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MEMORANDUM FOR: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Date 12/9/44

SUBJECT: Utilization of the Mass of Soviet Refugees. ^{HRP} 44-1

Reference: SECURITY MATTER, 17 March 1945, Utilization of Refugees from the Soviet Union in U.S. National Interest, Recommendation 5, as required of CIA.

PROBLEM: Whether the mass of refugees from the Soviet world, now in free Europe and Asia can be effectively utilized to further U. S. interests in the current struggle with the USSR and whatever may eventuate therefrom.

ANALYSIS:
1. During the past three years, CIA (and its predecessors) has systematically explored the potential intelligence value of the numerous anti-Communist and anti-Soviet groups in Central and Eastern Europe. Contacts have been developed with the leading groups of the mass of Soviet emigres, e.g., Ukrainians, Georgians, Balts and White Russians. Although these contacts were established primarily for purposes of procuring intelligence on Eastern Europe and the USSR, sufficient overall information on these groups has been inevitably gathered to permit a sound evaluation of their possible value to the U.S. Government for purposes of propaganda, sabotage and anti-Communist political activity.
2. On the basis of experience and careful analysis CIA has found the following characteristics in every group in the mass of Soviet emigres.

- a. These groups are highly unstable and undependable, split by personal rivalries and ideological differences, and primarily concerned with developing a secure position for themselves in the Western world.
- b. They have been completely unable to provide intelligence of real value since they are rarely able to tap useful sources of information within the USSR, and generally concentrate on producing highly biased propaganda materials in place of objective intelligence.
- c. They are almost exclusively interested in obtaining maximum support (usually from the U.S.) for their own propaganda activities and insist upon the provision of substantial financial, communications, propaganda, movement and personal assistance in return for vague and unrealistic promises of future service.

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d. They immediately capitalize upon any assistance which they receive to advertise the fact of official (U.S.) support to their colleagues and to other governments in order to advance their own personal or organizational interests.

e. These groups are a primary target for the Soviet KGB and intelligence agencies for purposes of political control, infiltration and subversion. CIA has sufficient evidence at this time to indicate that many of these groups have already been successfully penetrated by Soviet and satellite intelligence agencies.

CONCLUSIONS

In view of the above and after careful consideration of all possible ways in which a large mass of Soviet emigres might be exploited in the U.S. national interest, it is the firm conclusion of OIA that the large mass of these people should be effectively used in time of peace except for those purposes mentioned already proposed to SIRMOC. (Reference is made to SIRMOC 1974 Recommendations 1, 2, 3, and 4.)

It is the view of OIA that the possible value to the U.S. Government of large numbers of Soviet emigres would be great. The U.S. Government would, in a post-war era, have a critical need for thousands of these emigres as a source of personnel, interrogation teams, and sabotage and espionage operations and administrative personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In the light of the foregoing conclusions and as a matter of national policy, it is recommended that:

1. Prior to a point at war is begun and apart from the special use of a few individuals selected from the mass of Soviet emigres, there will be no organized utilization by the U.S. Government of large groups or the mass of Soviet emigres.
2. In connection with the screening of refugees from the Soviet world, a systematic index should be developed by the State Department, or other appropriately located government agencies concerned, of all those refugees who possess qualifications which will make them of use in the event of war. In addition, it would be useful if there would be recorded in a single place the residences and occupations (and changes therein) of all available Soviet refugees.
3. Screening must include the object of isolating persons who are suitable for direct use in intelligence purposes, as distinct from merely furnishing miscellaneous information.

H. H. HELENKOETTER
REAR ADMIRAL, USN
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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