(Q132) Official made unnecessary problems	36	39	34	3 2
RSQ	19	18	16	11
(Q153) Bribes are bad	-17	-16	-14	-8
(Q144) Official asked for or expected a bribe	22	19	31	33
(Q132) Official made unnecessary problems	29	34	18	2 2
RSQ	22	21	22	21

*Note:* Betas are the "standardised regression coefficients" or "path coefficients" in the multiple regressions. The squared multiple correlation x 100 is the RSQ, or the "percent of variation explained." The following codes apply: gave bribes: 0 = not, 1 = gave only a small present, 2 = gave money or an expensive present; bribes are bad: 0 = prefer a flexible system, 1 = the system of bribes is unavoidable, 2 = system of bribes bad for country and those involved; officials asked for or expected bribes: 0 = neither, 1 = expected, 2 = asked directly; officials made unnecessary problem to extort a bribe: 0 = never, 1 = rarely, 2 = usually or sometimes.

## Discussion

We found very widespread allegations that ordinary people offer presents and bribes to the **officials** they meet in day-to-day life in **Eastern Europe** and that the officials **accept** them. Using presents and **bribes to influence officials** was widely condemned but widely **practiced**. Between 37 percent and 74 percent in different countries said they would give a bribe if asked directly and if they could afford it. Between 24 percent and 58 percent of the people we surveyed in different countries admitted that they or their families had in fact given presents or bribes to **officials** in the last five years.

Yet a majority in every country condemned the practice as bad for their country, and for those involved, and most of the rest said it was bad for the country, even if unavoidable for people who have to live there. We hesitate to call this moral condemnation because there are so many reasons for condemning bribery and corruption. Some would no doubt, condemn bribery as inherently sinful, on a par with lying, cheating, and stealing. Both liberals and socialists might condemn it on the more ideological ground that it offends their concept of equality of treatment by the state. Transparency International, on the other hand, condemns bribery on grounds of rationality and efficiency rather than morality. But the basis for condemnation is not important. The fact remains that the practice is, for whatever reason, **widely** condemned.

Relatively few people said they actively preferred a system where officials were open to the influence of presents and bribes, though larger numbers preferred **such** a system to the alternative of a totally rigid system in which officials would never do a favor for anyone. That is not the only possible alternative, however. Flexibility and special or favorable treatment for those with special needs should be the aim of any system of administration. It is not necessary to equate flexibility with **corruption**. There are better alternatives than either corruption or rigidity.

Our evidence does not support the view that the people were the source of corruption, pressing their bribes and their demands for favors--on reluctant officials. But there remains the question of whether the people were victims of the officials or were accomplices. Did officials abuse their **position** to extort **unofficial** payments from weak, powerless, and reluctant citizens, or were citizens as happy to give as officials were **happy** to accept?

It is a question of some practical as well as theoretical importance. If ordinary people are the victims of extortion, it may be possible to reduce public sector **corruption** by reforming the administration in one way or **another**.<sup>16</sup> Reform would then go with the grain of public opinion and, if

well planned, should 'win public support. But if the citizens are in essence **accomplices** in petty **corruption**, reform is likely to be more difficult and **less** effective, and it would be necessary to reform the people as well as reform the administration.

In every country, ordinary people pictured themselves as the victims of a transition to a market economy where the chief beneficiaries had been (and would continue to be) politicians-and officials, the Mafia, and the former communist nomenklatura. On balance, there was no feeling anywhere that standards of conduct amongst officials had generally improved much since the end of the **communist** system, and, in some countries, there was a widespread consensus that it had declined. In every **country**, a majority thought there was more need to use contacts, presents, and bribes' in dealing with officials now than there had been under communism.

Nonetheless, a very large majority of the people in the Czech and Slovak **Republics** thought their officials were less corrupt than in most other Eastern European countries, **while** even larger majorities in Bulgaria and Ukraine thought their officials were more corrupt than in most **other** Eastern European **countries**. People in the Czech and Slovak **Republics** were most likely to blame their fellow **citizens** desperate to buy favors rather than greedy officials. **Conversely**, people in Bulgaria and Ukraine were more likely to blame greedy officials than their fellow citizens (though people in Bulgaria **were even** more likely to blame their **government** for failing to pay officials properly).

When asked why people might be more willing **to give** things to **officials** now than **under** communism, people in **the** Czech Republic were most likely to blame their fellow citizens, but Bulgarians and Ukrainians **were** the most likely, by far, to blame officials who now expect more. Opinion in Slovakia fell between these two extremes.

Taken at face value, these findings suggest that people **who** gave bribes to **officials** in the Czech Republic and, to a lesser extent, in Slovakia were not victims but accomplices or worse. Reforms in these two countries might therefore aim as much at bribe-givers as **bribe-takers**.<sup>17</sup> In principle, **it** may be more difficult to reform the people than to reform the administration, but the task would be made easier in these countries by the fact that -people explicitly blame bribe-givers more often than bribe-takers. In the Czech Republic, the task would be made easier by the relatively low incidence of bribery in day-to-day dealings **with officials**, so the target **would** not be the people as a whole but a deviant minority. And it would be made easier in both countries by the possibility of making bribe-givers feel ashamed **of** their conduct. Unlike the Czechs, people in Slovakia were inclined to imagine that successful bribe-givers would feel happy, and they were the least likely to think bribe-givers **would** feel ashamed, but they were particularly sensitive to whether many or 'only a few others were also giving things to officials. If , people thought only a few others were giving presents and bribes to **officials**, the profile of feelings attributed to bribe-givers-happiness, angel; fear, and shame-was dominated by shame and anger in both countries.

In Bulgaria and Ukraine, however, people were inclined to place the burden of guilt on the shoulders of their **officials** rather than on their fellow citizens, To a greater or lesser extent, they claimed to be victims of the administration, though many in Bulgaria felt that junior officials were also victims-victims of a government that did not pay them properly.

But in Ukraine, people pictured themselves unambiguously as the victims of officials high and low. Only 12 percent in Bulgaria, but 42 percent in Ukraine, alleged that officials invented unnecessary problems more than rarely in order to extort money or a present for solving them. If they felt few other people gave such things to **officials**, people in Ukraine were over twice as likely as people elsewhere to feel worried but **much** less likely than people elsewhere to feel **ashamed**. **Three-quarters**

of the people, surveyed in Ukraine would pay a bribe if asked' directly and if they could afford it-far more than anywhere else. In **their** own view, the people of Ukraine were the passive and guiltless victims of rapacious **officials**. Reforms targeted at bribe-givers in **Bulgaria** and more especially in Ukraine might only make people feel that they were the victims twice over-victims of the low-level officials who extorted bribes **from** them and of high officials who then punished them for their submission to extortion.

Such protestations of innocence may be a political fact, which it would be very unwise to ignore, yet they may not be a scientific or moral fact. They need **not** be taken at face **value**, **even** if they must be taken 'into account when devising' and implementing reform strategies. People in Ukraine **especially**, **were** very keen to picture themselves as victims of extortion. But that self-image is **slightly** tarnished by our finding that 61 percent of the Ukrainians surveyed would, be tempted to accept a bribe if they **were** themselves an official on a low salary, also by our finding that 48 percent preferred a system in which **officials** sometimea accept presents and in return did favors for people.

Our multiple regression analyzes suggest that attempts at extortion had a large impact on citizens' behavior wherever they occurred. But personal condemnation of bribery had 'much less impact on citizens' behavior in Ukraine than in any of the other countries. Bribe giving in Ukraine was driven by extortion and not hindered **very** much by personal, condentnation. Condemnation bred strong resistance to attempts at extortion in the Czech Republic, for example, but little resistance in Ukraine. It might perhaps be unfair to characterize citizens in Ukraine as. willing victims but, **based on** our evidence, they were certainly passive victims, whose behavior was influenced much more by the actions of **officials** than by their own moral or ideological positions.

In the absence of pressure from officials, however, few people who condemned the use of bribes to influence officials actually succumbed to the temptation to practice it. Over the past five years, only 3 percent in the Czech Republic, 4 percent in Bulgaria, 9 percent in Slovakia, and **14** percent in Ukraine said anyone in their families had ever given money or expensive presents to **an** official, unless the officials had made unnecessary problems in order to get money or presents for solving them. Over that period of time, the **14** percent in Ukraine is not negligible, but it is not large. In the absence of pressure from **officials**, behavior did not contradict principle to a very large extent.

It was the frequency and effectiveness of extortion—the combination of **officials'** greed and citizens' submissiveness—that produced **high levels** of bribery despite opposition to it in principle. In **the** Czech Republic, only **19** percent had experienced attempts at extortion more than rarely and, amongst those who condemned bribery, only **16 percent** submitted to it. In Ukraine, at the **other extreme**, 42 percent had experienced attempts at extortion more than **rarely** and, amongst those who condemned bribery, 44 percent submitted to it—twice the frequency of extortion **by officials** and three times as much submission by citizens as we found in the Czech Republic.

Finally, we must stress the counterintuitive nature of our findings. It **is** natural to imagine that where bribery is most common, citizens are most likely to be willing accomplices rather than victims. Our findings suggest the exact, opposite. They suggest that where, bribery was least common (in the Czech Republic), the relatively small number of people who gave bribes were more likely to be accomplices or even corrupters. And where bribery was most common (in Ukraine), the much larger numbers of people who gave bribes were much more likely to be victims of extortion.





## Notes

1. Bertolt Brecht, *Mother Courage and Her Children*, translated by David Hare for the National Theatre (London: Methuen/Random House, 1995), 44.

2. Tenovo **IDI-4** indicates a quotation from the **fourth** in-depth interview held in the Bulgarian **village of** Tenovo.

3. Sevastopol FG-4 indicates participant four in the focus-group discussion held in Sevastopol.

4. Tony Verheijen and Antoaneta Dimitrova, "Corruption and Unethical Behaviour of Civil and Public Servants: Causes and Possible Solutions" (paper presented at **NISPAcee** 5th Annual Conference, Tallinn, April 1997), 8.

5. See William L. Miller, Stephen White, and Paul Heywood, *Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1998), 8: 155.

6. See, for example, Marshall I. Goldman, *Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union: The Spoils of Progress* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1972); 31.

7. Bratislava-2 was the second focus-group discussion held in Bratislava. Two focus-group discussions were held in each capital city.

8. A negligible 1 percent said they had offered money or an expensive present but not a small present.

9. T. Wing Lo., *Corruption and Politics in Hong Kong and China* (Buckingham, U.K.: Open University Press, 1993), 148-9.

10. In the Czech Republic, the negative correlation between bribe **giving and the preference for** a rigid system was weaker than between bribe giving and condemnation. But in the Czech Republic, 91 percent expressed a preference for a rigid system. Such a degree of consensus tends to limit the size of correlations.

11. Amongst those who had been put under pressure by **officials** seeking gifts, a preference for a **rigid** Weberian system (**Q156**) reduced overall giving by 12 percent in Slovakia and by 20 percent in Bulgaria, though by only 1 percent in Ukraine. And the (smaller) numbers giving money or expensive presents **were** reduced by 13 percent in Slovakia, by 25 percent in Bulgaria, but by only 2 percent in Ukraine: The **consensus** in favor of a rigid system in the Czech Republic makes it **impossible to** gauge the effect of such preferences there.

12. Amongst **those** who had experienced **officials** making unnecessary problems in order to **get a** present or bribe, a preference for a rigid Weberian system (**Q156**) reduced overall giving by 9 percent in Slovakia, and by 29 percent in Bulgaria, though by only 4 percent in Ukraine. And it reduced the (smaller) numbers giving money or expensive presents by 11 percent in Slovakia and by 31 percent in Bulgaria, but not at all in Ukraine. As before, the consensus in

favor of a rigid system in the Czech Republic makes it impossible to gauge the effect of such preferences there.

13. Amongst those who expressed a preference for a rigid Weberian system (Q156: no presents and no special help) and had not experienced attempted extortion or an official making unnecessary problems; only 3 percent in the Czech Republic, 4 percent in Bulgaria; 10 percent in Slovakia, and 19 percent in Ukraine had given money or an expensive present to an official in the last five years.

14. Recalculating all these regressions, but 'using a preference for a rigid Weberian system (Q156: no presents to officials and no special help) instead of condemnation of bribery, produces broadly similar results. In particular, the beta coefficients for this Weberian preference never exceed 0.04 in Ukraine, but range between 0.13 and 0.21 elsewhere, confirming the dominant influence of extortion in Ukraine.

15. Indeed condemnation had such a weak effect in this multiple regression that it is not 'statistically significant by standard tests. Condemnation did have a statistically significant effect in the other versions of the multiple regression, however; so it is best to conclude that it did have *some* effect even in Ukraine, but a very weak one.'

16. For a discussion of possible reforms and the degree of public support for them, see William L. Miller, Åse B. Grødeland, and Tatyana Y. Koshechkina, "What Is to Be Done about Corrupt Officials? Public Opinion in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic" (paper presented at NISPAcee 6th Annual Confer&we, March 1998, Prague).'

17. When asked explicitly, a majority of those surveyed in all countries said **bribe-givers should** be punished less severely than bribe-takers, but this ranged from a bare majority of 53 percent in **the Czech Republic** to a massive 80 percent in Ukraine. See **Miller, Grødeland, and Koshechkina, 1998.**