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This statement is not available for public release until it is delivered at 2:00 p.m. (EDT), Wednesday, April 29, 1992. |
I appreciate the opportunity to testify today regarding the capability and cost of the tactical aircraft in the Air Force and the Navy. Over the next two decades, the Administration plans to reduce the number of the tactical air units in those two services; the remaining units will be modernized with four new or modified planes. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has analyzed the Administration's plan, and the results reveal both good and bad news.
The good news is that both the Air Force and Navy should be able to meet most of their numerical requirements for aircraft, though only if they are willing to tolerate older inventories of aircraft. Moreover, at least through the mid-1990s, the capability of U.S. tactical aircraft will far exceed the capability of key regional powers.
However, the Administration's plan also has its problems. The plan will be affordable only under optimistic assumptions about trends in costs to procure aircraft and the funds that will be available to buy them. Under less optimistic assumptions, the plan will require billions of dollars of additional funding, particularly during the next decade.
Problems of affordability could also exacerbate an apparent mismatch between fleet age and the order in which the four new or modified planes are to be developed and bought. The oldest fleet is being modernized last, a younger fleet first. Thus, measured by the criterion of age, the Administration should alter the sequence of its planned purchases of aircraft. Moreover, though age is only one criterion in determining when planes should be replaced, it may be a more important indicator now that there is less need to replace planes in order to keep pace with enemy threats.
This document is available in its entirety in PDF.