

The Honorable Robert B. Zoellick  
United States Trade Representative  
Executive Office of the President  
Washington, D.C. 20508

April 22, 2004

Dear Ambassador Zoellick:

Pursuant to Section 2104 (e) of the Trade Act of 2002 and Section 135 (e) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, I am pleased to transmit the report of the Labor Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy on the U.S. – Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, reflecting committee's consensus advisory opinion on the proposed Agreement.

Sincerely,

George Becker  
Chair of the Labor Advisory Committee on  
Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy

# **The U.S.-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement**

**Report of the  
Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy (LAC)**

**April 22, 2004**

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**Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy  
Report to the President, the Congress and the United States Trade Representative  
on the U.S.-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement**

April 22, 2004

**I. Purpose of the Committee Report**

Section 2104(e) of the Trade Act of 2002 (TPA) requires that advisory committees provide the President, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), and Congress with reports required under Section 135(e)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, not later than 30 days after the President notifies Congress of his intent to enter into an agreement.

Under Section 135(e) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, the report of the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations and each appropriate policy advisory committee must include an advisory opinion as to whether and to what extent the agreement promotes the economic interests of the United States and achieves the applicable overall and principle negotiating objectives set forth in the Trade Act of 2002.

The committee report must also include an advisory opinion as to whether the agreement provides for equity and reciprocity within the relevant sectoral or functional area of the committee.

Pursuant to these requirements, the Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy (LAC) hereby submits the following report.

**II. Executive Summary of the Committee Report**

This report reviews the mandate and priorities of the LAC, and presents the advisory opinion of the Committee regarding the U.S.-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (DRFTA). It is the opinion of the LAC that the DRFTA neither fully meets the negotiating objectives laid out by Congress in TPA, nor promotes the economic interest of the United States.

The labor provisions of the DRFTA will not protect the core rights of workers in either country, and represent a big step backwards from the Jordan FTA and our unilateral trade preference programs. The agreement's enforcement procedures completely exclude obligations for governments to meet international standards on workers' rights. Provisions on investment, procurement, and services constrain governments' ability to regulate in the public interest, pursue responsible procurement policies, and provide public services. Rules of origin and safeguards provisions invite producers to circumvent the intended beneficiaries of the trade agreement and fail to protect workers from the import surges that may result.

**III. Brief Description of the Mandate of the Labor Advisory Committee**

The LAC charter lays out broad objectives and scope for the committee's activity. It states that the mandate of the LAC is:

To provide information and advice with respect to negotiating objectives and bargaining positions before the U.S. enters into a trade agreement with a foreign country or countries, with respect to the operation of any trade agreement once entered into, and with respect to other matters arising in connection with the development, implementation, and administration of the trade policy of the United States.

The LAC is one of the most representative committees established by Congress to advise the administration on U.S. trade policy. The LAC is the only advisory committee with more than one labor representative as a member. The LAC includes unions from nearly every sector of the U.S. economy, including manufacturing, high technology, services, and the public sector. It includes representatives from unions at the local and national level, together representing more than 13 million American working men and women.

#### **IV. Negotiating Objectives and Priorities of the Labor Advisory Committee**

As workers' representatives, the members of the LAC judge U.S. trade policy based on its real-life outcomes for working people in America. Our trade policy must be formulated to improve economic growth, create jobs, raise wages and benefits, and allow all workers to exercise their rights in the workplace. Too many trade agreements have had exactly the opposite result. Since NAFTA went into effect, for example, our combined trade deficit with Canada and Mexico has grown from \$9 billion to \$95 billion, leading to the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs in the United States. Under NAFTA, U.S. employers took advantage of their new mobility and the lack of protections for workers' rights in the agreement to shift production, hold down domestic wages and benefits, and successfully intimidate workers trying to organize unions in the U.S. with threats to move to Mexico.

In order to create rather than destroy jobs, trade agreements must be designed to reduce our historic trade deficit by providing fair and transparent market access, preserving our ability to use domestic trade laws, and addressing the negative impacts of currency manipulation, non-tariff trade barriers, financial instability, and high debt burdens on our trade relationships. In order to protect workers' rights, trade agreements must include enforceable obligations to respect the core labor standards of the International Labor Organization (ILO) – freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, and prohibitions on child labor, forced labor, and discrimination – in their core text and on parity with other provisions in the agreement.

The LAC is also concerned with the impact that U.S. trade policy has on other matters of interest to our members. Trade policy must protect our government's ability to regulate in the public interest; to use procurement dollars to create jobs, promote economic development and achieve other legitimate social goals; and to provide high-quality public services. Finally, we believe that American workers must be able to participate meaningfully in the decisions our government makes on trade, based on a process that is open, democratic, and fair.

#### **V. Advisory Committee Opinion on the Agreement**

The DRFTA fails to meet these basic goals. The DRFTA largely replicates the NAFTA, which has cost the U.S. hundreds of thousands of jobs, allowed violations of core labor standards to continue, and resulted in numerous challenges to laws and regulations designed to protect the public interest. In the past three years, American workers have lost 2.8 million manufacturing

jobs, many due to the failures of our trade policy. These same policies resulted in another record-breaking trade deficit last year, of \$489 billion. The U.S. ran a deficit of \$242 million with the Dominican Republic last year, and, if history is any guide, the FTA will only worsen our bilateral trade deficit.

The LAC is not opposed in principle to expanding trade with the Dominican Republic, if a trade agreement could be crafted that would promote the interests of working people in, and benefit the economies of, both countries. Unfortunately, the U.S. Trade Representative has failed to reach such agreement. Instead, the labor provisions of the DRFTA make little progress beyond the ineffective NAFTA labor side agreement and actually move backwards from the labor provisions of our unilateral trade preference programs and the Jordan FTA. Meanwhile, the commercial provisions of the agreement do more to protect the interests of U.S. multinational corporations than they do to promote balanced trade and equitable development.

#### **A. Trade Impacts of the DRFTA**

In every case in which the United States has concluded a comprehensive “free trade agreement” with another country, the impact on our trade balance has been negative, despite promises to the contrary. Our combined trade deficit with Canada and Mexico is now more than ten times what it was before NAFTA went into effect. Since granting China Permanent Normal Trade Relations in 2000, the U.S. trade deficit with China has increased by almost 43 percent, hitting a staggering \$124 billion last year – making it our single largest bilateral deficit. The U.S. has even managed to rack up a trade deficit with tiny Jordan, with whom we had a surplus when we entered into a free trade agreement in 2001. Our trade deficit continues to rise as we reach new trade deals. Even in the services sector, where we are supposed to enjoy a trade advantage, we have seen our surplus fall as U.S. investors move overseas to export services back into the U.S. market.

It is likely that our trade balance will fare much the same way under the Dominican Republic agreement. The administration has still not released any analysis of the economic impacts of the agreement, despite clear instructions from Congress to do so. Section 2102(c)(5) of TPA instructs the President to provide a public report to Congress on the impact of a future trade agreement on United States employment and labor markets. This review is supposed to be available as early as possible in the negotiations, before negotiating proposals are put forward. But now, even after negotiations have been concluded, there is still no such review available. The ITC review of the economic impact of new trade agreement, also mandated by Congress in TPA, has only begun, and is not due until after the agreement is signed.

The sector in which trade with the Dominican Republic is likely to deteriorate the most is in apparel. The main text of the DRFTA is CAFTA, and the Dominican agreement contains many of the same loopholes on textiles and apparel that are in the Central American agreement. These loopholes will not only help destroy jobs in the United States – they will also put textile workers in Central America at risk as regional rules of origin are loosened to make way for third-country fabric, most likely to be from Asia. Third countries that benefit from these weakened rules have no obligation to respect workers’ rights under the agreement, and provide no reciprocal trade benefits to the U.S. This scheme will close even more American textile mills, hasten the decline of Central American producers, and benefit large multinationals that seek to ship even more work out of the region entirely. These loopholes are explored in detail in the “Rules of Origin”

section of the LAC's report on CAFTA, submitted on March 19, 2004. The DRFTA also increases access for the Dominican Republic to the U.S. sugar market by nearly twenty percent. Increased sugar imports from the region overall under CAFTA could threaten to destabilize the delicate supply and pricing mechanisms of the American sugar industry, putting thousands of American workers at risk of losing their jobs.

Market access provisions are not the only aspects of the agreement that will destroy U.S. jobs. Shortly after NAFTA went into effect, Mexico's large external indebtedness and inability to control speculative foreign capital contributed to a devastating financial crisis and the collapse of the peso. While the U.S. stepped in to bail out the Mexican economy, the massive devaluation made Mexican goods so much cheaper in comparison to American goods that our trade deficit ballooned and our economy bled jobs. The crisis also slammed Mexican workers, and ten years after NAFTA went into effect real wages in Mexico are lower and poverty is higher. The DRFTA does nothing constructive to address these important issues of external indebtedness, currency manipulation, and financial speculation. This is not just a theoretical concern in the Dominican Republic, which recently experienced its most severe financial crisis in decades. Instead of safeguarding against these risks, the FTA actually restricts the Dominican Republic's ability to impose capital controls and regulate financial speculation, increasing the likelihood of crisis, devaluation, and chronic imbalances in our trading relationship.

### **B. Labor Provisions of the DRFTA**

The DRFTA's combination of unregulated trade and increased capital mobility not only puts jobs at risk, it places workers in both countries in more direct competition over the terms and conditions of their employment. High-road competition based on skills and productivity can benefit workers, but low-road competition based on weak protections for workers' rights drags all workers down into a race to the bottom. Congress recognized this danger in TPA, and directed USTR to ensure that workers' rights would be protected in new trade agreements. One of the overall negotiating objectives in TPA is "to promote respect for worker rights ... consistent with core labor standards of the ILO" in new trade agreement. TPA also includes negotiating objectives on the worst forms of child labor, non-derogation from labor laws, and effective enforcement of labor laws.

Unfortunately, the labor provisions of the DRFTA fall far short of meeting these objectives. Instead, the agreement relies on the labor provisions of CAFTA, which actually step backwards from existing labor rights provisions in the U.S. – Jordan FTA and in our Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program. This is of particular concern given the fact that GSP has been a useful tool for improving workers' rights in the Dominican Republic, leading to labor law reforms in 1992. Though these reforms were inadequate and allowed a number of deficiencies to remain in the country's labor law, they provide an important example of the potential for positive change when trade benefits are linked directly to compliance with international labor standards as they are in the GSP program.

Unfortunately, if the FTA goes into effect, the GSP tool will no longer be available to workers, and will be replaced by CAFTA's significantly weaker labor provisions. The labor provisions of CAFTA were criticized in detail in the LAC's report on the agreement. Rather than repeat that analysis, this section focuses on particular weaknesses in labor rights protections in the

Dominican Republic. Labor laws in the Dominican Republic fail to meet international standards on freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the DRFTA will allow these deficiencies to persist:

- The labor code establishes onerous requirements for union registration which, in practice, are used to deny recognition to legitimate unions. The Labor Code establishes a minimum of 20 workers to form a union.<sup>1</sup> The union must hold a general assembly and provide the State Labor Secretariat (SET) with the minutes of this assembly, the union by-laws, a list of the founding members, and an invitation to all workers to attend the founding assembly.<sup>2</sup> Thus, the law requires the union to publicly announce the formation of the union before it is constituted, effectively inviting employer reprisal. The Director General of Labor (DGT) has ten days to review the documents and may reject them if the by-laws do not contain the essential elements for the functioning of the union, or if any of their provisions violates the law.<sup>3</sup> In practice, registration may be denied on purely technical grounds. For example, registration was denied to the union at Westinghouse in the Itabo zone in 1993 on the grounds that the union's use of the word "restructuring" was not legally equivalent to the term "reorganization."<sup>4</sup> In addition, the Labor Code requires the union to register the following documents with the Justice of the Peace: the names, profession, address and identification number of each member; an inventory of all of the union's property; a complete accounting of all of the union's income and expenditures; and the minutes of all general assemblies, executive committee meetings, and meetings of other union bodies. These excessive requirements violate Article 3 of ILO Convention no. 87.
- The Labor Code fails to adequately protect workers from anti-union discrimination. The Labor Code permits dismissal without cause (*desahucio*), except in the cases of workers protected by the union exemption (*fuero sindical*), workers who are pregnant or who have recently given birth, and workers who are on vacation, incapacitated, or on medical leave.<sup>5</sup> The *fuero sindical* protects only a limited number of workers: the 20 founding members of the union, between five and ten elected union leaders (depending on the size of the firm), and three members of the negotiating committee.<sup>6</sup> Other union members and activists may be legally dismissed without cause.<sup>7</sup> Article 391 of the Labor Code requires previous authorization by the Labor Court to dismiss a worker protected by *fuero sindical*. While this provision in theory should provide a shield against anti-union firings by employers, in practice it has often been used as a sword directed against workers who seek to organize. When employers ask the Labor Courts to authorize dismissal of a protected union founder or leader, the Courts take these cases on an expedited basis and issue a decision within five days, with no right of appeal. In contrast, when workers who have been fired using the

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<sup>1</sup> Código de Trabajo, Art. 324.

<sup>2</sup> Código de Trabajo, Art. 374.

<sup>3</sup> Código de Trabajo, Art. 376.

<sup>4</sup> Consejo Nacional de Unidad Sindical (CNUS), *Recopilación de los principales violaciones a los derechos laborales en la República Dominicana relacionados a políticas antisindicales, reducción del estado y libre comercio*, October 2003 [hereinafter *Recopilación*], p.12.

<sup>5</sup> Código de Trabajo, Art. 75.

<sup>6</sup> Código de Trabajo, Arts. 389-90.

<sup>7</sup> See International Labor Organization, *La situación sociolaboral en las zonas francas y empresas maquiladoras del istmo centroamericano y República Dominicana*, 1996, pp. 413, 418-19.



*desahucio* procedure appeal their dismissals, these cases are handled through the regular civil procedures, which may take two years or longer to order reinstatement of the fired workers.<sup>8</sup> In practice, employers take advantage of these provisions to harass, intimidate, fire, blacklist, and even physically threaten workers who try to form unions, particularly in the country's free trade zones (FTZs).

- A union must represent an absolute majority of all workers in an enterprise or branch of activity in order to bargain collectively, in violation of Article 4 of ILO Convention no. 98. This requirement denies minority unions the right to bargain on behalf of their members, thus depriving workers of their right to form more than one functioning union within an enterprise. The ILO found that, “the requirement is excessive because in many cases it could constitute an obstacle to collective bargaining or even make it impossible.”<sup>9</sup>
- Fifty-one percent of workers in an enterprise, including those who are not union members, must vote to approve a strike. The ILO has recommended that the law be revised to ensure that the quorum for casting a strike vote is reasonable and that only a majority of the votes actually cast by union members be required to authorize a strike.<sup>10</sup>
- Federations must obtain approval from two-thirds of their members in order to establish a confederation. This is contrary to Article 5 of ILO Convention no. 87, which grants full freedom to federations to determine their own rules for establishing confederations. The ILO Committee of Experts has recommended that the law be reformed.<sup>11</sup>
- Employees of autonomous and municipal state institutions are excluded from the protection of national labor laws, denying them the right to join unions and bargain with their employers. Associations of public servants must represent a minimum of 40 percent of the total number of employees in a public agency in order to be registered. The ILO has criticized the percentage requirement for being too high and requested reforms to bring the labor legislation into compliance with ILO standards.<sup>12</sup>

In addition to these deficiencies in the Dominican Republic's labor laws, there are serious problems with labor law enforcement in the country, making those rights that do exist on paper

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<sup>8</sup> *Recopilación*, pp. 16-17.

<sup>9</sup> ILO Committee of Experts, *Individual Observation Concerning Convention No. 98* (2002).

<sup>10</sup> ILO Committee of Experts, *Individual Observation Concerning Convention No. 87* (2003), para. 4.

<sup>11</sup> “The Committee notes that, by virtue of sections 383 and 388 of the Labour Code, the agreement of two federations, supported by the votes of two-thirds of their members, is still required to establish a confederation. The Committee recalls in this respect the commitments made by the Government in the past, which it has failed to fulfill, that it would submit to the National Congress a Bill allowing federations to set out in their rules the necessary requirements to establish confederations, after consulting the most representative occupational organizations. Accordingly, the Committee recalls that provisions which make the establishment of higher level organizations subject to the fulfillment of various excessive conditions are contrary to Article 5 of the Convention (see General Survey of 1994 on freedom of association and collective bargaining, paragraph 191). It urges the Government to ensure that it removes from the applicable legislation in the near future the restrictions relating to the requirement for two-thirds of the members of federations to vote for the establishment of a confederation, so that it is left to the rules of federations to lay down the criteria in this respect.” ILO Committee of Experts, *Individual Observation Concerning Convention No. 87* (2003), para. 1.

<sup>12</sup> *Id.*, para. 5.

very difficult to exercise in practice. In general, employers enjoy impunity for their repeated violations of workers' rights, while workers face a legal system that is unresponsive and unreliable. Even when the labor courts do find violations and rule against employers, their decisions are regularly defied and judgments are not enforced. Enforcement is particularly problematic in the country's 40 free trade zones, which employ more than 170,000 workers. Very few FTZ workers are members of recognized trade unions, and there are only three functioning collective bargaining agreements in the zones.

Problems persist in other sectors of the Dominican economy as well. Since the privatization of the sugar industry in 1999, working conditions have deteriorated in cane fields. Sugar cane workers are paid less than four dollars a day and cheated out of some of their paltry wages at plantation-run stores – the only places that accept the tickets workers receive in lieu of cash. Employers withhold wages and use guards to keep workers from leaving the plantations. Workers live in shantytowns without schools, hospitals, running water or sanitation. Discrimination against Haitian immigrant workers has been condemned in recent reports from Human Rights Watch and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Over the past few years, there have been reports of the use of child labor and anti-union dismissals.

The labor provisions in the DRFTA will not require any strengthening of Dominican labor laws, and will do very little to ensure that enforcement improves. The provisions on enforcement of labor laws are particularly weak in contrast to the FTA's enforcement obligations for intellectual property rights – specifically broadcast protection. In a side letter to the FTA, the Dominican government commits to provide quarterly reports on progress in television piracy cases, and to “immediately achieve the expeditious resolution” of pending cases. Though the same problems with judicial process and rule of law plague the enforcement of workers' rights, no such additional enforcement obligations were created to help guarantee workers' rights to organize and bargain collectively. It is particularly worrisome that the Administration failed to improve upon CAFTA's labor rights provisions in the Dominican agreement given recent public statements from the Dominican ambassador suggesting a willingness to strengthen the labor rights obligations in the agreement.

### **C. Other Issues in the DRFTA**

In addition to the problems with the labor provisions of the Dominican Republic agreement outlined above, commercial provisions of the agreement also raise serious concerns for the LAC. The commercial provisions of the agreement are found in the Central America FTA, which the LAC commented on at length in its March 19, 2004 report on CAFTA. Rather than repeat the same concerns here regarding investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, rules of origin, safeguards, and services, the LAC refers readers to its CAFTA report.

## **VI. Conclusion**

The LAC recommends that the President not sign the Dominican Republic agreement until it is renegotiated to fully address each of the concerns raised in this report. If the President does send the agreement to Congress in its current form, Congress should reject the agreement, and send a strong message to USTR that future agreements must make a radical departure from the failed NAFTA model in order to succeed.

The LAC recommends that USTR reorder its priorities before continuing with negotiations towards new free trade agreements with the Andean Region, Bahrain, Panama, Southern Africa, and Thailand. American workers are willing to support increased trade if the rules that govern it stimulate growth, create jobs, and protect fundamental rights. The LAC is committed to fighting for better trade policies that benefit U.S. workers and the U.S. economy as a whole. We will oppose trade agreements that do not meet these basic standards.

## **VII. Membership of the Labor Advisory Committee**

1. Ande Abbott, Director, Shipbuilding & Marine Division, International Brotherhood of Railway Building
2. Marjorie Allen, Legislative Representative, AFSCME, AFL-CIO
3. Paul Almeida, President, Department of Professional Employees, AFL-CIO
4. Mark Anderson, Secretary-Treasurer, Food and Allied Service Trades Department, AFL-CIO
5. R. Russell Bailey, Senior Attorney, Airlines Pilots Association
6. Gary Baker, President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 173
7. John Barry, President, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
8. Albert Battisti, Alkali Chemical Plant
9. George Becker, President Emeritus, United Steelworkers of America
10. Steve Beckman, International Economist, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
11. Joseph Bennetta, Teamsters Local 191
12. Brian Bergin, Assistant to the President, Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO
13. Carrie Biggs-Adams, Representative-International Affairs, Communications Workers of America
14. Michael D. Boggs, International Affairs Director, Laborers' International Union of North America, LIUNA
15. Stephen Brown, PACE Local 8-0712, Potlatch Corporation, Consumer Products Division
16. Patricia Campos, Legislative Director, Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE!)
17. Francis Chiappardi, Jr., General President, National Federation of Independent Unions
18. Joseph Coccho, President, American Flint Glass Workers
19. William Cunningham, Associate Director, Department of Legislation, American Federation of Teachers
20. Joseph W. Davis, Assistant Director of International Affairs, American Federation of Teachers
21. Elizabeth Drake, International Policy Analyst, AFL-CIO
22. Jennifer Lynn Esposito, Legislative Representative, International Brotherhood of Teamsters
23. Cathy Feingold, Program Specialist, Women in the Global Economy, AFL-CIO
24. Douglas A. Fraser, Professor, College of Urban, Labor and Metropolitan Affairs, Wayne State University
25. Patricia A. Friend, International President, Association of Flight Attendants
26. Michael W. Gildea, Assistant to the President, Department of Professional Employees, AFL-CIO
27. Stephen Goldberg, Professor, Northwestern University Law School

28. Arthur Gundersheim, Union of Needletrades, Industrial And Textile Employees (UNITE!)
29. Owen Herrnstadt, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
30. John Howley, Policy Director, Service Employees International Union
31. David Johnson, President, UFCW International Vice President, National Apparel, Garment and Textile Workers Council
32. Harry Kamberis, Director, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center
33. Don Kaniewski, Legislative and Political Director, Laborers' International Union of North America, (LIUNA)
34. Brendan Kenny, Legislative Representative, Air Line Pilots Association
35. Bill Klinefelter, Legislative and Political Director, United Steelworkers of America
36. Anne Knipper, Assistant to the Director, International Affairs Department, AFL-CIO
37. Thea Lee, Public Policy Department, AFL-CIO
38. Larry Liles, International Representative, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
39. William "Bill" Luddy, Director, Labor Management Trust, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America
40. Lawrence Martinez, VP Graphic Communication, Graphic Communications International Union
41. Jay Mazur, President, Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE!)
42. Lindsey McLaughlin, Washington Representative, International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union
43. Douglas Meyer, Director, Economic Research & Public Policy, International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Technical, Salaried & Machine Workers
44. Francis X. Pecquex, Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Maritime Trades Department, AFL-CIO
45. Cheryl Peterson, Senior Policy Fellow, American Nurses Association
46. Keith D. Romig, Jr., Director, National and International Affairs, PACE International Union
47. Michael Sacco, President, Seafarers International Union of North America
48. Jim Sauber, Research Director, National Association of Letter Carriers
49. Denny Scott, Assistant Director of Organizing, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America
50. Michelle Sforza, Public Policy Analyst, AFSCME
51. Barbara Shailor, Director, International Affairs Department, AFL-CIO
52. James Sheehan, United Steel Workers of America
53. Talmage E. Simpkins, Executive Director, AFL-CIO Maritime Committee
54. Alan Spaulding, International Affairs, United Food and Commercial Workers
55. Ann Tonjes, Manager, Policy Planning, Association of Flight Attendants
56. Edward Wytkind, President, Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO
57. Gregory Woodhead, Public Policy Department, AFL-CIO
58. David Yoeckel, Senior Research Analyst, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers of America