From: Christopher Papile [c_papile@yahoo.com]

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MSHA/SORV

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To: zzMSHA-Standards - Comments to Fed Reg Group

Subject: RIN: 1219-AB46

Comments RIN: 1219-AB46

Dear MSHA,

The Department of Labor's Emergency Mine Evacuation Final Rule ought to take into account a couple points which I have communicated to MSHA on a number of occasions since before Sago. I note that MSHA is trying to do alot to improve the situation of miners since Sago, this is of course good, but I like to bring to your attention again the following points:

1. Increasing the number of pressurized oxygen tanks underground causes a secondary hazard of these tanks having a secondary explosion during/right-after a primary explosion. Although there is a history of having a extra SCSRs underground and a history of using oxygen tanks in welding, one needs to consider the effect of adding many new oxygen tanks which are usually at 3500 psi.

2. Oxygen candles are also not safe, both because they create heat and oxygen in the same place.

3. Potassium Super Oxide is not particularly safe, because it sometimes does not work, can put burning powder in lungs, can dry lungs, give terrible feeling on trying to acquire oxygen from the device, and is an oxidant surrounded by fuel (coal dust, methane, carbon monoxide).

4. Rescue Chambers must have enough air to purge-out several times and keep a positive pressure inside, and therefore they must have many pressurized air tanks. Even though air is not considered overly flammable, since it contains nitrogen, many pressurized air tanks are dangerous, as a source of secondary explosion.

5. There are other ways to make oxygen which will keep out methane and carbon monoxide and will also offer no new flammable hazard. In your rule "Emergency Mine Evacuation Final Rule", there is no mention of added hazard in having many new such **oxidation sources** underground. Either you have not considered that, or you have considered it and declared it to be safe (if that is the case it is good to declare it publically as such). I am an inventor who is designing ways to make oxygen in such situations that brings no new flammable source. I feel from all I read in your efforts, this point is being overlooked. What happens if one of these new SCSRs leaks, or is crushed by heavy machinery, or bursts in a secondary explosion? One must consider these things, even if the available options are currently limited.

Lastly let me note, that (1) I have attended and spoke at meetings before Sago on this topic, (2) I wrote comments before to your web site (AB44-COMM-77), (3)spoke with an engineer from your office just after Sago, (4) went to the meeting in April in Washington and spoke on the microphone, (5) tried to speak with Dr. Kravitz, (6) tried to get in the Department of Labor meeting (Washington, D.C. on March 13, 2006) but was not allowed, (7) I have spoken about this topic on CBS news, and to several newspapers (West Virginia Herald Dispatch included), and (8) went to the West Virginia meeting. I have tried my darnedest to make this topic known to MSHA/Department of Labor, but I am bit frustrated. Your efforts that I read about are practical, and that is important in safety, but we also need to have a vision of what could be. Of course it is not easy to design an oxygen generation device that brings in no new source of hazard, but at the least one must recognize the hazard you accept when one does not even discuss such a possibility.

Thank you for your attention.

AB46-COMM-21

Regards,

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