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International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999 Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State Washington, DC, March 2000

POLICY AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

Policy and Program Overview for 1999

The drug trade had little to celebrate at the end of the twentieth century. Successful international counternarcotics efforts over the past few years have gradually narrowed the drug syndicates' field of action. Crop reduction and chemical control programs have caused major shifts in cultivation and refining operations. Effective law enforcement operations have fragmented the large cartels that once dominated the cocaine trade. Better interdiction now forces traffickers constantly to shift transportation routes to move drugs to market. Improved judicial systems make it more difficult for drug criminals to buy their freedom, while tougher extradition laws deny them the national safehaven they once could count on. Also, closer international cooperation among governments and financial institutions has made it more difficult for the drug trade to legitimize its profits through money laundering schemes.

The most striking change at the end of 1999 was the continuing, steady decline in the Andean coca crop, the source of all the cocaine destined for the United States. Even taking into account a marked expansion of cultivation in Colombia, overall Andean coca cultivation totals are at a new low. The most dramatic declines occurred in Peru and Bolivia, formerly the world's two principal coca producers. They now rank a distant second and third behind Colombia. At the end of 1999, coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia was at its lowest point since 1986, when we completed the first accurate surveys of Andean coca.

The joint effort first begun in 1995 to sever the "airbridge" that carried Peruvian coca to Colombian refineries and then to eradicate coca crops paid big dividends by the end of the decade. Of the 115,300 hectares of coca under cultivation in Peru in 1995, only 38,700 hectares remained at the end of 1999--a drop of two thirds. But Peru was not the only success story. During the same four-year period in Bolivia, Bolivian government eradication programs cut coca cultivation by more than half, from 48,600 hectares to 21,800 hectares. By any measure, these are remarkable accomplishments. Reductions on this scale were only possible through close, long-term cooperation between the governments of the United States and all of the governments concerned. They are tangible proof of what can be achieved when committed governments work together effectively toward a common goal.

There was also some bad news in 1999. Coca cultivation in Colombia increased by 20 percent. The expansion in the Colombian coca crop, however, came as no surprise. It was a predictable consequence of the successes in Peru and Bolivia. Faced by the ultimate loss of its major source of coca--and thereby a large source of its income--the Colombian drug trade has been racing to make up for the shortfall in the other two Andean producers. Realizing that the only way to have a guaranteed source of coca was to plant it in lands under their immediate control, the Colombian syndicates have been steadily moving cultivation to the conflict-ridden south and southwest of the country. Since cocaine profits also in part fund Colombia's principal insurgency, the convergence of interests has led to expanded cultivation in guerrilla-dominated territory, where security conditions make it difficult for the central government to conduct eradication operations. Through this displacement, Colombian cocaine syndicates expanded the coca crop from the 101,800 hectares at the end of 1998 to the current estimate of 122,500 hectares. Yet even with this expansion in coca, the total Andean coca crop at the end of 1999 stood at 183,000 hectares, the lowest figure since 1987.

Another disturbing development is confirmation that the Colombian syndicates have achieved extraordinary levels of efficiency in extracting cocaine from their coca crops. While, as we have reported in earlier INCSRs, we had anecdotal information that Colombian cocaine yields might be greater than initially reported, scientific confirmation did not come until 1999. Fieldwork carried out under Operation Breakthrough, an interagency yield study that has been under way for much of the past decade in the Andean region, indicates that higher yielding varieties of coca are being grown in parts of Colombia. Likewise, preliminary reporting suggests that Colombian laboratory operators are more efficient in processing coca leaf into cocaine base than previously believed. As a result, we adjusted upwards our estimates of potential cocaine HCl production in Colombia over the past five years. In 1999, Colombian refiners potentially produced 520 metric tons of cocaine HCl, a twenty percent increase over the comparable amount for 1998. Yet, even with that enormous ratcheting up of Colombian production, reductions in Peru and Bolivia brought total potential HCl from the Andean countries to 765 metric tons, a five-year adjusted low.

To help Colombia address the problem of drug expansion, the United States has proposed a two-year, $1.3 billion assistance package to strengthen Colombian democracy and reinvigorate the economy, at the same time as we attack the drug trade. In addition to coca eradication, this assistance will help train special counternarcotics battalions, purchase additional helicopters, upgrade the Colombian government's interdiction capability, promote alternative development, and increase the protection of human rights.

Cutting heroin flows to the United States also ranks high on our list of counternarcotics priorities. Though heroin abuse is still relatively limited, there are worrisome signs of increasing use, especially by young people. Stopping heroin at the source is more difficult than attacking cocaine supply. To do so we have to limit cultivation of opium poppy, from which heroin is refined. Unlike coca, which only grows in three Andean countries, the opium poppy can be found in nearly every region of the world. Also, unlike coca, opium is an annual crop and in Latin America can produce as many as three harvests per year. Where a perennial coca bush may not become productive for about two years, one can harvest opium gum an average of four months after planting. A further obstacle to U.S. efforts to limit its cultivation is that nearly 80 percent of the world's estimated opium poppy (141,000 hectares out of some 178,000) is cultivated in Burma and Afghanistan, countries where the United States has limited influence.

The opium poppies that interest us most, however, are those grown in Colombia and Mexico. Though these two countries together cultivate less than six percent of the world's total opium poppy, their production has a significant impact on the United States. Most of the heroin identified in the United States in 1999 was of Colombian or Mexican origin. With such a small crop supplying such a large share of the market, opium poppy control programs in those two countries can seriously affect the flow of heroin to the U.S. The United States Government estimates that in 1999 Mexico took out of production some 7,900 hectares, leaving 3,600 hectares for opium production. This is the lowest figure since 1992. In Colombia, however, opium poppy cultivation increased by 23 percent to 7,500 hectares. This figure would have been much larger had Colombian authorities not destroyed more than 8,000 hectares of opium poppy in 1999.

Drug Syndicates Suffer

Capturing key traffickers demonstrates--to the criminals and to the governments fighting them alike--that the syndicates are highly vulnerable to coordinated international pressure sustained over time. In the Western Hemisphere, the drug syndicates continued to suffer reverses, as key governments pursued the leaders of the major organizations. In October 1999, Operation Millennium, a joint effort involving the Colombian and U.S. governments, resulted in the arrest of scores of major Colombian traffickers. More significantly, it disrupted an international drug trafficking network that reached as far as Peru, the United States, and Europe.

Mexico continued to strike at the Juarez cartel. In 1999, Mexican law enforcement and military units moved against the remnants of the Carrillo Fuentes Organization operating in the state of Quintana Roo, especially in the resort city of Cancun. The Government of Mexico formally indicted Quintana Roo's governor, Mario Villanueva Madrid, on numerous drug trafficking charges stemming from his association with Alcides Ramon Magana. Until late 1998, Magana, in collusion with remnants of the cartel, had been coordinating multi-ton cocaine shipments from Colombia into the Yucatan. The ex-governor is a currently a fugitive. Also among those arrested was Juan Quintero Payan, co-founder of the Juarez Cartel.

Promoting Institutional Change

An underlying premise of our international drug control strategy has been to promote long term change in key national institutions of the main drug source and transit countries. Through training programs conducted by the principal U.S. Government law enforcement agencies, we have helped governments to modernize and professionalize law enforcement agencies. In an effort to narrow the opportunities for manipulation by the drug trade, we have worked to assist governments in strengthening their judicial and banking systems. Without a professional judicial system based on the rule of law and administered by officials of integrity, the best law enforcement operations can come to naught. There have been instances where law enforcement agencies in key drug-affected countries have captured and jailed prominent traffickers, only to see them set free by the arbitrary decision of a single judge or magistrate. Thanks to several long-standing cooperative administration of justice programs, such instances are becoming rarer. In 1999, several countries continued to modernize their laws and professionalize their court systems through reforms ranging from installing more modern equipment to major changes in the way judges are appointed. Though there will undoubtedly continue to be instances of judges arbitrarily dismissing evidence against or releasing well known drug traffickers, we can expect to see the number of such cases decline, as governments make basic reforms such as giving judges better pay and greater personal protection, while streamlining administrative procedures.

Extradition

Aside from dying at the hands of their rivals, there is perhaps no sanction that drug lords fear more than extradition to the United States. The long sentences already meted out to notorious international drug criminals by U.S. courts are stark reminders of what can happen to even the most powerful cartel leaders when they are subject to a justice system that they cannot manipulate through bribes and intimidation. Extradition for such crimes, however, is still far from universal. In many countries, where sovereign jurisdiction is politically sensitive, the laws still prohibit the extradition of their nationals. Powerful drug criminals are adept at exploiting such national sensitivities to their advantage. For example, a ban on extradition in the 1980's and 90's allowed the Medellin and Cali cartels to use their prisons as a high-security drug operations center.

In November, Colombia marked an important turning point in counternarcotics cooperation. Colombian authorities extradited a Colombian citizen to the United States for the first time in nine years, fulfilling one of the United States Government's most sought-after but elusive counternarcotics goals in that country. Despite narcotics traffickers' attempts to throw up legal roadblocks, and at least one bombing possibly linked to the extraditions, the Colombian government now appears ready to send narcotics traffickers to justice in the United States regardless of citizenship. The Colombian government's courageous decision to reverse the ban on extradition diminishes the possibility of a domestic safehaven to the current generation of drug syndicates. Other countries that extradited nationals to the United States in 1999 were Mexico and Pakistan. We hope to see similar actions by other countries whose nationals currently enjoy legal or de facto immunity from extradition.

Money Laundering

No matter how large the profits of the drug trade, drug money is worthless until it can be moved into legitimate financial and commercial channels. Disguising deposits of hundreds of millions of illegal dollars is not easy. International drug syndicates probably devote as much energy and ingenuity to finding ways of legitimizing their profits as they do to producing and moving drugs. They have been forced to become more creative thanks to international success in gradually closing off the drug trade's back avenues to international banking and financial systems. Working with our partners in the Financial Action and Caribbean Financial Action Task Forces, in 1999 we focused on expanding collective measures to make it as difficult as possible for the drug trade to legitimize its illicit fortune, especially in offshore financial institutions that accept money with few questions asked. Though several countries' financial institutions are still willing to turn a blind eye to--or even solicit--funds of questionable provenance, there has been progress over the past year. Thailand, for example, passed money-laundering legislation called for in the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Such actions move us closer to our common goal of eventually excluding drug money altogether from the international financial system.

The Drug Trade--A Formidable Opponent

Though we can take pride in our progress at the end of the century, we are still a long way from putting the drug trade out of business. As one of the pillars of international organized crime, it remains a formidable enemy. It has access to financial resources available to few national governments, without formal restraints on how they can be used. The drug syndicates also have the advantage of experience. Long before transnational crime had become recognized as a genuine threat to international stability, the Colombian and Mexican syndicates already had in place an impressive network of supply centers, distribution networks, foreign bases, and reliable entree into the governments of source and transit countries. They pioneered many of today's advanced money laundering techniques, hiring first-rate accountants, and investing in state-of-the-art technology. Even after suffering considerable losses, the drug trade's wealth, power, and organization equal or even exceed the resources of many governments.

International drug trafficking becomes more sophisticated every year, as it adapts to counternarcotics offensives. Although our collective efforts to cut drug traffic in 1999 have kept drug traffickers on the defensive, they were still able to move hundreds of tons of cocaine not only to the United States and Western Europe, but to markets in Latin America, Asia, Africa the NIS and CIS countries. The major drug trafficking syndicates are the criminal equivalent of large multinational organizations, with drug distribution centers and money laundering on every continent. But they are not alone, as Italian, Albanian, Turkish, Russian, Nigerian, and Southeast Asian crime syndicates, to name but a few, compete successfully for a share of the business.

The drug trade also promotes and adapts to changing trafficking and consumption patterns. It seeks to blur the lines between cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine-consuming countries. During the past few years we have observed more polydrug use, with addicts combining cocaine and heroin to offset each drug's respective stimulant and depressant effects. National tastes are also changing. Europe, once the preserve of the heroin trade, has developed a growing appetite for cocaine and amphetamines. In parts of Eastern Europe and Russia, cocaine sells for up to $300 per gram, three times the average cost in the United States.

In North America, heroin consumption has been gradually increasing, as cocaine use has declined sharply from skyrocketing use during the 1980's. (Between 1985 and 1998, the number of cocaine users dropped 70 percent, from 5.7 million to 1.8 million estimated users and has not risen appreciably since.) Although heroin use has not risen proportionately, the growing willingness of American high school students to experiment with heroin is disturbing. According to the 1998 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse released in August 1999, the rate of initiation for youths from 1994 to 1997 was the highest since the early 1970s. Though we cannot yet say whether this is the beginning of a trend, the Colombian and Mexican drug syndicates' major investment in heroin production indicates that they view the United States as a lucrative and expanding market for heroin. Given the drug trade's record in anticipating--and stimulating--market demand, the drug syndicates' persistent cultivation of opium poppy must be a cause for concern.

Dangerous Synthetics: Methamphetamine and Ecstasy

Another troubling development is the growing popularity of methamphetamine and the related drug, MDMA ("Ecstasy"). These stimulants are now an important and highly lucrative component of the international illegal drug market. Methamphetamine rivals cocaine as the stimulant of choice in many parts of the globe. The demand for methamphetamine and other synthetic stimulants, including amphetamines and MDMA, has been on the rise not only in the industrialized nations, but also in many countries of the developing world. In Thailand, for example, methamphetamine has displaced heroin as the most heavily abused drug.

The relative ease of manufacturing methamphetamine and the similarity of the refining process for MDMA appeal as much to small drug entrepreneurs as to the large international syndicates, since neither has to rely on vulnerable crops, such as coca or opium poppy. Synthetics allow individual trafficking organizations to control the whole process, from manufacture to sale on the street. Synthetics also have large profit margins and can be made anywhere from commercial chemicals. Mexico is the principal foreign supplier of methamphetamine and precursors for the United States, but there are centers of methamphetamine production in countries as far apart as Burma, Poland, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and North Korea. The United States has its own domestic methamphetamine production, as demonstrated in 1999 by the seizure of 1,916 methamphetamine laboratories by DEA and another 1,984 by state and local authorities.

Ecstasy, an amphetamine derivative, is another drug that is growing in popularity. Ecstasy first gained notoriety in the 1990's along with the "rave culture" that swept over Europe's younger generation. Ecstasy's stimulant properties furnished the chemically induced stamina to dance for hours at all-night discotheque parties known as "raves." It has now developed an international cult following, as one can see from internet sites that give detailed instructions on how to make and use MDMA "safely." Most of the MDMA available on the European drug market is manufactured in clandestine laboratories in the Netherlands and in Poland.

One pernicious aspect of Ecstasy is that many of its users do not consider it a dangerous drug. It is seen as a non-addictive stimulant. When an addictive drug develops a reputation for being relatively benign, efforts to suppress it become correspondingly difficult. Seizure data in many of this year's INCSR country chapters indicate a surge in Ecstasy consumption in Europe, suggesting that the drug's popularity is on the rise. France and Estonia are cases in point. But we have our own Ecstasy problems. The University of Michigan's Monitoring the Future study noted a rise in Ecstasy use by high school students. In 1999, slightly more than four percent and five percent of tenth and twelfth graders respectively reported using the drug.

Precursor Chemicals

But even synthetics have their Achilles' heel. Traffickers who manufacture stimulants and other synthetic drugs need precursor chemicals that they cannot produce themselves. Whereas opiates and cocaine require widely available and relatively substitutable "essential chemicals," amphetamine production requires "precursor chemicals", such as ephedrine, pseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine. These chemicals have important but fewer legitimate uses and are commercially traded in smaller quantities to discrete users. It is crucial to chemical control that each country have an effective, flexible system that regulates the flow of key precursor chemicals, without undue burdens on legitimate commerce. For that reason, the United States, the European Commission, and the UN's International Narcotics Control Board worked in 1999 with key governments to strengthen an informal multilateral system of information exchange on chemicals.

Controlling Drug Supply

Our mission is to stem the flow of drugs to the United States. How effectively we do so depends on our ability to attack drug supply at critical points along a five-point grower-to-user chain linking the consumer in the U.S. to the grower in a source country. Where cocaine or heroin are concerned, the chain begins with the growers cultivating coca or opium poppies, for instance, in the Andes or Burma, and ends with the cocaine or heroin user in a U.S. town or city. In between, lie the processing (drug refining), transit (shipping), and wholesale distribution links.

Our international counternarcotics programs target the first three links of the grower to user chain: cultivation, processing, and transit. The nearer to the source we can attack, the greater our chances of halting drug flows altogether. Where crops are destroyed or left unharvested, no drugs can enter the system. It is analogous to removing a malignant tumor before it can metastasize. Crop control is by far the most cost-effective means of cutting supply. In an ideal world, with drugs halted at the source, none could enter the distribution chain and there would be no need for costly enforcement and interdiction operations.

In the real world of counternarcotics programs, however, crop control has enormous political and economic implications for the producing country, for it inevitably means attacking the livelihood of an important sector of the population. Implementing crop control programs takes time, as governments develop alternatives for the affected population. As a result, while pursuing the goal of crop elimination, we cannot neglect the processing and distribution stages. Our programs therefore must constantly direct resources toward those links where we can have both an immediate and a long-term result.

Though eradication is the most direct way of eliminating a drug crop, it is not the only way. In many countries, large-scale eradication is neither politically nor socially feasible. As our experience the past few years in Peru and Bolivia has shown, the right combination of effective law enforcement actions and alternative development programs can produce truly remarkable results. We therefore work closely with the governments of the coca growing countries to find the best way to eliminate illegal coca in any given national context.

Reducing Coca

The coca crop offers the best prospect for dramatic reductions for several reasons. Coca is confined to a specific geographical region. Significant coca cultivation takes place in only three countries--Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia--and with modern technology we can locate the growing areas precisely. Thus, unlike a multi-ton load of finished cocaine distributed among trucks, boats, and aircraft, a coca field is a large, stationary target. Eliminating coca on the ground is also highly cost-effective. Current studies indicate that in Bolivia and Peru, where alkaloid content is high, every 200 hectares of coca taken out of production deprives the drug trade on average of a metric ton of refined cocaine. So even manual eradication can make a difference. But our high-speed spray aircraft offer a more effective alternative. If these planes had unobstructed access to the principal coca plantations, they could destroy a large percentage of the coca crop in a matter of months using environmentally safe herbicides.

Because the situation varies from country to country, the United States Government has been working with each Andean government to find the best way to eliminate illegal coca in the light of prevailing local conditions. Crop reduction successes in Peru, Bolivia, and the traditional growing areas of Colombia have created a new situation by driving coca production into areas in southern and southwestern Colombia controlled by the insurgency. The situation has therefore become simultaneously better defined and more dangerous. The concentration of coca cultivation in a geographically confined area gives counternarcotics spray aircraft a better target. But the determination of the guerrillas and the drug trade to protect their vital source of income by quasi-military action poses a new level of threat to eradication aircraft that were not designed for use in hostile environments. The United States Government's proposed $1.3 billion narcotics assistance to Colombia over the next two years should offer new possibilities of dealing with this problem.

Political Will

While cooperative anti-drug programs have proven their value, the most powerful defense against the drug trade is an intangible--political will. If political will is weak where organized crime is strong, corruption soon sets in. Left unopposed, such corruption ultimately vitiates the rule of law and puts democratic government in jeopardy. Consequently, a basic objective of U.S. counternarcotics policy is to prevent drug interests from becoming entrenched by bolstering political will to oppose illicit drug trade in the key source and transit countries. In those countries where political leaders have had the courage to sacrifice short-term economic and political considerations in favor of the long-term national interest, we have seen the drug trade weaken. And where political will has faltered, the drug syndicates have prospered accordingly.

The Power to Corrupt

The drug trade's ability to subvert even relatively strong societies stems from its access to nearly unlimited amounts of money. In what resembles economic alchemy, drug syndicates transform an intrinsically cheap, available, and easily renewable commodity (e.g., coca leaves) into an almost inconceivably remunerative product. In terms of weight and availability, there is currently no commodity more lucrative than drugs. Illegal drugs are relatively cheap to produce and offer enormous profit margins that allow the drug trade to generate criminal revenues on a scale without historic precedent. At an average retail street price of one hundred dollars a gram, a metric ton of pure cocaine has a retail value of $100 million on the streets of a U.S. city--two or three times as much if the drug is cut with adulterants. By this gauge, the 100 or so metric tons of cocaine that the United States Government typically seizes each year are theoretically worth as much as $10 billion to the drug trade--more than the gross domestic product of many countries. Even if only a portion of these profits returns directly to the drug syndicates, we are still speaking of hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars. To put these sums into perspective, in FY 2000 the United States Government's overall budget for international drug control operations is approximately one and half billion dollars. That is the street value of approximately 16 metric tons of cocaine. The Mexican drug cartels have lost that much in a few shipments and barely felt the loss.

Such boundless wealth offers the large trafficking organizations an almost unlimited capacity to corrupt. Though less obvious, in many ways the drug syndicates are a greater threat to democratic government than many insurgent movements. Guerrilla armies or political terrorist organizations seek to topple and replace governments through overt violence. The drug syndicates, on the other hand, covertly seek to manipulate existing governments to their advantage and guarantee themselves a secure operating environment. They can do so only by co-opting the right officials. A real fear of democratic leaders should be that one day the drug trade might take de facto control of a country by putting a majority of elected officials, including the president, directly or indirectly on its payroll. Though it has yet to happen, in the past few years there have been some disquieting near-misses. By keeping the focus on eliminating corruption, we can forestall the possibility of a government manipulated by drug lords from ever becoming a reality.

The Certification Process and Corruption

Drug corruption thrives in the shadows. It needs anonymity for survival. Since it shuns the light, the best way to attack drug corruption is to expose it regularly to public scrutiny. The drug certification process offers a means of forcing corruption to the surface. It gives the U.S. government the legislative equivalent of an international spotlight to shine on corruption. Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires the President to certify annually that each major drug producing or transit country has cooperated fully or has taken adequate steps on its own to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, including rooting out public corruption. Governments that do not meet the standard lose eligibility for most forms of U.S. military and development assistance; they also face a mandatory "no" vote by the United States Government on loans in six multilateral development banks.

Controversial but Effective

By now, most governments know that U.S. law requires the President to provide this annual assessment of counternarcotics cooperation based on factual information. Setting certification benchmarks is not a unilateral process. Through regular and sustained consultation throughout the year, we work with our partners to establish realistic, mutually acceptable goals for certification evaluation purposes, based on goals and objectives of the UN Convention. Though controversial, throughout the 14 years it has been in effect the certification process has proved to be a powerful policy instrument. Its strength lies in its reliance on public, rather than on traditional diplomacy. In a sharp departure from the confidentiality inherent in traditional bilateral diplomacy, public diplomacy stresses openness and transparency. Because of its public nature, the drug certification process makes every government concerned publicly accountable for its actions, including the United States. While the United States Government obviously cannot certify itself, most governments recognize that the President of the United States cannot issue such an important public declaration without being certain of--and held accountable for--his facts. The goal of the certification process is not to sanction; it is to hold all countries to a commonly acknowledged international standard of cooperation. By its nature it also exposes the United States to full public scrutiny by the rest of the international community. We become as accountable as any other country for our successes and our failings. As uncomfortable as it may be for all concerned, it is a healthy process.

Next Steps

Our achievements at the end of 1999 suggest that we are still on the right track. Concerted, sustained action over the year has kept the drug syndicates on the defensive. In the year ahead, we will build upon our gains by further pressing the drug trade at every point--targeting drug syndicates, reducing drug cultivation, destroying labs, disrupting the flow of the necessary processing chemicals, interdicting large drug shipments and attacking drug money flows. Though we cannot neglect any stage in the process, we know that we can inflict the most lasting damage at the crop cultivation and financial operations stages. Having seen again this year how cooperative ventures pay off in reducing drug crop cultivation, we will continue to strengthen these programs. Now we need to beef up our collective efforts to curb the illegal drug conglomerates' financial operations.

Though drug syndicates are powerful in their underworld milieu, they lose their advantage when they have to operate in the legitimate world. They are especially vulnerable when it comes to cashing in their profits. The drug trade's ability to generate vast amounts of cash is simultaneously its strength and its weakness. To stay in business it needs a steady flow of drugs to generate revenue; at the same time it requires a steady flow of money to buy the drug. Like a legitimate enterprise, the drug syndicates partially finance future growth by borrowing against future earnings. So every metric ton of drugs that does not make it to market represents a potential loss of tens of millions of dollars in essential revenue. On the revenue end of the process, cash proceeds are useless unless they can be reinvested in new drug crops, arms, bribes, advanced technologies and other assets to keep the syndicates operating. If we can cut off the flow of money and drugs long enough, we can choke off the lifeblood of the drug trade.

The international financial community, working through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the regional Financial Action Task Forces, has made considerable headway in closing off the major avenues for legitimizing the proceeds of international crime. Long gone are the days when organizations could bank large blocs of cash or transfer enormous sums to anonymous bank accounts with no questions asked. Yet our progress has only blocked off some of the more obvious money laundering channels. Since we have obliged international criminals to become more sophisticated in circumventing our roadblocks, we have to become even more ingenious in devising new ones. Therefore, working closely with our partners, we will encourage all governments to refine their oversight mechanisms, tighten regulations, enact anti-money laundering legislation, and strictly enforce all money laundering laws. We also will seek better ways to identify, freeze and, ultimately, cause forfeiture of illegal drug proceeds before they can be invested. Where the United States itself is concerned, we will continue to make use of the International Economic Emergency Powers Act to keep the drug trade from exploiting legitimate companies for criminal purposes.

We enter the twenty-first century with considerable experience and success in fighting the international drug trade. In the decade and a half since the flow of cocaine pouring into the United States reached crisis proportions, we have achieved many of our immediate critical goals. Cocaine use has fallen dramatically; the coca crop is at an historic low; the big drug cartels have become fragmented; and most of the flamboyant drug syndicate bosses of the 1980s and '90s are either dead or behind bars. The foundations for long-term counternarcotics cooperation among the majority of affected countries are in place. Collectively, we can take pride in how far we have come.

There is no room, however, for complacency. Fighting the international drug trade is a complex, dynamic process. The incentives for wealth and power are enormous, while opportunities are constantly springing up in the form of a new generation of potential users across a wide range of countries. The drug trade will be quick to exploit these openings. Though the affluent societies of the West offer especially inviting prospects, no country is safe from a drug abuse crisis. Illegal drugs also will remain one of the principal sources, if not the primary source of revenue for a diversity of insurgent and criminal organizations in both hemispheres. They will also continue to be a potential source of corruption. Yet, as menacing as this opposition may be, we have shown that it cannot overcome the sustained, collective efforts of a coalition of governments committed to its destruction. Our task in the year ahead will be to make that coalition even stronger.

Coca and Cocaine

Though demand for cocaine has fallen over the last decade and a half, it remains our most serious illegal drug threat. Every year, several hundred tons enter the United States to feed a body of hard-core users. Crack, the smokable--and most quickly addictive--form of cocaine, still incites much of the violence in America's cities. Crack is simultaneously the drug dealer's dream and society's nightmare. It is cheap, potent, and addictive; it is also widely available, easily distributed, and highly profitable. Competition for the lucrative crack market continues to fuel much of the gang violence in major U.S. cities.

The United States remains the largest single market for the drug, but we may be losing that distinction. The long-term decline and leveling off in American demand for cocaine has caused the drug syndicates to seek out markets where there are better prospects for growth. Europe has been their principal target, since the Continent's general prosperity offers potential markets ripe for exploitation. In many countries of Eastern and Central Europe cocaine has the cachet of novelty that once made the drug attractive to American athletes, media stars, and Wall Street traders in the 1980s. Its stimulant properties appeal to aspiring overachievers. Russia offers another attractive growth opportunity. The combination of overnight millionaires anxious to consume and well organized criminal syndicates ready to provide drugs suits the syndicates' aims perfectly. With reports that cocaine sells for up to $300 per gram in Russia--three times the going price in the U.S.-- it is easy to see why Latin American drug syndicates continue to view Europe as a safe source of income for the next few years.

Europe, however, is not the only continent experiencing a major influx of cocaine. It is available in virtually every major city of the world. Though the volume may not be as great, cocaine is common in Asia and the Middle East, Africa, and South America. If our own experience in the last decade and a half is any guide, demand for cocaine in the rest of the world will continue to escalate until governments implement serious counternarcotics programs. If governments can strengthen the whole gamut of counternarcotics measures, including prevention, demand reduction, and enforcement programs, they may spare themselves the economic and social consequences of a major cocaine and crack epidemic.

Source and Transit Country Highlights

The United States has longstanding cooperative drug control programs with the principal source and transit countries of Latin America. The oldest of these programs are those that help the major coca growing and processing countries eliminate coca at the source. These initiatives have had remarkable success. With assistance from the United States, Peru and Bolivia have now demoted themselves to second and third tier suppliers of coca leaf and cocaine. Successes in Peru and Bolivia, however, have increased pressure on Colombia's drug syndicates to make up for losses by expanding cultivation into areas under guerrilla control. Colombian coca cultivation in 1999 increased by 20 percent. This figure would have been considerably higher if spray aircraft had not attacked caused considerable damage to the crop.

The decision to concentrate the bulk of cultivation within zones of hostile activity has raised the stakes for all concerned. Modern weapons protecting the coca fields under the control of trafficker-guerrilla and trafficker-paramilitary alliances have escalated the risks for Colombian spray planes. In 1999, the Thrush and OV-10 spray aircraft took more frequent hits as more powerful anti-aircraft weapons were brought on line. This ratcheting up of the threat has forced a rethinking of tactics, leading to a major boost in United States Government programs to assist the Colombian government in eliminating cultivation. Colombia for its part has activated its elite, U.S.-trained, counternarcotics battalion and formed an air-mobile interdiction unit to augment its power to challenge the narco-insurgent forces.

Over the next two years, the United States Government will propose $1.3 billion in assistance to help the Colombian government fight drug trafficking, bolster its economy, and strengthen its democracy. In the year ahead, the United States will provide Colombia with assistance to push into the coca growing areas now dominated by guerrillas. Among other programs, United States Government funds will train special counternarcotics battalions, purchase 30 Blackhawk and 33 Huey helicopters and provide eradication equipment.

Bolivia, which only permits manual destruction of coca, eliminated 16,999 hectares of coca, 46 percent more than in 1998. At the end of 1999, Bolivia had 21,800 hectares of coca under cultivation, a 43 percent drop from 1998. Since 1995 Bolivia's crop has decreased by more than half and is now the smallest in a decade. The government's success in crop reduction has moved it within reach of its goal of eliminating all illicit coca by the year 2002.

Peru, once the world's major coca producer, had 38,700 hectares of coca under cultivation at the end of 1999. This was a 24 percent drop from the 1998 total of 51,000 hectares. In five years, the Peruvian coca crop has been reduced by two-thirds--an extraordinary achievement.

As drug flows have been diverted to riverine and land routes, Ecuador continued to make important cocaine seizures. In 1999, Ecuadorian authorities seized nearly one metric ton of cocaine, more than twice the amount confiscated in 1998.

Central America and the Caribbean are the natural transit areas for drugs moving to the United States. Better law enforcement operations by governments in both regions have forced the drug trade constantly to vary their routes. In Central America, government action appears to have diverted many cocaine shipments from traditional overland routes. For example, cocaine seizures in Costa Rica fell drastically compared to the previous two years (approximately two tons in 1999, versus eight tons in 1998 and seven the year before.) Successful interdiction efforts may have caused traffickers to move drug shipments directly to Guatemala and points north via go-fast boats and aircraft. In 1999, Guatemalan agencies seized over ten metric tons of cocaine, including the largest seizure ever made by Guatemalan authorities. They also seized over 51 kilos of heroin and three kilos of crack cocaine. Reduced seizures in Panama confirm the apparent shift of trafficking patterns away from the established drug routes.

Mexico is the transit and distribution hub for the bulk of the drugs moving to the United States. Once Colombian cocaine reaches Mexico and Central America, powerful Mexican drug syndicates move the drug to U.S. markets. There are indications that flows into Mexico may have increased in 1999. Mexican authorities seized 37.2 metric tons of cocaine in 1999, a 65 percent increase over the 1998 figure of 22.6 metric tons.

Though the Caribbean remains an important transshipment area for the drug trade, cocaine seizures in 1999 fell in many countries of the region. As of November, law enforcement officials in the Bahamas had seized slightly less than two tons of cocaine in 1999, roughly half of the previous year's levels, but close to the two and a half metric tons seized by Jamaica, a record for that country. The Dominican Republic seized 1.1 metric tons, nearly twice the 430 kilograms seized by Haiti in 1999.

Heroin and Opiates

Heroin, unfortunately, is no longer the once discredited drug of "dead-end" addicts. Throughout the 1990s it gradually crept back onto the U.S. drug scene to a degree that worries epidemiologists and drug control experts today. They fear that heroin use could gradually take root in a new generation ignorant of the usually irreversibly addictive qualities of the drug. Heroin has an insidious property that appeals to trafficker and addict alike: it allows many addicts to develop a long-term tolerance to the drug, giving the illusion that they can control use. Where cocaine--especially crack cocaine--abuse usually leads to escalating consumption that can kill an addict in five years, an addiction to heroin can last a decade or more. Many addicts can function and hide their addiction, as long as they have access to a maintenance "fix." There have been prominent heroin addicts known to have preserved the facade of a normal life for decades, a fact that can feed youthful skepticism over heroin's real dangers.

Worse, over the past few years heroin has acquired an upscale image--"heroin chic"--among the younger generation. The archetypal heroin addict injecting him-or herself--with a dirty needle and dying miserably in a filthy back alley is a phenomenon of the past. For today's prospective heroin user in the United States, needles are not obligatory. The high purity of Colombian heroin currently available in much of the United States can be sniffed like cocaine, sparing the user from both the need for syringes and the fear of contracting AIDS from infected needles. The consequences of addiction, however, are the same--a physical and psychological dependency with withdrawal symptoms that make conquering an addiction extremely difficult. Estimates of the United States heroin addict population, which for the better part of two decades had remained at about 600,000 individuals, were revised upwards to 980,000 addicts in 1998. Including casual use, the figure may be 1.2 million. Evidence of combined drug use suggests that growing numbers of the United States' 1.8 million cocaine addicts are using heroin to cushion the "crash" that follows the "rush" of using crack.

Despite the popularity of cocaine, heroin still reigns as the hard drug of choice in much of the world. Although, according to United States Government estimates, total potential world-wide opium production in 1999 was at its lowest point in a decade and half, the approximately three thousand metric tons potentially available were more than enough to supply global heroin demand many times over. Europe, the principal consumer of Southwest Asian heroin, received some bad news in 1999. Afghanistan now is second only to Burma in the area under opium poppy cultivation and has actually surpassed Burma in potential opium gum production. Afghan opium poppy cultivation rose by 23 percent in 1999 to a total of 51,500 hectares, enough potentially to produce 1,670 metric tons of opium or 167 metric tons of heroin. By comparison, though Burma cultivated 89,500 hectares in 1999, their potential yield was 1,090 metric tons of opium gum, two-thirds of the Afghan total. As opium gum yields are much higher in Afghanistan, that country now potentially produces 55 percent of the world's opium gum.

This boom in supply can only exacerbate heroin addiction problems, not only in Europe but also in all the intervening countries along the heroin supply routes. Despite active enforcement programs in most transit countries, high-quality Afghan heroin continues to move in large quantities along the Balkan Route's northern, central, and southern branches into every important market in Europe, Russia, and the other countries of the former Soviet Union. From the size of seizures, it appears that larger and larger amounts are entering the pipeline. In 1999, Turkey seized 2.2 metric tons of heroin. Italy seized 1.2 metric tons. By comparison, the United States Government's largest heroin seizure was 490 kg in 1991. With heroin demand potentially open-ended and heroin availability unlikely to be seriously diminished, in the twenty-first century we can expect to see a continuing flow of the drug to nearly every country on the globe.

The drug trade is clearly anticipating growing market demand in North America. The Colombian drug syndicates have committed substantial resources to heroin production, most, if not all, of it destined for North America. Over the past four years there has been a shift in heroin supply patterns to the United States. Colombian and Mexican heroin have displaced Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin in much of the United States. While some Southeast heroin continues to flow to U.S. markets in undetermined quantities via Canada and by international mail, the bulk of the heroin seized and identified by United States Government agencies in 1999 was of Colombian and Mexican provenance. Most of the heroin seized by United States Government law enforcement agencies in 1999 east of the Mississippi River was of Colombian origin. West of the Mississippi, Mexican heroin dominated seizures. Since the big drug syndicates are in effect large multinational criminal organizations that carefully follow drug demand patterns and plan their operations accordingly, it appears that these syndicates may be counting on rising heroin consumption in the younger generation to keep them in business

Source and Transit Country Highlights

A second year of unfavorable growing conditions in 1999 reduced opium cultivation in the Golden Triangle region of Southeast Asia by 29 percent to 112,135 hectares, the lowest level since 1988. The decline was significant in Burma, which produced approximately 50 percent of the world's illegal opium. Burma's crop fell by 31 percent to 89,500 hectares, the smallest crop since the explosion of poppy cultivation in 1988. Burma's crop could potentially yield 1,090 metric tons of opium, convertible to 109 metric tons of heroin, enough to supply much of the world's demand. In 1999, opium poppy cultivation in Laos fell by 16 percent to 21,800 hectares, potentially yielding 140 metric tons of opium, or 14 metric tons of heroin. That is approximately 11 percent of the region's estimated output. Already marginal production in Thailand further plummeted by 38 percent to 835 hectares, capable of yielding six metric tons of opium gum or one ton of heroin, less than a fraction of one percent of Southeast Asian potential production. In Vietnam, poppy cultivation dropped by more than 30 percent to an estimated 2,100 hectares, a new low for the country. Potential yields were 11 metric tons of opium or slightly over a metric ton of heroin.

In Southwest Asia, total poppy cultivation rose by 19 percent in 1999 to 53,570 hectares. The estimated yield rose from 1,350 metric tons of opium gum in 1998 to 1,670 in 1999. All of the increase occurred in Afghanistan, which thanks to very high yields per hectare is now the world's leading source of illicit opium gum. The Afghan crop was at an all-time high of 51,500 hectares, a 23 percent increase. In contrast, opium poppy cultivation in Pakistan was at an all-time low of 1,570 hectares, having fallen 48 percent below the 1998 figure of 3,030 hectares. Government of Pakistan initiatives played an important role in this decline. In 1999, Pakistani authorities tripled their opium seizures to 11.5 metric tons and increased their heroin seizures by 57 percent to nearly four metric tons.

Any increase in Southwest Asian heroin production is especially bad news for Europe. Afghanistan furnishes most of the heroin that has been flooding European cities for years. Heroin moves to Europe along the so-called Balkan Route, a series of overland routes out of Afghanistan and Pakistan. After passing through Turkey, it splits into several branches. The northern route carries heroin to Romania, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and points north. The southern branch crosses through Croatia, Slovenia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece and Albania to the countries of Western Europe. Every country along the route now faces serious domestic drug problems. Turkish drug syndicates, with distributors in ethnic enclaves in a large number of European cities, dominate most of the Balkan Route commerce. In Italy, Albanian traffickers control much of the heroin trade.

Russian criminal organizations also play an increasingly evident role in drug trafficking in Europe and Central Asia. Many of these gangs--often controlled by Russian ethnic minorities from the Caucasus--survived even under the Soviet regime. Thus they entered post-Soviet Europe with the advantage of criminal expertise, contacts, and established smuggling and distribution networks. With the head start of heroin sources developed during the Soviet Union's war with Afghanistan, the Russian gangs are now a major factor in the European drug trade. They use their networks to transport Southwest Asian heroin through Central Asia to Russia, as well as onward to the Baltics and Western Europe.

Russia itself is now suffering serious addiction problems. Government authorities put the number of addicts at about two million, although the figure could well be higher. According to the Russian press sources, the Interior Ministry has noted a continuing increase in the growth rate of hard drug addiction. Opium, heroin, cocaine, and synthetic drugs are taking the place of crude traditional narcotics such as poppy straw extract.

Geography and history make Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, formerly important poppy growing regions for the Soviet Union, natural conduits for much of the drug traffic in Russia. Kazakhstan provides a bridge for Southeast Asian heroin to move to Europe and Russia from Asia. The other countries offer profitable access routes for Southwest Asian, especially Afghan, heroin into Russia, the New Independent States, and Europe. Heroin, which fetches high prices in Russia and Europe, has been a tempting source of cash to finance the civil wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

Just as Colombian and Mexican traffickers dominate the cocaine trade, Nigerian criminal organizations control a large part of the world's heroin traffic. Nigeria continues to be Africa's most important heroin distribution hub. Nigerian drug couriers dominate the international heroin smuggling trade and are the principal means of smuggling heroin into the United States. There is a hardly a country in the world that does not report arrests of Nigerians for heroin trafficking. They surface in Brazil, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and in every country in Europe. Though the Government of Nigeria has taken radical steps to suppress the endemic corruption that facilitates drug trafficking, the heroin smuggling organizations are so well entrenched that they are likely to remain the principal international conduits for the drug.

With a poppy crop responsible for less than four percent of the world's opium production, Colombia is nonetheless the Western Hemisphere's largest grower of opium poppies. High purity Colombian heroin now accounts for much of the heroin in the eastern United States. Colombian opium poppy cultivation in 1999 increased by 23 percent to 7,500 hectares capable of producing 750 metric tons of opium gum or nearly eight tons of heroin.

After Colombia, Mexico is the largest opium producer in the Western Hemisphere. It currently supplies the bulk of the heroin flowing to states west of the Mississippi. In 1999, Mexican government eradication efforts were remarkably successful. They cut opium poppy cultivation by a third to 3,600 hectares, the lowest level since 1992. This crop could potentially have yielded 43 metric tons of opium gum or slightly over four metric tons of heroin. In 1999, Mexican authorities seized 214 kilograms of heroin and three quarters of a metric ton of opium gum, a new record for the country.

International Organizations

International organizational efforts continue to be a key component of the overall U.S. counternarcotics strategy. Through multilateral organizations the United States has the opportunity to multiply contributions from other donors and decrease the erroneous perception that drugs are exclusively a U.S. problem. The U.S. participation in multilateral programs also supports indigenous capabilities in regions where the U.S. is unable to operate bilaterally for political or logistical reasons. Moreover, the U.S. contributions to UNDCP have had significant impact on the operations and expansion of UN counternarcotics programs and policy. In 1999, Andorra and Indonesia became parties to the 1988 UN Convention.

In 1999, OAS/CICAD, with United States Government participation, worked to develop the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM), a hemispheric peer review system to evaluate each OAS Member State's anti-drug strategies and efforts. The MEM, which was mandated by the 1998 Summit of the Americas, was negotiated over an 18 month period by an Inter-governmental Working Group (IWG), and was completed at the August IWG session in Ottawa. The OAS formally approved the MEM in October, 1999 and will produce its first evaluations during 2000.

Demand Reduction

Drug "demand reduction" refers to efforts to reduce world-wide use and abuse of, and demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The need for demand reduction is obvious, since escalating drug use and abuse continue to take a devastating toll on the health, welfare, safety, security, and economic stability of all nations. As a result, foreign countries are requesting more technical assistance from the United States Government to address their demand problems, citing long-term U.S. experience and efforts in this area. Assisting countries to reduce drug consumption helps in a small, but important way, to preserve the stability of that country.

Our demand reduction strategy integrates a broad spectrum of initiatives. These include efforts to prevent the onset of use, intervention at "critical decision points" in the lives of vulnerable populations to prevent both first use and further use, and effective treatment programs for the addicted. Other aspects encompass education and media campaigns to increase public awareness of the deleterious consequences of drug use/abuse and community-coalition building. This latter effort involves the development of private/public sector demand reduction coalitions designed to mobilize national and international opinion against the drug trade and to encourage governments to develop and implement strong counternarcotics policies and programs. The demand reduction program also provides for evaluations of the effectiveness of these efforts and for research studies to use these findings to improve similar services provided in the U.S.

In 1999, INL fostered the development of the first-ever international network of drug prevention programs with over 400 representatives from 44 countries at an international prevention summit in Bangkok. At the same time, INL worked with NGOs to enhance the Drug Prevention Network of the Americas (DPNA), a coalition of prevention programs from Canada, the U.S., the Caribbean, and Latin America. A complementary network of 3,000 Latin American treatment programs was also significantly enhanced. Developing countries that were the recipients of INL-funded training and technical assistance continued to self-fund their own programs developed from this assistance. Of particular note, Thailand and the Philippines developed millions-of-dollars worth of correctional-based drug intervention programs following INL-funded training. In 1999, multi-year studies were initiated on INL-funded pilot projects and programs developed from INL-funded training to learn how these initiatives can help assist U.S.-based demand reduction efforts. Preliminary results indicate that projects for high-risk youth in Peru and Brazil are evidencing high program retention rates and reduced rates of violence and recidivism.

Chemical Control

Chemical diversion control is a proactive and straightforward strategy to deny traffickers the chemicals they must have to manufacture illicit drugs. It involves the regulation of licit commerce in the chemicals most necessary for drug manufacture to ensure that only transactions for which legitimate end-uses have been established are permitted to proceed, thereby preventing the diversion of drug-producing chemicals from licit trade to illicit drug manufacture.

The need for chemical control has been internationally accepted. Article 12 of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 UN Drug Convention) establishes the obligation for parties to the Convention to control their chemical commerce to prevent diversion to illicit drug manufacture. The two tables of the Annex to the Convention list 22 chemicals as those most necessary for drug manufacture and, therefore, subject to control.

The United Nations International Narcotics Control Board has a central role in the implementation of international chemical control initiatives.

The essential element of effective international chemical control is rapid multilateral exchange of information between competent national authorities on proposed transactions in regulated chemicals in order to identify and stop or seize those shipments involving chemicals likely to be diverted to illicit drug manufacture. National control systems alone cannot prevent diversion. The United States Government continues to seek the establishment of formal and informal mechanisms for this information exchange.

An obstacle to more effective implementation of chemical control regimes as part of a comprehensive counternarcotics strategy is the proclivity of many governments to consider chemical control as a trade issue to be handled by trade ministries/agencies with a bias toward promoting, not regulating, trade. This leads to a reluctance to participate in the multilateral information exchange initiatives required for effective chemical control out of concern for commercial confidentiality.

There needs to be greater involvement of law enforcement agencies in the implementation of chemical control regimes. Regulatory agencies need to accept that chemical control can be effectively achieved without harm to indigenous commercial interests, and that law enforcement agencies have an essential role in its implementation. When implementation of chemical control regimes is restrained by commercial concerns, criminals can more easily obtain the chemicals they require for illicit drug manufacture, hindering international cooperative efforts against criminal drug trafficking.

Methodology for Estimating Illegal Drug Production

How Much Do We Know? The INCSR contains tables showing a variety of illicit narcotics-related data. These numbers represent the United States Government's best effort to sketch the dimensions of the international drug problem at this time, but the image is less precise than we would like it to be. The numbers range from cultivation figures, relatively hard data derived by proven means, to crop production and drug yield estimates, figures that become softer as more variables come into play. As in previous years, we publish these data with an important caveat: the yield figures are potential, not final numbers. Although they are useful for determining trends, they are ultimately approximations.

Each year, as we get better data through field research, we revise our estimates. This type of field research is far from easy. The clandestine, violent nature of the illegal drug trade makes it difficult to develop precise information. At the same time, the harsh terrain on which many drugs are cultivated is not always easily accessible This is particularly relevant given the tremendous geographic areas that must be covered, and the difficulty of collecting reliable information over diverse and treacherous terrain.

What We Know With Reasonable Certainty. The most reliable information we have on illicit drugs is how many hectares are under cultivation during any given year. For a decade and a half, the United States Government has estimated the extent of illicit cultivation in a dozen nations using proven statistical methods similar to those used to estimate the size of licit crops at home and abroad. We can therefore estimate the area under cultivation with reasonable accuracy.

What We Know With Less Certainty. The picture is less clear where crop yields are concerned. How much of a finished product a given area will produce is difficult to estimate. Small changes in factors such as soil fertility, weather, farming techniques, and disease can produce widely varying results from year to year and place to place. Moreover, most illicit drug crop areas are not easily accessible to the United States Government, making scientific information difficult to obtain. Again, we are estimating potential crop available for harvest. Not all of these estimates allow for losses, which could represent up to a third or more of a crop in some areas for some harvests. The value in estimating the size of the potential crop is to provide a consistent basis for a comparative analysis from year to year.

Since cocaine remains at the top of the United States Government's drug-control priority list, we have gradually improved our yield estimates. Our confidence in coca leaf yield estimates, as well as in the finished product, has risen in the past few years, based upon the results of field studies conducted in Latin America. Eight years ago, after completing preliminary research, the United States Government for the first time began to make its own estimate of dry coca leaf yields for Bolivia and Peru instead of relying solely on reports from the governments of those countries. This year we are at last able to estimate coca yields in Colombia. Additional research and field studies have helped refine these estimates and make similar improvements possible in estimates of other drug crops. In all cases, multiplying average yields times available hectarage indicates only the potential, not the actual final drug crop available for harvest.

Harvest Estimates. Estimating how much coca leaf, opium gum, and cannabis is actually harvested and available for processing into finished narcotics remains a major challenge. Although we are improving our techniques, at this time we cannot accurately estimate this amount with precision for any illicit crop in any nation.

While farmers naturally have strong incentives to maximize their harvests of what is almost always their most profitable cash crop, the harvest depends upon the efficiency of farming practices and the wastage caused by poor practices or difficult weather conditions during and after harvest. Up to a third or more of a crop may be lost in some areas during harvests.

In addition, mature coca (two to six years old), is more productive than immature or aging coca. Variations such as these can dramatically affect potential yield and production. Additional information and analysis is allowing us to make adjustments for these factors. Similar deductions for local consumption of unprocessed coca leaf and opium may be possible as well through the accumulation of additional information and research.

Processing Estimates. The wide variation in processing efficiency achieved by traffickers complicates the task of estimating the quantity of cocaine or heroin that could be refined from a crop. These variations occur because of differences in the origin and quality of the raw material used, the technical processing method employed, the size and sophistication of laboratories, the skill and experience of local workers and chemists, and decisions made in response to enforcement pressures. (See Yield Estimates below.)

Figures Change as Techniques and Data Quality Improve. Each year, research produces revisions to United States Government estimates of potential drug production. This is typical of annualized figures for most other areas of statistical tracking that must be revised year to year , whether it be the size of the U.S. wheat crop, population figures, or the unemployment rate. For the present, however, these statistics represent the state of the art. As new information becomes available and as the art improves, so will the precision of the estimates.

Status of Potential Worldwide Production

In evaluating the figures below, one must bear in mind that they are theoretical. They represent estimates of potential production--the amounts that the United States Government estimates could have been produced if, and only if, all available crops were to be converted into finished drugs. Since these estimates do not always make allowance for losses, actual production is probably lower than our estimates. The figures shown are mean points in a statistical range.

Potential Opium Production. In Southeast Asia, for the third year in row, estimated opium cultivation and production in the Golden Triangle countries fell. In 1999, total cultivation fell by 29 percent, while yield fell by 35 percent. According to United States Government estimates, in 1999, growers in Burma, Laos, and Thailand cultivated an estimated 112,135 hectares of opium poppy, potentially producing 1,236 metric tons of opium. Burma's production accounts for 80 percent of this amount, down from 95 percent in 1998. In Burma, estimated opium poppy cultivation fell by 31 percent to 89,500 hectares from the 130,300 hectares reported for 1998. Estimated yield fell to 1,090 metric tons of opium gum for 1999, a 38 percent drop from 1,750 metric tons in 1998. Weather conditions were largely responsible for the decrease in the crop. In Laos, a 16 percent drop in estimated cultivation brought the estimated crop down to 21,800 hectares, down from the 26,100 hectare figure for 1998; estimated production, however, remained at 140 metric tons. Estimated opium poppy cultivation in Thailand again fell dramatically by approximately 38 percent to 835 hectares from the 1,350 hectares observed last year. Thailand had an estimated potential production of six metric tons--62 percent less than the 16 metric tons estimated in 1998. In 1999, the United States Government's fourth survey of Vietnam found that the crop had fallen by 30 percent to 2,100 hectares with a potential yield of 11 metric tons from last year's high of 3,000 hectares of opium poppy cultivation yielding a potential 20 metric tons. The United States Government found no significant opium cultivation in China's Yunnan Province in 1999.

Opium poppy cultivation in Southwest Asia increased by 19 percent in 1999 as a result of greater cultivation in Afghanistan, which has displaced Burma as the leading producer of illicit opium gum. The increase occurred despite a 48 percent drop in Pakistan's opium crop. Total hectarage for Afghanistan and Pakistan rose from 44,750 hectares in 1998 to 53,070 hectares in 1999. Total potential production for both countries rose from 1,415 metric tons to 1,707 metric tons. Afghan hectarage rose from 41,720 hectares in 1998 to 51,000 hectares in 1999, a 22 percent increase. The estimated yield rose by 23 percent from 1,350 metric tons in 1998 to 1,670 metric tons in 1999. Afghanistan alone now potentially produces 34 percent more opium than Asia's Golden Triangle. Pakistan's hectarage decreased 48 percent from 3,030 hectares in 1998 to 1,570 hectares in 1999. Estimated yield dropped 43 percent from 65 metric tons in 1998 to 37 metric tons in 1999.

The United States Government continues to examine the illicit drug crop situation in Russia and the Central Asian. While some of these countries may be able to produce significant opium poppy harvests, the United States Government still lacks sufficient data to identify and measure all suspected areas. Estimates in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in 1998, however, showed cultivation there to be negligible.

In the Western Hemisphere, the opium poppy growing countries have maintained active crop control efforts despite continuing campaigns by criminal organizations to expand the areas under cultivation. In Colombia, United States Government estimates showed a 23 percent increase in 1999 to 7,500 hectares, enough to yield an estimated 7.5 metric tons of opium gum, or a little under eight tons of heroin, assuming no losses. In Mexico, the 1999 opium poppy crop fell 34 percent. After Mexican government eradication operations took out production 7,900 hectares of poppy, there were 3,600 hectares of opium poppy--a near record low for the decade. Assuming no losses, the estimated potential yield was 43 metric tons of opium gum, or slightly over four metric tons of heroin. Guatemala's poppy cultivation remains at minimal levels after government efforts.

Coca Cultivation. Worldwide coca cultivation dropped four percent from last year's 190,800 hectares to 183,000 hectares in 1999. Despite an active eradication program, Colombia experienced an increase in coca cultivation to 122,500 hectares at the end of 1999. In Bolivia, government forces reduced cultivation from 38,000 hectares in 1998 to 21,800 hectares in 1999. Peru's coca crop dropped 24 percent from 51,000 hectares at the end of 1998 to 38,700 hectares at the end of 1999. Some coca is cultivated in inaccessible areas of Brazil, but its extent is unknown. Ecuador has only negligible amounts of coca.

Cocaine Field Estimates

The cocaine yield figure is offered with the same caveat as the crop harvest yield data: it is a figure representing potential production. It does not in every case allow for losses or the many other variables that one would encounter in a "real world" conversion from plant to finished drug. In fact, the amount of cocaine HCL actually making it to market is probably lower. Efficiencies vary greatly. A United States Government team that studied cocaine processing in Bolivia's Chapare region in 1993 found that in the laboratories under observation processing efficiency was lower than previously thought. The estimate for Bolivia was reduced accordingly. The reverse has happened in 1999 with Colombia, where United States Government researchers determined that not only were coca leaf yields were nearly twice as great as previously estimated, but that processing efficiencies allow Colombian traffickers to extract much higher percentages of cocaine alkaloid than previously supposed.

In 1999, taking into account estimates of local consumption and local seizures, the United States Government calculates that if virtually every coca leaf were converted into cocaine HCl, and there were no losses because of inefficiency, bad weather, disease, or the deterrent effects of law enforcement, 765 metric tons of cocaine HCl theoretically could have been available from Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru for worldwide export. This figure includes 175 metric tons potentially available from Peru, 70 metric tons potentially available from Bolivia, and approximately 520 metric tons potentially available from Colombia. In publishing these numbers, we repeat our caveat that these are theoretical numbers, useful for examining trends. Though every year research moves us closer to a more precise cocaine yield estimate for Latin America, we do not yet know for certain the actual amount available for distribution.

Consumption Data

Most of the chapters in this report contain some user or consumption data. For the most part, these are estimates provided by foreign governments or informal estimates by United States Government agencies. There is no way to vouch for their reliability. They are included because they are the only data available and give an approximation of how governments view their own drug abuse problems. They should not be considered as a source of data to develop any reliable consumption estimates.

Marijuana Production

Cannabis cultivation continued to decline in Mexico in 1999 to 3,700 hectares with a potential yield of 6,700 metric tons. The Mexican government took out of production some 19,400 hectares of cannabis in 1999. In Colombia's traditional cannabis growing zones, where intensive eradication in previous years had virtually destroyed the crop, there was a resurgence of cultivation in 1993 to an estimated 5,000 hectares. That estimate did not change in 1999. The size of Jamaica's cannabis crop in 1999 is still under review. We recognize that there may be considerable undetected cannabis cultivation in Central and East Asia, and on the African continent, though there is no evidence that any of this cannabis significantly affects the United States. As we gather more accurate information, we will report significant findings in future INCSRs.

Worldwide Illicit Drug Cultivation
1991-1999 (All Figures in Hectares)

	1999	1998	1997	1996	1995	1994	1993	1992	1991
Opium
Afghanistan	51,500	41,720	39,150	37,950	38,740	29,180	21,080	19,470	17,190
India	150		2,050	3,100	4,750	5,500	4,400
Iran1	200
Pakistan	1,570	3,030	4,100	3,400	6,950	7,270	6,280	8,170	8,205
Total SW Asia	53,420	44,750	45,300	44,450	50,440	41,950	31,760	27,640	25,395
Burma	89,500	130,300	155,150	163,100	154,070	154,070	146,600	153,700	160,000
China					1,275	1,965
Laos	21,800	26,100	28,150	25,250	19,650	19,650	18,520	25,610	29,625
Thailand	835	1,350	1,650	2,170	1,750	2,110	2,110	2,050	3,000
Total SE Asia	112,135	157,750	184,950	190,250	176,745	177,795	167,230	181,360	192,625
Colombia	7,500	6,100	6,600	6,300	6,540	20,000	20,000	20,000	1,160
Lebanon				90	150		440	na	3,400
Guatemala					39	50	438	730	1,145
Mexico	3,600	5,500	4,000	5,100	5,050	5,795	3,960	3,310	3,765
Vietnam	2,100	3,000	6,150	3,150
Total Other	13,200	14,600	16,750	14,640	11,779	25,845	24,838	24,040	9,470
Total Opium	178,755	217,100	247,000	249,610	238,964	245,590	223,828	233,040	227,490
Coca
Bolivia	21,800	38,000	45,800	48,100	48,600	48,100	47,200	45,500	47,900
Colombia	122,500	101,800	79,500	67,200	50,900	45,000	39,700	37,100	37,500
Peru	38,700	51,000	68,800	94,400	115,300	108,600	108,800	129,100	120,800
Ecuador									40
Total Coca	183,000	190,800	194,100	209,700	214,800	201,700	195,700	211,700	206,240
Cannabis
Mexico	3,700	4,600	4,800	6,500	6,900	10,550	11,220	16,420	17,915
Colombia	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	4,986	5,000	2,000	2,000
Jamaica			317	527	305	308	744	389	950
Total Cannabis	8,700	9,600	10,117	12,027	12,205	15,844	16,964	18,809	20,865

 

¹ USG surveys in 1998 revealed no cultivation of opium in Iran's traditional growing areas.

Worldwide Illicit Drug Cultivation
1987-1990 (All Figures in Hectares)

	1990	1989	1988	1987
Opium
Afghanistan	12,370	18,650	23,000	18,500
India
Iran
Pakistan	8,220	6,050	11,588	9,970
Total SW Asia	20,590	24,700	34,588	28,470
Burma	150,100	143,000	104,200	76,021
China
Laos	30,580	42,130	40,400
Thailand	3,435	4,075	2,843	2,934
Total SE Asia	184,185	189,205	147,443	78,955
Colombia
Lebanon	3,200	4,500	na	na
Guatemala	845	1,220	710
Mexico	5,450	6,600	5,001	5,160
Vietnam
Total Other	9,495	12,320	5,711	5,160
Total Opium	214,200	226,225	187,742	112,585
Coca
Bolivia	50,300	52,900	48,900	41,300
Colombia	40,100	42,400	34,000	25,600
Peru	121,300	120,400	110,400	108,800
Ecuador	120	150	240	300
Total Coca	211,820	215,850	193,540	176,000
Cannabis
Mexico	35,050	53,900	5,003	5,250
Colombia	1,500	2,270	4,188	5,005
Jamaica	1,220	280	607	680
Total Cannabis	37,770	56,450	9,798	10,935

Worldwide Potential Illicit Drug Production
1991-1999 (All Figures in Metric Tons)

	1999	1998	1997	1996	1995	1994	1993	1992	1991
Opium Gum
Afghanistan	1,670	1,350	1,265	1,230	1,250	950	685	640	570
India			30	47	77	90
Iran
Pakistan	37	65	85	75	155	160	140	175	180
Total SW Asia	1,707	1,415	1,380	1,352	1,482	1,200	825	815	750
Burma	1,090	1,750	2,365	2,560	2,340	2,030	2,575	2,280	2,350
China					19	25
Laos	140	140	210	200	180	85	180	230	265
Thailand	6	16	25	30	25	17	42	24	35
Total SE Asia	1,236	1,906	2,600	2,790	2,564	2,157	2,797	2,534	2,650
Colombia	75	61	66	63	65
Lebanon				1	1		4		34
Guatemala									11
Mexico	43	60	46	54	53	60	49	40	41
Vietnam	11	20	45	25
Total Other	129	141	157	143	119	60	53	40	86
Total Opium	3,072	3,462	4,137	4,285	4,165	3,417	3,675	3,389	3,486
Coca Leaf
Bolivia	22,800	52,900	70,100	75,100	85,000	89,800	84,400	80,300	78,000
Colombia1	521,400	437,600	347,000	302,900	229,300	35,800	31,700	29,600	30,000
Peru	69,200	95,600	130,200	174,700	183,600	165,300	155,500	223,900	222,700
Ecuador							100	100	40
Total Coca	613,400	586,100	547,300	552,700	497,900	290,900	271,700	333,900	330,740
Cannabis
Mexico2	3,700	8,300	8,600	11,700	12,400	5,540	6,280	7,795	7,775
Colombia	4,000	4,000	4,133	4,133	4,133	4,138	4,125	1,650	1,650
Jamaica			214	356	206	208	502	263	641
Belize									49
Others	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500
Total Cannabis	11,200	15,800	16,447	19,689	20,239	13,386	14,407	13,208	13,615

¹ Colombia's coca leaf production figures for 1995-98 were revised upward in 1999. See "Methodology for Estimating Illegal Production" in this section.

² Mexico's cannabis production figures for 1995-98 were revised upward in 1999.

Worldwide Potential Illicit Drug Production
1987-1990 (All Figures in Metric Tons)

	1990	1989	1988	1987
Opium Gum
Afghanistan	415	585	750	600
India
Iran				300
Pakistan	165	130	205	205
Total SW Asia	580	715	955	1,105
Burma	2,255	2,430	1,280	835
China
Laos	275	380	255	225
Thailand	40	50	25	24
Total SE Asia	2,570	2,860	1,560	1,084
Colombia
Lebanon	32	45
Guatemala	13	12	8	3
Mexico	62	66	67	50
Vietnam
Total Other	107	123	75	53
Total Opium	3,257	3,698	2,590	2,242
Coca Leaf
Bolivia	77,000	78,200	79,500	79,200
Colombia	32,100	33,900	27,200	20,500
Peru	196,900	186,300	187,700	191,000
Ecuador	170	270	400	400
Total Coca	306,170	298,670	294,800	291,100
Cannabis
Mexico	19,715	30,200	5,655	5,933
Colombia	1,500	2,800	7,775	5,600
Jamaica	825	190	405	460
Belize	60	65	120	200
Others	3,500	3,500	3,500	1,500
Total Cannabis	25,600	36,755	17,455	13,693

Parties to the 1988 UN Convention

Country	Date Signed		Date Became a Party
1. Afghanistan	20 December 1988		14 February 1992
2. Algeria	20 December 1988		5 May 1995
3. Andorra	Accession		23 July 1999
4. Antigua and Barbuda	Accession		5 April 1993
5. Armenia	20 December 1988		28 June 1993
6. Argentina	Accession		13 September 1993
7. Australia	14 February 1989		16 November 1992
8. Austria	25 September 1989		11 July 1997
9. Azerbaijan	Accession		22 September 1993
10. Bahamas	20 December 1988		30 January 1989
11. Bahrain	28 September 1989		7 February 1990
12. Bangladesh	14 April 1989		11 October 1990
13. Barbados	Accession		15 October 1992
14. Belarus	27 February 1989		15 October 1990
15. Belgium	22 May 1989		25 October 1995
16. Belize	Accession		24 July 1996
17. Benin	Accession		23 May 1997
18. Bhutan	Accession		27 August 1990
19. Bolivia	20 December 1988		20 August 1990
20. Bosnia and Herzegovina	Succession		01 September 1993
21. Botswana	Accession		13 August 1996
22. Brazil	20 December 1988		17 July 1991
23. Brunei Darussalam	26 October 1989		12 November 1993
24. Bulgaria	19 May 1989		24 September 1992
25. Burkina Faso	Accession		02 June 1992
26. Burma	Ratified		11 June 1991
27. Burundi	Accession		18 February 1993
28. Cameroon	27 February 1989		28 October 1991
29. Canada	20 December 1988		05 July 1990
30. Cape Verde	Accession		08 May 1995
31. Chad	Accession		09 June 1995
32. Chile	20 December 1988		13 March 1990
33. China	20 December 1988		25 October 1989
34. Colombia	20 December 1988		10 June 1994
35. Costa Rica	25 April 1989		8 February 1991
36. Cote d'Ivoire	20 December 1988		25 November 1991
37. Croatia	Succession		26 July 1993
38. Cuba	7 April 1989		12 June 1996
39. Cyprus	20 December 1988		25 May 1990
40. Czech Republic	Succession		30 December 1993
41. Denmark	20 December 1988		19 December 1991
42. Dominica	Accession		30 June 1993
43. Dominican Republic	Accession		21 September 1993
44. European Economic Community	8 June 1989		31 December 1990
45. Ecuador	21 June 1988		23 March 1990
46. Egypt	20 December 1988		15 March 1991
47. El Salvador	Accession		21 May 1993
48. Ethiopia	Accession		11 October 1994
49. Fiji	Accession		25 March 1993
50. Finland	8 February 1989		15 February 1994
51. France	13 February 1989		31 December 1990
52. Gambia	Accession		23 April 1996
53. Germany	19 January 1989		30 November 1993
54. Georgia	Accession		8 January 1998
55. Ghana	20 December 1988		10 April 1990
56. Greece	23 February 1989		28 January 1992
57. Grenada	Accession		10 December 1990
58. Guatemala	20 December 1988		28 February 1991
59. Guinea	Accession		27 December 1990
60. Guyana	Accession		19 March 1993
61. Haiti	Accession		18 September 1995
62. Honduras	20 December 1988		11 December 1991
63. Hungary	22 August 1989		15 November 1996
64. Iceland	Accession		2 September 1997
65. India	Accession		27 March 1990
66. Indonesia	27 March 1989		23 February 1999
67. Iran	20 December 1988		7 December 1992
68. Iraq	Accession		22 July 1998
69. Ireland	14 December 1989		3 September 1996
70)Italy	20 December 1988		31 December 1990
71. Jamaica	2 October 1989		29 December 1995
72. Japan	19 December 1989		12 June 1992
73. Jordan	20 December 1988		16 April 1990
74. Kazakhstan	Accession		29 April 1997
75. Kenya	Accession		19 October 1992
76. Korea	Accession		28 December 1998
77. Kyrgyzstan	Accession		7 October 1994
78. Latvia	Accession		24 February 1994
79. Lesotho	Accession		28 March 1995
80. Lebanon	Accession		11 March 1996
81. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Accession		22 July 1996
82. Lithuania	Accession		8 June 1998
83. Luxembourg	26 September 1989		29 April 1992
84. Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Rep.	Accession		18 October 1993
85. Madagascar	Accession		12 March 1991
86. Malaysia	20 December 1988		11 May 1993
87. Malawi	Accession		12 October 1995
88. Mali	Accession		31 October 1995
89. Malta	Accession		28 February 1996
90. Mauritania	Accession		1 July 1993
91)91. Mexico	16 February 1989		11 April 1990
92. Moldova	Accession		19 February 1995
93. Monaco	24 February 1989		23 April 1991
94. Morocco	28 December 1988		28 October 1992
95. Mozambique	Accession		8 June 1998
96. Nepal	Accession		24 July 1991
97. Netherlands	18 January 1992		8 September 1993
98. Nicaragua	20 December 1988		4 May 1990
99. Niger	Accession		10 November 1992
100. Nigeria	1 March 1989		1 November 1989
101. Norway	20 December 1988		1 January 1994
102. Oman	Accession		15 March 1991
103. Pakistan	20 December 1988		25 October 1991
104. Panama	20 December 1988		13 January 1994
105. Paraguay	20 December 1988		23 August 1990
106. Peru	20 December 1988		16 January 1992
107. Philippines	20 December 1988		7 June 1996
108. Poland	6 March 1989		26 May 1994
109. Portugal	13 December 1989		3 December 1991
110. Qatar	Accession		4 May 1990
111. Romania	Accession		21 January 1993
112. Russia	19 January 1989		17 December 1990
113. St. Kitts and Nevis	Accession		19 April 1995
114. St. Lucia	Accession		21 August 1995
115. St. Vincent and the Grenadines	Accession		17 May 1994
116. Sao Tome and Principe	Accession		20 June 1996
117. Saudi Arabia	Accession		9 January 1992
118. Senegal	20 December 1988		27 November 1989
119. Seychelles	Accession		27 February 1992
120. Sierra Leone	9 June 1989		6 June 1994
121. Singapore	Accession		23 October 1997
122. Slovakia	Succession		28 May 1993
123. Slovenia	Succession		6 July 1992
124. South Africa	Accession		14 December 1998
125. Spain	20 December 1988		13 August 1990
126. Sri Lanka	Accession		6 June 1991
127. Sudan	30 January 1989		19 November 1993
128. Suriname	20 December 1988		28 October 1992
129. Swaziland	Accession		3 October 95
130. Sweden	20 December 1988		22 July 1991
131. Syria	Accession		3 September 1991
132. Tajikistan	Accession		6 May 1996
133. Tanzania	20 December 1988		17 April 1996
134. Trinidad and Tobago	7 December 1989		17 February 1995
135. Togo	3 August 1989		1 August 1990
136. Tonga	Accession		29 April 1996
137. Tunisia	19 December 1989		20 September 1990
138. Turkey	20 December 1988		2 April 1996
139. Turkmenistan	Accession		21 February 1996
140. UAE	Accession		12 April 1990
141. Uganda	Accession		20 August 1990
142. Ukraine	16 March 1989		28 August 1991
143. United Kingdom	20 December 1988		28 June 1991
144. United States	20 December 1988		20 February 1990
145. Uruguay	19 December 1989		10 March 1995
146. Uzbekistan	Accession		14 August 1995
147. Venezuela	20 December 1988		16 July 1991
148. Vietnam	Accession		4 November 1997
149. Yemen	20 December 1988		25 March 1996
150. Yugoslavia	20 December 1988		3 January 1991
151. Zambia	9 February 1989		28 May 1993
152. Zimbabwe	Accession		30 July 1993
Signed but Pending Ratification
1. Gabon	20 December 1989
2. Holy See	20 December 1988	Not UN member
3. Israel	20 December 1988	Awaiting Money Laundering Legislation
4. Kuwait	2 October 1989
5. Maldives	5 December 1989
6. Mauritius	20 December 1988
7. New Zealand	18 December 1989
8. Philippines	20 December 1988
9. Switzerland	16 November 1989	Not UN member
10. Zaire	20 December 1988
Other
1. Anguilla			Not UN member
2. Aruba			Not UN member
3. Bermuda
4. BVI			Not UN member
5. Cambodia
6.Central African Republic
7. Chad
8. Comoros
9. Congo
10. Djibouti
11. DPR Korea
12. Estonia
13. Hong Kong			Not UN member
14. Laos
15. Liberia
16. Liechtenstein
17. Marshall Islands
18. Micronesia, Federated States of
19. Mongolia
20. Namibia
21. Papua New Guinea
22. Samoa
23. San Marino
24. Sao Tome and Principe
25. Taiwan			Not UN member
26. Thailand
27. Turks & Caicos			Not UN member
28. Vanuatu

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