- All of the OXCART’s operational missions were flown out of Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, shown here.
Facing changed circumstances in relations with the Soviet
Union and in US satellite development, US policymakers and intelligence
officials had to come to grips with how best to use the A-12 as it neared
completion. Its intended purpose, replacing the U-2 in overflights of the
Soviet Union, had become less and less likely well before the A-12 was
operational. Soviet air defenses had advanced to the point that even an
aircraft flying faster than a rifle bullet at the edge of space could be
tracked. In any event, President Kennedy had stated publicly that the United
States would not resume such missions. DCI McCone was determined to find a use
for the aircraft—which he later described as “quite invulnerable except under
miraculous circumstances” when it met design specifications.
[1] But he lost the argument then, as well as later, when making the case for
deploying the A-12 to help determine whether the Soviets had constructed an
antiballistic missile system around Leningrad. By 1965, moreover, the
photoreconnaissance satellite programs had progressed to the point that manned
flights over the Soviet Union were unnecessary to collect strategic
intelligence.
The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 drew attention to
the OXCART program because of the threat the U-2 faced from Cuban air defenses.
U-2s regularly overflew the island after nuclear missiles were discovered there
in mid-October, but two weeks after the discovery, a U-2 was shot down by a
Cuban surface-to-air missile. Regular high-altitude reconnaissance of Cuba
might no longer be possible. The A-12 now had a potential mission, and
achieving operational status became a priority. Because of continued
difficulties in achieving design requirements with the J58 engine, however, the
A‑12 would have to be flown only at up to Mach 2.8 at below 80,000 feet.
This risky program, codenamed SKYLARK, was accelerated during
the summer of 1964, after Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev declared that after
the US elections in November, U-2s flying over Cuba would be shot down. In
August, Acting DCI Marshall Carter ordered that SKYLARK be operationally ready
by 5 November 1964 in case Khrushchev carried out his threat. [2] A detachment of five pilots and ground
crew was organized to validate camera performance and qualify pilots for Mach
2.8 operations. They would have to go into action without the full complement
of ECMs, as only one of the several devices planned would be available by the
deadline, and Agency technical officers were certain that the Cubans would
detect the flights and could shoot down the A-12s.
In the end, Khrushchev’s threat was bluster, and the A-12
never was used against Cuba. US officials were still discussing the possibility
nearly two years later, however, and CIA officials regarded Cuban overflights
as a potentially productive way to test the A-12’s ECMs in a hostile area where
weather was a factor. Agency analysts judged that the Soviets most likely would
react to the flights privately and in low key. The 303 Committee—the NSC group
that reviewed sensitive intelligence operations—rejected the idea because it
“would disturb the existing calm prevailing in that area of our foreign
affairs." [3]
East Asia was the next area US leaders considered using the
A-12. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) had successfully tested a nuclear
device in October 1964, and US military activity in Vietnam was increasing.
Overhead collection would be the most important method for monitoring the
Chinese program and the military situation in Vietnam, but satellites did not
have a quick reaction capability, and several U-2s and drones had been lost
over China. US military and intelligence officials drew up a plan for flying
OXCART aircraft out of Kadena Air Base on Okinawa under a program called BLACK
SHIELD. The Pentagon made available nearly $4 million to provide support
facilities on the island, which were to be ready by early fall 1965.
Meanwhile, North Vietnam was starting to deploy SAMs around
Hanoi, and a concerned Secretary of Defense McNamara inquired in June 1965
about substituting A-12s for U-2s for reconnaissance over the North. CIA said
that BLACK SHIELD missions could be flown over Vietnam as soon as operational
performance requirements were achieved. With an overseas deployment looming,
personnel at the A‑12 test site went all out to have the aircraft meet mission
requirements by late 1965. Improvements came faster than expected.
In August, DCI William Raborn, who replaced McCone in April
1965, notified President Johnson that an A-12 had successfully simulated an
operational mission with two refuelings and three cruise legs. On each leg the
aircraft reached its design cruising speed of Mach 3.1 at altitudes between
80,000 and 90,000 feet. The flight covered a total distance of 7,480 miles in
just under five and a half hours; forty percent of that time was spent at
cruising speed. Only three minor malfunctions occurred; significantly, none
involved the air inlets and electrical systems or were related to high heat. [4]
[Top of page]
“The Bird Should Leave Its
Nest”
Kelly Johnson’s firm managerial hand had gotten OXCART back
on track. Four A-12s were selected for BLACK SHIELD, and final validation
flights were conducted during the fall. During them, the A-12s flew faster,
higher, and longer than ever before. On 12 November 1965, the CIA’s director of
special activities in charge of the program wrote to the Agency’s director of
reconnaissance that he was “very pleased to announce that, in my judgment, the
A-12 aircraft, its technical intelligence sensors, and its operating detachment
are operationally ready…. The detachment is manned, equipped, and highly
trained…. The aircraft system is performing up to specifications with
satisfying reliability and repeatability.” Because of “some as yet
unexplainable phenomena at cruise conditions,” the A-12 could not fly as far as
originally intended, but missions could be designed to take that deficiency
into account. By 20 November, the validation flights were complete, and all the
pilots were Mach 3 qualified. Two days later, Johnson told the Agency that “the
time has come when the bird should leave its nest." [5]
Soon after, CIA’s Board of National Estimates (BNE) issued an
assessment of the potential political implications of BLACK SHIELD. The
Agency’s most senior analysts judged that the PRC would quickly track
overflights of its territory but would not start a diplomatic controversy about
them unless it shot down an aircraft. Doing so would occasion a major political
and propaganda campaign, but “[w]e do not believe that OXCART missions, whether
or not any aircraft came down inside China, would significantly affect
Peiping’s broader calculations governing its policy toward the war in Vietnam.”
North Vietnam, “already subjected to heavy US air attack and
reconnaissance…would attach little extra significance to the OXCART operation.”
Lastly, through various sources, the Soviet Union would soon get a fairly
complete picture of the scope of BLACK SHIELD but “would probably take no
action and make no representations on the matter." [6]
Analyses such as the BNE’s informed the approval process for
proposed OXCART missions. The steps were the same as for U-2 flights: an
NSC-level recommendation and a presidential authorization. After the A-12
passed its final tests, in early December the 303 Committee ordered the development
and maintenance of a quick-reaction capability by 1 January 1966, with
deployment to Okinawa 21 days after the president issued his go order.
Then, nothing happened for more than a year. The 303
Committee approved none of CIA’s five deployment requests, submitted with
support in most instances from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the PFIAB.
Community analysts continued to believe the Chinese, North Vietnamese, or
Soviets would not react publicly and belligerently to the missions. Siding with
top State and Defense officials, however, the committee did not believe the
intelligence requirements at the time—including warning of Chinese intervention
in the Vietnam war—were so urgent as to justify the political risk of basing
the detachment at Okinawa or revealing some of the A‑12’s capabilities to
hostile nations.
In addition, some reluctance to use the A-12 was related to
the discussion that had already begun about phasing out the CIA program. In
mid-August 1966, President Johnson listened to the divergent views and upheld
the 303 Committee’s decision not to fly actual missions for the time being. [7]
[Top of page]
Biding Time, Sharpening
Procedures
During these months OXCART personnel worked on refining
mission plans and flight tactics, testing the aircraft and systems, training,
and preparing the forward base at Kadena. The delay was beneficial. Even though the A-12 had been declared
operationally ready, important components in the propulsion system still needed
correction. More efficient procedures reduced the time required to go from
mission notification to deployment from 21 to 15 days. Six operationally
configured aircraft were constantly training and engaging in operational flight simulations.
In October 1966, one week after its first flight, Article 127
flew for seven hours and 40 minutes, the longest time in air so far. Two months
later, Lockheed test pilot Bill Parks completed an impressive demonstration of
the A-12’s capabilities by flying 10,198 miles in six hours at an average speed
of 1,659 mph (including slowdowns for refueling)—setting a speed and distance
record unattainable by any other aircraft. By mid-February 1967, 2,299 test and
training flights had been flown over 3,628 hours, with more than 332 of those
at Mach 3 or higher. [8]
The first fatality of the OXCART program occurred on 5
January 1967, when Article 125 crashed, killing CIA pilot Walter Ray. Because
of a faulty fuel gauge and related electrical equipment problems, the aircraft
ran out of fuel while on its descent to the test site. Ray ejected at between
30,000 and 35,000 feet but did not separate from the seat. That kept the
parachutes from deploying, and he fell to earth, dying on impact. To protect
the security of the A-12 program, the Air Force informed the media that an
SR-71 was missing and presumed down, and identified the pilot as a civilian.
Like the three crashes that preceded it, Ray’s involved a problem inherent in
any new aircraft—a malfunction of a part specifically designed and built for
it. None of the four incidents occurred while the A-12 was being subjected to
the unprecedented rigors of design speeds and altitudes.
[Top of page]
Missions Begin: Spying on the
Enemy
- OXCART’s first mission over Southeast Asia, 31 May 1967. With pilot Vojvodich in the cockpit, Article 131 refueled three times during its 3 hour 39 minute flight.
By early 1967, the Johnson administration was growing anxious
that the North Vietnamese could deploy surface-to-surface missiles (SSM)
targeted at the South without being detected.
When the president asked for a collection proposal, CIA suggested that
the A-12 be used, noting that its camera was better than those on drones or the
U-2, and that it was much less vulnerable than those platforms and more
versatile than the CORONA satellites.
[9] DCI Helms brought up the idea at a luncheon with the president on 16 May and
got his approval. The Agency put the BLACK SHIELD deployment plan into effect
later that day.
On 17 May, the airlift of personnel and equipment to Kadena
began, and Articles 131, 127, and 129, flown by Vojvodich, Layton, and Weeks,
arrived between 22 and 27 May. The first two flew non-stop from Nevada to
Kadena; the third diverted at Wake Island to correct an equipment malfunction
and finished the trip the next day. The unit, which at its inception had been
designated for security purposes as the 1129th US Air Force Special Activities
Squadron (SAS), Detachment 1, comprised three A-12s, six pilots (three deployed
at a time), and over 250 support personnel. Its commander was Col. Hugh “Slip”
Slater, who had worked with CIA on the U-2 program and at the OXCART test site.
The 1129th SAS was ready for operations by the 29th. The call came the next day
to fly the first mission on the 31st over North Vietnam.
Piloted by Vojvodich (Layton was the secondary, and Weeks was
the backup), Article 131 took off just before 1100 local time in a torrential
downpour. The A-12 had never operated in heavy rain before, but the weather
over the target area was forecast to be satisfactory, so the flight went ahead.
It lasted three hours and 39 minutes and was flown at Mach 3.1 at 80,000 feet.
Vojvodich crossed the coast of North Vietnam at 1014 local time (Vietnam is two
hours ahead of Okinawa), flew the planned single-pass route in less than nine
minutes, refueled over Thailand, exited near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) at
1122, and touched down at Kadena in the rain at 1233 local time.
- This image of Hanoi area was taken during the fourth mission, on 30 June 1967.
The mission was a success, photographing 70 of the 190 known
SAM sites and nine other priority targets, including an airfield, a military
training area, an army barracks, and the port at Haiphong. No SSM facilities
were located. Contrary to some published accounts, neither Chinese nor North
Vietnamese radar tracked the aircraft nor did North Vietnam fire any missiles
at it. Those hostile reactions did not occur until the third and 16th missions,
respectively.
[10]
Through 6 May 1968—the date of what would become the last
flight—the A-12 pilots at Kadena flew 29 missions out of 58 they were put on
alert to perform: 24 over North Vietnam; two over Cambodia, Laos, and the DMZ;
and three over North Korea. The flights were distributed among the pilots:
Collins and Layton had six, Vojvodich and Weeks got five, Murray did four, and
Sullivan was on three. The aircraft were flown at between Mach 3.1 and 3.2 and
a bit above 80,000 feet. At that height, above the jet stream, air turbulence
was minimal, and the curvature of the earth showed beneath the black,
star-flecked sky.
The A-12s’ aeronautical components and photographic systems
proved very reliable. Twenty-seven of
the sorties were judged successful, based on the quality of photography
returned; two were deemed partially successful or unsuccessful due to cloud
cover or a camera malfunction. One mission had to be cut short after one pass
because of an engine problem. None of
the 29 cancelled alerts were the result of mechanical concerns; bad weather
caused all but three, which were due to operational decisions. The A-12s were
so fast that they typically spent only about 12.5 minutes over North Vietnam on
a single-pass mission and 21.5 on a double-pass route.
Project headquarters in the Washington DC area planned and
directed all the A-12 missions. Their preparation followed this procedure: Each
day at 1600 local time a mission alert briefing took place. If the weather
forecast—the key variable in deciding whether to go ahead or cancel the
sorties—seemed favorable, Kadena was alerted and given a flight profile about
28 to 30 hours before takeoff. The primary and back-up aircraft and pilots were
selected. The A-12s—painted black and bearing no markings other than red tail
numbers that were changed every mission—got thorough inspections and servicing,
all systems were checked, and the cameras were loaded into the bays. On the
evening before the day of the flight, the pilots received a detailed briefing
of the route. Twelve hours before takeoff (H minus 12), headquarters again
reviewed the weather over the target. If it was still favorable, preflight
procedures continued.
On the morning of the flight, the pilots got a final
briefing. The aircraft’s condition was reported, weather forecasts were
reviewed, and changes in the mission profile and relevant intelligence was
communicated. At H minus 2, headquarters issued a “go/no-go” decision. At this
point the weather forecast also had to be good for the refueling areas. If the
mission was still on, the primary pilot received a medical examination, suited
up, and squeezed himself into the aircraft. If any malfunctions developed, the
back-up would be ready to fly one hour later. This proved necessary only once.
On the second mission on 10 June 1967, the primary A‑12 lost a fillet panel
during refueling and returned to base, and the back-up completed the mission.
On most BLACK SHIELD flights, the A-12s were airborne about four hours. The
shortest complete mission in Southeast Asia lasted just over 3.5 hours; the
longest took nearly 5.5 hours. The aircraft took on fuel two or three times,
depending on the planned route, on each operational flight: once, soon after
takeoff south of Okinawa, and once over Thailand for each pass it would make
over the target area before it returned to Kadena.
After the A-12s landed, the camera film was removed from the
aircraft, boxed, and sent by courier plane to a processing facility. At first
the film was developed at the Eastman Kodak plant in Rochester, New York. That
trip took too long for US military commanders who wanted the intelligence more
quickly. By late summer, processing was shifted to an Air Force center in
Japan, and the photography could be available to the US military in Vietnam
within 24 hours after a mission was completed.
Less than two months into BLACK SHIELD, analysts had enough
evidence to conclude that North Vietnam had never deployed SSMs. By the end of
1967, the A-12 had collected clear, interpretable photography of all of North
Vietnam except for a small area along the border with the PRC. The BLACK SHIELD
missions provided valuable imagery of SAM sites, airfields and naval bases,
ports, roads, and railroads, industrial facilities, power plants, and supply
depots. Military planners and photo
interpreters used the information to develop air and air defense order of
battle estimates, assess bomb damage, and develop flight routes and target sets
for bombing runs, enabling US pilots to accomplish their missions more effectively
and in greater safety. Analysis of photography of the DMZ gave insights into
North Vietnamese infiltration and supply routes and North Vietnamese and Viet
Cong troop deployments. [11]
President Johnson’s national security adviser, Walt Rostow,
recounted that the A-12 missions (along with those of the SR-71) “were
invaluable to the president.” Without them, he “would never have allowed any
tactical air operations in the North because he was extremely sensitive…to the
possibilities of a bomb accidentally hitting a Chinese or Russian ship while it
was unloading in the harbor, and he also was determined to keep civilian damage
and casualties to a minimum.” Johnson “usually chose the targets personally and
insisted on approving each and every raid into the North…. Before signing off
on a mission he calculated in his own mind whether the anticipated losses were
worth the anticipated gains.” The A-12 and SR-71 photographs “were the decisive factors in helping him to make up his mind." [12]
[Top of page]
Under Fire over Vietnam
North Vietnam fired SAMs at BLACK SHIELD A-12s three times
but caused damage only once. The first attempted shootdown occurred on the 16th
mission on 28 October 1967. Flown by
Dennis Sullivan, the aircraft was on its second pass, approaching Hanoi from
the west, when an SA-2 was launched at it. Photographs taken during the mission
show missile smoke above the SAM site and the missile and its contrail, heading
down and away from the aircraft. The A-12’s ECMs worked well, and the SAM,
which was fired too late, was never a threat. [13]
The second incident, two days later, on the 18th mission, was
the closest an OXCART aircraft ever came to being shot down. Sullivan again was
the pilot. On the first pass between Hanoi and Haiphong, radar tracking
detected two SAM sites preparing to launch, but neither did. On the second pass
toward Hanoi and Haiphong from the west, at least six missiles were fired from
sites around the capital. The A-12 was flying at Mach 3.1 at 84,000 feet.
Looking out the rear-view periscope, Sullivan reported seeing six vapor trails
go up to about 90,000 feet behind the aircraft, arc over, and begin converging
on it. He saw four missiles—one as close as 100 to 200 yards away—and three
detonations behind the A-12. Six missile contrails appeared on mission
photography.
A post-flight inspection at Kadena found that a piece of
metal, probably debris from an exploded missile, had penetrated the lower right
wing and lodged near the fuel tank. A BLACK SHIELD officer at Kadena noted that
the A-12 pilots were “showing considerable anxiety about overflying this area
before we get some answers.” Helms ordered that missions be temporarily
suspended. None was flown until 8 December. It and the following one two
days later photographed the Cambodia-Laos-South Vietnam triborder area and were
not sent over the North. [14]
Sorties over North Vietnam resumed on 15 December and
continued until 8 March 1968—the next-to-last BLACK SHIELD flight. The first two flights took different paths
than the Hanoi-Haiphong route followed by the A-12s that were shot at in late
October. Another SAM was fired on mission 23 on 4 January 1968; that aircraft
took the same route as those that had been attacked. The missile, fired on the
second pass like the others, was captured on photography from launch to
detonation, well over a mile from the aircraft. Two of the next three flights
over North Vietnam came in from the south rather than the east, and all three
stayed farther away from Hanoi and Haiphong than those that had been shot at.
The general times when these flights were made did not change despite the SAM
attacks; all crossed into North Vietnamese territory in the late morning. [15]
[Top of page]
Looking for the Pueblo
The North Korean seizure of the US Navy ship
Pueblo
while it was on a SIGINT mission in international waters on 23 January 1968
enabled the A-12 to demonstrate its superiority as a quick-reaction collection
platform. Although the US military had
indicated its interest in BLACK SHIELD overflights of North Korea even before
the incident, the Department of State had opposed them, and none was planned
when the
Pueblo was captured. Walt Rostow remembered that
“[t]he whole country was up in arms over this incident. The president was
considering using airpower to hit them [the North Koreans] hard and try to
shake our crewmen loose. But when we cooled down, we had to suck in our gut and
hold back until we were sure about the situation.”
Helms urged use of the A-12 to find the missing ship. Johnson
was reluctant at first to offer such a “tempting target” but was assured that
the aircraft “could photograph the whole of North Korea, from the DMZ to the
Yalu River, in less than 10 minutes, and probably do so unobserved by air
defense radar. Which is precisely what happened." [16]
On 24 January the Pueblo advisory
group—comprising senior officials from the White House, the Departments of
Defense and State, and CIA—had Helms draw up a reconnaissance plan that
included A-12s. President Johnson approved their use later that day. [17] On the 26th, Jack Weeks flew a
three-pass mission over the southern part of North Korea and the Demilitarized
Zone. The purpose was to determine whether Pyongyang, which claimed it had
caught the United States spying inside its territorial waters, was mobilizing
for hostilities. Chinese radar tracked
the A-12, but no missiles were fired during the highly successful mission.
Substantial intelligence
was acquired on North Korea’s armed forces; no signs of a military reaction
were detected; and the Pueblo, apparently
undamaged, was found in a small bay north of Wonsan accompanied by two patrol
boats. [18] “So we had to abandon any plans to hit them with airpower,” according to
Rostow. “All that would accomplish would be to kill a lot of people, including
our own.” But the A-12’s photographs “provided proof that our ship and our men
were being held. The Koreans couldn’t lie about that, and we immediately began
negotiations to get them back." [19] After difficult and protracted discussions, North Korea released the surviving crewmembers 11 months later.
The US military wanted a second overflight of North Korea,
but the Pueblo advisory group decided not to recommend
any more right away because the “excellent” photography taken on the 26th,
along with other information, was deemed sufficient to answer the crucial
questions. By mid-February, however, the need returned. After the Department of
State accepted assurances that it was highly unlikely the A‑12 would come down
in hostile territory if something went wrong, the 303 Committee approved two
more missions over the peninsula. They were flown on 19 February and
6 May. On the first sortie, scattered clouds concealed the area where the Pueblo
had been spotted. (The ship had been moved by then.) The second flight—the last
A-12 mission, as it turned out—was piloted by Jack Layton. Like the other
missions over North Korea, it found no sign of a military buildup. [20]
[Top of page]
Footnotes
1. McCone
memorandum for the record, “Discussion at NSC Meeting—5 May 1964,” 5 May 1964.
2. Carter
memorandum to Wheelon, “SKYLARK,” 22 August 1964.
3. [DS&T,] “Vulnerability of the
OXCART Vehicle to the Cuban Air Defense System,” 15 September 1964; NRO Acting
Director memorandum to Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs et
al., “OXCART Reconnaissance of Cuba,” 6 September 1966; Peter Jessup (NSC)
memorandum, “Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 15 September 1966,”
16 September 1966; Wheelon to McCone, “Considerations bearing on OXCART use
over Cuba,” 7 September 1966; CIA Board of National Estimates to Helms,
“Probable Communist Reactions to Use of the OXCART for Reconnaissance over
Cuba,” 6 September 1966; Pedlow and Welzenbach, 44.
4. Raborn,
“Memorandum For the President,” 20 August 1965.
5. CIA Director of Special Activities to CIA Director of
Reconnaissance, “Operational Readiness of the OXCART System,” 12 November 1965;
McIninch, 23.
6. Board of National Estimates,
“Political Problems Involved in Operating OXCART Missions from Okinawa over
Communist China and North Vietnam,” 29 November 1965.
7. Peter Jessup (NSC) memorandum for the President, “Proposed
Deployment and Use of A-12 Aircraft,” 11 April 1966; Raborn memorandum to the
President, “OXCART Deployment Proposal,” 29 April 1966; Raborn memorandum to
the 303 Committee, “OXCART Deployment,” 15 June 1966; Special National
Intelligence Estimate 10-2-66, “Reactions to a Possible US Course of Action,”
17 March 1966; “OXCART Development Summary and Progress (1 October 1966-31
December 1966).”
8. [OSA,]
“Briefing Note for the Director of Central Intelligence…OXCART Status Report,”
15 February 1967
9. Helms memorandum to the 303
Committee, “OXCART Reconnaissance of North Vietnam,” with attachment, 15 May
1967.
10. [OSA,] “Critique for OXCART Mission BSX001,” 6 June 1967;
DS&T, “BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 31 May-15 August 1967,” 22
September 1967, 3-4; National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), “BLACK
SHIELD Mission X-001, 31 May 1967,” NPIC/R-112/67, June 1967; [OSA,] “Critique
for OXCART Mission Number BX6705,” 26 June 1967, and “Critique for OXCART
Mission Number BX6732,” 3 November 1967.
11. OSA mission critiques, 16 June 1967-15 May 1968; DS&T, “BLACK
SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 16 August-31 December 1967,” 31 January 1968,
and “BLACKSHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 1 January-31 March 1968.”
12. Quoted
in Rich and Janos, 244.
13. DS&T, “BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 16 August-31
December 1967,” 31 January 1968, 18-22; D/OSA memorandum to DDS&T,
“Analysis of Surface to Air Missile Engagements for OXCART Missions BX6732 and
BX6734,” 27 November 1967.
14. DDS&T Carl Duckett memorandum to
DCI Richard Helms, “OXCART Operations on 27, 28, 29 October (local time)”;
DS&T, “BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 16 August-31 December 1967,”
31 January 1968, 25-35; D/OSA memorandum to DDS&T, “Analysis of Surface to
Air Missile Engagements for OXCART Missions BX6732 and BX6734,” 27 November
1967; Cable OPCEN 2898, 30 October 1967; Cable from Kadena, IN 91487, 1
November 1967; Donald Smith (EA/DDCI) untitled memorandum to Duckett, 6
November 1967.
15. DS&T, “BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 16 August-31
December 1967,” 36-39; DS&T, “BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 1
January-31 March 1968,” 30 April 1968, 3-8, 10-11, 13-14.
16. Quoted
in Rich and Janos, 245.
17. “Summary Minutes of Pueblo
Group” and “Notes of the President’s Meeting,” both 24 January 1968, Foreign
Relations of the United States, XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 474,
475, 494; Helms memorandum to Walt W. Rostow et al., “OXCART Reconnaissance of
North Korea,” 24 January 1968.
18. NPIC, “North Korea Mission BX 6847, 26 January 1968, Highlights,”
NPIC/R-17/68, January 1968; DS&T, “BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 1
January-31 March 1968,” 30 April 1968, 8-10.
19. Quoted
in Rich and Janos, 245.
20. Joseph F. Carroll (Director, DIA) memorandum to Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, “Requirement for a Second BLACK SHIELD Mission Over North
Korea,” 29 January 1968; “Report on Meeting of the [Pueblo]
Advisory Group” and “Notes of the President’s Luncheon Meeting with Senior
American Advisors,” both 29 January 1968, FRUS, XXIX, Part
1, 557, 565; DS&T, “BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 1
January-31 March 1968,” 30 April 1968, 11, and “BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance
Missions, 1 April-9 June 1968,” 7 August 1968, 2-3; CIA Intelligence
Information Cable, “Implications of Reported Relocation of USS Pueblo,” 12
February 1968, Declassified Documents Reference System, doc. no. CK3100137943.
[Top of page]