APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
18 SEPT 95
CONFIDENTIAL
A former G-2 officer gives some personal views on how to multiply the value of a military intelligence asset.
UNRECOGNIZED POTENTIAL IN THE MILITARY ATTACHES
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
The system of U.S. military attachés, a worldwide liaison service which today is accredited to 75 countries, including five behind the Iron Curtain, is one of the least well
understood of the Government's intelligence arms. Probably because of this lack
of understanding its great potentialities remain relatively untapped.
The military attachés have produced
and are producing large amounts of intelligence information, and certain attaché
reports have been of significant strategic value. The Army attaché in Tel Aviv
correctly interpreted the Israeli Mobilization of October 1956 as a war measure
and determined the direction of the attack against Egypt. His prompt report, a key
item in the intelligence which enabled the Watch Committee to alert the
President to the impending Suez War, could be counted by itself a sufficient
justification for the attaché system's entire budget for the year. Service
reporting from behind the Iron Curtain has also been of incalculable value, and
that from many other areas has provided information of importance.
As the attaché systems become
recurrently the target of economy drives in the Department of Defense, however,
the lack of knowledge in the proper places as to what the attachés Produce for
the intelligence community grows apparent. Attaché reports are not often
singled out for distribution to high departmental policy levels. Most of them
are inconspicuous elements of the routine reporting which keeps each military
service up to date on the corresponding services of other countries. They
contribute to the "finished intelligence" of the encyclopedic
National Intelligence Surveys; but officers at the policy level are unlikely
ever to look at an NIS until, when a crisis hits, they have an immediate need f
data on the Lebanese army or the Indonesian navy, and even then they do not
necessarily remain conscious of the fact that it was the attachés who supplied
these data. Nor is it always obvious at the policy level that there is a
significant contribution from the military attaché system in nearly every
National Intelligence Estimate.
It seems clear that the social
rather than intelligence aspect of the military attachés' work is weighed too
heavily a certain levels in the Pentagon. Hence the attachés are criticized as
"cookie-pushers" assigned to duty on the cocktail circuit. It is true
that the nature of the job in many capitals requires considerable social
activity. In Washington
itself the papers abound with accounts of parties for or attend by the service
attachés of the various foreign embassies. I may also be true that the attaché
staffs occasionally include some too socially conscious or ambitious officers
who devote themselves too assiduously to the kind of intelligence collection
that is done over a glass. But that sort of thing can happen in any
organization; it is something that can be remedied quite quickly and easily by
command action.
It is important that a new dignity
be given to the attaché system and a deserved respect accorded it. It is
important that the still untapped reservoirs of information needed by the
Government which are available to military attachés be recognized and
exploited. There are new areas that need to be covered, and old ones that
should be covered better. There are new horizons of opportunity, and new
approaches that can be used to obtain intelligence of utmost value.
Coverage and Cross Accreditation
Today there are 761 U.S. staff
personnel serving in the attaché systems of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
overseas. The Army has 429 (143 officers, 212 enlisted men, and 74 civilians),
the Navy 161 (157 officers), the Air Force 171 (145 officers, 22 enlisted men,
and 4 civilians). There are army attachés accredited to 73 countries, air
attachés to 69, and naval attachés to 58. Army attachés are actually stationed
in 69 countries, air attachés in 53, and naval attachés in 45.
It has been the policy to accredit
one attaché to more than one country in order to economize in manpower, because
the activities of some countries in some military fields are limited. For
example, there are army attachés in Costa Rica,
El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua;
but Air Force interests in these four countries are handled by the air attaché
in Guatemala, and naval
matters in all five republics plus British Honduras are the responsibility of
the naval attaché in Mexico City.
There are other variations in service practices around the Caribbean.
A naval attaché is stationed in the Dominican
Republic, but the air attaché accredited to Ciudad
Trujillo is stationed in Venezuela,
and the army attaché comes over from Cuba. Haiti,
on the other hand, has an army attaché in Port au Prince but is covered by the
air attaché from Caracas and I the naval attaché
from Havana.
While there is certainly not enough
work under present conditions in many of these places to keep separate attachés fully occupied, the system of cross accreditation does create some
peculiarities. Thus in Havana, where the Air
Force representative covers only Cuba,
the Navy's covers Haiti in
addition, and the Army's the Dominican
Republic. Our military expertise on the Dominican Republic is partitioned among Ciudad Trujillo,
Havana, and Caracas;
a regional conference would have to be called to get the consensus of our
on-the-spot representatives about the over-all strength of the Trujillo regime.
Sometimes the changing currents of
international relations create some curious situations in this representation
from outside, and changes have to be made in accreditation. At one Point the United States had no service attachés in the Sudan, the representatives of all three services
in Egypt being accredited
also to Khartoum.
With the Sudanese more than a little suspicious of Nasr's designs on their
struggling young nation, this doubling raised obvious problems. Today there is
an army attaché in Khartoum-a most important assignment
with a military junta running the Sudan--and
air affairs there are covered by the air attaché in Ethiopia.
Cross accreditation is of course
economical, and it can be satisfactory in certain instances. But we should be
aware that in this era of rising nationalism the armed services of those
countries not accorded resident attachés may consider themselves slighted and
so feel more kindly-and cooperative-toward the major powers that do keep
attachés in residence. It would be wasteful, to be sure, to assign naval attachés to the Sudan or Switzerland,
but the most powerful and influential nation on earth should be able to afford
at least one appropriate service attaché in every country that has a military
force, however embryonic. That there will b more than enough to keep such officers
actively and profitably employed I hope the following paragraphs will
demonstrate
New Horizons
One need only look at the number of
countries where the military are today in full control, hold a dominant position
or at least exercise considerable political influence, in order see the
ascending potential of the role of the service attach Taking the world region
by region and noting only the more important examples of this situation, we
find in Europe General de Gaulle master of France, General Franco running
Spain, and Marshal Tito ruling Yugoslavia, all of them d pendent in one degree
or another on support from the army in the Middle East Egypt's Nasr and Iraq's
Kasem, army officers brought to power by military coups; in Africa Haile Selassie
of Ethiopia relying on the loyalty of his imperial body guard and the Sudan run
by a military junta; in Asia the governments of Laos, Pakistan, and Burma
subject to the w' of the military and Indonesia pivoting on the key position o
the army; in Latin America the army not the dominant factor for in domestic
politics only by exception from the rule.
In such countries, and in countries
where the military may in future emerge as a powerful political force, the
officers of the military services become a prime intelligence source and
target. The U.S. service attaché has as his first obligation of course, the
development of contact with officers on the chief-of-staff level of the service
to which he is accredited But the circumstances of the coup in Iraq point up
the need for getting to know also the ambitious and rising young officers who
through ability or good fortune may achieve prominence at some future time. The
attachés could by this means insure, not an advance warning of all future
coups, but that there would be fewer surprises.
It is acknowledged that in many
countries a too obvious or aggressive cultivating of friendships with military
personnel by U.S.
attachés would be viewed with disfavor-and probably recognized for the
surreptitious probing that it was. Some ingenuity and long-range planning would
be required here. Initially the attaché might be able only to spot upcoming
young officers who should be approached later, perhaps by others, particularly
since in many countries those that carry a political thrust are kept in
provincial garrisons away from the capital. Sometimes the embassy, using the
country-team system, could have people outside the attaché’s immediate office
make the initial contact, develop the necessary rapport, or maintain a
relationship which had been established.
But a main avenue of long-term
approach to future wielders of power starts in the United States. Every year hundreds
of foreign military officers attend U.S. service schools. Perhaps not
all of these will reach chief-of-staff level, but the expectation that they
will achieve senior rank is implicit in their selection for the expensive visit
to the United States.
Consider, for example, that Admiral Larrazabal, who headed the junta that
governed Venezuela between
the overthrow of the Perez Jimenez regime and the election of Betancourt, had
attended the U.S. Naval War College at Newport.
We have thus an ideal opportunity to
establish personal relationships that could in the future keep us informed on
affairs of critical intelligence interest. I am not talking about recruitment
of these officers as agents; it is a matter of developing the conviction in a
foreign officer that his, your, his country's, and the United States' interests
are all identical, or so very close that it would be to his country's
advantage, or at least not to its detriment, for him to confide in you.
First, there should be a thorough,
methodical system at the school for developing biographical data on each
individual officer-not just the usual personal history statement or
biographical sketch, but knowledge of the likes and dislikes of the man and
what makes him tick. Did his father fight with the Khalifa against Kitchener at Omdurman?
Does he drink heavily, have occasional sprees or amatory adventures? Is he
ashamed he can't afford a better home, feel he can't entertain Americans? What
are his cultural interests-music Goethe, chess? Has he been discriminated
against because of his race? Where does he want to end his career-as chief of
staff? as constitutionally elected president? as dictator? or as a professional
officer who has served his country well? And how does he see the future
development of his own country? Which great powers does he think can best help
it?
Much of this information can be
assembled by the faculty of the school in question. But intimate insight into a
man' character, and especially the establishment of a rapport that would yield
continuing intelligence dividends, would require that as often as feasible and
practical the U.S. officer destine to be assigned to a country become a
classmate of its potentially influential students at a U.S. service school. The
identity of interest among classmates creates a strong bond.
If a foreign officer attends a U.S.
school it can be assume that his English is passable. But this should not lead
to any relaxing of the attaché’s effort to acquire fluency in the language of
the country to which he is assigned. The psychological advantage of knowing the
language is tremendous. An intelligence officer's objectives are much easier to
reach if hi foreign contact senses in him not a superficial, self-seeking
interest but a true and deep understanding based upon knowledge of the
country's language, history, and customs and appreciation of its people. Such
specialization, it is true, implies a relatively long assignment at the post in
question.
The full implications of this
long-range approach for the personal career of a military attaché may appear
rather formidable in terms of present-day concepts. A year or two spent
learning language, area, and customs, a year or more at a service school to
cultivate the friendship of a foreign officer, and at least a double tour of
duty in one country-these may add up to a third or a half of the U.S. officer's
entire active military career. But if we are serious about our intelligence
effort, this is a way to give new significance and worth to the attaché system,
and the long-term benefits should certainly be high.
CONFIDENTIAL