


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A
CBO
PAPER

**Antidumping
Action in the
United States
and Around
the World:
An Update**



JUNE 2001

ANTIDUMPING ACTION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND AROUND
THE WORLD: AN UPDATE

June 2001

NOTES

Most of the figures and tables are based on a data set that the Congressional Budget Office constructed from the semiannual reports made by signatories to the Antidumping Code of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and, subsequently, of the World Trade Organization. That data set is referred to as the GATT/WTO data set.

Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals because of rounding.

PREFACE

Antidumping law and policy are recurring subjects of debate in the Congress and in international trade negotiations. At the request of the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means, this Congressional Budget Office (CBO) paper updates a June 1998 analysis examining international data on antidumping activity to determine trends, compare U.S. activity with that of other countries, and study claims made by various participants in the debate over U.S. policy. The June 1998 paper covered data through the end of 1995. The current paper updates the analysis through the end of 1999. In the case of the United States, the analysis includes the large number of terminations of antidumping orders that occurred on January 1, 2000, as a result of sunset reviews over the previous year and a half.

The paper was written by Bruce Arnold under the supervision of Roger Hitchner and David Moore. It benefits from helpful comments received on earlier drafts from Arlene Holen and Robert Murphy within CBO, and from J. Michael Finger of the American Enterprise Institute.

Leah Mazade edited the manuscript, and Christine Bogusz proofread it. Rae Wiseman prepared the paper for publication, and Lenny Skutnik produced the printed copies. Annette Kalicki prepared the figures and the electronic versions for CBO's Web site (www.cbo.gov).



Dan L. Crippen
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SUMMARY

A perennial complaint made by other countries against the United States in international trade negotiations concerns U.S. antidumping policy. Dumping is the selling of an imported good at a price below the price at which the manufacturer sells the good in its own domestic market or (in many cases) at a price below its cost of production. U.S. antidumping law views such imports as being sold at less than their fair value. Under the law, the United States imposes duties on dumped imports causing or threatening to cause "material injury" to the competing U.S. industry. Almost any appreciable injury is considered to be material. The rates of those duties are set equal to the dumping margin, which is the difference between the administratively determined fair value and the market price expressed as a percentage of the market price. Many other countries have similar laws.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has conducted two analyses in recent years of antidumping policy and its use in the United States and around the world. In a paper published in 1998, CBO concluded that although the United States generally had fewer and less significant restrictions on trade than most other countries did, it was the heaviest user of antidumping law: it investigated more cases; it imposed more and higher duties; and it left those duties in place longer than other countries did. This paper updates those earlier statistics, showing that although U.S. antidumping activity has moderated since the Uruguay Round agreement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade went into effect in the mid-1990s, the United States remains one of the most aggressive users of antidumping laws in the world. The duties it imposes are a substantial impediment to trade in the goods at issue, imposing net costs on the U.S. economy as a whole. U.S. trade policy is generally favorable to free trade, reflecting wide agreement among trade economists across the political spectrum regarding the benefits of trade and the high cost, relative to any benefits, of restricting it. Antidumping restrictions are a significant exception to that general free-trade thrust. In addition to the costs they impose on the U.S. economy, they are one of the major focuses of foreign complaints about U.S. trade policy.

U.S. ANTIDUMPING LAW AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMY

The first U.S. antidumping law, which was enacted in 1916, was very similar to a prohibition on the predatory pricing of imports. Predatory pricing is the intentional selling of a good at a price below the cost of production for the purpose of driving

competitors out of business to increase the market power of the predatory firm. The increased market power then allows the firm to raise its prices above competitive market levels and thereby increase profits, which is the ultimate motivation for predatory pricing. For a number of reasons (not the least of which is the greater ease of obtaining protection under the law discussed below), the first U.S. antidumping law, though still in effect, has received little use.

Antidumping cases today are generally brought under another law with a more expansive definition of dumping. Under that law, no attempt is made to determine whether the pricing is predatory or even whether successful predatory pricing is possible in the case at hand. All that is required to have duties imposed is a finding that the good has been sold below the price in the home market or below cost and that material injury has resulted. The vast majority of cases in which antidumping duties are imposed do not involve predatory pricing.

The change in the pricing behavior targeted by antidumping law is important. Predatory pricing is detrimental not only to the competing domestic industry but also to the economy as a whole. However, beyond the small minority of cases involving such predation (and even in cases in which a firm attempts predation but fails), imports priced below cost or below their foreign price are generally beneficial to a country's economy. Thus, the intended effect of the first antidumping law is beneficial to both the competing domestic industry and the economy as a whole, whereas the more frequently used current law helps the competing domestic industry but hurts the broader economy.¹ (As discussed in Chapter I, there is some dispute about the actual versus the intended effect of predatory pricing law.) U.S. law places no restrictions on the pricing behavior of domestic firms in the U.S. market that are comparable with those placed on foreign firms by the antidumping law. For those and other reasons (for example, charges of bias in U.S. administrative procedures and methodologies), antidumping law has been a continuing center of controversy and the topic of deliberations in multilateral trade negotiations and in the U.S. Congress.

In such deliberations, it is useful to know how antidumping practices of the United States compare with those of other countries and how the practices of other countries—especially those of the major U.S. trading partners—affect U.S. firms. The best sources of the data needed for making such comparisons are the semiannual reports made by signatories to the Antidumping Code of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and, subsequently, of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, drawing useful summary statistics from those reports is difficult,

1. Economists disagree about the *actual* effect of laws against predatory pricing as opposed to the *intended* effect. Some economists believe that the difficulty of distinguishing predatory pricing from fierce but nonpredatory price competition in a court of law is sufficiently great that laws against predatory pricing, regardless of intent, in actuality serve to diminish nonpredatory competition (which is economically beneficial) as well as predatory pricing. Consequently, they argue, such laws may do more harm than good (at least from an economic standpoint). Others disagree.

for several reasons: they are not in a computer format that is readily usable; information about each antidumping case is scattered among several tables in several reports; various countries have failed at one time or another to file reports for certain reporting periods; and the reports have many errors and omissions. Consequently, until recently, policy discussions and deliberations generally occurred without the benefits of good statistics.

CBO'S PREVIOUS ANALYSIS

Several years ago, CBO took information from the GATT/WTO reports and used it to construct a computer database of antidumping cases brought by—and the resulting antidumping measures imposed by—the United States and most of the countries with which it conducts a significant volume of trade. The database extended from July 1979 through December 1995, with more countries covered in later portions of that interval than in earlier portions. To the extent feasible, CBO corrected errors and omissions in the reports; using the database, it calculated and analyzed statistics relevant to the claims and issues surrounding antidumping practices.

Aggregate antidumping statistics are imperfect indicators of the economic significance of antidumping activity because no two cases are identical. Even if the same rate of duty is imposed in two antidumping cases, the cases might have substantially different effects because they might involve different products, different quantities of imports, different source countries, and so on. Furthermore, one country might tend to bring cases against products that are narrowly defined, whereas another country might use broader categories. (For example, one country might bring three cases, each against a particular steel product—such as steel plate, steel sheet, or wire rod—whereas another country might bring only one case against the same three products as a group.) A larger number of cases by a country using narrower categories could have a milder economic effect than a smaller number of cases by a country using broader categories. Despite those qualifications, however, the statistics provide information that can be used to draw a number of important conclusions about antidumping activity around the world.

CBO published its analysis and conclusions on antidumping cases in June 1998 in a paper entitled *Antidumping Action in the United States and Around the World: An Analysis of International Data*. Among the conclusions were the following:

- Compared with other countries, the United States had more antidumping cases initiated per year from 1991 through 1995 and more active antidumping measures in place on December 31, 1995 (or any other date). (The term *active antidumping measures* refers to measures that have been imposed and not yet terminated.)

- The differences between the United States and other countries in numbers of cases initiated and numbers of active measures were not easily explainable by the relatively large sizes of the U.S. economy and its imports.
- Antidumping duties imposed by the United States and many other countries were high enough and lasted long enough to be substantial impediments to trade of the goods in question. Further, U.S. antidumping duties were typically higher than those of most other countries and typically lasted longer.
- The United States had more measures by far directed against other countries than they had directed against it. However, the use of antidumping laws appeared to be spreading among developing countries.

NEW ANALYSIS: THE EFFECTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT

The Uruguay Round agreement, which created the World Trade Organization, went into effect on January 1, 1995. The agreement revised the Antidumping Code in ways that could be expected to restrain U.S. antidumping activity somewhat, and the coverage of the newly revised code was expanded to include all WTO members. (Previously, the code had applied only to the subset of GATT signatories that chose also to sign the code.) The data set for CBO's earlier paper extended only through the end of 1995—one year after the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect. That one year would have been inadequate to accurately assess the agreement's effects even if all of the provisions of the new Antidumping Code had become effective immediately on January 1, 1995. In fact, however, one of the provisions—requiring so-called sunset reviews and terminations of active antidumping measures—did not take effect for the United States until January 1, 2000. Consequently, CBO's 1998 analysis could not assess the effects of the agreement.

An assessment is now possible, however. Semiannual reports to the WTO covering activity through the end of 1999 are now available, providing five years of data with which to determine the effects of most provisions of the agreement. In addition, CBO used data from the Department of Commerce's Web site to update the data set for the United States by one day further, to January 1, 2000, allowing an assessment of the effects of the agreement's sunset review and termination provision. CBO could not update the data set by that one day for other countries, but most other countries were already conducting sunset reviews and terminations before the Uruguay Round agreement.

In general, the statistics show that U.S. antidumping activity has been less aggressive since the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect—possibly a result of the revisions made to the Antidumping Code. However, the agreement may not be the only cause of the changes in the statistics. For example, a recession occurred

during the five-year period before the agreement (in late 1991 and early 1992), but the five-year period since included no recession. That difference might explain at least part of the changes from one period to the next. A recession would be expected to make dumping more likely, to make dumping margins larger, and to make U.S. industries more sensitive to foreign competition and therefore more likely to file cases. CBO has not tried to determine whether or to what extent other factors might also explain part of the differences.

The Prevalence of Antidumping Action

Before the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect, only a few countries used antidumping laws to any great extent, and the United States was the heaviest user by virtually every indicator. It ranked first in average annual number of cases initiated, first in average annual number of new antidumping measures imposed, and first in number of active antidumping measures (see Summary Tables 1 and 2). Active U.S. measures against other countries totaled 281 versus 79 reported measures against the United States—a ratio of 3.6 U.S. measures for each measure against the United States. In addition, the United States had more active measures against each of 48 countries than those countries had against it, whereas only 10 countries each had more active measures against the United States than it had against them.

After the agreement went into effect at the beginning of 1995, the United States became a less frequent user of antidumping laws but remained one of the most aggressive users in the world. The average number of U.S. case initiations per year dropped by about one-half, to 26.4, which put the United States in a tie for third place. The average annual number of new U.S. measures declined by a little less than one-third, to 16.4, ranking the United States second by that indicator. In terms of active measures, the United States still ranked first, even after the large number of sunset terminations that occurred on January 1, 2000. On that date, it had 267 measures in place against other countries (a decline of about 5 percent from five years earlier) versus 107 measures against it—a ratio of 2.5 U.S. measures for each foreign measure against the United States. It had more active measures against each of 36 countries than those countries had against it, and only 11 countries had more active measures against the United States than it had against them.

The numbers for active measures compare the United States on January 1, 2000 (the date on which the sunset terminations provision of the Uruguay Round agreement became fully effective for the United States), with other countries on December 31, 1999, the most recent day for which data are available for them. Most

SUMMARY TABLE 1. RANKING OF THE UNITED STATES BY VARIOUS INDICATORS OF ANTIDUMPING ACTIVITY

Criterion	Before Adopting Uruguay Round Agreement ^a	After Adopting Uruguay Round Agreement ^b
Average Number of Cases Initiated per Year	1st of 27	3rd of 72
Average Number of New Measures Imposed per Year	1st of 25	2nd of 66
Number of Active Measures	1st of 52	1st of 54
Initial Duty Rate		
Mean	2nd of 14	10th of 21
Median	3rd of 14	13th of 21
Duration to Date of Active Measures		
Mean	1st of 16	1st of 25
Median	1st of 16	2nd of 25

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: For each entry, the second number (for example, the 27 in "1st of 27") is the number of countries for which it was possible to calculate the value of the indicator in question. The differences in those numbers stem from differences in when countries began reporting the relevant data. Countries reporting relevant data for only a year or less are not counted. See Tables B-8a through B-8f, B-9a through B-9f, and B-11a through B-11f for the detail underlying this summary table.

- a. Averages are unweighted and are figured over the 1990-1994 period. All other indicators are calculated as of December 31, 1994.
- b. Averages are unweighted and are figured over the 1995-1999 period. Other indicators for the United States are calculated as of January 1, 2000; for all other countries, those indicators are calculated as of December 31, 1999.

of the major users of antidumping laws other than the United States had sunset provisions in their laws before the agreement and so are not likely to have had large changes in their statistics during that one day. Further, even if some countries did have sizable declines because of the agreement's sunset provision, that would only make the statistics more lopsided, with the United States having even more active measures than other countries have.

SUMMARY TABLE 2. LEVELS OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING ACTIVITY

	Before Adopting Uruguay Round Agreement ^a	After Adopting Uruguay Round Agreement ^b
Average Number of Cases Initiated per Year	53.4	26.4
Average Number of New Measures Imposed per Year	23.2	16.4
Number of Active Measures	281	267
Initial Duty Rate (Percent)		
Mean	56.2	47.6
Median	37.9	30.9
Duration to Date of Active Measures (Years)		
Mean	7.3	8.2
Median	7.0	7.2

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- a. Averages are unweighted and are figured over the 1990-1994 period. All other indicators are calculated as of December 31, 1994.
- b. Averages are unweighted and are figured over the 1995-1999 period. All other indicators are calculated as of January 1, 2000.

The Magnitude and Duration of Antidumping Protection

Before the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect, antidumping duties typically were large enough and lasted long enough to be substantial impediments to trade in the goods on which they were imposed, and the duties imposed by the United States were typically higher and longer lasting than those of most other countries. Average U.S. initial duty rates had trended upward since the early 1980s. The few countries whose average initial duty rates were higher than the 56.2 percent unweighted average of the United States were not large users of antidumping laws; the large users all had lower average duty rates, but even their rates were high enough to be significant obstacles to trade. U.S. duties generally lasted longer than those of all other countries—long enough to be effectively permanent for all practical purposes.

After the Uruguay Round agreement took effect, the average U.S. initial duty rate declined, and the United States dropped to 10th in the ranking by that indicator. Nevertheless, the new U.S. average rate of 47.6 percent still hinders trade

substantially. On December 31, 1999, the mean and median durations to date of active U.S. duty orders (the administrative orders that impose the duties) were even longer than they had been five years earlier; they were also longer than those of any other country. The following day, the large number of sunset terminations reduced both the mean and median, but they remained higher than they had been five years earlier. The new mean after the terminations would still have ranked the United States first the day before; the new median would have ranked it second.

Long average durations to date of antidumping measures could merely reflect that one country's antidumping program has been active for a longer period of time than the programs of other countries. (A country that just started imposing measures one year ago cannot have an average duration to date that is longer than one year.) However, other statistics lend support to the notion that U.S. antidumping measures tend to last longer than those of other countries.

Antidumping Activity By and Against the United States

The ranking of countries by the number of active U.S. measures against them has not changed much since the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect. As one would expect, the countries against which the United States maintains the most measures are all large suppliers of imports to the United States. In addition, CBO's 1998 paper showed that developing countries and countries that have or that recently had nonmarket economies are the targets of more U.S. measures than one would expect solely from the level of U.S. imports from them. The similarity over time of the ranking of countries as targets of U.S. antidumping activity suggests that this is still the case.

The number of countries reporting active antidumping measures against the United States (12) is much smaller than the number targeted by U.S. measures (55). The countries with by far the most measures against the United States—both before and after the agreement—are Canada and Mexico, the result of their being the recipients of large quantities of U.S. exports. The two countries rank much lower when the numbers of antidumping measures are divided by the values of U.S. exports received by the countries in question. The number of foreign antidumping measures against U.S. firms has increased somewhat more than proportionately to the increase in trade since the agreement went into effect, and more countries have increased the number of measures they have against the United States than have decreased them.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since 1916, U.S. law has restricted the dumping of imported goods.¹ Under such law, an imported good is considered to be dumped if it is sold at less than its fair value. In most cases, *fair value* is defined as being approximately equal to whichever of the following is greater: the price of the good in the home market of the firm that exported it to the United States or the cost of producing the good (including a specified rate of profit).² Under the most frequently used antidumping law, the United States imposes duties equal to the dumping margin in cases in which the dumped import is causing "material injury" to the competing industry in the United States.³ (The dumping margin, normally expressed as a percentage of the import price of the good, is the amount by which the price of the dumped good is below the fair value as defined under antidumping law and regulations.) The statute does not define *material*, but in practice, almost any appreciable injury is considered to be material.

The Department of Commerce (DOC) and the International Trade Commission (ITC) administer the U.S. antidumping law. Cases may be initiated in response to a petition from the competing domestic industry or under the DOC's own authority. The DOC determines whether the imports in question are being dumped and, if so, by how much; the ITC determines whether the imports are causing material injury to the competing domestic industry. If those agencies find that dumping and material injury have occurred, the DOC issues an order directing the Customs Service to levy a duty equal to the amount by which the price of the import is less than the fair value

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1. U.S. antidumping law and procedures, as well as their history and economic effects, are discussed in detail in Congressional Budget Office, *How the GATT Affects U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing-Duty Policy* (September 1994). This paragraph and the following section on the economic effects of dumping and antidumping law briefly summarize some of the important points of that discussion.
 2. Strictly speaking, the fair value is equal to the price in the exporter's home market unless there are too few sales in the home market to determine a reliable price. If there are too few sales, then the price in a third country may be considered. If there are too few sales outside the U.S. market, then the U.S. price is compared with the cost of production. In many cases, however, sales below cost in the exporter's home market are disregarded when determining the average price in that market, so fair value is equal to the price in that market or the cost of production, whichever is higher.
 3. The law in question is subtitle B of title VII (sections 731-739) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.

as determined by the DOC. Orders imposing antidumping duties are subject to periodic review by the DOC, which can result in changes in the duty rate.⁴

Other countries also have antidumping laws, and disputes and complaints over the enforcement of such laws—particularly complaints by other countries about U.S. enforcement—repeatedly crop up in international trade negotiations. In discussions and debates over antidumping policy, it is useful to have a statistical overview. An earlier Congressional Budget Office (CBO) paper provided such an overview, covering the decade and a half leading up to and including 1995.⁵ This paper updates that overview through the end of 1999 to assess the effects of changes in the antidumping policies of the United States and other countries occurring at the beginning of 1995.

HOW DUMPING AND ANTIDUMPING LAW AFFECT THE U.S. ECONOMY

The target and purpose of U.S. antidumping law have changed over the years. At the outset, the law was aimed at predatory pricing—a practice that is detrimental to the economy when it is successful. Over time, however, antidumping law has become a form of general protection from foreign competition that would benefit the U.S. economy if such protection were not in place.

The original law—the Antidumping Act of 1916—was very similar to a prohibition on predatory pricing of imports. Predatory pricing is the intentional selling of a product at a loss in order to drive competitors out of business, thereby increasing the seller's market power and allowing it to raise prices above competitive market levels and boost profits. That practice is objectionable on economic grounds (assuming it succeeds) because the higher prices and reduced competition are detrimental to the economy's efficiency and productivity. Hence, prohibiting such behavior benefits the economy—assuming that it can be accomplished without at the same time significantly lessening nonpredatory price competition—and accords well with many people's notions of fairness.⁶ For a number of reasons, including the

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4. The administrative procedure, which is somewhat complicated, is covered in greater detail in Appendix B of Congressional Budget Office, *How the GATT Affects U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing-Duty Policy*.
 5. Congressional Budget Office, *Antidumping Action in the United States and Around the World: An Analysis of International Data*, CBO Paper (June 1998).
 6. Some economists believe that the difficulty of distinguishing, in a court of law, between predatory pricing and fierce but nonpredatory price competition (which is economically beneficial) is sufficiently great that laws against predatory pricing, regardless of intent, diminish price competition as well. Consequently, they argue, such laws may do more harm than good, at least from an economic standpoint. Other economists disagree.

relative infrequency of predatory pricing, the difficulty of obtaining relief (or protection) under the law, and the greater ease of obtaining it under more recent laws, the 1916 statute (though still in effect) is seldom used and will not be discussed further in this paper.

To provide greater protection for U.S. industry, the Congress passed a law in 1921 that had a more expansive definition of dumping. Since then, changes in U.S. antidumping law and in regulations and methodologies of enforcement have made it easier for U.S. industries to receive protection from competing imports.⁷ Today, U.S. antidumping law does not act primarily against predatory pricing but against international price discrimination (sales at a lower price in the United States than in the home country of the exporter) and sales below cost, regardless of whether the sales are predatory or not.⁸

That change is important. Whereas predatory pricing is economically detrimental but relatively infrequent, nonpredatory price discrimination and sales below cost are usually beneficial and relatively common.⁹ As a result, laws against the latter two pricing behaviors proscribe much more activity than do predatory pricing laws and generally hurt the economy. Under U.S. law as it relates to domestic firms, such nonpredatory behaviors are for the most part legal and unrestricted. The antidumping law treats foreign firms differently, however: in

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7. One of those changes, enacted in 1979, replaced the Antidumping Act of 1921 with a new title VII to the Tariff Act of 1930, which was similar but contained changes mandated by the Tokyo Round agreement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT. (The Tokyo Round was one of a series of rounds of international trade negotiations relating to the GATT. The most recent was the Uruguay Round, which is discussed later in this paper.)
 8. The same is true of other countries as well. Gunnar Niels, in an article in the *Journal of Economic Surveys*, describes the results of an empirical study for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: "By applying a rather conservative market power screen, it turns out that in the overwhelming majority of antidumping cases that resulted in remedies, there was no plausible threat of monopolization in the importing market. Only 28 out of 282 US, one out of 297 EU, and none of the 20 Australian and 155 Canadian antidumping cases analyzed involved a market structure where authentic predation *might* have been possible (a second-stage price-cost analysis was not applied). In a study for Mexico, Van Dijk (1997) finds a proportion of two cases out of 72." With no plausible threat of monopolization, predatory pricing could not have occurred, regardless of the relation of price to cost. See Gunnar Niels, "What Is Antidumping Policy Really About?" *Journal of Economic Surveys*, vol. 14, no. 4 (September 2000), pp. 467-492.
 9. For many reasons, firms commonly sell products at prices below their full costs of production. For example, many firms lose money during recessions, which means by definition that they are selling at prices that are below their costs. The introduction of a new product may also lead to below-cost sales. Many new products lose money for a period until demand reaches amounts that can be produced efficiently and the producing firms learn through experience the most efficient way to produce those products. A further example is the use of so-called loss leaders in retail sales. Loss leaders are products that a store puts on sale at very low prices to attract customers into the store, with the hope that customers will see and purchase other, higher-priced products.

effect, it punishes them by applying duties to their goods whenever they engage in those behaviors.

Economists widely agree on the harm done to the economy by trade restrictions. In the case of restrictions on imports, such as antidumping duties or any other tariff or quota, the harm results from the rise in the cost of acquiring the goods in question. The increased cost not only hurts the purchasers of the goods but also impairs the productivity and efficiency of the economy by causing the competing domestic industries to produce more than is economically optimal. When those industries, to satisfy demand, increase their production as a result of the restriction, they must use labor, raw materials, and intermediate goods that otherwise would have been used elsewhere in the economy to produce other goods. The resulting decrease in production of those other goods has a greater value than the increase in production of the goods that are subject to the import restrictions. Hence, the total value of the economy's production declines. Further harm occurs if other countries, either from following the lead of the first country or in retaliation, impose their own import restrictions affecting the first country's exporters.¹⁰

Even if other countries do not retaliate with restrictions, the first country's own import restrictions ultimately reduce its exports by roughly the same amount that they reduce its imports. As a result, the restrictions have little, if any, effect on the country's trade deficit or employment.¹¹ What little effect there may be initially on employment subsides to zero over time as wages and prices adjust to clear markets (that is, to bring supply and demand in line with each other). Ultimately, the import restrictions serve only to keep employees (as well as capital assets, land, and any other factors of production that are not specific to the industry) from being forced by the market to shift from the protected industry to other, more productive economic sectors.

The costs of trade restrictions can be large. Estimates put them in the range of 5 cents to 35 cents for each dollar reduction in imports and in the tens of thousands of dollars per year (over and above wages paid) for each employee who is kept from

10. Some supporters of antidumping law have put forward a mechanism by which such laws can benefit the United States economically even in the absence of predatory pricing. If the reason for the dumping is that the foreign exporter has a monopoly (or substantial market power) in its home market because that market is protected by trade barriers but has no such market power in the United States, the antidumping law may create pressure in the exporter's home market to eliminate the trade barriers that allow that market power. If the country eliminates the barriers, both the United States and the exporter's home country gain. If it does not eliminate them, however, both countries lose economically as a result of the antidumping law. In any event, U.S. antidumping policy makes no attempt to distinguish such cases when deciding whether to impose antidumping duties. That and other possible arguments in favor of antidumping laws are presented in a more detailed discussion of such laws' effects in Niels, "What is Antidumping Policy Really About?"

11. See Congressional Budget Office, *Causes and Consequences of the Trade Deficit: An Overview*, CBO Memorandum (March 2000).

being forcibly shifted out of the protected industry.¹² One study of 30 U.S. antidumping duties that were first levied between 1987 and 1992 estimated that they reduced U.S. economic welfare by \$275 million annually and cost U.S. consumers between \$500 million and \$800 million each year. The study further estimated that each dollar that producers gained from the protection afforded by the duties cost consumers \$3.20 and that such duties were probably typical of antidumping levies in effect at the time.¹³

Despite those costs, changes in the antidumping law and in regulations and methodologies of enforcement have, as noted earlier, been in the direction of making it easier for U.S. industries to receive protection. By the early 1990s, obtaining protection had become sufficiently easy that U.S. antidumping law was being used as a substitute for the section 201 escape clause in U.S. trade law.¹⁴ (The escape clause allows temporary protection of domestic industries from sudden surges of imports that are causing serious injury, without regard for whether the imports are fairly priced or are in any other sense fair. The idea is to give the domestic industry time to adjust, after which competition will be allowed to resume.) Industries generally found it easier to obtain protection under the antidumping law than under the escape clause because the Department of Commerce—at least partly as a result of a number of biases in its methodologies—seldom failed to find dumping in the cases that came before it.¹⁵ The main hurdle to obtaining protection under the antidumping law was demonstrating material injury to the domestic industry, and that injury standard was lower than the serious-injury standard required in the escape clause.

The Uruguay Round trade agreement, which will be discussed shortly, required further changes in U.S. antidumping law and policy but in the opposite direction. The changes were not substantial and did not change the basic character of the policy. On the whole, however, those changes would be expected to make U.S. policy

12. For the cost per dollar of reduction in imports, see Chapter 5 in Congressional Budget Office, *The Domestic Costs of Sanctions on Foreign Commerce* (March 1999). Although that study examines the cost per dollar reduction in exports, that cost is approximately the same as the import-reduction cost since imports and exports decline by roughly the same amount. For the cost per employee kept from being forcibly shifted to another industry, see pages 15-16 in Congressional Budget Office, *Estimating the Effects of NAFTA: An Assessment of the Economic Models and Other Empirical Studies*, CBO Paper (June 1993), and Chapter 3 in Congressional Budget Office, *Trade Restraints and the Competitive Status of the Textile, Apparel, and Nonrubber-Footwear Industries* (December 1991).

13. See James M. DeVault, "The Welfare Effects of U.S. Antidumping Duties," *Open Economies Review*, vol. 7, no. 1 (January 1996), pp. 19-33.

14. Sections 201 through 204 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended.

15. See Congressional Budget Office, *How the GATT Affects U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing-Duty Policy*, Chapters 4 and 5.

slightly less protectionist. One of the major purposes of this paper is to assess how much those changes have affected U.S. antidumping activity.

HOW U.S. ANTIDUMPING POLICIES COMPARE WITH THOSE OF OTHER COUNTRIES

As noted earlier, many other countries besides the United States have antidumping laws. Some had such laws before the United States did, but most countries imposed them more recently. Disputes over those laws and their administration have been a regularly recurring feature of the various rounds of trade negotiations relating to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). To resolve those disputes, part of the Kennedy Round in the 1960s was devoted to negotiating an agreement known informally as the Antidumping Code, which was signed by some but not all members of the GATT. The Antidumping Code put constraints on the structure and operation of the antidumping policies of its signatories. Continuing disputes have led to modifications of the code in subsequent GATT negotiation rounds.

The most recent version of the constraints on antidumping policy, which was negotiated during the Uruguay Round in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was incorporated into the new WTO agreement itself rather than being segregated in a separate antidumping code. Hence, all signatories to the WTO agreement are required to adhere to those constraints. Although the provisions are no longer a separate code, most people still refer to them as the Antidumping Code, and this paper therefore refers to them by that name.

Antidumping policies around the world have many similarities because of the constraints of the code and the fact that many countries have patterned their laws after the existing laws and practices of the United States or other countries. Nevertheless, significant differences remain, particularly in the aggressiveness of countries' antidumping enforcement, the methodologies for determining dumping margins (which lead to sizable differences in the duty rates imposed), and, at least until recently, the policies for terminating duties (which lead to substantial variations in how long duties remain in effect). Some countries often negotiate price undertakings rather than impose duties. A price undertaking is an agreement by the foreign exporter not to sell the product at a price below the fair value that has been determined by the antidumping administrative authority. (Duties and price undertakings have the same effect on trade. The only difference between them is who gets the additional revenue resulting from the higher price on each good sold. With a duty, the revenue goes to the government of the importing country; with an undertaking, it goes to the foreign exporter.)

The negative effects of antidumping laws have led some countries to agree not to use them against one another. Those countries have chosen instead to use competition (or antitrust) policy to regulate pricing behavior. Canada and Chile did that in the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement. Australia and New Zealand have similarly ceased enforcing antidumping laws against each other, as have the members of the European Union and the members of the European Free Trade Area. Canada tried to get the United States to agree to do so in the North American Free Trade Agreement, but the United States refused.

Antidumping law and policy have been a recurring subject of debate in the U.S. Congress as well as in multilateral trade negotiations. Participants in those debates often compare or contrast U.S. policies with those of other countries to support their positions. For example, some critics say that the United States is the foremost user of antidumping laws and that it has been an international trailblazer in aggressively enforcing them. They state further that other countries, following the U.S. lead, are beginning to make more use of such laws and that some of those countries are targeting U.S. firms in retaliation for antidumping actions that the United States has taken against their firms. Claims of bias in U.S. procedures are common.¹⁶

Although many studies making such claims support them and their conclusions with careful theoretical argument, analysis, and facts, until a few years ago they usually made at most a cursory reference to hard statistics to back them up. The reason is that such statistics were difficult to come by. The best source of international data on antidumping activity is the series of semiannual reports to the GATT, and subsequently to the WTO, made by signatories to the Antidumping Code. Until 1996, those reports were classified "restricted" by the GATT/WTO, which means that the raw reports were not to be distributed outside signatories' governments (although summary statistics could be disseminated). Furthermore, drawing statistics from the reports was—and still is—difficult and time-consuming, for several reasons: they are not in a readily usable computer format; information about each antidumping case is scattered among several tables in several reports; various countries have failed at one time or another to file reports for certain reporting periods; and the reports have many errors and omissions.

CBO's Previous Analysis

In June 1998, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published *Antidumping Action in the United States and Around the World: An Analysis of International Data*, which analyzed the GATT/WTO reports through the end of 1995. The purpose of the

16. See, for example, Richard Boltuck and Robert E. Litan, eds., *Down in the Dumps: Administration of the Unfair Trade Laws* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991).

analysis was to provide a statistical overview of how U.S. antidumping activity compared and contrasted with that of almost all of the United States' major trading partners, and to test a number of the claims being made about that activity. The paper reached several conclusions, which are summarized below.

The Prevalence and Significance of Antidumping Activity. Up through the end of 1995, only a few countries made significant use of antidumping laws, and the United States was the heaviest user among them. On December 31, 1995, the United States had 294 antidumping measures in effect; no other country had even half that many. Under a reasonable set of assumptions about the import market (all else being equal, the number of antidumping actions is likely to be proportional to the value of imports and inversely proportional to the size of the economy), the large quantities of U.S. imports and the large U.S. gross domestic product did not explain why U.S. antidumping activity was so much greater than that of other countries.¹⁷ Neither did they explain why U.S. activity against other countries was much more extensive than their activity against the United States, both one on one and in total.

CBO's earlier analysis also found that typical duty rates imposed in antidumping cases were high enough to be significant impediments to trade, especially the duties imposed by the United States and by a few small, mostly developing countries. The average rate of duty imposed by the United States from 1991 through 1995 was 56.8 percent. With the exception of Mexico, the other heavy users of antidumping laws imposed substantially lower average rates of duty than did the United States; however, their rates were still high enough to be major obstacles to trade. Among the most active users, Canada had the next highest average rate—36.1 percent. The United States progressively and substantially increased the initial duty rates it imposed from 1981 through 1995. The average initial rate imposed from 1993 through 1995 was almost triple the average from 1981 through 1983.

A further conclusion of the 1998 paper was that U.S. antidumping measures tended to last much longer than those imposed by any other country. Indeed, a large fraction of U.S. measures lasted so long—10.6 years on average—as to be effectively permanent. U.S. measures typically lasted longer than those of other countries at least in part because a number of those countries (for example, Canada; the European Community/Union, or EC/U; and Australia) had provisions for automatic sunset

17. CBO's June 1998 paper explains why those assumptions are reasonable. As the paper notes, those assumptions are not the only ones that someone might consider reasonable, and it might be possible to devise alternative reasonable assumptions that lead to different conclusions. Nevertheless, calculations based on the assumptions CBO chose cast doubt on the notion that the large U.S. numbers are merely a result of large volumes of U.S. imports.

reviews and terminations of antidumping orders, whereas the United States did not.¹⁸ The Uruguay Round agreement changed that, however. As CBO reported in an earlier study:

The new [WTO] Antidumping and Subsidies Codes require terminating antidumping and countervailing duties not later than five years from imposition, or five years from the date of the most recent review covering both dumping or subsidy (whichever is applicable) and injury. An exception is made if a review determines that such termination would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of the dumping or subsidy and consequent injury. The codes also set the same requirement for terminating price undertakings negotiated instead of antidumping and countervailing duties.¹⁹

In relation to the sunset provision, the Antidumping Code states that "existing antidumping measures shall be deemed to be imposed on a date not later than the date of entry into force for a Member of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. . . ."²⁰ For the United States, that meant that sunset reviews and any resulting terminations of duty orders in place at the time the agreement went into effect did not have to be completed until January 1, 2000. The United States did not begin those sunset reviews until mid-1998; taking full advantage of the time limit provided by the agreement, it held off the terminations required by the reviews until January 1, 2000. Hence, no such terminations occurred during the period covered by the June 1998 paper.

Finally, CBO's previous paper concluded, the United States tended to impose the most antidumping measures on the countries that exported to it the largest quantities of goods. It also tended to impose measures on developing countries and on countries that had (or had recently had) nonmarket economies.

The Increasing Use of Antidumping Laws Around the World. Statistics from the data set CBO used for its 1998 report supported several notions about the rising use of antidumping measures. For example, they indicated that the United States had been a leader in aggressively enforcing antidumping laws, and they lent some credence to fears that that policy might be starting to come back to haunt U.S. exporters as other countries followed the U.S. lead. The statistics also appeared to be broadly consistent with the idea that most countries substitute antidumping

18. Sunset reviews are periodic reviews of active measures to determine whether there is still a need for them (that is, there is still dumping and resulting injury or the threat thereof) or they should be terminated.

19. Congressional Budget Office, *How the GATT Affects U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing-Duty Policy*, pp. 72-73.

20. Article 18, paragraph 3, subparagraph 2 of the Antidumping Code.

enforcement for other means of protecting their domestic industries from international competition and that antidumping enforcement was consequently rising as the GATT/WTO increasingly proscribed those other forms of protection.

Almost alone among industrialized countries, the United States increased its antidumping activity fairly consistently and substantially throughout the 16 years covered by the data set (specifically, the second half of 1979 through the second half of 1995). The later years of that period also saw increased antidumping activity among developing countries, where such activity had historically been least prevalent. Most industrialized countries did not increase their activity over the period (and some decreased it); nevertheless, many of them were already heavy users of antidumping laws at the beginning of the period and remained so at the end.

The statistics also showed that the increasing antidumping activity of developing countries had led to mounting numbers of antidumping measures maintained by them against the United States, with most of the hikes coming fairly recently. The increases for most countries were small, however. As of December 31, 1995, the total increase for all developing countries was less than the total decline by some of the more frequent users in the industrialized world, primarily Australia and the European Community/Union. However, if trends among developing countries continued, CBO concluded, that could change.

A stronger form of the claim of harm to U.S. exporters from antidumping activity—that other countries were singling out U.S. firms for antidumping enforcement to retaliate for U.S. antidumping enforcement against their own firms—did not appear to be supported by the data. For 16 of the 18 countries for which data were available, the countries' imports from the United States as a percentage of their imports coming from the entire world from 1991 through 1995 were larger than the number of antidumping measures that they maintained against the United States as a percentage of the number they maintained against any and all countries at the end of 1995. Although retaliation may have occurred in particular cases, there was no widespread pattern. Most countries seemed to avoid imposing antidumping measures on the United States rather than single it out for such action.

Trends in the data were in line with the proposition that countries use antidumping enforcement as a substitute for other protection for their industries. The United States had been a leader in reducing other forms of protection and, correspondingly, a leader in increasing antidumping activity. Developing countries as a group had more recently come under GATT/WTO restrictions on their use of a number of other protectionist practices and, correspondingly, had only recently started to become significant players in antidumping enforcement.

The Current Analysis: Effects of the Uruguay Round Agreement

As noted earlier, the Uruguay Round agreement required a number of changes in U.S. antidumping policy that could be expected to make it somewhat less protectionist. The agreement also affected the policies of other countries. CBO's earlier analysis was unable to assess the effects of those changes quantitatively because the data set it examined extended only through 1995 (the first year after the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect) and not all of the antidumping provisions became effective immediately. The semiannual reports to the WTO on antidumping activity are now available through the end of 1999, making it possible to extend the data set and assess the effects of the agreement.²¹ This paper presents the results of that assessment.

21. As noted earlier, the provision for sunset reviews and terminations of duty orders did not become effective for the United States until January 1, 2000. However, as discussed later, CBO used data from the Department of Commerce's Web site to update the U.S. data by one day to include that date.

CHAPTER II

THE GATT/WTO DATA AND STATISTICS: THEIR LIMITATIONS AND SOME NOTES ON PRESENTATION

As the Congressional Budget Office noted in its June 1998 paper, summary statistics on antidumping activity, such as those discussed below, are only rough indicators of various countries' antidumping policies and their economic effects. Nevertheless, they provide important information that helps illuminate significant issues in the debate over antidumping policy. The reader should keep a number of qualifications in mind, however, in examining this or any other analysis of antidumping statistics.

LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA

The GATT/WTO reports that CBO analyzed are the best source of international data available on antidumping activity. (Box 1 briefly describes the reports' format and contents.) Those reports, however, are not without problems, some of which are summarized below.¹

First, although CBO devoted considerable effort to correcting the various errors, omissions, and inconsistencies in the reports, the sheer volume of those problems and the limited means at CBO's disposal for finding and correcting them virtually guarantee that a number of errors remain in the final data set used for analysis. However, the remaining errors are unlikely to be so serious or so numerous that they significantly affect the results and conclusions presented in this paper.

Second, the final data set does not cover every country: it covers only those that were signatories to the GATT/WTO Antidumping Code at each given date, and the number of signatories grew over time. The data set covers almost all of the major U.S. export markets, however—markets that collectively received close to 90 percent of U.S. exports in 1999 (see Table A-3 in Appendix A). The largest markets (in terms of value of U.S. exports) missing in that year are Taiwan, People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia; those countries were the destination of 2.7 percent, 2.0 percent, 1.2 percent, and 0.3 percent, respectively, of U.S. exports in 1999 (see Table A-2). The changing number of countries covered over time complicates the analysis: valid conclusions about worldwide trends cannot be derived from simple overall statistics for the world as a whole. Instead, one must

1. Appendix A in CBO's June 1998 report, *Antidumping Action in the United States and Around the World: An Analysis of International Data*, describes the reports in some detail; it also discusses their inherent problems and what CBO did to correct them. In addition, it notes the problems that remained in the final data set after those corrections had been made.

Box 1.
THE GATT/WTO REPORTS

From the beginning of 1980 through June 1994, the Antidumping Code of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) required its signatories to submit reports of their antidumping activity to the GATT Committee on Antidumping Practices every six months. Beginning with the next reporting period—July-December 1994—the new World Trade Organization (WTO) Antidumping Code picked up and continued that requirement.¹ Unlike the GATT Antidumping Code, however, the WTO Antidumping Code is incorporated in the WTO agreement itself. All WTO members have therefore been required to file reports since the July-December 1994 reporting period. After each reporting period, the GATT/WTO has distributed copies of all reports to signatories.

The reports consist primarily of tables of case data and lists of active measures. The case-data tables provide data on all actions taken during the reporting period relating to current antidumping cases and reviews. For each case on which action was taken, the tables give the product involved, the country from which it was imported, and any of the following occurring to date: the date the case was initiated; the date any provisional measures were imposed while the case is being investigated and decided and the percentage rate of that protection; the date and rate of any definitive duty imposed; the date and rate of any price undertaking imposed or agreed to; the date of a determination of no dumping; the date of a determination of no injury; and a general category of "other" for actions that do not fit into any of the aforementioned categories. The tables also give information about the amount of trade involved and the methodology that the administrative authority used to determine the dumping margin.

The lists of active antidumping measures include all of the antidumping measures (that is, all duty orders and price undertakings) resulting from past cases that were active on a given date during the reporting period—usually the last day of the period. Sometimes the lists indicate whether a measure is a duty or an undertaking.

Many of the reports also contain data on terminations of active measures. Those data can be found in several places: in the case-data tables, in the lists of active measures, or in separate tables altogether. In many cases, termination of a measure is never reported and must be inferred from the measure's disappearance from the list of active measures from one report to the next.

In principle, the lists of active measures are redundant. If one knows from the case data when measures are put into effect and, from other indications in the reports, when measures are terminated, one can derive the list of active measures at any given time. In practice, however, the case data, the termination data, and the lists of active measures contain many errors and omissions. Hence, it is valuable to be able to cross-check the lists with the case and termination data. In addition, reported lists of active measures are the only way to know of the existence of measures that went into effect before a country began reporting case data.

1. Reports for the July-December 1994 reporting period were actually submitted in early 1995 and therefore did not predate the January 1, 1995, starting date of the WTO.

examine each country separately and then determine whether many countries have similar trends.

Third, the European Community/Union (EC/U) has not always reported all of its cases and active measures. Before the July-December 1991 reporting period, the EC/U did not report case data for cases brought against countries that were not signatories to the code.² (As Box 1 describes, such data include the product at issue, the country from which it was imported, the date the case was initiated, the date and result of any preliminary or final decisions, and so on.) Furthermore, the EC/U's first list of active antidumping measures (duty orders and price undertakings that have been imposed and have not yet been terminated) including measures against nonsignatories was the one for September 1, 1989. The missing cases and measures before those dates do not affect the statistics concerning EC/U cases against the United States, but they do affect statistics relating to total antidumping activity.

ARBITRARINESS OF CASE DIVISIONS AND LACK OF EQUIVALENCE OF CASES

When a country brings an antidumping case, the case is frequently lodged against an array of closely related products (for example, various carbon steel products or various stainless steel products) from several different countries. For statistical purposes, an issue therefore arises about whether the case should be counted as one case or as several, and if counted as several, how it should be divided. When a case is brought against two or more countries for the same product, the data set treats each target country as a separate case. When a case or group of cases is brought against several related products from the same country, the data set follows the lead of the reporting country and treats it as the same number of cases against the same particular products that the country reports.

The process of dividing antidumping activity into cases by product is somewhat arbitrary. For example, one country might bring a case against several carbon steel products and report it as one case with the product name "various carbon steel products," whereas another country might bring a case against the same products and report it as three cases—one for carbon steel wire rod, one for carbon steel plate, and one for carbon steel sheet. If a particular country consistently uses narrower product

2. In 1979, the members of the European Community were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, West Germany, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Portugal and Spain joined on January 1, 1986. The European Community became the European Union on November 1, 1993. Austria, Finland, and Sweden became members on January 1, 1995. East Germany became a member upon reunification with West Germany in 1990.

categories for its cases than other countries use, that country will report more cases than the other countries (all else being equal) and therefore appear to be a heavier user of antidumping laws.

Given the data contained in the GATT/WTO reports, the only way analysts can get around that problem is to visually inspect the cases of each country and try to estimate the extent to which various countries are prone to more or less detailed case divisions. Rigorously determining the extent of the problem and correcting for it would require going back to original sources (the published decisions of antidumping administrative authorities) to determine the Harmonized System product codes that all of the various cases covered. (The Harmonized System is a common product classification code for trade, negotiated by most of the large trading countries of the world.) To determine codes for all of the cases in the data set and use the codes to assess tendencies to use narrower or broader classifications would be a massive undertaking. Furthermore, it could be done only for cases occurring since 1989, when the Harmonized System was adopted.

Further arbitrariness and problems arise in breaking down and comparing cases by target country. First, a case brought by or against a major trading country such as the United States or Japan is likely to involve far more trade than a case brought by or against a small country such as Trinidad and Tobago; therefore, the two cases are not equally significant. Second, sometimes a country will break up into two or more countries (as, for example, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia did) or two countries will merge (as East Germany and West Germany did) sometime during the period over which an antidumping measure is in effect. If a country correspondingly breaks up or merges its measures against those countries (as is done in some cases in the data set but not in others), the country's total number of active antidumping measures changes, even though the economic significance and effect of its measures have not changed at all.

Third, the EC/U brings cases at the community/union level rather than at the country level, and the cases are reported that way to the GATT/WTO. Many countries, however, including the United States, bring their cases against individual members of the EC/U rather than against the EC/U as a whole. Failing to correct for those asymmetries would bias a comparison of the number of cases brought by the United States and the number brought by the EC/U. Such a comparison would indicate that U.S. antidumping activity was greater relative to that of the EC/U than was actually the case.

More generally, any two antidumping cases are likely to differ in the quantity of imports involved, the type of products, the rate of duty applied, the market shares of the imported goods, the size of markets for the countries imposing the duties, and other significant characteristics. Consequently, even if all countries were consistent with one another in breaking down their cases by country and product, no two cases

would have the same economic effect, and a given number of cases or active measures brought or maintained by one country would not necessarily have the same economic effect as the same number brought or maintained by another.

DIFFICULTIES WITH REPORTING FORMS

Because the antidumping laws and procedures of signatories to the Antidumping Code must be consistent with its provisions, there is some similarity among the laws and policies of various countries. Because those laws and policies are not identical, however, no one form for reporting data can easily accommodate all of them. Consequently, some countries may have difficulty determining the proper information to put in some blanks on the form.

For example, the reporting form for case data has blanks for three different dates for each case: the date the case was initiated, the date any provisional measures were imposed pending further investigation of the case, and the date the final measure was imposed. Suppose a country's procedures allow its administrative authority the option of imposing preliminary duties on the date the case is initiated, conducting a quick preliminary investigation to possibly revise that decision, and, finally, having the full investigation followed by the imposing of the final definitive duty. It would not be clear, then, whether the date reported for the provisional measure should be the initiation date or the revision date. Moreover, if the person filling out the form for a given period is not familiar with which date was used in the report for the previous period, he or she might decide the issue differently, resulting in different dates for the provisional measure of the same case in subsequent reports.

The pattern of dates in Mexico's reports seems to suggest that such a problem exists or has existed. (Not being familiar with Mexico's procedures, CBO cannot be certain.) Another example is that the interpretation of the term *definitive duty date* by U.S. authorities has typically differed from that of other countries.³

3. In most cases, the United States reported the date and rate of the Department of Commerce's dumping determination, even though the International Trade Commission had not yet made its injury determination. Even if the injury determination was eventually positive, the definitive duty would not go into effect until after that determination (although a preliminary duty was already in effect and the definitive duty rate is always retroactive to goods imported before completion of the final determination). In some cases, the actual date on which the duty began was several months after the date reported as the definitive duty date. Even worse, in some cases, the subsequent ITC injury determination was negative but was never reported, leaving the reader of the reports to conclude that a duty was imposed when, in fact, it was not.

EFFECTS BEYOND THE STATISTICS

Antidumping laws have economic effects beyond those indicated by case statistics. For example, the U.S. steel industry filed a large number of antidumping cases in the 1980s, in response to which the Reagan Administration negotiated agreements on quotas with the countries in question. The antidumping cases were then withdrawn. Although that use of antidumping law ultimately led to protection for the steel industry, the protection did not show up anywhere in the U.S. reports. The case data indicated that the cases were withdrawn before a decision on protection was made, and nothing ever appeared on the lists of active measures in the reports. Many withdrawals of cases in other countries undoubtedly resulted from the negotiation of some kind of trade restraint not indicated in the GATT/WTO data, but such cases cannot be distinguished from those that were withdrawn for other reasons (such as the complaining industry's being told by the administrative authority that the case was weak and had little chance of success).

Another example of effects beyond the statistics stems from the high cost to a foreign firm—in money and time—of a U.S. antidumping investigation. The mere existence of the antidumping policy and the knowledge that domestic industries are ready and willing to file cases if competition becomes too fierce can, because of that cost, cause foreign firms to compete less aggressively in the U.S. market to avoid having cases filed against them. The same may be true in other countries.

SOME NOTES ON WORD USAGE, FIGURES, AND TABLES

To avoid confusion, some notes on word usage are in order. First, because the EC/U brings and reports its cases at the community/union level, the word *countries* in the rest of this paper will include the EC/U as one country.

Second, as discussed earlier, the GATT/WTO reports have information on two kinds of antidumping measures: duties and price undertakings. Different countries have different policies for the two. For example, the United States imposes duties almost exclusively. The EC/U uses sometimes one kind of measure, sometimes the other, and sometimes both. More important, the EC/U sometimes starts with one kind of measure imposed on a given good from a given country and changes to the other several years later for the same good from the same country; it may even change back at a later point. This analysis refers to either a duty or a price undertaking as an antidumping measure. It also considers as one measure instances in which both a duty and an undertaking are imposed on the same good. If the measure changes back and forth between a duty and an undertaking, the measure is considered as lasting from the beginning of the first restriction to the end of the last (assuming no long periods of time between them in which no restrictions are

imposed). A change from a duty to an undertaking or vice versa is not considered to be the end of one measure and the beginning of another.

Since a trend or other pattern of the data is easier to observe in a figure than in a table, most of the data presented in the main text of this paper are in the form of figures. In figures and tables that rank countries, the rankings are on the basis of antidumping activity since the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect—even when (as often is the case) the figures or tables also show data from the period before the agreement went into effect. The precise numbers used to construct the figures as well as other relevant numbers and qualifying notes are presented in tables in Appendix B. Both the text and the figures refer to the relevant appendix tables.

CHAPTER III

THE PREVALENCE OF ANTIDUMPING ACTION

Only a few countries made significant use of antidumping laws before the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect in January 1995, and the United States was the heaviest user by virtually every indicator. It ranked first in average number of cases initiated per year, average number of new antidumping measures imposed per year, and number of active antidumping measures. It had 281 active measures against other countries, compared with only 79 reported measures against it (a ratio of 3.6 measures against other countries for each measure against the United States). It had more measures against each of 48 countries than those countries had against it, and only 10 countries had more measures against the United States than it had against them.

After the agreement took effect, U.S. antidumping activity declined, but the United States remained one of the heaviest users of antidumping laws in the world. It is now tied for third in case initiations, ranks second in new measures imposed, and remains first in active measures in place—even after the large number of sunset terminations that occurred on January 1, 2000. On that date, it maintained 267 measures against other countries but had only 107 measures maintained against it—a ratio of 2.5 measures against other countries for each measure against it. It had more measures against each of 36 countries than those countries had against it, compared with only 11 countries that had more measures against the United States than it had against them.¹

The agreement may not be the only cause of the decline in U.S. antidumping activity. For example, the five-year period before the agreement went into effect includes the recession in late 1991 and early 1992; the five-year period since the agreement includes no recession. A recession would be expected to make dumping more likely, to make dumping margins larger, and to make U.S. industries more

1. Those numbers compare the United States on January 1, 2000 (the date on which the sunset review and termination provision of the Uruguay Round became fully effective for the United States), with other countries on December 31, 1999, the last day for which data are available for the other countries. Most of the major users of antidumping law already had sunset provisions in their laws before the agreement and so are not likely to have had large changes in their statistics during that one day. Further, even if some countries had sizable drops in their numbers of active measures because of the agreement's sunset provision, that would only make the statistics more lopsided in the direction of the United States' having more active measures than other countries have.

sensitive to foreign competition and therefore more likely to file cases.² Hence, the stronger economy in the period since the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect might explain at least part of the reduction in U.S. antidumping activity as well as other differences between statistics before and after the agreement that are discussed later in this paper. CBO has not attempted to determine what portion of the differences might be explained by the stronger economy or by other factors.

ANTIDUMPING CASES INITIATED PER YEAR

Before the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect, the United States was the heaviest user of antidumping laws as measured by average number of antidumping cases initiated per year. Since the agreement went into effect, the United States has been less aggressive in its use of the law; it is no longer the heaviest user by that indicator but is still one of the heaviest. The number of antidumping cases initiated per year is an indicator not only of aggressiveness of enforcement but also of the resulting effect on trade. In many instances, the initiation of a case can reduce imports even if the case has a low probability of success and is withdrawn before being fully investigated. In some cases, the reduction in imports can be even greater if the case is withdrawn than the reduction that would result from fully adjudicating the case and imposing duties.³


Including the United States, 16 countries reported initiating cases during the five-year period from 1990 through 1994, before the agreement went into effect.⁴ The United States initiated an average of 53.4 antidumping cases per year from 1990 through 1994—almost one-quarter of the reported total world average of 218.5 initiations per year and more than any other country reported (see Figure 1 and Table

2. This a priori theoretical expectation is supported by empirical evidence. See Michael P. Leidy, "Macroeconomic Conditions and Pressures for Protection Under Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws: Empirical Evidence from the United States," *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers*, vol. 44, no. 1 (March 1997), pp. 132-144.

3. See Thomas J. Prusa, "Why Are So Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn?" *Journal of International Economics*, vol. 33, no. 1/2 (August 1992), pp. 1-20. One reason that imports may drop in instances in which cases are withdrawn is that the domestic industry and foreign exporters may come to an agreement that the foreign exporter will reduce its exports or (equivalently) raise prices. In effect, the antidumping law facilitates collusion between the domestic industry and foreign exporters to raise prices to the benefit of both and the detriment of the domestic consumer.

4. That number does not include countries that began reporting in 1994. Especially in the second half of 1994, when the Uruguay Round agreement became effective for some countries and the reports started going to the WTO rather than to the GATT, a significant number of previously nonreporting countries began reporting on their antidumping activity. CBO deemed that only one or two reporting periods were too few from which to calculate reliable average numbers of case initiations for the entire 1990-1994 period.

FIGURE 1. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY AVERAGE NUMBER OF ANTIDUMPING CASES INITIATED PER YEAR



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTES: All of the countries listed above had at least one case initiation in one or both periods, even though for some countries the bar or bars may be too small to be visible. All other reporting countries had no case initiations. Of the countries in the figure showing no cases initiated in the 1990-1994 period, only Egypt actually reported no initiations. The others either did not report or made too few reports for a reliable average to be calculated. Further details and notes are given in Table B-1.

EC/U = the European Community/Union. (The European Community, which was established in 1979, became the European Union on November 1, 1993.)

B-1).⁵ The next heaviest user by this indicator was Australia, which averaged 51.2 initiations per year. After that, the numbers dropped rapidly. The third most active initiator was the EC/U, with 34.6 initiations per year, followed by Mexico, with 24.6; Canada, with 17.0; and Brazil, with 12.4. No other reporting country averaged more than 6.0 initiations per year. Three of the 16 reporting countries—Austria, Finland, and Sweden—joined the EC/U on January 1, 1995. Consequently, they now come under the EC/U antidumping policy and no longer initiate cases on their own.

From 1995 through 1999, after the agreement went into effect, 31 countries reported initiating cases, an increase of 15 from the 16 that reported initiating cases in the previous five-year period. That increase resulted mostly from a rise in the number of countries filing reports. Seventeen countries that had not filed reports in the earlier period reported initiating cases from 1995 through 1999, as did three countries that had reported no initiations in the earlier period, making a total of 20 additional countries that reported initiating cases in the later period. In the other direction, three countries that reported initiations in the earlier period did not file reports in the later period because they became part of the EC/U, and two other countries that reported initiations in the earlier period reported no initiations in the later one. Subtracting those five countries from the additional 20 gives the 15-country increase.

The most frequent initiator of cases from 1995 through 1999 was the EC/U, which averaged 38.8 case initiations per year. It was followed by South Africa, with 27.0 initiations per year, and the United States and India, each with 26.4 initiations per year. Four additional countries initiated between 10 and 20 cases per year. All others reported fewer than 10.

There was an even split between the number of countries averaging more cases in the later period than in the earlier period and vice versa. Nine countries—the United States, Australia, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Colombia, Poland, Japan, and Singapore—each averaged fewer cases in the later period than in the earlier period. Six countries—the EC/U, India, South Korea, Egypt, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia—averaged more cases in the later period.⁶ Additionally, the EC/U, which included Austria, Sweden, and Finland in the later period but not the earlier, averaged more cases in the later period than did each of those countries in the earlier

5. The numbers given for world averages throughout this paper are what those averages would have been if all of the countries that filed reports for only part of the 1991-1995 period had filed reports for the entire period and if their average rate of case initiations was the same for the additional periods as it was for the periods for which they actually filed reports. Countries that filed reports for only part of the period are identified in Table 1 on pages 30-31.

6. In the case of the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the comparison is between those countries in the later period and those countries and the predecessor countries of which they were once part—Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—in the earlier period.

period. Hence, those countries effectively averaged more cases in the later period also, bringing the total to nine countries. One country—Brazil—averaged the same number of cases in both periods.

NEW ANTIDUMPING MEASURES IMPOSED PER YEAR

The picture is similar when countries' antidumping activity is considered on the basis of new antidumping measures imposed.⁷ Including the United States, 12 countries reported imposing new antidumping measures from 1990 through 1994, before the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect. (Again, that number does not include countries that began reporting in 1994.) The United States imposed more new measures than any other country, an average of 23.2 per year (see Figure 2 and Table B-2). That number was a little less than a quarter of the reported total world average of 97.8 new measures per year. The next heaviest user by this indicator was the EC/U, which averaged 20.8 new measures per year, followed by Australia, with 17.6; Canada, with 12.8; and Mexico, with 10.8. No other reporting country averaged more than 4.0 initiations per year.


From 1995 through 1999, after the agreement went into effect, 26 countries reported imposing new antidumping measures, an increase of 14 from the previous five-year period. As was true of case initiations, the increase resulted mostly from a rise in the number of reporting countries. It comprised 12 countries that had not reported in the earlier period plus three countries that had reported no new measures earlier minus one country that had reported new measures earlier but did not report in the later period because it became part of the EC/U.

After the agreement, the United States became a less frequent user of antidumping law by this indicator. It averaged 16.4 new measures per year from 1995 through 1999—roughly one-third fewer than the 23.2 new measures it was averaging before the agreement. The lower number put the United States in second place behind the EC/U, which averaged 21.2 new measures per year over that period. In third place was South Africa, with 150 new measures per year, followed by Argentina, with 13.6; India, with 11.8; Mexico, with 8.0; and Canada, with 6.8. Compared with the 1990-1994 period, the average numbers of new measures per year over the 1995-1999 period taper off more slowly as one goes further down the ranking.

Slightly more countries increased their average number of new measures per year than decreased it. Six countries (excluding Sweden, which joined the EC/U

7. That similarity need not be the case since not all antidumping cases lead to the imposition of antidumping measures. Measures are imposed only if there are findings of dumping and material injury to U.S. producers.

FIGURE 2. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY AVERAGE NUMBER OF NEW ANTIDUMPING MEASURES IMPOSED PER YEAR



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: All other reporting countries imposed no new measures. Further details and notes are given in Table B-2. Of the countries in the figure showing no new measures in the 1990-1994 period, only Egypt, Singapore, and Poland actually reported no new measures imposed. The others either did not report or made too few reports for a reliable average to be calculated.

- a. EC/U = the European Community/Union. (The European Community, which was established in 1979, became the European Union on November 1, 1993.) On January 1, 1994, the European Economic Area was established, composed of the European Union and the members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) excluding Switzerland—that is, Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Sweden. Four days later, all active EU antidumping measures against the EFTA members (excluding Switzerland) were suspended. To give a better measure of the EC/U's antidumping policy toward the rest of the world, "EC/U—Adjusted" excludes measures against those countries. Sweden had no measures against EC/U members during any of the periods covered by its reports, so the statistics are the same for "Sweden" and "Sweden—Adjusted."
- b. The failure of Indonesia to file any lists of active measures for any reporting period makes it impossible to confirm that all of the reported new measures counted here, which are tallied from the case-data reports, were actually imposed. For many countries, a significant portion of the new measures reported on the case-data reports were not imposed—a fact that can be determined only by examining whether the measures show up on subsequent lists of active measures. There is no way to know whether the same is true for Indonesia.

and therefore ceased its own antidumping policy) each averaged fewer measures per year in the later period than in the earlier: the United States, Mexico, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Eight countries averaged more new measures per year: the EC/U, India, Brazil, South Korea, Egypt, Colombia, Singapore, and Poland. No countries reported the same number in the two periods (excluding countries that reported imposing no new measures in either period).


NUMBERS OF ACTIVE MEASURES

The most striking indicator of U.S. dominance of world antidumping activity before and after the Uruguay Round agreement is the stock of active antidumping measures (see Figure 3 and Table B-3). The United States had 281 antidumping measures in effect on December 31, 1994, or 37.0 percent of the reported world total of 759. No other country had even half as many measures. The next most frequent user of antidumping laws by the active-measures indicator was the EC/U, with 137, followed by Canada, with 97; Australia, with 75; and Mexico, with 49.

Five years later, on December 31, 1999, the U.S. stock had grown to 326 active measures, or 30.1 percent of the 1,082 reported by all countries and an increase of 45 over the number five years earlier. The United States remained in first place among countries by that indicator, with no other country having even half that many active measures. In second place was the EC/U, with 148 active measures, followed by South Africa, with 94; Canada, with 79; and Mexico, with 71. No other country had more than 60.

As noted earlier, at least one of the reasons that the United States has had so many more active measures than other countries have had is that unlike most of those countries, it had no provision for regular sunset reviews and terminations of antidumping measures before the Uruguay Round agreement. The agreement required the United States to implement them but not until January 1, 2000, and the United States waited until that deadline to carry out its first such terminations. The semiannual antidumping reports to the WTO for January-June 2000 were not available as this report was being produced, but CBO was able to obtain the relevant information on terminations occurring on January 1, 2000, from the Department of Commerce's Web site.

FIGURE 3. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY NUMBER OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTES: All of the countries listed above had at least one case initiation in one or both periods, even though for some countries the bar or bars may be too small to be visible. All other reporting countries had no active measures. Further details and notes are given in Table B-3.

EC/U = the European Community/Union. (The European Community, which was established in 1979, became the European Union on November 1, 1993.)

- a. The Uruguay Round agreement adopted by the United States at the end of 1994 requires periodic sunset reviews and terminations of active antidumping measures. The deadline for the United States to complete those reviews and any required terminations of measures in place when it adopted the agreement was January 1, 2000, at which time the United States consequently terminated a large number of measures. The number remaining on that date is more reflective of U.S. policy after the agreement than is the number on the day before. CBO did not have the necessary data to update other countries by that one day. However, most of them already had policies of conducting sunset reviews and terminations before the Uruguay Round agreement, so it is unlikely that other countries terminated many measures on that date.

On that date, the number of U.S. active measures dropped from 326 to 267, a substantial reduction from the day before and a decline of 14 from the 281 measures in effect five years earlier on December 31, 1994.⁸ Nevertheless, if the United States had had only those 267 measures in effect on December 31, 1999, it would still have had 26.1 percent of the active measures reported by all countries and substantially more than the 148 active measures reported by the second-place EC/U.

Twenty-three countries, among them the United States, had more measures in effect on December 31, 1999, than they had had five years earlier.⁹ Only two countries—Canada and Australia—had fewer active measures on the later date than on the earlier one, and two—New Zealand and Japan—had the same number on both dates. If the large number of U.S. sunset terminations on January 1, 2000, had occurred a day earlier, on that day the United States would have had fewer active measures than it had had five years earlier. The totals would then have been 22 countries with more measures in effect, three countries with fewer measures in effect, and two with the same number of measures in effect.

COMPARING U.S. ANTIDUMPING ACTIVITY AGAINST OTHER COUNTRIES WITH THEIR ACTIVITY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

The United States has substantially more active antidumping measures against other countries than those countries have against it. (Though not surprising, that fact does not necessarily follow from the United States' being the heaviest user, since other countries, in principle, could aim their enforcement disproportionately at U.S. firms or keep their measures in effect longer than the United States does. In fact, they do not.) Overall, the United States had 281 active antidumping measures against other countries on December 31, 1994, compared with only 79 measures against it—a ratio of 3.6 U.S. measures for every foreign measure against the United States (see Table 1).¹⁰

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8. That statement and all others concerning numerical values relating to U.S. active measures on January 1, 2000 (and to some extent those relating to active measures on December 31, 1999), assume the correctness of assumptions CBO made when using the data from the Commerce Department's Web page to update the GATT/WTO data set to that date. The Web page indicated terminations on January 1 of a number of orders that U.S. reports to the WTO indicated had already been terminated; further, it listed the terminations of a number of orders that it indicated had been in effect for many years but that had never appeared in any U.S. report to the GATT/WTO, either in the case-data tables or in the lists of active measures. In such instances, CBO decided the conflict in favor of the information in the reports to the GATT/WTO.
 9. See the note to Table B-3 indicated by the asterisk for a qualification to that statement.
 10. To make the comparison fair, CBO counted the two measures that the EC/U maintained against the United States as two for each of the 12 members of the EC/U on that date—for a total of 24—in tallying the 79 measures. Similarly, throughout this section, active EC/U measures against the United States are attributed to each and every member of the EC/U.

TABLE 1. NUMBER OF ANTIDUMPING MEASURES MAINTAINED BY AND AGAINST THE UNITED STATES ON DECEMBER 31, 1994

	U.S. Measures Maintained Against the Other Country	Measures Maintained by the Other Country Against the United States ^a
Countries That Had Fewer Active Measures Against the United States Than the United States Had Against Them		
Argentina	4	1
Armenia	1	*
Austria	1	0
Azerbaijan	1	*
Bangladesh	1	*
Belarus	1	*
Belgium ^b	3	2
Brazil	13	6
Chile	1	0
Ecuador	1	*
Estonia	1	*
Finland	2	0
France ^b	11	2
Georgia	2	*
Germany ^b	16	2
Hungary	2	0
India	4	1
Iran	1	*
Israel	2	0
Italy ^b	11	2
Japan	49	0
Kazakhstan	4	*
Kenya	1	*
Kyrgyzstan	2	*
Latvia	1	*
Lithuania	1	*
Malaysia	1	0
Moldova	1	*
Netherlands ^b	4	2
New Zealand	2	1
Norway	1	0
People's Republic of China	28	*
Poland	1	0
Romania	4	0
Russia	4	*
Singapore	4	0
South Korea	16	1
Sweden	5	0
Taiwan	17	*
Tajikistan	1	*

(Continued)

TABLE 1. CONTINUED

	U.S. Measures Maintained Against the Other Country	Measures Maintained by the Other Country Against the United States ^a
Countries That Had Fewer Active Measures Against the United States (Continued)		
Thailand	4	0
Turkey	2	0
Turkmenistan	1	*
Ukraine	5	*
United Kingdom ^b	6	2
Uzbekistan	2	*
Venezuela	5	2
Yugoslavia	2	*
Countries That Had More Active Measures Against the United States Than the United States Had Against Them		
Australia	2	6
Canada	15	17
Colombia	1	3
Denmark ^b	0	2
Greece ^b	1	2
Ireland ^b	0	2
Luxembourg ^b	0	2
Mexico	6	15
Portugal ^b	0	2
South Africa ^c	1	2
Country That Had the Same Number of Active Measures Against the United States as the United States Had Against It		
Spain ^b	2	2
All Countries		
Total	281	79

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- a. An entry of zero means that the country reported no measures against the United States or that a value of zero could be fairly reliably inferred from the country's reports. An asterisk means that the country did not report a list of active measures (and, in many cases, did not file any report at all) and no value could be reliably inferred. In most cases, the true value is probably zero.
- b. Member of the European Community/Union. Since that body implements its antidumping actions at the community/union level rather than the country level, the number given for each member country is the number of measures imposed by the European Community/Union against the United States.
- c. Because of inadequate reporting, the actual number of South Africa's measures against the United States could be larger than the number given here but probably is not much larger, if at all.

On a country-by-country basis, the United States had more active measures against each of 26 countries than those countries reported having against it (excluding the former East Germany, which is included with Germany for this tally). It had measures against an additional 22 countries that did not report their active measures but probably had none and are highly unlikely to have had as many against the United States as it had against them. That brings to 48 the countries for which the number of U.S. measures against them exceeded the number of their measures against the United States. Only 10 countries reported more active measures against the United States than it had against them. (However, those countries included Canada and Mexico, which are large U.S. trading partners.) One country reported the same number against the United States that the United States had against it.

On December 31, 1999, the numbers were only slightly less lopsided. The United States had 326 active measures against other countries, and they had 107 against it—a ratio of 3.0 U.S. measures for every foreign measure (see Table 2). The following day, sunset terminations dropped the number of U.S. measures to 267, for a ratio of 2.5.

On a country-by-country basis, on December 31, 1999, the United States had more active measures against each of 46 countries than those countries had against the United States (25 countries reporting their numbers of measures and 21 not reporting them but probably having few, if any, measures against any country). Only 11 countries reported more measures against the United States than the United States had against them, and two countries reported the same number of measures against the United States as it had against them. After the sunset terminations on the next day, the United States had more active measures against 36 countries than those countries had against it. Fourteen countries had more measures against the United States than vice versa, and one country had the same number of measures as the United States had against it.

One might be tempted to explain those numbers as the result of underlying volumes of trade. The United States runs a trade deficit with the rest of the world, importing more than it exports. Consequently, if one expects the number of antidumping measures that one country maintains against another to be roughly proportional to the amount that it imports from that country (all else being the same), the United States should have more active antidumping measures against the rest of the world than the rest of the world has against the United States.

TABLE 2. NUMBER OF ANTIDUMPING MEASURES MAINTAINED BY
AND AGAINST THE UNITED STATES ON DECEMBER 31, 1999, AND
JANUARY 1, 2000

	<u>U.S. Measures Maintained Against the Other Country</u>		Measures Maintained by the Other Country Against the United States on December 31, 1999 ^b
	On December 31, 1999	On January 1, 2000 ^a	
Countries That Had Fewer Active Measures Against the United States Than the United States Had Against Them on December 31, 1999			
Argentina	6	6	2
Armenia	1	0	*
Azerbaijan	1	0	*
Bangladesh	1	1	*
Belarus	1	1	*
Belgium ^c	4	4	3
Brazil	15	13	4
Canada	17	11	13
Chile	3	2	0
Estonia	1	1	*
France ^c	12	10	3
Georgia	1	0	*
Germany ^c	15	12	3
Hungary ^d	1	1	0
India	6	6	4
Indonesia	3	3	0
Iran	1	1	*
Italy ^c	15	13	3
Japan	54	38	0
Kazakhstan	1	0	*
Kenya	1	0	*
Kyrgyzstan	2	0	*
Latvia	1	0	*
Lithuania	1	1	*
Malaysia	1	1	0
Moldova	1	0	*
Netherlands ^c	4	4	3
Norway ^d	1	1	0
People's Republic of China	41	40	*
Poland	1	1	0
Romania ^d	4	4	0
Russia	6	6	*
Singapore	4	4	0
South Korea	19	17	3
Spain ^c	4	3	3
Sweden ^c	6	4	3
Taiwan	23	21	*
Tajikistan	1	1	*
Thailand	5	5	0
Turkey	4	3	0
Turkmenistan	1	1	*
Ukraine	4	4	*
United Kingdom ^c	6	5	3

(Continued)

TABLE 2. CONTINUED

	<u>U.S. Measures Maintained Against the Other Country</u>		Measures Maintained by the Other Country Against the United States on De- cember 31, 1999 ^b
	On December 31, 1999	On January 1, 2000 ^a	
Countries That Had Fewer Active Measures Against the United States (Continued)			
Uzbekistan	2	2	*
Venezuela	2	2	0
Yugoslavia	1	1	*
Countries That Had More Active Measures Against the United States Than the United States Had Against Them on December 31, 1999			
Australia	2	1	5
Austria ^c	1	0	3
Colombia	0	0	5
Denmark ^c	0	0	3
Finland ^c	2	1	3
Greece ^c	1	1	3
Ireland ^c	0	0	3
Luxembourg ^c	0	0	3
Mexico	9	8	18
Portugal ^c	0	0	3
South Africa	3	2	5
Countries That Had the Same Number of Active Measures Against the United States as the United States Had Against Them on December 31, 1999			
Israel	2	0	2
New Zealand	1	0	1
All Countries			
Total	326	267	107

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- a. The Uruguay Round agreement adopted by the United States at the end of 1994 requires periodic sunset reviews and terminations of active antidumping measures. The deadline for the United States to complete those reviews and any required terminations of measures in place when it adopted the agreement was January 1, 2000, at which time the United States consequently terminated a large number of measures. The number remaining on that date is more reflective of U.S. policy after the agreement than is the number on the day before. Numbers in boldface in this column are different from the number for the day before. CBO did not have the necessary data to update other countries by that one day. However, most of them already had policies of conducting sunset reviews and terminations before the Uruguay Round agreement, so it is unlikely that other countries terminated many measures on that date.
- b. An entry of zero means that the country reported no measures against the United States or that a value of zero could be fairly reliably inferred from the country's reports. An asterisk means that the country did not report a list of active measures (and, in many cases, did not file any report at all) and no value could be reliably inferred. In most cases, the true value is probably zero.
- c. Member of the European Community/Union. Since that body implements its antidumping actions at the community/union level rather than the country level, the number given for each member country is the number of measures imposed by the European Community/Union against the United States.
- d. Because of inadequate reporting, the actual number of this country's measures against the United States could be larger than the number given here but probably is not much larger, if at all.

CBO's earlier paper showed, however, that the U.S. trade deficit is not enough to explain the differences in numbers of active measures.¹¹ On December 31, 1995, the United States maintained almost five antidumping measures against other countries for every \$10 billion of U.S. imports, whereas other countries maintained fewer than two measures against the United States for every \$10 billion of U.S. exports.¹² Similarly, on a country-by-country basis, the United States maintained more measures per unit of imports against each of 48 countries than those countries maintained against it. The reverse was true for only 11 countries.

11. See Congressional Budget Office, *Antidumping Action in the United States and Around the World: An Analysis of International Data*, CBO Paper (June 1998), pp. 17-22.

12. In theory, Country A's exports to Country B are the same as Country B's imports from Country A. In practice, many countries track and tabulate their imports more carefully than their exports (because of the revenues obtained from import tariffs), so export numbers are often slightly smaller than the corresponding import numbers from the other country. That difference is small enough to be ignored here.

CHAPTER IV

THE MAGNITUDE AND DURATION OF

ANTIDUMPING PROTECTION


Before the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect on January 1, 1995, antidumping duties typically were large enough and long enough in duration to be substantial impediments to trade in the goods on which they were imposed. Moreover, duties imposed by the United States were typically higher and longer lasting than those of most other countries. Average U.S. initial duty rates had been trending upward since the early 1980s, and the average for the 1990-1994 period was 56.2 percent. The few countries whose average initial rates were higher than that of the United States were not heavy users of antidumping laws. Indeed, the large users all had lower average rates, but even their rates were high enough to be significant impediments to trade. U.S. duties generally lasted longer than those of all other countries—long enough to be effectively permanent for all practical purposes.

After the agreement went into effect, the average (mean) U.S. initial duty rate declined, and the United States dropped to 10th among countries ranked by that indicator. Nevertheless, the U.S. average rate for the 1995-1999 period of 47.6 percent was still a sizable barrier to trade. On December 31, 1999, the mean and median durations to date of active U.S. duty orders were even longer than they had been five years earlier and longer than those of any other country. The following day, the large number of sunset terminations reduced the mean and median to points that would have ranked the United States first in terms of the mean and second in terms of the median on the previous day. Both the mean and the median remained higher on that day than on December 31, 1994, the day before the agreement went into effect.

HOW LARGE ARE ANTIDUMPING DUTIES?

From 1990 through 1994, before the Uruguay Round agreement became effective, antidumping duty rates—especially those imposed by the United States and a few small, mostly developing countries—were quite high (see Figure 4 and Table B-4). The countries with the highest mean rates imposed from 1990 through 1994 were Mexico, at 126.0 percent; the United States, at 56.2 percent; Colombia, at 51.3 percent; South Korea, at 36.9 percent; and Canada, at 34.0 percent. The mean initial duty rates of all of the heaviest users of antidumping laws except Mexico were substantially lower than that of the United States: Canada's rate, as noted above, was 34.0 percent; the European Community/Union's rate was 31.0 percent; and

FIGURE 4. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY MEAN INITIAL DUTY RATE IMPOSED
(In percent)



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTES: Further details and notes are given in Table B-4.

EC/U = the European Community/Union. (The European Community, which was established in 1979, became the European Union on November 1, 1993.)

- a. Two of the duties for Venezuela from 1995 through 1999 were reported as 100 percent plus US \$1.46 per unit. The average plotted here was calculated without the \$1.46 per unit, so the true average is higher by an unknown percentage.

Australia's rate was 24.6 percent. Nevertheless, even those rates are high enough to constitute major hindrances to trade.¹


Looking at medians rather than means does not significantly change the picture (see Figure 5 and Table B-4). The countries with the highest median initial duty rates from 1990 through 1994 were Colombia, at 56.3 percent; Mexico, at 49.9 percent; the United States, at 37.9 percent; South Korea, at 35.9 percent; Canada, at 32.6 percent; and Thailand, at 30.0 percent. Again with the exception of Mexico, the heaviest users of antidumping laws all had lower median duty rates than did the United States: Canada's rate was 32.6 percent, the EC/U's was 22.0 percent, and Australia's was 20.0 percent.

In the five years since the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect, U.S. initial duty rates have been somewhat lower than they were before, and the United States is no longer among the countries with the highest rates. Nevertheless, its rates still hinder trade significantly. The countries with the highest mean initial duty rates from 1995 through 1999 were Trinidad and Tobago, at 260.0 percent, although in just one case; Guatemala, at 89.5 percent, also in just one case; Argentina, at 84.8 percent; Colombia, at 62.1 percent; and Australia, at 59.3 percent. The United States ranked 10th, at 47.6 percent, which despite the substantial decline in the U.S. ranking was only a moderate reduction from the mean of 56.2 percent five years earlier. Among the most frequent users of antidumping law, Argentina, at 84.8 percent; Mexico, at 59.1 percent; and Brazil, at 53.2 percent, all had mean initial duty rates higher than that of the United States. Only South Africa, at 45.2 percent; Canada, at 44.7 percent; and the EC/U, at 27.7 percent, were lower. (Australia, which was one of the heaviest users five years earlier, imposed substantially fewer measures from 1995 to 1999.) The pattern for median rates of initial duties is similar.

The rates imposed by the United States increased dramatically from 1980 through 1994, but they have declined somewhat since then (see Table 3). The decline has nevertheless left the mean and median higher than they were before 1990. The use of five-year intervals for averages masks considerable fluctuation in the rates that the United States has imposed. Considering three-year intervals reveals the same

1. In principle, a small duty could be a substantial impediment to trade in an extremely competitive industry, and a larger duty might not be much of an obstacle if the foreign exporter did not have much competition in the U.S. market. It is not usually the case, however, that foreign exporters have little competition in the United States. Further, duty rates of the magnitude under discussion here would significantly reduce imports of most products even if the foreign exporter had little competition.

FIGURE 5. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY MEDIAN INITIAL DUTY RATE IMPOSED
(In percent)



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTES: Further details and notes are given in Table B-4.

EC/U = the European Community/Union. (The European Community, which was established in 1979, became the European Union on November 1, 1993.)

- a. Two of the duties for Venezuela from 1995 through 1999 were reported as 100 percent plus US \$1.46 per unit. The average plotted here was calculated without the \$1.46 per unit, so the true average is higher by an unknown percentage.

TABLE 3. AVERAGE INITIAL RATES OF ANTIDUMPING DUTIES IMPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES, AT FIVE- AND THREE-YEAR INTERVALS (In percent)

Period	Mean Duty Rate ^a	Median Duty Rate
Five-Year Intervals		
1980-1984	25.8	12.9
1985-1989	41.0	26.3
1990-1994	55.1	36.2
1995-1999	47.9	30.0
Three-Year Intervals		
1982-1984	26.5	12.9
1985-1987	30.5	14.7
1988-1990	60.5	51.2
1991-1993	50.6	32.6
1994-1996	65.6	56.4
1997-1999	41.9	17.5

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

a. Straight, unweighted averages rather than trade-weighted averages.

general pattern but with significant extraneous variation over time (especially in the median rates).²

The mean duty rates given in this section are straight, unweighted averages, not trade-weighted averages (which give greater weight to duties that affect large quantities of trade). Unweighted averages are better indicators of the tendencies and propensities of the antidumping laws, procedures, and administrative authorities than of effects on the U.S. economy. Although trade-weighted averages would be better indicators of the latter, they have problems of their own, and the GATT/WTO reports do not give sufficient information to calculate them. (See the note to Table B-4 for more details.)

2. The mean and median rates of initial duties for the 1979-1981 period (37.7 percent and 37.1 percent, respectively) are substantially higher than the means and medians for the next two three-year periods, which is contrary to the trends. However, the 1979-1981 period has only 11 rates from which to compute the averages, whereas all of the other periods have more than three times that many. The small number of rates means that one or two large rates could have an outsized influence on the average, which is therefore a less reliable indicator than the average of a larger number of rates. See Table B-5 for more statistical details on rates of initial U.S. duties.

HOW LONG DO ANTIDUMPING MEASURES LAST?


Before the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect, foreign exporters generally found it difficult to get U.S. antidumping orders against them removed, and with no provision for sunset reviews and terminations, U.S. orders usually stayed in place long enough to be effectively permanent. Statistics derived from the GATT/WTO data set show several things: the measures imposed by other countries were not particularly short-lived; the measures imposed by the United States lasted much longer than those imposed by other countries; and a large fraction of U.S. measures were, indeed, effectively permanent. Because the sunset review and termination provision of the Uruguay Round agreement did not take effect immediately, the average duration to date of U.S. measures continued to increase until January 1, 2000. On that date, the sunset terminations became effective and U.S. averages dropped. Both the mean and median durations for the United States remained longer than they were before the agreement, however, and the United States continued to have the longest mean and the second-longest median durations to date. (Once again, the averages are unweighted, not trade weighted.)

Active Measures on December 31, 1994

Before the agreement, durations to date of U.S. antidumping measures were significantly longer than the durations of all other reporting countries' measures. The mean duration to date of active U.S. antidumping measures on December 31, 1994, was 7.3 years; the median was 7.0 years (see Figures 6 and 7 and Table B-6). More than one in five U.S. measures had been in effect for 10 or more years. More than one in nine had been in effect for 15 or more years, and one measure had been in effect for more than 28 years. For second-place Canada (ranking by means), the mean was only 4.9 years and the median was only 3.4 years. For the third-place EC/U, the mean and median were 3.9 years and 3.5 years, respectively, and for fourth-place New Zealand, they were 3.8 years and 3.1 years.

Other countries besides the United States had some very long-lived measures: one Canadian measure had been in effect almost 20 years, and an EC/U measure had been in effect more than 13 years. However, the United States and Canada were alone in having any measures that had been in effect 15 or more years, and those two countries plus the EC/U were the only ones with any measures that had been in effect 10 years or more.

FIGURE 6. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY MEAN DURATION TO DATE OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES (In years)




SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: Further details and notes are given in Tables B-6 and B-7.

EC/U = the European Community/Union. (The European Community, which was established in 1979, became the European Union on November 1, 1993.)

- a. The Uruguay Round agreement adopted by the United States at the end of 1994 requires periodic sunset reviews and terminations of active antidumping measures. The deadline for the United States to complete those reviews and any required terminations of measures in place when it adopted the agreement was January 1, 2000, at which time the United States consequently terminated a large number of measures. The terminations affect the number of active measures and the mean and median durations to date of active measures. The values of the number, mean, and median on January 1, 2000, are more reflective of U.S. policy after the agreement than are the values on the day before. CBO did not have the necessary data to update other countries by that one day. However, most of them already had policies of conducting sunset reviews and terminations before the Uruguay Round agreement, so it is unlikely that other countries terminated many measures on that date.

FIGURE 7. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY MEDIAN DURATION TO DATE OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES (In years)



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTES: Further details and notes are given in Tables B-6 and B-7.

EC/U = the European Community/Union. (The European Community, which was established in 1979, became the European Union on November 1, 1993.)

a. The Uruguay Round agreement adopted by the United States at the end of 1994 requires periodic sunset reviews and terminations of active antidumping measures. The deadline for the United States to complete those reviews and any required terminations of measures in place when it adopted the agreement was January 1, 2000, at which time the United States consequently terminated a large number of measures. The terminations affect the number of active measures and the mean and median durations to date of active measures. The values of the number, mean, and median on January 1, 2000, are more reflective of U.S. policy after the agreement than are the values on the day before. CBO did not have the necessary data to update other countries by that one day. However, most of them already had policies of conducting sunset reviews and terminations before the Uruguay Round agreement, so it is unlikely that other countries terminated many measures on that date.

As the Congressional Budget Office's 1998 paper noted, duration-to-date statistics such as those given above do not by themselves prove that U.S. measures were more long lasting than those of other countries. They indicate that many antidumping measures were long-lived, but they do not indicate how long measures normally lasted before being terminated since, by definition, the duration to date is the lifetime so far of a measure that has not yet been terminated. A given country with shorter mean and median durations to date than those of the United States might have enacted a large number of measures very recently (perhaps because it had just lately begun enforcing antidumping laws or because a flood of imports had just come in as a result of exchange rate fluctuations). Those measures could end up lasting as long as the U.S. measures, but in the meantime, they would lower the average durations of active orders for the countries in question. Indeed, CBO's earlier paper indicated that the U.S. median dropped from 6.6 years at the end of 1985 to 3.3 years at the end of 1987 because a large number of new measures were imposed. The median then trended back up over time, reaching 6.6 years by the end of 1995. A similar, although much less pronounced, pattern was evident in the mean.

The earlier paper also showed, however, that the United States' number-one ranking in the duration-to-date numbers for December 31, 1995, was backed up by other measures. For the United States, the mean duration of measures terminated during the period covered by the data set through December 31, 1995, was 9.1 years, and the median was 7.9 years. Four in 10 measures lasted 10 years or more. More than one in six lasted 15 years or more, and one lasted over 31 years. The next highest ranking countries were Canada, the EC/U, Brazil, and Australia, with means of 6.3, 5.6, 5.0, and 4.2 years, respectively. Their respective medians were 5.4, 5.2, 5.0, and 3.6 years, and the longest-lived measures were 15.6, 12.4, 5.0, and 9.6 years.³

CBO's previous paper also derived another statistic—the expected median duration of antidumping measures. The expected median duration is the number of years such that half of all measures first put into effect on a given date by a particular country can be expected to be shorter-lived than the median, and half can be expected to be longer-lived. (The number assumes that future policy on terminating measures is the same as it was over the period covered by the GATT/WTO data set through December 31, 1995.) The expected median duration for U.S. antidumping measures reported in the 1998 paper was 10.6 years, which was considerably longer than the comparable numbers for the other countries for which it was possible to compute the statistic (Canada, at 6.5 years; the EC/U, at 6.3 years; Mexico, at 3.8 years; and Australia, at 3.4 years).

3. See Congressional Budget Office, *Antidumping Action in the United States and Around the World: An Analysis of International Data*, CBO Paper (June 1998), pp. 27-29 and 88 for more details and qualifications.

Given the support of the numbers for the average lifetime of a measure at termination and for the expected median duration, one can conclude that although in theory, the duration-to-date numbers might sometimes lead to incorrect conclusions about the relative durations of different countries' measures, in this case that theoretical possibility does not appear to be an actual problem.

Active Measures on December 31, 1999 (January 1, 2000)

On December 31, 1999—five years after the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect and one day before the first sunset terminations occurred—the mean duration of active U.S. measures was 9.7 years, an increase of 2.4 years over the 7.3-year mean on December 31, 1994 (see Figures 6 and 7 and Table B-7). The median duration to date was 8.9 years, an increase of 1.9 years over the median five years earlier. The longest-lived U.S. measure (which was the same one that was noted five years earlier) had now been in effect 33.3 years, which, of course, was an increase of five years.

The United States continued to maintain its number-one ranking based on mean and median durations to date. Following the United States in the ranking by mean were Turkey, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Mexico, and the EC/U, with mean durations to date of 6.7, 6.3, 6.2, 4.7, 4.5, and 4.4 years, respectively. Following the United States in the ranking by median were New Zealand, Turkey, Australia, Canada, Japan, and Mexico, with median durations to date of 7.3, 7.0, 5.9, 5.6, 4.4, and 4.4 years, respectively.

On January 1, 2000, the large number of sunset terminations caused significant drops in the average durations to date of active U.S. measures. The mean dropped from 9.7 years to 8.2 years, and the median fell from 8.9 years to 7.2 years. Despite those drops, however, the new averages a day earlier would still have ranked the United States number one on the basis of means and number two on the basis of medians.

On December 31, 1999, and January 1, 2000—as was the case five years earlier—only the United States and Canada had active measures that had been in effect for 15 years or longer. Only those two countries plus the EC/U, New Zealand, and South Africa had active measures that had been in effect for 10 years or more.

CHAPTER V

ANTIDUMPING ACTIVITY BY AND AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

The ranking of countries by the number of active U.S. antidumping measures against them has not changed much since the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect. As one would expect, the countries against which the United States maintains the greatest numbers of measures are all large suppliers of imports to the United States. In addition, the Congressional Budget Office's earlier paper showed that developing countries and countries with nonmarket economies (either currently or recently) have more active U.S. measures against them than one would expect solely from how much the United States imports from them.

The number of countries with active antidumping measures against the United States is much smaller than the number of countries with active U.S. measures against them. The countries with the most measures by far against the United States, both before and after the agreement, are Canada and Mexico—a result of the large quantities of U.S. exports that those countries receive. When the numbers of measures are divided by the values of U.S. exports to the countries in question, Canada and Mexico drop substantially in the ranking. The number of foreign antidumping measures against U.S. firms has increased roughly proportionately to the increase in trade since the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect.

WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE THE MOST ACTIVE U.S. MEASURES AGAINST THEM?

The targets of U.S. antidumping activity have changed little since the Uruguay Round agreement. The countries against which the United States maintained the largest numbers of active measures on December 31, 1994, were Japan, with 49; People's Republic of China, with 28; Taiwan, with 17; South Korea and Germany, with 16 each; Canada, with 15; Brazil, with 13; and Italy and France, with 11 each (see Table 4). No other country had more than six U.S. measures against it.

Five years later, on December 31, 1999, the same nine countries were the major targets of U.S. antidumping action. Their order was only slightly altered; the main difference was that the United States had more measures in place against most of them. The countries were Japan, with 54 measures; People's Republic of China, with 41; Taiwan, with 23; South Korea, with 19; Canada, with 17; Brazil, Italy, and Germany, with 15 each; and France, with 12. No other country had more than nine measures against it.

TABLE 4. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY NUMBER OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES MAINTAINED AGAINST THEM BY THE UNITED STATES

Country	January 1, 2000 ^a	December 31, 1999	December 31, 1994
People's Republic of China	40	41	28
Japan	38	54	49
Taiwan	21	23	17
South Korea	17	19	16
Brazil	13	15	13
Italy	13	15	11
Germany	12	15	16
Canada	11	17	15
France	10	12	11
Mexico	8	9	6
Argentina	6	6	4
India	6	6	4
Russia	6	6	4
United Kingdom	5	6	6
Thailand	5	5	4
Sweden	4	6	5
Belgium	4	4	3
Netherlands	4	4	4
Romania	4	4	4
Singapore	4	4	4
Ukraine	4	4	5
Spain	3	4	2
Turkey	3	4	2
Indonesia	3	3	0
Chile	2	3	1
South Africa	2	3	1
Uzbekistan	2	2	2
Venezuela	2	2	5
Australia	1	2	2
Finland	1	2	2
Bangladesh	1	1	1
Belarus	1	1	1

(Continued)

On the following day—January 1, 2000—the large number of sunset terminations changed the order very slightly again and reduced the counts for many of the countries, but the terminations left the same nine countries as the major targets of U.S. action: People's Republic of China, with 40 measures; Japan, with 38; Taiwan, with 21; South Korea, with 17; Brazil and Italy, with 13 each; Germany, with 12; Canada, with 11; and France, with 10. No other country had more than eight measures against it.

TABLE 4. CONTINUED

Country	January 1, 2000 ^a	December 31, 1999	December 31, 1994
Estonia	1	1	1
Greece	1	1	1
Hungary	1	1	2
Iran	1	1	1
Lithuania	1	1	1
Malaysia	1	1	1
Norway	1	1	1
Poland	1	1	1
Tajikistan	1	1	1
Turkmenistan	1	1	1
Yugoslavia	1	1	2
Israel	0	2	2
Kyrgyzstan	0	2	2
Armenia	0	1	1
Austria	0	1	1
Azerbaijan	0	1	1
Georgia	0	1	2
Kazakhstan	0	1	4
Kenya	0	1	1
Latvia	0	1	1
Moldova	0	1	1
New Zealand	0	1	2
Colombia	0	0	1
Ecuador	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	267	326	281

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- a. The Uruguay Round agreement adopted by the United States at the end of 1994 requires periodic sunset reviews and terminations of active antidumping measures. The deadline for the United States to complete those reviews and any required terminations of measures in place when it adopted the agreement was January 1, 2000, at which time the United States consequently terminated a large number of measures. The number remaining on that date is more reflective of U.S. policy after the agreement than is the number on the day before. CBO did not have the necessary data to update other countries by that one day. However, most of them already had policies of conducting sunset reviews and terminations before the Uruguay Round agreement, so it is unlikely that other countries terminated many measures on that date.

CBO's 1998 paper showed that the United States tends to impose the most antidumping measures on the countries from which it imports the most and on developing countries that have or have recently had nonmarket economies. In particular, the ranking of countries by active U.S. measures against them on December 31, 1995, was very similar to the ranking of countries by the value of

imports received from them by the United States in 1995; in addition, the United States tended to have more active measures per unit of imports against developing countries and countries with nonmarket economies (either currently or recently) than against others. The similarity over the past five years in the rankings of countries by active U.S. measures against them suggests that these tendencies have not changed.

WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE THE MOST ACTIVE MEASURES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES?

The countries that report antidumping measures in place against the United States are less numerous than the countries against which the United States maintains measures. On December 31, 1994, the United States had active measures against 55 countries, whereas only 12 had measures against the United States (see Table 5). Counting the EC/U as 12 countries (the number of member countries at that time) boosts the number of countries with measures against the United States to 23—less than half the number of countries with active U.S. measures against them. On December 31, 1999, the United States had active measures against 54 countries; only 12 countries (26, if the EC/U is counted as 15, the number of member countries at that time) had measures against the United States. Thus, the number of countries with measures against the United States was still less than half the number of countries with U.S. measures against them. The next day, after the sunset terminations, the countries targeted by U.S. measures dropped to 43—still substantially more than the number reporting measures against the United States the previous day.

As noted earlier, Canada and Mexico had by far the most active measures against the United States on both December 31, 1994, and December 31, 1999. On the earlier date, the countries with the most active measures against the United States were Canada, with 17; Mexico, with 15; Australia and Brazil, with six each; and Colombia, with three. On the later date, the countries were Mexico, with 18 measures; Canada, with 13; and Australia, Colombia, and South Africa, with five each. On December 31, 1999, eight countries had more measures against the United States than they had had five years earlier, four had fewer, and one had the same number (excluding countries that had no measures against the United States in either period).¹ Those statistics support the tentative conclusion in CBO's 1998 paper that antidumping activity against U.S. firms is increasing.

1. Two of the eight countries reporting more measures were South Africa and Israel. Because of inadequacies in reporting by those countries, they could have had more measures than those included in the GATT/WTO data set. Therefore, it is possible (although not necessarily probable) that those countries did not, in fact, have more measures on the later date than on the earlier, even though the data set indicates that they did.

TABLE 5. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY NUMBER OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES THEY MAINTAIN AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

Country	December 31, 1999	December 31, 1994
Mexico	18	15
Canada	13	17
Australia	5	6
Colombia	5	3 ^a
South Africa	5	2 ^a
Brazil	4	6
India	4	1
EC/U	3	2
South Korea	3	1
Argentina	2	1 ^a
Israel	2	0
New Zealand	1	1 ^a
Venezuela	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>
Total	65	57

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: EC/U = European Community/Union. (The European Community, which was established in 1979, became the European Union on November 1, 1993.)

- a. Because of inadequate reporting, the actual number of measures against the United States could be larger than the number given here but probably is not much larger, if at all.

Considering the number of measures per \$10 billion of U.S. exports to the country in question drops the rankings of Canada and Mexico substantially. By that indicator, the countries with the most active measures against the United States on December 31, 1994, were Colombia, with 10.7; Brazil, with 10.1; South Africa, with 9.6; New Zealand, with 8.2; and Australia, with 7.0 (see Table 6).² No other country had as many as five measures against the United States. The ranking five years later on December 31, 1999, was South Africa first, with 17.2 measures; India, with 12.0; Colombia, with 11.3; New Zealand, with 5.6; and Australia, with 4.4.

2. The number of measures per \$10 billion of U.S. exports is only a crude gauge of the effects of large quantities of exports because the number of measures would not necessarily be expected to be strictly proportional to the exports' value. Nevertheless, one would expect that, all else being the same, a country that imported substantial amounts from the United States would have more measures against the United States than would a country that imported little.

TABLE 6. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY NUMBER OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES THEY MAINTAIN AGAINST THE UNITED STATES PER \$10 BILLION OF U.S. EXPORTS

Country	December 31, 1999	December 31, 1994
South Africa	17.2	9.6 ^a
India	12.0	4.5
Colombia	11.3	10.7
New Zealand	5.6	8.2 ^a
Australia	4.4	7.0
Argentina	4.1	3.6
Israel	3.7	0
Brazil	3.1	10.1
Mexico	2.8	4.0
South Korea	1.3	0.7
Canada	1.0	2.0
EC/U	0.2	0.2 ^a
Venezuela	0	4.8

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set and trade data from the Bureau of the Census.

NOTE: EC/U = European Community/Union. (The European Community, which was established in 1979, became the European Union on November 1, 1993.)

a. Because of inadequate reporting, the actual number of measures against the United States could be larger than the number given here but probably is not much larger, if at all.

Totaled over all countries, the number of reported measures against the United States increased from 57 on the earlier date to 65 on the later one.³ Multiplying the number of measures that the EC/U maintains against the United States by the number of EC/U member countries brings the respective totals for all countries for the two dates to 79 and 107. Although the numbers of measures have increased, they have not increased relative to U.S. exports. On both dates, the total number of reported measures against the United States by all countries per \$10 billion of U.S. exports to all countries was just under 1.2 (with the measures of the EC/U multiplied by the number of member countries on each date).

3. Incomplete reporting by South Africa, Israel, and Venezuela make it possible that some measures maintained by those countries are not included for December 31, 1994. It seems unlikely, however, that that explains much, if any, of the difference between the totals for that date and December 31, 1999.

APPENDIX A

COMPLETENESS OF COVERAGE

OF THE GATT/WTO DATA SET


The GATT/WTO data set covers antidumping cases brought by countries that were signatories to the Antidumping Code of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and subsequently of the World Trade Organization at the time of each semiannual report (and that obeyed the reporting requirement of the code). (See Table A-1 for a list of countries covered for each reporting period.) Starting with the July-December 1994 reporting period, those countries have included almost all nations whose antidumping policies are of economic interest to the United States. The July-December 1994 reporting period is the first under the new WTO regime, which requires all WTO members to file reports of their antidumping activity.¹

Despite the new requirement, many countries have not submitted reports. Some of the nonreporting countries are not members of the WTO and therefore are not required to file reports. Most of the nonreporting countries have probably not had significant antidumping activity. Whether they have or not, however, few of them are important U.S. export markets, so their antidumping activity is of little economic interest to the United States. (See Table A-2, which lists the U.S. export markets that have never filed a GATT/WTO report and the shares of U.S. exports going to those markets.)

The largest U.S. export markets not covered by the data set for 1999 are Taiwan, People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, which received 2.7 percent, 2.0 percent, 1.2 percent, and 0.3 percent, respectively, of U.S. exports that year. All other noncovered countries in total received less than 4 percent of U.S. exports. Almost 91 percent of U.S. exports went to countries reporting case data for the January-June period of that year, and almost 89 percent went to countries reporting such data for the July-December period. (See Figure A-1 and Table A-3 for the corresponding shares of U.S. exports covered by GATT/WTO reports for each reporting period from the beginning of 1983 through the end of 1999.) Hence, statistics drawn from the final years of the data set should give a fairly accurate indication of world antidumping activity that is of economic interest to the United States.

1. Reports for the July-December 1994 reporting period were actually submitted in early 1995 and therefore did not predate the January 1, 1995, starting date of the WTO.

FIGURE A-1. PERCENTAGE OF U.S. EXPORTS GOING TO COUNTRIES FILING GATT/WTO REPORTS



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the semiannual reports to the GATT/WTO and trade data from the Bureau of the Census.

NOTES: EC/U = the European Community/Union. (The European Community, which was established in 1979, became the European Union on November 1, 1993.) Before the July-December 1991 reporting period, reports filed by the EC/U did not include data for cases against countries that were not signatories to the Antidumping Code. Similarly, before September 1, 1989, the EC/U's lists of active measures did not include measures against nonsignatories.

The tick marks labeled with years are for July through December of the years in question. The unlabeled tick marks in between are for January through June. Further details and notes are given in Table A-3.

Before the July-December 1994 reporting period, the coverage of the data set is less complete than it is after the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect because not all GATT members were signatories to the Antidumping Code. Countries covered by the set for 1985 received roughly two-thirds of U.S. exports that year. That coverage is substantial enough that statistics drawn from the set are strongly indicative of worldwide activity, but they may miss some of it. The fact that one-third of U.S. exports went to countries not covered by the data set does not necessarily mean that the data set excludes one-third of the antidumping activity of

interest to the United States. Rather, it means that the countries in question did not file reports on their activity, which in many instances may have been negligible or nonexistent. (Several of the countries that have filed reports for many years have had no antidumping activity for that entire time.)

The number of countries that were signatories to the GATT/WTO Antidumping Code grew sizably over the periods covered by the data set, and, consequently, so did the number of countries covered by the set. Hence, one must be careful not to draw erroneous conclusions from trends in the data. For example, the increase in the total number of active antidumping measures in the data set over time is not proof that such activity around the world is increasing. Even if all countries' activity had remained the same, the fact that more countries have begun reporting over time means that the set would contain an increasing worldwide total of active orders over time.

Finally, before the July-December 1991 reporting period, the European Community/Union (EC/U) did not report case data for cases brought against countries that were not signatories to the Antidumping Code. Furthermore, its first list of active measures to include measures against nonsignatories to the code was that for September 1, 1989—the list included in the same report containing the January-June 1989 case data. Figure A-1 and Table A-3 therefore show two sets of numbers: one including and one excluding the EC/U before those times. That reporting practice does not affect the statistics for EC/U cases brought against the United States, but it does affect statistics relating to total antidumping activity.

TABLE A-2. COUNTRIES THAT HAD NEVER FILED A SEMIANNUAL REPORT AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1999

Country	Share of U.S. Exports in 1999 (Percent)
Taiwan	2.747
People's Republic of China	1.960
Saudi Arabia	1.184
Russia	0.284
Bahamas	0.125
Nigeria	0.097
Haiti	0.093
Netherlands Antilles	0.085
Algeria	0.070
Cayman Islands	0.055
Lebanon	0.054
Uzbekistan	0.053
Bermuda	0.052
Aruba	0.045
Vietnam	0.043
Bangladesh	0.042
Jordan	0.042
Angola	0.039
Equatorial Guinea	0.034
Ukraine	0.031
French Guiana	0.030
Kenya	0.029
Oman	0.029
Kazakhstan	0.028
Syria	0.027
Ethiopia	0.026
Yemen (Sana)	0.024
Suriname	0.022
Guyana	0.021
Belize	0.020
Croatia	0.017
Cote d'Ivoire	0.015
Turks and Caicos Islands	0.015
French Polynesia	0.014
Antigua	0.014
Georgia	0.013
Lithuania	0.010
Grenada	0.010
Guadeloupe	0.010
Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro)*	0.009
Macedonia (Skopje)*	0.009
Azerbaijan	0.009
British Virgin Islands	0.008
Guinea	0.008
Saint Vincent and Grenadines	0.008
Iran	0.007
Armenia	0.007
Congo (ROC)	0.007
Gabon	0.007
Liberia	0.007
Bosnia-Herzegovina*	0.007
Cameroon	0.006
Marshall Islands	0.005
Papua New Guinea	0.005

(Continued)

TABLE A-2. CONTINUED

Country	Share of U.S. Exports in 1999 (Percent)
Mozambique	0.005
Martinique	0.005
Botswana	0.005
Mali	0.004
Djibouti	0.004
Togo	0.004
Belarus	0.004
Albania	0.004
Federated States of Micronesia	0.004
Mauritania	0.004
Anguilla	0.003
Congo (DROC)(Zaire)	0.003
Nepal	0.003
Cambodia (Kampuchea)	0.003
New Caledonia	0.003
Niger	0.003
Turkmenistan	0.003
Afghanistan	0.003
Palau Islands	0.002
Sierra Leone	0.002
Tajikistan	0.002
Monaco	0.002
Western Samoa	0.002
North Korea	0.002
Moldova	0.002
Iraq	0.001
Sudan	0.001
Maldiv Islands	0.001
San Marino	0.001
Andorra	0.001
Seychelles	0.001
Malawi	0.001
Cape Verde	0.001
Vanuatu (New Hebrides)	0.001
Kiribati (Gilbert Islands)	0.001
Tonga	0.001
Faroe Islands	a
West Bank	a
Tokelau Islands	a
Gibraltar	a
Central African Republic	a
Eritrea	a
Montserrat	a
Somalia	a
Chad	a
Saint Pierre and Miquelon	a
Reunion	a
Burundi	a
Vatican City	a
Norfolk Island	a
Laos	a
Solomon Islands	a
Gaza Strip	a
French S. Antarctic Territory	a

(Continued)

TABLE A-2. CONTINUED

Country	Share of U.S. Exports in 1999 (Percent)
Cook Islands	a
Christmas Island	a
Nauru	a
Guinea-Bissau	a
Lesotho	a
Bhutan	a
British Indian Ocean Territory	a
Sao Tome and Principe	a
Cocos (Keeling) Islands	a
Saint Helena	a
Svalbard, Jan Mayen Island	a
Comoros	a
Pitcairn Island	a
Wallis and Futuna	a
Niue	a
Falkland Islands	a
Western Sahara	a
Heard Islands and McDonald Islands	a
Total	7.723

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on trade data from the Bureau of the Census.

NOTE: This table includes all countries, other political or geographical jurisdictions, and categories that U.S. Customs reported as being the destination of nonzero quantities of U.S. exports in 1999 and that are not listed in Table A-1. The table does not include all countries that had never filed any semiannual reports as of December 31, 1999, because some of those countries, such as Libya, received no exports in 1999.

a. Less than 0.001 percent.

* The country in question was formerly a constituent republic of Yugoslavia, which filed reports from 1980 through 1992 before it broke up into several countries. Slovenia resumed filing reports starting with the second half of 1994, but none of the other former republics had resumed filing as of December 31, 1999.

TABLE A-3. PERCENTAGE OF U.S. EXPORTS GOING TO COUNTRIES REPORTING CASE DATA

Reporting Period	Includes EC/U Before July-December 1991 ^a	Excludes EC/U Before July-December 1991 ^a
1983		
January-June	63.7	42.5
July-December	63.7	42.5
1984		
January-June	64.6	44.0
July-December	66.3	45.7
1985		
January-June	67.5	47.0
July-December	67.5	47.0
1986		
January-June	72.8	50.7
July-December	72.8	50.7
1987		
January-June	72.2	50.0
July-December	72.2	50.0
1988		
January-June	78.3	56.6
July-December	78.3	56.6
1989		
January-June	80.6	58.3
July-December	80.6	58.3
1990		
January-June	81.3	57.8
July-December	81.3	57.8
1991		
January-June	79.6	56.5
July-December	79.6	79.6
1992		
January-June	78.4	78.4
July-December	78.4	78.4
1993		
January-June	77.6	77.6
July-December	77.6	77.6
1994		
January-June	79.5	79.5
July-December	89.5	89.5

(Continued)

TABLE A-3. CONTINUED

Reporting Period	Includes EC/U Before July-December 1991 ^a	Excludes EC/U Before July-December 1991 ^a
1995		
January-June	89.8	89.8
July-December	89.3	89.3
1996		
January-June	90.9	90.9
July-December	90.6	90.6
1997		
January-June	90.8	90.8
July-December	91.0	91.0
1998		
January-June	90.6	90.6
July-December	90.6	90.6
1999		
January-June	90.9	90.9
July-December ^b	88.7	88.7

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on semiannual reports to the GATT/WTO and trade data from the Bureau of the Census.

NOTES: The numbers given are the percentage of U.S. exports for the year--not the reporting period--in question.

A country that did not submit a report for a given period is still counted in this table as having filed a report if CBO is reasonably confident that all actions taken in that period were included in reports the country submitted for other periods.

- a. Before the July-December 1991 reporting period, reports filed by the European Community/Union (EC/U) did not include data for cases against countries that were not signatories to the Antidumping Code.
- b. The largest U.S. export markets not reporting case data for July-December 1999 were Taiwan, People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and the Dominican Republic, which received 2.7, 2.0, 1.2, 0.7, and 0.6 percent of U.S. exports, respectively, in that year. For the January-June 1999 period, the largest nonreporting countries were the same except that the Dominican Republic (which reported for that period) is replaced by Jamaica, which received 0.2 percent of U.S. exports in 1999.

APPENDIX B

STATISTICAL TABLES

The following tables provide more detailed data relating to the discussion in the main text.

TABLE B-1. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY AVERAGE NUMBER OF ANTIDUMPING CASE INITIATIONS PER YEAR

Country	1995-1999		1990-1994	
	Average Number per Year	Country Average as Percentage of World Average a	Average Number per Year	Country Average as Percentage of World Average a
EC/U	38.8	15.9	34.6	15.8
South Africa	27.0	11.1		
United States	26.4	10.8	53.4	24.4
India	26.4	10.8	3.0	1.4
Australia	19.2	7.9	51.2	23.4
Argentina	18.2	7.5		
Brazil	12.4	5.1	12.4	5.7
Canada	11.2	4.6	17.0	7.8
South Korea	8.2	3.4	4.0	1.8
Mexico	7.4	3.0	24.6	11.3
Indonesia	6.0	2.5		
Venezuela	5.2	2.1		
New Zealand	5.0	2.1	6.0	2.7
Israel	4.4	1.8		
Peru	4.2	1.7		
Egypt	3.6	1.5	0	0
Malaysia	3.2	1.3		
Colombia	2.8	1.2	3.7 d	1.7
Philippines	2.4	1.0		
Turkey	2.4	1.0		
Costa Rica	1.5 b	0.6		
Chile	1.4	0.6		
Trinidad and Tobago	1.4	0.6		
Thailand	1.0 b	0.4		
Poland	0.8	0.3	4.8	2.2
Nicaragua	0.7 c	0.3		
Panama	0.7 d	0.3		
Czech Rep. 1993-1999, Czechoslovakia 1990-199	0.6	0.2	0	0
Ecuador	0.5 b	0.2		
Guatemala	0.2	0.1		
Slovenia 1994-1999, Yugoslavia 1990-1992	0.2	0.1	0 d	0
Japan	0	0	0.8	0.4
Singapore	0	0	0.4	0.2
Austria	e		1.8	0.8
Sweden	e		0.6	0.3
Finland	e		0.2	0.1
All Other Reporting Countries	0	0	0	0
Total, All Countries	243.3 a	100.0	218.5 a	100.0

(Continued)

TABLE B-1. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTES: EC/U = European Community/Union. (The European Community, which was established in 1979, became the European Union on November 1, 1993.)

A number of previously nonreporting countries began reporting in 1994, mostly in the second reporting period (July-December) of that year. Averages are not given for those countries for 1990 to 1994 because CBO judged that averages calculated from so few reporting periods would be unreliable.

- a. The world average in this table is what the world average would have been if the countries that filed reports for only part of the period had instead filed reports for the entire period and if their average rate of case initiations for the additional periods was the same as it was for the periods for which they filed reports.
 - b. Based on data for eight of the 10 reporting periods.
 - c. Based on data for nine of the 10 reporting periods.
 - d. Based on data for six of the 10 reporting periods.
 - e. Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the European Union on January 1, 1995, and stopped filing their own reports independent of those of the European Union.
-

TABLE B-2. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY AVERAGE NUMBER OF NEW ANTIDUMPING MEASURES
IMPOSED PER YEAR

Country	1995-1999		1990-1994	
	Average Number per Year	Country Average as Percentage of World Average a	Average Number per Year	Country Average as Percentage of World Average a
EC/U--Adjusted	21.2	16.2	20.8	21.3
United States	16.4	12.6	23.2	23.7
South Africa	15.0	11.5		
Argentina	13.6	10.4		
India	11.8	9.0	1.1	1.1
Mexico	8.0	6.1	10.8	11.0
Canada	6.8	5.2	12.8	13.1
Brazil	5.4	4.1	4.0	4.1
South Korea	4.6	3.5	1.8	1.8
Egypt	3.6	2.8	0	0
Australia--Adjusted	3.4	2.6	17.6	18.0
Indonesia*	3.1 b	2.4		
Turkey	2.6	2.0		
Venezuela	2.4	1.8		
Israel	2.2	1.7		
Colombia	1.8	1.4	1.7 d	1.7
Peru	1.8	1.4		
Malaysia	1.8	1.4		
New Zealand--Adjusted	1.6	1.2	3.2	3.3
Trinidad and Tobago	1.0 c	0.8		
Chile	0.8	0.6		
Thailand	0.7 b	0.5		
Singapore	0.4	0.3	0	0
Japan	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
Poland	0.2	0.2	0	0
Guatemala	0.2	0.2		
Sweden	e		0.6	0.6
All Other Reporting Countries	0	0	0	0
Total, All Countries	130.6 a	100.0	97.8	100.0

(Continued)

TABLE B-2. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTES: A number of previously nonreporting countries began reporting in 1994, mostly in the second reporting period (July-December) of that year. Averages are not given for those countries for 1990 to 1994 because CBO judged that averages calculated from so few reporting periods would be unreliable.

EC/U = European Community/Union. (The European Community, which was established in 1979, became the European Union on November 1, 1993.)

The notation "--Adjusted" means that certain measures were excluded as follows:

On January 1, 1994, the European Economic Area (EEA) was established. The EEA was composed of the European Union (EU) and the members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), excluding Switzerland. (The members of the EFTA are Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.) Four days later, all active EU antidumping measures against the EFTA members (excluding Switzerland) were suspended. Similarly, on January 1, 1986, Spain and Portugal joined the European Community (EC), at which point all active EC measures against them were terminated. To give a better measure of the EC/U's antidumping policy toward the rest of the world, "EC/U--Adjusted" excludes all measures against those countries. Similar adjustment of the data for Spain eliminates a measure against EC/U-member Italy, which is Spain's only measure. Consequently, Spain falls under "All Other Reporting Countries." Sweden had no measures against EC/U members during any of the periods covered by its reports, so the statistics are the same for "Sweden" and "Sweden--Adjusted."

During the period covered by the reports, Australia and New Zealand replaced anti-dumping policy on trade between them with competition policy and terminated the active measures against each other. To give a better indication of the countries' antidumping policies toward the rest of the world, "Australia--Adjusted" and "New Zealand--Adjusted" exclude Australia's measures against New Zealand and New Zealand's measures against Australia.

- * The failure of Indonesia to file any lists of active measures for any reporting period makes it impossible to confirm that all of the reported new measures counted here, which are tallied from the case data reports, actually occurred. For many countries, a significant portion of the new measures reported on the case data reports did not actually occur--a fact that can be determined only by examining whether the measures show up on subsequent lists of active measures. There is no way to know whether the same is true for Indonesia.
 - a. The world average in this table is what the world average would have been if the countries that filed reports for only part of the period had instead filed reports for the entire period and if their average rate of case initiations for the additional periods was the same as it was for the periods for which they filed reports.
 - b. Based on data for nine of the 10 reporting periods.
 - c. Based on data for eight of the 10 reporting periods.
 - d. Based on data for six of the 10 reporting periods.
 - e. Sweden joined the European Union on January 1, 1995, and stopped filing its own reports independent of those of the European Union.
-

TABLE B-3. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY NUMBER OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES

Country	Active Measures on 12/31/99 (01/01/00)		Active Measures on 12/31/94	
	Number	As Percentage of World Total	Number	As Percentage of World Total
United States	326 (267)	30.1 (26.1)	281	37.0
EC/U	148	13.7	137	18.1
South Africa	94	8.7	26 *	3.4
Canada	79	7.3	97	12.8
Mexico	71 a	6.6	49	6.5
India	60	5.5	5	0.7
Argentina	43	4.0	3	0.4
Brazil	39	3.6	20	2.6
Australia	38	3.5	75	9.9
Turkey	35	3.2	28	3.7
South Korea	26	2.4	7	0.9
New Zealand	21	1.9	21	2.8
Egypt	18 b	1.7	0 *	0
Colombia	14	1.3	5	0.7
Venezuela	14	1.3	2 *	0.3
Indonesia	14	1.3	0 *	0
Israel	9	0.8	0 *	0
Malaysia	9 c	0.8	0 *	0
Peru	8	0.7	0 *	0
Trinidad and Tobago	4	0.4	0 *	0
Thailand	4	0.4	1	0.1
Chile	2	0.2	1	0.1
Singapore	2	0.2	0	0
Japan	1	0.1	1	0.1
Guatemala	1	0.1	0 *	0
Nicaragua	1	0.1	0 *	0
Poland	1	0.1	0 *	0
All Other Reporting Countries	0	0	0	0
Total, All Countries	1,082 (1,023)	100.0	759	100.0

(Continued)

TABLE B-3. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTES: From July 1998 through December 1999, the United States conducted a number of sunset reviews, as a result of which antidumping orders were terminated, with the termination effective January 1, 2000. The number in parentheses for the United States is the number of orders remaining after those orders were terminated.

EC/U = European Community/Union. (The European Community, which was established in 1979, became the European Union on November 1, 1993.)

* See Table B-11a for the precise meaning of this symbol. Its practical significance for this table is that because of inadequate reporting by the country in question, the true value of the number of active measures in this case could be, although in most instances is unlikely to be, somewhat higher than the number given here. The likelihood is highest in cases for which the number cited is not zero.

a. One of the Mexican orders on 12/31/99 is against the EU as a whole.

b. Three of the Egyptian orders on 12/31/99 are against the "EU other than France" as a whole.

c. Two of the Malaysian orders on 12/31/99 are against the EU as a whole.

TABLE B-4. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY INITIAL ANTIDUMPING DUTY RATES IMPOSED

Country	Duty Rate (Percent)		Number of Cases	
	Mean	Median	Duties Imposed	Duty Rates Reported
Duties Imposed, 1995-1999				
Trinidad and Tobago	260.0	260.0	3	1
Guatemala	89.5	89.5	1	1
Argentina	84.8	86.3	50	12
Colombia	62.1	59.4	9	9
Australia	59.3	59.3	14	2
Venezuela	57.2 ^a	56.3 ^a	12	12
Canada	44.7	49.2	33	24
Mexico	59.1	48.0	39	35
Brazil	53.2	45.5	27	24
Peru	40.2	39.1	9	8
South Korea	28.9	32.4	18	3
South Africa	45.2	31.5	75	44
United States	47.6	30.9	72	70
Thailand	27.4	27.8	3	3
EC/U	27.7	24.8	106	63
New Zealand	51.9	23.0	9	9
Malaysia	28.8	18.5	9	9
Egypt	24.0	17.6	18	18
Israel	16.2	16.4	8	4
Turkey	10.6	10.6	13	1
Chile	8.8	9.0	4	4
India			59	0
Japan			0	0
Duties Imposed, 1990-1994				
Colombia	51.3	56.3	5	5
Mexico	126.0	49.9	53	27
United States	56.2	37.9	106	106
South Korea	36.9	35.9	9	7
Canada	34.0	32.6	60	60
Thailand	30.0	30.0	1	1
Brazil	32.3	27.2	18	14
India	27.6	23.2	5	5
EC/U	31.0	22.0	110	66
Australia	24.6	20.0	85	65
Turkey	19.4	19.4	31	2
New Zealand	15.4	13.3	15	6
Japan	10.9	10.9	2	2
Chile	7.0	7.0	1	1
Argentina			0	0
Egypt			0	0
Guatemala			0	0
Israel			0	0
Malaysia			0	0
Peru			0	0
South Africa			25	0
Trinidad and Tobago			0	0
Venezuela			2	0

(Continued)

TABLE B-4. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTES: In cases for which more than one duty rate was reported, CBO took a simple unweighted average of the rates as the duty imposed for the case. The resulting rates were then averaged together with the rates for cases in which only one duty rate was reported, again using a simple unweighted average. In principle, it would have been better to take an import-weighted average, but the import numbers needed to calculate such an average (that is, the quantities of imports covered by the duty orders denominated in the same units for all orders) were not available.

EC/U = European Community/Union. (The European Community, which was established in 1979, became the European Union on November 1, 1993.)

- a. Two of the duties in question were on blue jeans and were specified as 100 percent plus US \$1.46 per unit. The average given here was calculated without the \$1.46 per unit, so the true average is higher by an unknown percentage.
-

TABLE B-5. DETAILED STATISTICS ON U.S. INITIAL DEFINITIVE DUTY RATES,
07/01/79 - 12/31/99

Number of Cases	341
Number with Duty Rate Reported	331
Mean Duty Rates (Percent)	
Entire reporting period	45.4
Three-year intervals	
1979-1981	37.7 (11 cases)
1982-1984	26.5 (37 cases)
1985-1987	30.5 (73 cases)
1988-1990	60.5 (48 cases)
1991-1993	50.6 (79 cases)
1994-1996	65.6 (44 cases)
1997-1999	41.9 (39 cases)
Five-year intervals	
1980-1984	25.8 (43 cases)
1985-1989	41.0 (105 cases)
1990-1994	55.1 (112 cases)
1995-1999	47.9 (66 cases)
Median Duty Rates (Percent)	
Entire reporting period	31.0
Three-year intervals	
1979-1981	37.1 (11 cases)
1982-1984	12.9 (37 cases)
1985-1987	14.7 (73 cases)
1988-1990	51.2 (48 cases)
1991-1993	32.6 (79 cases)
1994-1996	56.4 (44 cases)
1997-1999	17.5 (39 cases)
Five-year intervals	
1980-1984	12.9 (43 cases)
1985-1989	26.3 (105 cases)
1990-1994	36.2 (112 cases)
1995-1999	30.0 (66 cases)
Highest Duty Rate (Percent)	376.7
Lowest Duty Rate (Percent)	0 a
Percentage of Cases with Duty of:	
10 percent or more	77.3 (256 cases)
25 percent or more	55.0 (182 cases)
50 percent or more	33.8 (112 cases)
100 percent or more	12.7 (42 cases)
200 percent or more	1.2 (4 cases)
300 percent or more	0.6 (2 cases)

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- a. According to the U.S. semiannual report, this duty was adjusted to zero in accordance with GATT article VI:5 to reflect the margin attributable to export subsidies, as determined in a concurrent countervailing-duty investigation. Thus, it does not reflect the actual lowest dumping margin found. The next lowest duty for the period is 0.65 percent.

TABLE B-6. DURATION TO DATE OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES ON DECEMBER 31, 1994

Measures Imposed by:	Number of Measures		Duration to Date (Years)			Percentage with Duration to Date of at Least:					
	Total	Of Known Dura- tion	Mean	Median	Longest	5	10	15	20	25	30
						Years	Years	Years	Years	Years	Years
Industrialized Countries											
North America											
Canada	97	97	4.90	3.43	19.93	36.1	14.4	5.2	0	0	0
United States	281	281	7.33	6.98	28.30	61.6	21.0	12.5	7.5	1.8	0
Asia and So. Pacific											
Australia	75	75	2.22	2.19	6.28	1.3	0	0	0	0	0
Japan	1	1	1.92	1.92	1.92	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Zealand	21	21	3.83	3.06	6.58	38.1	0	0	0	0	0
Europe--EC/U	137	133	3.87	3.51	13.56	25.6	3.0	0	0	0	0
Developing Countries											
North America--											
Mexico	49	49	1.56	1.37	5.22	2.0	0	0	0	0	0
South America											
Argentina	3	3	0.75	1.06	1.06	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil	20	20	1.96	2.00	3.55	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	1	1	0.40	0.40	0.40	0	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia	5	5	1.48	1.08	2.63	0	0	0	0	0	0
Asia and So. Pacific											
India	5	5	0.92	0.95	0.95	0	0	0	0	0	0
Singapore	0	0									
South Korea	7	7	1.02	1.00	1.92	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thailand	1	1	0.15	0.15	0.15	0	0	0	0	0	0
Europe											
Poland	0	0									
Turkey	28	28	3.02	3.48	4.09	0	0	0	0	0	0
Africa											
Egypt	0	0									
South Africa	26	26	1.88	1.48	5.71	3.8	0	0	0	0	0

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: EC/U = European Community/Union. (The European Community, which was established in 1979, became the European Union on November 1, 1993.)

TABLE B-7. DURATION TO DATE OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES ON DEC. 31, 1999 (JAN. 1, 2000)

Measures Imposed by:	Number of Measures		Duration to Date (Years)			Percentage with Duration to Date of at Least:					
	Total	Of Known Duration	Mean	Median	Longest	5	10	15	20	25	30
						Years	Years	Years	Years	Years	Years
Industrialized Countries											
North America											
Canada	79	79	6.31	5.45	24.93	57.0	19.0	5.1	1.3	0	0
United States	325	325	9.72	8.86	33.30	75.7	45.8	14.5	8.6	4.3	0.3
(United States)	(267)	(267)	(8.23)	(7.16)	(26.21)	(70.0)	(37.1)	(8.6)	(4.1)	(0.7)	(0)
Asia and South Pacific											
Australia	38	38	4.59	5.87	7.94	55.3	0	0	0	0	0
Japan	1	1	4.41	4.41	4.41	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Zealand	21	21	6.24	7.30	11.58	57.1	9.5	0	0	0	0
Europe--EC/U	148	147	4.44	3.72	14.21	32.7	10.2	0	0	0	0
Developing Countries											
North America											
Guatemala	1	1	2.89	2.89	2.89	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mexico	71	71	4.53	4.39	9.26	46.5	0	0	0	0	0
South America											
Argentina	43	43	2.19	1.93	4.96	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil	39	39	3.63	3.67	7.48	33.3	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	2	2	2.69	2.69	2.69	0	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia	14	14	3.26	2.65	7.63	14	0	0	0	0	0
Peru	8	8	2.25	2.74	4.41	0	0	0	0	0	0
Trinidad and Tobago	4	4	0.80	0.66	1.79	0	0	0	0	0	0
Venezuela	12	12	1.48	0.57	4.81	0	0	0	0	0	0
Asia and South Pacific											
India	60	60	1.83	1.55	5.81	1.7	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	9	9	0.80	1.04	1.77	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malaysia	9	9	2.27	1.74	3.79	0	0	0	0	0	0
Singapore	2	2	4.25	4.25	4.42	0	0	0	0	0	0
South Korea	26	26	2.91	2.62	6.00	19	0	0	0	0	0
Thailand	4	4	2.78	2.14	5.14	25	0	0	0	0	0
Europe											
Poland	1	1	1.15	1.15	1.15	0	0	0	0	0	0
Turkey	35	35	6.71	6.98	9.09	65.7	0	0	0	0	0
Africa											
Egypt	18	18	0.59	0.24	1.51	0	0	0	0	0	0
South Africa	94	94	2.67	1.95	10.71	21.3	1.1	0	0	0	0

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTES: From July 1998 through December 1999, the United States conducted a number of sunset reviews, as a result of which antidumping orders were terminated, with the termination effective January 1, 2000. The numbers in parentheses for the United States are the number of orders remaining after those orders were terminated.

EC/U = European Community/Union. (The European Community, which was established in 1979, became the European Union on November 1, 1993.)

TABLE B-8a. ANTIDUMPING CASES INITIATED AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

	North America		Asia and South Pacific			Europe								
	United States	Canada	Australia	New Zealand	Japan	EC/U ^a	Austria	Finland	Iceland	Liechtenstein	Norway	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland
1979 Jul-Dec	6							1				0		
1980 Jan-Jun	11	11			0	4	0	0			0	0	0	0
1980 Jul-Dec	10	16			0	12	0	2			0	0	0	0
1981 Jan-Jun	5	11			0	11	0	0			0	0	0	0
1981 Jul-Dec	9	13			0	23	0	0			0	0	2	0
1982 Jan-Jun	16 c	50			0	16	0	0			0	0	0	0
1982 Jul-Dec	19	26	48		0	17	0	0			0	0	0	0
1983 Jan-Jun	21	13	41		0	8	0	0			0	0	0	0
1983 Jul-Dec	28	17	41		0	19	1	0			0	0	0	0
1984 Jan-Jun	19	6	28		0	13	0 *	1			0	1	0	0
1984 Jul-Dec	20	17	24		0	24	0	0			0	0	0	0
1985 Jan-Jun	43 c	17	33		0	17	0	0			0	0	0	0
1985 Jul-Dec	34	19	22		0	2	0	0			0	0	2	0
1986 Jan-Jun	33	9	33		0	4	0	0			0	b	0	0
1986 Jul-Dec	34	8	29		0	7	0	0			0	b	0	0
1987 Jan-Jun	7	15	11		0	8	0	4			0	b	0	0
1987 Jul-Dec	9	17	11		0	25	0	0			0	b	0	0
1988 Jan-Jun	22	2	10		0 *	12	0 *	5			0	b	0	0
1988 Jul-Dec	19	12	6	5	0	21	0 *	0			0	b	0	0
1989 Jan-Jun	10	2	14	0	0 *	14	0 *	3			0	b	2	0
1989 Jul-Dec	14	11	7	1	0 *	5	0	0			0	b	6	0
1990 Jan-Jun	10	4	15	1	0 *	31	0	0			0	b	0	0
1990 Jul-Dec	25	11	31	0	0	16	0	0			0	b	2	0
1991 Jan-Jun	35	1	31	6	0	5	0	1			0	b	0	0
1991 Jul-Dec	30	10	38	3	3	18	0	0			0	b	1	0
1992 Jan-Jun	29	6	34	10	0	12	5	0			0	b	0	0
1992 Jul-Dec	54	27	35	4	0	28	0	0			0	b	0	0
1993 Jan-Jun	15	2	24	0	0	6	4	0			0	b	0	0
1993 Jul-Dec	22	22	34	0	0	15	0	0			0	b	0	0
1994 Jan-Jun	28	0	11	2	1	34	0	0			0	b	0	0
1994 Jul-Dec	19	2	3	4	0	8	0	0	0		0	b	0	0
1995 Jan-Jun	10	7	3	5	0	26	b	b	0	0	0	b	b	0
1995 Jul-Dec	4	4	2	6	0	9	b	b	0	0	0	b	b	0
1996 Jan-Jun	11	2	7	3	0	11	b	b	0	0	0	b	b	0
1996 Jul-Dec	11	3	10	1	0	15	b	b	0	0	0	b	b	0
1997 Jan-Jun	7	5	11	0	0	11	b	b	0	0	0	b	b	0
1997 Jul-Dec	8	9	30	5	0	25	b	b	0	0	0	b	b	0
1998 Jan-Jun	21	1	5	0	0	12	b	b	0	0	0	b	b	0
1998 Jul-Dec	15	7	7	1	0	9	b	b	0	0	0	b	b	0
1999 Jan-Jun	27	10	10	3	0	32	b	b	0	0	0	b	b	0
1999 Jul-Dec	18	8	11	1	0	44	b	b	0	0	0	b	b	0

(Continued)

TABLE B-8a. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTES: EC/U = European Community/Union. (The European Community, which was established in 1979, became the European Union on November 1, 1993.)

USDOC = U.S. Department of Commerce.

- * Failure of the country to file a report for this period and one or more subsequent periods makes it possible that the true number of initiations for this period is higher than the number given here, but in CBO's judgment, the probability of an uncounted initiation is low.
- a. Before the July-December 1991 reporting period, the EC/U reported only the actions it took against other signatories to the GATT Antidumping Code. Therefore, the numbers for those dates understate the actual numbers of case initiations. The missing initiations, all of which were against nonsignatories, fall into three groups: (1) those for which no anti-dumping measures were imposed; (2) those for which antidumping measures were imposed but were terminated before the country became a signatory or before the EC/U began reporting measures against nonsignatories; and (3) those for which antidumping measures were imposed and remained in effect after the country became a signatory or after the EC/U began reporting measures against nonsignatories. The GATT/WTO reports yield no information about the first two groups, but one can determine that the following 72 initiations from the third group are missing: 10 in the Jul-Dec 1990 reporting period or earlier; 2 in the Jan-Jun 1990 period or earlier; 34 in the Jul-Dec 1989 period or earlier; 4 in the Jan-Jun 1989 period or earlier; 1 in the Jul-Dec 1988 period or earlier; 2 in the Jan-Jun 1988 period or earlier; 3 in the Jul-Dec 1987 period or earlier; 4 in the Jul-Dec 1986 period or earlier; 7 in the Jan-Jun 1985 period or earlier; 1 in the Jul-Dec 1980 period or earlier; and 4 in the Jan-Jun 1980 period or earlier. Few if any initiations are likely to be missing in the Jan-Jun 1991 reporting period, which was the last reporting period before the EC/U began reporting cases against nonsignatories, because almost all cases take longer than six months from initiation to final decision. All or almost all cases initiated during that period would be decided and therefore reported in the following period (when the EC/U began reporting cases against nonsignatories) as well as in the period in question. In addition to the missing cases, the GATT/WTO reports list one case as terminated on July 16, 1992, but give no initiation date.
- b. On January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EC/U, became covered by the EC/U's antidumping law, and ceased filing their own reports. Similarly, on January 1, 1986, Spain joined the EC/U, became covered by the EC/U's antidumping law, and ceased filing its own reports.
- c. Numbers for the United States for the Jan-June 1982 and Jan-June 1985 reporting periods are sensitive to the breakdown by product of a sizable number of cases against steel imports. The GATT/WTO reports and USDOC data used for this paper use broad categories such as "certain carbon steel products," resulting in a smaller number of tabulated cases than would result if separate cases were listed for each of the various carbon steel products. A listing given to CBO several years ago by a former Commerce Department official had significantly larger numbers of cases for those reporting periods: 43 instead of 16 for Jan-June 1982 and 57 instead of 43 for Jan-June 1985. Most of the differences appear to result from use of narrower product categories for the steel cases.
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TABLE B-8b. ANTIDUMPING CASES INITIATED AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN NORTH AMERICA AND THE WEST INDIES

	Barbados	Costa Rica	Cuba	Dominica	Dominican Republic	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Jamaica	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Saint Lucia
1979 Jul-Dec														
1980 Jan-Jun														
1980 Jul-Dec														
1981 Jan-Jun														
1981 Jul-Dec														
1982 Jan-Jun														
1982 Jul-Dec														
1983 Jan-Jun														
1983 Jul-Dec														
1984 Jan-Jun														
1984 Jul-Dec														
1985 Jan-Jun														
1985 Jul-Dec														
1986 Jan-Jun														
1986 Jul-Dec														
1987 Jan-Jun														
1987 Jul-Dec										17				
1988 Jan-Jun										3				
1988 Jul-Dec										15				
1989 Jan-Jun										3				
1989 Jul-Dec										5				
1990 Jan-Jun										3				
1990 Jul-Dec										7				
1991 Jan-Jun										4				
1991 Jul-Dec										5				
1992 Jan-Jun										20				
1992 Jul-Dec										6				
1993 Jan-Jun										20				
1993 Jul-Dec										32				
1994 Jan-Jun										5				
1994 Jul-Dec		0	0		0	0	0	0	0	21	0			0
1995 Jan-Jun	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	1	0 *			0
1995 Jul-Dec	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	3	0			0
1996 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	0	0	0 *	1	0	0	3	0			
1996 Jul-Dec	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0			
1997 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	0	0	0 *	0	0	0	4	0	0		
1997 Jul-Dec	0	0	0	0	0	0 *	0	0	0	2	1	0		
1998 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 *	7	0	0	0	
1998 Jul-Dec		0	0		0	0	0	0	0 *	4	2	2		
1999 Jan-Jun		0	0		0	0	0	0	0 *	8	0	0		
1999 Jul-Dec		0	0			0	0		0	4		0		

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

* Failure of the country to file a report for this period and one or more subsequent periods makes it possible that the true number of initiations for this period is higher than the number given here, but in CBO's judgment, the probability of an uncounted initiation is low.

TABLE B-8c. ANTIDUMPING CASES INITIATED AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN SOUTH AMERICA

	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Ecuador	Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Trinidad & Tobago	Uruguay	Venezuela
1979 Jul-Dec													
1980 Jan-Jun													
1980 Jul-Dec			0										
1981 Jan-Jun			0										
1981 Jul-Dec			0										
1982 Jan-Jun			0										
1982 Jul-Dec			0										
1983 Jan-Jun			0										
1983 Jul-Dec			0										
1984 Jan-Jun			0										
1984 Jul-Dec			0										
1985 Jan-Jun			0										
1985 Jul-Dec			0										
1986 Jan-Jun			0										
1986 Jul-Dec			0										
1987 Jan-Jun			0										
1987 Jul-Dec			0										
1988 Jan-Jun			1										
1988 Jul-Dec			0										
1989 Jan-Jun			3										
1989 Jul-Dec			0										
1990 Jan-Jun			0										
1990 Jul-Dec			2										
1991 Jan-Jun			0										
1991 Jul-Dec			7										
1992 Jan-Jun			4		0								
1992 Jul-Dec			5		3 *								
1993 Jan-Jun			5		3								
1993 Jul-Dec			29		3								
1994 Jan-Jun			2		1								
1994 Jul-Dec	7		8	1	1				0	3	0	0	0
1995 Jan-Jun	0	0	5	1	0				0	1	0 *	0	1
1995 Jul-Dec	27	0	0	3	4				0	1	0	0	2
1996 Jan-Jun	13	0	1	1	1	1	0		0	4	0	0	2
1996 Jul-Dec	10	0	16	2	0	3	0		0	2	1	0	0
1997 Jan-Jun	9	0	4	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1997 Jul-Dec	6	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	4
1998 Jan-Jun	2	0	6	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	3
1998 Jul-Dec	4	0	10	0	6	1	0 *	0	0	0	3	0	7
1999 Jan-Jun	10	0	0	0	2	0	0 *	0		4	3	0	7
1999 Jul-Dec	10		15	0	0	0	1	0		3	0	0	0

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

* Failure of the country to file a report for this period and one or more subsequent periods makes it possible that the true number of initiations for this period is higher than the number given here, but in CBO's judgment, the probability of an uncounted initiation is low.

TABLE B-8d. ANTIDUMPING CASES INITIATED AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN ASIA AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC

	Bahrain	Brunei Darussalam	Fiji	Hong Kong	India	Indonesia	Israel	Kuwait	Kyrgyz Republic	Macao	Malaysia	Mongolia	Myanmar	Pakistan	Philippines	Qatar	Singapore	South Korea	Sri Lanka	Thailand	United Arab Emirates	
1979 Jul-Dec																						
1980 Jan-Jun				0																		
1980 Jul-Dec				0	0																	
1981 Jan-Jun				0	0																	
1981 Jul-Dec				0	0									0								
1982 Jan-Jun				0	0									0								
1982 Jul-Dec				0	0									0								
1983 Jan-Jun				0	0									0								
1983 Jul-Dec				0	0									0								
1984 Jan-Jun				0	0									0								
1984 Jul-Dec				0	0									0			0					
1985 Jan-Jun				0	0									0			0					
1985 Jul-Dec				0	0									0			0					
1986 Jan-Jun				0	0									0			0	3				
1986 Jul-Dec				0	0									0			0	0				
1987 Jan-Jun				0	0									0			0	1				
1987 Jul-Dec				0	0									0			0	0				
1988 Jan-Jun				0	0									0			0	0				
1988 Jul-Dec				0	0									0			0	0				
1989 Jan-Jun				0	0									0			0	1				
1989 Jul-Dec				0	0									0			0	0				
1990 Jan-Jun				0	0									0			0	3				
1990 Jul-Dec				0	0									0			0	2				
1991 Jan-Jun				0	0									0			0	0				
1991 Jul-Dec				0	0									0			0	0				
1992 Jan-Jun				0	5									0			0	0				
1992 Jul-Dec				0	3									0			0	5				
1993 Jan-Jun				0	0									0			0	2				
1993 Jul-Dec				0	0									0			0	4				
1994 Jan-Jun				0	1									0			0	4				
1994 Jul-Dec		0		0	6	0	1				0		0	6			2	0	0	0		
1995 Jan-Jun		0		0	4	0	2	0			3			0	0		0	3	0	0		
1995 Jul-Dec		0		0	2	0	3				0			0	0		0	1	0	0	0	
1996 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	0	3	1	2	0			0			0	0	0	5	0	1	0	0	
1996 Jul-Dec	0	0	0	0	18	8	5			0	2			0	1	0	0	8	0	0	0	
1997 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	0	2	1	2				0	0		0	2	0	0	10	0	2	0	*
1997 Jul-Dec	0	0	0	0	11	3	1	0			8	0		0	0	0	0	5	0	1	0	
1998 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	0	25	8	4				0			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1998 Jul-Dec	0	0	0	0	5	0	3				1			0	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	
1999 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	0	35	0	0		0	0	1			0	2	0	0	2	0		0	
1999 Jul-Dec	0	0		0	27	9	0		0	0	1			0	4	0	0	4	0			

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

* Failure of the country to file a report for this period and one or more subsequent periods makes it possible that the true number of initiations for this period is higher than the number given here, but in CBO's judgment, the probability of an uncounted initiation is low.

TABLE B-8e. ANTIDUMPING CASES INITIATED AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN EUROPE

	Bulgaria	Cyprus	Czechoslovakia	Czech Republic	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Malta	Poland	Romania	Slovak Republic	Slovenia	Turkey	Yugoslavia
1979 Jul-Dec			0			0								
1980 Jan-Jun			0			0								
1980 Jul-Dec			0			0								0
1981 Jan-Jun			0			0			0	0				0
1981 Jul-Dec			0			0			0	0				0
1982 Jan-Jun			0			0			0	0				0
1982 Jul-Dec			0			0			0	0				0
1983 Jan-Jun			0			0			0	0				0
1983 Jul-Dec			0			0			0	0				0
1984 Jan-Jun			0			0			0	0				0
1984 Jul-Dec			0			0			0	0				0
1985 Jan-Jun			0			0			0	0				0
1985 Jul-Dec			0			0			0	0				0
1986 Jan-Jun			0			0			0	0				0
1986 Jul-Dec			0			0			0	0				0
1987 Jan-Jun			0 *			0			0	0				0
1987 Jul-Dec			0			0			0	0				0
1988 Jan-Jun			0 *			0			0	0				0
1988 Jul-Dec			0			0			0	0				0
1989 Jan-Jun			0 *			0			0	0				0
1989 Jul-Dec			0 *			0			0	0				0
1990 Jan-Jun			0 *			0			0	0				0
1990 Jul-Dec			0 *			0			0	0				0
1991 Jan-Jun			0 *			0			24	0				0
1991 Jul-Dec			0 *			0			0	0				0
1992 Jan-Jun			0			0			0	0				0
1992 Jul-Dec			0			0			0	0				0
1993 Jan-Jun			b	0		0			0	0	0			a
1993 Jul-Dec			b	0		0			0	0	0			a
1994 Jan-Jun			b	0		0			0	0	0		19	a
1994 Jul-Dec			b	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	2	a
1995 Jan-Jun		0	b	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	a
1995 Jul-Dec		0	b	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	a
1996 Jan-Jun		0	b	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	a
1996 Jul-Dec	0	0	b	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	a
1997 Jan-Jun	0	0	b	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	5	a
1997 Jul-Dec	0	0	b	0		0		0	1	0	0	0	0	a
1998 Jan-Jun	0	0	b	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	a
1998 Jul-Dec	0	0	b	2		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	a
1999 Jan-Jun	0	0	b	0		0	0	0	3	0	0	1	6	a
1999 Jul-Dec	0		b	1	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	a

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

* Failure of the country to file a report for this period and one or more subsequent periods makes it possible that the true number of initiations for this period is higher than the number given here, but in CBO's judgment, the probability of an uncounted initiation is low.

a. Yugoslavia ceased filing reports when it broke into several countries. One of its former constituent republics, Slovenia, began filing reports with the 1994 July-December reporting period. None of the other former constituent republics have filed any reports.

b. Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, which began reporting separately with the Jan-June 1993 reporting period.

TABLE B-8f. ANTIDUMPING CASES INITIATED AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN AFRICA

	Benin	Burkina Faso	Egypt	Gambia	Ghana	Madagascar	Mauritius	Morocco	Namibia	Rwanda	Senegal	South Africa	Swaziland	Tanzania	Tunisia	Uganda	Zambia	Zimbabwe
1979 Jul-Dec																		
1980 Jan-Jun																		
1980 Jul-Dec																		
1981 Jan-Jun																		
1981 Jul-Dec																		
1982 Jan-Jun																		
1982 Jul-Dec			0															
1983 Jan-Jun			0															
1983 Jul-Dec			0															
1984 Jan-Jun			0															
1984 Jul-Dec			0															
1985 Jan-Jun			0															
1985 Jul-Dec			0															
1986 Jan-Jun			0															
1986 Jul-Dec			0															
1987 Jan-Jun			0															
1987 Jul-Dec			0															
1988 Jan-Jun			0															
1988 Jul-Dec			0															
1989 Jan-Jun			0															
1989 Jul-Dec			0															
1990 Jan-Jun			0															
1990 Jul-Dec			0															
1991 Jan-Jun			0															
1991 Jul-Dec			0															
1992 Jan-Jun			0															
1992 Jul-Dec			0															
1993 Jan-Jun			0															
1993 Jul-Dec			0															
1994 Jan-Jun			0															
1994 Jul-Dec			0		0		0	0				15		0			0	0
1995 Jan-Jun			0				0	0	0		0	4		0	0		0	0
1995 Jul-Dec			0				0	0	0		0	16	0		0		0	0
1996 Jan-Jun	0		0				0	0	0		0	23			0	0	0	0
1996 Jul-Dec	0	0	0				0	0	0			11		0	0	0	0	0
1997 Jan-Jun	0	0	2				0	0	0			15			0	0	0	0
1997 Jul-Dec	0	0	3				0	0	0			8			0	0	0	0
1998 Jan-Jun	0	0	0					0	0	0		18			0		0	0
1998 Jul-Dec		0	12	0	0	0		0	0	0		24			0		0	0
1999 Jan-Jun		0	1					0	0			7			0			0
1999 Jul-Dec			0					0				9			0			0

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

TABLE B-9a. NEW ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

	North America		Asia and South Pacific					Europe							
	United States	Canada	Australia	Australia--Adjusted ^c	New Zealand	New Zealand--Adjusted ^c	Japan	EC/U	EC/U--Adjusted ^d	Iceland	Liechtenstein	Norway	Spain--Adjusted ^d	Sweden	Switzerland
1979 Jul-Dec	4												0		
1980 Jan-Jun	4	7					0	16	12			0	0	0	0
1980 Jul-Dec	1	4					0	6	4			0	0	0	0
1981 Jan-Jun	3	10					0	7	7			0	0	0	0
1981 Jul-Dec	1	4					0	4	4			0	0	0	0
1982 Jan-Jun	3	13					0	14	14			0	0	0	0
1982 Jul-Dec	4	7	23	22			0	17	15			0	0	0	0
1983 Jan-Jun	5	23	34	32			0	17	15			0	0	0	0
1983 Jul-Dec	8	17	18	15			0	14	14			0	0	0	0
1984 Jan-Jun	12	16	22	21			0	7	6			0	0	0	0
1984 Jul-Dec	10	4	14	14			0	14	11			0	0	0	0
1985 Jan-Jun	5	13	4	4			0	11	9			0	0	0	0
1985 Jul-Dec	7	15	20	19			0	6	4			0	0	0	0
1986 Jan-Jun	18	13	5	4			0	7	6			0	b	0	0
1986 Jul-Dec	10	7	4	4			0	16	15			0	b	0	0
1987 Jan-Jun	22	3	0	0			0	3	3			0	b	0	0
1987 Jul-Dec	28 a	11	4	4			0	6	6			0	b	0	0
1988 Jan-Jun	8	11	3	2	3	1	0	7	7			0 *	b	0	0 *
1988 Jul-Dec	5	1	9	9	3	3	0	16	16			0	b	0	0
1989 Jan-Jun	18	2	6	6	3	3	0 *	16	15			0 *	b	0	0 *
1989 Jul-Dec	5	3	4	4	1	1	0 *	33	33			0	b	0	0
1990 Jan-Jun	2	6	0	0	0	0	0 *	20	17			0	b	2	0
1990 Jul-Dec	12	1	5	5	0	0	0	9	9			0	b	0	0
1991 Jan-Jun	11	4	1	1	0	0	0 *	11	11			0	b	0	0
1991 Jul-Dec	9	8	20	20	5	5	0	12	12			0	b	0	0
1992 Jan-Jun	5	3	15	15	2	2	0	8	8			0	b	0	0
1992 Jul-Dec	18	5	21	21	9	9	0	10	10			0	b	0	0
1993 Jan-Jun	16	9	7	7	0	0	1	7	7			0	b	0	0
1993 Jul-Dec	25	7	5	5	0	0	0	11	11			0	b	0	0
1994 Jan-Jun	9	8	11	11	0	0	0	10	10			0	b	1	0
1994 Jul-Dec	9	13	3	3	0	0	0	9	9	0		0	b	0	0
1995 Jan-Jun	11	1	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	0	0	0	b	b	0
1995 Jul-Dec	14	6	1	1	3	3	1	7	7	0	0	0	b	b	0
1996 Jan-Jun	6	0	0	0	1	1	0	18	18	0	0	0	b	b	0
1996 Jul-Dec	6	0	1	1	3	3	0	5	5	0	0	0	b	b	0
1997 Jan-Jun	6	3	1	1	0	0	0	6	6	0	0	0	b	b	0
1997 Jul-Dec	9	4	0	0	0	0	0	17	17	0	0	0	b	b	0
1998 Jan-Jun	1	1	3	3	1	1	0	19	19	0	0	0	b	b	0
1998 Jul-Dec	8	9	6	6	0	0	0	15	15	0	0	0	b	b	0
1999 Jan-Jun	11	2	5	5	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	b	b	0
1999 Jul-Dec	10	8	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	0	0	0	b	b	0

(Continued)

TABLE B-9a. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * Failure of the country to file a report for this period and one or more prior periods makes it possible that the true number of new measures for this period is higher than the number given here, but in CBO's judgment, the probability of an uncounted new measure is low.
 - a. Fifteen of these are orders against the same product from the various Soviet republics.
 - b. On January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EC/U, became covered by the EC/U's antidumping law, and ceased filing their own reports. Similarly, on January 1, 1986, Spain joined the EC/U, became covered by the EC/U's antidumping law, and ceased filing its own reports.
 - c. During the period covered by the reports, Australia and New Zealand replaced anti-dumping policy on trade between them with competition policy and terminated the active measures against each other. To give a better indication of the countries' antidumping policies toward the rest of the world, "Australia--Adjusted" and "New Zealand--Adjusted" exclude Australia's measures against New Zealand and New Zealand's measures against Australia.
 - d. On January 1, 1994, the European Economic Area (EEA) was established. The EEA was composed of the European Union (EU) and the members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), excluding Switzerland. (The members of the EFTA are Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.) Four days later, all active EU antidumping measures against the EFTA members (excluding Switzerland) were suspended. Similarly, on January 1, 1986, Spain and Portugal joined the European Community (EC), at which point all active EC measures against them were terminated. To give a better measure of the EC/U's antidumping policy toward the rest of the world, "EC/U--Adjusted" excludes all measures against those countries. Similar adjustment of the data for Spain eliminates a measure against EC/U-member Italy, which is Spain's only measure. Sweden had no measures against EC/U members during any of the periods covered by its reports, so the statistics are the same for "Sweden" and "Sweden--Adjusted" and there is no need to list the latter separately.
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TABLE B-9b. NEW ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN NORTH AMERICA AND THE WEST INDIES

	Barbados	Costa Rica	Cuba	Dominica	Dominican Republic	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Jamaica	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama
1979 Jul-Dec												
1980 Jan-Jun												
1980 Jul-Dec												
1981 Jan-Jun												
1981 Jul-Dec												
1982 Jan-Jun												
1982 Jul-Dec												
1983 Jan-Jun												
1983 Jul-Dec												
1984 Jan-Jun												
1984 Jul-Dec												
1985 Jan-Jun												
1985 Jul-Dec												
1986 Jan-Jun												
1986 Jul-Dec												
1987 Jan-Jun												
1987 Jul-Dec												
1988 Jan-Jun										2		
1988 Jul-Dec										2		
1989 Jan-Jun										2		
1989 Jul-Dec										4		
1990 Jan-Jun										0		
1990 Jul-Dec										3		
1991 Jan-Jun										4		
1991 Jul-Dec										7		
1992 Jan-Jun										5		
1992 Jul-Dec										5		
1993 Jan-Jun										4		
1993 Jul-Dec										4		
1994 Jan-Jun										2		
1994 Jul-Dec		0	0		0	0	0	0	0	20	0	
1995 Jan-Jun	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	1		
1995 Jul-Dec	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	17		
1996 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	
1996 Jul-Dec	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
1997 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	0	0		1	0	0	3	0	0
1997 Jul-Dec	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	4	0	0
1998 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
1998 Jul-Dec	0	0	0	0	0		0	0		3	0	0
1999 Jan-Jun		0	0		0	0	0	0		4	0	0
1999 Jul-Dec		0	0		0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

TABLE B-9c. NEW ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN SOUTH AMERICA

	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Ecuador	Paraguay	Peru	Trinidad and Tobago	Uruguay	Venezuela
1979 Jul-Dec											
1980 Jan-Jun											
1980 Jul-Dec			0								
1981 Jan-Jun			0								
1981 Jul-Dec			0								
1982 Jan-Jun			0								
1982 Jul-Dec			0								
1983 Jan-Jun			0								
1983 Jul-Dec			0								
1984 Jan-Jun			0								
1984 Jul-Dec			0								
1985 Jan-Jun			0								
1985 Jul-Dec			0								
1986 Jan-Jun			0								
1986 Jul-Dec			0								
1987 Jan-Jun			0								
1987 Jul-Dec			0								
1988 Jan-Jun			0								
1988 Jul-Dec			0								
1989 Jan-Jun			4								
1989 Jul-Dec			0								
1990 Jan-Jun			0								
1990 Jul-Dec			0								
1991 Jan-Jun			2								
1991 Jul-Dec			0								
1992 Jan-Jun			2		1						
1992 Jul-Dec			7		1 *						
1993 Jan-Jun			2		0 *						
1993 Jul-Dec			4		1						
1994 Jan-Jun			3		1						
1994 Jul-Dec	1		0	1	1		0	0	0	0	0
1995 Jan-Jun	9	0	0	2	1			0		0	2
1995 Jul-Dec	11	0	3	0	0		0	2		0	0
1996 Jan-Jun	10	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1996 Jul-Dec	5	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
1997 Jan-Jun	11	0	1	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
1997 Jul-Dec	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
1998 Jan-Jun	6	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
1998 Jul-Dec	7	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
1999 Jan-Jun	5	0	0	0	4		0	1	0	0	5
1999 Jul-Dec	4		5	0	2	0		2	2	0	3

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

* Failure of the country to file a report for this period and one or more prior periods makes it possible that the true number of new measures for this period is higher than the number given here, but in CBO's judgment, the probability of an uncounted new measure is low.

TABLE B-9d. NEW ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN ASIA AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC

	Bahrain	Brunei Darussalam	Fiji	Hong Kong	India	Indonesia	Israel	Macao	Malaysia	Pakistan	Qatar	Singapore	South Korea	Sri Lanka	Thailand	United Arab Emirates
1979 Jul-Dec																
1980 Jan-Jun				0												
1980 Jul-Dec				0	0											
1981 Jan-Jun				0	0											
1981 Jul-Dec				0	0 *					0						
1982 Jan-Jun				0	0					0	*					
1982 Jul-Dec				0	0					0	*					
1983 Jan-Jun				0	0					0						
1983 Jul-Dec				0	0					0						
1984 Jan-Jun				0	0					0						
1984 Jul-Dec				0	0					0		0				
1985 Jan-Jun				0	0					0		0				
1985 Jul-Dec				0	0					0		0				
1986 Jan-Jun				0	0					0		0	0			
1986 Jul-Dec				0	0					0		0	2			
1987 Jan-Jun				0	0					0		0	0			
1987 Jul-Dec				0	0					0		0	0			
1988 Jan-Jun				0	0					0	*	0	0			
1988 Jul-Dec				0	0					0		0	0			
1989 Jan-Jun				0 *	0 *					0 *		0 *	0			
1989 Jul-Dec				0	0					0		0	1			
1990 Jan-Jun				0	0 *					0 *		0	0			
1990 Jul-Dec				0	0					0		0	0			
1991 Jan-Jun				0	0					0		0	0			
1991 Jul-Dec				0	0					0		0	2			
1992 Jan-Jun				0	0					0		0	0			
1992 Jul-Dec				0	0					0		0	0			
1993 Jan-Jun				0	0					0		0	2 *			
1993 Jul-Dec				0	0					0		0	2			
1994 Jan-Jun				0	5					0		0	1			
1994 Jul-Dec		0		0	0	0	0		0	0		0	2	0	1	
1995 Jan-Jun		0		0	0	0	0		0	0		0	0	0	0	
1995 Jul-Dec		0		0	7		0		0	0		2	0	0	0	0
1996 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1996 Jul-Dec	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0
1997 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	6	0	1	0
1997 Jul-Dec	0	0	0	0	5	4 **	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0
1998 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	0	11	2 **	2	0	4	0	0	0	3	0	2	0
1998 Jul-Dec	0	0	0	0	11	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0
1999 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	0	16	8 **	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1999 Jul-Dec	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0		

(Continued)

TABLE B-9d. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * Failure of the country to file a report for this period and one or more prior periods makes it possible that the true number of new measures for this period is higher than the number given here, but in CBO's judgment, the probability of an uncounted new measure is low.

 - ** The failure of Indonesia to file any lists of active measures for any reporting period makes it impossible to confirm that all of the reported new measures counted here, which are tallied from the case data reports, actually occurred. For many countries, a significant portion of the new measures reported on the case data reports did not actually occur--a fact that can be determined only by examining whether the measures show up on subsequent lists of active measures. There is no way to know whether the same is true for Indonesia.
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TABLE B-9e. NEW ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN EUROPE

	Bulgaria	Cyprus	Czechoslovakia	Czech Republic	Hungary	Malta	Poland	Romania	Slovak Republic	Slovenia	Turkey	Yugoslavia
1979 Jul-Dec			0		0							
1980 Jan-Jun			0		0							
1980 Jul-Dec			0		0			0				0
1981 Jan-Jun			0		0		0					0
1981 Jul-Dec			0		0		0					0
1982 Jan-Jun			0		0		0					0
1982 Jul-Dec			0		0		0					0
1983 Jan-Jun			0		0		0					0
1983 Jul-Dec			0		0		0					0
1984 Jan-Jun			0		0		0					0
1984 Jul-Dec			0		0		0					0
1985 Jan-Jun			0		0		0					0
1985 Jul-Dec			0		0		0					0
1986 Jan-Jun			0		0		0					0
1986 Jul-Dec			0		0		0					0
1987 Jan-Jun			0		0		0					0
1987 Jul-Dec			0		0		0					0
1988 Jan-Jun			0 *		0		0	0 *				0
1988 Jul-Dec			0		0		0	0				0
1989 Jan-Jun			0 *		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1989 Jul-Dec			0 *		0		0	0				0
1990 Jan-Jun			0 *		0		0 *	0				0
1990 Jul-Dec			0 *		0		0	0				0
1991 Jan-Jun			0 *		0		0	0				0
1991 Jul-Dec			0 *		0		0	0				0
1992 Jan-Jun			0		0		0	0				0
1992 Jul-Dec			0		0		0	0				0
1993 Jan-Jun			a	0	0		0	0	0			b
1993 Jul-Dec			a	0	0		0	0	0			b
1994 Jan-Jun			a	0	0		0	0 *			2	b
1994 Jul-Dec			a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	b
1995 Jan-Jun		0	a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	b
1995 Jul-Dec		0	a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	b
1996 Jan-Jun		0	a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	b
1996 Jul-Dec	0	0	a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	b
1997 Jan-Jun	0	0	a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	b
1997 Jul-Dec	0	0	a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	b
1998 Jan-Jun	0	0	a	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	b
1998 Jul-Dec	0	0	a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	b
1999 Jan-Jun	0	0	a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	b
1999 Jul-Dec	0	0	a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	b

(Continued)

TABLE B-9e. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * Failure of the country to file a report for this period and one or more prior periods makes it possible that the true number of new measures for this period is higher than the number given here, but in CBO's judgment, the probability of an uncounted new measure is low.
 - a. Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, which began reporting separately with the Jan-June 1993 reporting period.
 - b. Yugoslavia ceased filing reports when it broke into several countries. One of its former constituent republics, Slovenia, began filing reports with the July-Dec 1994 reporting period. None of the other former constituent republics have filed any reports.
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TABLE B-9f. NEW ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN AFRICA

	Egypt	Morocco	Namibia	South Africa	Tunisia	Zambia	Zimbabwe
1979 Jul-Dec							
1980 Jan-Jun							
1980 Jul-Dec							
1981 Jan-Jun							
1981 Jul-Dec							
1982 Jan-Jun							
1982 Jul-Dec	0						
1983 Jan-Jun	0						
1983 Jul-Dec	0						
1984 Jan-Jun	0						
1984 Jul-Dec	0						
1985 Jan-Jun	0						
1985 Jul-Dec	0						
1986 Jan-Jun	0						
1986 Jul-Dec	0						
1987 Jan-Jun	0 *						
1987 Jul-Dec	0						
1988 Jan-Jun	0 *						
1988 Jul-Dec	0 *						
1989 Jan-Jun	0 *						
1989 Jul-Dec	0						
1990 Jan-Jun	0 *						
1990 Jul-Dec	0 *						
1991 Jan-Jun	0						
1991 Jul-Dec	0						
1992 Jan-Jun	0						
1992 Jul-Dec	0						
1993 Jan-Jun	0						
1993 Jul-Dec	0						
1994 Jan-Jun	0						
1994 Jul-Dec	0	0		4		0	0
1995 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 *
1995 Jul-Dec	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1996 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	0	0 *	0	0
1996 Jul-Dec	0	0	0	9	0	0	0
1997 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	13	0	0	0
1997 Jul-Dec	0	0	0	6	0	0	0
1998 Jan-Jun	5	0	0	6	0	0	0
1998 Jul-Dec	0	0	0	4	0	0	0
1999 Jan-Jun	0	0	0	22	0	0	0
1999 Jul-Dec	13	0	0	15	0		0

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

* Failure of the country to file a report for this period and one or more prior periods makes it possible that the true number of new measures for this period is higher than the number given here, but in CBO's judgment, the probability of an uncounted new measure is low.

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TABLE B-10a. TERMINATIONS OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES BY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

	North America		Asia and South Pacific					Europe							
	United States	Canada	Australia	Australia--Adjusted	New Zealand	New Zealand--Adjusted	Japan	EC/U ^a	EC/U--Adjusted ^a	Iceland	Liechtenstein	Norway	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland
1979 Jul-Dec													0 *		
1980 Jan-Jun	1						0 *	0	0			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *
1980 Jul-Dec	3	3					0 *	0	0			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *
1981 Jan-Jun	6	1					0 *	0	0			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *
1981 Jul-Dec	2	4					0 *	0	0			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *
1982 Jan-Jun	1	1					0 *	0	0			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *
1982 Jul-Dec	0	13	1	0			0 *	2	2			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *
1983 Jan-Jun	0	0	3	3			0 *	2	2			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *
1983 Jul-Dec	2	3	5	5			0 *	0	0			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *
1984 Jan-Jun	4	5	12	12			0 *	1	1			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *
1984 Jul-Dec	4	8	12	8			0 *	0	0			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *
1985 Jan-Jun	4	4	5	5			0 *	0	0			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *
1985 Jul-Dec	12	17	16	16			0 *	19	15			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *
1986 Jan-Jun	3	6	31	30			0 *	22	7			0 *	b	0 *	0 *
1986 Jul-Dec	4	8	37	36			0 *	6	6			0 *	b	0 *	0 *
1987 Jan-Jun	1	5	28	27			0 *	9	8			0 **	b	0 *	0 **
1987 Jul-Dec	8	13	24	23			0 *	13	13			0 *	b	0 *	0 **
1988 Jan-Jun	0	4	41	38	1 *	0 *	0 **	14	12			0 **	b	0 **	0 **
1988 Jul-Dec	0	18	26	26	4 *	0 *	0 *	13	12			0 *	b	0 *	0 *
1989 Jan-Jun	1	0	13	12	0	0	0 **	14	13			0 **	b	0 *	0 **
1989 Jul-Dec	4	14	2	2	0	0	0 **	5	4			0 *	b	0	0 *
1990 Jan-Jun	4	24	4	4	0	0	0 **	15	14			0 *	b	2	0 *
1990 Jul-Dec	6	39	5	4	0	0	0 *	13	12			0 *	b	0	0 *
1991 Jan-Jun	7	13	1	1	0	0	0 **	9	9			0 *	b	0	0 *
1991 Jul-Dec	1	9	7	7	0	0	0 *	12	12			0 *	b	0	0 *
1992 Jan-Jun	1	2	5	5	0	0	0 *	8	8			0 *	b	0	0 *
1992 Jul-Dec	0	3	3	3	0	0	0 *	2	2			0 *	b	0	0 **
1993 Jan-Jun	3	3	2	2	0	0	0	15	14			0 *	b	0	0 *
1993 Jul-Dec	2	9	3	3	1	1	0	10	10			0 *	b	0	0 *
1994 Jan-Jun	5	9	2	2	0	0	0	24	16			0 *	b	1	0 *
1994 Jul-Dec	22 c	2	5	5	2	2	0	5	5	0 *		0 *	b	0	0 *
1995 Jan-Jun	3	5	0	0	0	0	0	10	10	0 *	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
1995 Jul-Dec	8	2	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	0 *	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
1996 Jan-Jun	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	7	7	0 *	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
1996 Jul-Dec	3	0	12	12	2	2	0	13	13	0 *	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
1997 Jan-Jun	3	4	19	19	1	1	0	12	12	0 *	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
1997 Jul-Dec	0	8	10	10	0	0	0	14	14	0 *	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
1998 Jan-Jun	1	17	3	3	0	0	1	16	16	0 *	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
1998 Jul-Dec	4	7	4	4	6	6	0	7	7	0 *	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
1999 Jan-Jun	1	2	5	5	0	0	0	5	5	0 *	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
1999 Jul-Dec	12	6	1	1	0	0	0	6	6	0 *	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
January 1, 2000	59 d														

(Continued)

TABLE B-10a. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTES: During the period covered by the reports, Australia and New Zealand replaced antidumping policy on trade between them with competition policy and terminated the active measures against each other. To give a better indication of the countries' antidumping policies toward the rest of the world, "Australia--Adjusted" and "New Zealand--Adjusted" exclude Australia's measures against New Zealand and New Zealand's measures against Australia.

On January 1, 1994, the European Economic Area (EEA) was established. The EEA was composed of the European Union (EU) and the members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) excluding Switzerland. (The members of EFTA are Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.) Four days later, all active EU antidumping measures against the EFTA members (excluding Switzerland) were suspended. Similarly, on January 1, 1986, Spain and Portugal joined the European Community (EC), at which point all active EC measures against them were terminated. To give a better measure of the EC/U's antidumping policy toward the rest of the world, "EC/U--Adjusted" excludes all measures against those countries. Similar adjustment of the data for Spain eliminates a measure against EC/U-member Italy, which is Spain's only measure. Sweden had no measures against EC/U members during any of the periods covered by its reports, so the statistics are the same for "Sweden" and "Sweden--Adjusted" and there is no need to list the latter separately.

- * The country in question has reported no lists of active measures for dates earlier than this date. Such lists are necessary for complete reliability of the number, because other sources of termination data in reports are often sporadic and unreliable. For countries that show a long string of no terminations over time, however, it is unlikely the numbers are in error.
 - ** Same as for "*" plus the country failed to file a case data report for this period, raising further the probability one or more terminations could have occurred in the period(s) that is (are) not counted here. CBO nevertheless judges the likelihood of such uncounted terminations to be low.
 - a. See note "a" in Table B-11a, "Active Antidumping Measures Against All Other Countries by Various Industrialized Countries."
 - b. On January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EC/U, became covered by the EC/U's antidumping law, and ceased filing their own reports. Similarly, on January 1, 1986, Spain joined the EC/U, became covered by the EC/U's antidumping law, and ceased filing its own reports.
 - c. Eleven of these are orders against the same product from the various former Soviet republics.
 - d. The data set from the Department of Commerce's Web site, from which this number is ultimately obtained, listed more terminations than indicated here. However, a number of those terminations conflicted with what the Department of Commerce stated in its reports to the WTO, which are the primary source of data on which this report is based. Those conflicting terminations are not counted here.
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TABLE B-10b. TERMINATIONS OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN NORTH AMERICA AND THE WEST INDIES

	Barbados	Costa Rica	Cuba	Dominica	Dominican Republic	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Jamaica	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama
1979 Jul-Dec												
1980 Jan-Jun												
1980 Jul-Dec												
1981 Jan-Jun												
1981 Jul-Dec												
1982 Jan-Jun												
1982 Jul-Dec												
1983 Jan-Jun												
1983 Jul-Dec												
1984 Jan-Jun												
1984 Jul-Dec												
1985 Jan-Jun												
1985 Jul-Dec												
1986 Jan-Jun												
1986 Jul-Dec												
1987 Jan-Jun												
1987 Jul-Dec										0 *		
1988 Jan-Jun										0 *		
1988 Jul-Dec										0 *		
1989 Jan-Jun										0 *		
1989 Jul-Dec										0 *		
1990 Jan-Jun										1 *		
1990 Jul-Dec										4 *		
1991 Jan-Jun										2 *		
1991 Jul-Dec										0 *		
1992 Jan-Jun										0		
1992 Jul-Dec										5		
1993 Jan-Jun										2		
1993 Jul-Dec										0		
1994 Jan-Jun										2		
1994 Jul-Dec		0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0	0 *	
1995 Jan-Jun	0	0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0		
1995 Jul-Dec	0	0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0		
1996 Jan-Jun	0	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 **	0 *	0 *	0	0	0 *	
1996 Jul-Dec	0	0	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0	0 *	
1997 Jan-Jun	0	0	0 *	0	0 *	0 **	0 *	0 *	0	0	0 *	0 *
1997 Jul-Dec	0	0	0 *	0	0 *	0 **	0 *	0 *	0	6	0 *	0 *
1998 Jan-Jun	0	0	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0	0 *		2	0 *	0 *
1998 Jul-Dec		0	0 *		0 *	0 **	0	0 *		3	0 *	0 *
1999 Jan-Jun		0	0 *		0 *	0 *	0	0 *		1	0 *	0 *
1999 Jul-Dec		0	0 *		0 *	0 *	0		0	6		0 *

(Continued)

TABLE B-10b. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * The country in question has reported no lists of active measures for dates earlier than this date. Such lists are necessary for complete reliability of the number, because other sources of termination data in reports are often sporadic and unreliable. For countries that show a long string of no terminations over time, however, it is unlikely the numbers are in error.
 - ** Same as for "*" plus the country failed to file a case data report for this period, raising further the probability one or more terminations could have occurred in the period(s) that is (are) not counted here. CBO nevertheless judges the likelihood of such uncounted terminations to be low.
-

TABLE B-10c. TERMINATIONS OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN SOUTH AMERICA

	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Ecuador	Paraguay	Peru	Trinidad and Tobago	Uruguay	Venezuela
1979 Jul-Dec											
1980 Jan-Jun											
1980 Jul-Dec			0 *								
1981 Jan-Jun			0 *								
1981 Jul-Dec			0 *								
1982 Jan-Jun			0 *								
1982 Jul-Dec			0 *								
1983 Jan-Jun			0 *								
1983 Jul-Dec			0 *								
1984 Jan-Jun			0 *								
1984 Jul-Dec			0 *								
1985 Jan-Jun			0 *								
1985 Jul-Dec			0 *								
1986 Jan-Jun			0 *								
1986 Jul-Dec			0 *								
1987 Jan-Jun			0 *								
1987 Jul-Dec			0 *								
1988 Jan-Jun			0 *								
1988 Jul-Dec			0 *								
1989 Jan-Jun			0 *								
1989 Jul-Dec			0 **								
1990 Jan-Jun			0 *								
1990 Jul-Dec			0 *								
1991 Jan-Jun			0 **								
1991 Jul-Dec			0 *								
1992 Jan-Jun			0 *								
1992 Jul-Dec			0 *								
1993 Jan-Jun			0 *								
1993 Jul-Dec			0								
1994 Jan-Jun			4		0						
1994 Jul-Dec			0		0		0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *
1995 Jan-Jun	2	0 *	0	1	0		0 **	0 *	0 **	0 *	0 *
1995 Jul-Dec	1	0 *	0	0	0		0 *	0	0 **	0 *	0
1996 Jan-Jun	3	0 *	1	2	0	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0
1996 Jul-Dec	4	0 *	2	0	0	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0
1997 Jan-Jun	7	0 *	2	0	0	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0
1997 Jul-Dec	1	0 *	0	0	0	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0
1998 Jan-Jun	5	0 **	3	0	0	0	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0
1998 Jul-Dec	2	0 *	0	0	0	0	0 *	1	0	0 *	0
1999 Jan-Jun	2	0 *	0	0	0			0	0	0 *	2
1999 Jul-Dec	1		0	0	0			0	0	0 *	0

(Continued)

TABLE B-10c. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * The country in question has reported no lists of active measures for dates earlier than this date. Such lists are necessary for complete reliability of the number, because other sources of termination data in reports are often sporadic and unreliable. For countries that show a long string of no terminations over time, however, it is unlikely the numbers are in error.
 - ** Same as for "*" plus the country failed to file a case data report for this period, raising further the probability one or more terminations could have occurred in the period(s) that is (are) not counted here. CBO nevertheless judges the likelihood of such uncounted terminations to be low.
-

TABLE B-10d. TERMINATIONS OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN ASIA AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC

	Bahrain	Brunei Darussalam	Fiji	Hong Kong	India	Indonesia	Israel	Macao	Malaysia	Pakistan	Qatar	Singapore	South Korea	Sri Lanka	Thailand	United Arab Emirates
1979 Jul-Dec																
1980 Jan-Jun				0 *												
1980 Jul-Dec				0 *	0 *											
1981 Jan-Jun				0 *	0 *											
1981 Jul-Dec				0 *	0 *					0 *						
1982 Jan-Jun				0 *	0 **					0 **						
1982 Jul-Dec				0 *	0 *					0 **						
1983 Jan-Jun				0 *	0 *					0 *						
1983 Jul-Dec				0 *	0 *					0 *						
1984 Jan-Jun				0 *	0 *					0 *						
1984 Jul-Dec				0 *	0 *					0 *		0 *				
1985 Jan-Jun				0 *	0 **					0 *		0 *				
1985 Jul-Dec				0 *	0 *					0 *		0 *				
1986 Jan-Jun				0 *	0 *					0 *		0 *	0 *			
1986 Jul-Dec				0 *	0 *					0 *		0 *	0 *			
1987 Jan-Jun				0 *	0 *					0 **		0 *	0 *			
1987 Jul-Dec				0 *	0 *					0 *		0 *	0 *			
1988 Jan-Jun				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **	0 *			
1988 Jul-Dec				0 *	0 *					0 *		0 *	0 *			
1989 Jan-Jun				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **	0 **			
1989 Jul-Dec				0 *	0 *					0 *		0 *	0 *			
1990 Jan-Jun				0 *	0 **					0 **		0 *	0 *			
1990 Jul-Dec				0 *	0 *					0 *		0 *	2 *			
1991 Jan-Jun				0 *	0 *					0 *		0 *	0 *			
1991 Jul-Dec				0 *	0 *					0 *		0 *	0 *			
1992 Jan-Jun				0 *	0 *					0 *		0 *	1 **			
1992 Jul-Dec				0 *	0 *					0 *		0 *	0 *			
1993 Jan-Jun				0 *	0 *					0 *		0 *	2 **			
1993 Jul-Dec				0 *	0 *					0 *		0 *	0 *			
1994 Jan-Jun				0 *	0 *					0 *		0 **	0 *		0 *	
1994 Jul-Dec		0 *		0 *	0	0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *	0	0 *	0 *	
1995 Jan-Jun		0 *		0 *	0	0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *	1	0 *	0	
1995 Jul-Dec	0 *	0 *		0 *	0	0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0	0	0 *	0	0 *
1996 Jan-Jun	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0	0 *	0	0 *
1996 Jul-Dec	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0	0	0 *	0	0 *
1997 Jan-Jun	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0	0	0 *	0	0 **
1997 Jul-Dec	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	4	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0	0	0 *	0	0 **
1998 Jan-Jun	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0	1	0 *	0	0 *
1998 Jul-Dec	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0	0	0 *	0	0 *
1999 Jan-Jun	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	1	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0	0	0 *	0	0 *
1999 Jul-Dec	0 *	0 *		0 *	0	0 *	0	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0	2	0 *		

(Continued)

TABLE B-10d. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * The country in question has reported no lists of active measures for dates earlier than this date. Such lists are necessary for complete reliability of the number, because other sources of termination data in reports are often sporadic and unreliable. For countries that show a long string of no terminations over time, however, it is unlikely the numbers are in error.
 - ** Same as for "*" plus the country failed to file a case data report for this period, raising further the probability one or more terminations could have occurred in the period(s) that is (are) not counted here. CBO nevertheless judges the likelihood of such uncounted terminations to be low.
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TABLE B-10e. TERMINATIONS OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN EUROPE

	Bulgaria	Cyprus	Czechoslovakia	Czech Republic	Hungary	Malta	Poland	Romania	Slovak Republic	Slovenia	Turkey	Yugoslavia
1979 Jul-Dec			0 *		0 *							
1980 Jan-Jun			0 *		0 *							
1980 Jul-Dec			0 *		0 *			0 *				0 *
1981 Jan-Jun			0 *		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1981 Jul-Dec			0 *		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1982 Jan-Jun			0 *		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1982 Jul-Dec			0 *		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1983 Jan-Jun			0 *		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 **
1983 Jul-Dec			0 *		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1984 Jan-Jun			0 *		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1984 Jul-Dec			0 *		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1985 Jan-Jun			0 *		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1985 Jul-Dec			0 *		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1986 Jan-Jun			0 *		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1986 Jul-Dec			0 *		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1987 Jan-Jun			0 **		0 *		0 *	0 **				0 *
1987 Jul-Dec			0 *		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1988 Jan-Jun			0 **		0 **		0 **	0 **				0 **
1988 Jul-Dec			0 *		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1989 Jan-Jun			0 **		0 **		0 **	0 **				0 **
1989 Jul-Dec			0 **		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1990 Jan-Jun			0 **		0 *		0 **	0 *				0 *
1990 Jul-Dec			0 **		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1991 Jan-Jun			0 **		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1991 Jul-Dec			0 **		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 *
1992 Jan-Jun			0 *		0 *		0 *	0 *				0 **
1992 Jul-Dec			0 *		0 **		0 *	0 *				0 *
1993 Jan-Jun			a	0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *	0 *			b
1993 Jul-Dec			a	0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *	0 *			b
1994 Jan-Jun			a	0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *	0 **		0	b
1994 Jul-Dec			a	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	b
1995 Jan-Jun		0 *	a	0 **	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	b
1995 Jul-Dec		0 *	a	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	b
1996 Jan-Jun		0 *	a	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	b
1996 Jul-Dec	0 *	0 *	a	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	1	b
1997 Jan-Jun	0 *	0 *	a	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	b
1997 Jul-Dec	0 *	0 *	a	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	2	b
1998 Jan-Jun	0 *	0 *	a	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	1	b
1998 Jul-Dec	0 *	0 *	a	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	1	b
1999 Jan-Jun	0 *	0 *	a	0	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 **		1	b
1999 Jul-Dec	0 *		a	0	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *		0	b

(Continued)

TABLE B-10e. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * The country in question has reported no lists of active measures for dates earlier than this date. Such lists are necessary for complete reliability of the number, because other sources of termination data in reports are often sporadic and unreliable. For countries that show a long string of no terminations over time, however, it is unlikely the numbers are in error.
 - ** Same as for "*" plus the country failed to file a case data report for this period, raising further the probability one or more terminations could have occurred in the period(s) that is (are) not counted here. CBO nevertheless judges the likelihood of such uncounted terminations to be low.
 - a. Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, which began reporting separately with the Jan-Jun 1993 reporting period.
 - b. Yugoslavia ceased filing reports when it broke into several countries. One of its former constituent republics, Slovenia, began filing reports with the July-Dec 1994 reporting period. None of the other former constituent republics have filed any reports.
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TABLE B-10f. TERMINATIONS OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN AFRICA

	Egypt	Morocco	Namibia	South Africa	Tunisia	Zambia	Zimbabwe
1979 Jul-Dec							
1980 Jan-Jun							
1980 Jul-Dec							
1981 Jan-Jun							
1981 Jul-Dec							
1982 Jan-Jun							
1982 Jul-Dec	0 *						
1983 Jan-Jun	0 *						
1983 Jul-Dec	0 *						
1984 Jan-Jun	0 *						
1984 Jul-Dec	0 *						
1985 Jan-Jun	0 *						
1985 Jul-Dec	0 **						
1986 Jan-Jun	0 *						
1986 Jul-Dec	0 *						
1987 Jan-Jun	0 **						
1987 Jul-Dec	0 *						
1988 Jan-Jun	0 **						
1988 Jul-Dec	0 **						
1989 Jan-Jun	0 **						
1989 Jul-Dec	0 *						
1990 Jan-Jun	0 *						
1990 Jul-Dec	0 *						
1991 Jan-Jun	0 *						
1991 Jul-Dec	0 *						
1992 Jan-Jun	0 *						
1992 Jul-Dec	0 *						
1993 Jan-Jun	0 *						
1993 Jul-Dec	0 *						
1994 Jan-Jun	0 **						
1994 Jul-Dec	0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *	0 *
1995 Jan-Jun	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 **
1995 Jul-Dec	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *
1996 Jan-Jun	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 **	0 *	0 *
1996 Jul-Dec	0 *	0 *	0 *	2	0 *	0 *	0 *
1997 Jan-Jun	0 **	0 *	0 *	2	0 *	0 *	0 *
1997 Jul-Dec	0 *	0 **	0 *	1	0 *	0 *	0 *
1998 Jan-Jun	0 *	0 *	0 *	1	0 *	0 *	0 *
1998 Jul-Dec	0	0 *	0 *	1	0 *	0 *	0 *
1999 Jan-Jun	0	0 *	0 *	0	0 *		0 *
1999 Jul-Dec	0	0 *		0	0 *		0 *

(Continued)

TABLE B-10f. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * The country in question has reported no lists of active measures for dates earlier than this date. Such lists are necessary for complete reliability of the number, because other sources of termination data in reports are often sporadic and unreliable. For countries that show a long string of no terminations over time, however, it is unlikely the numbers are in error.
 - ** Same as for "*" plus the country failed to file a case data report for this period, raising further the probability one or more terminations could have occurred in the period(s) that is (are) not counted here. CBO nevertheless judges the likelihood of such uncounted terminations to be low.
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TABLE B-11a. ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

	North America		Asia and South Pacific				Europe								
	United States	Canada	Australia	Australia--Adjusted	New Zealand	New Zealand--Adjusted	Japan	EC/U ^a	EC/U--Adjusted ^a	Iceland	Liechtenstein	Norway	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland
12/31/78	84 **	15 **	19 **	19 **				1 **	1 **						
06/30/79	94	33 **	23 **	23 **				4 **	2 **				0 **		
12/31/79	98	83 **	35 **	35 **			0 **	26	14				0 **		0 **
06/30/80	101	87	38 **	37 **			0 **	42	26				0 **		0 **
12/31/80	99	88	43 **	42 **			0 **	48	30				0 **		0 **
06/30/81	96	97	54 **	53 **			0 **	55	37				0 **		0 **
12/31/81	95	97	63 **	62 **			0 **	59	41				0 **		0 **
06/30/82	97	109	110	106			0 **	73	55				0 **		0 **
12/31/82	101	103	132	128			0 **	88	68				0 **		0 **
06/30/83	106	126	163	157			0 **	103	81				0 **		0 **
12/31/83	112	140	177	168			0 **	117	95				0 **		0 **
06/30/84	120	151	187	177			0 **	123	100				0 **		0 **
12/31/84	126	147	188	182			0 **	137	111				0 **		0 **
06/30/85	127	156	187	181			0 **	148	120				1 *		0 **
12/31/85	122	154	191	184			0 **	135	109				1 *		0 **
06/30/86	137	161	165	158			0 **	120	108				b		0 **
12/31/86	143	160	132	126	0 **	0 **	0 **	130	117				b		0 **
06/30/87	164	158	104	99	2 **	0 **	0 **	124	112				b		0 **
12/31/87	185	156	84	80	2 **	0 **	0 **	117	105				b		0 **
06/30/88	193	163	46	44	6 *	1 *	0 *	110	100				b		0 **
12/31/88	198	146	29	27	9 *	4 *	0 *	113	104				b		0 **
06/30/89	215	148	22	21	12	7	0 *	115	106				b		0 *
12/31/89	216	137	24	23	13	8	0 *	143	135				b		0 *
06/30/90	214	119	20	19	12	8	0 *	148	138				b		0 *
12/31/90	220	81	20	20	8	8	0 *	144	135				b		0 *
06/30/91	224	72	20	20	8	8	0 *	146	137				b		0 *
12/31/91	232	71	33	33	13	13	0 *	146	137				b		0 *
06/30/92	236	72	43	43	15	15	0 *	146	137				b		0 *
12/31/92	254	74	61	61	24	24	0 *	154	145				b		1
06/30/93	267	83	66	66	24	24	1	146	138				b		1
12/31/93	290	87	68	68	23	23	1	147	139				b		1
06/30/94	294	86	77	77	23	23	1	133	133	0 **			b		1
12/31/94	281	97	75	75	21	21	1	137	137	0 *	0 **		b		0 *
06/30/95	289	93	75	75	22	22	1	135	135	0 *	0 *	0 *	b		b
12/31/95	295	97	76	76	25	25	2	137	137	0 *	0 *	0 *	b		b
06/30/96	299	96	76	76	26	25	2	148	148	0 *	0 *	0 *	b		b
12/31/96	302	96	65	65	27	25	2	140	140	0 *	0 *	0 *	b		b
06/30/97	305	95	47	47	26	25	2	134	134	0 *	0 *	0 *	b		b
12/31/97	314	91	37	37	26	25	2	137	137	0 *	0 *	0 *	b		b
06/30/98	314	75	37	37	27	25	1	140	140	0 *	0 *	0 *	b		b
12/31/98	318	77	39	39	21	25	1	148	148	0 *	0 *	0 *	b		b
06/30/99	328	77	39	39	21	25	1	146	146	0 *	0 *	0 *	b		b
12/31/99	326	79	38	38	21	25	1	148	148	0 *	0 *	0 *	b		b
01/01/00	267														

(Continued)

TABLE B-11a. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTES: During the period covered by the reports, Australia and New Zealand replaced antidumping policy on trade between them with a competition policy and terminated the active measures against each other. To give a better indication of the countries' antidumping policies toward the rest of the world, "Australia--Adjusted" and "New Zealand--Adjusted" exclude Australia's measures against New Zealand and New Zealand's measures against Australia.

On January 1, 1994, the European Economic Area (EEA) was established. The EEA was composed of the European Union (EU) and the members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) excluding Switzerland. (The members of the EFTA are Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.) Four days later, all active EU antidumping measures against the EFTA members (excluding Switzerland) were suspended. Similarly, on January 1, 1986, Spain and Portugal joined the European Community (EC), at which point all active EC measures against them were terminated. To give a better measure of the EC/U's antidumping policy toward the rest of the world, "EC/U--Adjusted" excludes all measures against those countries. Similar adjustment of the data for Spain eliminates a measure against EC/U-member Italy, which is Spain's only measure. Sweden had no measures against EC/U members during any of the periods covered by its reports, so the statistics are the same for "Sweden" and "Sweden--Adjusted" and there is no need to list the latter separately.

- * The country in question filed no lists of either active measures (orders and undertakings) or terminations for this date or any earlier date, but it did file case data reports. The number given here is derived from the case data and the earliest available list of active measures (if there is one). The number assumes that no active measures were in effect before the first number with one asterisk given for this country or, if there were active measures, that they were terminated before this date. That assumption is probably correct for countries that have a long string of numbers with one asterisk for which the first few numbers are zero (Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Czechoslovakia/Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Egypt). It may or may not be correct for other countries (New Zealand, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and South Africa).
- ** The country in question filed no reports of any kind (case data, lists of active measures or terminations) for this date or any earlier date. The number given here is the number of measures that the country reported on its earliest list of active measures (or on the earliest list that can be derived from the country's reports) for which the starting date of the measure is on or before this date. The actual number of active measures for this date cannot be less than the number given here, but it might be more--possibly substantially more. The likelihood that the actual number is substantially more increases with the length of time between the date in question and the first date for which the number given has one or no asterisks.
- a. Before September 1, 1989, the lists of active measures reported by the EC/U included only measures against other signatories to the Antidumping Code. Hence, the actual numbers of active measures are likely to be larger than the numbers given here. The following numbers of measures with unknown beginning dates appear on the list of active measures that CBO constructed from the EC/U reports on the dates indicated: 22 on December 31, 1979 (12 in the case of the EC/U--Adjusted list); 4 on June 30, 1980; 1 on December 31, 1980; 2 on October 6, 1982; 7 on June 30, 1985 (6 in the case of the EC/U--Adjusted list); 1 on September 1, 1986; 1 on May 4, 1988; and 34 on September 1, 1989. All that can be said for certain about the beginning dates of those measures is that they are on or before the dates on which the measures first appear on the list of active measures.
- One can determine from the EC/U reports that it terminated 67 measures over the 30-month period from March 1, 1987 (the date of one of the reported lists of active measures) to September 1, 1989 (the date of the next reported list of active measures), but the actual dates of termination cannot be determined any more accurately. This tabulation assumes that those measures were terminated at an even rate of 2.23 per month (67/30) over the period (as close as can be approximated within the constraint that the number of terminations at any given time must be an integer). The adjusted EC/U data included 62 such terminations, which were assumed to have occurred at an even rate of 2.07 terminations per month (62/30).
- b. On January 1, 1986, Spain joined the EC/U, became covered by the EC/U's antidumping law, and ceased filing its own reports. Sweden did the same on January 1, 1995.
-

TABLE B-11b. ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN NORTH AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

	Barbados	Costa Rica	Cuba	Dominican Republic	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Jamaica	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama
12/31/78											
06/30/79											
12/31/79											
06/30/80											
12/31/80											
06/30/81											
12/31/81											
06/30/82											
12/31/82											
06/30/83											
12/31/83											
06/30/84											
12/31/84											
06/30/85											
12/31/85											
06/30/86											
12/31/86											
06/30/87									0 **		
12/31/87									1 **		
06/30/88									3 *		
12/31/88									5 *		
06/30/89									7 *		
12/31/89									11 *		
06/30/90									10 *		
12/31/90									9 *		
06/30/91									11 *		
12/31/91									18 *		
06/30/92									23		
12/31/92									23		
06/30/93									25		
12/31/93									29		
06/30/94		0 **	0 **	0 **	0 **	0 **	0 **	0 **	29 a	0 **	
12/31/94	0 **	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	49 a	0 *	
06/30/95	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	50 a		
12/31/95	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	67 a		
06/30/96	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	70 a	0 *	
12/31/96	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	71	0 *	0 **
06/30/97	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	1 *	0 *	0 *	74	0 *	0 *
12/31/97	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	1	0 *	0 *	72	0 *	0 *
06/30/98	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	1	0 *		72	0 *	0 *
12/31/98		0	0 *	0 *	0 *	1	0 *		72	0 *	0 *
06/30/99		0	0 *	0 *	0 *	1	0 *		75	1 *	0 *
12/31/99		0	0 *		0 *	1		0 *	71 a	1 *	0 *

(Continued)

TABLE B-11b. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * The country in question filed no lists of either active measures (orders and undertakings) or terminations for this date or any earlier date, but it did file case data reports. The number given here is derived from the case data and the earliest available list of active measures (if there is one). The number assumes that no active measures were in effect before the first number with one asterisk given for this country or, if there were active measures, that they were terminated before this date. That assumption is probably correct for countries that have a long string of numbers with one asterisk for which the first few numbers are zero (Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Czechoslovakia/Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Egypt). It may or may not be correct for other countries (New Zealand, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and South Africa).
- ** The country in question filed no reports of any kind (case data, lists of active measures or terminations) for this date or any earlier date. The number given here is the number of measures that the country reported on its earliest list of active measures (or on the earliest list that can be derived from the country's reports) for which the starting date of the measure is on or before this date. The actual number of active measures for this date cannot be less than the number given here, but it might be more--possibly substantially more. The likelihood that the actual number is substantially more increases with the length of time between the date in question and the first date for which the number given has one or no asterisks.
- a. One of the Mexican orders in the last period is against the European Union as a whole. The same is true for 06/30/94 through 06/30/96.
-

TABLE B-11c. ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN SOUTH AMERICA

	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Ecuador	Paraguay	Peru	Trinidad and Tobago	Uruguay	Venezuela
12/31/78											
06/30/79											
12/31/79											
06/30/80			0 **								
12/31/80			0 *								
06/30/81			0 *								
12/31/81			0 *								
06/30/82			0 *								
12/31/82			0 *								
06/30/83			0 *								
12/31/83			0 *								
06/30/84			0 *								
12/31/84			0 *								
06/30/85			0 *								
12/31/85			0 *								
06/30/86			0 *								
12/31/86			0 *								
06/30/87			0 *								
12/31/87			0 *								
06/30/88			0 *								
12/31/88			0 *								
06/30/89			4 *								
12/31/89			4 *								
06/30/90			4 *								
12/31/90			4 *								
06/30/91			6 *								
12/31/91			6 *		0 **						
06/30/92			8 *		1 *						
12/31/92	0 **		15 *		2 *						
06/30/93	1 **		17		2 *						
12/31/93	3 **		21		3						0 **
06/30/94	3 **		20	0 **	4		0 **	0 **	0 **	0 **	2 **
12/31/94	3	0 **	20	1	5		0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	2 *
06/30/95	10	0 *	20	2	6		0 *	0	0 *	0 *	4 *
12/31/95	20	0 *	23	2	6	0 **	0 *	2	0 *	0 *	4
06/30/96	27	0 *	28	0	6	0 *	0 *	2	0 *	0 *	4
12/31/96	28	0 *	26	0	7	0 *	0 *	3	0 *	0 *	4
06/30/97	25	0 *	25	2	7	0 *	0 *	5	0 *	0 *	4
12/31/97	31	0 *	26	2	8	0 *	0 *	6	0 *	0 *	6
06/30/98	32	0 *	29	2	8	0	0 *	6	1	0 *	6
12/31/98	37	0 *	34	2	8	0 a	0 *	5	2	0 *	6
06/30/99	40	0 *	34	2	12	0 a	0 *	6	2	0 *	11
12/31/99	43		39	2	14	0 a	0 *a	8	4	0 *	14

(Continued)

TABLE B-11c. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * The country in question filed no lists of either active measures (orders and undertakings) or terminations for this date or any earlier date, but it did file case data reports. The number given here is derived from the case data and the earliest available list of active measures (if there is one). The number assumes that no active measures were in effect before the first number with one asterisk given for this country or, if there were active measures, that they were terminated before this date. That assumption is probably correct for countries that have a long string of numbers with one asterisk for which the first few numbers are zero (Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Czechoslovakia/Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Egypt). It may or may not be correct for other countries (New Zealand, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and South Africa).

 - ** The country in question filed no reports of any kind (case data, lists of active measures or terminations) for this date or any earlier date. The number given here is the number of measures that the country reported on its earliest list of active measures (or on the earliest list that can be derived from the country's reports) for which the starting date of the measure is on or before this date. The actual number of active measures for this date cannot be less than the number given here, but it might be more--possibly substantially more. The likelihood that the actual number is substantially more increases with the length of time between the date in question and the first date for which the number given has one or no asterisks.

 - a. Ecuador submitted no list of active measures for December 31, 1999, and neither a list of active measures nor a case data report for either of the two immediately preceding reporting periods. Consequently, it is possible, although in CBO's judgment unlikely, that one or more active measures were imposed in this period. Similarly, Paraguay submitted no reports for the last two periods, so the number listed for it for the last period could be too low. (It is unlikely that the number for the next to the last period is too low.)
-

TABLE B-11d. ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN ASIA AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC

	Bahrain	Brunei Darussalam	Fiji	Hong Kong	India	Indonesia	Israel	Macau	Malaysia	Pakistan	Qatar	Singapore	South Korea	Thailand
12/31/78														
06/30/79														
12/31/79				0 **										
06/30/80				0 **	0 **									
12/31/80				0 **	0 **									
06/30/81				0 **	0 **					0 **				
12/31/81				0 **	0 **					0 **				
06/30/82				0 **	0 **					0 **				
12/31/82				0 **	0 **					0 **				
06/30/83				0 **	0 **					0 **				
12/31/83				0 **	0 **					0 **				
06/30/84				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **		
12/31/84				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **		
06/30/85				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **		
12/31/85				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **		
06/30/86				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **	0 **	
12/31/86				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **	2 **	
06/30/87				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **	2 **	
12/31/87				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **	2 **	
06/30/88				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **	2 **	
12/31/88				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **	2 **	
06/30/89				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **	2 **	
12/31/89				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **	3 **	
06/30/90				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **	3 **	
12/31/90				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **	1 *	
06/30/91				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **	1 *	
12/31/91				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **	3 **	
06/30/92				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **	2 **	
12/31/92				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **	2 **	
06/30/93				0 **	0 **					0 **		0 **	2 **	
12/31/93				0 **	0					0 **		0 **	4 *	0 **
06/30/94		0 **		0 **	5	0 **	0 **		0 **	0 **		0 **	5	0 **
12/31/94		0 *		0 **	5	0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0	7	1
06/30/95	0 **	0 *		0 **	5	0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0	6	1
12/31/95	0 *	0 *	0 **	0 **	12	0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *	0 **	2	6	1
06/30/96	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	12	0 *	1 *	0 **	2	0 *	0 *	2	6	1
12/31/96	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	14	0 *	1 *	0 *	2	0 *	0 *	2	11	1
06/30/97	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	18	0 *	1 *	0 *	4	0 *	0 *	2	17	2
12/31/97	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	19	4 *	1 *	0 *	4	0 *	0 *	2	21	2
06/30/98	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	30	6 *	3	0 *	8	0 *	0 *	2	23	4
12/31/98	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	41	6 *	7	0 *	8	0 *	0 *	2	28	4
06/30/99	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	57	14 *	7	0 *	8	0 *	0 *	2	28	4
12/31/99	0 *	0 *		0 *	60	14 *	9	0 *	9 a	0 *	0 *	2	26	4

(Continued)

TABLE B-11d. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * The country in question filed no lists of either active measures (orders and undertakings) or terminations for this date or any earlier date, but it did file case data reports. The number given here is derived from the case data and the earliest available list of active measures (if there is one). The number assumes that no active measures were in effect before the first number with one asterisk given for this country or, if there were active measures, that they were terminated before this date. That assumption is probably correct for countries that have a long string of numbers with one asterisk for which the first few numbers are zero (Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Czechoslovakia/Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Egypt). It may or may not be correct for other countries (New Zealand, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and South Africa).
- ** The country in question filed no reports of any kind (case data, lists of active measures or terminations) for this date or any earlier date. The number given here is the number of measures that the country reported on its earliest list of active measures (or on the earliest list that can be derived from the country's reports) for which the starting date of the measure is on or before this date. The actual number of active measures for this date cannot be less than the number given here, but it might be more--possibly substantially more. The likelihood that the actual number is substantially more increases with the length of time between the date in question and the first date for which the number given has one or no asterisks.
- a. Two of the Malaysian orders on 12/31/99 are against the European Union as a whole.
-

TABLE B-11e. ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN EUROPE

	Bulgaria	Cyprus	Czechoslovakia ^a	Hungary	Malta	Poland	Romania	Slovenia	Turkey	Yugoslavia
12/31/78										
06/30/79			0 **	0 **						
12/31/79			0 *	0 *						
06/30/80			0 **	0 *			0 **			0 **
12/31/80			0 *	0 *		0 **	0 *			0 **
06/30/81			0 **	0 *		0 **	0 *			0 **
12/31/81			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *			0 **
06/30/82			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *			0 **
12/31/82			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *			0 **
06/30/83			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *			0 **
12/31/83			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *			0 **
06/30/84			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *			0 **
12/31/84			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *			0 **
06/30/85			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *			0 **
12/31/85			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *			0 **
06/30/86			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *			0 **
12/31/86			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *			0 **
06/30/87			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *			0 **
12/31/87			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *			0 **
06/30/88			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *			0 **
12/31/88			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *			0 **
06/30/89			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *			0 **
12/31/89			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *			0 **
06/30/90			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 **	0 **
12/31/90			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		6 **	0 **
06/30/91			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		13 **	0 **
12/31/91			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		17 **	0 **
06/30/92			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		20 **	0 **
12/31/92			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		21 **	0 **
06/30/93			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		23 **	b
12/31/93			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		26	b
06/30/94			0 *	0 *	0 **	0 *	0 *	0 **	28	b
12/31/94		0 **	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	28	b
06/30/95		0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	39	b
12/31/95		0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	39	b
06/30/96	0 **	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	39	b
12/31/96	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	38	b
06/30/97	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	38	b
12/31/97	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	36	b
06/30/98	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	36	b
12/31/98	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	1	0 *	0 *	35	b
06/30/99	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	1	0 *	0 *	34	b
12/31/99	0 *		0 *	0 *	0 *	1	0 *	0 *	35	b

(Continued)

TABLE B-11e. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * The country in question filed no lists of either active measures (orders and undertakings) or terminations for this date or any earlier date, but it did file case data reports. The number given here is derived from the case data and the earliest available list of active measures (if there is one). The number assumes that no active measures were in effect before the first number with one asterisk given for this country or, if there were active measures, that they were terminated before this date. That assumption is probably correct for countries that have a long string of numbers with one asterisk for which the first few numbers are zero (Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Czechoslovakia/Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Egypt). It may or may not be correct for other countries (New Zealand, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and South Africa).
- ** The country in question filed no reports of any kind (case data, lists of active measures or terminations) for this date or any earlier date. The number given here is the number of measures that the country reported on its earliest list of active measures (or on the earliest list that can be derived from the country's reports) for which the starting date of the measure is on or before this date. The actual number of active measures for this date cannot be less than the number given here, but it might be more--possibly substantially more. The likelihood that the actual number is substantially more increases with the length of time between the date in question and the first date for which the number given has one or no asterisks.
- a. Includes the Czech and Slovak Republics after Czechoslovakia split up (which begins with 06/30/93). The asterisk does not apply to the Czech Republic for the final three reporting periods.
- b. Yugoslavia ceased filing reports when it broke into several countries. One of its former constituent republics, Slovenia, began filing reports with the July-Dec 1994 reporting period. It has not reported any lists of active measures, and it is doubtful there are any such measures (see column for Slovenia). None of the other former constituent republics have filed any reports.
-

TABLE B-11f. ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN AFRICA

	Egypt	Morocco	Namibia	South Africa	Tunisia	Zambia	Zimbabwe
12/31/78							
06/30/79							
12/31/79							
06/30/80							
12/31/80							
06/30/81							
12/31/81							
06/30/82	0 **						
12/31/82	0 *						
06/30/83	0 *						
12/31/83	0 *						
06/30/84	0 *						
12/31/84	0 *						
06/30/85	0 *						
12/31/85	0 *						
06/30/86	0 *						
12/31/86	0 *						
06/30/87	0 *						
12/31/87	0 *						
06/30/88	0 *						
12/31/88	0 *			0 **			
06/30/89	0 *			1 **			
12/31/89	0 *			1 **			
06/30/90	0 *			1 **			
12/31/90	0 *			1 **			
06/30/91	0 *			1 **			
12/31/91	0 *			4 **			
06/30/92	0 *			7 **			
12/31/92	0 *			11 **			
06/30/93	0 *			13 **			
12/31/93	0 *			21 **			
06/30/94	0 *	0 **		22 **		0 **	0 **
12/31/94	0 *	0 *	0 **	26 *	0 **	0 *	0 *
06/30/95	0 *	0 *	0 *	26	0 *	0 *	0 *
12/31/95	0 *	0 *	0 *	26	0 *	0 *	0 *
06/30/96	0 *	0 *	0 *	26	0 *	0 *	0 *
12/31/96	0 *	0 *	0 *	33	0 *	0 *	0 *
06/30/97	0 *	0 *	0 *	44	0 *	0 *	0 *
12/31/97	0 *	0 *	0 *	49	0 *	0 *	0 *
06/30/98	5 a	0 *	0 *	54	0 *	0 *	0 *
12/31/98	5 a	0 *	0 *	57	0 *	0 *	0 *
06/30/99	5 a	0 *	0 *	79	0 *		0 *
12/31/99	18 a	0 *		94	0 *		0 *

(Continued)

TABLE B-11f. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * The country in question filed no lists of either active measures (orders and undertakings) or terminations for this date or any earlier date, but it did file case data reports. The number given here is derived from the case data and the earliest available list of active measures (if there is one). The number assumes that no active measures were in effect before the first number with one asterisk given for this country or, if there were active measures, that they were terminated before this date. That assumption is probably correct for countries that have a long string of numbers with one asterisk for which the first few numbers are zero (Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Czechoslovakia/Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Egypt). It may or may not be correct for other countries (New Zealand, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and South Africa).

 - ** The country in question filed no reports of any kind (case data, lists of active measures or terminations) for this date or any earlier date. The number given here is the number of measures that the country reported on its earliest list of active measures (or on the earliest list that can be derived from the country's reports) for which the starting date of the measure is on or before this date. The actual number of active measures for this date cannot be less than the number given here, but it might be more--possibly substantially more. The likelihood that the actual number is substantially more increases with the length of time between the date in question and the first date for which the number given has one or no asterisks.

 - a. Three of Egypt's orders for the last four reporting periods are against the "EU [European Union] other than France" as a whole.
-

TABLE B-12a. ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BY VARIOUS INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

	North America	Asia and South Pacific			Europe							
	Canada	Australia	New Zealand	Japan	EC/U ^a	Austria	Finland	Liechtenstein	Norway	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland
12/31/78	1 **	3 **			1 **							
06/30/79	2 **	5 **			1 **							
12/31/79	12 **	5 **		0 **	1 **	0 **	0 **			0 **	0 **	0 **
06/30/80	12	5 **		0 *	3 *	0 *	0 *		0 **	0 *	0 *	0 **
12/31/80	14	5 **		0 *	5 *	0 *	0 *		0 **	0 *	0 *	0 **
06/30/81	18	5 **		0 *	8 *	0 *	0 *		0 **	0 *	0 *	0 **
12/31/81	18	5 **		0 *	11 *	0 *	0 *		0 **	0 *	0 *	0 **
06/30/82	19	7		0 *	13 *	0 *	0 *		0 **	0 *	0 *	0 **
12/31/82	19	11		0 *	17 *	0 *	0 *		0 **	0 *	0 *	0 **
06/30/83	20	14		0 *	18 *	0 *	0 *		0 **	0 *	0 *	0 **
12/31/83	19	15		0 *	19 *	0 *	0 *		0 **	0 *	0 *	0 **
06/30/84	22	15		0 *	20 *	0 *	0 *		0 **	0 *	0 *	0 **
12/31/84	21	15		0 *	20 *	0 *	0 *		0 **	0 *	0 *	0 **
06/30/85	24	17		0 *	20	0 *	0 *		0 **	1 *	0 *	0 **
12/31/85	21	17		0 *	20	0 *	0 *		0 **	1 *	0 *	0 **
06/30/86	19	13		0 *	18	0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0 *	0 **
12/31/86	18	12		0 *	18	0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0 *	0 **
06/30/87	19	9		0 *	16	0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0 *	0 **
12/31/87	19	10	0 **	0 *	14	0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0 *	0 **
06/30/88	18	7	0 *	0 *	10	0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0 *	0 **
12/31/88	16	1	0 *	0 *	8	0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0 *	0 **
06/30/89	18	1	0	0 *	7	0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0	0 **
12/31/89	19	2	0	0 *	6	0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0	0 **
06/30/90	18	1	0	0 *	4	0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0	0 **
12/31/90	14	0	0	0 *	2	0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0	0 **
06/30/91	13	0	0	0 *	3	0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0	0 **
12/31/91	13	1	0	0 *	3	0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0	0 **
06/30/92	15	3	0	0 *	3	0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0	0 **
12/31/92	16	4	1	0 *	2	0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0	0 **
06/30/93	17	5	1	0	2	0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0	0 **
12/31/93	19	5	1	0	2	0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0	0 **
06/30/94	17	5	1	0	2	0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0	0 **
12/31/94	17	6	1	0	2	0 *	0 *	0 **	0 **	b	0	0 **
06/30/95	18	6	1	0	2	b	b	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
12/31/95	18	6	1	0	2	b	b	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
06/30/96	17	6	1	0	3	b	b	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
12/31/96	17	5	1	0	3	b	b	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
06/30/97	17	5	1	0	3	b	b	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
12/31/97	16	4	1	0	2	b	b	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
06/30/98	16	3	1	0	2	b	b	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
12/31/98	14	4	1	0	3	b	b	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 *
06/30/99	13	5	1	0	3	b	b	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 **
12/31/99	13	5	1	0	3	b	b	0 *	0 *	b	b	0 **

(Continued)

TABLE B-12a. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * The country in question filed no lists of either active measures (orders and undertakings) or terminations for this date or any earlier date, but it did file case data reports. The number given here is derived from the case data and the earliest available list of active measures (if there is one). The number assumes that there were no active measures before the first number with one asterisk given for this country or that, if there were active measures, they were terminated before this date. That assumption is probably correct for countries that have a long string of numbers with one asterisk for which the first few numbers are zero and for those that have a long period of time with no cases or measures reported. It may or may not be correct for other countries (Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and South Africa).
- ** The country in question filed no reports of any kind (case data, lists of active measures or terminations) for this date or any earlier date. The number given here is the number of measures that the country reported on its earliest list of active measures (or on the earliest list that can be derived from the country's reports) for which the starting date of the measure reported by the country is on or before this date. The actual number of active measures for this date cannot be less than the number given here, but it might be more--possibly substantially more. The likelihood that the actual number is substantially more increases with the length of time between the date in question and the first date for which the number given has one or no asterisks.
- a. The European Community/Union (EC/U) data set has lists of active measures for June 30, 1980, and June 30, 1985, but not for any date in between. However, one can determine from the data set that one measure began after the first of those dates (on December 9, 1980) and ended before the latter, but the precise date is unclear. This tabulation assumes that the measure was terminated on March 21, 1983--the midpoint between December 9, 1980, and June 30, 1985.
- The EC/U data set has lists of active measures for March 1, 1987, and September 1, 1989, but not for any date in between. One can determine from the lists that 14 measures ended between those two dates, but the precise date for each is unclear. This tabulation assumes that termination of those measures was evenly spread between the two dates.
- b. On January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EC/U, became covered by the EC/U's antidumping law, and ceased filing their own reports. Similarly, on January 1, 1986, Spain joined the EC/U, became covered by the EC/U's antidumping law, and ceased filing its own reports.
-

TABLE B-12b. ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN NORTH AMERICA AND THE WEST INDIES

	Barbados	Costa Rica	Dominican Republic	Guatemala	Honduras	Jamaica	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama
12/31/78									
06/30/79									
12/31/79									
06/30/80									
12/31/80									
06/30/81									
12/31/81									
06/30/82									
12/31/82									
06/30/83									
12/31/83									
06/30/84									
12/31/84									
06/30/85									
12/31/85									
06/30/86									
12/31/86									
06/30/87							0 **		
12/31/87							1 **		
06/30/88							3 *		
12/31/88							5 *		
06/30/89							5 *		
12/31/89							5 *		
06/30/90							4 *		
12/31/90							5 *		
06/30/91							7 *		
12/31/91							10		
06/30/92							12		
12/31/92							9		
06/30/93							12		
12/31/93							13		
06/30/94		0 **	0 **	0 **	0 **	0 **	12	0 **	
12/31/94	0 **	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	15	0 *	
06/30/95	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	15		
12/31/95	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	17		
06/30/96	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	17	0 *	
12/31/96	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	17	0 *	0 **
06/30/97	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	19	0 *	0 *
12/31/97	0 *	0	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	20	0 *	0 *
06/30/98	0 *	0	0 *	0	0 *		22	0 *	0 *
12/31/98		0	0 *	0	0 *		21	0 *	0 *
06/30/99		0	0 *	0	0 *		21	0 *	0 *
12/31/99		0		0		0 *	18	0 *	0 *

(Continued)

TABLE B-12b. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * The country in question filed no lists of either active measures (orders and undertakings) or terminations for this date or any earlier date, but it did file case data reports. The number given here is derived from the case data and the earliest available list of active measures (if there is one). The number assumes that there were no active measures before the first number with one asterisk given for this country or that, if there were active measures, they were terminated before this date. That assumption is probably correct for countries that have a long string of numbers with one asterisk for which the first few numbers are zero and for those that have a long period of time with no cases or measures reported. It may or may not be correct for other countries (Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and South Africa).
- ** The country in question filed no reports of any kind (case data, lists of active measures or terminations) for this date or any earlier date. The number given here is the number of measures that the country reported on its earliest list of active measures (or on the earliest list that can be derived from the country's reports) for which the starting date of the measure reported by the country is on or before this date. The actual number of active measures for this date cannot be less than the number given here, but it might be more--possibly substantially more. The likelihood that the actual number is substantially more increases with the length of time between the date in question and the first date for which the number given has one or no asterisks.
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TABLE B-12c. ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN SOUTH AMERICA

	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Ecuador	Peru	Trinidad and Tobago	Uruguay	Venezuela
12/31/78										
06/30/79										
12/31/79										
06/30/80			0 **							
12/31/80			0 *							
06/30/81			0 *							
12/31/81			0 *							
06/30/82			0 *							
12/31/82			0 *							
06/30/83			0 *							
12/31/83			0 *							
06/30/84			0 *							
12/31/84			0 *							
06/30/85			0 *							
12/31/85			0 *							
06/30/86			0 *							
12/31/86			0 *							
06/30/87			0 *							
12/31/87			0 *							
06/30/88			0 *							
12/31/88			0 *							
06/30/89			0 *							
12/31/89			0 *							
06/30/90			0 *							
12/31/90			0 *							
06/30/91			0 *							
12/31/91			0 *		0 **					
06/30/92			1 *		0 *					
12/31/92			2 *		1 *					
06/30/93	0 **		2		1 *					
12/31/93	1 **		6		1					0 **
06/30/94	1 **		6	0 **	2		0 **	0 **	0 **	2 **
12/31/94	1	0 **	6	0	3		0 *	0 *	0 *	2 *
06/30/95	1	0 *	6	0	4		0	0 *	0 *	2 *
12/31/95	1	0 *	6	0	4	0 **	0	0 *	0 *	2
06/30/96	1	0 *	6	0	4	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	2
12/31/96	1	0 *	6	0	4	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	2
06/30/97	1	0 *	5	0	4	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	2
12/31/97	1	0 *	5	0	4	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	2
06/30/98	1	0 *	3	0	4	0	0	0	0 *	2
12/31/98	2	0 *	3	0	4	0 a	0	0	0 *	2
06/30/99	2	0 *	3	0	5	0 a	0	0	0 *	0
12/31/99	2		4	0	5	0 a	0	0	0 *	0

(Continued)

TABLE B-12c. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * The country in question filed no lists of either active measures (orders and undertakings) or terminations for this date or any earlier date, but it did file case data reports. The number given here is derived from the case data and the earliest available list of active measures (if there is one). The number assumes that there were no active measures before the first number with one asterisk given for this country or that, if there were active measures, they were terminated before this date. That assumption is probably correct for countries that have a long string of numbers with one asterisk for which the first few numbers are zero and for those that have a long period of time with no cases or measures reported. It may or may not be correct for other countries (Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and South Africa).
 - ** The country in question filed no reports of any kind (case data, lists of active measures or terminations) for this date or any earlier date. The number given here is the number of measures that the country reported on its earliest list of active measures (or on the earliest list that can be derived from the country's reports) for which the starting date of the measure reported by the country is on or before this date. The actual number of active measures for this date cannot be less than the number given here, but it might be more--possibly substantially more. The likelihood that the actual number is substantially more increases with the length of time between the date in question and the first date for which the number given has one or no asterisks.
 - a. Ecuador submitted no list of active measures for December 31, 1999, and neither a list of active measures nor a case data report for either of the two immediately preceding reporting periods. Consequently, it is possible, although in CBO's judgment unlikely, that one or more active measures were imposed in this period.
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TABLE B-12d. ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN ASIA AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC

	Bahrain	Brunei Darussalam	Fiji	Hong Kong	India	Indonesia	Israel	Macau	Malaysia	Pakistan	Philippines	Qatar	Singapore	South Korea	Thailand
12/31/78															
06/30/79															
12/31/79				0 **											
06/30/80				0 **	0 **										
12/31/80				0 **	0 **										
06/30/81				0 **	0 **					0 **					
12/31/81				0 **	0 **					0 **					
06/30/82				0 **	0 **					0 **					
12/31/82				0 **	0 **					0 **					
06/30/83				0 **	0 **					0 **					
12/31/83				0 **	0 **					0 **					
06/30/84				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **		
12/31/84				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **		
06/30/85				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **		
12/31/85				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **		
06/30/86				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **	0 **	
12/31/86				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **	0 **	
06/30/87				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **	0 **	
12/31/87				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **	0 **	
06/30/88				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **	0 **	
12/31/88				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **	0 **	
06/30/89				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **	0 **	
12/31/89				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **	0 **	
06/30/90				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **	0 **	
12/31/90				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **	0 **	
06/30/91				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **	0 **	
12/31/91				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **	1 *	
06/30/92				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **	1 *	
12/31/92				0 **	0 **					0 **			0 **	1 *	
06/30/93				0 **	0 *					0 **			0 **	0 **	
12/31/93				0 **	0					0 **			0 **	0 **	0 **
06/30/94		0 **		0 **	1	0 **	0 **		0 **	0 **	0 **		0 **	0	0 **
12/31/94		0 *		0 **	1	0 *	0 *		0 **	0 **	0 *		0	1	0
06/30/95	0 **	0 *		0 **	1	0 *	0 *		0 *	0 **	0 *		0	1	0
12/31/95	0 *	0 *	0 **	0 **	1	0 *	0 *		0 *	0 **	0 *	0 **	0	1	0
06/30/96	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	1	0 *	1 *	0 **	0	0 *	0 *	0 **	0	1	0
12/31/96	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	1	0 *	1 *	0 **	0	0 *	0 *	0 **	0	4	0
06/30/97	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	2	0 *	1 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 **	0	4	0
12/31/97	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	2	0 *	1 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 **	0	4	0
06/30/98	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	3	0 *	1	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 **	0	4	0
12/31/98	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	3	0 *	2	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 **	0	4	0
06/30/99	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	4	0 *	3	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 **	0	4	0
12/31/99	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	4	0 *	2	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 **	0	3	0

(Continued)

TABLE B-12d. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * The country in question filed no lists of either active measures (orders and undertakings) or terminations for this date or any earlier date, but it did file case data reports. The number given here is derived from the case data and the earliest available list of active measures (if there is one). The number assumes that there were no active measures before the first number with one asterisk given for this country or that, if there were active measures, they were terminated before this date. That assumption is probably correct for countries that have a long string of numbers with one asterisk for which the first few numbers are zero and for those that have a long period of time with no cases or measures reported. It may or may not be correct for other countries (Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and South Africa).
- ** The country in question filed no reports of any kind (case data, lists of active measures or terminations) for this date or any earlier date. The number given here is the number of measures that the country reported on its earliest list of active measures (or on the earliest list that can be derived from the country's reports) for which the starting date of the measure reported by the country is on or before this date. The actual number of active measures for this date cannot be less than the number given here, but it might be more--possibly substantially more. The likelihood that the actual number is substantially more increases with the length of time between the date in question and the first date for which the number given has one or no asterisks.
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TABLE B-12e. ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BY VARIOUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN EUROPE AND AFRICA

	Europe										Africa						
	Bulgaria	Cyprus	Czechoslovakia ^a	Hungary	Malta	Poland	Romania	Slovenia	Turkey	Yugoslavia	Egypt	Morocco	Namibia	South Africa	Tunisia	Zambia	Zimbabwe
12/31/78																	
06/30/79			0 **	0 **													
12/31/79			0 *	0 *													
06/30/80			0 *	0 *					0 **								
12/31/80			0 *	0 *		0 **	0 **		0 **								
06/30/81			0 *	0 *		0 **	0 *		0 **								
12/31/81			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *								
06/30/82			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 **						
12/31/82			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
06/30/83			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
12/31/83			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
06/30/84			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
12/31/84			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
06/30/85			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
12/31/85			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
06/30/86			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
12/31/86			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
06/30/87			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
12/31/87			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
06/30/88			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
12/31/88			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
06/30/89			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
12/31/89			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
06/30/90			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
12/31/90			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
06/30/91			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
12/31/91			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
06/30/92			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *						
12/31/92			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 *		0 *		0 **				
06/30/93			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0 **	b	0 *		1 **				
12/31/93			0 *	0 *		0 *	0 *		0	b	0 *		1 **				
06/30/94			0 *	0 *	0 **	0 *	0 *	0 **	0	b	0 *	0 **	1 **		0 **	0 **	0 **
12/31/94		0 **	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	b	0 *	0 *	2 *	0 **	0 *	0 *	0 *
06/30/95		0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	b	0 *	0 *	0 *	2	0 *	0 *	0 *
12/31/95		0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	b	0 *	0 *	0 *	2	0 *	0 *	0 *
06/30/96	0 **	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	b	0 *	0 *	0 *	2	0 *	0 *	0 *
12/31/96	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	b	0 *	0 *	0 *	2	0 *	0 *	0 *
06/30/97	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	b	0 *	0 *	0 *	3	0 *	0 *	0 *
12/31/97	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0	b	0 *	0 *	0 *	4	0 *	0 *	0 *
06/30/98	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0	b	0	0 *	0 *	4	0 *	0 *	0 *
12/31/98	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0	b	0	0 *	0 *	4	0 *	0 *	0 *
06/30/99	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0	b	0	0 *	0 *	5	0 *		0 *
12/31/99	0 *		0 *	0 *	0 *	0	0 *	0 *	0	b	0	0 *		5	0 *		0 *

(Continued)

TABLE B-12e. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * The country in question filed no lists of either active measures (orders and undertakings) or terminations for this date or any earlier date, but it did file case data reports. The number given here is derived from the case data and the earliest available list of active measures (if there is one). The number assumes that there were no active measures before the first number with one asterisk given for this country or that, if there were active measures, they were terminated before this date. That assumption is probably correct for countries that have a long string of numbers with one asterisk for which the first few numbers are zero and for those that have a long period of time with no cases or measures reported. It may or may not be correct for other countries (Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and South Africa).
 - ** The country in question filed no reports of any kind (case data, lists of active measures or terminations) for this date or any earlier date. The number given here is the number of measures that the country reported on its earliest list of active measures (or on the earliest list that can be derived from the country's reports) for which the starting date of the measure reported by the country is on or before this date. The actual number of active measures for this date cannot be less than the number given here, but it might be more--possibly substantially more. The likelihood that the actual number is substantially more increases with the length of time between the date in question and the first date for which the number given has one or no asterisks.
 - a. Includes the Czech and Slovak Republics after Czechoslovakia split up (which begins with 06/30/93). The asterisk does not apply to the Czech Republic for the final three reporting periods.
 - b. Yugoslavia ceased filing reports when it broke into several countries. One of its former constituent republics, Slovenia, began filing reports with the July-Dec 1994 reporting period. It has not reported any lists of active measures, and it is doubtful there are any such measures (see column for Slovenia). None of the other former constituent republics have filed any reports.
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