Report for Congress: Review of the U.S. Army Proposal for Off-Site Treatment and Disposal of Caustic VX Hydrolysate From the Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility
Review of the
Toxicology and Health Hazard Considerations for Safe Management of
Newport (Indiana) Caustic VX Hydrolysate
By
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry in collaboration with
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Atlanta, Georgia
November 3, 2004
Review of the Transportation and Risk Management Provisions for
Caustic VX Hydrolysate
By
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in collaboration with the
Department of Transportation
November 3, 2004
INTRODUCTION
CDC prepared this report to analyze DuPont’s Transportation Safety
Assessment and Risk Management Plan Safety, dated March 3, 2004. CDC
considered this component of the response from two perspectives,
described as follows:
First, CDC determined whether the transportation plan is consistent
with Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements for shipping
hazardous materials from the point of generation—Newport, Indiana—to
the point of final treatment and disposal—Deepwater, New Jersey. This
determination differs from typical CDC reviews because of the
different hazard characteristics and larger volumes involved;
therefore, CDC requested and received assistance from DOT in
conducting this part of the review.
Second, CDC determined whether the safeguards, emergency planning, and
other risk management considerations that will be applied to this
proposed project are comparable to transportation of other potentially
hazardous substances, such as recovered chemical weapons material (RCWM).
Some of the criteria considered by CDC included route selection
considerations, shipping containment provisions, emergency planning,
and notification activities. CDC is conducting this analysis directly.
Considerable overlap exists in the safety considerations required by
DOT and the safety provisions considered by CDC in reviews of RCWM
transportation plans.
BACKGROUND
The Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility proposes to treat agent
VX with sodium hydroxide to produce caustic VX hydrolysate (CVXH) with
no agent detected ≤20 parts per billion (ppb). This clearance criteria
is equivalent to the Army’s drinking water standard for nerve agents
for field use by soldiers, and CDC considers it appropriately
conservative for use as a clearance criteria for shipment of waste.
The CVXH can be characterized as being predominantly caustic and
aqueous with a smaller organic fraction, the extent of which depends
on the VX loading rate used in the batch process. Batch VX loadings of
8%, 16%, and 33% have been examined for the Newport facility. The
current plan calls for plant startup using an 8% loading of VX
stabilized with diisopropylcarbodiimide (DIC), and this is the only VX
loading rate fully evaluated in this review. Please note that in this
report, the more technically accurate term CVXH generally is
used in place of Newport caustic hydrolysate or NCH.
Other major by-products of interest in the caustic VX hydrolysate are
ethyl methyl phosphonic acid (EMPA), methyl phosphonic acid (MPA),
thiolamine, and EA 2192. EMPA and MPA are of interest because of their
potential for persistence in the environment, and thiolamine is of
interest because of its strong and disagreeable characteristic odor.
As a general matter, EA 2192 exhibits nerve agent properties similar
to VX. However, EA 2192 will be limited to ≤1 part per million (ppm)
for a cleared batch of CVXH, a concentration deemed by CDC to be
suitable for the risk management practices contained in this proposal.
Toxicity considerations of these by-products are discussed in the full
CDC report.
DISCUSSION
CDC considers four broad functional areas applicable to the proposed Newport CVXH transportation plan.
Packaging and
Containment—The DuPont transportation plan discusses several options
for the containment, including dedicated tank trucks and
transportable tote containers (“ISO tanks”). The materials of
construction and strength of the container design were considered,
as were placement of valves, remote operability characteristics
designed to minimize personnel potential exposure to tank contents,
and vulnerability of the valves to bump hazards. DOT, in
correspondence to CDC, noted that the plan “proposes to use
equipment and procedures that go beyond what the regulations require
for materials with the specific hazard and risk involved.”1
Personnel
Qualifications—The transportation plan proposes use of two hazardous
materials shippers that have “excellent safety records” as evidenced
by “very low DOT recordable accident rates” and “very favorable DOT
safety ratings.” Each of the two shippers reportedly maintains high
qualification standards by employing experienced personnel who have
passed rigorous background checks. Extensive training, including
hazardous materials spill response, will be required of the drivers
for this project. A team of two prequalified drivers will be used
for each trip.
Route Planning—DuPont
analyzed potential risk associated with four identified highway
routes and one combined rail and highway route for transporting the
CVXH from Newport, Indiana, to Deepwater, New Jersey. Factors
considered included number, length, and duration of each trip;
accident potential based on historic truck accident rates for each
route; general population exposure potential for each route;
potential environmental impact from accidental CVXH release for each
route; and emergency response capability for each route. A
commercially available risk analysis algorithm was used to
quantitatively estimate total potential impact potential for each
route option analyzed.
Emergency Preparedness—DuPont describes its Integrated Emergency Response Plan (IERP) used to support ongoing transportation incidents. A detailed specific emergency response plan would be developed for this proposed CVXH shipping plan and shared with appropriate state and local responders along the selected transportation route. DuPont also has IERP teams in place in Belle, West Virginia, and Deepwater, New Jersey, to serve as regional service centers to support incident responses if needed. In accordance with the IERP, these teams consult with and advise on-scene DuPont personnel and local emergency response personnel. As needed, additional on-scene advisors or response resources may be deployed.
DuPont’s transportation
analysis is predicated on the assumption that the CVXH poses a
corrosivity hazard with no attendant nerve agent properties. Most
transportation plans reviewed by CDC involve limited amounts of
chemical warfare agents moved in one or a very limited number of
moves. This plan differs both in the volumes of and predominant
characterization of the material to be moved.
CDC asked DOT personnel to review the DuPont transportation plan for
overall consistency with DOT requirements for hauling hazardous
materials. DOT determined the plan generally met or exceeded DOT
requirements. However, DOT recommended that the shipping designation
for the CVXH be reconsidered to reflect that it is a corrosive liquid,
basic, inorganic, not otherwise specified, rather than the organic
corrosive designation described in the plan. DOT’s review reflected
DuPont’s characterization of the CVXH.
In evaluating RCWM transportation plans, CDC also typically reviews
agent air monitoring. Air monitoring for chemical agent before and
after a move of RCWM is usually an integral part of a plan to detect
any breech in containment so corrective action can be taken. For the
CVXH, the Army and DuPont have stated that VX agent is required to be
destroyed to ≤20 ppb to qualify for shipment.2 Because this
clearance level would produce minimal safety hazard when compared with
the corrosive nature of the CVXH, agent air monitoring for VX would
not be useful and consequently was not included in the DuPont
proposal.
Batch processing studies indicate that, if VX survives, it would
partition into the organic fraction of the caustic VX hydrolysate. The
Army has stated that, at an 8%–16% VX loading, the organic fraction
should be limited to approximately <1%–3% of VX hydrolysate. In the
absence of mixing or agitation, the organic fraction separates, and
layers on top of the aqueous component of the CVXH. At an 8% VX (DIC-stabilized)
batch loading, the organic layer remains nearly indistinguishable from
the much larger inorganic, aqueous fraction. The CVXH will be
reprocessed if VX is detected above the MDL. However, the current
sampling and analytical method used for process batch clearance does
not attempt to evaluate potential VX in the organic layer of CVXH but
instead evaluates the organic and aqueous components as a mixture.
Examination of the impact of potential agent VX survival in the
organic fraction of the CVXH requires estimation of an upper-bound
level for the VX concentration within this fraction. On the basis of
existing batch studies, CDC believes a reasonable upper-bound estimate
is approximately 1–10 ppm of residual VX. This assumes a maximum of
≤20 ppb VX for the CVXH mixture and a VX loading of 8%. CDC noted,
however, that one study showed a VX residual of approximately 2100 ppm
in the organic layer (at a VX feed rate of 33%) of VX/sodium hydroxide
(NaOH) batch hydrolysate,3 despite analysis showing that
the hydrolysate mixture had ≤20 ppb VX. CDC contacted the lead author
on this study to ask whether follow-up work was conducted to resolve
and clarify this finding. Although recommended, the study was not
repeated. The author believed, however, that this VX finding in the
organic layer resulted from a sample mishandling in the laboratory and
is not consistent with his laboratory’s other studies of VX/NaOH
hydrolysate.
A maximum credible event could involve a 5000-gallon tank truck or
tote in an in-transit accident that ruptures the containment. If the
above study result is the outlier it appears to be, then human
exposure to VX at an estimated maximum of 1–10 ppm could occur with
direct, unprotected contact with the organic fraction of the spilled
material. The nerve agent effects of this level of VX and possible
concurrent EA 2192 at the 1-ppm level are difficult to assess.
However, to reach this maximum exposure to VX, the organic fraction
(estimated at <0.5% by volume of the total contents for the 8% loading
level CVXH) would need to remain undiluted from any mixing from the
spill, which CDC believes is highly unlikely. Mixture and dilution of
the organic fraction with the much larger aqueous fraction, to the
extent that the corrosivity of the spilled material would present the
most significant hazard, would be more likely.
Inhalation exposure to VX vapor in a spill is believed to be
negligible given its low initial assumed concentration in the CVXH and
the relatively low volatility of VX. Because of the corrosivity of the
bulk of the CVXH, emergency responders are required to take
appropriate precautions to avoid contact with the spilled material;
consequently, prevention of exposure to low residual VX, even if the
organic fraction remains intact, should not require extraordinary
measures. As with any release of hazardous liquid materials, untrained
observers and the public should be kept away from the active
response zone.4
To be thorough, CDC sought to evaluate the likelihood and potential
impact of a shipment of off-specification CVXH that could contain
residual VX above the clearance level (≥20 ppb VX). At CDC’s request,
the Army’s contractor evaluated the probability of human or system
error resulting in shipping of off-specification CVXH.5
The review of off-specification scenarios identified a potential
cross-contamination link (a three-way valve that controls flow of both
hydrolysate and agent) that could result in agent VX reaching the CVXH
holding tank after batch reactor sampling. This potential link,
without mitigation, reportedly would result in a calculated annual
event frequency of shipping off-specification CVXH of approximately 1
per 20,000. Processing estimates for NECDF range from a low of less
than 200 shipments per year up to a maximum of about 900 shipments per
year if the entire stockpile is processed in one year. For
cross-contamination to risk health or safety of transportation
personnel would require coincidence of the event with a shipping
accident large enough to release the VX hydrolysate and to splash the
drivers or other people who might be in the area of the accident. The
DuPont transportation review estimates the maximum likelihood of an
accident involving a release of CVXH at 1 in 13,000. This estimate is
based on actual observed transportation accident statistics in the
United States. Combining the probabilities of two independent
events—an off-specification shipment of CVXH involved in an accident
severe enough to release its contents—yields an event likelihood of
well under 1 in 1,000,000, which risk management specialists consider
insignificant. Add to this the probability of a responder or other
person being splashed during the event, and the total risk would be
further reduced. Nonetheless, Dupont should consider deferring CVXH
shipment during severe weather, such as heavy prolonged rains, icing,
and snowstorms, to reduce accident risk.
CDC believes the potential agent-related risk to human health and
safety from a transportation accident involving off-specification CVXH
is negligible. Nonetheless, the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for
CVXH should recommend as a precaution that medical response personnel
evaluate anyone having direct skin contact with released CVXH for
possible nerve agent effects so appropriate medical intervention can
be taken if needed. However, nerve agent effects are extremely
unlikely, and the corrosiveness of caustic VX hydrolysate is likely to
be the major concern.
Finally, the highly odorous nature of normal-process CVXH should be
noted. Although the cause of the odors would not be expected to result
in adverse health impacts directly, knowledge that the spilled
material originated from a facility processing agent VX could result
in considerable confusion and possible panic during the event. This
characteristic of CVXH should be described clearly to avoid potential
misunderstandings. The MSDS for CVXH should alert responders to its
disagreeable odor characteristics to help inform both responders and
the public and to minimize possible confusion or concern over exposure
to airborne VX.
CONCLUSIONS
This transportation analysis was based on information about CVXH
produced with VX at the 8% loading level and stabilized with DIC. The
remainder of the stockpiled VX, which is stabilized with DCC or with a
mixture of DIC and DCC, is not addressed in this review because of
inadequate characterization of the organic layer.
The DuPont plan appropriately addresses CDC’s key risk management
considerations, as well as DOT’s requirements for transporting
hazardous materials. The predominant potential hazard during
transportation of CVXH is its corrosivity. Precautions used to manage
this hazard in a spill are adequate to protect response personnel from
the low-level residual agent VX or residual EA 2192 at levels
estimated for maximum credible event analysis.
MATERIALS REVIEWED
E-mail correspondence
from Reeves (DOT) to Decker (CDC), May 19, 2004, re: Transportation
Plan for Chemical Weapons Waste
Presentation to CDC by
Parsons and U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, May 24, 2004, re:
Response to CDC questions regarding proposed operations at the
Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility.
Manthei J, Way R,
Gaviola B, Burnett D, Bona D, Durst H, Thompson S. Toxicological
Evaluation of VX Decontamination Wastestreams According to DOT Test
Procedures, February 1999.
Manthei J, Way R,
Gaviola B, Bona D, Burnett D. “Alternative Technology Program:
Intravenous Toxicological Evaluation of Four VX Wastestreams in
Mice.” U.S. Army ERDEC, ECBC-TR-173, August 2001.
“Quantitative
Subsystem Hazard Analysis of Potential for Off Site Transfer of
Hydrolysate Containing Above the 20 ppb Method Detection Limit”,
Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, Texas A&M University System
(TAMUS), August 2004.
DuPont Technical
Assessment on U.S. Army Newport (Indiana) Project,
Executive Summary, E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, March 2004.
Burke C.
Transportation Safety Assessment and Risk Management Plan –
Shipments of Newport (Indiana) Caustic Hydrolysate (NCH) Newport IN
to Deepwater NJ, DuPont Safety, Health and Environment Excellence
Center, March 2004.
Zimmerman G, Ensminger J, Saulsbury J. Transportation Analysis for the Off-Site Shipment of Liquid Process Effluent from the Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility at the Newport Chemical Depot, Indiana, Oak Ridge National Laboratory for the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, December 2003.
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2 Presentation to CDC by Parsons and U.S. Army Chemical
Materials Agency, May 24, 2004, re: Response to CDC questions
regarding proposed operations at the Newport Chemical Agent Disposal
Facility.
3 Manthei JH, Way RA, Gaviola BI, et al. Toxicological
Evaluation of VX Decontamination Wastestreams According to Department
of Transportation (DOT) Test Procedures, U.S. Army ERDEC, 1999
February.
4 The risk concerns of residual VX discussed herein also
would apply to the low level residual EA 2192 that could reside in the
hydrolysate.
5 “Quantitative Subsystem Hazard Analysis of Potential for
Off Site Transfer of Hydrolysate Containing Above the 20 ppb Method
Detection Limit”, Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, Texas A&M
University System (TAMUS), August 2004.