MARGARET M. HECKLER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET
AL., APPELLANTS V. STEPHEN J. ROY, ET AL.

   No. 84-780

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1984

   On Appeal From the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania

   Jurisdictional Statement

                       PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

   In addition to appellant Heckler, the defendants named in the
district court were John R. Block, Secretary of Agriculture, and
Walter Cohen, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare.

   In addition to appellee Roy, Karen Miller was a plaintiff in the
district court.

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Opinions below
   Jurisdiction
   Statutory provisions involved
   Statement
      A. Appellees' challenge to the SSN requirements
      B. The role of SSNs in the administration of the
         AFDC and Food Stamp programs
      C. The district court's decision
   The question is substantial
   Conclusion
   Appendix A
   Appendix B
   Appendix C
   Appendix D
   Appendix E
   Appendix F

                            OPINIONS BELOW

   The opinion of the district court (App., infra, 1a-23a) is reported
at 590 F. Supp. 600.  A prior opinion of the district court (App.,
infra, 27a-35a) is unreported.

                             JURISDICTION

   The judgment of the district court (App., infra, 26a) was entered
on June 22, 1984.  The federal appellants filed a notice of appeal to
this Court on July 18, 1984 (App., infra, 37a).  On September 11,
1984, Justice Brennan extended the time within which to docket this
appeal to and including November 15, 1984.  The jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1252.  See United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 256 n.5 (1982).

                     STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

   At the time of the district court's decision in this case, Section
402(a)(25) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(25), provided:

         A State plan for aid and services to needy families with
      children must * * * (25) provide (A) that, as a condition of
      eligibility under the plan, each applicant for or recipient of
      aid shall furnish to the State agency his social security
      account number (or numbers, if he has more than one such
      number), and (B) that such State agency shall utilize such
      account numbers, in addition to any other means of
      identification it may determine to employ in the administration
      of such plan.  /1/

   Section 16(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. 2025(e),
provides in pertinent part:

         The Secretary (of Agriculture) and State agencies shall (1)
      require, as a condition of eligibility in the food stamp
      program, that each household member furnish to the State agency
      their social security account number (or numbers, if they have
      more than one number), and (2) use such account numbers in the
      administration of the food stamp program.

                          QUESTION PRESENTED

   Whether 7 U.S.C. 2025(e) and 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(25), which require
all applicants for and recipients of benefits under the Food Stamp and
Aid to Families with Dependent Children programs to provide their
state welfare agencies with their social security numbers, violate the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as applied to persons who
hold a sincere religious belief that social security numbers are part
of a "great evil" that should be avoided.

                               STATEMENT

   Appellees Stephen J. Roy and Karen Miller refused to comply with
the requirement, contained in 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(25) and 7 U.S.C.
2025(e), that participants in two federal programs, the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program and the Food Stamp program,
furnish their state welfare agencies with social security numbers
(SSNs) of the members of their household as a condition of receiving
program benefits.  Appellees contended that compliance with the SSN
requirement as applied to their three-year old daughter, Little Bird
of the Snow, would violate their religious beliefs and constitute an
impermissible burden on their First Amendment right to freely exercise
their religion.  Because appellees refused to comply with the
statutory requirement that they provide an SSN for Little Bird of the
Snow, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare terminated AFDC
and medical assistance benefits payable to appellees on Little Bird of
the Snow's behalf and instituted proceedings to reduce the level of
food stamps being received by appellees' household.  Appellees then
commenced this action against the Secretary of the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, and the Secretary of Agriculture, challenging the
constitutionality of the SSN requirement as applied to themselves.
The district court held that the SSN requirement is unconstitutional
as applied to appellee Roy and enjoined the state and federal
defendants from denying program benefits to appellees on account of
their failure to provide an SSN for Little Bird of the Snow.  The
court also enjoined Secretary Heckler from "using or disseminating"
the SSN already assigned to Little Bird of the Snow in response to an
application made by her mother, appellee Miller, shortly after Little
Bird of the Snow's birth.

   At trial, appellees introduced evidence concerning Roy's religious
beliefs, and the defendants introduced evidence explaining the
purposes of the SSN requirement in the administration of the AFDC and
Food Stamp programs.  That evidence may be summarized as follows.

            A. Appellees' Challenge To The SSN Requirement

   Appellee Roy is a Native American descended from the Abenaki Tribe.
 /2/ Roy testified that he derives his religious beliefs "(p)  artly
from intuition, partly from hearing other Abenakis speak, partly from
what (he) read about religious teachings" (5/17/84 Tr. 57, 64).  The
central tenet of Roy's beliefs appears to be the legend of Katahdin,
which is about the "great evil." The "great evil" consists of three
separate but related "evils." The first evil is the widespread use of
computers, the second evil is people's casual acceptance of the
widespread use of computers, and the third evil is the proliferation
of weaponry that increasingly employs computer technology, thereby
making the use of the weapons to kill people a "sterile" act.  App.,
infra, 4a.  The legend of Katahdin is "ancient," predating the arrival
of the white man.  It does not deal specifically with nuclear energy
or computers, but Roy's "intuition" tells him that the legend would be
concerned about computers and nuclear weapons.  5/17/84 Tr. 143-144.

   Roy considers social security numbers to be part of the "great
evil," apparently because they are "used by the computers" and
therefore rob people's spirits in a manner similar to what non-Native
psychologists would call "dehumanization" (5/17/84 Tr. 81-82).  In
addition, Roy believes that the evil of SSNs is related to their
function as unique personal identifiers.  He testified that an SSN
would be used to rob Little Bird of the Snow "of her ability to have
greater power in that this number is a unique number. * * * It's
applied to her and only her;  and being applied to her, that's what
offends us, and we try to keep her person unique, and we try to keep
her spirit unique, and we're scared that if we were to use this
number, she would lose control of that and she would have no ability
to protect herself from any evil that that number might be used
against her" (id. at 78-79;  see also id. at 115).

   Roy testified that he objects not to all numbers (but see pages
6-7, infra) but just to "the manner (in which the SSN) is used because
it represents a great evil to us" (5/17/84 Tr. 79).  Roy has no
specific religious objection to receiving numbered food stamps or
numbered AFDC checks (id. at 92).  On the other hand, Roy testified
that he would be upset "to some degree" by the use of any sort of
information that identified himself and his family as individuals (id.
at 120).  He also testified that he might be "a little" upset if he
were to learn that the state welfare department uses a unique case
number to identify Little Bird of the Snow (id. at 127).

   Although the case was tried on the assumption that Little Bird of
the Snow did not have an SSN and that it would violate Roy's religious
beliefs to obtain one for her, it was learned on the last day of trial
that she does have one.  /3/ Her mother, appellee Miller, applied for
Little Bird of the Snow's SSN when the child was born, apparently
without Roy's knowledge.  When Roy received Little Bird of the Snow's
social security card in the mail, he and Miller allegedly returned it
to the Social Security Administration and asked that it be "revoked."
Roy testified that the Social Security Administration advised him in
writing that Little Bird of the Snow's SSN would remain "dormant," but
Roy did not produce any correspondence to support his testimony.
5/22/  84 Tr. 149-151.

   Roy himself uses a social security number, as does Miller and their
older daughter, Renee.  Roy does not object to providing SSNs for
himself, Miller, and Renee because all three acquired their numbers
before Roy came to hold his current religious beliefs and therefore
the spirits of all three have been sufficiently robbed that they can
no longer be prepared for greater power.  5/17/84 Tr. 82-83, 116-117.
With respect to Little Bird of the Snow, on the other hand, Roy
believes that he can still prepare her for greater power and that her
spirit has not yet been robbed by overuse of the SSN she acquired
shortly after her birth.  Roy believes that Little Bird of the Snow
must decide for herself whether she wishes to use an SSN, but he does
not know when she will be ready to make that decision or when he will
discuss the matter with her.  5/17/84 Tr. 86, 124, 132-133, 138-139.

   During the course of trial, Roy was asked about various
alternatives to the use of an SSN for Little Bird of the Snow.  The
district judge explained his system of converting numbers into words
as a device to remember telephone numbers;  for example, the district
judge remembers the telephone number of the Chief Judge of the
District by calling him "Phillippino Ovenpot." 5/17/84 Tr. 147-148.
Using this system, the judge asked Roy whether he would object to
Little Bird of the Snow's being given the number 515-94-1802 as her
SSN, which represented the judge's conversion of Little Bird of the
Snow's name into a nine-digit number.  /4/ Although he saw "a lot of
good" in the suggestion, Roy was unwilling to accept this alternative
because the special number still would apply uniquely to Little Bird
of the Snow.  In addition, Roy felt that Little Bird of the Snow would
have to have some say in the decision to accept or reject the judge's
suggestion, but she is currently incapable of making such a decision.
5/22/84 Tr. 144-145.

   Roy also was unwilling to select any other SSN from a group of
numbers that the government could make available, and he testified
that he would object to any other system of unique numerical
identifiers (5/  17/84 Tr. 126-127).  The only alternatives acceptable
to Roy were the use of his own SSN for Little Bird of the Snow or the
use of her name alone (id. at 14, 90).  Roy did not believe that the
use of his SSN for Little Bird of the Snow would harm her because the
number would not be unique to her (id. at 90), and he did not object
to the use of her name alone because he believes that her name would
protect her from any evil that might otherwise befall her while her
records were being processed through the computer system (id. at
91-92).

 B. The Role Of SSNs In The Administration Of The AFDC And Food Stamp
Programs

   The AFDC program, established by Title IV of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. 601 et seq., is a jointly-funded federal-state program.
 Its purpose is to encourage "the care of dependent children in their
own homes or in the homes of relatives" by providing funds for the
support of such children.  42 U.S.C. 601.  Eligibility for the program
is based on financial need.  Dependent children and their parents or
other caretaker relatives are eligible for a grant if their income and
resources are less than a set minimum subsistence level.  42 U.S.C.
602(a)(7) and (18).

   The purpose of the Food Stamp program, as established in the Food
Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., is to "permit low-income
households to obtain a more nutritious diet through normal channels of
trade by increasing food purchasing power for all eligible households
who apply for participation." 7 U.S.C. 2011.  The Food Stamp program
is jointly administered by the state and federal governments.  As is
the case under the AFDC program, eligibility for the Food Stamp
program is based on financial need.  7 U.S.C. 2014.

   In order to receive benefits under either program, therefore, a
household must establish its financial eligibility.  To make possible
the verification of income, resources, and other eligibility factors,
and to aid in the detection of fraud, Congress has required benefit
applicants and recipients to furnish the administering state agencies
with the SSNs of each member of their household.  7 U.S.C. 2025(e);
42 U.S.C. 602(a)(25);  see S. Rep. 93-1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 49
(1974);  H.R. Rep. 97-106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 58, 60 (1981).
Congress has not chosen to require benefit applicants and recipients
to furnish any other self-identifying information to their state
welfare agencies;  although state agencies commonly request additional
information, the SSN requirement is the only information mandated by
federal statute.  /5/

   As the record in this case reflects, the AFDC and Food Stamp
programs are truly massive.  In fiscal year 1981, an average of nearly
four million families received AFDC payments each month.  Affidavit of
Harris G. Factor Paragraph 3 (hereinafter cited as Factor Aff.).
These families included more than 11 million persons, of whom 7 1/2
million were children.  Ibid.  In that same year, the federal
government spent nearly $8 billion to fund AFDC programs in the states
and other United States jurisdictions.  Similarly, in fiscal year
1982, an average of approximately 20 million persons received food
stamps each month.  Affidavit of Virgil Conrad Paragraph 3
(hereinafter cited as Conrad Aff.).  In that same year, the federal
government spent approximately $11 billion on the Food Stamp program.
Ibid.

   The magnitude of these programs requires a computerized system
based on unique identifiers such as SSNs for the management of data
concerning benefit applicants and recipients.  Requiring all
applicants and recipients to provide SSNs serves a multitude of
discrete purposes, only some of which need be noted here.  First, the
requirement enables state welfare agencies to verify applicants'
resources and income.  Factor Aff. Paragraph 4;  Conrad Aff. Paragraph
9.  /6/ Obtaining applicants' SSNs is particularly necessary for
achievement of this task because the records systems of other
governmental entities and private entities that state welfare agencies
consult to verify the assets and income of welfare applicants utilize
SSNs for identification purposes.  For example, many private and
public institutions, including banks, businesses, hospitals, schools,
and state and local service agencies, maintain their records based
upon SSN identification.  5/18/84 Tr. 68-69, 81-83;  5/21/84 Tr. 151,
153, 156, 179.

   Second, the statutory SSN requirement is necessary in order to
ascertain whether AFDC applicants are receiving other federal benefits
that would render them ineligible for AFDC benefits or require a
reduction in the level of AFDC benefits provided.  5/18/84 Tr. 62-63,
87-88.  Similarly, SSNs are used to keep track of persons no longer
entitled to receive food stamps because of past abuses of the program.
 5/21/84 Tr. 153.

   Finally, the SSN requirement is an essential tool in the
government's efforts to combat welfare fraud and waste.  A few
examples will suffice.  Upon learning of reports that many federal and
military employees were receiving AFDC benefits, the Inspector General
of the Department of Health and Human Services launched "Project
Match" in 1977 to cross-check federal military and civilian employee
rolls against state AFDC rolls.  Initially, 26 states submitted
computer tapes for this match, and 33,000 apparent matches were
forwarded to the federal agencies for submission of payroll data.
Approximately 33% of these cases were found to be overpaid or
ineligible for benefits.  Interjurisdictional matches were also
undertaken in 1977 to match tapes from participating states against
each other in search of instances in which individuals might be
drawing grants from two or more jurisdictions.  Out of the initial 26
states that were matched in 1977, 9,000 individuals were identified as
receiving duplicate welfare payments.  A second interjurisdictional
match of all 50 states identified an additional 8,000 individuals.
The Inspector General of HHS estimated savings of $7.9 million in
reduced and terminated AFDC payments in the first year following the
federal employee and interjurisdictional matches.  Factor Aff.
Paragraphs 6, 7.  Interjurisdictional matches have continued in
subsequent years, and each year's match uncovers more fraud and abuse.
 Factor Aff. Paragraphs 8, 9.  Interjurisdictional matches cannot be
performed without SSNs because SSNs are the only common element in the
data systems of the various states.  5/18/84 Tr. 76-80, 97-99, 111.
/7/

   SSNs are required for all members of a household, including
children, because the various data banks that are consulted to verify
eligibility and detect fraud may contain information about each member
of the household.  For example, children may have bank accounts in
their own names, and their unearned interest income must be considered
in determining a household's total income and resources.  If the SSNs
of only the parents were required, such information would go
undetected.  In addition, it is not uncommon for children to be
improperly claimed as dependents by more than one household.  Without
an SSN requirement applicable to children, therefore, state welfare
agencies would be unable to detect improper payments or cases in which
benefits are sought on behalf of nonexistent children.  5/18/84 Tr.
100, 101-102;  5/21/84 Tr. 159.

                   C. The District Court's Decision

   The district court issued an opinion (App., infra, 1a-23a) holding
that the SSN requirement is unconstitutional as applied to appellee
Roy.  The court first held that the case was not moot despite the
surprise discovery on the last day of trial that Little Bird of the
Snow has had an SSN since birth (see page 5, supra).  The court
reasoned (App., infra, 11a) that, while Roy would have preferred that
no SSN had ever been established for Little Bird of the Snow, "Roy
sincerely believes that the spirit of Little Bird of the Snow has not
been robbed by the mere establishment of a social security number for
her," and that Roy "further believes that no substantial harm will
befall Little Bird of the Snow until her social security number is
'used.'" Accordingly, the court concluded that appellees' desire to
obtain welfare benefits without the government's using Little Bird of
the Snow's SSN saved the case from mootness.  Id. at 11a-12a.

   The district court next concluded that Roy's beliefs concerning
SSNs are religious in nature (App., infra, 13a-14a) and that they are
sincerely held (id. at 14a-15a).  /8/ At the same time, the court
found that the government's interest in maintaining the SSN
requirement is "substantial" and "great" (id. at 15a, 18a).  (The
court previously had issued an opinion on the parties' motions for
summary judgment in which it found that the government interest is
"compelling" (id. at 32a).  The court did not alter that conclusion in
its final opinion.) The court then stated that it would "consider this
case under the reasonable less restrictive alternative standard" (id.
at 18a);  in other words, it would uphold the SSN requirement unless
it were shown that the governmental interest could be served "by some
reasonable less restrictive alternative" (id. at 32a).  /9/

   Although the district court stated (App., infra, 18a) that it would
consider appellees' "interest as against the government's interest in
this particular case as well as the government's interest in the
social security number requirement as a general matter," in fact the
court's analysis focused entirely on this particular case.  Thus, the
court stated that the government's general interest in maintaining the
SSN requirement "does not appear to be threatened by the claim
presented in this case because the Plaintiffs' claim appears to be
extremely unusual." Ibid. (emphasis added).  Similarly, for its
case-specific analysis, the court held that the government's interest
"in avoiding a grant of an exemption to the social security number
requirement to the Plaintiffs in this case is very small." Id. at 19a.
 The court summed up its conclusion as follows (ibid.):

         It appears to the Court that the harm the Government might
      suffer if the Plaintiffs prevailed in this case would be, at
      worst, that one or perhaps a few individuals could fraudulently
      obtain welfare benefits.  Such a result would obtain only if (1)
      Little Bird of the Snow attempted fraudulently to obtain welfare
      benefits or someone else attempted fraudulently to obtain such
      benefits using Little Bird of the Snow's name and (2)
      identification procedures available to the Defendants that do
      not require utilization of a social security number failed to
      expose the fraud.  This possibility appears to the Court to be
      remote.

   In view of this conclusion, the district court enjoined defendants
from denying benefits to appellees for Little Bird of the Snow because
of appellees' failure to provide an SSN for Little Bird of the Snow
(App., infra, 21a).  The court also enjoined Secretary Heckler from
"using or disseminating" the SSN already assigned to Little Bird of
the Snow (id. at 22a) and ordered the Secretary to "notify any agency,
individual, business entity or other third party to which the number
has been provided and demand that said agency permanently refrain
from:  (1) making any use of the number and (2) disseminating the
number to any other agency, person, individual, business entity, or
any other third party" (id. at 24a-25a).  These injunctions are to
remain in effect until Little Bird of the Snow's 16th birthday (id. at
22a).  Finding that appellees have no current religious objection to
the past establishment of an SSN for Little Bird of the Snow, the
court denied their request that her SSN be "eliminated" (id. at
21a-22a).  The court also denied appellees' claim for payment of past
due benefits and for damages against the defendants in their personal
capacities (id. at 22a-23a).

                      THE QUESTION IS SUBSTANTIAL

   The district court has held unconstitutional as applied to appellee
Roy the requirement that applicants for and recipients of AFDC and
food stamps provide to their state welfare agencies a social security
number for every household member who receives benefits.  As the only
requirement Congress has deemed necessary to impose on the way in
which recipients of these benefits are identified, the statutory
provisions at issue come to this Court with a heavy presumption of
constitutionality.  The district court's invalidation of these
provisions seriously jeopardizes the government's ability to combat
fraud in federal welfare programs and generally to promote the
administrative efficiency of such programs through the uniform
application of a logical, neutral rule that undeniably serves a
compelling governmental interest.  The district court's ruling was
based on a flawed premise -- that the smaller the number of persons
objecting to a neutral requirement on religious grounds, the greater
their claim to an exemption from the requirement.  No decision of this
Court supports such a peculiar result.  Instead, it is clear that, in
the circumstances here presented, the individual's interest in
religious liberty must yield to the greater interest of society in the
efficientive and effect administration of its welfare programs.

   1. a. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that although "the Free
Exercise Clause provides substantial protection for lawful conduct
grounded in religious belief, * * * '(n)ot all burdens on religion are
unconstitutional . . . .  The state may justify a limitation on
religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an
overriding governmental interest.'" Bob Jones University v. United
States, No. 81-3 (May 24, 1983), slip op. 28 (quoting United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-258 (1982)).

   In both Bob Jones University and Lee, this Court addressed the
question presented here, namely, how to resolve the conflict between a
requirement that serves a compelling governmental interest and the
contrary dictates of a sincerely held religious belief.  When such a
conflict occurs, "(t)he remaining inquiry is whether accommodating the
* * * belief will unduly interfere with fulfillment of the
governmental interest." United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259.  If the
belief "cannot be accommodated with that compelling governmental
interest, * * * and no 'less restrictive means' * * * are available to
achieve the governmental interest," the government's interest must
prevail.  Bob Jones University, slip op. 29 (citations and footnote
omitted).  As the Court concluded in Lee, 455 U.S. at 259 (footnote
omitted):

      To maintain an organized society that guarantees religious
      freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some
      religious practices yield to the common good.  Religious beliefs
      can be accommodated, see, e.g., Thomas (v. Review Board, 450
      U.S. 707 (1981));  Sherbert (v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)),
      but there is a point at which accommodation would "radically
      restrict the operating latitude of the legislature." Braunfeld
      (v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).

That point has been exceeded by the district court's decision in this
case.

   b. We do not contend that Roy's beliefs are not religious in
nature, nor do we contend that his beliefs are not sincerely held.  By
the same token, neither the district court nor appellees question the
fact that the government has a compelling interest in the SSN
requirement as a general matter.  The dispute in this case is whether
the "least restrictive means" inquiry is to be applied to the
programmatic governmental interests of verifying eligibility,
preventing and detecting fraud, and administering massive programs
efficiently, or whether the Free Exercise Clause requires a
case-by-case determination of each individual claim to an exemption.
In our view, the district court erred in considering appellees' claim
in isolation and in placing its primary focus on the number of persons
who potentially might seek an exemption from the SSN requirement.
/10/ Instead, it should have focused on the programmatic
considerations addressed by Congress in enacting the SSN requirement
and Congress's judgment that there should be no exceptions to that
requirement.

   This Court's decision in Lee demonstrates the error of the district
court's analysis.  There, the Court rejected the claim of an Amish
employer for an exemption from paying social security taxes for his
Amish employees.  The Court did not confine its analysis to the effect
on the social security program of exempting only the Amish;  if it
had, the programmatic effect would have been beneficial because the
Amish not only oppose paying into the social security system but also
oppose receiving benefits, and benefit payouts far exceed
contributions.  See Lee, 455 U.S. at 262 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Instead, the Court looked to the government's compelling interest in
uniform administration of the social security program and tax
collection in general and concluded that mandatory participation by
all employers was essential to the fiscal vitality of the program.
Id. at 258-260.

   Like Lee, the earlier cases of Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961), and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), also
demonstrate the impropriety of ignoring a legislative determination
that individualized exemptions would undermine the purposes behind a
neutral law of general applicability.  In Braunfeld, the appellants
were Orthodox Jewish merchants whose religious convictions required
that their places of business remain closed on Saturdays.  They sought
an injunction to prevent enforcement against them of a state
Sunday-closing law, on the ground that closing their businesses on
Sundays interfered with their ability to earn a living.  The Court
rejected the claim, noting that "to permit the exemption might well
undermine the State's goal of providing a day that, as best possible,
eliminates the atmosphere of commercial noise and activity" (366 U.S.
at 608).  /11/

   Prince likewise involved a state statute that imposed an absolute
ban on the activity in which the appellants there sought to engage.
The statute at issue was a child labor law forbidding children from
engaging in street sales of magazines, newspapers, and other
merchandise.  Unlike the Jewish merchants in Braunfeld, whose
religious faith was only indirectly burdened by the statute in
question (see 366 U.S. at 605-607), the appellants in Prince were
Jehovah's Witnesses whose religious faith specifically required that
they engage in the activity the state sought to prohibit -- street
sales of their religious tracts.  Nevertheless, the Court held that
the statute was constitutional as applied to the appellants, even
though there was no danger to the particular child in question, who
had been closely supervised by her aunt.

   These cases clearly demonstrate that when the legislature seeks to
advance a compelling governmental interest through uniform application
of a facially neutral requirement, it is not relevant that granting
exemptions in rare cases might work only a minute or incremental
interference with the governmental interest.  This analysis compels
reversal of the decision below.  Achievement of the compelling
governmental interest in preserving and promoting the fiscal integrity
of the AFDC and Food Stamp programs is dependent upon the proper
verification of income and resources and the correct payment of
benefits to needy individuals.  Whether or not any one individual
might seek to collect benefits to which he is not entitled is
irrelevant;  the pertinent point is that the programs as a whole
cannot be managed effectively without the SSN requirement.  Programs
the size of the AFDC and Food Stamp programs cannot possibly be
administered without the aid of computer technology, and computers
communicate with each other in numbers.  One who is opposed on
religious grounds to computers and numbers might well find the SSN
requirement objectionable, but no decision of this Court suggests that
such an indirect burden on religious freedom is a sufficient basis for
striking down a neutral procedural requirement that is undeniably
essential to sound program administration.

   Moreover, the decision below leads to absurd consequences.
Essentially, the court has held that government must accommodate those
individuals holding the most unique and idiosyncratic religious
beliefs because the cost of exempting those few individuals from a
facially neutral procedural requirement would be quite small.  The
logical corollary to this holding is that government may refuse to
accommodate religious beliefs so widely held that the administrative
burden and programmatic impact would be deemed too great.  In essence,
the right to the free exercise of religious beliefs would shrink as
the number of persons who share those beliefs grows.  Such a result
defies common sense.

   In addition, there would appear to be no limit to the
"accommodations" that could be required of government under the
district court's analysis.  For example, Roy objects to the use of
computers but not strongly enough to protest issuance of his AFDC
check by a computer.  Another plaintiff, however, could insist that
the government process his check manually or that he be paid in cash
instead of by check.  Viewing each case in isolation, as the district
court's decision requires, the government would be obliged to
accommodate these sorts of demands, because it unquestionably could do
so in a handful of instances without undue burden or expense.  Logic
compels the conclusion that there are limits to the accommodations
government is required to make in administering facially neutral
program requirements, and those limits have been exceeded by the
decision below.  /12/

   c. The present case can readily be distinguished from other cases
in which this Court has required states to permit religious exemptions
from otherwise applicable statutory requirements.  See Thomas v.
Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981);  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).  /13/ Both Thomas and Sherbert involved applicants for
unemployment compensation who, as a result of having been denied
benefits, were forced to choose between receiving no income or
continuing to engage in employment-related activity that violated
their religious beliefs.  In both cases, this Court held that the
states were required to accommodate the religious beliefs of the
individuals involved.

   In contrast to the present case, however, the states in Thomas and
Sherbert could not demonstrate a compelling governmental interest.
Compare Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719, and Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-409,
with App., infra, 15a, 18a, 32a.  Moreover, the statutes under
consideration in Thomas and Sherbert explicitly permitted exemptions
from their general requirements based on individualized determinations
of "good cause." /14/ Because the legislatures had clearly
contemplated such exemptions under certain circumstances, the states
were unable to persuade the Court that they had sought to accomplish
their objectives in the least restrictive manner with respect to the
individuals at hand.  Thus, the statutes in Thomas and Sherbert,
unlike the statutes here, provided by their own terms the necessary
"play in the joints," Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970), to
allow for exemptions grounded in the Free Exercise Clause.

   By contrast, the statutory provisions requiring applicants for AFDC
payments and food stamps to provide social security numbers to their
state welfare agencies do not permit exemptions for any reason.
Moreover, the increasing importance that Congress attaches to the SSN
requirement cannot be doubted.  For example, the use of SSNs in the
Food Stamp program was optional with the states until 1981 (see 7
U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980) 2025(f));  in that year, Congress changed the
pertinent statutory language from "may" (ibid.) to "shall" (7 U.S.C.
2025(e)).  More recently, Congress expanded the number of programs to
which the mandatory SSN requirement applies.  See note 1, supra.  It
did so on the recommendation of the Grace Commission, which reported
that computer matching employing SSNs "is the Federal Government's
most cost-effective tool for verification or investigation in the
prevention and detection of fraud, waste and abuse." 7 The President's
Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, Management Office Selected
Issues, Information Gap in the Federal Government 90 (1984);  see also
id. at 82-92;  7 The President's Private Sector Survey on Cost
Control, Report on Federal Feeding 46-55 (1984).  Accordingly,
Congress has determined that the compelling governmental interest in
verifying program eligibility and preventing welfare fraud cannot be
reconciled with the granting of exemptions.  That Congress might have
written the statutes differently, to permit individually-determined
exemptions, is irrelevant.  See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. at
260-261;  /15/ Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. at 608.  /16/ The district
court erred in ignoring the legislative judgment in this regard and
engrafting onto the statutes an unfounded exemption that cannot be
reconciled with the underlying legislative purposes.

   2. The district court's injunction is in any event overbroad.  The
court cited no legal basis to justify enjoining Secretary Heckler from
"using or disseminating" Little Bird of the Snow's SSN and directing
her to demand that all other entities, governmental and private, cease
using Little Bird of the Snow's SSN.  The Free Exercise Clause, even
under the most expansive interpretation, only prohibits government
from compelling an individual to think or act contrary to his
religious beliefs;  no decision of this Court holds that the Clause
protects an individual against having his religious sensibilities
offended by observing actions of government to which he objects.  Cf.
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982).  Were the rule
otherwise, those professing religious objections to the conduct of war
or to the manner in which government spends tax dollars could assert a
Free Exercise Clause violation based on nothing more than their
observation of governmental action that they find offensive on
religious grounds.  This is simply not the law, and the district
court's contrary ruling cannot be sustained.

                              CONCLUSION

   Probable jurisdiction should be noted.

   Respectfully submitted.

   REX E. LEE

      Solicitor General

   RICHARD K. WILLARD

      Acting Assistant Attorney General

   KENNETH S. GELLER

      Deputy Solicitor General

   KATHRYN A. OBERLY

      Assistant to the Solicitor General

   LEONARD SCHAITMAN

   PETER R. MAIER

      Attorneys

   NOVEMBER 1984

   /1/ The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat.
494 et seq., was signed into law on July 18, 1984.  Section 2651(b)(1)
of that legislation amended Section 402(a)(25) of the Social Security
Act to read as follows (98 Stat. 1149):

      provide that information is requested and exchanged for purposes
      of income and eligibility verification in accordance with a
      State system which meets the requirements of section 1137 of
      this Act(.)

Section 2651(a) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (98 Stat. 1147),
in turn added a new section (Section 1137) to the Social Security Act
that establishes detailed requirements for the income and verification
systems that states must use in administering various federal welfare
programs.  Section 1137(a)(1) of the Social Security Act now provides
(98 Stat. 1147) that:

      (T)he State shall require, as a condition of eligibility for
      benefits under any program listed in subsection (b), that each
      applicant for or recipient of benefits under that program
      furnish to the State his social security account number (or
      numbers, if he has more than one such number), and the State
      shall utilize such account numbers in the administration of that
      program so as to enable the association of the records
      pertaining to the applicant or recipient with his account
      number(.)

The programs included in the expanded income and eligibility
verification system established by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
are the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, the Medicaid
program, the unemployment compensation program of Section 3304 of the
Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.), the Food Stamp program, and any
state program under a plan approved under Titles I, X, XIV, or XVI of
the Social Security Act.  Pub. L. No. 98-369, Section 2651(a), 98
Stat. 1148-1149.

   /2/ Appellee Miller is not an Indian by blood, did not testify at
trial, and, so far as the record reflects, holds no religious beliefs
relevant to this case.  The government moved to have Miller dismissed
as a plaintiff, but the district court denied the motion.  5/18/84 Tr.
40-41, 46-47.

   /3/ Roy was asked whether he ever told his attorney that Little
Bird of the Snow already had an SSN.  Roy stated that he had but
seemed to be unsure whether the attorney was paying attention during
their consultation.  5/22/84 Tr. 149-151.

   /4/ A government witness testified that the number 515-94-1802 has
not been assigned to anyone else and that the Social Security
Administration occasionally assigns special numbers upon request.  The
witness did note that the number created by the judge, because of its
first three digits, would normally be assigned to someone in Kansas
rather than Pennsylvania, and that even in Kansas the number is
approximately 30,000 numbers ahead of numbers currently being issued.
Because computers are programmed to reject "impossible" account
numbers, some sort of computer modification would have to be made so
that the number 515-94-1802 would not be rejected.  The witness did
not testify, however, that any such modification would be impossible.
5/  22/84 Tr. 36-38.

   /5/ Congress has authorized the use of photographic identification
cards in the administration of the Food Stamp program.  7 U.S.C.
2020(e)(16).  Congress has not made the use of such cards mandatory,
however, choosing instead to leave the matter to the discretion of the
Secretary of Agriculture.  Ibid.

   /6/ State governments have a particularly strong incentive to
employ SSNs in the administration of these programs because they are
under a congressional mandate to reduce their payment error rates.  7
U.S.C. 2025(d)(2);  42 U.S.C. 603(i).  Moreover, the federal
government reduces the level of reimbursement to states when their
payment error rates exceed a certain level.  7 U.S.C. 2025(a)-(d);  42
U.S.C. 603(i).  On the other hand, the federal government provides
states with an incentive to improve the reliability of their programs
by agreeing to pay a higher portion of the administrative costs
incurred by a state in setting up a system that meets various federal
standards, including such elements as cross-matching the income
reports of welfare applicants and recipients against records of the
Social Security Administration, state income tax records, vital
statistics bureaus, and motor vehicle registrations.  7 U.S.C.
2025(g);  42 U.S.C. 602(a)(30), 603(a)(3)(B).  See also 5/18/84 Tr.
59-62;  5/21/84 Tr. 168-171.

   /7/ Although certain types of intrastate matches may be performed
without SSNs, the reliability of those matches is significantly less
than matches performed with SSNs.  Duplication of names, misspellings,
variations in the manner in which nonnumerical data are entered into
computers, and various other factors all combine to reduce the
effectiveness of any system of cross-checking that does not employ
SSNs.  5/18/84 Tr. 93-97, 106-107;  5/21/84 Tr. 157.

   /8/ With respect to appellee Miller, the court stated (App., infra,
14a-15a):

      (B)ecause she did not testify at the trial of this case, we are
      unable to determine whether she sincerely holds religious
      beliefs identical or similar to those held by Mr. Roy.
      Plaintiff Miller does not claim that she has been denied cash
      assistance for Little Bird of the Snow but she contests
      Defendants Block and Cohen's threatened termination of food
      stamps for Little Bird of the Snow.  We are hesitant to grant
      Miller injunctive relief against the threatened termination of
      food stamps in light of her failure to testify at trial.
      Nevertheless, it would be inequitable to hold that Plaintiff Roy
      need not provide a social security number for Little Bird of the
      Snow, while allowing the government to reqire Miller to provide
      a social security number for Little Bird of the Snow, thereby
      effectively denying Roy the relief he seeks.

   /9/ The court derived this test from Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d
1269 (9th Cir. 1984), a case raising a nearly identical challenge to
the SSN requirement.  Although we believe that Callahan was wrongly
decided, we have not sought review of that decision in this Court
because the court of appeals' ruling is interlocutory.

   /10/ Though we do not believe that the number of persons seeking an
exemption is relevant to the correct disposition of this case, we note
that appellees' objections are not unique.  See Callahan v. Woods, 736
F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1984);  Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896
(E.D.N.Y. 1977);  Mullaney v. Woods, 97 Cal. App. 3d 710, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 902 (1979);  Atwood v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, No.
83-3066 (D. Idaho filed May 23, 1983).

   /11/ The Court also noted that to permit the exemption might
provide the Jewish merchants with a competitive advantage over other
merchants who had no religious objection to the Sunday-closing law.
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608-609.  A similar problem looms large in this
case because the district court's decision effectively assures that
the welfare applications of appellees and those who share their
beliefs will not receive the same degree of scrutiny that all other
applicants undergo.

   /12/ Even if a case such as this were to be analyzed on an
individual, rather than programmatic, basis, we submit that the
district court erred in concluding that the government's compelling
interest can be satisfied without requiring Roy to furnish an SSN for
Little Bird of the Snow.  There is something fundamentally wrong with
the notion that an individual can claim an entitlement to government
benefits while at the same time refusing to comply with that portion
of the program designed to verify eligibility and most effectively
detect fraud.  If appellees wish to avail themselves of government
benefits, the Free Exercise Clause does not stand as an obstacle to
the government's ability to ensure, as effectively and efficiently as
possible, that they are legitimately entitled to receive them.  It is
undisputed that the SSN requirement is by far the most effective means
for achieving this compelling governmental interest, and appellees'
suggested "alternatives" simply do not satisfy Congress's purposes.
For example, the dual use of Roy's own SSN to identify himself and
Little Bird of Snow is inherently inconsistent with the role of SSNs
as unique personal identifiers.  The use of Little Bird of the Snow's
name alone is likewise an ineffective alternative.  Though her name is
concededly unusual (but see Arthur v. Wahsington State Dep't of Social
& Health Services, 19 Wash. App. 542, 549, 576 P.2d 921, 925 (1978)
("A name affords neither precision nor permanence.  A social security
number does.")), computer cross-matching by name is simply not as
reliable as computer cross-matching by SSN, and in some cases it is
not even possible.

   /13/ Interestingly, the district court did not explicitly rely on
these cases or any other decision of this Court in support of its
holding that the government's interest in enforcing the SSN
requirement was outweighed by Roy's interest in the free exercise of
his religious beliefs.

   /14/ Thus, the provisions of the South Carolina Unemployment
Compensation Act at issue in Sherbert provided that employees were
ineligible for benefits only if they "'(have) failed, without good
cause'" to apply for, accept, or return to work.  374 U.S. at 400 n.3
(emphasis added).  Similarly, in Thomas, the statute provided that an
individual was ineligible for benefits if he "voluntarily left his
employment without good cause." 450 U.S. at 710 n.1 (emphasis added).

   /15/ In Lee, the Court noted that Congress had permitted an
exception from the social security tax for self-employed Amish.  26
U.S.C. 1402(g).  The Court declined to extend a similar exemption to
Amish employers on constitutional grounds, reasoning that "Congress
has accommodated, to the extent compatible with a comprehensive
national program, the practices of those who believe it a violation of
their faith to participate in the social security system." 455 U.S. at
260.

   /16/ The Orthodox Jewish merchants in Braunfeld objected to the
fact that the Sunday-closing law there at issue did not permit
exemptions for religious reasons.  The Court noted that "(a) number of
States provide such an exemption, and this may well be the wiser
solution to the problem.  But our concern is not with the wisdom of
legislation but with its constitutional limitation." 366 U.S. at 608
(footnote omitted).  In the present case, given the importance of
having a nationally uniform method of identifying recipients of AFDC
and food stamps, one might well question whether it would even be wise
for Congress to provide exceptions.  In any event, exceptions are not
constitutionally required.

                               APPENDIX