RITCHIE: Was there anything additional from that trip in 1961 that you think we should include?

VALEO: We made several other stops. We stopped in Greece and at Wheeler Air Force Base in Libya. Of course, in those days our relationship with the Libyans was very pleasant and happy. I remember a large airport, that's all. We spent only a few hours there and then went on to Bermuda where we made our final stop.

But I did want to go back for one purpose to the Library of Congress, and that is to stress, if I haven't already done enough, the significance of Ernest S. Griffith in this whole process. I think, if one has to trace the origins of the present staff structure of the Congress, and certainly what is now Congressional Research, he is the key person. He and George Galloway, who was the specialist in politics and a long time associate of Ernest, I believe, were the ones that put together the La Follette-Monroney Act, the original legislation in 1946 that began to develop the concept of a professional staff for the Congress. Prior to that, there was really nothing in the way of professional staff except perhaps on the Finance Committee and the Ways and Means Committee that would have passed for that.

Up until that time, most of the need for experts and professionals was filled by the executive branch of the government. They'd simply send down a tax expert, or they'd send down a foreign relations expert or whatever, depending upon the need of the committee. The concept of divided powers at that point, as it's involved in the Constitution, was not really fully appreciated on the Hill. I think this was an outgrowth, in part, of the whole Roosevelt period. Roosevelt so dominated the politics of the United States as well as the Congress that there was no chance of reversing it significantly while Roosevelt was alive. When Truman became president and the war ended, then, of course, all of these repressed tendencies towards division began to emerge. In that atmosphere, the idea of a professional staff, responsible only to Congress rather than to the executive branch, was far more acceptable than it would otherwise have been.

Ernest was a remarkable man. He was a Methodist, and he probably missed his calling, he would have made a great minister. He was a tee-totaler. He didn't like alcohol and he didn't like cigarettes, but he suffered the people around him who smoked, such as I and others at the time, and occasionally drank. He never preached to us, but it was very clear that he suffered us in that situation. We used to have a director's council meeting the first thing in the morning once a week, and of course smoking was still very much in evidence in that period, so there would be a lot of

tobacco smoke around and Ernest would wince, but he would never say anything about it. He had two great faiths: he had great faith in God, and he had great faith in the Constitution. He read it as a purist, pretty much, and tried to develop the whole concept of staffing on the basis of his understanding of it. He also had great faith in education. His whole approach was to try to integrate the reasoning which emerges from good research into the actual political and the legislative processes.

He was a really remarkable man, and he not only had to suffer a rather tattered staff, which included me and others, but he had to deal with Luther Evans, who was for the most part the Librarian while Ernest was head of Legislative Reference. Luther Evans was a totally different type as Librarian. I think Archibald MacLeish brought him into the Library as the first head of the Legislative Reference Service, and Ernest was his assistant. Then Luther became Librarian, he was a Texan, he was a relatively small man in height but very stocky and he had a voice like a bull. He dominated everyone around him, including poor Ernest, who kept his faith as far as he could. Luther could be rather cruel sometimes. He was derogatory of people and he looked for their weaknesses and played on them.

He contrasted beautifully with Ernest, who was basically a conservative Republican. Luther Evans was a somewhat left wing Democrat, in the terms of that period. The two of them politically made an excellent team. Luther got to depend on Ernest when it came to getting along with Congress, which he didn't. His arrogance gave him all sorts of problems with Congress, which became increasingly conservative in that period, certainly in the Eightieth Congress. So he depended on Ernest's good relations, particularly with the House Administration Committee, to carry the budget for the whole Library of Congress. I must say, the combination was very, very effective.

I was very young when I was made a division chief in the Legislative Reference Service, which entitled me to attend the Librarian's conference, which was held about once a month. Of course, I had been introduced to Luther Evans, but he could never remember my name. He had an assistant, whose name I think was Anderson, again a long-suffering person, who had to bear Luther's tyranny. I noticed that whenever I came in for a luncheon—the minute Luther spotted me he would lean over to Anderson and I'm sure say: "What's this guy's name?" And of course, by the time I got to shake hands with him in the line, he'd say, "How are you, Mr. Valeo?" Well, this must have happened half a dozen times. Then Luther left the Library and became the staff director for UNESCO. I didn't see him for a long time, then once when I ran

into him on the tarmac at Bangkok airport, and he knew my name immediately! I never understood why he couldn't remember it in the Library, but he remembered it a year later on the tarmac in Bangkok.

But I just wanted to stress the importance of Ernest Griffith in the whole development of the concept of professional staff for the Congress and the constitutional principle of divided powers. For better of for worse, he deserves a lot of the credit or blame for it.

RITCHIE: I suppose even he couldn't imagine how large the Congressional Research Service would become.

VALEO: Not at all. When I say this about Ernest's role, it also involved the committee staffs, because the La Follette-Monroney Act of 1946 laid the legislative basis for the staff development within the Congress as well.

RITCHIE: Some of it had to do with the fact that the issues were becoming so much more complicated.

VALEO: Precisely.

RITCHIE: And that the Congress no longer could rely on outside sources but needed to generate its own information on a year-round basis.

VALEO: That could have been said by Ernest Griffith! That's exactly right. Well, I wanted to get that into the record somewhere.

RITCHIE: Going back to after the 1961 trip. Did you make any other trips with Lyndon Johnson?

VALEO: No. That was the only one. Our relations became very strained, progressively, during the Vietnamese War, and it was not until after he decided not to run again that we rediscovered the fact that we really weren't enemies. He came down for a reception on the Hill that I think Senator Mansfield and the leadership gave him, or maybe it was a combined reception of [Hugh] Scott and Mansfield. He sought me out during the reception. He grabbed me again by the lapels, with a big smile, and said, "When are we going to make a trip together again?" But that was the finale. In the meantime, he had blamed me for the congressional attitudes on the war, at least in the Senate through Mansfield. Senator [Russell] Long of Louisiana came in to see me one day, and he said, "You know, Frank, I've just been down to see the president on a matter and your name came up. I didn't bring it up, he did. He called you the most dangerous man in the American government." He said, "Why would he think that?" I said, "I really don't know, Senator, unless it's about Vietnam, and he's probably blaming me for most of what goes on in the Senate about Vietnam."

But one learned to take that sort of thing from Lyndon Johnson with a grain of salt. His exaggerated speech was part of his nature. He fired Horace Busby and George Reedy and two or three others of his intimate staff over the Pacific Ocean. He said, "Get off the plane, right now! I don't want to see you again!" It was in the same vein. If you'd lived with Lyndon Johnson at all, you knew that you didn't take that too seriously. He was going to send the whole State Department back at one point; he decided they were the ones who were leaking stories to the press that he didn't want leaked.

RITCHIE: Did you have very many dealings with him when he was vice president?

VALEO: You know, it wasn't a very long period. It was shortly after that that he became president. But there were things that were most interesting in that period. I didn't have direct dealings with him, but I came into contact with him a lot, because I began to sit in on most of the leadership meetings and occasionally he would come. Mansfield would always invite him. He never came to the caucus again, I think until the very end of his presidency, but he did come occasionally, I believe, to policy committee meetings—again, by invitation of Mansfield; he never came without an invitation.

I remember in some of those early policy committee luncheons, which were quite private, he talked very frankly about what was happening in the White House. One of his pet peeves at that point, or so he implied, was Walt Rostow. He said, "Kennedy's got some real strange people around him down there." He mentioned Walt Rostow by name and there was this speechwriter named [Richard] Goodwin at the time too, he mentioned him. He said, "Those fellows want to go to war tomorrow!" It was ironic that he depended heavily on Rostow when he became president, but at that time he said, "I try to calm it down a little bit. Those fellows are all gung-ho to go to war in Vietnam." Of course, Mansfield delighted in hearing that at the time, because he was doing the same thing with the administration: attempting to dissuade them from the course of ever-deepening involvement. And at that time it was still a relatively modest involvement.

Johnson was a strange man. I don't want this to reflect on what he did later. I think it was more a mannerism of speech than anything else. But at one point he said, "The president is real worried about this civil rights question. He doesn't know what to do with it, whether he should send a bill up or not." He said, "He's not going to get a bill through, I've told him that. You know, the way to deal with that problem is appoint a nigger to the Supreme Court. " It was interesting that he did appoint a negro when he became president. He appointed Thurgood Marshall, the

first black justice to the Court. It was his way of dealing with it. The symbolic action was extremely important to him, and he thought that that was persuasive. I don't think he realized the depth of the civil rights issue at that point. Nor did many other people. We had not yet had the Atlanta riots and the Birmingham riots, so it's understandable that he would have thought in terms of his background, and an appointment would have been his solution to the problem of pacifying the black community.

I went through several meetings at the White House with him as the Vietnamese thing deepened, but I think they're probably better treated when we deal with the whole Vietnam situation, as it developed.

RITCHIE: Did Johnson at that stage participate very much in Kennedy's legislative program, when he was vice president?

VALEO: Not really, no. I don't think he did any arm twisting at all. He knew it would have been ineffective in any event. He played his own game. It was interesting because there was a great contrast in the way he behaved towards Kennedy and the way Humphrey behaved towards him as president. Humphrey felt he was compelled to follow whatever line Johnson put out and he did, whereas Johnson did not do that with Kennedy. He still stayed Johnson, and you knew he was Johnson. He sounded just like Johnson two years before. I think that's an important contrast,

because I think it explains some of Humphrey's difficulties and why he didn't quite make it to the White House.

RITCHIE: This when Mansfield had just become majority leader. How difficult did Mansfield find it to be majority leader following after a Lyndon Johnson?

VALEO: Extremely difficult. But he had immense good will in the Senate when he started. It's like any leadership, you get a honeymoon. But he had a really deep-seated one because senators all liked him, and coming after Johnson, all of them were willing to go out of their way to help him in some way or other. Those who were running for president had subsided now, because Kennedy was president and was likely to be president for eight years. So they were grumbling and looking primarily for their situation or their future in the Senate. So he had a lot of support.

Mansfield depended very, very heavily on Baker for the mechanics of the Senate. He knew very little about them. I knew even less. The first questions that came up as leader were the appointments to committees. This started, I believe, in that first caucus and continued. There were many complaints that the two controlling committees of the party, that is the Steering Committee for appointments, and the policy committee, presumably for policy—it didn't really work that way under Johnson, but presumably for policy—were overly dominated by the South and by con-

servatives. There were some offers immediately from southerners to get off. They said this had simply reflected what had happened in the elections in the past. Southerners tended to be elected and remain, whereas the liberals and the northerners on the committee were defeated, so they weren't replaced as rapidly. But this became a heated matter of discussion in the early caucuses.

Mansfield then asked someone to put what they would like done on these two committees in the form of a resolution. The record will show precisely what it said, but basically the idea was that the two controlling party committees should be elected by the caucus, on the recommendation of the leader, who would choose the people that he recommended on the basis of a consideration of the strength of the party as it related to the geographic distribution of the membership. Well, I did the first arithmetic on how to divide it up so that it would be that. It came out not very different from the way it was, but it set a pattern which was very important, and this was followed continuously from then on. I think now it's a very well established principle. But again it has lost meaning because Bob Byrd does not call policy committee meetings. But at that time it was important because Mansfield meant to use the policy committee as a policy committee. And we did.

We worked out the distribution. I remember having great trouble with West Virginia. What do you regard them as, southern

or western or eastern or what? We did the best we could to develop a geographic spread. The other consideration in the resolution was that his selections should be made with due regard to the spread of the ideological inclinations within the party. It was the first move towards a democratization of the inner process of the Democrats in the Senate after Johnson and an erosion of the seniority system. Frankly, I don't know what the situation was before that, I think these committees were unimportant. There was no policy committee to begin with until '46. So we took the first step. Bobby Baker shook his head on this. He thought this was a mistake, that this should have been fought in the caucus as weakening the leadership. I remember that. He wanted the control maintained.

The next question came up with the Steering Committee, and the election of members to the other committees by the Steering Committee, which technically is what should be done. But again, this was something Johnson decided on his own, and just picked people, including Mansfield for the Foreign Relations Committee as a freshman. This had been a great bone of contention at the caucus, that people were chosen on the basis of favoritism and so forth, so Mansfield said, "All right, from now on, they'll be elected by the Steering Committee." So the first meeting of the Steering Committee, which included then some more liberals than it had in the past, was held. Mansfield decided the procedure there

would be for individual senators to request two or three committees that they would like to go on, in a letter to him or to the secretary for the majority. These letters would be presented to the Steering Committee and a decision made by the committee.

I was still not the person who handled this, the secretary for the majority was responsible, but I sat in on all these meetings at Mansfield's request. I was learning how the process worked, in doing so. When the question came up about electing members to committees, there was some reluctance: we don't want to have hard feelings, so let's have a secret ballot. So the new committee assignments were decided by secret ballot. As secretary for the majority, Bobby Baker had to work out the mathematics of it, because there were ratios involved and what not, ratios between the Republicans and Democrats. But the elections were made, and this satisfied what had been a basic complaint against Johnson: one, that he was favoring southerners over liberals, and second of all, that he was picking people out of his own hat without due regard to any kind of democratic process.

So we got off on the right foot with that. Mansfield was still feeling his way very, very cautiously, still depending heavily on Baker for the general functioning of the Democrats in the Senate. The other key committee was the Campaign Committee, which was potentially the root of corruption in the inner workings of the Senate and the party within the Senate, because at the time

this was where campaign funds were distributed. He put down a flat fiat that every Democrat running for the Senate would receive exactly the same amount as a base; that if they individually wanted to redistribute their funds on the basis of the fact that they didn't have a need for them, that would be acceptable, but that he would not do that. As far as the committee was concerned, it would function strictly on the basis of an equal distribution of funds to all of the members.

Now, it is true, some members didn't need the full amount, and others did. And of course, campaigns then didn't cost what they cost now. But it ended the kinds of things that had happened before, where Johnson would say, "Well, give him another ten thousand, send him another ten thousand," the arbitrary decisions that were made. What it did do, however, was to shift a lot of that from the Campaign Committee over to Bob Kerr. This was the problem that eventually got Baker in trouble, because he was working very closely with Kerr in this period. The money, the oil money particularly, no longer came into the committee per se, but went through Kerr, and Kerr was beginning to build up his citadel of power directly. Before he had done it through Lyndon, but now he was doing it directly.

RITCHIE: Could you tell me a little bit about Senator Kerr? He's not very well remembered, I suspect.

VALEO: Yes, he was a bad man. I have no other way to describe him. Bad, no, perhaps that's wrong, I don't want to say that. How can I describe him? He was a nasty man, basically a nasty man. He looked like he was angry with the entire world all the time. Yet he tithed to his church a very large percentage of his income. He had a foul mouth. He used the most horrible kind of profanity. I can't remember whether he smoked cigars or what, but he was a scowling, overbearing kind of person. His interests were Oklahoma, he played it very closely, and yet he was the first one to challenge [Joseph] McCarthy. So there was this redeeming feature. You take the worst members that I have seen in a lifetime in the Senate and there was almost inevitably some kind of redeeming feature. He was the first one to take on McCarthy. He was the only one that I know of that would have dared to do it at that point. He really ripped into him at the very beginning, which of course gave him a great standing in much the same way that [Sam] Ervin got it as a result of Watergate, because of his willingness to go to the mat with somebody whom he felt was damaging the country badly. He did that.

By the same token, I think he's the same one who wanted to declare war on Cuba because of the first hijacked plane, in the mistaken belief that Cuba had hijacked it. Of course, the Cubans were in the process of releasing it, but Kerr was in the process of putting in a declaration of war on Cuba at the same time. It

was stopped only because of Bob Taft, Sr. on the Republican side, saying "We better let this one lay over until tomorrow."

The only man who really could take Kerr on in Senate debate was [John] Pastore, and Pastore would really floor him. Kerr didn't want to mix with Pastore. Pastore was about half his size, physically, but he understood Kerr and Kerr aroused in Pastore all of his aggressiveness. He would treat him with an incredible sarcasm that even topped Kerr's and Kerr was an awfully sarcastic man. So he avoided conflicts, but Pastore didn't. Pastore was always looking for an occasion to go to work on Kerr, and he was usually quite successful with it when he did. He'd get him torn down to size with sarcasm and scorn.

RITCHIE: The rules of the Senate all work toward defusing that sort of situation; everything is very polite. How is it that someone can come along and let loose and in a sense violate the spirit of the rules and the comity of the institution?

VALEO: Well, it's done politely! The Senate's the only place that I know where you can do that. Of course, it's not uncommon in parliamentary debate. You see it in the House of Commons in England and in other places, where it can be even more vicious than it is in the Congress. There are limits, and if it goes beyond a certain limit—I think the rules were set up primarily to prevent people from coming to blows. The practices

have reinforced that, by the use of courteous address, "the distinguished senator," and so forth, which defuses it. If, in effect, you're saying "the distinguished senator is an ass," the "distinguished" part of it sort of modifies the "ass." I never saw blows in the Senate. I saw anger, real anger, very serious anger, but never blows. Sometimes alcohol was involved in that.

RITCHIE: How would you say that Kerr was treated by other members of the Senate? Were they fearful of him?

VALEO: Well, there were two reactions to him. One was unctuous, in the sense of wanting to get campaign funds. And those who didn't need him, or didn't think that was the way to get campaign funds, were disdainful of him. But all of them were mollified, I think, at least among the Democrats, by his stand on McCarthy, because the Democrats suffered most from that. There were a few Republicans who also suffered, but mostly the Democrats paid the price of McCarthy politically. Mansfield was one of them. McCarthy never attacked Mansfield directly, but he released forces in the country which went out to Montana in that 1952 campaign to call him "China Mike," and "the agrarian reformer" and all of these very unenviable titles.

RITCHIE: When Mansfield became majority leader, Kerr was chairman of the Finance Committee, Russell was chairman of Armed Services, there were some really powerful chairmen. How can a

leader work in a situation when the power centers were so identified in other people outside of the leadership?

VALEO: Many of them were on the policy committee, and of course almost all of them were committee chairmen and therefore were in the committee chairmen luncheon group, which would meet periodically. Mansfield treated them all with great, great deference, including Kerr. There were certainly no clashes with Kerr, quite the contrary. But I think one has to differentiate between certain people in these powerful groups who were very anxious for Mansfield to succeed and those who were indifferent to it. Kerr was one who was quite indifferent. He didn't care whether Mansfield succeeded or not; he had already mapped out his own particular sphere of activity. So long as Mansfield could keep the Senate running, he was quite satisfied. But Russell, [Warren] Magnuson, [Henry] Jackson, a number of others in that period, were very supportive of Mansfield, and were somewhat dismayed because he showed none of the Lyndon Johnson traits that would tend to either cower people into line, or cajole them into line. Mansfield left it all, in effect, to them. They already had a number of privileges in their special positions as chairmen, but he seemed to be showering them with even more. They were perplexed by it, frankly. Very often they tried to give it back to him, but in the end, they said, "Well, if you want us to do it, we'll do it." But he never tried to force an issue.

Bear in mind, too, we're talking about the early period of the Kennedy administration, which was a shaking down period also for the White House. Kennedy was feeling his way. He had a lot of skilled people who were putting together programs that there had long been a need for. What later was to become the whole Johnson Great Society program was really being formed by Kennedy's immediate entourage, either in the cabinet or in the White House. They were beginning to shape policies that they felt would move the country towards the "Great Society"—they didn't use the term, but that's in effect what it was. They felt there were a lot of neglected social problems within the country that needed attention, and they were beginning to develop the kinds of programs and the legislation to go with it that would produce an effort to correct what they felt was a long period of social neglect and social injustice.

The first question that came up in this connection was the civil rights question, and Johnson had gotten through a bill a year before or two years before, and it was beginning to have some effect in certain places in the South, but a very limited effect. Meanwhile the pressure from the black community was growing very rapidly. So I'm quite sure Kennedy asked Mansfield directly what he thought were the prospects, if they should put some legislation through. Mansfield advised him strongly against it. He said, "We haven't even really begun here in the Senate.

It will go nowhere. I can only advise you not to do it." I don't know what the words were, but basically, that's what it amounted to. Kennedy concurred with him. He had the same kind of feeling about it at that point. Again, we had not yet had the flair-ups of violence in the South. That came, I guess, somewhere between the first and second session. The problems began then to take on a physical side in the South, and I think that's what ultimately brought the legislation to the floor in the Senate, which was where the hold-up was. They were ready to move in the House. And it was true, there was no way that at that point, and in that atmosphere, that the civil rights bill would have gone through the Senate.

The only other pieces of legislation of any consequence that developed in that period had to do, I believe, with taxation. Kerr was the leader in that on the Finance Committee. I think what they were pushing were basically tax breaks for accelerated depreciation, and things of that sort. But there was an important side development. In one of these measures that were pushed through, which were basically conservative, business-oriented measures, Wayne Morse launched a filibuster. I think it had something to do with communications, I'm not really sure now what the issue was. He launched a filibuster, and he kept it up for quite a while. I remember discussing it with Mansfield.

He had made up his mind at the very beginning and had so discussed it with me that there would be no night sessions of the kind that Johnson had done, with people in their pajamas and that sort of thing, to break a filibuster in the Senate. He'd made up his mind that the Senate would run as far as possible on a noon-to-five basis, five days a week. If there were any problems, he was going to throw them back at the Senate. He was not going to try to resolve them himself by maneuver.

Well, since that had been set as the base for the approach to the Senate leadership, the question came up of how to handle Morse's filibuster. Whether I suggested it or not, I said, "The only way you are going to do it is to apply the Senate rules, which is cloture." Of course, Baker's view was you couldn't get cloture. I said, "There is no alternative." At this time I had begun to sit in on some of the meetings between Baker and Mansfield. I said, "There's no other way." Well, they talked about going round the clock and so forth, but Mansfield would not have that. So he put a cloture petition in, and surprise of surprises, it succeeded. That was the first time in many, many years. Morse was flabbergasted. So was the Senate. Actually, none of the members had ever seen a cloture vote succeed, as I recall. Oh, [Carl] Hayden probably would have seen one, way, way back, but there had been no history of success for cloture motions.

RITCHIE: That was because it was usually invoked on civil rights issues.

VALEO: They never got anywhere with it. But it came up on some other issues. It had very rarely been even tried, because most people felt you'd never get anywhere with it. But the success of it was very critical, because this then became the precedent for the great Civil Rights bill in '64, when again the same technique was used. Well, Morse took his defeat well. He didn't try to extend or break the cloture rule. He just accepted the fact that cloture had been imposed. The thing passed. Nothing more was thought of it, except that it was an unusual occurrence in the Senate to adopt a cloture measure. It was partly because of the substance of the bill, but partly because everybody had gotten tired of hearing Morse talk. And Morse could do that endlessly. He was marvelous when he came to debate, but he went on forever. He would not stop. There was no way you could stop him, except by a cloture vote. So the pattern was set in that cloture vote for what was to come next, and then was to become a regular practice in the Senate.

There had been some attempts, as I recall, it was either in that Congress or the second one, to try the same tactic that had been tried with Nixon in the chair as vice president under Eisenhower, of changing the rule to make it more easy to get cloture. The attempt had not succeeded. Mansfield had opposed

the attempt. He, at that point, fought to hold the cloture rule the same way as it was, which was again typical of the way he was moving in the leadership, with extreme caution, and in the process endearing himself to the Southerners because of his respect for the traditional practices. He was treating them all with great deference, letting them pretty much carry their own bills. Johnson as leader always wanted to carry measures on the floor. Mansfield would take a back seat and let the chairman of the committee get up in front and carry his own committee's measures, and things of that sort, which really endeared him to the committee chairmen.

But then there were some rumblings beginning in the Senate that, you know, this fellow's no leader at all. What kind of a leader is this? He doesn't lead. He's a leader without leading. I would catch repercussions of it, from time to time, through the assistant secretary for the majority, Jay McDonald. He was a minor figure in the Senate operation. He really had charge of the pages. He later ran as a Republican for governor in the State of Washington. Brought in by Warren Magnuson, Jay McDonald despised Bobby Baker. He may have been a little bit off his rocker, as well, I'm not really sure.

McDonald would bend my ear whenever he had an opportunity. He'd catch me in the halls to tell me what Baker was doing and the way he was beginning to spread corruption, and undermining the

leadership, and everything else, fully expecting that I would carry these stories back to the majority leader, which I did not do. I needed to have something more tangible than the view of an assistant secretary about the secretary. So I treated it with great caution and held it to myself while it was developing. I would always say, "Well, would you want to see the majority leader and talk to him about it?" Oh, no, he didn't want to do that, but he wanted the stories to get around. Baker was playing his own game. He'd already gotten started on a hotel business out in Ocean City, the Carousel, as I recall. He was borrowing stuff from the Senate restaurant to take out there to get his hotel started. It was petty stuff at that time around the Senate, but the important Baker connection was with Kerr and the oil money that was coming in through Kerr to finance campaigns.

The financing of campaigns is always a major cause of corruption in the Senate. Most men whom I've seen in the Senate in my life were not corrupt, but it took money to run campaigns. Now it takes a great deal of money, so the potential for even greater corruption is there, as compared with that time. Money was important then but it did not play the kind of role that it plays today. There was one big flair-up on it when Francis Case—I can't remember whether this happened under Johnson or whether it happened under Mansfield—but Francis Case was absolutely furious. He was a paragon of virtue, a Republican from the Dakotas, and a

very decent man, very conservative and very decent. A good deal like Ernest Griffith. Someone had come up and tried to bribe him in his office with several thousand dollars for his campaign in return for a vote. He was outraged. That brought the matter to the newspapers. But then, somehow or other, it was glossed over. I can't remember why or how, but it did get a flair-up of attention at the time. Somebody said, "Oh, it's just Francis Case. He just imagined that somebody's trying to bribe him. Probably just wanted to give him a regular campaign contribution." I think that's the way it was treated. But it was the first sign, either in the later days of Lyndon's period or in Mansfield's earlier days, where this came to the fore.

Let me see if there was anything else in terms of procedures that changed then. Again, the same things that had happened in the Steering Committee and the policy committee were carried over to the floor. Mansfield would not try to force the issue on anything with any member. I remember writing dozens of opening statements in this period for the opening of Congress: saying over and over again, if there's a problem, the Senate is going to have to solve it. The leadership has no power beyond what any other member has, except the power of recognition. Traditionally, if he's on his feet, he's recognized as the person first on his feet.

RITCHIE: This was a period in which the Democrats had a solid majority in the Senate and the House. They had a new president with an ambitious program, and yet things moved very slowly. Everybody remembers those as quiet, pleasant days around the Senate.

VALEO: Inactive, almost, one might say. Everybody was making speeches and getting restless. Because first of all, the press lost interest. This was precisely what Mansfield wanted. He would make the briefest statements to the press people at the opening of each session. "What are you going to take up?" It would be some bill, the confirmation of so-and-so to be major general or some minor thing. The press would say, "Well, isn't there anything else coming up? How do you feel about the economy." But, you see, it was very important to do that, because he was trying also to solidify the Kennedy administration and have Kennedy be the spokesman for the Democratic party. The policy committee, which would later develop into a very powerful tool, in this period had to be kept subordinate to the White House if you were going to have any semblance of unity among the Democrats. Kennedy was, of course, obliging, because he was highly effective with the press, so many of the correspondents began to move downtown from the Hill, because the Hill was no longer a showplace.

It was a very quiet place. You would usually see two or three members sitting around on the floor. At five o'clock the

adjournment bell would go off, unless Morse wanted to make a speech for the West Coast newspapers, and then held take the floor and somebody would complain about "Oh, I don't want to sit in the chair and listen to him for two hours." You'd get that kind of reaction—which once blew up because of Danny Brewster. That story has probably been told, but Brewster was in the chair and the hour was late. Morse stopped speaking for a glass of water or something, and Brewster adjourned the Senate. He apologized the next day, I think, to Morse, but Morse was furious.

RITCHIE: How did Mansfield treat that situation?

VALEO: With humor. There was no other way to treat it.

RITCHIE: Looking back on that period, '61 and '62, and the slowness of the legislative program, was any one party more at fault? The Kennedy administration, the Senate, the House, what was slowing things down?

RITCHIE: Well, in terms of the program, the Kennedy administration hadn't gotten it in order yet. It's one thing to make speeches, another thing to reduce your political philosophy to legislation, how you're going to do it. We were thinking about such bills as Medicare, which didn't exist at that time. There were many other modifications to the Social Security program under consideration. There were civil rights measures that they had in

mind. There were tax bills that they had in mind. There were many, many reforms that they hoped to make, many programs that they wanted to interpret into legislation.

The cabinet members used to make a fairly steady march down to the Hill. [Arthur] Goldberg was at that time labor secretary. I remember him particularly because he immediately established a good working relationship with Mansfield. The fellow who was later senator from Connecticut, [Abraham] Ribicoff, who had been a member of Congress and knew how it worked, he came down, because many of the programs that were going to be involved were going to be HEW programs. He came down and established a good relationship. [Robert] McNamara less; Rusk did not; but then his responsibilities were somewhat different. The fellow who was interior secretary, [Stewart] Udall, was seen around. But again, when Kennedy administration leaders saw the way the land lay, and that it was different from Johnson, they began to bypass the leader's office and go directly to the committee chairmen. This was one of the significant changes. Of course, Mansfield would encourage them. He'd say, "Well, you'd better go down and talk with Jackson if you want to get into Interior matters." He deliberately almost pushed them away.

The door was always open. He always worked with his door open. We always had a coffee pot. We had a fellow named Morris,

an old man who had been around the Senate and worked for the sergeant at arms for many years. He was getting too old to do a lot of the labor work, so the sergeant at arms offered him to Mansfield. Mansfield said, "All right, if you want to send him down to take care of these rooms, send him down." He did, so Morris came down. I never called him anything but "Mr. Morris." I don't even know whether he had a first name, or whether that was his first name. But he was a nice fellow, and he used to keep the coffee pot on, and when anybody came in he automatically would bring them a cup of coffee. The office was a very quiet place. I was still in Mansfield's office at that time. I hadn't yet moved to the majority secretary's office. The Senate ran along for that first session very peacefully.

We made one trip to Vietnam in that period, it would have been about six months after the Johnson trip, in the fall of 1961. It was a very elaborate trip, forty-five days, an around-the-world trip. Mansfield wanted to cover all of the places that he thought might present us with significant problems. He spoke to Kennedy about it, and Kennedy said, "Yes, I would like very much for you to do that. " So I drafted a letter for Kennedy to sign, asking Mansfield to take the trip. The people who went along included [Claiborne] Pell, [Benjamin] Smith, who had replaced Kennedy in the Senate and was a lame duck, Danny Inouye joined it later—he had just been elected, I think he met the plane when we got to

Hong Kong—or was it Hiram Fong? I can't remember. And the senator from Delaware at the time, awfully nice guy.

RITCHIE: Caleb Boggs?

VALEO: Cale Boggs was on the trip. Who else? Mansfield, Pell, Boggs and Smith, I guess that's it. I went on it, and since it was a presidential mission, we had an assignment of people from the State Department to handle the administrative affairs. There was a fellow named Henry Ford, who was the chief administrative officer, who was later killed in an automobile accident in Germany, after he became counsel general in some German city.

It was an extraordinary trip. We went first directly to Germany, and went through the usual procedures at the Wall, which had just been established then. Pell and I and our wives went over into East Germany. You could still do it. You could do it on the subway train if you wanted to, and we came back that way. We actually crossed on foot. It was bleak and depressing. In the cold it was really very, very bleak. There was very little to do; we found a little coffee shop to sit in. We walked around. The city was still very bombed out; very little reconstruction had yet been done. I think actually the Soviet Union had done that deliberately. They wanted to downplay the significance of Berlin. They didn't even use it as the capital of East Germany. They used another place nearby as the capital. We came back then to the

West by subway train from the East. No check coming by subway. It was only if you crossed the Wall that you had to check through.

We went from there, I think, to Greece. I can't remember what the significant problems were with Greece at the time. We went to Egypt, where we met Nasser, who had only recently taken over and had within three or four years become the president and had begun to establish, or was moving in the direction of a relationship with the Soviet Union. From there we went across probably to Ceylon, or some such place. We went to India, and we went to Burma. Burma was important because Mansfield established a relationship with Ne Win, who had just overthrown U Nu. He and I alone went to see Ne Win Che wouldn't receive the whole group. He was in his military headquarters then; he was a general at the time and he was behind sandbags and barbed wire. We went to see him, and he and Mansfield developed a certain rapport. I don't know exactly why it worked that way. He was also very friendly with me; I don't know why. I think we were the first American officials that he had seen. He started out by being very suspicious, which is basic to his nature in any event, and then gradually warmed to us.

There was an interesting incident in connection with this. While we were en route, the U.S. ambassador in Rangoon sent word that he would be glad to entertain the Senate members of the party for Thanksgiving dinner, but that he couldn't take care of the

rest. So Mansfield sent a wire back which said we would invite him to come to the hotel to have dinner with the entire party. In which case the ambassador suddenly discovered he could take the whole party for Thanksgiving dinner and Mansfield interpreted that to include the plane crew as well. That was the way Mansfield would very often act, where he thought he saw anything that smacked of arrogance or any kind of inequity, he would immediately respond that way. It was very effective in situations of that kind, and I think it's one of the things that endeared him to a lot of Asians, who recognized that as a trait, even when he didn't show it. It was in his whole manner.

We went from there to Cambodia and Laos and to Vietnam. In Cambodia, Sihanouk gave a very large dinner for Senator Mansfield. He thought Mansfield was one of the few Americans who understood what he was trying to do in Cambodia. He went all out. He even arranged the menu himself; he composed music for the occasion. He had the court dancers. He did the whole thing up as only he could do, in the most elaborate kind of reception for the whole party. In the conversations with him it was clear that he was having great difficult with the American embassy at that point—and this was even before we became deeply involved in the Vietnamese War. He looked for Mansfield to help him resolve his problems, and he hoped that Mansfield would be helpful, which Mansfield always tried to be with a view to keeping a neutralized

Cambodia during this period when the executive branch just disdained the whole idea of a neutral Cambodia.

The party did not go to Laos, but Mansfield and I and the Senate members all went up to Vientiane. We saw Souvanna Phouma, who was then prime minister of what was about to become a neutralized tripartite government in Vientiane, something which was still being resisted by our own executive branch people, whether it was the CIA or Department of State or what. They still had another Laotian that they had bet on, somebody else whom they had armed who was proving totally incompetent in the situation. Souvanna Phouma, again with his pipe smoking practices—I think Mansfield may have brought him some tobacco, I'm not sure. But it was clear that he was treading very, very carefully. He didn't really know what was going to happen.

I can't remember whether it was before this meeting, or afterwards, but Souvanna Phouma had been in exile in Paris. His wife had come to the office and we had her to lunch. She said that there was pressure on her husband, particularly from the French, to go back to Vientiane, where he had been upset and forced out of office by a military coup. She said, "He's going to do it. But he's not going to play it the way he did before. He's just going to fill the job and not try to force any issues." I don't know whether Souvanna Phouma eventually went on opium or what, which was a common occurrence in that part of the world.

When things got too much, you went on opium. Whether he ever did that or not, I don't know, but from that time on, he gave the impression of really leaving everything in the hands of someone else. In this case, as time went on, it became more and more the American embassy which ran the country. But at that period his half-brother was supposedly the Communist leader, whom we met at the time. Souvanna Phouma gave a reception. He was a very impressive person. He spoke about seven or eight languages, very articulate and very militant in his views. It came across to me more as a nationalist rather than as an exponent of any particular economic ideology. The other fellow, the military person, I think was also at that dinner. Souvanna Phouma just didn't talk very much and when he did, he talked in terms of pleasantries, about having Mansfield and how important Mansfield had been to them, and so forth.

We went up and met the new king in Luang Prabang. We had met him previously as crown prince. He too was bewildered by what had happened. He didn't know which way to turn. He was very concerned about a Chinese road which was being built down under the terms of the agreement which they had made for the neutralization of Laos. Again, my timing may be off. I may be mixing up the '61 trip with the '64-'65 trip, which was in the same area. But in any event, we did meet him and talk with him at some length, and then went on down to Vietnam.

In Vietnam, Mansfield and I had a private meeting with Diem, in addition to the one with the regular group. Both he and I noticed that there were some very significant changes in Diem. He seemed to be faltering in speech, and not at all certain about what he was saying, and very non-committal, which contrasted very sharply with the way he had been earlier with us. Meanwhile, his sister-in-law had really taken over as his hostess (he was never married). She was just the opposite: she was very articulate and very affirmative in her views of what the United States should do in Vietnam, and what they shouldn't do.

Then I got word that his brother [Ngo Dinh Nu] wanted to meet with me privately, and could I come to see him for a very late supper. I remember going from the dinner with Diem to his house. It was about midnight. He and I had late supper together. He said he wanted to talk to me because he knew that I would explain to Mansfield what was involved, and he didn't want to do it in front of everyone else. He said that he felt that they were on top of the situation, that they had this new system of whatever they called them, I can't remember, some kind of strategic hamlets. He was very articulate and brilliant in many ways. He talked at great length about their program, and he made it very clear that what they really wanted from the United States was more understanding and less involvement in their own affairs, that they

felt that they could do it, and they would be effective in controlling the country, which I of course duly related to Mansfield when I went back.

We went down to the Philippines and met the predecessor of [Ferdinand] Marcos, who was [Diosdado] Macapagal. These were essentially official, more or less ceremonial meetings, with briefings from their point of view on what was happening in their country and their attitudes towards U.S. relations. We did, I believe, also meet Marcos, who was then the majority leader of the Philippine Senate. I have only a vague recollection of that meeting, but I think that was our first meeting with Marcos.

After that, we went to Hawaii, and Frank Meloy and I started to work on the report going across the Pacific. We agreed that Frank would draft the public report, and I would draft the one for the president. I talked to Mansfield at some length before I started to work on it, to get more of his attitudes and his reactions to what had happened. He said, "We have to be very careful about getting in deeper in Vietnam. We've just got to discourage that. First of all, I don't think Diem is functioning as well as he might, physically, and I think that it's an extremely dangerous situation." This was, of course, the way I drafted the report, which he gave to Kennedy, subsequent to our arrival in the States.

Now, his findings in that situation would have been completely in accord with his attitude towards the whole area. He thought Diem was an able fellow and a very dedicated Vietnamese nationalist. But he knew the situation was touch-and-go from the very beginning. The last thing he wanted was a U.S. involvement, even to rescue Diem. He didn't want any part of that. But he always thought Diem was the key person, that if you couldn't do it with Diem, there would be no other way in which you could do it, because Diem did have nationalistic characteristics that were very strong, and were recognized by his own people in that sense. So we wrote what amounted to a very discouraging report.

The public report on the trip was drafted by Frank Meloy and he and I worked it over. I remember a conversation with Frank on that on the plane. There was something that I was finding fault with in the report, so he said, "Well, you know, the key to this thing is China. We're not talking about Vietnam, we're talking about China. We either have to make our peace with China, or there is no way really that you can solve this kind of problem." I said, "Well, why don't we say that?" He said, "Are you kidding? You know you can't say that." Of course, he was right. At that point you couldn't say that. That would have been anathema to Rusk and to anybody in the State Department, it was anathema to almost anyone in the administration except possibly Kennedy, but

Kennedy wouldn't have known what to do with it if you said it at that time. The country was not yet ready to listen to it.

When we got back, Kennedy did ask for Mansfield to come down to see him. I remember Mansfield saying he was going down to see Kennedy in Florida, Kennedy was vacationing in Florida, and I think it was to discuss the report. This is second-hand; some reports said that Kennedy was extremely angry with Mansfield for the report, even though he couldn't find fault with it, he was just angry with him for having told him things that he felt he couldn't do anything about. I don't know whether that was true or not. Mansfield, in talking to me about his meeting with Kennedy, merely said, "We had a pleasant meeting. We talked for a long time about Vietnam. We went over the whole thing." He didn't say anything about his being angry or so forth. He said, "He asked a lot of questions, and I gave him straight answers as far as I could."

RITCHIE: I've heard that Mansfield wrote memoranda to Kennedy fairly frequently about Vietnam and about Asia.

VALEO: In that period there was a struggle to get Kennedy's attention. The careerists in the executive branch, and Rusk was one of them, were for carrying over the previous policy. They continued to recommend exactly the same policies, which was understandable, notwithstanding the change in administration. If

you believed in what you were doing a year ago, you don't change it because of a change in the presidency. But those were, in my judgment, badly informed policies, colored too much by the fear of the bureaucracy over what had happened to them as a result of McCarthy and the China experience. They had couched the whole approach to policy only in part on the realities of the situation in Southeast Asia; they also were influenced by the fears of being clobbered in Vietnam and elsewhere with the same club that had hit their colleagues earlier on China. They were still talking about the Communist axis from Moscow to Beijing to Hanoi, even though it was already beginning to come apart. But they were still talking about it in those terms. The only thing that tended to bring it together and hold it still, was our involvement in Vietnam, prior to that it was actually falling apart.

So I think that their advice was bad, and there was no place that Kennedy could get any other advice except from the Hill. Mansfield recognized that, so he kept me writing memoranda. He'd come up with something from the newspapers indicating some new twist in policy, that we were getting prepared for a deeper involvement, and he'd say, "Let's get a memorandum out on this. I'll make a statement on the floor, and let's get a memorandum to the president." I don't know how many we wrote, or how many statements he made on the floor on this subject. But he tried to keep a counter pressure on Kennedy through this whole period.

He mentioned to me once the meeting that Kennedy had held on Laos, with a number of members of the Senate, including Bourke Hickenlooper and Fulbright and himself and many others from both sides. He said, "He talked to us about military involvement and nobody opened their mouth, except a few of us. I did. I told him to be very careful about deepening it. So did Fulbright and Bourke Hickenlooper—I was surprised at Bourke, he went the same way. He warned about being very careful with involvement in that part of the world." There were two or three other names he mentioned. "But basically," he said, "most of the congressional leadership, [John] McCormack and the others, they just took it the way it was, and if anything encouraged him." But Mansfield's whole thrust was to attempt to neutralize the pressures which he knew were on Kennedy to deepen our involvement, and he was trying to push in the other direction.

RITCHIE: Did you ever get any feedback from the White House about those memoranda—or from the State Department?

VALEO: No, they went to the president. Mansfield might have gotten it orally. There weren't that many memoranda. Mansfield felt if you overdid it, then nobody would pay any attention to them. So he was careful with that. When he felt that they weren't paying attention, then he'd make a statement on the floor. That was almost the way it went. Then he'd get atten-

tion in the press from it, and then he might get a response from the White House. It was something of that pattern.

RITCHIE: Do you have any sense of what Mansfield's relations with Kennedy were at that stage; how close he was?

VALEO: Yes, he had a blow-up of a news picture on the wall in the office with Kennedy throwing the first ball out at Griffith Stadium, where the Washington Senators were playing the first ball game of the season. Kennedy's sort of leaning back and getting ready to throw the ball, and Mansfield is holding out his hands to hold him up. He said, "I always like to think that that's the relationship. I want to try to support him as much as I can." There was a lot of dissatisfaction with him in the case of others in the White House staff, I know that. They felt he was not the kind of man Kennedy needed in the job. Did we get into that, on how he got the job? The recommendations, did we cover that last time, do you recall?

RITCHIE: You mentioned that Kennedy had talked to him on the phone.

VALEO: Yes, right. And there were others who were passing out rumors about who Kennedy really wanted. Mostly they centered on Humphrey. My own feeling was that Johnson wanted George Smathers, but he was too smart to go in that direction. So he came out for Mansfield; mildly, but he came out for him. In the

end there was absolute agreement on the part of all of them that Mansfield was the logical one to be Senate leader, the contested question was: who was going to be number two? It boiled down to whether it was going to be Humphrey or Smathers. I think, again, Johnson would have preferred to have Smathers in number two, and the Kennedy people preferred to have Humphrey in number two, so they wound up with Mansfield, Humphrey and Smathers as the leadership.

RITCHIE: What was Smathers' official position?

VALEO: He was secretary of the conference. I had very mixed feelings about Smathers, largely because I thought he defeated one of the really outstanding senators, and he did it in a rather tricky way. He had been on his staff and then ran against him—and that was Claude Pepper, who was the first senator I met when I came to Washington. I had a high regard for him, born out, I think, by what he had done during the Roosevelt administration. He remains a remarkable personality.

RITCHIE: You mentioned about Humphrey becoming whip. What were Mansfield's relations with Humphrey in those number one and two spots?

VALEO: Well, the important thing is that Humphrey changed after that. I remember a luncheon we had in the office with Humphrey and a number of others there. Of course, he had a great

sense of humor, you never knew when he was serious and when he was being funny. But he said, "From now on, I'm taking everything that's coming my way. I don't care what it is, I want it all. I'm sick and tired of all these do-good causes that have been hanging on my neck for years. I just want anything that comes my way." Well, of course, everybody laughed. It was typical behavior on the part of Hubert Humphrey.

But he had a very aggressive staff, he always did have that, and the staff would say, "If he's the whip, he should take over on the floor." Of course, they ran into Bobby Baker on that. I wasn't directly involved in it at that point. But there was beginning to develop a certain amount of friction between Humphrey's people and Baker. Also, apparently Baker was the target of Bobby Kennedy. Bobby Kennedy, I suspect, had him in mind for a long time as being somebody who had to be disposed of. I can remember two things. I mentioned the Jay McDonald thing in a previous meeting. His stories on Baker kept coming to me and I knew they were going to other people as well, probably to Humphrey's people among others, and perhaps even to Kennedy's. Then Baker once said to me, and this was not too long before Kennedy's assassination, he said, "They've been looking into me. I don't know what they're trying to do down there." I always played it dumb with Baker about what was going on. I said, "What do you mean, Bobby? I don't understand what you mean." He said, "Oh, they've got people

looking into my records and everything else." I said, "Who?" He said, "Oh, Bobby Kennedy, who else?" I can remember that going on. I said, "Oh, I didn't know that." Then Mansfield fired Jay McDonald, because Jay McDonald went to him with the Baker story. Whether Bobby Baker had gone to him too and insisted that Jay McDonald be fired, I don't know. He never told me that, but he did fire him. I remember Magnuson coming in, who was McDonald's sponsor, to argue with Mansfield about firing Jay McDonald, or trying to find him a job somewhere else. Then Mansfield said to me, "I don't know about that fellow. He's crazy. He keeps coming in to talk to me. I don't know what the hell he's talking about half the time. I finally got fed up with him and I just had to get rid of him." And he didn't rehire him. So we are beginning to approach the point where the story breaks on Baker.

RITCHIE: I think that would be a good place to start the next time, but I wanted to ask one more question about Mansfield and Humphrey. Mansfield, in so many ways, took a passive leadership role; Humphrey was such an aggressive activist. Were they able to divide tasks that way? Or did Humphrey just go off on his own?

VALEO: The problem with Humphrey was that it was never a continuous thing. Humphrey had so many irons in the fire. He'd come down and make a big stir. You'd think, "Well, gee, he's going to take over the Senate. He's going to be on that floor all the time." Something else would distract him, and then after

having made a big flourish on the floor about getting some action, on something or other, you wouldn't see him for a week. That was his nature. So they really never had any great flair-ups. Humphrey never seriously went after Mansfield's job, and Mansfield had another thing in mind for Humphrey, and that was the Civil Rights bill, which was going to be Humphrey's great moment in the American government, clearly. If he's remembered for anything, he'll be remembered for his role in that Civil Rights bill, because he was the key figure in the Senate. I think Mansfield never took Hubert as whip that seriously. Basically, he liked him, but he didn't really take him too seriously.

End of Interview #6