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FORM NO. 51-28A (Ecl. A)

**SECURITY INFORMATION**

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CLASSIFICATION

This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

TO : Director Central Intelligence

FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Special Intelligence [redacted]

SPECIFIC— [redacted]

Date 2/18/96

HRP 95-1

In accordance with our discussion of 28 August the attached field project outline has been prepared and is being forwarded for presentation to you through [redacted] of (Staff D).

I am of the opinion that the key to the success of this project is primarily a matter of maintaining the highest possible degree of security. For this reason I am most anxious to confine knowledge of the plan to an absolute minimum; in fact, it is my conviction that only those individuals who can make a specific contribution to the success of this operation should be made aware of its existence.

[redacted]

Considering the tremendous amount of time consuming work that lies ahead of us in this undertaking, it is of the utmost importance that we begin as soon as possible in order to be ready for the final phase which must necessarily be accomplished at the end of the summer of 1954.

[redacted signature]

LUCIAN B. TRUSCOTT

Dist: Copies 1-3 - Wash

17 September 1953

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FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR. 1949

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(Encl 8)

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FIELD PROJECT OUTLINE

Recommended by: [Redacted]  
Approved by: [Redacted]  
Cryptonym: [Redacted]

Date: 21/1/95  
16 September 1959  
ERP 917

1. Pursuant to discussions of 28 August 1953 between COM Germany and the DCI, wherein it was agreed that the intelligence potential of the subject project justified its inherent risk and financial cost, the following outline and plan of action is submitted for approval and the implementation indicated.
2. It should be noted that this project will be developed jointly and explicitly in accordance with existing formal agreements between [Redacted] and [Redacted]. For security reasons resulting from the physical location of the project, [Redacted] participation must be limited during the earlier phases of the operation.
3. In view of the absolute necessity for maintaining complete operational security, all aspects of this project must be handled separately from all other intelligence matters. All communications regarding this project should be handled in separate and unique intelligence channels. Further, in consideration of the high intelligence potential of the operation and of the considerable risk involved, it is imperative that all other activities in this particular field, both existing and proposed, be kept under constant review to insure that no one of them adversely affects it.
4. The objective of this project is to collect covertly the Soviet intelligence known to be passing over certain underground telecommunication cables that are adjacent to and accessible from the U.S. Sector of Berlin. [Redacted]. From reliable technical information collected over a period of several years, it has been established that these cables carry Soviet Military, Security Service and Diplomatic telephone and telegraph traffic to and from various Soviet Headquarters in Germany and in certain instances between those Headquarters and Moscow. [Redacted]. Access to these cables however can be secured only through the construction of a subterranean passage approximately 1800 feet in length, one half of which will be in Soviet Sector territory.
5. Although the technical and engineering difficulties of this undertaking cannot be minimized, they can for the most part be met with experience developed from similar operations conducted elsewhere. Confining knowledge of this operation in all its phases, however, is

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the greatest problem. In this respect and considering the location of the site of the operation, it is difficult to visualize an installation and activity of the size required being established at this remote spot. It is, nevertheless, reasonable and possible for the U.S. Forces in Berlin to construct a number of warehouses within the bounds of the U.S. Sector. Although such constructions will attract attention, the fact remains that knowledge of what transpires within these buildings is a matter not beyond control. In actuality, therefore, the problem is not so much the establishment of a perfect cover, but more a matter of maintaining absolute internal security within a physically enclosed area housing the operation. To meet these operational construction and security requirements, it is planned to have the U.S. Army activate a plan calling for the construction and maintenance of three warehouses located along the US/Soviet Sector and the US/Soviet Zone borders. These warehouses will for all intents and purposes constitute an emergency equipment dispersal system operated in connection with the security of U.S. Forces in Berlin. Each of these installations will be manned by a carefully hand-picked and screened detachment of 2 officers and 36 enlisted men who will be engaged in the handling of crates and equipment. Actually these detachments will be engaged in the construction of the subterranean passage and the handling of equipment and supplies related to this activity from the one installation which is adjacent to the target. The officers and men of these units will be hand-picked, specially trained, and thoroughly indoctrinated on the accomplishment of their mission and the maintenance of absolute security. The operation from the inception must be divorced from all traceable OPRAW and intelligence activity. (Control and security will be exercised and maintained through properly indoctrinated officers assigned to the units.)

6. Implementation of the above proposed action will be accomplished in four phases and as follows:

A) Initial stage: (1) Collaboration between the appropriate U.S./British engineers will be established for the purpose of preparing an engineering study and training plans. (2) In association with a C.G. USAREUR appointed staff officer, a plan calling for the establishment of an emergency equipment dispersal installation in Berlin will be drawn up. Based on this plan Berlin Military Post will establish a Post engineer project requiring the construction of the three warehouses. (3) Simultaneously and as a part of the above plan the officers and men required to man the warehouses will be recruited and assigned to a newly activated and formally designated Army Service Unit which will eventually be assigned to the Berlin Command.

B) Training stage: (1) During the construction of the required buildings in Berlin the recruited teams will be in training. This training will consist of normal military subjects including driving,

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