Press Office
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
 
Fact Sheet 

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR PROTECTION AND RECOVERY FOLLOWING 
RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICE AND IMPROVISED NUCLEAR DEVICE 
INCIDENTS

The Planning Guidance for Protection and Recovery Following Radiological Dispersal Device 
(RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents, formerly titled Application of Protective 
Action Guides to Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) 
Incidents, was initially published for interim use and comment on Jan. 3, 2006.  The Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) recently released the final version of the guidelines.  

The guidance provides state, local, tribal, territorial and federal emergency response personnel 
and decision-makers with information to protect their communities from the harmful effects of 
radiation following a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) or an Improvised Nuclear Device 
(IND) incident.
  
An RDD poses a threat to public health and safety through the malicious spread of radioactive 
material by some means of dispersion.  The mode of dispersal typically conceived as an RDD is 
an explosive device coupled with radioactive material.  The explosion adds an immediate threat 
to human life and property.  Other means of dispersal, both passive and active, may be 
employed.
	
An IND is an illicit nuclear weapon bought, stolen, or otherwise originating from a nuclear State, 
or a weapon fabricated by a terrorist group from illegally obtained fissile nuclear weapons 
material that produces a nuclear explosion.  The nuclear yield achieved by an IND produces 
extreme heat, powerful shockwaves, and prompt radiation that would be acutely lethal for a 
significant distance.  It also produces radioactive fallout, which may spread and deposit over 
very large areas.  

This guidance outlines the projected dose of radiation to an individual exposed to radioactive 
material resulting from RDD/IND incident, and recommends specific protective action to reduce 
or avoid that dose.  This guidance helps responders assess their risks as they make safety 
decisions during emergency operations. It also provides a decision-making framework – referred 
to as “site-specific optimization” – for reaching a consensus on the desired level of cleanup that 
meets state and local needs including, above all, the protection of public health and welfare. 

Site-specific optimization is a flexible and scalable approach in which a variety of dose and risk 
benchmarks identified from federal, state, local and other authoritative sources such as national 
and international advisory organizations may be considered for the specific incident site in order 
to establish appropriate cleanup options. 

State, local, tribal, territorial and federal responders and decision makers will be able to use this 
guide to make informed decisions, with sufficient information, about what is best for their 
community. This cleanup guidance does not change or supersede any existing standards or 
cleanup programs. 

This guidance makes use of recommendations previously published by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), in consultation with other federal agencies. EPA recommendations 
have been used by local and state officials since the 1970s to respond to incidents involving the 
release of radioactive material from a nuclear power plant or other similar nuclear or radiological 
incident (see the Manual of Protective Actions Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear 
Incidents, revised 1992). 

However, an RDD scenario exercise in Seattle, Washington, in May 2003 (TOPOFF-2) pointed 
to the need to specifically address the response to an RDD/IND attack.  In particular, the need for 
a unique, flexible and incident-specific approach to immediate response and long-term recovery 
efforts was recognized. In response, the Homeland Security Secretary tasked a federal 
interagency working group to develop this guidance. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 
provided the Secretary with the authority for coordinating this activity as well as the mission to 
prepare the nation to respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. Mandates 
to coordinate national preparedness are further spelled out in Homeland Security Presidential 
Directives (HSPDs) 5 and 8. 

The departments and agencies that participated in the working group were the Departments of 
Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Labor, the Environmental Protection Agency, 
Health and Human Services, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

This guidance considers the application of existing U.S. EPA radiation dose levels for the early 
and intermediate phases of a response to an RDD or IND incident. It also provides local, state 
and federal officials with a decision-making framework, or a “site-specific optimization” 
process, for long-term cleanup allowing for a remediation plan appropriate to the size and 
complexity of the specific incident. The protective action guides were based on the following 
criteria to: 

• preventing acute health effects, 
• reducing the risk of long-term health effects, 
• balancing protection with other important factors that affect the public welfare, and 
• ensuring actions taken result in more benefit than harm. 

The working group recognizes that this guidance has limited applicability to an IND incident. 
These guidelines apply equally to RDD and IND incidents, but the guidance was not written to 
provide specific recommendations for a nuclear detonation.  Rather, it considers the applicability 
of existing guidance to RDD and IND incidents. The guidance does not consider very high doses 
or dose rate zones expected following an IND detonation and other complicating factors that can 
significantly affect life-saving outcomes, such as severely damaged infrastructure, loss of 
communications, water pressure, and electricity, and the prevalence of fire and other secondary 
hazards. A follow-on federal effort is underway to address the unique aspects of emergency 
response to an IND.

Scientifically sound recommendations for state, local, tribal, territorial and federal responders 
and decision makers are a critical component of post-IND life-saving activities, including 
implementing protective orders, safe shelter-in-place options, evacuation implementation, safe 
responder entry and operations, urban search and rescue and victim extraction. This guidance 
should be used until IND guidance is developed.

In developing the guidance, the federal government drew from institutional knowledge contained 
in existing programs such as U.S. EPA’s Superfund program, NRC’s standards for 
decontamination and decommissioning to terminate a plant license, and other national and 
international recommendations to create this guidance to be useful in planning the cleanup and 
recovery efforts following an RDD/IND incident. This guidance further allows the consideration 
and incorporation, as appropriate, of approaches from any or all of the existing programs. It is 
flexible to address the broad range of situations that can occur under various RDD/IND 
scenarios, and the unique circumstances that may occur in terrorist attacks.

Copies of both the interim and final guidance, as well as related material, are available in the 
public docket at www.regulations.gov . 

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