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APPENDIX B.

RECAPITULATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE DERIVED

Set forth below are a recapitulation of intelligence derived from the ^{funnel} material and some typical consumer comments.

GENERAL

The operation provided the United States and the British with a unique source of current intelligence on the Soviet Orbit of a kind and quality which had not been available since 1948. Responsible officials considered ^{the funnel} during its productive phase, to be the prime source of early warning concerning Soviet intentions in Europe, if not world-wide. Following are examples of items of intelligence for which ^{the funnel} was either a unique or most timely and reliable source.

POLITICAL

Throughout the life of source (11 May 1955 - 22 April 1956) we were kept currently informed of Soviet intentions in Berlin; ^{the funnel} provided the inside story of every "incident" occurring in Berlin during the period - a story which was in

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each case considerably at variance with accounts of the same incident as reported by other sources. ^{The tunnel} () showed that, contrary to estimates by other sources, the Soviets at that time did not intend to relinquish their prerogatives vis-a-vis the other three occupying powers despite continually increasing pressure from the East Germans to assert their sovereignty in East Berlin as well as in the rest of East Germany. ^{THE TUNNEL} () provided a clear picture of the unpreparedness, confusion, and indecision among Soviet and East German officials whenever an incident occurred in East Berlin involving citizens of one of the Western powers.

The Soviet decision to implement the establishment of an East German Army was disclosed by ^{The tunnel} () in October 1955, in time to notify our representatives at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva to that effect.

^{The tunnel} () provided a detailed account of the Soviet program for implementation of the decisions of the 20th Party Congress, including measures to suppress unrest among Soviet nuclear scientists resulting from a too-literal interpretation of the new theory of collective leadership and the denigration of Stalin.

The progress of Marshal Zhukov's attempt to curtail the influence of the political officer in the Soviet Armed Forces (which led to his subsequent downfall) was traced in ^{tunnel} ()

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material from the autumn of 1955 to mid-April 1956.

Tip funnel
(~~redacted~~) provided considerable intelligence on the relationships between various key military and political figures of the Soviet hierarchy and on relations between the Poles and the Soviet military forces stationed in Poland.

MILITARY

General

- a. Reorganization of the Soviet Ministry of Defense.
- b. Soviet plans to implement the Warsaw Pact by increasing Soviet-Satellite military coordination.
- c. Implementation of the publicly announced intention to reduce the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces.
- d. Identification of several thousand Soviet officer personnel.

Air

- a. Development of an improved nuclear delivery capability in the Soviet Air Army in East Germany.
- b. Re-equipment of the Soviet Air Army in East Germany with new bombers and twin-jet interceptors having an airborne radar capability.
- c. Doubling of the Soviet bomber strength in Poland and the appearance there of a new fighter division.

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d. Identification and location of approximately 100 Soviet Air Force installations in the USSR, East Germany, and Poland, including a number of key aircraft factories.

Ground Forces

a. Order of battle of Soviet ground forces within the USSR not previously identified or not located for several years by any other source.

b. Soviet training plans for the spring and early summer of 1956 in East Germany and Poland.

c. Identification of several thousand Soviet field post numbers (used by G-2 to produce Soviet order of battle intelligence).

Navy

a. Reduction in the status and personnel strength of the Soviet Naval Forces.

b. Organization and administrative procedures of the Headquarters of the Soviet Baltic Fleet and Soviet Naval Bases on the Baltic Coast.

SCIENTIFIC

Identification of several hundred personalities associated with the Soviet Atomic Energy (AE) Program.

Association of certain locations in the USSR with AE activities.


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Organization and activities of Wismuth SDAG (mining uranium in the Aue area of East Germany).


OPERATIONAL

Organization, functions, and procedures of the Soviet Intelligence Services in East Germany; identification of several hundred Soviet Intelligence personalities in East Germany and Moscow.



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