Deputy Secretary of Defense John P. White
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and Mid-America Committee
Chicago, Ill.
May 22, 1997
The American inventor Charles Kettering once said, we
should all be concerned about the future, because we will have to
spend the rest of our lives there. Right now the Department of
Defense is uniquely focused on the future, and today I want to
talk about a new vision for the future of American defense. It
is a vision to achieve an American military force that can
protect our nation and our global interests in a time of rapid
change, and in a future we cannot predict.
In many ways, realizing this vision demands that we win the
age-old battle between man and machine. Just a few weeks ago,
Gary Kasperov declared that a computer can't beat a human
chessmaster. And the IBM computer Deep Blue replied,
checkmate. Well, 20 years ago, Alvin Toffler warned that
unless you tame technology, you will encounter future shock.
Today, the challenge for the Department of Defense is not to tame
technology, but to harness technology for a future force that
will guarantee our future security.
It is critical that we look at the future right now, for we
are at a critical juncture for American defense. The post-Cold
War era is coming to a close. We are entering a new era marked
by constant change at a faster rate, unexpected events and
sporadic new dangers. In a world of rapid change, the future
will come at us faster than ever. So while we still must
protect the nation from the realities of today, we must begin
immediately to build the combat power we need for the
uncertainties of tomorrow. It is time to leap our national
defense into the future.
Over the past six months, the Department of Defense has been
taking a fresh look at the future between now and the year 2015,
in a process called the Quadrennial Defense Review. We asked
broad, existential questions such as, what will it take for the
United States to remain the world's sole superpower? How can we
continue to influence world events for the better? And how can
we ensure that our armed forces remain the most powerful in the
world?
On Monday, we issued our report. It offers a vision for
American defense well into the 21st Century, and recommends
changes in the force today in order to begin building the force
for the future. These changes are controversial. They will
affect government jobs, production lines and military
communities. But they are critical if we are going to harness
technology to futurize our forces.
These changes will require the support of Congress and the
American people. So it is important that we make clear what is
at stake. So let me explain what we determined and where we
still need to go.
First of all, we live in a changed world. On the one hand,
it is a better world. The threat of global war is gone.
American values of democracy, free markets and free trade are
spreading around the world, fostering peace, stability and
prosperity in their wake. We have renewed relations with old
allies and developed new partnerships with old enemies.
On the other hand, we also have a world of danger and
uncertainty. There is the threat of large-scale aggression by
Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Failed or failing states may touch
off internal conflict, destabilize a region or create a
humanitarian crisis. Biological weapons, nerve agents and the
makings of nuclear weapons are falling into hostile hands,
increasing the chance of attack. In fact, since our Armed
Forces are the most powerful in the world, we stand a greater
chance of being attacked not directly, head-to-head, but by
asymmetric means, including terrorism, chemical or biological
weapons, or information warfare.
Those are the devils we know. There are also devils we
don't know in our future. We could face coercion and aggression
by more capable regional powers; threats to American citizens and
soil; greater and more creative asymmetrical challenges that
search for an Achilles' heel in our military superiority; as well
as wild card scenarios, such as the hostile takeover of
friendly regimes. And beyond the year 2010, we could even see a
great power or a global peer emerge that is hostile to our
interests.
How should the United States deal with these potential
threats? The foundation of our defense is to remain engaged in
the world, out there every day trying to enlarge the realm of
democracy and stability. We do this through a combination of
diplomacy, national will and military presence. If we pull
back, the dangers will grow more plentiful and severe.
Given that we need to remain engaged, our vision for future
security involves a three-part defense strategy.
First, we must try to shape the world for the better. Our
military forces can promote more democracy in more nations, more
cooperation among nations, more stability in more regions, and
help reduce threats to our interests and allies. Our forces are
conducting peacetime training exercises with militaries of
Central and Eastern Europe, including Russia. We invited
Chinese Navy warships to visit our California ports. We are
also helping the former Soviet republics dismantle their Cold War
nuclear arsenals. We are working with Latin American militaries
to promote democratic military reform, protect human rights and
fight illegal drug trafficking. And we sponsor multi-national
security conferences and invite military officers from new
democracies to attend our military colleges.
We also deter aggression and conflict by keeping a strong US
military force presence in key regions on land and at sea, and
the ability to project power quickly anywhere in the world. So
we will keep about 100,000 forces in the Pacific, another 100,000
in Europe and tens of thousands rotating through the Arabian
Gulf.
But as we try to shape the world, we still need to maintain
strong, ready military forces that can respond quickly and
decisively to a range of threats to US interests.
At the high end of the scale, we maintain forces that can
deter and, if necessary, defeat major aggression in two regions
at nearly the same time -- namely, in Korea and the Arabian Gulf.
Some ask why we need this two-war capability, and why we have
such large forces devoted to it. The answer is because it
guarantees that if we are fighting aggression in one region, it
doesn't encourage another aggressor on the other side of the
world. And our forces are large because we don't want a fair
fight -- we want to win quickly, decisively and with minimal risk
to American forces, as we did in Desert Storm.
But we also call on these forces to do much more than fight
major theater wars. In the past five years, our forces actually
have focused more on conducting smaller-scale contingencies from
day-to-day. These include show-of-force operations, like when
we sent two carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Straits
when China made threats against Taiwan. Or limited strikes,
like when we launched air strikes against Iraq when it threatened
the Kurds. Or civilian evacuation operations, like when we
rescued Americans from strife-torn Liberia and Albania, and
prepared to do so in Zaire. Or peace enforcement, as our
forces are doing in Bosnia. Or humanitarian assistance, like
when we delivered clean water to Rwanda when civil war led to a
cholera outbreak. These kinds of operations are a defining
element of today's security environment -- and they are likely to
remain so in the future.
Some may ask, we're not the world's policeman -- why are we
doing so many of these peacetime operations? We need to be
selective, and we are. We carefully avoided getting involved in
East Zaire despite significant international pressure. But quite
often, these relatively low-risk missions can prevent threats and
crises from turning into larger conflicts that cost us more in
blood and treasure. And we're not doing them alone, but with
allies and other nations. This not only shares the burden, it
also helps to promote greater military cooperation.
But if a major aggressor strikes, our forces must be able to
turn away from these smaller contingencies and rush to the
threatened region, ready to dominate and defeat enemy forces in a
major theater war. That means that our forces must be multi-
mission capable. They need to be highly mobile, agile and
flexible. They need to be organized, trained, equipped and
managed with multiple missions in mind. They need to have
quality people, superior intelligence, full access to space, the
seas and the skies, and robust air and sealift. They need to be
the best Armed Forces in the world, without peer.
We have those peerless forces today. But the toughest
question is, how do we guarantee our forces will be peerless in
the future? What is our vision for the future force?
That leads to the third part of our strategy -- preparing
our forces for the future. We need to begin developing the
future force today. We won the Gulf War with technology
developed in the 1970s and 80s. The 21st Century force will
fight with technology we develop today. Consequently, we need a
new vision for the future force. There is a technology
revolution out there that we commonly call the Revolution in
Military Affairs. We can harness this revolution to transform
the way our forces fight, and give them a superior edge against
any adversary. We must harness this revolution, for if we
don't, somebody else will -- to our grave peril.
Look what happened in World War II. In the European
theater, we helped to defeat Nazi forces after the US Army
married new battle-tank technology with
new mobile warfighting concepts, tactics and doctrine. In the
Pacific theater, we won the war at sea by harnessing aircraft,
battleships and new warfighting techniques to create the aircraft
carrier battle group. And we won the island-hopping campaign by
creating amphibious warfare that combined new ways of fighting
with new equipment.
We defeated global aggression in the 1940s because in the
1920s and 30s, there were Americans with vision and a commitment
to prepare for an uncertain future. Today, we have the same
challenge -- and the same chance -- to launch another Revolution
in Military Affairs, once again combining new technology with new
ways of fighting. How we protect our security in the 20-teens
will be determined by our vision and commitment today in the 90s.
Today's revolution begins with advanced versions of the
stealth aircraft and precision-guided smart munitions that we
used to such devastating effect in Desert Storm. But what
makes our vision truly revolutionary is the harnessing of
information technology and platforms -- computers, satellites,
sensors and reconnaissance vehicles -- into a new command and
control system. This system will give our commanders and troops
what we call information dominance -- a clear, constant and
complete picture of the seas, skies, terrain and everything in it
... lightening communications ... and a greater ability to
control the combat theater, manage the battle and utilize smart
weapons.
Information dominance will give our forces a quantum leap in
capability. They will be able to out-maneuver and out-position
the enemy with greater intelligence, speed, mobility, agility and
versatility. They will be able to identify and destroy targets
with pinpoint accuracy. They will be able to have the supplies
they need, just in time, when and where they need them. As a
result, fighting units can be smaller and lighter. They will
need fewer weapons platforms. They will cause less collateral
damage, and suffer less friendly fire and fewer casualties. And
they will be able to surprise and overwhelm the enemy and end the
battle quickly on our terms -- sometimes even before it starts.
This is not science fiction. Right now, soldiers, sailors,
airmen and Marines are developing and testing these new
technologies and concepts in actual warfighting situations under
names like Force 21, Sea Dragon and Experiment Alpha. The
results are very impressive. I've seen them for myself. Our
vision is becoming a reality. The future force is within our
grasp.
But there's a catch. Realizing this vision will be
expensive. It's one thing to envision the future force, but
quite another to finance it. Defense budgets probably are going
to remain flat for the foreseeable future, at about $250 billion
a year. And we cannot ask for a greater share of the federal
budget pie. We must be able to finance today's force, while
investing in the future force.
But we haven't succeeded in doing that. In the past few
years, we've had to migrate funds out of our procurement budget
to pay for day-to-day operations and support. As a result, our
procurement budget has eroded, leaving a large shortfall in our
modernization accounts each year.
So as we imagined the future force, we also had to face the
fiscal reality of halting the procurement erosion if we are to
achieve our vision. The question comes down to: how can we both
maintain today's force for today's world, while investing in the
future force for tomorrow? How can we afford to launch a new
Revolution in Military Affairs?
The answer is, we must launch a Revolution in Business
Affairs at the Department of Defense in order to pay for the
Revolution in Military Affairs. Only then will we generate the
savings needed to assure the full funding of our modernization
programs.
We cannot build a 21st Century military force on top of a
20th Century organization. But in too many respects, the
Department is still stuck in the Cold War. Our infrastructure is
too big. Our overhead is too high. Our processes and
procedures have too many steps. There is too much bureaucracy,
paperwork, red tape, duplication, repetition and inefficiency.
Many of the laws, rules and habits that govern our support
activities were designed for the Cold War, but still they
survive.
We need to overhaul the way the Department operates, and not
just to reduce costs and devote more resources to modernizing the
force. We also need a leaner, more efficient DoD so we can
serve the warfighter faster, better and more cheaply. We need a
DoD that is just as agile, flexible and responsive as the troops
we support.
To build the 21st Century DoD, we can borrow the lessons
learned by the corporate sector. Over the past fifteen years,
private industry has reorganized, restructured and adopted
revolutionary new business and management practices, in order to
maintain its competitive edge in the global marketplace. DoD
must follow suit so that our forces can maintain their
competitive edge in the global security environment of the
future.
To begin with, we need more base closures. Even after four
rounds, we still have excess capacity. Look at the numbers.
Since 1985, we have reduced the forces by 33 percent. But so
far we have reduced bases by only 26 percent worldwide -- and
just 21 percent if you count only the US bases. By the same
token, we've only reduced the civilian and military personnel
associated with bases and support facilities by 28 percent. So
we need another two rounds of BRAC. And we need to reduce about
100,000 civilian and military personnel associated with bases and
support facilities.
But we need to do much more than close more bases. DoD
also needs to deregulate, downsize, streamline and reengineer our
support activities. We need to adopt more of the innovative
business practices used in the private sector in three basic
areas.
First, we need to operate more efficiently and effectively.
We have just begun to overhaul the organization and structures of
many of our field activities, such as our inventory and
distribution system, financial management system, civilian
personnel system, health system, travel system and commissary
system. We need to reengineer the major support functions and
reorganize accordingly. Reengineering generally involves the 3Cs
-- consolidate, computerize and commercialize. The goal in all
cases is the same: better service and performance at lower
operating costs.
Second, we need to buy smarter through acquisition reform.
We are overhauling the massive DoD acquisition system by adopting
the best commercial standards and commercial buying practices and
getting rid of unneeded regulations. Now we must apply our new
acquisition system to all programs, from the big buys to the
smaller buys, all the way down to the base level.
Third, we need to rely on the private sector for more of our
goods and non-core activities. That means we must outsource far
more of our support activities -- that is, allow commercial
companies to compete for the work. Our experience with
outsourcing shows we can focus better on our core tasks, get
better quality service, reduce costs, be more responsive, and get
better access to new commercial technologies.
Modernizing DoD will challenge some sacred cows. Already,
some members of Congress are saying we can't cut bases. But to
ensure that our Armed Forces remain the most powerful in the
world today and in the future, we need to make some stark choices
about what's more important. The bottom line is, do we want to
build a superior force for the 21st Century? Or protect an old,
inefficient infrastructure from the 20th Century? While I expect
the debate to be heated, I firmly believe that the Congress will
support us.
It is a quirk of history that we are going to make such
revolutionary changes to DoD today, our 50th anniversary. But
nobody would better recognize the need for this revolution than
man who created the Department -- Harry Truman.
Truman's rise to national prominence and the presidency
began with his leadership of the Truman Committee, which
investigated inefficiency and waste in defense. Later when
President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, which
created the Department of Defense, he did so on board his
official presidential plane. It was nicknamed, The Sacred
Cow.
Today, we must recognize that when it comes to protecting
our national security, there is only one sacred cow. It is a
strong, well prepared and well equipped military force. That
must be our single focus as we make the tough national security
choices for the next 50 years.
I urge you to assist us in making those choices. Thank you.