OTIS R. BOWEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, APPELLANT V. CHAN KENDRICK, ET AL. No. 87-253 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1987 On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia Jurisdictional Statement Parties To The Proceeding In addition to the party named in the caption, the parties are: Reverend Robert E. Vaughn, Reverend Lawrence W. Buxton, Dr. Emmett W. Cooke, Jr., Shirley Pedler, Reverend Homer A. Goddard, Joyce Armstrong, John Roberts, and The American Jewish Congress. TABLE OF CONTENTS Question Presented Parties To The Proceeding Opinion below Jurisdiction Constitutional and statutory provisions involved Statement The question is substantial Conclusion OPINION BELOW The opinion of the district court (App., infra, 1a-46a) is reported at 657 F. Supp. 1547. JURISDICTION The order of the district court declaring the statute unconstitutional and enjoining the Secretary from enforcing it "as it pertains to 'religious organizations'" (App., infra, 47a-49a) was entered on April 15, 1987. A notice of appeal to this Court (App., infra, 54a) was filed on May 15, 1987. On July 7, 1987, the Chief Justice extended the time within which to docket this appeal to and including August 13, 1987. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1252. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof * * * . 42 U.S.C. 300z-5(a)(21) provides in pertinent part: An application for a grant for a demonstration project for services under this subchapter shall be in such form and contain such information as the Secretary may require, and shall include . . . * * * * (21) a description of how the applicant will, as appropriate in the provision of services . . . * * * * (B) involve religious and charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups in the private sector as well as services provided by publicly sponsored initiatives * * * . QUESTION PRESENTED The Adolescent Family Life Act, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 300z et seq., authorizes federal funds to support demonstration projects designed to discourage adolescent pregnancy and to provide care for pregnant adolescents. The question presented is whether the Act violated the Establishment Clause, either on its face or as applied, insofar as it requires prospective grantees to describe how they will, "as appropriate in the provision of services, * * * involve religious and charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups in the private sector as well as services provided by publicly sponsored initiatives" (42 U.S.C. 300z-5(a)(21)(B)). STATEMENT 1. The Adolescent Family Life Act, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 300z et seq. (AFLA), "authorizes appropriations for demonstration grants to individuals, public and nonprofit entities for services and research in the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy" (S. Rep. 97-161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981)). In pertinent part, AFLA provides funding for programs that offer either "prevention services" (intended to discourage adolescent premarital pregnancy) or "care services" (intended to care for pregnant, unmarried adolescents). The Act is generally designed "to promote self discipline and other prudent approaches to the problem of adolescent premarital sexual relations, including adolescent pregnancy"; "to promote adoption as an alternative for adolescent parents"; and "to establish innovative, comprehensive, and integrated approaches to the delivery of care services * * * for pregnant adolescents" (42 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 300z(b)(1), (2) and (3)). In enacting AFLA, Congress found that pregnancy and childbirth, particularly among young adolescents, "often result() in severe adverse health, social, and economic consequences" (42 U.S.C. 300z (a)(5)), and that these issues are "best approached through a variety of integrated and essential services provided * * * by other family members, religious and charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups in the private sector as well as services provided by publicly sponsored initiatives" (42 U.S.C. 300z(a)(8)(B)). The Act accordingly requires applicants for AFLA funds to describe how they will, "as appropriate in the provision of services, * * * involve religious and charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups in the private sector as well as services provided by publicly sponsored initiatives" (42 U.S.C. 300z-5(a)(21)). In establishing this requirement, Congress "recogniz(ed) the limitations of Government in dealing with a problem that has complex moral and social dimensions." Congress concluded that "promoting the involvement of religious organizations in the solution to these problems is neither inappropriate or illegal" but rather "would be a simple recognition that nonprofit religious organizations have a role to play in the provision of services to adolescents" (S. Rep. 97-161, supra, at 15-16). AFLA contains two principal restrictions on the use of grant monies. First, pursuant to Section 300z-3(b)(1), funds may not be used "for the provision of family planning services," unless such services "are not otherwise awailable in the community." In setting this restriction, Congress determined that "money spent on birth control services under this program would divert resources from the purposes of the act" (S. Rep. 97-161, supra, at 13). Second, AFLA grants may be made "only to programs or projects which do not provide abortions or abortion counseling or referral, or which do not subcontract with or make any payment to any person who provides abortions or abortion counseling or referral, except that any such program or project may provide referral for abortion counseling to a pregnant adolescent if such adolescent and the parents or guardians of such adolescent request such referral" (42 U.S.C. 300z-10(a)). Congress concluded that "abortion * * * can be terribly damaging to the physical and mental health of adolescents, and the well-being of their families" and that "legislation, to foster alternatives to abortion, and to encourage adolescents to bring their babies to term, serves a critical national interest" (S. Rep. 97-161, supra, at 20). 2. Appellees, a group of taxpayers, clergymen, and the American Jewish Congress, brought this action to enjoin the enforcement of AFLA, claiming that the Act violates the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. On April 15, 1987, the district court granted summary judgment in appellees' favor (App., infra, 1a-49a). Although it acknowledged that AFLA has a valid secular purpose (id. at 17a-22a), /1/ the court declared the Act unconstitutional, on its face and as applied, "insofar as religious organizations are involved in carrying out the programs and purposes of the Act" (id. at 48a). The district court first held (App., infra, 22a-38a) that the statute on its face has the primary effect of advancing religion because it "explicitly permits religious organizations to be grantees and envisions a direct role for those organizations in the education and counseling components of AFLA grants" (id. at 28a). Without deciding whether any of the grantees in this case are "pervasively sectarian" (see id. at 23a-28a), /2/ the district court stated that participation in AFLA programs by any religious organization would inevitable advance religion because those programs involve "teaching by grant recipients and subcontractors * * * about the harm of premarital sexual relations and the factors supporting a choice of adoption rather than abortion, and these matters are fundamental elements of religious doctrine" (id. at 28a (emphasis in original)). Relying on this Court's decisions involving government aid to parochial schools, the district court explained (id. at 30a) that "(t)o presume that AFLA counselors from religious organizations can put their beliefs aside when counseling an adolescent on matters that are part of religious doctrine is simply unrealistic." And the district court found the prospect of religious indoctrination to be particularly likely since AFLA programs involve "impressionable and unlearned adolescent(s)" who receive "one-on-one counseling, a situation in which there are few discernable constraints" (id. at 31a). The district court next held (App., infra, 32a-38a) that the statute, as applied, also has the primary effect of advancing religion because grants in practice have been made to religious organizations. The court found (id. at 34a-35a) that ten grantees or subgrantees "were themselves 'religious organizations' in the sense that they have explicit corporate ties to a particular religious faith and by-laws or policies that prohibit any deviation from religious doctrine." The court also noted (id. at 33a) that other grantees, "while not explicitly affiliated with a religious denomination, are religiously inspired and dedicated to teaching the dogma that inspired them." And the court found that several AFLA programs took place at sites adorned with religious symbols and were administered by members of religious orders, thereby causing participants in the programs to "believe() that these federally funded programs were also sponsored by the religious denomination" (id. at 37a). /3/ Again, however, the court nowhere found that any of the participating organizations were "pervasively sectarian." Finally, the district court held (App., infra, 39a-43a) that the statute causes excessive government entanglement with religion. In analyzing the entanglement question, the district court did not distinguish among the various categories of "religious organization" involved here, which include hospitals, maternity homes, and YWCAs. Rather, it surmised that, because AFLA authorizes funds to religious organizations in general, "the risk that AFLA funds will be used to transmit religious doctrine can be overcome only by government monitoring so continuous that it rises to the level of excessive entanglement" (id. at 40a). The court also found that "the nature of the aid" in this case -- involving, in part, the counseling of "impressionable" adolescents (id. at 42a-43a) -- "creates the danger that AFLA funds flowing to religious organizations will inescapably advance religion absent continual government monitoring" (id. at 41a). /4/ The district court therefore declared AFLA unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement insofar as it pertains to "religious organizations" (App., infra, 46a). The court then ordered the parties to submit briefs on the question whether the "religious organizations" clause is severable from the balance of the Act under this Court's decision in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, No. 85-920 (Mar. 25, 1987). /5/ On May 22, 1987, the district court issued an order, staying the effect of its judgment until September 30, 1987, insofar as it pertains to current grantees (App., infra, 50a-51a). On August 10, 1987, the Chief Justice issued an order granting a stay pending appeal. THE QUESTION IS SUBSTANTIAL The district court has held unconstitutional a carefully considered enactment whose constitutionality was explicitly addressed and approved by the enacting Congress. In a bipartisan effort, Congress sought to stem the "severe adverse health, social, and economic consequences" of adolescent pregnancy and childbirth (42 U.S.C. 300z(a)(5), and it determined that religious organizations -- together with "family members, * * * charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups in the private sector" (42 U.S.C. 300z(a)(8)(B))-- "have a role to play" that does "not violate the constitutional separation between church and state" (S. Rep. 97-161, supra, at 15-16). In the district court's view, however, Congress's decision to permit religious organizations to participate in AFLA programs violates the Establishment Clause and may not be enforced. In reaching that result, the district court relied entirely on this Court's cases involving government aid to parochial schools. That reliance was misplaced. This Court's parochial school cases hinge on the central premise that parochial schools have a "pervasively sectarian" mission that cannot be separated from their various secular functions. In the parochial school setting, the Court has explained, government assistance programs cannot easily be channeled to purely secular ends, absent excessive and entangling monitoring by the state. At the same time, however, the Court has upheld government programs designed to assist religious organizations that are not "pervasively sectarian." In these cases -- many involving what the district court would describe as "religious organizations" -- the Court has refused to strike down assistance programs because of the possibility that one or another recipient may misuse a grant that the government had restricted to secular ends. The district court elided that distinction entirely, assuming instead that any religious organization that participates in an AFLA program will inevitably inculcate religious doctrine or, on the other hand, will require excessive government monitoring in order to avoid doing so. Presuming, at bottom, that religious organizations are indistinguishable, the district court struck down the statute, on its face and as applied. The result cannot be reconciled with this Court's Establishment Clause cases and reflects a marked lack of deference to "the duly enacted and carefully considered decision of a coequal and representative branch of our Government." Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319 (1985). The question presented is therefore substantial. 1. "A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." United States v. Salerno, No. 86-87 (May 26, 1987), slip op. 5. Accord, Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U.S. 736, 761 (1976) plurality opinion). The district court concluded that appellees had met this challenge, on the theory that there can be no religious organization constitutionally capable of participating in AFLA programs. This premise is deeply flawed. Religious organizations vary in structure, purpose, degree of religious affiliation, and commitment to a theological regime. They range in nature and mission from churches and parochial schools (whose functions include the propagation of religious doctrine) to social welfare organizations (which provide aid to the needy without regard to religious orientation, and which are operated by professional staffs bound by ethical standards that preclude religious inculcation). The district court thus erred in barring all religious organizations from participating in ALFA programs without first making a meticulous assessment of each organization's special characteristics. a. This Court's decisions have drawn a crisp distinction between parochial schools, whose pervasive religious mission often disables them from receiving governmental assistance, and other religious organizations, which are ordinarily free to participate in government programs on an equal footing. The Court has observed that in parochial schools, education and counseling are "integral part(s) of the dominant sectarian mission * * * in which an atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is constantly maintained" (Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371 (1975)). The Court has emphasized that in a parochial school setting "(r)eligious authority necessarily pervades the school system," and that it is the "substantial religious character of * * * church-related schools" (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616, 617 (1971)) that requires the Court to be "particularly vigilant" (Edwards v. Aguillard, No. 85-1513 (June 19, 1987), slip op. 4). The "danger that a teacher under religious control and discipline poses to the separation of the religious from the purely secular" is a "conflict of functions (that) inheres in the situation" (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 617). See also Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 384-385, 391-392 (1985); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 501-504 (1979). But there are a great many "religious organizations" -- such as the hospitals and maternity homes providing care to pregnant teenagers here -- that are fully capable of discharging their services without permitting "ideological content * * * (to) creep in()" (Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 389). "The proposition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any program which in some manner aids an institution with a religious affiliation has consistently been rejected" (Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742 (1973)). The Court therefore has upheld governmental assistance programs offered to religious organizations or institutions that were not "pervasively sectarian" in nature. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, supra; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). For example, in Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, a plurality of the Court upheld noncategorical grants to colleges, among them religiously affiliated colleges, under a statute that simply stipulated that none of the funds could be used for sectarian purposes (426 U.S. at 755-758). Because the grant recipients, while religious, were not pervasively so, the Court was unwilling to assume (as the district court did in the present case) that the recipients would use the funds to promote "'specifically religious activity'" (id. at 759 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. at 743)). The Court stressed in Roemer that it "must assume that the colleges * * * will exercise their delegated control over use of the funds in compliance with the statutory, and therefore the constitutional, mandate" (426 U.S. at 760). And in marked contrast to the approach taken by the court below, the Court cautioned (id. at 761) that "(i)t has not been the Court's practice, in considering facial challenges to statutes of this kind, to strike them down in anticipation that particular applications may result in unconstitutional use of funds." Indeed, in one of its earliest cases, the Court made much the same point, upholding, in Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), a grant of $30,000 to a hospital to be used for the construction of buildings. The hospital, which was operated by a sisterhood of the Roman Catholic Church, had previously been incorporated by an act of Congress, giving the hospital the power "for the care of such sick and invalid persons as may place themselves under the treatment and care of the said corporation" (Act of Apr. 8, 1864, ch. 50, Sections 2, 13 Stat. 44). The Court held that although the hospital was "conducted under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church," which "exercise(d) great and perhaps controlling influence over the management of the hospital," the hospital's charter was limited to the purpose of operating a hospital (175 U.S. at 298). See Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U.S. at 746. Because the charter ensured that the hospital's mission was not fundamentally religious, the Court refused to inquire into "the individual beliefs upon religious matters of the various incorporators" (175 U.S. at 298). Even though "the influence of any particular church may be powerful over the members of a non-sectarian and secular corporation," the Court stated, such influence was "surely not sufficient to convert such a corporation into a religious or sectarian body" (ibid). b. Notwithstanding this central distinction, the court below refused to conduct a careful examination as to whether the AFLA grantees, subgrantees, or other participants are "prevasively sectarian." The district court reasoned that there is no need to make such a determination when "the connection between religion and the challenged government statute or practice is clear from the face of the statute" (App., infra, 25a). Because AFLA "envisions a direct role" (id. at 28a) for religious organizations, in connection with issues that are the subject of "fundamental * * * religious doctrine" (ibid.), the district court concluded that it does not matter whether or not the actual grant recipients are pervasively sectarian. The district court's legal theory, which it did not attempt to tie directly to any of this Court's decisions (see App., infra, 25a), effectively disqualifies religious organizations from the AFLA program simply because they are religiously affiliated. Such discrimination produces a form of "religious gerrymander()" (Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J.)); that mode of linedrawing is improper, since a systematic hostility to religious organizations offends the First Amendment as much as governmental establishment of religion. See, e.g., Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 211-212 (1948). The judgment of the district court places religious organizations under a disability, not imposed by Congress, to which no other organization, public or private, is subject. There is no warrant in this Court's cases for that result. On the contrary, the Court has "dispel(led) any notion that a religious person can never be in the State's pay for a secular purpose" and has long held that "religious institutions need not be quarantined from public benefits that are neutrally available to all." Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U.S. at 746. Indeed, a policy that invited participation by private organizations generally, but advised that religious organizations need not apply, would violate principles of equal protection inherent in the Due Process Clause. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). c. The district court's analysis also poses a threat to a broad array of well-established federal programs -- and, we suspect, state programs -- in which religious organizations have traditionally participated and under which they have routinely received government funds. There is a long history of cooperation between government and the charitable arms of the Nation's churches in providing for the needs of the sick, /6/ the orphaned, /7/ delinquent adolescents, /8/ and the poor. /9/ Like AFLA, these programs, both federal and state, are administered without regard to the religious affiliation of the grant applicants and those they assist, and without inquiry into the existence of a religious basis for their interest in the program. Yet, like AFLA, each of these programs involves issues that "are fundamental elements of religious doctrine" (App., infra, 28a). Under the district court's thesis, all of these programs would risk a violation of the First Amendment. There is no basis in the cases for such an extravagant view. Indeed, the "cases have recognized that religious institutions and religious practices may, in certain contexts, receive the benefit of government programs and policies generally available, on the basis of some secular criterion, to a wide class of similarly situated nonreligious beneficiaries * * * " (Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 809 (1983) (footnote omitted) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Thus, "(n)either the original purposes of the establishment clause nor the needs and values of our contemporary pluralistic society require exclusion of voluntary religious organizations from full participation in a process of socialization for which the state enlists the cooperation of private associations." Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development Part II; The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 513, 556 (1968). 2. The district court's conclusion that AFLA, as applied, violates the Establishment Clause is marred by the same defects that beset its facial examination of the statute. In making its as-applied judgment, the court likewise refused to examine, on a case-by-case basis, the individual "religious organizations" or even to define what it meant by a "religious organization." The court simply stated that "at least ten" AFLA grantees or subgrantees had "explicit corporate ties to a particular religious faith * * * " and asserted that the "religious character" of unnamed other AFLA grantees or subgrantees was "indisputable" (App., infra, 34a-35a). This cursory approach cannot be squared with the Court's insistence in Roemer that "(t)o answer the question whether an institution is so 'pervasively sectarian' that it may receive no direct state aid of any kind, it is necessary to paint a general picture of the institution, composed of many elements" (426 U.S. at 758). The Court has steadfastly refused to "strike down an Act of Congress on the basis of a hypothetical 'profile'" of the "'typical sectarian' institution of higher education" (Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 682). And it has explained that "(i)ndividual projects can be properly evaluated if and when challenges arise with respect to particular recipients and some evidence is then presented to show that the institution does in fact possess these (pervasively sectarian) characteristics" (ibid.). The district court's refusal to make any such evaluation cannot be sustained. What is more, because the court declined to address the religious nature of the individual grantees and subgrantees, its order is necessarily vague. The court characterized the phrase "religious organizations" as "self-evident," and found that it "so clearly means organizations with a religious character and purpose that 'one would necessarily need to consult a lawyer to effectively miscontrue it'" (App., infra, 40a, quoting Logan v. United States, 518 F.2d 143, 152 (6th Cir. 1975)). As a result, the court's decision leaves largely unresolved which organizations now receiving AFLA funds are henceforth to be disqualified from the program, and offers still less guidance to Health and Human Services in making future funding decisions. 3. Congress enacted AFLA because it perceived a growing crisis among unwed adolescents. Congress found that pregnancy and childbirth, particularly among young adolescents, "often result() in severe adverse health, social, and economic consequences, including: a higher percentage of pregnancy and childbirth complications; a higher incidence of low birth weight babies; a higher frequency of developmental disabilities; higher infant mortality and morbidity; a decreased likelihood of completing schooling; a greater likelihood that an adolescent marriage will end in divorce; and higher risks of unemployment and welfare dependency" (42 U.S.C. 300z(a)(5)). To address "a problem that has complex moral and social dimensions" (S. Rep. 97-161, supra, at 15), Congress sought to involve the widest possible array of assistance, from both private and public organizations. As a consequence of the district court's decision, however, large numbers of unmarried teenagers, some pregnant and others likely to become so, may lose vital benefits that Congress intended them to have. The courtS judgment rests on brittle legal premises and assumes facts about the AFLA program and its many participants that the record will not support and that the district court in any event failed to find. That judgment is deeply flawed and warrants this Court's review. CONCLUSION Probable jurisdiction should be noted. Respectfully submitted. CHARLES FRIED Solicitor General RICHARD K. WILLARD Assistant Attorney General ALBERT G. LAUBER, JR. Deputy Solicitor General ROBERT J. CYNKAR Deputy Assistant Attorney General LAWRENCE S. ROBBINS Assistant to the Solicitor General MICHAEL JAY SINGER JAY S. BYBEE Attorneys AUGUST 1987 /1/ Specifically, the court found that "the AFLA was motivated by Congress' concern that teenage pregnancy and premarital sexual relations are very damaging to society and, particularly, to adolescents" (App., infra, 17a-18a (footnote omitted)). Moreover, the court observed (id. at 20a (emphasis in original)) that the mere fact that this secular purpose "coincide(s) or conflict(s) with religious tenets does not transform (it) into (a) sectarian purpose() motivated wholly by religious considerations." "Religious organizations," the court concluded (id. at 21a-22a), "can play a vital role in furthering values." /2/ The district court reasoned (App., infra, 24a) that a court need only decide whether a grantee is pervasively sectarian where "the connection to religion is not apparent on the face of the statute or from the nature of the government act itself." Because "the statute, taken as a whole, explicitly permits religious organizations to be grantees and envisions a direct role for those organizations in the education and counseling components of AFLA grants" (id. at 28a), the court concluded that there was no need to decide whether any particular grantee or subgrantee under AFLA was pervasively sectarian. /3/ The district court also found (App., infra, 44a) that the "some grantees attempted to evade restrictions (on) * * * religious teaching by establishing programs in which an AFLA-Funded staffer's presentations would be immediately followed, in the same room and in the staffer's presence, by a program presented by a member of a religious order and dedicated to presentation of religious views on the subject covered by the AFLA staffer." /4/ The district court also found (App., infra, 43a) that the statute would "tend to incite political division along religious lines" because AFLA programs involve "sensitive issues upon which religions' fundamental beliefs differ." Moreover, the court believed that such division would be "recurring and intensified" (ibid.) because appropriations under the Act are made annually. The court acknowledged, however, that "political divisiveness has never been the only ground for holding a statute unconstitutional" (id. at 43a), and that "the political division caused by the AFLA may not be sufficient to invalidate it" (id. at 44a). /5/ The district court heard arguments on that issue on August 11, 1987. /6/ See, e.g., Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Washington Health Care Facilities Authority v. Spellman, 96 Wash. 2d 68, 633 P.2d 866 (1981); Abernathy v. City of Irvine, 355 S.W.2d 159 (Ky. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 831 (1962); Craig v. Mercy Hospital -- Street Memorial, 209 Miss. 427, 45 So.2d 809 (1950); Kentucky Building Comm'n v. Effron, 310 Ky. 355, 220 S.W.2d 836 (Ct. App. 1949); Collins v. Kephart, 271 Pa. 428, 117 A. 440 (1921). /7/ See, e.g., Sargent v. Board of Education, 177 N.Y. 317, 69 N.E. 722 (1904); Nevada ex rel. Nevada Orphan Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (1882). /8/ See, e.g., Schade v. Allegheny County Institution District, 386 Pa. 507, 126 A.2d 911 (1956); Dunn v. Chicago Industrial School for Girls, 280 Ill. 613, 117 N.E. 735 (1917); Cook County v. Chicago Industrial School for Girls, 125 Ill. 540, 18 N.E. 183 (1888). /9/ See, e.g., Richter v. Mayor & Alderman, 160 Ga. 178, 127 S.E. 739 (1925); Bennett v. City of La Grange, 153 Ga. 428, 112 S.E. 482 (1922). appendix