Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington, D.C.
May 22, 1997
In March, I went out to Ft. Irwin to see the US Army's Force
XXI experiments in which the Army's Experimental Force is
harnessing the power of digital technology and using the
capability it provides to test out new operational concepts,
doctrine, tactics, and organizational designs. It was an awe
inspiring demonstration. Few who see it in action can doubt that
Force XXI will revolutionize land warfare by linking commanders,
planners and shooters with digital information and communications
technology, cutting through the fog of war. Force XXI is the
much-vaunted Revolution in Military Affairs made real. A new
book published by CSIS -- Douglas Macgregor's Breaking the
Phalanx -- talks about the US military's race to be ready for
the 21st century. Force XXI is already past the first lap.
As I witnessed Force XXI in action, I felt a sense of
urgency. I knew that the technology I was seeing was key to US
military superiority in the future. I knew that we had to find
some way through the Quadrennial Defense Review to get this
technology into the force. And I knew it was going to be tough
going -- to both sustain our superiority today and, at the same
time, reach out to that future I saw on the training fields at
Ft. Irwin.
I believe that the QDR, which we released on Monday, gives
us a realistic, executable plan for accomplishing this goal.
This afternoon, I want to report to you on what that plan is and
how we arrived at it.
Upon taking office, I made clear my expectations for how the
QDR would be conducted. I made clear, first of all, that the
defense strategy developed in the QDR process must be the basis
for all other QDR analysis and decisions. I also made clear that
there were to be no
unrealistic assumptions, whether about the threat, about
operations and support costs, or about program schedules and
costs. Finally, I made clear that we would finish on time. Four
years may seem like forever to some, but not in a department that
thinks in six-year chunks of time and that is developing weapons
today that will be used by military personnel not yet born and
by their children. I think the report we presented on Monday
does a good job of meeting these requirements.
I inherited a Department of Defense that had done very well
in adapting to the post-Cold War environment. I saw how it was
preparing to move beyond the "post-Cold War" mind-set and
reorient itself to a new era and a new century. To paraphrase
Boris Pasternak: "We know that the stake where we stand will be
the border of two different eras of history and we have been
chosen."
The era we are entering is one of change and uncertainty,
containing both strategic opportunity and new challenges and
threats. These include regional dangers, including the threat of
aggression against US friends, allies and interests in key
regions such as Southwest Asia and Northeast Asia. We are also
threatened by proliferation of advanced technologies nuclear
technology, chemical and biological weapons, missile systems, and
information warfare capabilities that could encourage adversaries
to challenge us in asymmetric ways that circumvent our
strengths, exploit our vulnerabilities and threaten both our
forces in the field and Americans at home. We also face
transnational dangers, such as uncontrolled migrant flows, the
illegal drug trade, and international organized crime.
We also must be prepared for "wild card" scenarios: low
probability but high consequence developments, such as loss of
access to critical overseas facilities, unexpected emergence of
new technological threats or hostile forces gaining control of
now friendly governments. And while we do not expect a regional
great power or a "near peer competitor" to emerge in the next 10-
15 years, we must prepare for the possibility in the years beyond
and hedge against its earlier arrival.
The first task of the QDR was to develop a defense strategy
to meet these threats and opportunities. In doing so, we built
upon the President's National Security Strategy, which
encompasses political, diplomatic, economic and other elements in
addition to defense. The essence of our new defense strategy can
be captured in three words: shape, respond, prepare.
First, we must shape the international security environment
in ways favorable to US national interests, by promoting regional
stability, preventing conflicts, reducing threats, and deterring
aggression and coercion on a day-to-day basis in key regions. We
promote regional stability and deter day-to-day through forward
presence of our forces, strong alliances, cooperative defense
relationships and other peacetime engagement activities. We
reduce threats through efforts like the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction program and military-to-military contacts.
But we also need strong, ready forces that can respond
quickly and decisively to threats across the full spectrum of
crises -- everything from small-scale contingencies to major
theater war, including asymmetric challenges like chemical and
biological weapons, terrorism and information warfare.
This includes the ability to fight and win two major theater
wars that overlap. Without this capability, our allies could
question our commitment and seek alternative security solutions.
Our adversaries would be emboldened to challenge us, especially
once we became engaged in a large operation elsewhere. Indeed,
we could become self-deterred -- hesitant to respond to a crisis
for fear an enemy in another region would seize its chance.
America would become just another power, unable to protect our
global interests with confidence.
The third element of the strategy is that we must prepare
now for an uncertain future. This requires that we maintain
military superiority. The path for this is outlined in Joint
Vision 2010, General Shalikashvili's blueprint for future
military operations, which combines modern technology with new
operational concepts and organizational structures designed to
make the most of technological advances.
This force will seek the best people our nation can offer.
It will give them the best technology our scientists and
engineers can produce. And this technology will transform the
way our forces fight. We want them to be able to dominate any
situation we send them into. We don't want a fair fight -- we
want a decisive advantage.
The key will be an integrated system of systems that gives
our forces battlespace awareness, greatly reducing the risk of
war. I saw a glimpse of what a system like this can give us when
I visited Ft. Irwin. This system of systems will integrate the
laptop, the microchip, the microwave, the videocam, the satellite
and the sensor. It will connect the cockpit, the quarterdeck,
the control panel and the command post and link the shooter to
the supplier to the commander.
The ability to collect and distribute to US forces
throughout the battlesespace an uninterrupted flow of information,
while denying the enemy the ability to do the same, will provide
our future forces with new capabilities. With a full picture of
the battlespace, advanced vehicles, and agile organizations, US
forces will be able to attack enemy weak points throughout the
depth of the battlefield what we term dominant maneuver. They
will also have precision engagement -- the ability to identify
the target and precisely aim a smart weapon at it. They will be
supported through focused logistics -- the ability to deliver the
right supplies at the right place on the battlefield at the right
time. And they will have full dimension protection multiple
layers of protection at all levels for themselves, their assets
and their communications against a full spectrum of threats, from
ballistic missiles to germ warfare, so that they have greater
freedom of action in all phases of combat.
What these four capabilities mean is that our forces will go
in lighter. They will need fewer weapons platforms. They will
be able to direct lethal fire to the right targets. There will
be less collateral damage, less friendly fire and fewer
casualties. And US forces on the scene early in a conflict will
be able to take the initiative away from a numerically superior
enemy, overwhelm the enemy as we bring more forces to bear, and
end the battle quickly on our terms.
There are different approaches we could follow to try to
execute the strategy, and the QDR focused on three specific
options.
The first option is to focus on current dangers. While this
option does not ignore the future, it places highest priority on
dealing with today's threats, and accepts greater risk in dealing
with threats of the future. This is essentially the path DoD has
been following in recent years -- maintaining the current force
structure, exercising it at a high rate and repeatedly delaying
the increase in procurement spending needed to prepare for the
future, thereby putting off taking full advantage of the
Revolution in Military Affairs. This is business as usual, and
the QDR rejected continuing with business as usual.
The second option would seek to rapidly and radically
restructure the force for the future. But to pay for this we
would have to cut today's force significantly. While allowing
more aggressive pursuit of new technologies, this option would
undermine our ability to shape the international environment to
meet today's threats and to fulfill our commitments. It would
greatly stress our troops and put them at greater risk in the
near and mid term. By casting doubt on our reliability it would
jeopardize alliances we need today and in the future, and
embolden our adversaries. While this might appear "bold" to
some, it is not best for America.
The option we have chosen strikes the necessary balance
between the needs and risks of today, with those of the future.
Modest reductions in force structure, focused on the tail, not
the tooth, will enable us to continue to meet current threats and
to shape the environment. These reductions, and aggressive
efforts to change how DoD conducts business, will pay for focused
modernization to deploy advanced systems at the right pace. This
is the path that will take us safely from the present to the
future.
Once the strategy was defined, and we chose an integrated
approach to meet the strategy, we had to confront fiscal reality
and figure out how to get from here to there.
First, let me give you some fiscal reality that is
overlooked by many who think we are stuck in the past with a Cold
War budget and Cold War forces. In fact, DoD's budget has taken
deep cuts, nearly 40 percent, since the Cold War. Our force
structure has been cut one-third, and our procurement budget
slashed by two-thirds. So, it is those critics who are frozen in
a Cold War mind-set, not the US Armed Forces.
We can get by with no real growth above this year's budget
of $250 billion if we are able to shift funds from current
operations and support activities into modernization. DoD's
track record, however, has been exactly the opposite: year after
year, procurement funds have been taken to pay for unexpected
operations and support costs. As a result, we are failing to
prepare for the future at the pace necessary. That is why the
QDR rejected the status quo.
What we did instead was to rebalance our program:
accelerating some new programs and slowing others, depending on
how mature the technology is. We also have reduced the size of
some programs, because their advanced capabilities mean fewer are
needed. And we have worked to weed out unrealistic expectations
and fix deficiencies in the Service and defense-wide budgets, so
that our programs are more stable and more efficient.
The result is that we can now execute a solid, realistic
plan to exploit the Revolution in Military Affairs, rather than
falter on shifting sand.
Let me give you some of the highlights of our plan to build
the force of the future.
First, we are accelerating the fielding of the Army Force
XXI's first digitized corps. At the same time, the Navy and the
Marines will continue with focused efforts to harness the power
of information technology through their Fleet Battle Experiments
and Sea Dragon program. The Air Force will continue doing the
same through its six new battle laboratories, exploring
everything from cyberspace to outerspace.
We are also accelerating our development of leap-ahead
tactical air capability. That's why I cut the F/A-18 E/F buy
nearly in half and accelerated the deployment in quantity of the
Navy Joint Strike Fighter. And to promote efficiency, we
established a competition between the two aircraft in the
outyears. We will also proceed to build the F-22 with its
revolutionary capabilities, which will enable us to reduce the
overall buy.
Meanwhile, the Marine's will accelerate their buy of the
leap-ahead V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, one of the vehicles that
will help provide our forces with dominant maneuver.
The QDR also determined that we needed to spend more
research and development money on a National Missile Defense
program to protect our homeland from limited missile attacks. So
we will add about $2 billion over the Future Years Defense
Program.
Finally, the QDR determined that we must prepare right now
against the danger of asymmetric threats, including chemical and
biological weapons. That's why we're adding about $1 billion to
counter-proliferation programs and moving to institutionalize
counter-proliferation, so it is integral to all military
activities, plans, logistics, maneuver and strike, as well as
internationalize it and encourage our allies to prepare for these
threats seriously.
The plan coming out of the QDR will allow us to reach that
Revolution in Military Affairs that we seek. But a central
conclusion of the review was that the only way we could pay for
this revolution was to also have another revolution -- a
Revolution in the Business Affairs of DoD, to slough off the
excess weight we still carry from the long winter of the Cold
War. What we're talking about is a fundamental reengineering of
the way we do business. American industry has reengineered the
way it does business and, as a result, has regained its
leadership in rapidly changing global markets. We must do the
same if we are to retain our leadership in the rapidly changing
global security arena.
This will free up resources that we need to modernize the
force. It will also make our support organizations more
responsive to the warfighters they support. We can sharpen the
blade and shave the hilt to give America a sword that is more
lethal and more agile. And we cannot afford to wait.
That's why the modest reductions in active forces we have
proposed will be targeted on supporters, not shooters. Thus, the
QDR will reduce 109,000 civilian and military personnel
associated with infrastructure. That's also why I have gone to
Congress to ask for two additional rounds of base closures. Even
after four BRAC rounds, we still have excess facilities. Force
structure is down 33 percent, and will be down 36 percent under
our plans. But over the same period, domestic infrastructure
will be down only 21 percent. It's time to take the next step.
The QDR also adopted initiatives to reduce personnel and
costs of defense agencies and defense-wide activities by
outsourcing selected logistics, accounting and health support
programs. But much more needs to be done. To take best
advantage of the benefits of outsourcing we need relief from
legislative impediments especially the 60/40 rule, that
requires 60 percent of depot maintenance to be performed in
public depots.
I have appointed a Defense Reform Task Force, which will be
overseen by DoD Comptroller John Hamre, to make a fundamental re-
examination of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, defense
agencies, defense-wide activities, and the military departments,
and to advise me on how best to restructure, consolidate and re-
engineer them. They will report to me in November, but in the
meantime, I will proceed with steps that make sense. We have no
time to waste.
The bottom line is that we must deregulate DoD so that we
can become as efficient and agile as the warfighters. The
American people will not stand for waste and inefficiency,
whether it stems from "tradition" or legislation. The QDR
addressed and tackled many tough issues and required difficult
choices. There will be concerns expressed on Capitol Hill and
elsewhere over some of our decisions especially those to reduce
certain programs and eliminate excess infrastructure. Indeed,
the cries are already being sounded.
As an alternative to infrastructure cuts, some may propose
cutting or eliminating certain programs. But this is not a
simple dollars game. The QDR represents a coherent set of
interlocking pieces that taken as whole enable us to execute the
strategy. We are open to constructive ideas but any proposed
changes must meet the rigorous test of fulfilling the strategy.
Killing a program to save a base might look like an equal trade
to an accountant -- but not to the warfighter.
The fact is we need to be like a decathlon athlete -- fast,
agile and able to do many things well. And if we continue to
carry around our excess weight, we will not be able to jump as
high nor run as fast or as far. So critics who don't like base
closings or outsourcing better be able to tell us how many air
wings they want to take out, how many carriers, how many
divisions, because there is no more money. They better be able
to say what part of the strategy they want to change, which part
of the world we should ignore. And ultimately they need to be
prepared to answer the question of how many more casualties they
are willing to accept in some future conflict where we don't have
the best technology in the hands of our warfighters.
Having spent a quarter century on Capitol Hill, and having
witnessed the difficult transformation for communities affected
by base closures, I fully appreciate the reaction we are
receiving to our infrastructure decisions. But I would ask my
former colleagues to please join me in shaping the strongest
possible military force for those who wear the uniform today --
and for soldiers not yet born. It is easy to become focused on
near-term concerns. But we are called to look ahead to make
choices that will ensure our children and grandchildren can enjoy
lasting peace -- a peace that can be secured only by a strong and
effective military.