IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
HAYES WILLIAMS, et al,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN McKEITHEN, et al,
Defendants,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Amicus Curiae.
Civil No. 71-98-B
IN RE: JUVENILE FACILITIES
Civil No. CH 97-MS-001-B
IN RE: TALLULAH CORRECTIONAL
CENTER FOR YOUTH
Civil No. CH 97-0665-B-M1
IN RE: JETSON CORRECTIONAL
CENTER FOR YOUTH
Civil No. CH 97-0666-B-M1
IN RE: SWANSON CORRECTIONAL
CENTER FOR YOUTH
Civil No. CH 97-0667-B-M1
IN RE: LOUISIANA TRAINING
INSTITUTE - BRIDGE CITY
Civil No. CH 97-0668-B-M1
______________________________
BRIAN B., et al.,
Plaintiffs.
v.
RICHARD STALDER, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil No. 98-886-B-M1
______________________________
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiffs
v.
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, et al,
Defendants.
Civil No. 98-947-B-1
_____________________________
RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES
TO THE COURT'S ORDER OF NOVEMBER 6, 1998
CONCERNING THE JENA JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER
On November 6, 1998, the Court issued an Order granting
the motion of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections and
Wackenhut Corrections Corporation ("Wackenhut") to transfer
juveniles to the Jena Juvenile Justice Center ("Jena"). The
Court approved the opening of Jena, in light of the Jena Interim
Agreement, which is attached as Exhibit A. Pursuant to ¶ 1 of
that agreement, the United States hereby submits reports from
four experts concerning conditions of confinement at Jena. Based
on those reports, the United States has grave concerns about the
safety of the juveniles confined at Jena. As will be discussed
in greater detail below, we will immediately attempt to reach a
consensual resolution with the State and Wackenhut to address the
serious deficiencies that we found at Jena.(1) Failing that, we
will need to seek judicial assistance to address the conditions
at Jena.
BACKGROUND
In the summer of 1998, before the Court would permit the
State to transfer juveniles to the newly-built Jena, the Court
requested that the United States, amicus in Williams, evaluate
the proposed plans for the opening of the facility. The Court
was concerned about the opening of a new secure juvenile
correctional facility and stated that Jena was "not opening unless we get everything on board. We're not going to have another Tallulah at Jena." Transcript of August 10, 1998 Status
Conference at 19. The United States evaluated the proposed plans to open Jena; expressed several concerns with the plans; and,
together with Williams plaintiffs, negotiated a non-enforceableagreement with the State and Wackenhut, which provided for
specific interim measures to govern Jena's operation andcontribute to the safety of the juveniles to be confined there.
This agreement, called the Jena Interim Agreement, also provided that after Jena was up and running, the United States and its
experts would evaluate conditions of confinement at Jena and file
reports with the Court. See Exhibit A at 3.(2)
Jena opened in December 1998. Since then, as required by
the agreement, the State and Wackenhut provided us with periodic
updates concerning conditions at the facility. We were aware,
for instance, that Jena experienced some serious problems shortly
after they opened. In fact, we wrote counsel for the State and
Wackenhut to express our concerns about conditions of confinement
at Jena at that time and to state the areas in which the State
and Wackenhut were then violating the Jena Interim Agreement.
See Exhibit B.
We were also aware that the State had stepped in on May
31, 1999 to assist Jena with training and bring order to the
facility. State and Wackenhut reports indicated that when the
State left Jena in mid-September 1999, order had been restored to
the facility. However, during this same year, the Court Expert,
John Whitley, filed several disturbing reports with the Court
concerning conditions at Jena. Essentially, Mr. Whitley's
reports documented problems at the facility right from the start
-- some security problems were improved during the State's
presence at Jena, but even these have worsened since the State
left in September 1999. Some problems have never been resolved.
Indeed, in his most recent report, Mr. Whitley stated: "My
impression of the Jena Juvenile Justice Center, if no major changes are made,
is that it is a disaster waiting to happen." December 13, 1999 Whitley Report at 13.
In late November 1999, we learned about the use of
chemical agents at Jena over the Thanksgiving weekend. Based on
the information we received, we believed that at least one use of
chemical agent appeared to be in violation of the Jena Interim
Agreement. Reports of these incidents, combined with the
December Whitley reports, demonstrated that it was time to
evaluate conditions of confinement under the agreement.
We toured Jena on January 3-7 and January 19-21 with four
experts. At then end of each tour, our experts provided exit
interviews to counsel for Wackenhut and the State, as well as to
Jena staff, to give Jena the benefit of their initial thoughts
and an opportunity to begin to take corrective action
immediately. Attached are the reports of Dr. Nancy Ray, an
expert in protection from harm and prevention of abuse (Exhibit
C); Dr. Kathleen Quinn, a child and adolescent psychiatrist who
evaluated Jena's mental health care (Exhibit D); Dr. Michael
Cohen, a pediatrician who evaluated the medical and dental care
at Jena (Exhibit E); and Paul DeMuro, an expert in conditions of
confinement in juvenile correctional facilities (Exhibit F).
DISCUSSION
Jena fails to provide reasonable safety, improperly uses
chemical restraints, and provides inadequate mental health,
medical, and dental care for the approximately 276 adolescent
boys confined there at any one time. As detailed below and in
the attached expert reports, Jena has not been able to overcome
the formidable obstacles posed by its remote location, high staff
turnover, inadequately trained staff, and the issues presented by
the large numbers of troubled youth confined in this institution.
The State and Wackenhut have failed to comply with a number of
provisions in the Jena Interim Agreement and have subjected the
juveniles to unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
I. Jena Fails to Provide Juveniles with Reasonable Safety
Juveniles confined to Jena have rights under the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the right to
reasonable care, the right to reasonably safe conditions of
confinement, the right to adequate clothing, and the right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994); Hudson v. McMillan, 503
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1992); Hellig v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993); City
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307, 314-16 (1982); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36,
546-547 (1979); Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 790 F.2d 1220, 1224-25
(5th Cir. 1986)("violence and sexual assault among inmates may
rise to a level rendering conditions cruel and unusual").Juveniles' rights are violated where staff use excessive force
and inappropriately isolate juveniles for excessive periods of
time. Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 942 (10th Cir. 1982);
H.C. v. Ogletree, 786 F.2d 1080, 1089 (11th Cir. 1986).
Conditions at Jena are unconstitutional as well as violative of
the Jena Interim Agreement.
A. Juveniles suffer frequent injuries.
Youth at Jena are not adequately protected from harm.
Dr. Nancy Ray, the United States' expert on protection from harm
and abuse investigations, found an unacceptably high rate of
traumatic injuries(3) to youth at Jena, almost all of which were
attributed to officers' use of force or fights among youth. Dr.
Ray performed an analysis of the injuries suffered by the youth
at Jena for a 54-day period, from November 28, 1999 (the day
after the use of chemical agents, so that the numerous youth who
were harmed during those incidents did not distort her data)
until January 20, 2000 (her final day of touring Jena). In that
54-day period:
There were 104 reported traumatic injuries to youth, or
two traumatic injuries per day;
At least one-fourth of the youth at Jena had been
traumatically injured at least once during this brief
period;
There were 66 reported orthopedic injuries to youth at
Jena, and in almost all of these cases, youth were
x-rayed for suspected fractures or serious sprains or
strains to various body parts including hands, wrists,
feet, ankles, backs, spines, jaws, shoulders, noses,
ribs, knees, and hips;
Twenty-five youth were sent for assessments, usually
x-rays, or other treatment for hand injuries,
reflective of the number of physical fights at Jena;
There were 40 non-orthopedic traumatic injuries,
including lacerations requiring sutures, youth having
teeth knocked out, and busted lips;
There were five reports of youth alleging sexual
assaults, only two of which had been formally
investigated; and
Eight youth either harmed or tried to kill themselves.
Exhibit C at 9-15.
Although Jena administrators reported to Dr. Ray that
there was less use of force by security officers now than in
Jena's early days, Dr. Ray's analysis of the facility's use of
force logs indicated that the incidence of documented use of
force has been increasing since November 1999. Exhibit C at 17.
Dr. Ray concludes that "the frequency and seriousness of these
incidents [of use of force], coupled with the high rate of
serious traumatic injuries to youth at the institution, provide
hard empirical evidence that the Jena Center is a dangerous place
to be." Exhibit C at 18.
B. Juveniles are the victims of staff abuse.
Most of the youth whom Dr. Ray interviewed reported at
least one incident where they had been hit or harmed by the
physical intervention of officers. Exhibit C at 3. Dr. Ray
found that the claims of youth that officers routinely use
excessive force and sometimes abuse, mistreat, and humiliate them
were well-supported by documented evidence. Exhibit C at 9. In
many instances, officers resort too quickly to physical
interventions and that some officers, including supervisory
captains and lieutenants, issue arbitrary and crude commands to
youth with the apparent intention to provoke the youth to a
violent response. Ibid.
Dr. Ray found that there was "substantial consistency" in
the nature of youths' allegations of staff abuse. In repeated
reports, youth complained that officers: 1) resorted to force
too quickly in addressing minor acts of non-compliance; 2) were
overly-aggressive during searches of the belongings of youth; and
3) sometimes taunted youth for little reason and provoked their
violent reactions.(4) Exhibit C at 19. "There were also
remarkable similarities in the alleged manner in which security
officers forced compliance by tripping youth, twisting their
arms, legs, or ankles, slamming them into cell walls or doors, or
taking them violently to the ground." Ibid. And, it appears,
only a handful of officers account for most of the allegations of
staff abuse. For the last quarter of 1999, 12 officers account
for 82% of the reports of staff abuse. Exhibit C at 20.
C. Jena fails to investigate abuse allegations adequately.
Dr. Ray found overwhelming evidence that DPS&C's Project
Zero Tolerance abuse investigation process was so broken that it
offered youth few, if any, of the protections it was intended to
afford. "[I]n some cases, the shell of the program left at the
institution served as little more than a "cover" for officers'
ongoing use of excessive force and abuse of youth." Exhibit C at
9. Problems included serious barriers to youth in reporting
allegations of abuse, a pattern of staff discarding even those
complaints that were filed, and critical flaws in the
investigation of the complaints that were actually investigated
by the facility. Exhibit C at 23. There was also evidence of
Jena's failure to take reasonable steps to protect youth by
placing officers targeted in credible complaints on
administrative leave, in violation of the Jena Interim Agreement
Part II at ¶ 3. Ibid.
Barriers to youths reporting allegations of abuse
included broken PZT Hotline phones and the posting of the wrong
Hotline phone number above the phones. A December 6, 1999 note
in the Medical Shift Log, apparently entered at the request of
Jena's PZT investigator, is clearly directed toward discouraging
and curtailing youth reports of abuse. The log states, "Nurses -
if any offender does not allege abuse initially on body sheet or
interview, he cannot come back later and attempt to allege abuse
per Ms. H." Exhibit C at 25. Juvenile JP(5) received a note from
the Jena PZT investigators, stating that JP would be required to
pay for his own as well as any officers' physical exams if he
filed another false abuse allegation. "Although such a provision
would likely have a chilling effect on abuse reporting at any
juvenile correctional facility where money is scarce, it was a
particularly adverse warning at the Jena Juvenile Justice Center
where over the past year only 6% of all allegations [of staff on
juvenile abuse] are substantiated." Exhibit C at 26.(6) JP did
not file any more allegations. Ibid.
Dr. Ray found evidence that "hundreds" of incidents of
suspected or alleged staff-on-youth abuse at Jena over the past
year were never investigated by the PZT investigator. "Many of
these un-recorded and un-investigated allegations were more
serious than the filed cases." Exhibit C at 29. Examples of
allegations that were never investigated include:
A mother called the PZT Hotline stating that on "5/22,
at 6 pm, a white female guard forced AG (her son) to
remove [his] shirt and slither like a snake a long
distance."
A youth reported, and a Captain confirmed the report,
that a sergeant let two youth fight without
intervening, stating that they can "fight, shoot dice,
do whatever they want..."
A counselor filed a complaint that she witnessed an
officer falsely charge and ticket a youth, stating to
the youth, "You try to beat that Mother Fucker."
A youth wrote an administrative procedure request
(ARP), stating that he witnessed the unnecessary use of
force against another youth by three officers, stating
that the youth was placed in physical restraint by the
officers and was being compliant and a sergeant "was
constantly chopping the offender in the neck while the
rest of the employees were on top of him with there
[sic] knees on his back."
Jena received a fax from the PZT Hotline that youth BA
had called to report that he had been grabbed by an
officer and slammed to the ground. Jena's psychologist
substantiated the youth's report.
Nine youth wrote a grievance "reporting Sgt. [JB] for
eating off our trays ever sigal dining hall, one time
(yesterbay) sgt [JB] took two trays...he taks pepos
snaks and saying we have no more but I saw him...(and
he siad "Sgts. come first.") He brigs his own food why
can't he eat it and leave our food alone." The
grievance was rejected because the youth did not start
their statement with the phrase, "this is a request for
administrative relief."
Richard Rogers, the District Manager of the Office of
Youth Development, wrote a memo to the Warden,
requesting an investigation of two reports of
allegations of excessive force against a youth RD.
Exhibit C at 25-29.
Even when formal abuse investigations were undertaken,
they usually did not reflect reasonable efforts to determine
exactly what really happened. Many basic investigatory standards
were not followed. "The most critical problem with the
investigations ... however, were related to the PZT
Investigator's final conclusions. Time and again, her
conclusions suggested bias against the accounts of youth and in
favor of security officers' testimony," even when officers'
accounts were vague and youth accounts were specific and even
when Jena staff supported the youths' accounts. Exhibit C at 30.
For example, the investigator found evidence that youth
DO was invasively strip searched, with staff requiring DO to
strip, lean over, spread his buttocks, squat naked for at least
two minutes, and cough in the presence of female officers.
Following that, staff told him to pull down his pants and lift
his testicles. A sergeant said, "you not keeping it real. My
little nephew got bigger nuts than you do." Although no
contraband was found that day, staff returned the next morning,
re-strip searched DO, and found a five dollar bill in his
laundry. The investigator's notes state: "It appears that "O" is
being set up by Sgt S, Sgt H and Sgt J." In the margin of her
notes is written "Possible." Sgts. H and J refused to cooperate
with the investigation. The investigator did not substantiate
the youth's allegations of inhumane treatment or that he had been
set up. There is no evidence that the officers were counseled or
disciplined. Exhibit C at 31.
D. Jena fails to provide juveniles with adequate
basic care.
Dr. Ray found serious problems in basic custodial care at
Jena, including inadequate clothing, inadequate bed sheets,
denied opportunities for showering and personal hygiene, grossly
inadequate recreational opportunities, and excessive placement of
youth in lockdown. Exhibit C at 33. Dr. Ray found youth in
Falcon A and B with no clean clothing at all, "huddled under a
sheet or blanket in their racks. Some reported that this was the
reason that they had not attended school." Exhibit C at 34. Dr.
Ray found that the shoe shortage at Jena was "pervasive. On all
dorms, many youth had no shoes." Exhibit C at 35. There were
similar shortages of bed linens. "I observed the 48 youth on one
open dorm struggle to retrieve their sheets from the tangled mess
in the [laundry] cart. Initially, I thought that the youth were
engaged in a group fight, but on closer observation I noticed
that they were simply crowding the cart to make sure that they
got back their sheets, before they were taken by another youth."
Exhibit C at 36-37. "At least in some areas, the problems seemed
to be linked to the reluctance of Wackenhut Corrections
Corporation to spend adequate funds to provide for the care of
the youth." Exhibit C at 33.
Dr. Ray found that youth in the cell block dorms (Falcon
A and B and Eagle A and B) who did not attend school were
confined to their cells all day. Exhibit C at 39. This is in
violation of the Jena Interim Agreement, Part II, ¶ 2(C) and
2(E). Dr. Ray also found that Jena is removing juveniles from
"programming" and putting them in isolation without documenting
the reason for the removal, in violation of the Jena Interim
Agreement, Part II, ¶ 2(C). Exhibit C at 39-40. Finally,
although Jena officials reported that all youth attended outdoor
physical education for one hour a day, three or four days a week,
dormitory log books verify the youths' statements that they are
often not allowed their allocated outdoor recreation time.
Exhibit C at 37.
E. Jena has serious workforce problems.
In the facility's short tenure of only thirteen and a
half months, it has had five wardens, and more than 600 men and
women have been hired to fill its approximately 180 staff
positions. Dr. Ray concluded that:
Wackenhut's inability to resolve this
fundamental problem of ensuring sound and
stable leadership and management, as well as a
capable line staff, has also led the
Corporation down the dangerous road of
compromising on critical personnel recruitment
and hiring safeguards and of keeping on
employees with known problems in their past and
in their current work performance at the
Center. Overall, the personnel issues, which
surfaced in my abbreviated review of these
matters, were alarming. At the Jena Center,
Wackenhut has not only egregiously violated
many of its own corporate policies, but it has
also transgressed the most basic professional
standards for ensuring a safe and capable
workforce.
Exhibit C at 41. In calendar year 1999, Jena employees worked
73,962 hours of overtime. Exhibit C at 43. Dr. Ray found that
the frequent use of overtime had an adverse impact on care at
Jena. "There were at least a dozen security staff persons,
including several who were later fired for excessive force or
other serious misconduct... who worked extended overtime hours...
payroll period after payroll period." Exhibit C at 43. Dr. Ray
found evidence that, in a number of cases, officers simply walked
off their posts rather than stay for the required overtime shift.
Ibid.
Turnover continues to be a very serious problem. In the
ten weeks during the period November 1, 1999 through January 14,
2000, 55 security officers, including one major, one captain and
two lieutenants, quit their job or were terminated -- 44% of the
institution's security workforce. Exhibit C at 44. Only a
little more than one third of the security workforce has a six-month tenure at Jena. Ibid. "The result is a security staff
that is not only overworked, but also inexperienced." Ibid. And
the high turnover in the leadership of the facility, "explained
why so few things actually ran in an orderly fashion at Jena."
Exhibit C at 45.
Most disturbing is the fact that Jena has taken critical
short cuts in hiring practices, failing in some cases to ensure
that staff hired are medically and professionally qualified and
that they did not have past criminal records or employment
experiences that made them unsuited for work with juveniles.
Exhibit C at 45. Jena's new Human Resource Director found in a
recent audit of 40 personnel files that:
32 files were missing Wackenhut's required
psychological screening exam;
28 files were missing one or more required criminal
background check;
23 files were missing documentation of
screening for tuberculosis;
6 files were missing a pre-employment urine drug
screen.
Exhibit C at 45-46. Jena's poor hiring practices have led to an
unusually high termination rate of security staff. In the
institution's first year, 125 employees, most of whom were
security staff, were terminated for such serious misconduct as
personal/sexual relationships with youth, falsification of
documents, excessive use of force, bringing contraband on campus,
and accepting money, goods, or favors from offenders. Exhibit C
at 48.
In addition, some employees have been hired and
maintained on the payroll despite identified histories of
criminal arrests and convictions. For instance, Sgt. TW was
hired in December 1998 and was terminated for youth abuse in July
1999, after youth BC suffered a serious injury. Another officer
witnessed Sgt. W grab the youth's head and slam his face onto the
concrete. Officers from Swanson had to pull Sgt. W off the youth
to stop Sgt. W from repeatedly slamming BC's head to the floor.
There is a report from the Jonesville Police Department in TW's
personnel file stating that TW had four 1998 criminal convictions
and had served time in jail for aggravated assault, disturbing
the peace, and contempt of court. The PZT log lists three prior
allegations of abuse filed against TW before he was terminated.
Exhibit C at 48.
II. Other Juvenile Justice Issues
The United States asked Paul DeMuro, an expert on
juvenile justice issues, to assess the adequacy of conditions at
Jena from a juvenile justice perspective. In particular, we
asked Mr. DeMuro (and our medical expert, Dr. Michael Cohen) to
investigate Jena's use of chemical restraints on the night of
November 27, 1999. In juvenile correctional facilities such as
Jena, chemical restraints should only be used when a genuine risk
of serious bodily harm to another exists and other less intrusive
methods of restraint are not reasonably available. Alexander S.
v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 785-86 (D.S.C. 1995); see also Ruiz v.
Johnson, 37 F. Supp.2d 855, 935-36 (S.D. Tex. 1999)(inmates'
Eighth Amendment rights were violated where OC gas was used on an
entire pod of 23 inmates in response to a disturbance by some).
A. Jena's use of gas on November 27, 1999 violated
juveniles' constitutional rights and the Jena
Interim Agreement.
On November 27, 1999, Jena staff violated the Jena
Interim Agreement in five separate ways. Moreover, the United
States' experts concluded that Jena staff endangered the lives of
and abused the youth on Falcon C, used excessive force, and
failed to investigate the incident adequately. Exhibit E at 4-9;
Exhibit F at 6-7. On November 27, 1999, the State and Wackenhut
violated the constitutional rights of the juveniles on Falcon C
who were subjected to the unlawful use of chemical agents.
When the events of the night of November 27, 1999 began,
youth on Falcon C at Jena had been without clean clothes for
several days, had problems accessing showers, and had been
experiencing a group punishment lockdown for two days. Exhibit F
at 6. A relatively new Deputy Warden was in charge of the
facility. The Deputy Warden came to the unit, delegated to lower
ranking staff the authority to use gas as a last resort, and left
Falcon C.(7) Cf. Wackenhut Corrections Corporation February 2,
2000 Report at 6. Several supervisory staff were present on
Falcon C and the youth were somewhat compliant. When the
supervisory staff left, the youth began to act up. Instead of
calling the supervisory staff back to the unit, Jena's
investigator, who later investigated the incident and concluded
that the use of gas that night was within acceptable limits, made
the decision to use gas. A "triple chaser grenade", a CS gas
grenade, was rolled into Falcon C. The grenade was deployed
indoors in a unit housing at least 46 youth (some of whom were
being compliant and already in bed) and several Jena staff. With
that decision, Jena staff put the lives of at least 46 youth and
some staff at risk and used excessive force.
The triple chaser grenade had been brought to Jena
earlier in the year from Wackenhut's adult correctional facility,
Allen. Exhibit F at 6. The manufacturer's specifications for
the triple chaser state that the grenade "is designed for outdoor
use in crowd control situations . . . . It should not be
deployed . . . indoors due to its fire producing capability."
Exhibit F at 6 and attachment to the report. Thankfully, no fire
erupted on Falcon C.(8)
When the grenade was rolled into Falcon C, staff and
juveniles fled through the unlocked door. Juveniles were made to
lie face outdoors on concrete in the cold, some in only their
underwear, for many hours. Exhibit E at 5. During this time,
at least four juveniles were sprayed in the face with a hand-held
canister of mace while they were on the ground. The youth claim
that they were lying down with their hands behind their back and
staff claim that the youth were trying to get up. On at least
two occasions, two groups of youth were forced to go back into
Falcon C - the youth claim for punishment because they were
complaining about being cold and the guard who ordered them back
onto the unit claims that he wanted to see if enough time had
passed so that the clean-up process could begin. Exhibit F at 7.
One of the youth who was on Falcon C when the triple chaser
grenade was deployed, was ordered back into the unit, and was
sprayed in the face while lying on the walk outside, began to
violently shake immediately after being sprayed in the face. A
nurse found him unresponsive to people around him and he was
taken by ambulance to the emergency room. Exhibit E at 6.(9) The
Court Expert was not notified about this episode in a timely
fashion. Exhibit F at 15-16.
The Jena investigator who had authorized the use of the
triple chaser grenade found the use of chemical restraint that
night to be within acceptable limits. The United States'
juvenile justice expert, Paul DeMuro, found that the
investigation of the use of chemical agents on the night of
November 27, 1999 was "seriously flawed." Among other things:
1) the investigator failed to interview a number of key actors --
both youth and staff -- who were involved with the events of that
evening; and 2) the investigator omitted some very important
facts, including any mention of the individual uses of chemical
agents on the walk outside of Falcon C and that some youth were
ordered back into Falcon C while the gas was still noxious.
Exhibit F at 6-7, 13; see also Exhibit E at 4-9 (Dr. Cohen's
report describing major problems with the medical care provided
to the juveniles who were subjected to chemical restraints that
night).
Wackenhut takes the position that only one provision of
the Jena Interim Agreement may have been violated by the use of
chemical agents on the night of November 27, 1999 -- the
provision relating to reporting the use of chemical agents to the
Court Expert in a timely fashion. In response to our request to
the State asking for the State's position on whether Jena's use
of chemical agents on November 27, 1999 violated the Jena Interim
Agreement, the State referred us to Wackenhut.
Wackenhut breached the Jena Interim Agreement in several
ways:
1. The Deputy Warden on duty delegated his approval
authority to a lesser ranking officer and was not
present at the authorization and use of the gas
(violating ¶ 1(A) and ¶ 1(C) of Part II of the
agreement).
2. The use of the gas grenade was not permitted under
any of the conditions set forth in ¶ 1(C) of Part
II of the agreement. There was no impending or
actual riot occurring. No juvenile was posing a
direct and immediate threat of injury to staff or
another juvenile. No juvenile was committing a
felony, like escape. And a gas grenade was not
the only means to avoid a physical confrontation
that would likely result in injury to any of the
juveniles or to the staff. Furthermore, there was
no mass disturbance such as an attempted mass
escape going on, which is a circumstance for which
use of gas is permissible under ¶ 1(A) of Part II
of the agreement.
3. The use of chemical spray on juveniles lying face
down outside in the cold -- even if they were
attempting to get up -- was not permitted under
any of the conditions listed in ¶ 1(C) of Part II
of the agreement.
4. Ordering youth back into contact with gas on the
Falcon C unit while the gas was still noxious was
a use of a chemical agent that is not permissible
under any of the conditions listed in ¶ 1(C) of
Part II of the agreement.
5. The Court Expert was not informed of the use as
soon as practicable after the use, as required by
¶ 1(D) of Part II of the agreement.
Further, the State and Wackenhut violated the constitutional
rights of the affected juveniles by using a chemical agent when
no genuine risk of serious bodily harm to another existed and
there were other less intrusive methods of restraint reasonably
available. Alexander S., 876 F. Supp. at 785-86.
B. Jena's staff are inadequately trained.
Paul DeMuro, the United States' expert on juvenile
justice issues, concluded that Jena
continues to be plagued with a variety of major
problems. The events of November 27, 1999 were
not an aberration. They grew out of an
institution which is in trouble, an institution
which has a largely untrained and stretched work
force.
Exhibit F at 16. Mr. DeMuro found that Jena has major staffing
problems, given its unacceptable line staff turnover rate; a lack
of consistent leadership; and the insufficient juvenile justice
experience of many of its key staff. Exhibit F at 8-9.
Most of the youth interviewed by Mr. DeMuro claimed to
have witnessed or have been subjected to a variety of staff
abuses such as overly-aggressive physical restraints, punches,
take downs, and body slams. Exhibit F at 9. Mr. DeMuro found a
widespread abusive summary punishment practice where staff order
youth to lie face down on the ground for extended periods of time
with their hands behind their back, keeping their head off the
ground and their feet in the air. Ibid. Youth claimed that some
staff allowed youth to fight without breaking up the fights and
that some staff "recruited" and "encouraged" stronger youth to
fight other youth who staff believed needed to be taught a
lesson. Ibid; see also Exhibit E at 43-44 (youth told physician
that "staff won't break up fights. That is how JM got his front
tooth knocked out. There was a fight and no one did anything to
stop it.").
C. Other juvenile justice issues
Mr. DeMuro found that Jena's grievance system "is broken"
and, like Dr. Ray, Mr. DeMuro found that DPS&C's Project Zero
Tolerance investigation process at Jena is dysfunctional.
Exhibit F at 5. Mr. DeMuro found that the four large, 48-bed
dorm settings are not safe. Exhibit F at 12; see also Exhibit D
at 27 (because Jena operates at full capacity, youth cannot be
transferred to other dorms without displacing other youth).
Mr. DeMuro also found that the State and Wackenhut "have
had on going and serious problems complying with many of the
provisions detailed in the November 6, 1998 Interim Agreement."
Exhibit F at 15. Mr. DeMuro found noncompliance with provisions
regarding: 1) staffing mandates; 2) the use and handling of
chemical agents; 3) isolation and disciplinary hearings; 4) the
PZT process; and 5) the limitations on use of mechanical
restraints at the facility. Exhibit F at 15-16. Mr. DeMuro
concludes that, "Youth at JJJC are not safe." Exhibit F at 16. III. Jena Fails to Provide Adequate Mental Health Care
Confined juveniles such as the juveniles at Jena have a
constitutional right to adequate mental health care. Morales v.
Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 101 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322
(1977); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp.
1354, 1374 (D.R.I. 1972). Where facilities fail to provide
adequate treatment to youth who are attempting suicides and
engaging in self-mutilating behaviors, juveniles' constitutional
rights are violated. Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1436-37
(9th Cir. 1987); see also Partridge v. Two Unknown Police
Officers of the City of Houston, 791 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (5th Cir.
1986)(failure to provide pre-trial detainee with adequate
protection from his own suicidal impulses is actionable).
Conditions at Jena endanger the juveniles with mental
disabilities who are confined there. Dr. Kathy Quinn, our expert
on mental health care, found that some juveniles at Jena
repeatedly engage in self-mutilating behavior to seek the safety
of the medical unit and escape the dangers of the Jena general
population, where victims are strong-armed for food or canteen or
are being sexually victimized. Both Jena's psychologist and
psychiatrist described this pattern, but neither could describe
Jena's approach to address the causes of the self-injurious
behavior. Exhibit D at 13. For example, juvenile NR, whose file
is full of allegations that others make sexual advances toward
him and take his food and clothing, regularly self-mutilates. He
has also twice attempted suicide while at Jena. Exhibit D at 14.
Other juveniles become depressed and anxious about the conditions
of their daily lives. For example, youth JM, who entered Jena
with no current mental health needs, was assaulted by other youth
on December 28, 1999, and sustained two black eyes and trauma to
his nose and lip and lost a tooth. The other youth were trying
to strong-arm JM for his piece of cake. Following this episode,
JM sought mental health care, describing depression and anxiety
over facing his peers. Exhibit C at 22.
Juveniles with known suicidal impulses are housed in
areas with known and obvious suicide hazards. In particular, the
shower heads and the window bars throughout the facility
(including the window bar in the medical isolation room) create a
risk for hanging. Exhibit E at 44 and photographs attached as
Appendix C to that Report. Jena staff are aware of the risk
presented by the window bars because youth have attempted suicide
using these bars. For instance, youth CB tied a sheet around his
neck and to the window bars. When he was discovered "in bad
condition," a code blue was called. Exhibit D at 19. In another
example, juvenile TG tied a sheet around his neck and the window
bars. Less than a month later, TG tied a shoelace to his neck
and the window bars and threatened to jump from the top bunk
while tied. Exhibit D at 20. Jena staff also permit youth with
known suicidal tendencies access to potentially lethal
instruments. For example, youth NR has been found on various
occasions with a belt, a sock, and an ace bandage around his
neck. Exhibit D at 19-20.
When Jena does respond to self-mutilation and suicidal
behaviors, "it often does so in a coercive and punitive fashion."
Exhibit D at 15. There is a pattern of writing disciplinary
tickets for both self-mutilation and suicide attempts, as well as
charging youth for property damage or for medical care. For
instance, when juvenile DC put a belt around his neck and tied it
to the cell door, staff sprayed him with mace. He was written up
with a disciplinary ticket. Exhibit D at 15. In another
example, juvenile RH self-mutilated and was forced to lie naked
on a concrete floor of a cell with blood spattered on the floor
and door. Exhibit D at 16 and photographs in Appendix F to that
report.
Although Jena is supposed to be a substance abuse
facility, it fails to provide minimally adequate substance abuse
treatment. Exhibit D at 3-7. Administrative and program staff
at Jena uniformly stated that Jena does not now and never has
functioned as a substance abuse treatment center. Exhibit C at
2. Jena employs only one certified substance abuse counselor,
who estimates that only one-third of the youth who need substance
abuse services at Jena are getting such services. Exhibit D at
4. For example, RH was sent to Jena in July 1999 to receive
court-ordered substance abuse treatment. RH began substance
abuse at age 11, using alcohol and marijuana daily. When he was
15, he began using cocaine, acid, opium and crystal. In the more
than seven months he has been at Jena, he has only attended seven
substance abuse meetings -- the last one he attended was in mid-October, 1999. Exhibit D at 6-7. Jena's sole certified
substance abuse counselor admits that RH is not receiving
adequate substance abuse services at Jena; Dr. Quinn concludes
that the level of care that RH has received at Jena is "grossly
inadequate." Exhibit D at 7.
Dr. Quinn also found that Jena fails to adequately
identify and treat juveniles' mental health needs, Exhibit D at
7-13, falls below the standard of care in the use of psychotropic
medications, id. at 17-18, subjects juveniles confined there to
an unacceptable level of violence, id. at 21-24, and lacks
adequate youth development programming. Id. at 24-25. Dr. Quinn
also found that Jena's use of medical and mechanical restraints
grossly deviates from acceptable professional standards. Id. at
27-32. For example, after MT cut his wrists, Jena's psychologist
ordered that correctional staff constantly monitor the youth.
Ignoring the mental health order and not providing staff to
constantly watch MT, correctional staff instead restrained MT to
the bed in his cell in four-point restraints. Exhibit D at 29;
see also Exhibit E at 11 (it is contrary to juvenile justice
practices for correctional staff to physically affix a youth to a
fixed object in his dormitory).
IV. Jena Fails to Provide Adequate Medical and Dental Services
Confined juveniles such as the juveniles at Jena have a
right to adequate medical care. Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F.
Supp. 773, 788 (D.S.C. 1995)(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 103 (1976)); Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1155-1156
(S.D. Miss. 1977); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 101 (E.D.
Tex. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976),
rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977); Martarella v. Kelly, 359 F. Supp. 478
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Dr. Michael Cohen, the United States' medical expert, found
that the health program at Jena substantially departs from
current accepted professional standards for juvenile justice
facilities and clinical practice of adolescent medicine. Exhibit
E at ii. Dr. Cohen recommends that "[i]mmediate action is
required to prevent ongoing harm to youth at Jena." Ibid.
Jena's physician is not trained in pediatrics or adolescent
medicine. Dr. Cohen found that the physician's management of
acute and chronic health problems is so substandard that
immediate measures must be taken. Dr. Cohen suggests that Jena's
physician be reviewed and supervised by a physician with
experience in adolescent medicine. Exhibit E at 23-34.
The physician's deficient care of asthmatic youth at Jena
illustrates the problem. Although the peak expiratory flow meter
has been a routine part of asthma care for more than 20 years,
the physician does not obtain peak flow rates when he evaluates
asthmatic youth -- he does not obtain them when asthmatic youth
are feeling well; he does not obtain them when youth complain of
shortness of breath; he does not use them to assess the
effectiveness of the treatment he prescribes. Exhibit E at 28.
Furthermore, one of the most important advances in asthma care
over the past 15 years has been the widespread use of inhaled
steroids to control the disease. At Jena, inhaled steroids are
not used at all.(10) Instead, youth are given steroid pills. For
instance, the physician at Jetson ordered a steroid inhaler for
juvenile DH at intake; when DH was transferred to Jena, the
physician changed the order to prescribe a daily oral steroid.
Exhibit E at 30. Dr. Cohen states that "[t]his is obsolete
therapy which subjects the youth to unacceptable risks of steroid
complications and substantially deviates from current accepted
clinical practice." Exhibit E at 29. Dr. Cohen further
concludes that because inhaled steroids are more expensive than
steroid pills, "[t]he physician and Wackenhut are subjecting
youth to the risks of systemic steroid complications in order to
avoid the cost of the current standard of care which is inhaled
steroids." Exhibit E at 29.(11)
The physician's care of the unusual number of youth with
significant peptic ulcer disease at Jena further illustrates the
problem.(12) The current standard of care to manage peptic ulcer
disease is to test for H. pylori, a bacterium which causes
ulcers, and antibiotic treatment with three or more drugs to
eradicate infection when it is present. Only one of the three
youth at Jena with ulcers, SD, was tested for H. pylori infection
(which was found to be present) and only SD has been given
antibiotics. However, only a single antibiotic was prescribed.
Dr. Cohen notes that "[i]t is not unexpected, therefore, that
treatment was ineffective and his bleeding episodes have
continued." Exhibit E at 31. Despite recurrent episodes of
vomiting blood related to his ulcer, the physician has failed to
consult an appropriate specialist for assistance in managing SD's
potentially life-threatening disease. Exhibit E at 31.
Nurses at Jena fail to recognize conditions that require
medical evaluation by a physician. Exhibit E at 21. For
instance, juvenile DM has a known history of a bleeding disorder
-- his mother called the facility to alert them to the disorder
and DM has twice told the nurses about the disorder. Nurses,
however, have failed to refer DM to the physician for evaluation,
even when he came to the infirmary with nosebleeds. Exhibit E at
32.(13) In another example, juvenile LB came to sick call with
painful urination; LB was not evaluated or treated for a sexually
transmitted disease and nurses did not refer him to a physician.
Exhibit E at 21.
Dr. Cohen found a number of other problems with the health
program at Jena. The initial health appraisal at Jena is
incomplete; among other things, Jena nurses do not recognize some
abnormal urine and blood test results and therefore do not refer
juveniles with such abnormal results to the physician. Exhibit E
at 10-13. Youth with abnormal vision intake screens are not
provided timely or effective evaluations when they are
transferred to Jena. Dr. Cohen found no evidence that any
prescription glasses had ever been to supplied to any youth.
Exhibit E at 13-14. The Jena hearing program did not follow up
effectively on any of the youth admitted to Jena with abnormal
hearing during the past year. Exhibit E at 15.
Although Wackenhut has a policy regarding seeking and
obtaining prior immunization records, this is not done at Jena.
Auditors for the American Correctional Association passed Jena on
the immunization standard based on the policy, but apparently
failed to observe that no immunization records were ever actually
sought or obtained. Exhibit E at 16-17.
Sick call requests are controlled by security staff in the
lockdown units. Youth report that some sergeants will not give
out sick call slips. Exhibit E at 19-20.
Nurses perform wholly inadequate assessments after youth are
subjected to chemical agents. They do not take vital signs, do
no assessment of eyes or vision, do no assessment of lungs or
breathing, do no assessment of skin for burns, and do no
assessment of the mental status of the youth. Exhibit E at 21.
Dr. Cohen also found that Jena fails to provide adequate
dental care. Among the problems, some juveniles with diagnosed
cavities are not scheduled to have these cavities filled. As
noted by Dr. Cohen, "[n]o parent should neglect the ongoing
destruction of permanent teeth which have been found to have
decay. The state must not neglect the care of the children in
its custody. To be most effective, such care must be timely, as
the damage to the tooth is ongoing and continuous." Exhibit E at
35-38. The dentist does not replace missing teeth; he believes
that DPS&C policies prohibit him from replacing any teeth. The
dentist stated that even those youth whose front teeth are
knocked out in a fight, such as JM in 12/99 and CW on 1/3/00,
will not get dental prostheses to replace these teeth.(14) This is
contrary to clinical practice and correctional health standards.
Exhibit E at 38-39.
Finally, Dr. Cohen found that the quality assurance program
that exists at Jena has failed to identify and correct
significant deficiencies in the health program. The Health Care
Administrator could not name a single significant improvement in
care that had been initiated as a result of the QA process.
Exhibit E at 42.
VI. Conclusion
Until the significant deficiencies raised by the United
States in the attached expert reports are sufficiently remedied,
conditions at the facility will remain unlawful and will continue
to endanger the health and welfare of the juveniles confined at
Jena. We will shortly report to the Court concerning our
progress negotiating remedies with the State and Wackenhut.
Respectfully submitted,
BILL LANN LEE
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division
STEVEN H. ROSENBAUM
Chief
Special Litigation Section
ROBINSUE FROHBOESE
Deputy Chief
Special Litigation Section
_______________________
JUDITH C. PRESTON
IRIS GOLDSCHMIDT
Trial Attorneys
Special Litigation Section
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 66400
Washington, D.C. 20035-6400
(202) 514-6258
L.J. HYMEL, La. Bar #7137
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
777 Florida Street, Suite 208
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801
1. With the filing of our reports, the Jena Interim Agreement
expires. Exhibit A at 2, 11.
2. The Jena Interim Agreement, which provided that the expert
reports were to be filed with the Court by January 15, 1999, was
modified by the agreement of the parties when it became apparent
that juveniles were not going to be transferred to Jena according
to the dates specified in the agreement. The parties agreed that
the tours would occur at a mutually agreeable time.
3. A "traumatic injury" is a bodily injury produced by
violence.
4. For example, an officer filed a report stating that two
officers were taunting several youth who were just arriving at
Jena. He stated that the officers were calling the youth stupid
and that one officer told a youth that "if he farted and [the
officer] smelled it, he would be wrote up, because he [was
sentenced to] juvenile life." Exhibit C at 22.
5. In accordance with the January 4, 2000 protective order
and to protect the privacy of the confined juveniles, only the
initials of juveniles are provided in this pleading and in the
reports. The actual names of the juveniles referenced in the
reports have been provided to counsel of record.
6. There is, of course, a difference between imposing
consequences on filing "false" allegations and imposing
consequences on filing complaints that are not substantiated by
the investigators.
7. The Deputy Warden went to Eagle D, where he sprayed the
dayroom (and the several juveniles in the dayroom) with a hand-held canister of gas.
8. This is not the first time a gas grenade has been used at
Jena. On December 19, 1998, Jena staff used a Federal 519 gas
grenade to quell a disturbance. When we learned about this
incident, we sent the State and Wackenhut a letter to express our
serious concerns about the ability of the State and Wackenhut to
protect juveniles at Jena from harm. Exhibit B at 2. When we
toured Jena in January 2000, we saw a number of these gas
grenades in Jena's armory. The Federal 519 grenade has a warning
label surrounding it that states: "...for outdoor use only. May
release lethal concentration indoors." Exhibit E at 4.
9. Dr. Cohen, the United States' medical expert, found that
the medical care provided to this youth as well as other youth
who were gassed on the night of November 27, 1999 was inadequate.
Exhibit E at 8-9. For instance, the youth who was sent to the
emergency room on the night of November 27, 1999 reported to sick
call on November 29 complaining of blurred vision, facial
burning, and a sore left eye. The physician did not evaluate him
at all, but instead rotely recited in his physician note that
there were no heart, lung, or abdominal problems related to the
gassing. The physician provided no evaluation, no diagnosis, a
nd no treatment for the youth's actual injuries and complaints.
"No care was provided at all." Exhibit E at 8. A youth with
asthma was also seen by the physician on November 29, complaining
of the aftereffects of being gassed. "His respiratory rate was abnormal at 22 per minute." Ibid. The physician failed to
obtain a measure of lung function, such as a peak flow rate, and
the youth was provided no treatment for his asthma. Ibid.
10. The physician admitted that he uses inhaled steroids in
his private practice. Exhibit E at 29.
11. The Wackenhut drug formulary reads:
Steroid pills ($)
Beclomethasone inhaler ($$$$)
The inhaler contains a steroid preparation. Exhibit E at 29.
12. Dr. Cohen found an unusually high rate of stress related
disorders such as hypertension and ulcers in this facility, which
may be related to the "extremely violent environment at Jena,"
which "is harmful to the health of the youth." Exhibit E at 43.
13. On July 18, 1999, DM came to the infirmary for evaluation
after staff used force on him. His upper left abdomen was
bruised during restraint by staff, who had not been alerted to
his risk of bleeding. Dr. Cohen notes that "blunt trauma to the
abdomen is very dangerous" to DM. Exhibit C at 43.
14. The dentist does provide prostheses in his private
practice to replace single front teeth and when several teeth are
missing in one quadrant. Exhibit E at 39.
Updated July 25, 2008