GEORGE BENNETT AND EVERETT SHELTON, PETITIONERS V. STATE OF ARKANSAS No. 86-6124 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1987 On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arkansas Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae This brief is filed in response to the Court's order inviting the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. TABLE OF CONTENTS Question Presented Statement Argument Conclusion QUESTION PRESENTED Whether 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 407(a) and 38 U.S.C. 3101(a), which preclude the attachment of Social Security benefits and veterans' benefits respectively, bar a State's attempt to attach those benefits as reimbursement for costs incurred in maintaining the recipient in custody. STATEMENT 1. Petitioner George Bennett receives $275 per month in Social Security retirement benefits. Petitioner Everett Shelton receives $626 per month in Veterans Administration (VA) disability benefits for a psychiatric disorder that is rated 70% disabling. In 1983, both petitioners were confined in Arkansas state prisons, carrying out sentences for felonies committed some years earlier. /1/ The State of Arkansas in 1983 commenced this action against petitioners in state court, seeking to attach petitioners' federal benefits as reimbursement for the costs of their incarceration. In bringing the action, the State proceeded under the State Prison Inmate Care and Custody Reimbursement Act, Ark. Stat. Ann. Sections 46-1701 et seq. (Supp. 1985). That law directs the Attorney General of Arkansas, in any case where a person "has been admitted to a penal facility of the Department of Correction as a prisoner," to attach the prisoner's "estate" as reimbursement for "the expenses paid and to be paid by it on behalf of said person as a prisoner." Id. Section 46-1704(a). The statute defines this attachable "estate" to mean "any properties, tangible or intangible, real or personal, belonging to or due an inmate confined to an institution of the Department of Correction including income or payments to such inmate from Social Security, previously earned salary or wages, bonuses, annuities, pensions or retirement benefits, or from any source whatsoever." Id. Section 46-1702(d). Bennett opposed the State's claim, arguing that its attempt to attach his Social Security benefits was foreclosed by 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 407(a). That section provides that "none of the moneys paid or payable * * * under (the Social Security Act) shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process * * * ." Similarly, Shelton contended that the State's attempt to attach his VA benefits was inconsistent with 38 U.S.C. 3101(a), which provides that such benefits "shall be exempt from the claim of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary." The state trial court rejected these contentions, holding that petitioners' federal benefits were subject to the Arkansas reimbursement statute. /2/ Employing a formula provided in the Arkansas law, the trial court accordingly directed that a portion of petitioners' benefits be paid to the State. Pet. App. 2. /3/ The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed, one Justice dissenting (Pet. App. 1-8). The court acknowledged that "the federal acts would clearly prevail under the Supremacy Clause" if the federal and state statutes were "in conflict" (id. at 2). But the court held that "there is no conflict (here) because the federal statutes contain an implied exception to the exemption from legal process when the State provides for the care and maintenance of a beneficiary of social security or veterans' funds" (ibid.). The court reasoned that both Social Security and VA benefits are paid "for the purpose of assuring the beneficiaries' care and maintenance"; the court therefore concluded that "reimbursement of the State for the care and maintenance of the beneficiaries of these two federal programs is entirely consistent with the thrust of the federal legislation" (id. at 2, 3). In reaching this conclusion, the Arkansas court distinguished this Court's prior decision in Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 409 U.S. 413 (1973), which held that 42 U.S.C. 407 bars a State from attaching Social Security benefits as reimbursement for state welfare assistance payments. This distinction was based on the theory that the Social Security recipient in Philpott "'was capable, at least in part, of providing for his own care,'" whereas Arkansas in the instant case was "'acting in loco parentis'" by providing all of the "care and maintenance (of) the beneficiaries" (Pet. App. 4 (citation omitted)). Justice Purtle dissented, finding Philpott "controlling" here (Pet. App. 6). He explained that Congress "unquestionably, by the clear and express language of the statutes, intended the recipients to be the owners of such funds and that no one, even judgment creditors, could take these funds away from the beneficiaries" (ibid.). And he noted that the "majority opinion * * * is precedent for allowing judgment creditors, who have furnished food, clothing, lodging, and other items of the costs of living to recipients of Veterans' benefits and Social Security benefits, to garnish such benefits" (id. at 7). He therefore found the majority's holding to be "inconsistent with the clear and unambiguous language of the federal statutes," adding that "(a)ny change in the law should come from Congress" (id. at 7, 8). ARGUMENT "There can be no dispute that the Supremacy Clause invalidates all state laws that conflict or interfere with an act of Congress." Rose v. Arkansas State Police, No. 85-1388 (Nov. 3, 1986), slip op. 2 (per curiam). See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712-713 (1985); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824). It is equally clear that the validity of a challenged state law turns on its consistency with the congressional language and purposes. See California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, No. 85-494 (Jan. 13, 1987), slip op. 7; Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208-209 (1985). We believe that the Arkansas statute challenged here, both on its face and as applied by the Arkansas Supreme Court, is invalid under the Supremacy Clause because it is inconsistent with the explicit language of the relevant federal statutes. /4/ 1. a. The conflict between the Arkansas statute and federal law is plain from the language of Sections 407 and 3101. The federal statutes respectively provide that "Social Security and VA benefits shall not be "subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process," and "shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever." 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 407(a); 38 U.S.C. 3101(a). But the Arkansas statute directs the State to proceed against a prisoner's "estate," a term that is defined to include "income or payments * * * from any source" (Ark. Stat. Ann. Section 46-1702(d) (Supp. 1985)); this definition specifically includes "payments * * * from Social Security" (ibid.), and the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the definition reached VA payments as well (Pet. App. 1, 3). In holding that Social Security and VA benefits could be attached in this way to satisfy the claims of the State as creditor, the Arkansas Supreme Court disregarded Congress's clear directives. The unsurprising proposition that Congress meant what it said in Sections 407 and 3101 is confirmed by this Court's decision in Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 409 U.S. 413 (1973). Relying on prior interpretations of Section 3101 (see 409 U.S. at 416-417), the Court there held that the "all-inclusive" language of Section 407 barred a State's attempt to attach Social Security benefits as reimbursement for its welfare assistance payments (id. at 415). /5/ The Court saw "no reason why a State, performing its statutory duty to take care of the needy, should be in a preferred position as compared with any other creditor" (id. at 416). /6/ The Court therefore declined to read "an implied exemption" into Section 407 for the State's benefit (ibid.). This holding is dispositive here. /7/ b. The Arkansas Supreme Court nevertheless ruled that the federal anti-attachment provisions "contain an implied exception to the exemption from legal process when the State provides for the care and maintenance of a beneficiary," thus fulfilling the purpose of the federal benefit program. Pet. App. 2, 4. /8/ But this analysis simply cannot be reconciled with the plain language of either federal statute. As the Court put it in Philpott, the language of Section 407 -- and thus, necessarily, the virtually identical language of Section 3101 -- "is all-inclusive" (409 U.S. at 415 (footnote omitted)). Neither provision contains an exception for creditors or for other persons who may have provided the recipient with necessary care. And neither provision contains any language suggesting that a State stands on a different footing from any other creditor; indeed, this Court in Philpott rejected that very argument (id. at 416). There is no reason in this case to doubt that "the ordinary meaning of the language that Congress employed 'accurately expresses the legislative purpose.'" Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 (1985). Where the statutory language is clear, a court's invocation "of the 'plain purpose' * * * at the expense of the terms of the statute * * * prevents the effectuation of congressional intent." Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986). Indeed, as Justice Purtle noted in dissent, the rationale used by the Arkansas Supreme Court would create a large loophole in Sections 407 and 3101 by permitting suits on the part of "judgment creditors, who have furnished food, clothing, lodging, and other items of the costs of living to the recipients of Veterans' benefits and Social Security benefits" (Pet. App. 7). Such a result would scarcely advance the purpose of the federal anti-attachment statutes. /9/ 2. a. The clarity of the statutory language and the obvious applicability of this Court's decision in Philpott make consideration of the statutes' legislative histories largely superfluous. But those histories do not, in any event, contain anything inconsistent with the respective statutory texts. Section 407 was enacted in 1935 as part of the original Social Security Act. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, Section 208, 49 Stat. 625. The relevant committee reports accompanying this legislation simply paraphrase the language of the statute; neither suggests that Section 407 contains any implied exceptions. See H.R. Rep. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1935); S. Rep. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1935). When Congress reenacted the provision as part of the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, Section 207, 53 Stat. 1372, it again confirmed, in general terms, that Section 407 "provides that a right to payment under this title shall not be transferable or assignable nor shall any moneys paid or payable be subject to execution or other legal process." H.R. Rep. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1939); S. Rep. 734, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1939). Similarly, nothing in the legislative history of Section 3101 suggests that that statute contains any implied exception for the benefit of States or other creditors who provide support to recipients of VA benefits. Although laws protecting veterans' benefits from attachment date back to 1873, /10/ Congress enacted the substance of the present provision in 1935. Act of Aug. 12, 1935, ch. 510, Section 3, 49 Stat. 609. The Senate report accompanying the bill explained that predecessor statutes differed somewhat in the extent of the protection that they afforded veterans, and stated that "(t)he purpose of this new section is twofold; first, to make uniform the law with respect to exemptions granted beneficiaries, and second to clarify the language with respect to such exemptions." S. Rep. 1072, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935). The corresponding House report stated simply that "amendatory legislation" was needed "in order that the same protection, immunity, and exemption may be provided for all benefits" (H.R. Rep. 16, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935)). Given the broad language of the statute, these explanations certainly suggest that Congress intended Section 3101 to be all-inclusive. /11/ b. It should be added that legislation enacted in 1980 and 1983 eliminates or substantially reduces the Social Security and VA benefits available to certain persons who have been incarcerated following the commission of certain crimes. In 1980, Congress amended the Social Security Act to provide that disability benefits may not be paid to any person for any month during which such individual is confined in a jail, prison, or other penal institution or correctional facility, pursuant to his conviction of an offense which constituted a felony under applicable law, unless such individual is actively and satisfactorily participating in a rehabilitation program which * * * is expected to result in such individual('s) being able to engage in substantial gainful activity upon release and within a reasonable time. Act of Oct. 19, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-473, Section 5(c), 94 Stat. 2265 (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980) 423(f)(1)). This restriction was broadened in 1983 to withhold Social Security retirement benefits, as well as disability benefits, from incarcerated felons. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, Section 339(a), 97 Stat. 133 (codified at 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 402(x)(1)). Similarly, in 1980 Congress substantially curtailed the VA benefits payable to veterans who have been confined to a federal, state, or local penal institution "for a period in excess of sixty days for conviction of a felony." Veterans' Disability Compensation and Housing Benefits Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-385, Section 504(a), 94 Stat. 1534 (codified at 38 U.S.C. 3113(a)(1)). Such a veteran with a service-connected diability rated 20% or more disabling generally may not receive more than $68 per month from the sixty-first day of incarceration through the date of his release (38 U.S.C. 3113(a)(1)(A), cross-referring to 38 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 314(a)). This reduction in VA benefits does not apply, however, "with respect to any period during which a person is participating in a work-release program or is residing in a half-way house" (38 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 3113(a)(2)), and any compensation forfeited by the veteran may generally be apportioned to his spouse or children (38 U.S.C. 3113(b)(1) and (2), 3107). In enacting the amendments just described, Congress dealt in a careful and circumscribed manner with one aspect of the problem involved in this case -- whether and to what extent incarcerated felons should continue to receive federal disability and retirement benefits. Those amendments express Congress's general understanding, subject to various exceptions, that federal benefits should not be paid, or should be paid at substantially reduced levels, for the upkeep of persons who are incarcerated. /12/ But the 1980 and 1983 enactments obviously did not create or sanction any "implied exception" (Pet. App. 4) to the scope of Sections 407 and 3101 of the sort manufactured by the Arkansas Supreme Court. While Congress recognized that some prisoners might obtain an unjustified windfall if they continued to receive full Social Security or VA benefits while incarcerated, /13/ Congress chose to address that problem by eliminating or reducing those benefits. Congress did not provide that Social Security and VA funds could be converted into a subsidy for state prison systems by allowing States to attach the federal benefits that prisoners receive. To the contrary, in the same legislation that enacted the restriction on the payment of retirement benefits to felons, Congress enhanced the protection afforded by Section 407 against the attachment of Social Security benefits. That enhancement was accomplished by adding a new Subsection 407(b), providing that "(n)o other provision of law, enacted before, on, or after April 20, 1983, may be construed to limit, supersede, or otherwise modify the provisions of this section except to the extent that it does so by express reference to this section." Pub. L. No. 98-21, Section 335(a), 97 Stat. 130 (as codified in 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 407(b)). /14/ It is thus clear that a State's attempt to attach Social Security benefits, in circumstances where Congress has continued to make such benefits available to an incarcerated person, would run directly counter to Section 407. 3. The significance of the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision has been reduced by the 1980 and 1983 legislation just described. As a rule, persons who have been incarcerated after felony convictions will not receive Social Security payments for years after 1983, and such persons will receive VA benefits for years after 1980 only in substantially reduced amounts. Thus, state attachment statutes of the sort involved here will operate in the future in a smaller universe of cases, and on a smaller pool of benefits, than was true when this litigation arose. In our view, however, the question presented nevertheless has continuing importance. The 1980 and 1983 enactments reduce federal benefits only in the case of felony convictions; as we have observed (note 4, supra), several States authorize attachment of inmates' funds outside the felony context. Even in felony cases, Congress specifically chose to make limited VA benefits available to felons serving prison terms despite the fact of their incarceration (38 U.S.C. 3113(a)(1)). Congress likewise chose to make full VA and Social Security benefits available to felons in specified circumstances, e.g., where the prisoner is participating in a rehabilitation or work-release program. See 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 402(x)(1); 38 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 3113(a)(2). The decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court, which would apprear to permit the attachment of benefits in such circumstances, is flatly inconsistent with this congressional decision. The rationale used by the Arkansas Supreme Court, moreover, would seem to validate the attachment of Social Security and VA benefits paid to persons confined in state mental hospitals (see cases cited at note 8, supra) or in other institutions where they are provided care by the State. Whether federal benefits may be attached by the State under those circumstances is a significant question that has caused confusion among the lower courts (see note 8, supra), and it is a question that "touch(es) the accommodation of state and federal interests under the Constitution." Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62, 65 (1974). Review by this Court accordingly is appropriate to ensure the uniform administration of these nationwide benefit programs. /15/ CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. Respectfully submitted. CHARLES FRIED Solicitor General RICHARD K. WILLARD Assistant Attorney General ALBERT G. LAUBER, JR. Deputy Solicitor General CHARLES A. ROTHFELD Assistant to the Solicitor General JOHN F. CORDES JOHN P. SCHNITKER Attorneys SEPTEMBER 1987 /1/ We are informed by the Department of Health and Human Services that Bennett was sentenced in 1973 to 21 years incarceration for second-degree murder, and that he was released from prison on December 1, 1984. We are informed by the VA that Shelton was sentenced in 1980 to 15 years incarceration for theft, and that he was released from prison in January 1985. Petitioners' Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis states (at 1) that Shelton now "cannot be found." The attachment order issued by the Arkansas state courts remains outstanding against both petitioners' property, however. /2/ The parties stipulated that the funds in question consist of noncommingled federal benefits. See Pet. 5. Thus, the State acknowledges that it "seized Veterans Administration benefits and Social Security benefits that were being paid to (petitioners)." Br. in Opp. 2. /3/ The trial court subsequently ordered the assets frozen pending resolution of this action. See Order No. 83-357 (Nov. 21, 1983) (attached as exhibit to petitioners' Affidavit in Support of Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis). /4/ Arkansas is not the only State that permits an action against an inmate's property for the costs of his incarceration. At least four other States -- Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma and Tennessee -- have reimbursement statutes similar to the statute involved here. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Sections 800.401 et seq. (West 1982 & Supp. 1987); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Sections 307.93(D), 341.14, 341.19, 753.02(B), 753.04(B), 753.16(C), 2301.56(B), 2947.19(B) and 2929.15 (Anderson 1979 & Supp. 1986); Okla Stat. Ann. tit. 57, Section 542 (West Supp. 1987); Tenn. Code Ann. Sections 41-21-216 et seq. (1982). It also appears that six States -- Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska and North Carolina -- require reimbursement from certain types of prisoners. Ala. Code Section 14-6-22 (Supp. 1986) (misdemeanants); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, para. 1003-4-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (juveniles; limited to $200 in the aggregate); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 534.045 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (misdemeanants; limited to $10 per day); Mo. Ann. Stat. Section 221.070 (Vernon 1983) (county prisoners); Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 29-1006 (1985) (prisoners where confinement in a county or local jail is a condition on probation); N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 7A-313 (1986) (prisoners awaiting trial). Finally, it appears that eight States -- Arizona, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota and Rhode Island -- require reimbursement for certain kinds of state claims. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 31-342 (1986) (costs of escape); Fla. Stat. Ann. Section 901-35(1)(b) (West 1985) (medical expenses); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, Section 1712 (Supp. 1986) (medical expenses); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, Sections 678(B), 636 (1982) (costs of escape and destruction of state property); Miss. Code Ann. Section 47-5-119 (1981) (costs of escape); Nev. Rev. Stat. Section 209.246 (1985) (costs of escape, property damage, medical treatment and participation in a riot); N.D. Cent. Code Sections 11-15-07.21, 12-48-20 (1985) (costs of escape and sheriff's cost in boarding prisoners); R.I. Gen. Laws Section 42-56-20.1 (1984) (medical expenses). /5/ The Court explained that Sections 407 and 3101 bar the attachment of any benefits that "retain() the 'quality of moneys' and ha(ve) not become a permanent investment" (409 U.S. at 416 (quoting Porter v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 370 U.S. 159, 161-162 (1962)). The funds at issue here -- non-commingled benefit payments whose disposition has been frozen pending the outcome of this litigation (see notes 2 & 3, supra) -- surely fall within this category. /6/ Several lower courts have held that Section 407 does not prohibit state efforts to obtain "voluntary" repayment of state expenditures from an individual's Social Security benefits. See French v. Department of Social Services, 92 Mich. App. 701, 285 N.W.2d 427 (1979); Tunnicliff v. Commonwealth, 483 Pa. 275, 396 A.2d 1168 (1978). See also State Central Collection Unit v. Stewart, 292 Md. 255, 438 A.2d 1311 (1981) (concluding that Philpott does not bar entry of a judgment against a person whose sole known income consists of Social Security benefits, provided that the State does not attempt to execute on the judgment). But see Page v. Heckler, 596 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 786 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1986) (Section 407 bars the Secretary of HHS from attempting to obtain reimbursement out of benefits by means of cross-program recovery); Ellender v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), dismissed, 781 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1986) (same). /7/ The Arkansas Supreme Court distinguished Philpott on the ground that "'there the welfare recipient was capable, at least in part, of providing for his own care'" (Pet. App. 4 (quoting Department of Health v. Davis, 616 F.2d 828, 830 (5th Cir. 1980)), while "here the State provided the care and maintenance for the beneficiaries" (Pet. App. 4). But nothing in Philpott supports such a distinction. Indeed, the recipient in that case received state welfare payments "by reason of permanent and total disability" (409 U.S. at 414); the Court nowhere suggested that the recipient received support from sources other than the State, or that the presence or absence of such support would have made any difference to its holding. /8/ Several other courts have used a similar rationale in holding that States may attach Social Security or VA benefits paid to prisoners or to patients confined to mental hospitals. See Department of Health v. Davis, 616 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1980) (Social Security and VA benefits; incompetent in state hospital); In re Lewis' Estate, 287 Mich. 179, 283 N.W. 21 (1938) (VA benefits; incompetent in state hospital); State Treasurer v. Brown, 125 Mich. App. 620, 337 N.W.2d 23 (1983) (Social Security benefits; inmate in state prison). See also Auditor General v. Olezniczak, 302 Mich. 336, 4 N.W.2d 679 (1942) (VA benefits; incompetent prisoner in state hospital). Several decisions also have allowed States to obtain reimbursement under a parens patriae rationale -- in effect, holding that the State was performing a duty as guardian for the incompetent beneficiary. In re Bayly's Estate, 95 Cal. App.2d 174, 212 P.2d 587 (1949); In re Bemowski, 3 Wis. 2d 133, 88 N.W.2d 22 (1958). Other courts have held that States may obtain reimbursement for the costs of supporting patients confined to mental hospitals on the rationale that the State is not a "creditor." See Savoid v. District of Columbia, 288 F.2d 851, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Cruce v. Arkansas State Hospital, 241 Ark. 680, 689, 692, 409 S.W.2d 342, 347-349 (1966); Department of Public Welfare v. Sevcik, 18 Ill.2d 449, 164 N.E.2d 10 (1960); State v. Bean, 159 Me. 455, 195 A.2d 68 (1963); In re Simpson, 270 A.D. 902, 61 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1946); State ex rel. Eastern State Hospital v. Beard, 600 P.2d 324, 325-326 (Okla. 1979); In re Bemowski, supra. And several courts have held that the protection of Section 3101 is lost when a veteran dies, so that the State may obtain reimbursement after death for care that had been rendered to an incompetent veteran. See In re Todd's Estate, 243 Iowa 930, 54 N.W.2d 521 (1952); State v. Monaco, 81 N.J. Super. 448, 195 A.2d 910 (1963); In re Estate of Pierce, 492 Pa. 10, 421 A.2d 1065 (1980); In re Buxton's Estate, 246 Wis. 97, 16 N.W.2d 399 (1944). But see In re Estate of Chojnacki, 397 Pa. 596, 156 A.2d 812 (1959) (State cannot compel satisfaction of its claim for full cost of maintenance of mentally incompetent veteran in state hospital out of proceeds of veteran's pension in hands of guardian), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 826 (1960). Compare In re Grcich, 492 Pa. 210, 214-215, 423 A.2d 347, 349 (1980) (guardian of incompetent veteran may not be surcharged for use of VA benefits, with consent of the VA and the court, to reimburse State for the ward's care and maintenance), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 997 (1981). /9/ The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court is not supported by this Court's recent decision in Rose v. Rose, No. 85-1206 (May 18, 1987), that a veteran can permissibly be held in contempt for failing to pay child support even though his VA disability benefits are his only means of satisfying his support obligations. In holding that Section 3101 did not bar the contempt citation, the Court found it "critical" that VA benefits "are intended to support not only the veteran, but the veteran's family as well" (slip op. 13; see id. at 10). Because use of funds to pay child support therefore would "further, not undermine, the federal purpose in providing these benefits" (id. at 13) -- and because there is a strong presumption that Congress has not intended to preempt the field of domestic relations (see id. at 5) -- the Court held that Section 3101 "does not extend to protect a veteran's disability benefits from seizure where the veteran invokes that provision to avoid an otherwise valid order of child support" (id. at 13). Obviously, neither of those factors is at work in this case. /10/ Section 4747 of the Revised Statutes (1873 ed.) provided as follows: No sum of money due, or to become due, to any pensioner, shall be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, whether the same remains with the Pension-Office, or any officer or agent thereof, or is in course of transmission to the pensioner entitled thereto, but shall inure wholly to the benefit of such pensioner. In 1924, Congress enacted the World War Veterans' Act, ch. 320, Section 22, 43 Stat. 613, which provided, in pertinent part: That the compensation, insurance, and maintenance and support allowance payable under (this Act), * * * shall not be subject to the claims of creditors of any person to whom an award is made * * * ; and shall be exempt from all taxation * * * . /11/ The veterans' benefit provision was put in its current form in 1957 (Pub. L. No. 85-56, Section 1001, 71 Stat. 122) and was codified at 38 U.S.C. 3101 in the following year. Pub. L. No. 85-857, Section 3101(a), 72 Stat. 1229. The relevant committee reports explain that both of these statutes restated existing law. See H.R. Rep. 279, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 22 (1957); S. Rep. 332, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957); H.R. Rep. 1298, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1958); S. Rep. 2259, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1958). /12/ The statutory limitation on payment of VA benefits to incarcerated felons by its terms does not apply to petitioner Shelton, who was adjudged disabled prior to October 1, 1980, and who committed his felony prior to the October 7, 1980, effective date of the statute. See 38 U.S.C. 3113(d). In contrast, the payment of Social Security retirement benefits to petitioner Bennett should have been terminated after April 20, 1983, the effective date of the 1983 amendment to the Social Security Act (see Section 340(c), 97 Stat. 135). We are informed by the Department of Health and Human Services, however, that Bennett erroneously was paid benefits through the date of his release from prison in December 1984. The Social Security Administration (SSA) has informed Bennett that it intends to recoup the overpayment; Bennett's request for a waiver of the recoupment claim is pending before SSA. /13/ In providing that Social Security disability benefits should not be paid to persons incarcerated after the commission of a felony, Congress explained in 1980 that "(t)he (Social Security) disability program exists to provide a continuing source of monthly income to those whose earnings are cut off because they suffered a severe disability. The need for this continuing source of income is clearly absent in the case of an individual who is being maintained at public expense in prison." S. Rep. 96-987, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980). See H.R. Conf. Rep. 98-47, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1983). See also H.R. Rep. 96-1155, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1980) (reduction of VA benefits to incarcerated felons is a "cost-saving" measure). /14/ Congress's immediate intention in adding Section 407(b) was to overrule several judicial decisions that had construed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 to permit inclusion of Social Security benefits in a debtor's estate, and that had directed the payment of such benefits to the bankruptcy trustee. See H.R. Rep. 98-25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 1, at 82-83 (1983); H.R. Conf. Rep. 98-47, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 153 (1983) ("Since 1935, the Social Security Act has prohibited the transfer or assignment of any future social security or SSI benefits payable and further states that no money payable or rights existing under the Act shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law."). /15/ Because the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court is at odds with the plain language of Sections 407 and 3101, the Court may wish to consider summary reversal.