Francis R. Valeo

Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

OPENING THE DOOR TO CHINA

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RITCHIE: Today I'd like to talk about the beginning of the Nixon years, in 1969, and how things changed for the Senate at that stage.

VALEO: There are two things that I need to recall just before this period. I think I mentioned earlier that Mansfield and I were not here for that election, and even the previous Johnson election, actually. I think it was this election that we went to Eastern Europe. We went to Czechoslovakia, because it was a time of expected democratization of Czechoslovakia. We went to Prague and we were briefed by the American embassy and anybody else we could find there, including the Western press people, on what was happening in Czechoslovakia. It was a time of great enthusiasm. There was a luncheon at the embassy with members of the new democratic group who had just come to power. It was a rather heady time, they were talking very much in Western democratic terms. We duly reported this in our report when we got back, and mentioned, in effect, that there was no suggestion of a Soviet invasion of the country to change that situation and there wasn't. That was obviously the question that we put wherever we went, whether there was any expectation of that, and there

was absolutely none in Western diplomatic circles in the area. Everybody on the contrary was very cheerful and it looked as if Czechoslovakia were going to go back where it belonged, with the West, and so forth. I guess Mansfield made a statement on it. It was not a formal report. He made a statement on the floor to that effect. And of course, the next day, I think it was, the Soviet Union moved in in full force and upset that apple cart completely.

It was a time when Mansfield was pushing his perennial measure to try to force a reduction of American forces in Europe. He decided that the better part of discretion would indicate that he'd better not push it that year. Actually, the reduction of U.S. forces in Europe was not an original Mansfield idea, it was an Eisenhower idea. Eisenhower had said in an article in the *Saturday Evening Post*, I believe, some years before, that there was no way, if the Soviets were determined to move into Western Europe, you could really stop it on the ground. What we were using the troops there for were as a trip-wire, and that one division, I think Eisenhower used, rather than four would be just as good if you have a trip-wire. Well, Mansfield I think raised it to two divisions as a trip-wire, but essentially he was just following through on a thought of Eisenhower's.

But he ran into what seemed to me to be the most formidable entrenched opposition to a change anywhere I've ever seen. The

State Department was adamant, the military people were totally adamant. When there was some threat that we might possibly get it passed in a resolution, I recall Johnson or Nixon brought in a whole battery of former secretaries of State and everyone else he could think of to say how foolish this would be. So the effort was all out to forestall Mansfield. I've never understood why the executive branch was so built in on this. I'm sure the need to stay in Europe was a valid one, I don't think there was any question of that, but it seemed to me that the insistence that even the slightest cut in forces would be a disaster was ridiculous. I think there were two things that probably motivated this kind of reaction. First of all there was a bureaucratic in-build: you have a lovely set-up in Europe, why change it? It's a good place to send your troops when you don't know what else to do with them. So certainly some of that was a part of the resistance

But I think the other thing was not so much a fear of the Soviet Union, that four or one divisions would make that much difference with the Soviet Union. I think the deeper fear, at least in the Department of State, was that if you once made a conspicuous cut, you would unearth all of the latent isolationist forces in the United States who would then say: why do we need any troops in Europe? And that would be the really dangerous thing. I really do not believe that the opposition was based on military considerations primarily. What they did instead was to

throw the idea of reductions into that pot of negotiations with the Soviet Union where it has churned for decades along with disarmament, or control of armaments in Europe. It was argued that we needed the troops as a bargaining chip. Well, if something is an expensive operation, which it is, and it's costing you probably billions of dollars a year to keep those three or four extra divisions beyond a trip-wire that you need in Europe, it seems to me that it makes it a bargaining chip for the other side. Why would they want to relieve you of that burden by agreeing to any kind of a cut-down. On the contrary, they would say: "No, of course not, we're not going to move any of our troops." So the use of the term "bargaining chip" seemed to me to be ridiculous in that situation. You had nothing to bargain with.

I was only partially involved with Mansfield on the troop withdrawal from Western Europe. I think he got tired of seeing the same old tired things that I would give him on the subject. There was nothing new that you could say on it. I think he asked Charlie Ferris or somebody else to try to pick it up and see if they had some new angles, but it still came out the same way. He would use it repeatedly, and he confessed to me one time that he really didn't care whether it got through, the real thing was to keep reminding them downtown that this was a ridiculous situation that they had got themselves into and they really needed to make some changes. I would certainly agree with that. We took the

same view on troops in Japan later on. This was of course before he became ambassador; he's changed his view on it now and is following the administration line. But at that time he was very much in favor of a reduction of U.S. troops not only in Japan but in Korea as well. I personally see no reason why that isn't a valid position even today.

Again, you run into essentially the same reasoning in the executive branch of the political consequences. Some people in the department almost said as much in private. They'd say, "Well, we can make a ten percent reduction quietly, but if we do it on a formal basis, why, it will not look good." They always put it in terms "we'd make our allies nervous," but I don't think it would have made our allies at all nervous. I think it would be much more the question of perhaps scaring up some old ghosts in the United States, the ghosts of isolationism. The danger in not doing it, however, not doing what is logical in the situation, in my judgment, is that you feed precisely the thing that you don't want to see happen. I think that is one of the consequences that we're seeing now in some of these cross-signals in difficult problems. As a nation, you become—I used to like to use the term "isolated internationalist" or you move in effect in that direction. Little by little you lose touch with reality and in the process lose the allies that are essential. So that probably is an even greater danger because it leads then to a certain type of

national imperiousness which can do us a great deal of damage. I think we are seeing more of that.

RITCHIE: It's interesting that you use the bureaucracy as the villain in this story, that policies do get so entrenched. Is the only way the Congress can deal with that by frontal assault?

VALEO: Almost. In the case of the monetary problems which result from entrenchment, the equivalent of it was the so-called "meat-axe cuts" for departments. Rather than trying to do what amounted to a rational, reasonable job, you just said cut the departments by ten percent. Well, one department might really need to grow ten percent. But if you put in overall cuts, or overall freezes, what you're really doing is essentially a "meat-axe" approach. It's one of the techniques which develop out of a sense of hopelessness in dealing with a situation. It is a very dangerous one. The only answer I know is to take a look at why you have this accumulated dry rot in the departments, and you find the roots in the accumulated legislation passed in previous years and decades. So you come to the question of "Sunset" provisions in laws, which I think offer some hope, and which are really another way of utilizing fully the oversight function of the Congress.

The problem with trying to deal with the situation in the direct, logical way of oversight, is that you come up with an

oversight report out of a committee which very often has a good deal of validity in its examination of a department, or a policy, or a way of doing things, and nobody pays much attention to it after the first day or two that it's out. So the report gets buried with everything else. In the case of a "Sunset" law where you write in the provision of automatic expiration, Congress is forced to look at its handiwork and re-pass the law periodically. In that way you are not able to talk about changes for a day or two and then forget it, because if you did then the law would expire and everything would drop and most members do not want to drop everything. I don't think that "sunset" has gotten very far as a device in the Congress. I personally think it is an immensely valuable one.

Now, to go on a little bit to Nixon's victory. Everybody had really counted him out until that time, but ironically it was the Vietnamese War that saved him. I think we mentioned this earlier. My own feeling was that he and Mel Laird were about as responsible as anyone for prodding Johnson in the direction of involvement in Vietnam. This is no excuse for Johnson, it was his business to stand against that, and while they may have been playing politics with a very serious matter, the fact remains that it was politics on their part, whereas on Johnson's part he had the responsibility and he should have acted accordingly. But he didn't. I'm quite sure he was looking over his shoulder always at Nixon. He never

believed Nixon was dead after the defeat in the governorship race in California. Well, Nixon came back and beat Humphrey.

I think Senator Pastore really put his finger on what was responsible for Humphrey's defeat. He didn't say this after Humphrey's defeat, he said it before. He was in my office one day and there were two or three other members sitting around. He said, "I don't know how Hubert's going to do in this. I don't think he can make it." He said, "We all love him, and he's a great guy, but there are some problems. I'll tell you what happened. At the convention, right after he was nominated, he sought me out and I went to see him. We sat down and he said, 'Now John, I want you to give me your best advice on how I should handle this campaign.' So I did, I said, 'Well, Hubert, now that you've asked me, I'll tell you. There are really two things you've got to do: the first is to move yourself away from Johnson on Vietnam. The second thing you've got to do, you've got to shorten your speeches.'" "So," he continued, "What did he do? The next day he went out and made a speech. He went down the line in defense of Johnson on Vietnam, and he did it in the longest speech I ever heard him make."

I think Pastore, who had a marvelous sense of humor, put his finger on it pretty well. I think Vietnam beat Hubert. His eagerness to accept the Johnson embrace, or to seek it even, was very transparent, and that hurt him too. He was probably thinking

in terms of the South and the need to hold the South in line, and that was the way to do it. But it obviously did not work that way for him.

So we come to the Nixon administration. This change to a Republican administration altered the picture in the Senate. For one thing, the direct majority leadership contact with the White House was diminished. It was not completely cut off, but it was considerably diminished. We went through the formalities of the inauguration. Nixon came up, it was the first time I think I'd ever seen him close up, for the traditional luncheon. Mansfield, after his first contacts with Nixon, said something to me, it was—no, I guess that was later, and we'll get to that later when we get to the impeachment questions. But it was clear that Mansfield had great difficulty getting a handle on Nixon, and on how to approach him on anything that we were doing. They had never been close in the Senate. He had no real personal animosities towards Nixon or, at least, he didn't show them if he did. Nixon, I don't think, had been involved directly in campaigning against him in the scurrilous '52 campaign when Eisenhower was elected, when they were calling him "China Mike." Their relations had always been rather, I think, pleasant enough on a personal basis, and somewhat formal.

What it did change most was that with a different party in the White House, meant the role of the policy committee,

considering the way Mansfield had already begun to use it, became very significant. And that's precisely the way we moved. We also began—I can't remember now whether it was in the first Nixon administration or the second when we became very worried about the situation as the Nixon impeachment approached. We inaugurated a new practice at that time of a minimum of one formal meeting a month with the House leadership. This happened after Carl Albert became Speaker, so that may give some indication of the time. Mansfield did not try joint leadership meetings with McCormack as Speaker. McCormack would not even have heard what he said had he suggested it. But Albert was most willing. So these were two major changes, a more forceful use of the Majority Policy Committee on issues of substance and the development of a joint party leadership approach, on a somewhat formal basis, between the House and the Senate. As for the Majority Policy Committee, it began to meet regularly every week and by this time the discussions were heavily on Vietnam, but not exclusively, they got into many other things. We put out many public resolutions of positions.

There was one other thing. Bob Strauss was then chairman of the Democratic National Committee and he was looking for a way to make the Democratic National Committee the spokesman of the Democratic opposition. He pled for opportunities to come up and talk with the leadership. Well, Mansfield handled him rather carefully and kept him at a discrete distance. This was a

traditional situation between the Senate leadership—Johnson certainly did the same thing—and the leadership of the national party. So Strauss was invited to a breakfast from time to time, but what he really wanted was to be there all the time, and that was ruled out.

I must say, the policy committee showed a great deal of understanding of what we were trying to do by establishing party positions as far as that was possible in the Senate. The press went right along with that, because they always need personalities, and the Senate's the only place really where you can get them, except for a few people in the leadership in the House. Most of the members of the policy committee stayed very close to the position that Mansfield was enunciating so that it gradually became more and more a Democratic policy position and, to a degree, a Senate position. This had started with Johnson in the White House over Vietnam and the same practice continued with Nixon. We used somewhat different language with him than we used with Johnson, but Mansfield continued the practice of keeping the heat on Nixon on Vietnam, to try to end the war. Of course, Nixon had already pledged to do this, so that gave you something to hang it on. So you'd always refer to "As the president has said so many times," that sort of thing, in statements. The pressure in the country was getting stronger and stronger. I don't know whether—did the demonstrations start in this period?

RITCHIE: There were demonstrations in the late Johnson period and they picked up again early in the Nixon years. The Moratorium was in November 1969.

VALEO: I don't know that there's anything specific that I can point to. The thing that keeps coming back in this period almost exclusively is Vietnam. The other issues, all of them, seemed trivial by comparison. I noticed that many of those political scientists, such as Richard Neustadt, whom I recognized as being strong, ardent advocates of executive supremacy in foreign policy, began to change their tone very markedly in this period. They came up and ate crow a lot of times, recognizing that if there was any hope of ending this thing it came from the kind of pressure that was being generated now on both sides of the aisle in the Senate.

But we kept looking at the congressional mathematics of it, and the prospects of getting a majority of a hundred senators, and then you really had to think in terms of a two-thirds majority because you didn't know where the administration would go on legislative measures that might curtail the involvement and ultimately end it. We might have had two-thirds on some propositions, if they were innocuous enough. In some ways the attempt would almost make you look foolish, because you'd have to say in legislation, you can bomb below the 38th parallel but not above it. That was like trying to run the war from the Hill, and

there's just no way you can do that. But the pressure was important, and the threat on money curtailment for the war was important. At one point, it became so serious that Mel Laird said he was going to resurrect a law that was passed during the Civil War which would permit him to use funds for the war no matter what Congress said. The GAO was very negative on his suggestion, but that's how bad it got after a while. Senators were thinking in terms mostly of funds cut off; that seemed to be the easiest route.

By this time, Frank Church had taken much of the leadership in terms of devising specific legislation to try to end the war. Mansfield left it primarily to Church and Cooper to get out front on the actual legislative process of termination. There were no defenders of the administration in the Senate to speak of, with the possible exception of Gale McGee, who would make these statements prompted primarily by the State Department at that time. I think he was still there, it was shortly after that that he was defeated, I believe.

RITCHIE: He was there until 1976.

VALEO: Yes. But he was about the only one who even thought to defend the executive branch.

RITCHIE: What was your impression of Church's role in all of this?

VALEO: Church had a very deliberate mind. I should tell you a little more about the background. He was Mansfield's choice for the keynoter in the 1960 national convention. He was a freshman at the time. I guess Mansfield was asked by Johnson to name a keynoter, and he chose Church. He was terribly disappointed by Church's performance. After that it never ceased to bother him; he always felt that Church had let him down in some way, because he had apparently thought very highly of him when he first came into the Senate. But Church had a deliberate and very intellectual approach. I don't know how to describe it, he was not a person of warmth. He tried to be friendly, but there was something synthetic about it. One had the feeling that down deep he wasn't very warm. But he was deliberate and cautious, and he didn't object to doing the kind of detailed study of issues that would give you something in legislation to serve as some kind of a curb on the involvement. He went together with Cooper on this a lot. Cooper, I always regarded as the best of the Republicans in that whole period. He and [Charles] Mathias, I thought, were the outstanding members on the Republican side.

Church and Cooper, or their staff people—that's right, Cooper had a very able staff person who later became, interestingly enough, Church's staff director on the CIA study. That was a fellow named Bill Miller, who had come from the Department of State. He became fed up with things in the department, came down

on the Hill and went to work for Cooper. I always thought very highly of him. It was probably his staff work, at that time with Cooper, which may very well have been the way they got at this thing legislatively. He knew enough about the situation to realize what would be effective and what wouldn't. He was also a very cautious careful man who could be trusted with very delicate matters. If I'm not mistaken, he got involved in some way in the Iranian hostage thing. I think Carter may have used him as an emissary at one point. He was probably the key staff person in connection with that whole process of trying to end the Vietnamese War through legislation.

You know, you'd have to be sure of two-thirds of the Senate and two-thirds of the House if you really wanted by legislative fiat to end it, because Johnson and then Nixon would not have accepted a straight majority vote. Probably if you had gotten the two-thirds they'd even have figured out a way around it, but the congressional action had two values: first of all, it kept a constant pressure on the administration, whether it was Nixon or Johnson, to move in the direction of getting the war over, and at the same time it provided a sounding board for literally millions of people in the country who at that time had become not only deeply concerned with the war, but angry at it, especially the young people.

Interestingly enough, Mansfield never became involved with speaking before any of the groups that came to Washington to protest. That was not his way. I don't think he ever met with them as emissaries of any kind. He might have met with them individually, particularly if they came from Montana, but he avoided putting himself in the front of this process. From his point of view that was wisdom, because he was not going to be president and it would be of no value to him personally to have been identified as the leader. Perhaps he was thinking of his place in history, but he used to say, "When I leave here I just want to be forgotten." Whatever the case, he did not try in any sense to become a prominent figure in the anti-war movement. It was also partly due probably to his leadership position, because he had to deal with the president, whoever it might be. By not being the most visible proponent of the peace forces, if you will, it made it easier for him to keep that relationship.

RITCHIE: I was going to ask that, because Johnson worked very closely with Eisenhower, when he was majority leader, and I wondered if Mansfield had any hope that he could work with either Nixon or William Rogers or Henry Kissinger, to influence them in any way?

VALEO: He got along best, I would think, with Rogers and to some extent, with Kissinger. We went together with Kissinger to Mexico to the Tlateloco Treaty conference, along with Carl

Albert and several others. It was Kissinger's first major conference in Latin America, I believe, as secretary of state. We traveled on his plane. That man, I don't know how he ever did it, but he loved to travel in planes. It didn't seem to bother him at all. Everybody else would be worn out, but he never seemed to be. There's a very amusing story, this was right after he had become secretary of state. Pierre Salinger told the story. We were in Mexico City, and Salinger was covering the conference I think for some French newspapers. He wanted to come up and say hello to Mansfield. We had a drink with him in the room, and he said, "I'm picking up some very amusing stories from the Latin American foreign ministers. They're trying to take Kissinger's measure and they haven't quite figured him out yet. Of course they all know Rogers, having met with him previously. Their relations with Rogers had been correct but they thought with Kissinger they would be better. As Salinger related it, one foreign minister had said "when Kissinger gives you an 'abrazo' it is very warm and Latin American. But when Rogers gave you one it was as though he were making an obscene gesture." I thought, in a way, the story was very revealing of the character of the two men. Kissinger had a way, he was relaxed. He could move easily with people, and Rogers was stiff and tense in the secretary's role.

I think what we need to do is to talk now about the China situation, unless you have some more questions.

RITCHIE: I noticed that you made several trips in the late '60s on the "Rim of the Pacific" and to Southeast Asia, but on none of your trips from '67 on did you stop in Vietnam.

VALEO: That's right.

RITCHIE: What was the reason for that?

VALEO: I think Mansfield felt there was nothing you could do by stopping there, that the thing was going to run its course. I certainly shared that view. I saw no particular value in going to Vietnam at that time. We did go to Cambodia in that period. Maybe we ought to take that up, because that got involved with the invasion. I'm trying to remember whether Sihanouk was there then.

RITCHIE: In '69 I think you interviewed Sihanouk.

VALEO: Yes, that's right, he was there. But he was leaving for Europe; it was just before the coup. We saw Sihanouk. Again he welcomed Mansfield with great warmth. At this point there were no attempts to interfere with the visit in any way. I'm trying to remember who would have been on that trip. Maybe Norvill Jones, or it could have been Jim Lowenstein, who was on the committee staff. By this time we had gotten to the point of taking a professional along from the committee on these trips, in part because I was just too pushed for time. It was Mansfield's suggestion that I get some help. So we made it a point of

taking someone from the committee, and we traveled then with an administrative person from the Department of State. It would have been, repeatedly, Ken Calloway. He was someone whom we had met many years before in Hong Kong and thought highly of. He could handle the administrative matters of a trip very effectively. He was later to make the China trips with us too, or at least two of them.

When we went to Cambodia, and I guess this was the time in 1969 or thereabouts, I think Sihanouk already knew there was something afoot to try to overthrow him. I thought later that he may have gone to Moscow and Paris because he suspected a plot, and opened the door to it, because he felt he couldn't stand against it in any event. We went to see him and we had a good talk with him. We had just restored relations on Nixon's initiative. He had sent a chap out as ambassador who had been earlier in Laos. We had met him there in the early fifties when there were only two Americans in Laos, and he was one of the two Americans. Mike Reeves, his name was. Mike Reeves was just feeling his way and when we went to see Sihanouk he came with us. It was, I believe, at this time that Sihanouk gave a small dinner, not more than fifteen or twenty people. He made a speech at the end of it. He said almost in so many words: "I don't believe I can hold it together much longer." He said, "I think circumstances are developing that won't permit this. But there's one thing I'm

going to leave: the people are going to have a remembrance of the golden age under the monarchy."

One can never underestimate the significance of Sihanouk's family in the positions he took, and particularly his mother, who was at this time the queen mother. He was the prince, he had abdicated the throne, but the mother stayed as the queen mother and was a powerful force in his life. He was attempting really to establish—he said, "When things get bad here, they'll remember the monarchy and they'll remember it with longing," or something to that effect. He was a very poetic man. I personally thought he bordered on genius.

We met General Lon Nol, who had been Sihanouk's main military commander. He was very evasive when we talked to him at that time. We didn't know what the cause of it would be. He supposedly had been sick. He had been in Paris where later on the stories were that he had a CIA connection in Paris at the American hospital in Paris, where he had been cared for. Sihanouk was convinced of course that the CIA was responsible for the coup. When the coup actually occurred, the first call Mansfield got that morning was from Richard Helms, assuring Mansfield that CIA had nothing to do with it, which I thought was really an odd kind of compulsion to have to tell him they had nothing to do with it. Mansfield went on a TV interview immediately after the overthrow, and he was asked that question, whether he thought we had had

anything to do with it. He said, "Absolutely not." But that would be the way he would do it. I don't know whether he ever thought we did or didn't. I thought we did, and I thought that went back a dozen or more years. I didn't think it had anything to do with the immediate situation except that the military strategy then had shifted to bring on the invasion of Cambodia, and this laid the groundwork for it. That could have raised all kinds of international complications if Sihanouk were still in power.

Mansfield told me a strange thing at that point. He said he had seen Nixon sometime shortly after the overthrow, and Nixon had said, "Well, they finally did it," almost with disgust, as though he was not a part of it. I never knew whether he and Kissinger had been a part of the plan to overthrow Sihanouk, or whether it was brought about without their knowledge and they were putting the best face on it after it happened. I always kept going back in my mind to the U-2 incident that broke up Eisenhower's summit with Khrushchev. Eisenhower didn't deny responsibility for it, but it was obvious he also didn't know that it was going to happen at that particular moment and in those particular circumstances. I wondered whether there might not have been something similar, but then maybe I give Nixon too much credit, I don't know. Of course, it was another disastrous mistake, it took the one peaceful place in Southeast Asia and destroyed it and increased the cost of the war to us. Whatever may have been done later by Pol Pot really

as a direct consequence of the fall of Sihanouk. It would not have happened without his overthrow.

RITCHIE: So you were watching things that you had seen develop for years beginning to crumble.

VALEO: Yes. We realized that at the time, and I sensed in that last speech of Sihanouk's at that dinner that—I didn't think he was going to be overthrown in the next couple of weeks, but the question still remains in my mind whether he knew it. Whether he knew enough of the details of the plot to decide to get out; whether he'd been forewarned to get out by others, including Lon Nol, those things I never really understood. I don't have any insights into them. One can only make surmises. But Sihanouk lived to fight another day, and in effect to come back, which is something he is still planning to do.

RITCHIE: I was interested to see that your trips seemed to be less in Southeast Asia and more on what you called the "Rim of the Pacific."

VALEO: Yes. Again, these were Mansfield's decisions. I didn't decide where we were to go. We were leading up, I think, to the China trip. There was one final reference that I should make to this last trip to Cambodia. We had sent Sihanouk a letter earlier—sent two letters which I drafted, one to Ne Win in Burma and one to Sihanouk, suggesting that the time might be ripe for a

restoration of some contact with China, and that Mansfield would appreciate their intercession, if they could do anything to have the Chinese invite him to come. The State Department was fully cognizant of what we were doing. He also told Johnson, and Johnson had said, I'm told, "Oh, he'll never get anywhere with that." But it didn't appear to trouble Johnson particularly that he had done it. It was on his own initiative. He didn't ask them for permission, but he informed them that he was doing it. That was the beginning of a period of effort to try to make contact with China through Congress. I don't know whether he was the first to try it, but other members of the Senate sought to do the same thing. At that point these requests were all falling on deaf ears in Beijing. Ne Win, I believe replied that he could do nothing. Sihanouk said when we saw him in PP that he had delivered the letter to Chou En-lai (the letter was written to Chou En-lai as premier) in person, and that Chou En-lai said, "Maybe sometime, but the time isn't right yet." But it did lay the groundwork for the later visits. I don't know whether I should continue with the China situation, or do you want to go back. You were asking about the "Rim" trip.

RITCHIE: I was wondering whether you and Senator Mansfield thought that the future of American involvement in Asia was really going to be in Japan and the Philippines and the Pacific rim, rather than in Southeast Asia?

VALEO: No, I don't think it was from that so much, but he felt that with the war in Vietnam in full force there were no possibilities of having a constructive influence there until it had run its course. He still kept in contact with the Indochina situation. We went to Burma at the same time that we went to Cambodia. And we went up to Laos on that trip too, I should mention that. We met with Souvanna Phouma, but I was appalled at the way he looked at that point. One had the feeling that he just seemed to have lost all interest, and it was clear that the American embassy in Laos was calling all the shots at that time. So Mansfield and Souvanna talked about playing chess or a few other odds and ends of light conversation, but nothing of substance. I felt some change in his personality. We went to see the king; again I felt the same kind of thing, that both of them were completely caught in some kind of an anxiety which would not permit them to be frank anymore.

The king who had been in a way so imperious that he reminded me of the musical "The King and I," had become somewhat meek; glad to see Mansfield, but not really communicative in any way. He was worried about the Chinese lines of supply that were supposedly being built into his northern provinces and what that might do to his country. One had the sense that anything constructive that you could do in Southeast Asia had been done and it had not proved successful in preventing the war, and that until the war had run

its course there would be very little opportunity to do anything by going to these countries.

RITCHIE: It was in '69 that Nixon issued his "Nixon Doctrine," or the "Guam Doctrine."

VALEO: Oh, right.

RITCHIE: What was Mansfield's reaction to that?

VALEO: Mansfield picked it up immediately, and I think this explains in part these Asian rim trips. I remember that he discussed it wherever we went. He was all for it, the idea of reducing American involvement. He wasn't necessarily for the idea that Asians should fight Asians, but the idea of American involvement was what he was mostly concerned with. He wanted very badly to cut that. I think Mansfield gave Nixon's statement the title "Nixon Doctrine." I think he decided to use it, to pin it with that title, in order to raise it in importance. I think that's what he had in mind. So he pushed it wherever he could. He read into it things probably that Nixon didn't intend. Yes, that was one of the reasons that we made that trip around the rim of Asia, which was his selected title for that report, by the way. Jim Lowenstein drafted the original version and I finished it.

We again used the same technique. He had a letter from Nixon asking him to go, and in turn gave Nixon a private written report

on the situation as we found it, mostly, now as I recall, in terms of the very favorable and positive responses to the Nixon Doctrine.

RITCHIE: In a sense there were some movements, Vietnamization of the war, and the Nixon doctrine that really were things that Mansfield had been talking about in the past.

VALEO: Precisely.

RITCHIE: Even though the war continued on for another four years, Mansfield must have felt some sense of positive accomplishment.

VALEO: I think he thought there was a better chance of ending the war with Nixon than with Johnson, largely because Nixon wasn't so embedded in the idea of victory. He came in when the thing was already a disaster, so anything he did to alleviate it was almost beyond criticism. In much the same way, he felt that would be true in the case of the movement towards China. Unless you have any more questions, I'll go into that, because it's a rather interesting story.

We are talking about '71, '72. The first inkling we had of an interest on the part of the Chinese came through the State Department. Apparently a German professor had been in Beijing and had seen Sihanouk, and Sihanouk had said, "Get word to Senator

Mansfield that that thing he wants to do is now doable, that Chou En-lai said it's now doable." So the professor passed this to the State Department and they knew what the reference was. They called Mansfield on it immediately. Well, almost simultaneously we got word through the French embassy that they had heard also from Sihanouk that Chou En-lai was prepared to receive Senator Mansfield. This came shortly after the ping-pong players. It was just around that time, I can't remember what the order was, but it was right around that time.

Mansfield was playing it very cautiously. We kept the Department of State fully informed on anything that we did in connection with it. He asked me to go to see the French ambassador, to try to get something more on it, and I did. I think I have a memorandum on some of these developments in my files still in my office, but they'll eventually wind up in the Library of Congress. The ambassador and his deputy chief of mission said that their ambassador in Beijing, who had an unusual name, it was a Slavic name, I think it was Mana'ch, had informed them of the development. As we found out later, when we met him in Beijing, Mana'ch was a brilliant, brilliant student of Asian affairs, particularly Southeast Asia. He had communicated to the French embassy in Washington substantially the same information that came through the State Department, that Chou En-lai wanted to see Senator Mansfield in Beijing. Well, Mansfield was not persuaded

by this indirect approach. He decided that what we would do would be to write a letter to Chou En-lai and tell him that we'd been hearing these things, but that we needed to know something more specific, a time frame if they were accurate reports, and so forth. So we wrote a letter to Chou En-lai.

The question arose as to how to deliver it. I asked whether we should send it through the French embassy? "No," he said, "let's just send it through the post as a special delivery, or registered letter." I had read somewhere that letters could get through to Beijing via the International Postal Union, and that it might work. So we mailed the letter, and heard nothing more after that. The next thing we heard was about the secret Kissinger trip. About two months later the letter we had sent to Chou En-lai came back. Obviously it had been opened, either in Hawaii or San Francisco, both places where there had been some reports of CIA examining overseas mail to the Communist countries. It was stamped with the phrase: "Not deliverable." This was about two months later.

The conclusion we drew was that the letter had been opened, and that its contents had been divulged, and that Kissinger's sudden trip to Asia had been to make sure that if we were going to move in the direction of restoration, the president should move first. That was confirmed, in effect, by Nixon—not that the letter had been opened, but that they knew of the situation.

Nixon said to Mansfield, after his trip, something to the effect that he knew of Chou En-lai's invitation to Mansfield but that he felt as president he should go first. Mansfield said, "Of course, that is fully understandable." But Nixon also said, "Chou En-lai asked about you when I was there, and I've arranged for you and Senator Scott to go to Beijing in the near future." That was the first of the Mansfield trips. It was with Hugh Scott—I'll try to remember the other people on that trip, although I'm sure it's in one of the reports—we took John Thomas of the State Department and his secretary for the administrative arrangements. Scott took his secretary Margie Lynch, who later married Senator Pearson and and of course Bill Hildenbrand from Scott's office. We took Salpee Sahagian. Both Mrs. Mansfield and Mrs. Scott were included. Norvill Jones came from the Foreign Relations Committee.

We decided we wanted no one, absolutely no one, from the executive branch of the government except John Thomas for administrative purposes. Then at the last minute Scott decided to take along a woman from the State Department whom he said spoke Chinese. Mansfield asked me to find out about her, to make some inquiries downtown. I had already begun a refresher course in Chinese at the Foreign Service Institute at this point. My Chinese had not been used for years and wasn't very good to begin with. But I began the refresher. I made inquiries at the F.B.I. to see if they knew about her, I asked Ken Calloway if he could

find out anything about her. Well, the whole thing had a kind of fishy smell to it. They knew her, but only in a sort of vague way. She had been listed as some sort of a student in Chinese and had studied in Taiwan, I believe, where there was a language school at the time. But Taiwan also happens to be a CIA center in Asia. And I was really becoming very, very paranoiac about the CIA. The last thing we needed on that trip would be somebody from the CIA because the Chinese would probably know it, even though we didn't. We tried to dissuade Scott from taking her, but he insisted and he stood on his rights, so we took her. Scott insisted on the grounds that she was the daughter of a very important constituent in Philadelphia. She was quite young and knew a little Chinese. As it turned out, she didn't do any harm on the trip. She didn't do much good either.

We approached China in stages. We went to Honolulu, and then to Guam. We were overnight in Honolulu and got a wire the next day that Nixon had inaugurated the bombing of Hanoi. It just couldn't have come at a worse time from our point of view. We had no idea how the Chinese would react to it—they were at that time supporting the North Vietnamese. We did not know whether or not we would still be welcome, whether this meant that the whole situation was going to change. We tried to make some inquiries but could find nothing. We were really flying in the dark. But we decided the best thing to do was just to go on as though nothing

had happened. If the Chinese wanted us to turn back they would probably tell us, not shoot us down. So we thought that would be the best strategy. We went then to Guam and directly from Guam to China. We decided that we would not stop in foreign countries en route, that that would not be desirable. We'd do it on the way back. So we skipped Japan and following Chinese instructions went directly into the airport at Shanghai. Beijing was not yet opened. We landed and left the crew of our own plane, we had a U.S. military plane at that point, we left them in Shanghai, and flew in a Chinese plane to Beijing.

This was the first of the congressional trips. We were received by the acting foreign minister, (Qas Guan-hua) who was later involved with the Gang of Four. I can't remember whether he was one of them or not, but he was certainly associated with them and was dropped out of power after Mao's death. Actually we were guests of the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs, a kind of semi-official arm of the Chinese Foreign Office, which they were using then to greet distinguished foreign visitors and to promote friendship with other countries. They were our hosts throughout.

I must say something of the first impression of going into Beijing—I had never been there before. In the early period that I was in China I had never gotten to Beijing. The thing that impressed me most was the obvious reforestation that they were

doing, right along the road. Everywhere they were growing trees, trees, trees. I think that impressed all of us at that time. It was in early spring. People looked rather poorly dressed. A lot of patches on clothes. And practically nobody wore anything other than the characteristic padded blue cotton—which incidentally did not begin with the Communists, it was the characteristic Chinese clothing for a long time before. The only people who didn't wear it were people who had money, who were few enough. So that was not a shocker to anyone who had seen old China. We were billeted at a guesthouse that had been the Austria-Hungarian Embassy—it really went far back. It was pleasant. The equipage was rather dated, maybe forty, fifty, a hundred years old, but the service was very pleasant. We were extraordinarily well fed. And of course once we got into the city, then the enormous churning of bicycles was the other thing that impressed us greatly.

It was essentially a ceremonial visit. Chou En-lai gave a dinner for Senator Mansfield, rather early in the trip. He was then still in good health, he had not yet become ill. I remember it very vividly, it was a dinner for about twenty-five people. The women in our party, who included Salpee Sahagian and Mrs. Mansfield and Mrs. Scott, came out in evening dress, and of course the women in the other party had on blue caps and these warm cotton quilted blue uniforms. That was the last time the American women wore evening gowns on that trip. But anyhow it was

a marvelous dinner. Chou En-lai showed the Beijing Duck around before it was carved. The dinner was after our conversation with him.

We had that conversation in the Great Hall of the People, which we were advised had been built in less than nine months. It was a huge, huge building with immense rooms, looking very Russian actually. They said that it had been built almost eighty percent with volunteer labor, and that it had been completed in eight or nine months, which was really quite a spectacular achievement. As you would expect, there were murals from all of the different provinces of China, mostly on a militant revolutionary note, for example, Red Army people looking like Washington crossing the Delaware, except in Chinese clothes. Almost all of the carvings had some sort of a socially significant theme. They were not carving the old classic Chinese scholar and his girlfriend, they were carving the new things, which were mostly militant, Communist themes, workers, soldiers, etc., usually with the Red banner flying.

They put us through the appropriate amount of sightseeing in Beijing, but from the point of view of the historic record the important thing is the conversation with Chou En-lai. We came into the audience room, it was arranged in a horseshoe of chairs. Tea was served in large cups with covers. And when Chou En-lai saw Senator Mansfield—he apparently had seen him once in

Chungking, when he was the agent in Chungking during World War II for the Chinese Communist party and Mansfield was visiting there on, I think, a trip for Roosevelt. So they had had a very brief meeting at an earlier period. He saw Mansfield, and his first remarks were: "Senator Mansfield, we were expecting you a month ago but instead Mr. Kissinger came. Where were you?" But Mansfield said, "Well, I'm delighted that the president could get here first. That's the way it ought to be. I'm just glad to be here now." So the conversation got off on a good note. We were hit of course immediately with the question of the bombing of Hanoi. We didn't raise that, but they raised it, and of course their gripes about it.

One thing that was very significant in the conversation again shows the importance of the personal element in so many of these situations. Chou raised almost immediately a slight that he had received from John Foster Dulles in the first Geneva conferences on Indochina in 1954. He said that when he saw Secretary Dulles he went over to shake hands with him and Dulles turned away. He had not forgotten that, and this was fifteen years later. The minute that we touched on any theme which was from their point of view objectionable he dropped his charm and he became very vehement in making the Chinese point. Other than that, he was a very charming man with a ready smile, easy to talk with, even through an interpreter, and extremely pleasant. We went to the

Chinese opera with him on another evening. They were showing the—what was that?

RITCHIE: Wasn't that "The White-Haired Girl?"

VALEO: Yes, it was "The White-Haired Girl," not the Red Army Corps of Women. We were sitting in the balcony. We didn't go with Chou, that's right. He was in the orchestra. There was an interesting byplay. Before the curtain, we were watching the arrivals from the balcony and Madame Jiang Quing came in. Chou En-lai spotted her at the entrance door and he was over there in a second to take her by the arm and bring her in to bows and applause. My own feeling on the whole situation in China, partly from reading and partly from watching these sort of off-guard reactions, was that Chou En-lai was not on Jiang Quing's list. Chou En-lai was an essential element in keeping the situation together, and whether she liked or disliked him, she would not have been able to remove him.

Our people, our China watchers in Hong Kong and Taiwan, kept looking for the break between Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. Our experts kept playing to this, expecting it. Our press did the same thing. But it seemed to me they forgot something, that Mao's relationship with Chou was really a more important marriage than his marriage to Jiang Quing. Mao Tse-tung could not run a government, Chou En-lai could. Mao could though, inspire and lead

a revolution. Chou could not but he could organize it and a government. This partnership went back to their very earliest associations. At that time, they were both young and Chou En-lai undoubtedly had the same dreams for China as Mao Tse-tung, of leading a revolution in China. After the Chiang Kai-shek military movement north in the mid-twenties and the break between the [?????] and the Chinese communists, the Chinese Communist ranks were decimated. Chou and Mao discovered early in the 1925-'30 period that if there was any chance of a survival of the revolution, they were both needed. From that time on that relationship never was at anytime subject to a break. Every other one was, including Mao's relationship with Jiang Quing, but not that one. But that was precisely where our people were looking for the break. They wasted a lot of years looking for it. This little byplay with Jiang Quing at the theater seemed to underscore the point. She came in smiling and was delighted by the attention. She gave her arm to him and they went down the aisle together to put her in her seat.

We came back from China extremely enthusiastic about what was happening in China. Mansfield had been there in the '20s and then again during World War II. I had been there during the war. The change was great even at that point—bear in mind now we're talking about the closing period of the Cultural Revolution. Deng Xioping was still in disgrace, his name wasn't even mentioned at

that point. He was to come back and be there at the next trip that we made, but at that time he was not there and not even mentioned. Mao was seen in public only infrequently. The so-called Gang of Four were in the party, ideologically at the top of the heap. Their views were being accepted and promulgated by the party. Cho En-lai was running a government which had suffered greatly as a result of the Cultural Revolution. It had lost a lot of its talent, perhaps not as much as is sometimes painted now, but there was a lot of human devastation. But he was running the government. The Chinese economy had made considerable progress already in terms of modernization as measured against the so-called Liberation year of 1949.

As we saw, their textile factories at that point, 1973, were maybe forty years behind ours, but in 1949, except for Shanghai mills, they were two hundred years behind ours. So that represented a great advance. They were already making their own automobiles. They weren't the greatest autos, but we rode in them for four days without a breakdown. They had already detonated a nuclear device. So one must not assume that the Cultural Revolution flattened the land. The progress that they had already made, primarily on their own capabilities but secondarily with assistance from the Soviet Union in some of the technological areas, was very evident, and anybody who knew the old China was amazed by what they had done, as I was and as Senator Mansfield was.

It was not only a matter just of their capabilities in many spheres, it was also their very human approach to things. There was a great concern about people. Well, in the old China that we remembered, you would see people literally die of starvation on the street, or rickshaw pullers selling their wives for a dime, anything just for sheer survival; that had disappeared largely. And it wasn't a matter just of being shown show-places. To be sure there was some of that, but I knew enough Chinese to walk around the streets, and I did walk around the streets on my own. They didn't like the idea of my having done it, but I would slip out while everybody was having a siesta and take a walk. You could see very clearly that things were far, far better than they had been before. I was especially impressed by the improvement in sanitation, which had been really appalling under the old system. They had dealt with that. I was impressed with the health care; for the most part, primitive, crude, but at least caring. That was something which was totally absent in the earlier China. In part, because that's the way it was, but in part because it was a war situation and they had no capacities for dealing with it at that time.

On the course of that trip we went to the scenic spots, Hangzhou. It was not an extensive trip. We went to Kuangdong, to Canton, to Shanghai and one or two other cities in between. In every one they pulled out the red carpet. We were curiosities.

There hadn't been many foreigners there to speak of after the Russians left and during the Cultural Revolution. There had been very few, so that we were objects of curiosity, especially coming in a kind of motorcade of four or five cars. I don't know whether we were the curiosities or the automobiles were, because there weren't that many automobiles being used. Almost all of the people were riding buses, bicycles or walking. They had pretty much eliminated the old pedicabs and the rickshaw pullers were gone completely, in all of the cities. In some of the more primitive places—and we did go to one or two, I can't remember now which ones—they still used the pedicabs, but not the rickshaws, they had gone.

In the meetings with Chou En-lai and with the foreign minister, Chao Guan-hua, we got into discussions of policy, and the same questions that come up now came up then, especially the Taiwan question, and the Vietnamese question, but surprisingly less than we had anticipated that we were going to hear. They made some comments on the bombing of Hanoi, but it was more subdued than I had expected it would be. Other than those two conversations, the rest of it was largely ceremonial. We went to the Great Wall and did the things that people were expected to do. We left on a very pleasant note, and if I'm not mistaken it was shortly thereafter that the liaison offices were opened. At that

point there were no liaison offices in China. David Bruce went, I believe, shortly thereafter to become the first liaison man.

RITCHIE: It must have been a very emotional trip for both you and Senator Mansfield.

VALEO: It was, because I was really tremendously impressed by the change for the better, from what I had seen in the China of World War II. Of course, it is true that in the China of World War II, I probably saw just about the worst places including Gueizhou province, which was one of the most backward of all the Chinese provinces. And the other one was Shanghai, which was literally a den of iniquity, and was strictly a foreign-dominated city in the old days. Everything was for sale, it didn't matter what. Well, that had all disappeared. We were immensely impressed by the honesty of people. You'd leave a pack of cigarettes around or something and they'd come chasing after you with the cigarettes.

One of the things that impressed me too was that a good deal of the "front" had disappeared, partly because everybody was wearing the same clothes. You'd have to look at people as they were, because fancy clothes weren't there to mislead you. I noticed this particularly in riding, when you have time for musing, in an airplane. You'd look at the Chinese who were helping us. There were some women and some men. You'd realize

you were seeing them as people, because they did not, by virtue of any artificial add-on, change their basic personality. It was a very fascinating experience. As I said, the trip was mostly concentrated in Beijing. It was a short trip. I think it was less than two weeks.

I must say, Hugh Scott did a very credible job. As you know he's a great collector of Chinese art and antiquities and he knew a great deal about it. He has written a book on the artifacts of the Tang Dynasty. We went to one museum, I can't remember where it was but there was a display of a certain type of artifact, it might have been horses, or something. The interpreter was interpreting the curator's statement. "Yes," he said, "this was a series of twenty-five, but we only have twenty-three here." Scott said, "Well, where are the other two?" And he said, "In the museum in Philadelphia." Scott was quiet after that.

What interested me was that people on the streets had a lot curiosity. They were not in any sense necessarily very friendly. They were just curious. If you passed them, they would pass; if you asked directions of someone, like a policeman as I did, you didn't get a very warm or friendly smile. You got the minimum in terms of an answer. I think part of it was they were still suspicious—they wouldn't know that we were Americans as such, certainly would not have known that about me, walking around on my own. I went looking for places I had known in Shanghai right

after World War II. I found the YMCA where I had stayed, for about two or three months. It was still there. It was used for some sort of office or association headquarters. The buildings next to it were the Pacific Hotel and the International Hotel or the Park Hotel as it was called. These were along what in the old days was called Bubbling Well Road. The hotels were right across from the racetrack, right in the middle of the city, that's the way Shanghai was in the old days; horse racing was very important. The racetrack had been turned into a public park. These hotel buildings had been turned into public buildings. There were three or four of them in a row. Two had been rather elaborate, for the time. One was still being used for food and for restaurant service, but it was not operating as a hotel.

We stayed at a place called—I think it was called the Broadway Mansions, again, something from the twenties, comfortable enough but certainly not what we would now regard as a luxury hotel. In Hangzhou, our quarters were in an old-fashioned, quasi-European type of building on the lake. In Canton it was a very lovely guest house.

RITCHIE: Having been once smeared as "China Mike," was Mansfield at all concerned about traveling to China and becoming too identified with China?

VALEO: No, he had passed over that by then. That's why I should mention the occasion that finally ended that fear. It was somewhat before this trip, two or three years. The University of Montana had set up a Mike and Maureen Mansfield Foundation. The initial financing of it was by private fund-raising; there were sufficient funds to provide for a guest speaker, I guess one or two a year. They had asked, since it was his foundation, if he would do the first address. He talked to me about that, and he said, "What do you think we ought to do it on?" I thought for a while. I had had a dinner date with a young schoolteacher just about a week before, and we got into a discussion of Joe McCarthy and the McCarthy period. I mentioned China in that connection, and she said, "Well, what did McCarthy have to do with China?" She didn't know. I suddenly realized how many years had gone by since McCarthy. It made a profound impression on me. I said to myself, "Here we are acting as though McCarthy were yesterday."

So when Mansfield asked me that question, I said, "I think we ought to do it on China. Don't you think it's about time we took a look at China and did something meaningful instead of going through this same routine as we've been doing year in and year out." I think we were both old enough at this time to take that kind of a position. He said, "Well, I don't know about the risk." I said, "I know, but do you realize how long it's been?" And I told him the story of the schoolteacher and he sort of smiled at

it. He said, "See what you can do with it. Maybe get somebody to help you down on the committee." So I talked to Jim Lowenstein, and I told him what I thought we ought to try to do, how we could approach it, and asked him to put together a draft, which he did. I worked it over for a long time, really sweated over it, and finally showed it to Mansfield. Basically it took the same theme: don't you really think it's about time that we looked at this situation the way it is instead of evading it any longer? That was basically the theme of the speech. We had, as I recall, a plan worked out under which we proposed initiatives that we felt were doable in that period.

He did the speech in Montana as the opening one in the Mike and Maureen Mansfield Foundation lecture series, and we waited eagerly to see how the press in Montana would handle it. He had only one hostile editorial, and that was in some weekly which had been hostile to him for twenty-five years, one of those things. The other editorial comment in the state was uniformly favorable. So that we realized that the time had come when you could begin to deal with the China question rationally. I think it was Kissinger who told Mansfield later, "When I saw Chou En-lai he waved your speech under my nose and said, 'Now I know where Kissinger is getting his ideas from.'" or something like that. But that really was a decisive moment. I owe a lot to that school-teacher whose name I can't even remember now! It really opened my eyes. That,

and another thing that [Lee] Metcalf had mentioned to me as we were opening the Senate one morning. He said he had a girl in his office and she didn't even remember the Korean War! And here was the Senate acting as though the China thing had happened just yesterday.

RITCHIE: It was the most amazing phenomenon that China went from being our arch-enemy to being a friend almost overnight.

VALEO: Largely because the whole thing had been held in this state of limbo for so many years, beginning as a political issue, it began to take on a kind of permanence, it was like an institution: you'd have to say not just Communist China but "Godless, Communist China." It became an institutionalized irrational hostility. Even when the great break came between the Soviet Union and the Chinese, we couldn't accept that and act to utilize the opportunity. We should have seen immediately that we were talking about two totally different situations in the Soviet Union and in China that theretofore we had treated as an entity, and yet we were unable to do it as a people. I don't think I ever saw an editorial in a major newspaper which made reference to the possibility that China might be something different than what you had in the Soviet Union. Neither do I recall a president or secretary of state making a meaningful differentiation. There may have been some groping in the Congress but it wasn't heeded. The truth of the matter is that the two situations are extraordinarily

different. Basically, the Soviet Union is a suspicion-ridden country. If you travel there you feel the suspicion almost vibrate around you. China is essentially an open country by contrast.

RITCHIE: Why do you think there were some politicians and political leaders who were locked into place, Dean Rusk and others who could never see China differently, and others like Mansfield and Kissinger who could all of a sudden look at it in a new light?

VALEO: Bear in mind that it was a long time before Mansfield could look at it or if he did he kept it to himself. The same was true for Rusk. In the case of Rusk, as a young assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, in the early days of the UN, when the big break came with China, he didn't defend the revolution but he was attempting at that point to follow what was State Department policy and that was, I believe, to bring China into the UN and to try to develop some modus vivendi with the new government. He made speeches on that side of the coin. Then came McCarthy, and his earlier stance, like that of many careerists in the State Department, became something that haunted him his whole career in much the same way that it haunted Mansfield, or he thought it did at least for his whole career. I think Rusk was trying to separate himself as much as possible from those who had been tarred by the McCarthy brush. Then later on,

when the situation became a real political one, the potential for personal damage resulting from it was so great that he got a mind-set which I don't think he could ever shake. I think he believed what he was saying after awhile about "yellow hordes" and so forth. But he couldn't have believed it in the early period. I can't imagine that he could have believed it in the early period.

RITCHIE: Did you find that there was more interest in the Senate on China and on Asian policy at this stage of the game? In the beginning you said there really weren't that many members who seemed that interested.

VALEO: Oh, without the Nixon trip you wouldn't have had it. It would have gone on for some more years in the old way. You might have had an occasional ping pong player, or a Senator Mansfield going, but the Nixon trip was so decisive. Whatever you may think of Nixon, that was an extraordinary performance. He knew precisely how to do it in terms of the internal American situation. The use of the media, which I thought was outrageous at first, proved to be one of the most important and compelling factors in producing this changed attitude.

RITCHIE: You mean the coverage of Nixon's trip?

VALEO: Yes, exactly. I mean it suddenly became the thing to do, and people have been doing it ever since: go to China. I thought his understanding of the role of the media so far greater than mine. At first, I thought it was a disaster to bring all those television people to Beijing. That was not my idea of the way you conduct foreign policy. But he understood that the important part of it was what it did at home. Having spent years of his life building up the attitude of hostility to China and communism, I guess he knew best how to change it. Of course, he was one of the people greatly responsible for the distortion for so many years.

RITCHIE: It's interesting because the question just came up this morning: someone asked who were the senators now who were interested in China, and I thought there's nobody like Mansfield or Scott or Baker, or the people who had been so interested and preoccupied almost in the past.

VALEO: Now you've got [Alan] Cranston who wants to go back the other way. In the morning press he's very concerned about the nuclear thing, apparently.

RITCHIE: And he's the ranking Democrat on the Asian Affairs subcommittee.

VALEO: You can't overlook the fact that he's from California, and the Nationalist forces are still strong in the Chinese communities in California. He's had a long connection with them. Any senator would have to have it. Reagan certainly had his connections with it.

RITCHIE: But despite the last ten years of our relations with China, we probably still have more senators who are European-oriented, and Latin-American-oriented than they are Asian-oriented.

VALEO: I think it's difficult to understand Asia. It's not an easy area, and our whole culture is really more oriented European, so it's not surprising to me that you don't have that interest in China, in the absence of big issues. Now, when Japan or Hong Kong or Korea ceases to be number one textile enemy and China becomes number one textile enemy, then I think you'll have it. But it's going to be a negative influence. That may be part of what you're hearing now on other matters. It may also be related to the fact that China's foreign trade is growing very rapidly and it's beginning to come into some very competitive situations with American business, particularly in the simpler manufactured goods. They learn very fast and they produce very well.

I must get on the next time around the setting up of the Chinese liaison office in Washington, which came shortly after this early trip.

RITCHIE: Why don't we start the next session then with that?

VALEO: All right.

End of Interview #12