United States Department of State

Focus on the Issues

Building Peace And Security Around the World

Excerpts of testimony speeches, and remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright on building peace and security around the world

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Foreword

The Cold War is over, but numerous perils to U.S. security and world peace remain. These include terrorists who target Americans; possible conflicts in key regions; drug traffickers; and the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles that deliver them.

In many cases, we cannot defend against these threats by force alone or by acting alone. We need the help of others. We must reserve the possibility of military action, while doing all we can diplomatically to make the use of force unnecessary.

Focus on the Issues: Building Peace and Security Around the World highlights U.S. foreign policy efforts to protect American citizens, territory, and interests from 21st-century threats. This is the fifth in a series of publications on current foreign policy challenges which contain excerpts from testimony, speeches, and remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright.

Nuclear Weapons

Remarks to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
Chicago, IL
November 10, 1999

. . .Your survey. . .reveals that a majority of our citizens are afraid, as the new century is about to dawn, that the next 100 years will prove even bloodier than the last. And, given our experience of Holocaust and global war, that is a daunting prospect. We have no higher responsibility than to do all we can to prevent that prospect from becoming a reality.

This evening, I would like to discuss with you a major part of that responsibility, because even though the Cold War has ended, the dangers posed to us by nuclear weapons have not. We must carry out a comprehensive strategy to limit those dangers both by keeping such weapons out of the wrong hands and by deterring and defending against their possible use.

These goals received a setback last month when the U.S. Senate voted not to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, or CTBT. America's allies and friends responded to this vote with universal shock and disappointment. I have personally been besieged by calls from my counterparts around the globe. All express concern. Some even fear that America is on the verge of deciding simply to go it alone; to abandon efforts at nuclear non-proliferation;

and to rely solely on military might in what could become a new, wider, and even more dangerous nuclear arms race. . . .

My reply to those who harbor the fear that we might overreact and pull out of the world is that the United States has not gone crazy. A clear majority in the Senate wanted to delay voting to allow more time to deliberate on the treaty. President Clinton and Vice President Gore have reaffirmed America's commitment to non-proliferation. And, as Winston Churchill once reportedly declared,

> Americans can always be counted upon to do the right thing in the end, after all the other possibilities have been exhausted.

That said, the Senate debate was a highly sobering experience. Never before have the clearly expressed views of our closest allies been so lightly dismissed. Never before has the Senate rejected so abruptly a treaty of this importance. And never before has the tradition of a bipartisan foreign policy, once championed by such giants of this state as Everett Dirksen and Paul Douglas, seemed so distant.

Much has been said about how the Administration and Senate leadership handled this issue. It is fair to assign blame to both sides: to the Senate for giving the treaty short shrift; to the Administration for not doing enough to lay the groundwork for a successful debate.

But our focus now must be not on where we have been but on where we are headed. And that is why I have chosen to address this subject here, tonight. Those of us in public life have a duty, when circumstances warrant, to raise a flag of warning. And I do so now, because I believe it is dangerous when the world's leading nation is as sharply divided as we appear to be on how to confront the world's greatest threat.

Our challenge is to overcome the scars left by past arguments, put aside partisan distractions, and come together around concrete measures that will keep Americans secure. To succeed, we must go beyond slogans to the reality of a world in which U.S. actions and attitudes have real consequence.

If we do not accept the rules we insist that others follow, others will not accept them either. The result will be a steady weakening of nuclear controls. And if efforts at control fail, within a couple of decades or less, a host of nations from the Middle East through South Asia to the Korean Peninsula could possess nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them at long range.

One can imagine then a world imperiled by bitter regional rivalries in which governments are able to threaten and destroy each other without ever having to mass troops at a border, send an aircraft aloft, or launch a ship of war. This is where the issues of nuclear testing and missile defense are linked. For those of us concerned about defending against missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction should be the first to value halting nuclear tests as an initial line of defense.

More than four decades ago, President Eisenhower warned that the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons would spread and that not even a massive arsenal would be enough to keep America safe. He strived, therefore, to achieve agreements, including a comprehensive test ban, that would reduce the risk of war.

His successor, President John Kennedy, took up that same banner. In 1963, he said that

> the conclusion of a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests. . .would check the nuclear arms race in one of its most dangerous areas. . . .Surely, this goal is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, yielding to the temptation neither to give up the effort, nor. . .our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards.

These, then, are the core principles that guided America in years past and should guide us still. First, America must lead in the effort to assure stability and peace in a nuclear world. Second, we should strive for sound agreements to reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. Third, we should view such agreements not as ends but as means; they must contribute to our overall security.

Obviously, agreements do not erase the need for a powerful nuclear and conventional military deterrent. But they establish rules that increase the chance that our deterrent will succeed in preventing war. They complicate efforts by potential adversaries to develop and build nuclear weapons. And they make it more likely that others will join us in a common response against those who break the rules. By outlawing nuclear tests, the CTBT will impede the development of more advanced weapons by nuclear weapons states and constrain the nuclear capabilities of countries that do not now have such weapons.

For example, in Asia, the CTBT would make it harder for North Korea to advance its nuclear weapons program or for China to develop the technology required to place multiple warheads atop a single small missile. In the Persian Gulf, the treaty would create another important yardstick to measure the intentions of Iran, where a historic debate between the forces of openness and isolation is underway.

In South Asia, the treaty would be a valuable tool for constraining a potentially catastrophic arms race along a disputed border. In Russia, there is support among some for building a new generation of tactical nuclear arms, because Russia's conventional military capabilities have degraded, and money is lacking to rebuild them. The CTBT would reinforce momentum toward nuclear restraint around the world.

Despite these benefits, critics say the treaty is too risky because some countries might cheat.

But improvements in our own national means of verification, together with the International Monitoring System established by the treaty, would enhance our ability to detect nuclear explosions. Also, the treaty's provisions for on-site inspections should help deter violations and assist in finding the smoking gun should a violation occur.

Moreover, the military value of very low-yield tests is limited. They are of little use in developing more advanced strategic weapons. The bottom line is that, under the CTBT, it is less likely that nations will test, because the risks of detection will be higher. But if they do test in ways that might threaten our security, they will be detected. And if that were to happen, the world, not just the United States, would object with the full force of international law on its side.

Of course, some among you may ask, so what? Aren't international law and world opinion merely abstractions? Won't governments, and especially those we worry about most, pursue their own interests regardless of treaty obligations?

There is a good deal of merit in these questions. But there is no merit to the conclusion that some draw, which is that if we cannot assure 100% compliance with the rules we establish, we are better off not establishing any rules at all. Consider the facts.

During the first 25 years of the nuclear age, five countries tested nuclear weapons. In the 29 years since, two, India and Pakistan, have joined the list. During this period, knowledge about how to build nuclear arms has spread, but far fewer nations than we once predicted are acting on that knowledge.

The question is "Why?" The answer, I think, is that global standards matter. Over the years, more and more nations have embraced the view that it is unnecessary and dangerous to develop and test nuclear weapons.

This view has given birth to an extensive, although not yet complete, framework of legally binding agreements. These include nearly universal participation in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT.

Of course, neither law nor opinion will prevent nations from acting in their own best interests. But most countries are influenced in how they define their interests by what the law is, and most find it in their interests to operate within the law or, at least, be perceived as doing so.

Why else, for example, did South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina abandon their nuclear weapons programs? Why else did China agree to halt its own nuclear tests and sign the CTBT? Why else have India and Pakistan agreed, in principle, to do the same? And why else have the nations that contribute to the proliferation problem made such vigorous efforts at concealment?

Some treaty opponents have pointed out, accurately, that North Korea joined the NPT and then evaded its obligations under it. But why did North Korea take on these obligations in the first place? And why should we conclude that because that pact was violated, we would have been safer without it? After all, North Korea's secret activities first came to light as a result of inspections under that agreement.

Further, we can only imagine what kind of world we would have today if the NPT had not entered into force three decades ago—or what kind of world we will have three decades from now if we decide that the job of stopping proliferation is either not worth doing or already done.

To me, it is an open and shut case that outlawing nuclear tests by others will result in a more favorable security climate for America than would otherwise exist. But the second question we must consider is whether accepting a legal ban on our own tests will undermine our nuclear deterrent.

That deterrent includes our ability to put a nuclear weapon on a bomber or missile and deliver that weapon with a high degree of accuracy. The knowledge that we can do this will stop any rational government from attacking us, and the CTBT would not affect that. Because the treaty does not cover delivery systems, we can continue to test and modernize them.

There can be no doubt that our deterrent is effective. After all, we have already conducted more than 1,000 tests—hundreds more than anyone else. Our knowledge base and technology are superb.

However, many Senators opposed the CTBT because of their concern that, without testing, weapons in our arsenal might become either unsafe or unreliable. Obviously, this is a very serious concern, which we have taken seriously. Our nation's most experienced nuclear weapons scientists have examined very carefully the possibility that our weapons will degrade without testing. They have recommended steps that will enable us to retain confidence in the safety and reliability of our arsenal under CTBT, including a robust program of stockpile stewardship. These steps were incorporated in a package of understandings that accompanied the treaty when it was submitted to the Senate.

We simply do not need to test nuclear weapons to protect our security. On the other hand, would-be proliferators and modernizers must test if they are to develop the kind of advanced nuclear designs that are most threatening. Thus, the CTBT would go far to lock in a technological status quo that is highly favorable to us.

There is, moreover, even another layer of protection for American security. If the day should come when our experts are not able to certify the safety or reliability of our nuclear arsenal—or if the treaty is not working and new threats are arising that require us to resume nuclear tests—we will have the right to withdraw from the treaty.

The case for ratifying the CTBT is strong. It asks nothing of us that we cannot safely do; it requires of others a standard we very much want the world to meet. Those tempted to cheat will face a higher risk of being caught and will pay a higher price when they are. And if the worst case unfolds, and we must withdraw, we can and will.

The burden on treaty supporters is to persuade skeptics that ratifying the CTBT will reduce the dangers posed to our security by nuclear weapons, without endangering our security by preventing us from taking steps necessary to national defense.

But there is also a burden on treaty opponents, for it is not sufficient simply to say the treaty is imperfect; opponents must offer an alternative that is better. And they must explain why America will be safer in a world where nuclear tests are not outlawed and may again become commonplace; where there is no guarantee of an international monitoring system to detect such tests; where we have no right to request on-site inspections; and where America is held responsible by allies and friends everywhere for the absence of these protections.

To those Senators who want the Administration to bury the CTBT, we say, "No, our national interests will not allow us to do that." But to those who are willing to take a further look at the treaty, we say, "How can we help?"—For despite the Senate vote, the treaty lives.

It is essential that the dialogue on CTBT continue and bear fruit. After all, the Administration and Congress have worked together on difficult national security issues before. A number of leading Senators from both parties have expressed interest in a bipartisan effort to move forward on CTBT now.

In that spirit, I am announcing today that we will establish a high-level Administration task force to work closely with the Senate on addressing the issues raised during the test ban debate. As we did

with NATO enlargement, this team will also carry the dialogue to Americans from all walks of life to explain and analyze the treaty.

In our discussions with the Senate, we will be open to a variety of possible approaches for bridging differences, including at an appropriate point the potential need for additional conditions and understandings, as was the case with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Meanwhile, President Clinton has made clear that the United States will continue to observe a moratorium on nuclear explosive tests and has urged all others to do the same. And we will continue to work with Congress to provide our share of support for preparatory work, including construction of the International Monitoring System.

Finding the way forward on CTBT is necessary, but not sufficient, to crafting a bipartisan strategy for reducing the nuclear danger. It is equally important that we establish common ground on the question of national missile defense and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Here, agreement must be found between the extremes. On one side, there are those demanding that we scrap the ABM Treaty, despite objections from Russia, China, and our closest allies. On the other are people who oppose any adjustments to the treaty and are against developing even a limited system of national missile defense.

The Administration believes that both extreme views are dangerous. The first risks reviving old threats to our security; the second fails to respond to new ones.

For more than a quarter century, the ABM Treaty has contributed to strategic nuclear stability. It is based on the understanding that an all-out competition in ABM systems would create destabilizing uncertainties about intentions and destroy our ability

to reduce strategic offensive arms. Preserving this understanding is vital to us. It is also essential to Russia.

If we were simply to abandon the ABM Treaty, we would generate fears in Moscow that we are also abandoning the goal of stability. We would squander a historic opportunity for negotiating further mutual reductions in our nuclear arsenals. And we would run the unnecessary risk of transforming Russia into once again our most powerfully armed adversary.

On the other hand, our partners must recognize that the strategic environment has changed greatly in the 27 years since the ABM Treaty was signed. The Gulf war showed what a real threat theater-range missiles in hostile hands can be. And tests of longer range missiles by Iran and North Korea raise concerns about vulnerability that must be addressed.

Our military serves as an effective deterrent to any rational adversary. The problem is how to deal with threats from sources that are neither rational nor interested in complying with global norms.

It is against this danger that the Administration is developing and testing a limited National Missile Defense System, with a decision on deployment possible as early as next summer. For deployment to occur, certain changes to the ABM Treaty would be necessary, and we have begun discussing these with Congress, our allies, and Moscow.

To date, Russian leaders have expressed strong opposition to any treaty modifications and accused us of undermining the entire system of international arms control simply by raising the subject. A Russian defense official recently proclaimed that his nation has the ability to overwhelm the missile defense system we are planning. That is true—and part of our point. The system we are planning is not designed to defend against Russia and could not do so. And that will remain true even if we are able to negotiate further deep reductions in our arsenals.

The changes we are contemplating in the ABM Treaty are limited. They would not permit us to undermine Russia's deterrent. And because Russia and we are vulnerable to the same threats, we are prepared to cooperate with Moscow on missile defense.

In response, Russia must do more than just say "*nyet*." It is in our mutual interest to develop an arrangement that preserves the essential aims of the ABM Treaty, while responding to the new dangers we both face.

Domestically, the Administration recognizes that if we are to have support for any agreement we might reach with Russia, we must consult closely with the legislative branch. The Administration and Congress have the same boss—and that is you, the American people. We have an obligation to work shoulder to shoulder in support of policies that will keep our citizens secure. ■

Force and Diplomacy

Remarks at the William Cohen Lecture
University of Maine
Bangor, Maine
October 13, 1999

. . .Earlier generations of Americans turned the tide in the first global war, defeated the greatest evil the world has known, and defended freedom through decades of Cold War. Our task is different, and seemingly less dramatic, but no less important. It is to forge a steadily growing consensus, based on steadily rising standards, that will help bring nations on every continent closer together around basic principles of democracy and open markets, the rule of law, and a commitment to peace.

As a goal, that is as easy to say as it is difficult to achieve. Like freedom itself, it is something we will never fully achieve but can only pursue. And if America is to lead the world in the right direction, as we must, we will have to make good use of every available foreign policy tool. That means our armed forces must remain the best led, best trained, best equipped, and most respected in the world. And as President Clinton has pledged, and Secretary Cohen and our military leaders assure, they will.

But we will also need first-class diplomacy, because on many occasions, we will rely on diplomacy as our first line of defense—to cement alli-

ances, build coalitions, and find ways to protect our interests without putting our fighting men and women at risk.

At the same time, our diplomacy is stronger because we have the threat of force behind it. In this way, force and diplomacy complement each other. It's like having Pedro Martinez to do your pitching and Mark McGwire or Sammy Sosa to bat cleanup.

It is by combining force and diplomacy, for example, that we protect Americans from the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Here, the military deterrent provided by our armed forces and the technological edge they enjoy are indispensable. But we will all sleep better if our deterrent is never used. The diplomatic challenge is to create a political environment in which serious military threats to our country are less likely to arise.

That is why, since 1992, our support has helped deactivate almost 5,000 nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union, eliminated nuclear weapons from three former Soviet Republics, and purchased more than 60 tons of highly enriched uranium that could have been used by terrorists or outlaw states to build such arms. We are also helping 30,000 former Soviet weapons scientists find employment in peaceful commercial ventures, so they are not tempted to sell their expertise to those who might do us harm.

We are taking steps, as well, to protect ourselves from the new threats posed by ballistic missiles. Here, the military job is to maintain our deterrent and develop the best defensive technology possible. The diplomatic job is to ensure that in responding to new dangers, we do not act rashly and aggravate or revive old ones.

Finally, we have called upon the Senate to approve a treaty that would ban nuclear explosive tests of any size, for any reason, in any place—for all time. . . .

A second example of where we use force and diplomacy to safeguard American security is by striving to reduce the risks posed by regional conflicts. Because the United States has unique capabilities and standing, it is natural that others will turn to us in time of emergency. In one sense, that is gratifying, but it also leads to difficult, damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't, choices.

American actions must reflect American interests. Neither our armed forces nor our prestige should be committed lightly. And when we decide on a course of action, we should not rest until our goals are achieved.

The question, of course, is when, where, and how America should engage. There is no mathematical formula for arriving at such judgments. Before launching a diplomatic initiative, or considering the use of troops, a President must weigh our interests against a matrix of past commitments, present capabilities, future hopes, and enduring values.

He, or she, must marry principle to pragmatism, so that we are not only able to do the right thing but also to do the thing right. The risks of action must be balanced against the risks of not acting. And America's stake must be reflected in the nature and extent of America's commitment.

Taking all this into account, I believe Americans can be proud of the part we have played in supporting peacemakers over bombthrowers in key regions of the world. For example, President Clinton and another of Maine's extraordinary former Senators, George Mitchell, have been deeply involved in efforts to end the century-long strife in Northern Ireland.

In the Middle East, we have entered a new and more hopeful stage in the peace process. For the first time in years, Israelis and Palestinians are talking directly to each other, negotiating directly, and looking for creative ways to address each other's concerns.

America will do all it can to support the parties in their pursuit of peace. This is true not only between the Israelis and Palestinians but also for the entire region. Daunting obstacles remain, but a just, lasting, and comprehensive Middle East peace is within our grasp. This is an opportunity leaders in the region must seize, for there could be no greater gift to the future.

In East Timor, we are participating in a UN-authorized force, led by Australia and Thailand, to shield civilians from violence and allow them to shape their own destiny in accordance with the popular will. Secretary Cohen was in Indonesia last month, where he conveyed our message, which is firm but fair.

We fully back Indonesia's efforts to strengthen its democracy. But we also expect the Indonesian armed forces to disarm militias in West Timor and prevent them from threatening the East. Too often, during the past few months, those charged with preserving order have conspired with the enemies of order. That is a crime against the people of East Timor and unacceptable to the world.

We are also working with leaders in Africa to end the numerous conflicts that have generated suffering and slowed progress on that continent. Next week, I will travel to Africa for the third time in my current job. I will make clear America's commitment to assist, not by trying to impose solutions, but by supporting the implementation of African solutions and ideas.

Finally, in Kosovo, we continue to meld force and diplomacy in a manner that serves U.S. interests while upholding values that we cherish. Southeast Europe has been a source of dangerous instability through much of this century. It is where World War I began, battles in World War II were fought, and Europe's worst violence in 50 years occurred this decade. It would have been irresponsible—and

unconscionable—if America and NATO had simply stood by when Slobodan Milosevic launched his ruthless campaign of ethnic cleansing.

At the outset, we used diplomacy backed by the threat of force to deter Milosevic and achieve a peaceful settlement. When Belgrade chose instead to attack, we responded with force while working diplomatically to maintain allied unity and explain NATO's intentions.

Later, we used diplomacy to isolate Milosevic, enlist Russia on the side of peace, and gain Security Council support for an international peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Now we are working jointly, through military and civilian institutions, to build peace, aid economic recovery, and lay the groundwork for democratic self-government.

In recent weeks, we have heard some suggest that America need not concern itself when aggression or atrocities are committed overseas, unless they are committed directly against us. Obviously, we neither can nor should try to right every wrong or fight every fight. But the history of this century warns us that problems abroad, if left unattended, will all too often come home to America. We have a strong interest in acting where we can to prevent disagreements in key regions from becoming conflicts—and in containing conflicts before they become all-out wars.

At the same time, except in extreme cases, America cannot go it alone. More often than not, the American role should be that of energizer or coalition-builder. Or perhaps we will provide limited amounts of specialized assistance. But if global standards are to be enforced and international stability maintained, many nations, not just the United States, have indispensable parts to fill. . . .

Before closing, I want to say just a few words about the need to back up our national security leadership with resources. Over the past 5 years, the funds we annually invest in international affairs have

declined by roughly 20% from the prior 5-year period. Unfortunately, the world is not 20% smaller or less dangerous. And what has been a very bad situation is now at risk of becoming much worse. . . .

Let us be clear what we are talking about. Most of the funds we spend on international affairs cannot fairly be called foreign aid; they aid America.

When we provide resources to safeguard nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union, or help South American farmers find alternatives to growing coca, or train foreign police in counterterrorism, we are aiding America. When we take steps to keep regional disputes from exploding into conflicts that could require the presence of U.S. troops, we aid America.

When we negotiate trade agreements that open overseas markets to Maine seafood, paper products, or high technology, we are helping America. When our visa offices enable 6 million foreign tourists and other travelers to visit the United States annually, while keeping known criminals out, we help and protect Americans.

Even when we assist other countries in meeting such needs as clearing land mines, caring for refugees, and fighting HIV/AIDS, we are serving America's long-term interests and staying true to America's permanent values. Taken together, our international programs help make our citizens safer, our economy stronger, our world more stable, and our freedoms more secure.

Many Americans are surprised when I tell them that the amount we allocate for foreign affairs is equal not to a quarter, or dime, or even a nickel, but only to about one penny of every dollar the federal government spends. But that penny can spell the difference between hard times and good times for our people, war and peace for our country, less and more freedom for our world. . . .■

Terrorism

Testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies
Washington, DC
February 4, 1999

. . .I welcome this opportunity to testify concerning U.S. efforts to counter the forces of international terror. As you know, the President has designated the Department of State as the lead agency for coordination of our counterterrorism policy and operations abroad, while the FBI is the lead agency for countering terrorism in the United States. . . .

The Threat

I will begin by discussing the threat posed to the United States and the world by the forces of international terror. If you look at the statistics, you will see that the number of terrorist incidents worldwide is declining. This reflects the diplomatic and law enforcement progress we have made in discrediting terrorist groups and making it harder for them to operate. It reflects, as well, the improved political climate that has diminished terrorist activity in places such as Northern Ireland and Central America.

But you would not be conducting this hearing, Mr. Chairman, if the dangers posed by international terrorism had declined. Tragically, they have not.

Last August, I had the sad honor of bringing back to U.S. soil the bodies of Americans who perished in the embassy bombing in Kenya. Like the members of our armed forces who died in foreign conflicts, these

Americans went in harm's way for our country. But there is a difference, for they were not combatants in a war as we have long understood that term. They were casualties, instead, of a new kind of confrontation that looms as a new century is about to begin.

In this struggle, our adversaries are likely to avoid traditional battlefield situations because there, American dominance is well established. They may resort, instead, to weapons of mass destruction and the cowardly instruments of sabotage and hidden bombs. As we know from explosions over the past decade in Africa, the Khobar apartment complex, the World Trade Center, and Pan Am 103, these unconventional threats endanger both Americans and others around the world.

Accordingly, we must be vigilant in protecting against the terrorist triple threat posed, first, by the handful of countries that actively sponsor terrorism; second, by long-active terrorist organizations; and third, by loosely affiliated extremists such as, among others, Osama bin Laden, who has urged his followers to kill Americans when and wherever they can.

Our strategy must be long-term. The 5-Year Plan is only the beginning. Certainly, no single arrest or shutdown of a terrorist operation will be sufficient. The advance of technology has given us new means to counter terrorists. But it has also enabled terrorists to develop more powerful weapons and to travel, communicate, recruit, and raise funds on a global basis.

It is essential, therefore, that we work closely with others. The perpetrators of terror include persons from a wide variety of creeds, cultures, and countries. And their criminality has claimed victims almost everywhere—from Jerusalem to Japan, Tanzania to Turkey, and Oklahoma City to Sri Lanka.

To counter this plague, law-abiding peoples everywhere must close ranks to detect, deter, prevent, and punish terrorist acts. It is not enough for Americans to be concerned only about attacks

against Americans; we must reach out to all those victimized or threatened by terror. The victims of the attacks orchestrated in Africa by Osama bin Laden, after all, were predominately African, including many practitioners of Islam. Terrorism is a highly indiscriminate form of violence. It must be opposed not simply as a matter of national interest but as a fundamental question of right and wrong.

Fighting Back

Following the embassy attacks last August, President Clinton ordered military strikes to disrupt terrorist operations and deter new bombings. The message he conveyed is that, in this battle, we will not simply sit back and wait. We will take the offensive. We will do all we can to limit terrorist movements, block terrorist funds, and prevent terrorist acts.

As the President's decision demonstrated, we will not hesitate, where necessary, to use force to respond to or defend against acts of terrorism. But force is only one element in our strategy.

Every day, in every part of the world, we use a full array of foreign policy tools in our zero- tolerance campaign against international terror.
For example, we place the highest priority on measures to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the wrong hands. This imperative is on our agenda with virtually every nation and figures in almost every major meeting I have.

We constantly exchange information with friendly governments concerning terrorist activities and movements, thereby preventing attacks and facilitating arrests. We work with other agencies and other countries to strengthen screening procedures and increase intelligence sharing on visa applications.

We are expanding our Anti-terrorism Training Assistance Program, which has already instructed more than 20,000 law enforcement officers from

more than 90 countries, in subjects such as airport security, bomb detection, maritime security, VIP protection, hostage rescue, and crisis management.

We are engaged, through the State Department-chaired Technical Support Working Group, in a vigorous research and development program to improve our ability to detect explosives, counter weapons of mass destruction, protect against cyber sabotage, and provide physical security. In the technological race with terror, we are determined to gain and maintain a decisive strategic edge.

We are making use of the Terrorism Information Rewards program to encourage persons to come forward with information to prevent acts of terrorism and apprehend those who commit them. We impose economic sanctions against state sponsors of terror. Currently, the seven governments on this list are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. And both domestically and internationally, we are working to strengthen the rule of law.

The Rule of Law

At home, we have changed our statutes to block the financial assets of terrorist groups, prevent them from raising funds in the United States, and allow us to bar foreigners who support such groups.

Around the world, we couple law enforcement with diplomacy in order to bring suspected terrorists before the bar of justice. As the subcommittee knows, we have done this successfully in the World Trade Center case, the CIA killings, and to a very considerable extent in the Africa embassy bombings, which triggered a worldwide man hunt for bin Laden and his associates in murder. The Attorney General and Director Freeh will provide more detail on these efforts, but let me stress two points.

The first is that law enforcement success often depends upon international cooperation. That cooperation has been extraordinary in some recent cases.

We cannot discuss these in public, but I did want the record of this hearing to reflect our deep appreciation for the timely and lifesaving help we have received. Second, I believe every American should be proud of the work the FBI, the Justice Department, the CIA, and the State Department's Diplomatic Security Service—or DS—have been doing.

When I was in Nairobi last August, I had a chance to meet some of the FBI personnel who were literally sifting the wreckage of the embassy for clues. I was deeply impressed by their dedication, and I have been even more deeply impressed by the progress made in gaining custody of suspects. I am gratified, moreover, that the partnerships in the field among the FBI, Department of Justice, DS, and our embassies and other agencies are excellent. Our people are working together closely and well to investigate past crimes and prevent new ones. They are doing a great job for America.

I cannot leave the subject of bringing terrorists to justice without highlighting the tragic case of justice delayed with respect to the bombing more than a decade ago of Pan Am flight 103. As Senators know, we have challenged the Government of Libya to meet its pledge to deliver the two suspects in that case for trial in the Netherlands under Scottish law. This approach has been approved by the Security Council and is supported by Arab and African regional organizations. It is an approach that is reasonable and fair and that has been on the table now for more than 6 months.

I would like to take this opportunity once again to urge Libya to deliver the suspects for trial and thereby gain suspension of the UN sanctions. If this does not occur by the time those sanctions come up for Security Council review later this month, we will seek additional measures against the Qadhafi regime.

Our effort to strengthen the rule of law against terrorism is global. At its heart is the message that every nation has a responsibility to arrest or expel

terrorists, shut down their finances, and deny them safe haven.

Attached to my testimony is a chart showing the extent to which countries have ratified 11 international antiterrorism conventions. Our goal is to obtain universal adherence to these treaties. Our purpose is to weave a web of law, power, intelligence, and political will that will entrap terrorists and deny them the mobility and sustenance they need to operate.

As we stressed in the aftermath of the murders in Kenya and Tanzania, terror is not a legitimate form of political expression and it is certainly not a manifestation of religious faith. It is homicide, plain and simple. It is right for nations to bring terrorists to justice, and those who do so should be recognized and rewarded appropriately.

It is wrong to finance terrorist groups, whether or not specific contributions are for terrorist purposes. It is cowardly to give terrorist groups money in return for not being targeted. It is irresponsible simply to look the other way when terrorists come within one's jurisdiction. And it fools no one to pretend that terrorist groups are something they are not.

Consider the words of Hezbollah's Sheik Hassan Nasrallah shortly after the Wye accords were signed: "I call on any Palestinian who has a knife, a hand grenade, a gun, a machine gun or a small bomb to go out during these few weeks and kill the Israelis and the Accord." He also called for the assassination of Chairman Arafat.

Some say Hezbollah is not terrorist, because it has a political agenda. But that is sophistry. As long as it advocates indiscriminate violence and assassination, it is terrorist. The same is true of other groups, such as Hamas, the PKK, and Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers.

For each, the decision to use terror was a choice it did not have to make. Law-abiding nations must unite in helping them realize that the choice they have made is wrong.

In this connection, I was very disappointed that Germany failed to make good on the recent opportunity to prosecute Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the terrorist PKK—and that Italy and Turkey were unable to find an alternative way to ensure he was brought to justice. Instead of determination, this opportunity was greeted with handwringing and vacillation.

Ocalan has left Italy and his current whereabouts are unknown. We call upon any nation into whose jurisdiction Ocalan comes to cooperate in ensuring that he stands trial for his alleged crimes.

Diplomatic Force Protection

The measures we take to provide physical protection for our diplomatic personnel overseas play a major role in our strategy for countering terror. I know this subject is a matter of great interest to the subcommittee. And certainly, nothing is of more urgent concern to me.

In the aftermath of the embassy bombings last August, I established Accountability Review Boards, chaired by Adm. William Crowe, to investigate and recommend improved security systems and procedures. I received their report last month and will be submitting a formal response this spring.

As you probably know, Mr. Chairman, the Boards found that the security systems and procedures followed by the two embassies involved were in accord with State Department policy. In both cases, the terrorists were prevented from penetrating the perimeter of the post. In neither case did U.S. employees or members of the military breach their duty.

The Boards did, however, identify what they termed “a collective failure” by the executive and legislative branches of our government over the past decade “to provide adequate resources to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. diplomatic missions.”

The report suggests that responsibility for this failure must be shared broadly, including by the Secretary of State, and I accept that. It reminds us all that no matter how much we care, no matter how much we do, we can always do more when the lives of our people are on the line.

The report cites some of the steps we have taken, particularly since August, to strengthen perimeter defense, increase security personnel, and speed necessary construction and repairs. It notes, as well, congressional approval of the security-related supplemental appropriation late last year. We were, and are, very grateful for your swift action on that measure. It has helped us to resume, albeit in a makeshift way, our diplomatic activities in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. And it is enabling us to upgrade physical security levels worldwide through the hiring of additional diplomatic security agents and support personnel.

The Accountability Review Boards concluded, however, and I agree, that these measures must be viewed as just an initial deposit toward what is required to provide for the security of our posts overseas. According to the report,

> We must undertake a comprehensive and long-term strategy. . .including sustained funding for enhanced security measures, for long-term costs for increased security personnel and for a capital building program based on an assessment of requirements to meet the new range of global terrorist threats.

The Boards stress, and again I concur, that "additional funds for security must be obtained without diverting funds from our major foreign affairs programs." This is a key point, for it would make no sense to enhance the security of our people overseas while, at the same time, depriving them of the resources they need to effectively represent American interests.

The State Department is determined to go forward with an extensive, multi-year program for upgrading security at all our posts. The President's budget for Fiscal Year 2000, released earlier this week, proposes the minimum amount required to move ahead with such a program.

First, it includes $268 million to fund what we call the "tail" of the supplemental. This includes the recurring costs required by additional personnel and security improvements not addressed in emergency supplemental approved last fall. We expect such costs to run about $300 million annually in subsequent years.

We recognize the need to continue an aggressive program of locating suitable sites and building secure facilities overseas. The President's budget includes an additional $36 million for site acquisition and the design of new facilities; augmenting FY 1999 emergency funds available for site, design, and construction. It also proposes $3 billion in advance appropriations for new construction in the years 2001 through 2005.

I feel strongly that in order to have a viable security construction program, we need a long-term commitment of resources. The President's request proposes that this be done by advanced appropriations. We have been able to work together on such arrangements in the past, and I hope very much that we will able to do so in this case.

I wish to stress, Mr. Chairman, that our request for support is not special pleading. American embassies include a broad range of U.S. Government employees and their families. They host a constant flow of U.S. citizens who turn to our people for help on everything from business advice to travel tips to emergency medical aid. They are open to foreign nationals who wish to come to our country as tourists or students or for commercial reasons. And

as the casualty list for the Africa bombings illustrates so starkly, many of our embassy employees are locally hired.

Under international law, the host country is responsible for protecting diplomatic missions. We hold every nation to that standard and will assist, where we can, those who need and want help in fulfilling that duty. In an age of advanced technology and suicide bombers, no one can guarantee perfect security. But our embassies represent America. They should not be easy targets for anyone. We owe our people and all who use or visit our facilities the best security possible. . . .■

Arms Control

Remarks at the Stimson Center
Washington, DC
June 10, 1998

. . . Today, I want to set out the diplomatic framework guiding our efforts to prevent the spread and limit the dangers of the world's deadliest weapons. In fulfilling this mission, diplomacy is an important, but not our only, tool. When we negotiate arms control and non-proliferation agreements, we hope others will act in good faith. But we never count on this. We insist, instead, on the most thorough possible verification measures. We exercise our treaty rights to the full. And we maintain the world's strongest, best-prepared, and best-equipped armed forces.

We pursue arms control because our citizens and military will be more secure if certain weapons are eliminated—or, at least, kept out of the wrong hands. Consider, for example, that millions of Americans and Europeans sleep safer every night because the START and INF Treaties have eliminated thousands of Russian nuclear weapons. Consider that Saddam Hussein has been kept in a strategic box because UNSCOM has ferreted out and destroyed more weapons of mass destruction capacity than was destroyed in the entire Gulf war. Consider that 37,000 American troops in Korea are safer and Asia is more stable because the Agreed Framework has

frozen North Korea's dangerous nuclear program. And consider what the modern world would be like if poison gas and deadly viruses were viewed as legitimate weapons.

Former Secretary of Defense William Perry had it right when he said that effective arms control is "defense by other means." Through the decades, we have served this goal through formal treaties, such as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. We have pursued agreements to limit the transfer of dangerous technologies, while maintaining rigorous controls on our own exports. We have developed early warning and detection capabilities, which we are always striving to improve. We have backed fully the inspection activities of the IAEA and the UN Special Commission. We have worked steadily to expand the circle of nations that abide by the rules of non-proliferation, while not hesitating to expose and confront those who cheat.

Especially in recent years, we have made great progress. More nations in more parts of the world have been signing up and following through. Increasingly, countries that had been contributing to the proliferation problem are becoming part of its solution. More and more, the understanding has spread that a world in which the most dangerous weapons are under, not out of, control, will be more secure for all.

Unfortunately, that understanding has not taken sufficient hold in South Asia. The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests dealt a blow to the non-proliferation regime. But let me be clear: Those senseless blasts beneath the ground do not, as some suggest, discredit that regime. To the contrary, they illustrate its logic and its necessity.

Indian leaders, especially, predicted that the decision to test would make their country more respected, more secure, and more firmly in control

of events in South Asia. Those leaders were wrong. A month ago, India and Pakistan could look forward to improved relations with the United States and other major powers; to steadily increasing outside investment and beneficial trade; and to serious consideration of their membership on the UN Security Council. Today, those prospects have been demolished.

A month ago, the people of India and Pakistan were living—as they had lived for decades—with bitter tensions over Kashmir. But those tensions did not pose a clear and present danger to most of either nation's population. Today, both Indians and Pakistanis are less safe.

In 1993, a devastating earthquake claimed 20,000 lives in central India; it was an unforgettable tragedy. But a nuclear exchange of even a limited nature would kill not thousands but millions. Depending on the winds, even a unilateral attack could destroy untold lives on both sides of the border.

For both nations, the strategic environment is now far more complicated and grave. Both face the prospect of an arms race neither can afford. Each faces the risk of nuclear missiles being pointed at their cities. Neither can be confident it will have early warning of what the other will do. And the risk of misinformation leading to miscalculation leading to disaster is high. . . .

Obviously, the nuclear tests cannot be undone. But the resulting risks and disruptions can be minimized if cooler heads and clearer thinking now prevail.

We hope that this is beginning to occur. The rhetoric in New Delhi and Islamabad seems to be quieting, calls for renewing their bilateral dialogue are increasing, and both sides say they have no present plans for further nuclear tests. But these steps are nowhere near enough.

The world community is urging leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad to forswear any future tests and to refrain from deploying nuclear weapons or from testing missiles capable of delivering them. Further, we have called upon both countries to join the CTBT, without conditions; to stop producing fissile material and join in negotiating a worldwide pact; to refrain from deploying missiles; and to formalize their pledges not to export any materials or technology that could be used to build nuclear weapons or their delivery systems. India and Pakistan should take such measures not as a favor to the world community, but because it is in the security interests of each to do so. . . .

We are working across the board to ensure that the American people never again have to bear the costs and risks of a nuclear arms race. Many Americans assume our arms control relationship with Russia no longer matters. But it does matter; it matters a lot—for until we bring our nuclear arsenals and postures into line with post-Cold War realities, each of us will be forced to maintain larger arsenals at higher states of alert than would be ideal. And though we are slicing apart weapons as fast as we can—with START I eliminations running 2 years ahead of schedule—we cannot move beyond START II until that treaty is ratified. All we can do is prepare the ground for START III negotiations with preliminary experts' meetings to frame issues. That kind of planning has begun, but planning is not enough.

Unfortunately, I must report that the Duma today voted to postpone consideration of START II. I deeply regret that action, and I hope that the majority of the Russian legislature will come to understand what its clearest thinkers already have—which is that, in light of the South Asia tests, START II ratification is now more urgent than ever.

As President Yeltsin has said, START II is manifestly in Russia's interest, as well as our own. It will eliminate the deadliest weapons ever pointed our way, and it will set the stage for START III cuts in strategic arsenals to 80% below Cold War peaks.

That would be a remarkable achievement in its own right. It would also provide further evidence that we are serious about meeting our NPT commitment to move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. That is a worthy goal, embraced by Presidents of both parties, including President Clinton. But we cannot build that kind of world alone, and sadly, it seems more distant today than only a month ago.

START III will be more than a sequel to START II. It will mark a major qualitative as well as quantitative step forward. For the first time, it will address destruction of warheads and bombs, not just the missiles and planes that deliver them.

This past September, we completed the ABM Treaty succession and demarcation agreements. The Senate will have every opportunity to examine them closely when they are presented as a package with the START II extension protocol. Meanwhile, these accords would not impede our efforts to develop the capable theater missile defenses we need. And we know that for Russian strategic reductions to continue, the ABM Treaty must remain in place.

START III is a vital goal. As we pursue it, we will bear in mind the need for strict verification, improved intelligence, and greater transparency. These advances, in turn, will give us a leg up on the "loose nukes" problem that rightly worries us all.

We are working hard to keep the critical ingredients of nuclear weapons—plutonium and highly enriched uranium—out of the wrong hands. It is this fissile material, not the basic design information for a nuclear device, that is the biggest hurdle facing those who seek to build nuclear weapons. That is why we are insisting that North Korea adhere to its commitments under the Agreed Framework and why we are

working so hard with the Congress to ensure that we live up to ours. That is why our strategy includes working with the New Independent States to secure nuclear materials as we did in transporting HEU out of Kazakstan and Georgia to safe storage. That is why it includes efforts, through the G-8 nuclear smuggling program, to deal with excess plutonium and make cuts in nuclear arsenals irreversible. And that is why the Administration seeks more funding for Nunn-Lugar-Domenici programs—to keep Russian weapons and nuclear materials secure and atomic scientists engaged in their home countries, not in business with rogue regimes.

We are pressing every country in the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiating a fissile material cutoff treaty. We are pleased that India has now said it is willing to participate in these negotiations. We believe Pakistan should follow suit. I am also directing U.S. negotiators to conclude agreements by the year 2000 to make "excess" U.S. and Russian plutonium permanently unusable for weapons. Finally, we should convene a conference this year to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material—to increase accountability, enhance protections, and complement our efforts to strengthen IAEA safeguards.

The nuclear menace has long been familiar to Americans. But other dangers, no less real, confront us in the form of chemical, biological, and destabilizing conventional weapons. Against these threats, as well, our strategy is to employ a full-court press.

Last year, with bipartisan support from the Senate, America joined the Chemical Weapons Convention as an original party. Other key countries, such as Russia, Iran, and Pakistan have since joined, as well. This year, we are asking Congress to approve legislation to implement that Convention and thereby make it harder for terrorists to concoct, conceal, or conspire to use poison gas in our own country.

This measure is supported by U.S. industry, and would bring us into full compliance with the Convention. While moving forward with it, Congress should not at the same time move backward by adding provisions that are not consistent with the Convention and that would diminish its effectiveness.

The Biological Weapons Convention, or BWC, has stigmatized the use of dread diseases as instruments of war. And its implementing legislation has helped our law enforcement officials block attempts to acquire or produce biological weapons. But the BWC needs enforcement teeth if we are to have confidence it is being respected around the world. Under President Clinton's leadership, we have redoubled our efforts to negotiate a compliance protocol in Geneva this year.

Ideological opponents of arms control say treaties lull us into a false sense of security. But look at the facts. This Administration has increased funding for defense against chemical weapons. And the President has announced a plan to inoculate our troops against biological threats.

Global conventions are not silver bullets that can stop terrorists in their tracks. But they are a valuable tool, and we would be foolish not to use them—for they make the terrorist's task harder and the law enforcement job easier. They also heighten police and public awareness, which can lead to tips that foil plots and save lives. This same problem-solving perspective informs the President's initiative to enhance our readiness against unconventional threats. No President has done more than Bill Clinton to recognize and rectify potential U.S. vulnerabilities in this area.

Finally, let me address a subject whose inherent difficulties make it more, not less, worthy of attention—and that is conventional arms control. Legitimate exports of conventional arms can support our interests and our foreign policy goals. But in the

wrong hands, such exports can endanger our people and empower our adversaries. A prime example is the growing threat to civil aviation posed by shoulder-fired missiles. Today, I am calling for negotiation of an international agreement to place tighter controls on the export of these portable, easily concealed weapons.

I welcome the European Union's recent decision to adopt a code of conduct for arms transfers and will work to ensure better coordination of our respective policies. I also want to strengthen the Wassenaar arrangement, which has not yet reached its potential. We want that arrangement to be recognized as the institution where responsible nations take practical steps to prevent and address the dangers arising from irresponsible arms exports.

Lastly, I am proposing that we broaden our efforts to crack down on illicit firearms trafficking. Through the OAS, we have negotiated a landmark agreement to combat such trafficking in our own hemisphere. We are now pursuing a global agreement, which we aim to conclude by 1999.

One export control issue much in the news lately has been our policy of sometimes allowing U.S. satellites to be launched by Chinese rockets. This issue has been belabored elsewhere, so I will only touch on it here. As Secretary of State, I agree with my predecessors from both parties that such launches can serve American interests. They create incentives for China to help us stop the spread of missile and other technology, bolster U.S. competitiveness, and help broadcast Western ideas and values into China.

To those who see this policy as a threat to U.S. security, I would point out that the practice was initiated by President Reagan at a time when China's record on proliferation was a good deal worse than it is today. These launches involve strictly commercial communications satellites. All are subject to DoD

safeguards to prevent the transfer of technology that would improve China's missile capabilities and all are subject to full review and comment by the Department of State.

In closing, I want to say a word about how we forge arms control and non-proliferation policies in the executive branch and in Congress. Clearly, there is room for differences of opinion and debate about the specifics of those policies. But it does seem to me that certain truths are self-evident.

First, America is stronger and more effective when the executive and legislative branches are working cooperatively, rather than at cross purposes.

Second, the Administration and Congress need to reach a better consensus on when, how, and for what purpose to employ the tool of sanctions—for if sanctions are to work, they must be part of an overall strategy, and they must provide sufficient flexibility for the executive so that we are able to do good, not just feel good.

Third, we only have one President and Secretary of State at a time. If they are to do their jobs for America, they need adequate resources, tools, and authority from Congress. But if Congress is to do its job, it needs information and respect from the executive.

This morning, I met with almost half the Senate to discuss South Asia. Before leaving for the Beijing Summit, I plan to meet with congressional leaders at the Department. I and other Administration officials will consult regularly.

Our purpose is to develop a stronger partnership on arms control with our friends on Capitol Hill. This issue is critical to our security and credibility around the world. We need to be speaking with one voice and acting with America's interests—not partisan interests—firmly in mind. . . .■

Security

Commencement address to the
U.S. Coast Guard Academy
New London, CT
May 20, 1998

. . . In the early days of our country, our citizens felt protected by the vast oceans to our east and west. But as technology advanced and U.S. overseas interests grew, we learned the hard way that we couldn't be safe if friends and allies were in danger. And today, the idea of an ocean as protection is as obsolete as a castle moat; for Americans travel constantly, our borders are increasingly tough to secure, and the dangers we face are as fast-moving as a renegade virus and as unpredictable as a terrorist's bomb.

In such a world, no nation can guarantee its security alone. We must act together, and we must plot our defense not against a single powerful threat, as during the Cold War, but against a viper's nest of perils. Of these, four stand out.

First, although the superpower rivalry between East and West has ended, the danger posed by nuclear weapons plainly has not. Evidence of this was provided last week by India's unjustified and unwise decision to conduct explosive nuclear tests.

Why was this decision so dangerous? Because it could ignite an arms race with no visible finish line between India and Pakistan, who have fought three wars in the last 51 years, and who remain bitterly divided over Kashmir and other issues. India's rash

action is sure to heighten security tensions throughout Southern Asia, and other nations may be tempted to follow India's wrong-headed example.

President Clinton has strongly condemned these nuclear tests. Consistent with U.S. law, he has imposed an array of sanctions that will cost India dearly. And he and other world leaders have made it plain to India's Government that exploding nuclear devices is a way to lose—not win—international respect. . . .

Even beyond the events in South Asia, our strategy for minimizing the nuclear danger to our citizens is broad, comprehensive, and increasingly ambitious. In the weeks ahead, I will be working with my Administration colleagues and the leaders in Congress to identify new steps and to fully implement our prior initiatives.

We are determined to seize the opportunity history has presented to reduce further the roles and risks of nuclear weapons. There could be no greater gift to the future.

Last year, the President submitted to the Senate a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to ban nuclear explosive tests of any size, for any purpose, in any place, for all time. Now, more than ever, India should sign that agreement—and Pakistan, too. And it is doubly important for the Senate to act quickly to approve that treaty. American leadership on this issue should be unambiguous, decisive, and strong.

We have proposed to Russia a new round of arms reductions that could bring our arsenals down to 80% below Cold War peaks and, for the first time, to eliminate bombs and warheads, not just the planes and missiles that deliver them.

As we demonstrated recently through the purchase and transport of highly enriched uranium from the country of Georgia, we are also working hard to ensure that all nuclear materials are securely guarded and safely handled. Our goal is to see that no nukes become loose nukes.

Finally, we have made halting the spread of nuclear weapons a top priority in our bilateral diplomacy with Russia, Ukraine, China, and other key nations.

The **second** step we must take to ensure American security is to reduce the risk posed by regional conflicts, for we know that small wars and unresolved disputes can erupt into violence that endangers allies, creates economic havoc, generates refugees, and embroils our own forces in combat.

American diplomacy backed by military power is the single most effective force for peace in the world today. There are those who say that America has a short attention span, and that we grow weary in our commitments. But for almost half a century, our leadership in NATO has defended freedom in Europe, while our troops in Asia have maintained peace on the Korean Peninsula.

In the Gulf it was U.S. determination that rolled back Iraqi aggression 7 years ago, and U.S. vigilance that keeps pressure on Saddam Hussein to live up to his commitments today. In the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East, we are standing shoulder to shoulder with the peacemakers against the bombthrowers, in hopes the children of those troubled regions will grow up surrounded not by hate and fear, but by tolerance and the quiet miracle of a normal life.

We do this because it is right but also because in an era when weapons are more available and destructive than ever before, our citizens will be less at risk if peace spreads and conflicts do not.

That is why, too, the United States has a keen interest in defusing unstable situations in places such as Indonesia, where further unrest could have profoundly negative consequences for peace and prosperity throughout Asia. In this regard, President Soeharto's statement yesterday that he was willing to launch a democratic political transition in Indonesia was an important development.

President Soeharto has given much to his country over the past 30 years—raising Indonesia's standing in the world and hastening Indonesia's economic growth and integration into the global economy. Now he has the opportunity for a historic act of statesmanship —one that will preserve his legacy as a man who not only led his country, but who provided for its democratic transition.

In this delicate and difficult time, we strongly urge the Indonesian authorities to use maximum restraint in response to the peaceful demonstrations.

Third, if Americans are to be secure, we must also protect ourselves from the unexpected. Because of our military strength, potential enemies may try to attack us by unconventional means such as sabotage and terror. They may seek to disrupt our government, sow fear within our communities, inhibit our travel, and make it harder for us to keep or deploy our troops overseas.

In responding to this danger, our goal is grounded in a Coast Guard doctrine—*semper paratus*—always ready, always prepared. We maintain an arsenal of tough legal and law enforcement measures to fight terror both at home and overseas. We do all we can diplomatically and militarily to see that poison gas and biological weapons do not fall into the wrong hands. We have tightened border security, and we are engaged in constant efforts—with the Coast Guard's active participation and help—to safeguard transportation so that our people may move about our nation and the world without fear.

Finally, if Americans are to be secure, we must push ahead hard in the war against narcotics trafficking and the hydra-headed evil of international crime. Drug cartels and the criminal empires they finance threaten us every day, whether we are traveling abroad or going about our daily business here at home.

President Clinton spoke to this danger last week when he unveiled a comprehensive strategy to integrate all facets of the federal response to international crime. The Coast Guard and the State Department are both key partners in this effort, which is designed to extend the first line of defense against crime far beyond U.S. borders.

To this end, we are working together with other nations as never before to train judges, police, and Coast Guards; to share information about criminals; to seize drug assets; to expose and close front companies; and to halt money laundering.

I saw an example of this cooperation last month when I met with U.S., Haitian, and Dominican Republic law enforcement officials on the Coast Guard cutter *Dallas* near Port au Prince. In recent months, we have been engaged in a joint operation that has shut down numerous drug-running efforts, including one by a Colombian vessel under Coast Guard pursuit even while I was on board the *Dallas*. And I don't think they just put it on for my visit.

In each case, we may be satisfied that the drugs involved, whether seized or dumped, will never profit those who sought to peddle them. Those drugs will never incite an attack in which an innocent person might be harmed. And most important, those poisonous drugs will never find their way into the bodies of our children.

Drug law enforcement is a good example of the challenge we face in protecting our citizens today. New technologies are available to both the good guys and the bad. Further, although we are strong, there are many security threats we cannot defeat alone. That is why we moved this past weekend to increase cooperation on crime among the G-8.

It is why we are forging international agreements and establishing higher standards on everything from the elimination of chemical weapons to the extradition of drug kingpins. It is why we place a high priority

on Senate approval of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. And that is why it is so important that organizations such as the Coast Guard, that are fighting to extend the rule of law, have the fast ships, modern communications gear, and other state-of-the-art tools they need to get the job done.

Our purpose is to create an ironclad web of arrangements, laws, inspectors, police, and military power that will deny criminals and aggressors the space they need to operate and without which they cannot survive. . . . ■