JOHN R. BLOCK, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, ET AL., PETITIONERS V.
RONALD E. PAYNE, ET AL.

   No. 84-1948

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1984

   The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of Agriculture,
the Administrator of the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), and FmHA
Officials in Florida, Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to Review the
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit in this Case.

   Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

                       PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

   In addition to the Secretary of Agriculture, the Administrator of
the Farmers Home Administration, the State Director and Assistant
State Director of the agency's Florida office, the FmHA County
Supervisor for Madison County, Florida, and a District Supervisor of
the FmHA were defendants below and are petitioners in this Court.  /*/
In addition to Ronald E. Payne, Carbie Ellie was an individual
plaintiff below and is a respondent in this Court.  Payne and Ellie
were certified as representatives of a class of farmers in a 13-county
area of north Florida covered by presidential disaster declaration
M-345 who suffered losses from floods or storms in early April 1973
and who were eligible to apply for emergency loans administered by the
FmHA but were not so notifed by the agency (App., infra, 46a-47a).

   In the district court, James H. Collins attempted to intervene as a
plaintiff representing a class of farmers in 27 states and Puerto Rico
who had suffered losses as a result of natural disaster occurring
between December 27, 1972, and April 19, 1973, and who had been
eligible to apply for emergency loans.  Collins appealed
unsuccessfully from the denial of his motion to intervene (App.,
infra, 27a-29a).

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Opinions below
   Jurisdiction
   Statutes and regulations involved
   Statement
   Reasons for granting the petition
   Conclusion
   Appendix A
   Appendix B
   Appendix C
   Appendix D
   Appendix E
   Appendix F
   Appendix G
   Appendix H
   Appendix I
   Appendix J

                            OPINIONS BELOW

   The opinion of the court of appeals on remand from this Court
(App., infra, 1a-3a) is reported at 751 F.2d 1191.  The initial
opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 4a-29a) is reported at
714 F.2d 1510.  The supplemental opinion of the court of appeals on
petition for rehearing (App., infra, 30a-33a) is reported at 721 F.2d
741.  The opinion of the district court (App., infra, 34a-45a) is
unreported.

                             JURISDICTION

   The judgment of the court of appeals on remand from this Court was
entered on January 31, 1985.  A timely petition for rehearing was
denied on March 19, 1985 (App., infra, 65a-66a).  The jurisdiction of
this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

                   STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

   Sections 4 and 10(c) of Pub. L. No. 93-237, 87 Stat. 1024-1025,
Sections 1, 3, 4 and 8 of Pub. L. No. 93-24, 87 Stat. 24-25, and
Section 5 of Pub. L. No. 92-385, 86 Stat. 557 are set forth at App.,
infra, 59a-64a, The applicable regulations, 7 C.F.R. 1832.81-1832.83
(1975), are set forth in pertinent part at App., infra, 53a-55a.

                          QUESTION PRESENTED

   Whether the Secretary of Agriculture may be equitably estopped from
enforcing a valid regulation establishing a deadline for filing of
applications for Farmers Home Administration emergency loans on the
ground that the agency's news release announcing the availability of
loans did not specify the generous terms of the loan program.

                               STATEMENT

   Like its earlier decision that was vacated by this Court and
remanded for further consideration in light of Heckler v. Community
Health Services, No. 83-56 (May 21, 1984), the decision of the court
of appeals on remand requires the Secretary of Agriculture to reopen
an emergency farm loan program that expired more than 10 years ago,

   1. a. For many years the Farmers Home Administration of the
Department of Agriculture has administered a program of emergency
loans designed to make possible continuation of farming operations by
farmers who have suffered crop losses or property damage as a result
of natural disasters such as floods, storms, or drought.  See
Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act Sections 321-330, 7 U.S.C.
1961-1971.  From time to time Congress has adjusted the interest
rates, credit conditions and forgiveness of indebtedness provisions of
the emergency loan program.  Generally, however, if crop yields are
substantially and adversely affected by a formally declared natural
disaster and losses are not covered by insurance, an affected farmer
may apply for an emergency loan.  See generally 7 U.S.C. 1961;  7
C.F.R. Pt. 1945;  7 C.F.R. Pt. 1832 (1974).

   b. In early April 1973, heavy rains caused flooding, crop losses
and property damage in a 13-county area of northern Florida.  On May
26, 1973, the President declared this region to be a major disaster
area.  Pursuant to Section 321 of the Consolidated Farm and Rural
Development Act, 7 U.S.C. 1961, the Secretary was then authorized to
make emergency loans to farmers suffering losses in the affected area.
 Under the terms of the emergency loan program in affect at the time
of the disaster designation, emergency loans bore an interest rate of
5%, and applicants were required to show inability to obtain credit
from ordinary commercial sources.  See Pub. L. No. 93-24, Sections 3,
4, 87 Stat. 24-25.  No provision was made for cancellation of any
portion of the principal amount of the loan.  /1/ FmHA required
applications for loans to cover crop losses to be filed within nine
months of the formal disaster declaration.  Thus, in the case of the
north Florida floods of April 1973, applications were due no later
than February 26, 1974, App., infra, 4a-6a.  Apparently no loans were
made in the north Florida disaster area during this period (id. at
91).

   On January 2, 1974, however, Congress liberalized the terms and
conditions for FmHA emergency loans with respect to natural disasters
occurring between December 27, 1972, and April 20, 1973.  The new law
made available emergency loans bearing a 1% interest rate for eligible
farmers who had suffered losses in this interval, authorized
cancellation of 50% of the principal amount of indebtedness, up to
$5,000, and dispensed with the requirement that applicants show the
unavailability of credit from other sources.  Pub. L. No. 93-237,
Section 4, 87 Stat. 1024.  /2/ Congress directed that the Secretary of
Agriculture "extend for ninety days after the date of (the new)
enactment" the otherwise applicable deadline for seeking emergency
loan assistance, if the administrative deadline based on the date of
the disaster declaration was earlier.  Pub. L. No. 93-237, Section
10(c), 87 Stat. 1025;  see H.R. Rep. 93-363, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1973).  The effect of this provision was to enlarge the deadline for
north Florida farmers to apply for emergency loans from February 27,
1974, thorugh April 2, 1974, and to make available more favorable loan
terms than previously had been offered.

   On February 15, 1974, FmHA issued instructions to its staff and
rules to implement the special emergency loan program created by Pub.
L. No. 93-237.  Initially issued as staff Special Instruction 441.5 in
unpublished form, the directive was published without material change
in the Federal Register on February 27, 1974.  7 C.F.R. Pt. 1832,
Subpt. E, at 39 Fed. Reg. 7569.  /3/ The Federal Register publication
included all pertinent details concerning the terms and conditions of
the special emergency loan program, including the 1% interest rate,
the forgiveness provision, and the absence of any requirement that
unavilability of other credit be demonstrated.  7 C.F.R. 1832.82(a)
and 1832.83(a), at 39 Fed. Reg. 7570-7571 (App. infra, 54a-55a).  The
regulations also specified that "the termination date for acceptance
of applications * * * will be April 2, 1974" (id. at 54a).

   In addition, although Pub. L. No. 93-237 did not require that the
special loan program be publicized in any special manner, the agency's
staff instructions stated:

      State Directors and County Supervisors will inform the news
      media, including newspapers, radio and television in the
      affected counties of the provisions of P.L. 93-237.  A suggested
      news release for local use is attached as Exhibit C.

   App., infra, 49a, 54a.  /4/ The "suggested news release" was
transmitted by the state FmHA director to local agency offices on
February 28, 1974, and was in turn "forwarded to the local media" (id.
at 10a).  /5/ The press release, which was carried in at least two
newspapers in the north Florida disaster area (see DX's 11A and 11B,
C.A. App. 48a, 49a), advised farmers that they could apply for
emergency loans from FmHA under Pub. L. No. 93-237 if they had
suffered property nor crop losses as a result of the April 1973
flooding, and that the application period would close on April 2,
1974.  Only a handful of loan applications were received in this
period (App., infra, 24a-25a).

   2. Respondent Payne, a north Florida farmer, filed this action in
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on
August 19, 1976.  Although respondent Payne had received actual notice
of the special 1974 emergency loan program, had applied for a loan,
and had received one, he brought suit on behalf of a class of roughly
2500 farmers in the 13-county area covered by the May 26, 1973
disaster declaration who allegedly had been eligible for loans under
the 1974 program.  Contending that the class members had been denied
property without due process by inadequacies in the publicity given to
the special loan program, and that the FmHA had violated its own
regulations governing publicity, respondent sought entry of an
injunction directing that the 1974 loan program be reopened.  C.A.
App. 56a-61a.  /6/

   The district court certified a class consisting of all farmers in
the 13-county area covered by the May 26, 1973 disaster declaration
who suffered damages as a result of the natural disaster, were
eligible to apply for emergency loans, and were not so notified (App.,
infra, 44a).  In an opinion issued on February 11, 1981, the court
held that the publicity given to the emergency loan program in
1973-1974 by the responsible FmHA offices did not satisfy the
requirements of general agency publicity regulations, including a
directive to make "such public announcements as appear appropriate" (7
C.F.R. 1832.3(a)(1) (1973)).  App., infra, 42a-43a.  Accordingly, the
court enjoined FmHA to reopen the 1974 emergency loan program in the
1973 north Florida disaster area, directed the agency to give notice
of the reopened program, and required it to process applications under
the eligibility requirements prevailing in 1974 and to make loans upon
the terms that were applicable in 1974 (id. 43a-45a).  /7/

   3. a. On appeal, the government argued that by mandating reopening
of the long closed 1974 emergency loan program, in disregard for the
applicable deadline established by law, the district court had
impermissibly estopped the United States from enforcing lawful
conditions upon the receipt of public benefits, contrary to Schweiker
v, Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981), and FCIC v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380
(1947).  The government also argued that the publicity given to the
1973 and 1974 emergency loan programs in north Florida met any
judicially enforceable legal requirements.  /8/

   b. The court of appeals affirmed (App., infra, 4a-29a).  The court
held that the publicity given to the special 1974 emergency loan
program created by Pub. L. No. 93-237 in the north Florida disaster
area was inadequate.  The court reasoned that the press release
disseminated by the state and local FmHA offices "failed to 'inform
the news media . . . of the provisions of P.L. 93-237'" (App., infra,
25a (quoting 39 Fed. Reg. 7570 (1974);  emphasis added by the court of
appeals)) because it did not mention the reduced interest rate, the
possibility of partial cancellation of the debt, or the waiver of any
requirement that the unavailability of alternative sources of credit
be demonostrated.  The court thus concluded that the agency had failed
to comply with its own publicity regulations governing the special
1974 emergency loan program (App., infra, 25a, 27a n.35).  /9/

   The court of appeals rejected the government's contention that the
district court lacked authority to require reopening of the 1974 loan
program (App., infra, 14a-22a).  Initially, the court of appeals held
that Section 10(c) of Pub. L. No. 93-237 (see page 4, supra) did not
establish a statutory deadline for the filing of applications under
the special 1974 emergency loan program.  The court of appeals held
that the statute merely mandated a minimum extension of
administratively set deadlines, to ensure that those deadlines did not
expire before eligible farmers had an opportunity to apply for
assistance.  The court concluded that the Secretary had authority to
prescribe filing deadlines and, in the circumstances presented, could
extend, or could be ordered (under the Administrative Procedure Act)
to extend, the deadline for the 1974 loan program beyond April 2,
1974.  App., infra, 16a-19a.

   The court of appeals stated that it did not "condone the failure of
potential loan applicants to follow legitimate time restrictions set
as prerequisite to applying for government benefits" (App., infra,
18a).  In the court's view, however, FmHA's failure to give the
special emergency loan program fuller publicity created "exigent
circumstances beyond the farmers' control (that) precluded intended
beneficiaries from applying for loans," and justified the district
court's order that the agency "extend the loan period" (id. at 18a,
19a).  Citing Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), and Morton
v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), the court of appeals stated that
reopening of the 1974 loan program was simply an application of the
principle that agencies must abide by their own regulations (App.,
infra, at 19a, 21a-22a),

   The court of appeals rejected the contention that Schweiker v.
Hansen, supra, was controlling here (App., infra, 19a-21a).  The
court's primary ground for distinguishing Hansen was that reopening
the emergency loan program would "not threaten the public fisc"
because "(l)oans * * * presumably are repaid" (App., infra, 21a).  The
court also reasoned that this case involved "failure on the part of an
entire agency fo follow self-imposed regulations" (id. at 20a), rather
than a negligent act of an individual government employee (id. at
19a-20a).  Finally, the court of appeals remarked that "the error in
Hansen was revocable," but that the agency omission in this case was
not (id. at 20a-21a).

   c. The court of appeals issued a brief supplemental opinion in
response to the government's petition for rehearing (App., infra,
30a-33a), The court stated that "while any language (in its opinion)
categorizing" the FmHA's publicity directive "as a regulation may have
been overbroad," the result reached was correct because the courts are
authorized to compel agencies to comply with their "internal
administrative procedures" (id. at 32a).

   4. The government then sought further review in this Court,
suggesting disposition as appropriate in light of Heckler v. Community
Health Services, No. 83-56, then pending.  Following the Court's
decision in Community Health Services, the Court granted the petition,
vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for
further consideration in light of Community Health Services. Block v.
Payne, No. 83-1691 (Oct. 1, 1984).

   On remand the court of appeals reinstated its prior decision (App.,
infra, 1a-3a), suggesting that its judgment did not depend on
application of equitable estoppel (id. at 2a;  emphasis in original):

         We have considered the opinion of the Supreme Court (in
      Community Health Services) and conclude that it does not control
      the decision in the case sub judice.  The liability of the
      United States Department of Agriculture in this case is based on
      the failure of its agency, The Farmers Home Administration, to
      follow law enacted by Congress and its own regulations.  The
      plaintiffs did not seek relief based on reliance upon agency
      action that created an estoppel.  The plaintiffs alleged and
      proved to the satisfaction of the district court that the agency
      failed to act in accordance with the law.

   The court of appeals explained that its decision rested on the view
that "government agents must be aware of the law and must obey it,
just as private (parties) were required (to do) in (Community Health
Services)." Id. at 2a.

                   REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

   The court of appeals has reinstated its holding that the Secretary
of Agriculture must reopen a multimillion dollar program of emergency
loans designed to provide farmers with short-term financial relief
from crop and property losses suffered more than a decade ago.  In so
ruling, the court below barred enforcement of a published regulations,
having the force and effect of law, that established April 2, 1974 as
the deadline for filing applications for such loans.  This Court
should again grant certiorari.  In light of the court of appeals'
failure, on remand, to conform its judgment to this Court's relevent
teaching, plenary review is now warranted.

   The court of appeals' ruling conflicts with this Courts' many
decisions holding that, at least in the absence of serious affirmative
misconduct, the government may not be equitably estopped from
enforcing valid statutory or regulatory conditions of eligibility for
the receipt of public benefits.  See, e.g., INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S.
14, 17-19 (1982);  Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1983);  INS
v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973);  Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308,
314-315 (1961);  FCIC v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384-385 (1947).  In
addition, the decision below conflicts with the holding in Heckler v.
Community Health Services, No. 83-56 (May 21, 1984), that estoppel
claims against the government should be rejected at the threshold
unless the private party "at least demonostrat(es) that the
traditional elements of estoppel are present" (slip op. 9);  here,
petitioners have been prevented from enforcing a valid condition on
the receipt of public benefits, even though respondents cannot show
any detrimental change of position made in reasonable reliance on the
representation of a government official.

   To the extent that the court of appeals relied on the
Administrative Procedure Act and the concomitant obligation of
agencies to abide by their own regulations, the decision below is
contrary to fundamental principles that govern remedies available for
agency procedural error.  It also circumvents in undisguised fashion
the strictures on equitable estoppel against enforcement of valid
legal requirements.  This Court has recognized that an agency's
violation of its own regulations does not render all ensuing agency
action a nullity.  United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 753-755
(1979).

   1. a. The regulations that governed the special 1974 emergency loan
program as it applied in north Florida unambiguously provided:  "(T)he
termination date for acceptance of applications based on both physical
and production losses will be April 2, 1974" (7 C.F.R. 1832.82(a)
(1975);  see App., infra, 54a).  Even assuming that Congress did not
establish a statutory deadline for filing applications under the 1974
emergency loan program in Section 10(c) of Pub. L. No. 93-237 (see
page 8, supra), there can be no doubt that the deadline reflected in
the regulation has the force and effect of law.  Pursuant to Section
339 of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act, 7 U.S.C. 1989,
the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized "to make such rules and
regulations (and to) prescribe the terms and conditions for making * *
* loans * * * as he deems necessary" to carry out the agricultural
loan programs under his supervision.  Thus the Secretary was vested
with authority to adopt a deadline for filing of loan applications
having legislative effect.  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., No. 82-1005 (June 25, 1984), slip op.
5;  Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 & no.9 (1977), The
Secretary explicitly invoked this substantive rulemaking authority in
promulgating the regulation that contains the April 2, 1974 deadline
for filing loan applications.  See 7 C.F.R. Pt. 1832, Subpt, E (1975)
(App., infra, 53a).  And the deadline regulation was promulgated as a
substantive rule in accordance with the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act.  /10/

   The April 2, 1974 deadline for filing of emergency loan
applications accordingly has "the substantive characteristics" and is
the "product of (the) procedural requisites" that vest a regulation
with the "force and effect of law" (Chrysler Corp. v. Brwon, 441 U.S.
281, 301 (1979)).  Indeed, the court of appeals seemed to acknowledge
as much, describing the deadline as a "legitimate time restriction( )
set as a prerequisite to applying for governmental benefits" (App.,
infra, 18a).  Yet the court of appeals unaccountably failed to
recognize that Schweiker v. Hansen controls the outcome in this case.
Here, as in Hansen, 450 U.S. at 790, Congress "delegated to (the
Secretary) the task of providing by regulation the requisite manner of
application" for a government benefit.  And here, just as there, a
"court is not more authorized to overlook the valid regulation
(governing) applications * * * than it is to overlook any other valid
requirement for the receipt of benefits" (ibid.).  See also FCIC v.
Merrill, 332 U.S. at 384-385;  cf. United States v. Locke, No. 83-1394
(Ar. 1, 1985), slip op. 16-17.

   b. In its original opinion the court of appeals appeared to
recognize that the result of its decision was to override "legitimate
time restrictions" that conditioned the availability of government
benefits (App., infra, 18a) -- i.e., to estop the Secretary from
enforcing the loan application deadline.  The court accordingly took
considerable pains to distinguish Schweiker v. Hansen, supra.
However, the distinctions offered by the court of appeals are
insubstantial.

   The primary distinction, in the court of appeals' view, was that,
because a loan program is involved here, "the district court's remedy
does not threaten the public fisc" (App., infra, 21a).  It is, of
course, true that protection of the Treasury against unauthorized
expenditures is a significant polciy and underlying the restrictions
that govern equitable estoppel in government cases.  Community Health
Services, slip op. 11.  But this Court has already rejected the
distinction proffered by the court of appeals, holding that the rule
forbidding any estoppel that would preclude government enforcement of
the law does not depend upon a showing of adverse impact on the
federal fisc.  See, e.g., INS v. Miranda, supra;  INS v. Hibi, supra;
Montana v. Kennedy, supra.  Indeed, in Miranda, the court of appeals
had distinguished Hansen on precisely the ground offered by the court
below.  See Miranda v. INS, 673 F.2d 1105, 1106 (9th Cir. 1982).  This
Court responded (459 U.S. at 19):

         The * * * distinction drawn by the Court of Appeals between
      this case and Hansen is unpersuasive.  It is true that Hansen
      relied on a line of cases involving claims against the public
      treasury.  But there was no indication that the Government would
      be estopped in the absence of the potential burden on the fisc.

   In any event, the court of appeals' suggestion that reopening the
1974 special emergency loan program will produce no drain upon the
Treasury is incorrect.  First, as indicated above, the terms of the
loan program included forgivenss of 50% of the borrower's debt, up to
$5,000.  Accordingly, each loan issued under the reopened program is,
in effect, a grant of $5,000.  Extending such relief to the estimated
2500 members of the class certified in this case would cost the
government $12.5 million dollars in direct outlays.  See also page 24,
infra.  Second, in light of prevailing interest rates, a substantial
subsidy is reflected in the 1% interest rate applicable to loans under
the 1974 program.  The attractiveness of these "loan" terms assures
that the reopening of the program will impose substantial costs of
federal taxpayers.  Thus the court of appeals' decision disregards
"the duty of all courts to observe the conditions defined by Congress
for charging the public treasury" (FCIC v. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 385).
See also Community Health Services, slip op. 11.

   The court of appeals also reasoned that the government could be
estopped here because this case involves "failure of an entire agency
to follow self-imposed regulations" rather than negligence by a single
employee (App., infra, 20a).  But the rule against estoppel in
government cases plainly is not limited to situations in which an
individual employee acts in a manner that adversely affects the
interests of an applicant for a benefit.  For instance, the delay in
processing a petition for adjustment of immigration status at issue in
INS v. Miranda was not attributed to any employee's conduct, but was
assessed on the premise that it was the act of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service as a whole.  459 U.S. at 18 & n.3, Similarly,
the suspension within the Philippines of a special overseas
naturalization program in INS v. Hibi was ordered by the Attorney
General, in consultation with the Commissioner of Immigration, and
reflected the official policy of the United States.  See 414 U.S. at
10-11 (Douglas, J., dissenting);  see also United States v. Mendoza,
No;  82-849 (Jan. 10, 1984), slip op. 2.  Nonetheless, estoppel was
rejected in these cases, and there is no justification for a different
result here.  /11/

   In sum, this Court's decisions make clear that, at least in the
absence of serious affirmative misconduct, the government may not be
estopped from enforcing the requirements of public law.  See INS v.
Miranda, 459 U.S. at 16-18;  Schweiker v. Hensen, 450 U.S. at 788-790;
 INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. at 8-9;  Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U,S. at 315.
Yet the court of appeals expressly declined to rest its decision upon
a finding of affirmative misconduct (App., infra, 21a n.29), correctly
recognizing that the case at most involved a failure to act, or
"neglect" (ibid.; id. at 19a).  Plainly, a mere failure to follow
"affirmatively required procedure" (ibid.) is not the kind of
misconduct that would "raise a serious question whether petitioner is
estopped from insisting upon compliance with (a) valid regulation"
(Schweiker v. Hensen, 450 U.S, at 790).

   c. The decision of the court of appeals in also inconsistent with
Heckler v. Community Health Services, supra.  Reviewing prior
decisions, the Court reiterated there that "the Government may not be
estopped on the same terms as any other litigant" because if it were
"unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has given
rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in
obedience to the rule of law (would be) undermined" (slip op. 8;
footnote omitted);  In light of these special concerns, the Court
remarked (slip op. 9) that

      when an estoppel is asserted against the Government, the private
      party surely cannot prevail without at least demonstrating that
      the traditional elements of an estoppel are present.

   As rehearsed in the Court's opinion (slip op. 7 & n. 10), the
traditional requisites of an estoppel claim include the claimant's
justifiable reliance to his detriment upon a material
misrepresentation of fact or misleading conduct by the other party.
The Court held that estoppel was precluded in Community Health
Services because the party seeking the benefit of that doctrine had
neither suffered significant detriment in reliance on the governmental
conduct or statement, nor shown that its reliance was reasonable.
Slip op. 9-14.

   Respondents similarly have failed to satisfy the traditional
requirements for application of estoppel against a private party.
Even assuming that the FmHA's press release violated the publicity
undertaking in the agency's regulations, respondents could not
reasonably have relied on the shortfall in information as a reason for
not applying for a loan before the April 2 deadline.  The flaw in the
agency's performance identified by the court of appeals was simply the
failure of the press release to specify the favorable terms of the
emergency loan program.  App., infra, 25a.  /12/ But it is undisputed
that the press release disseminated to the media contained the
critical information that a new program of emergency loans was
available to persons who suffered crop losses in the April 1973
flooding in north Florida.  See App., infra, 54a-55a.  Plainly this
information was sufficient to alert any farmer who might have been
eligible and interested in securing a loan to make an appropriate
inquiry concerning the precise terms of the new loan program.  See
Community Health Services, slip op. 13;  Atkins v. Parker, No. 83-1660
(June 4, 1985), slip op. 15.  In any event, the details of the loan
program were accurately presented in their entirety in the Secretary's
Federal Register notice.  See Atkins v. Parker, slip op. 14;  FCIC v.
Merrill, 332 U.S. at 385.  Accordingly, it would have been
unreasonable to decide not to seek a loan because of the level of
information contained in the Secretary's press release, and any
reliance on respondents' part was "not the kind of reasonable reliance
that would even give rise to an estoppel against a private party."
Community Health Services, slip op. 14.

   2. Although the court of appeals attempted, in its original
opinion, to distinguish Hansen on the grounds that we have discussed,
portions of that opinion can also be read to suggest that the judgment
rests upon a different principle, independent of equitable estoppel.
That is, the court of appeals portrayed its order mandating the
reopening of the 1974 special emergency loan program as a routine
exercise of judicial authority under the Administrative Procedure Act
to require an agency to abide by its own regulations (App., infra,
13a-14a n.20, 19a, 21a-22a & n.29).  The court of appeals underscored
this aspect of its reasoning in its supplemental opinion on denial of
rehearing (id. at 31a).  And following this Court's remand for further
consideration, the court of appeals concluded that Community Health
Services shed no light on this case because "the plaintiffs did not
seek relief based on reliance upon agency action that created an
estoppel" (id. at 2a).  The court of appeals' analysis is
insupportable, however;  the relief awarded here is indistinguishable
for estoppel and finds no sanction in the APA or in the corollary
doctrine that agencies are generally required to abide by their own
regulations.  /13/

   The APA creates no loophole in the doctrine restricting application
of equitable estoppel against the United States.  To be sure, "in
cases * * * brought under the APA" or in similar contexts the Court
has held that "(a)gency violations of their own regulations * * * may
well be inconsistent with the standards of agency action which the APA
directs the courts to enforce." United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S.
741, 754 (1979) (footnote omitted);  see also id. at 751 n.14.  /15/
The question in this case, however, is not whether the Secretary could
be directed by a court to carry out his own publicity directive (at a
time when the program was still in effect), but whether the courts
below had authority to reopen the loan program, which had, by its
terms, expired.

   None of this Court's decisions requiring an agency to abide by its
regulations suggests that relief of the latter kind is permissible.
Rather, in each of these cases, the agency had sought to deny an
individual a benefit to which he was entitled by law, or to deprive a
person of a position lawfully occupied, in a procedurally irregular
manner;  the relief sought was simply the setting aside of that agency
action.  /15/ The line of authority invoked by the court of appeals
simply does not indicate that a court may disregard valid, legally
effective limitations upon eligibility for benefits because of agency
violations of self-imposed regulations unrelated to the validity of
the eligibility limitations.  Indeed, Caceres, which holds that
evidence secured in violation of agency regulations is not subject to
the exclusionary rule, makes clear that a violation of agency
regulations does not render all ensuing agency action a nullity.

   The relief awarded in this case simply does not resembel that made
available in prior cases and is not authorized by the APA.  To reopen
a long expired emergency loan program, in the face of a valid
regulation establishing a deadline for filing of applications, because
of a finding of noncompliance with unrelated agency requirements
covering the program is not to "compel agency action unlawfully
withheld" (5 U.S.C. 706(1)).  Under that provision a court might well
have enjoined the FmHA to comply with its own publicity directives.
But the relief awarded here is not of that nature.  Reopening the loan
program also is not "invalidation of agency action that is arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, * * * not in accordance with law *
* * (or) taken 'without observance of procedure required by law'"
(United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. at 753-754 (quoting 5 U.S.C.
706(2)).  The court of appeals did not suggest that the agency's
regulation establishing the April 2, 1974 deadline was deficient in
any of these respects when adopted.  Instead, the court appears to
have concluded (App., infra, 18a-19a) that, in light of subsequent
developments, it was unreasonable for the agency to fail to waive its
own deadline, and that a court could accordingly direct it to do so.
/16/

   This reasoning is fundamentally at odds with Schweiker v. Hansen
and FCIC v. Merrill.  Applying the reasoning of the decision below,
this Court should have held in Hansen that the Social Security
Administration acted unreasonably in refusing to waive the written
application requirement established by agency rules, in light of its
employee's violation of the SSA Claims Manual.  And the Court should
have held in Merrill that the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation was
required to waive the provisions of its regulations precluding
issuance of insurance upon crops planted on reseeded acreage, in light
of its employee's failure to give correct advice.

   Of course, these were not the rulings of this Court.  The
strictures upon application of equitable estoppel to the United States
established by this Court's decisions cannot be circumvented by
manipulating doctrinal labels in the fashion employed by the court of
appeals.  In analytical terms, the decision of the court below
inescapably rest upon principles of estoppel:  in reopening the 1974
emergency loan program, the court below barred enforcement of the
legally enforceable deadline for filing loan applications.  Thus, this
is a case in which "the Government (has been prevented from)
enforc(ing) the law because (of) the conduct of its agents" (Community
Health Service, slip op.8).  And the policy considerations that
underlie the no-estoppel rule -- "the interest of the citizenry as a
whole in obedience to the rule of law" and "(p)rotection of the public
fisc" (Community Health Services, slip op. 8, 11) -- are fully
applicable here.  Finally, the remedy afforded may also be identifed
as an estoppel because it possesses the classic identifying trademark
of that doctrine:  it "prevent(s) the one against whom it operates
from pleading the truth" (Restatement (Second) of Agency Section 8B,
comment a (1958)) -- here, the expired filing deadline for emergency
loan applications.  In sum, the authority available to a court under
the APA to require agency obedience to regulations does not extend to
preventing the government from enforcing a separate lawful condition
upon the receipt of federal benefits.

   3. The decision of the court of appeals predictably will trigger a
flood of applications from farmers primarily interested in obtaining a
$5,000 grant and/or a loan at interest rates far below those otherwise
available.  As we have noted, the result will be costly indeed for the
United States.  Furthermore, the cost will be greatly magnified if the
unsuccessful intervenor in this case succeeds in extending the court
of appeals' ruling to benefit a nationawide class in his separate
action pending in district court in Georgia (see page II, supra;
App., infra, 27a-29a & n.42),

   Reopening the 1974 special emergency loan program will also produce
substantial administrative costs and burdens.  It plainly will be
difficult to determine at this late date whether any individual
applicant suffered losses in 1973 and what the extent of any losses
were.  The filing deadline overridden by the court of appeals thus is,
like the written application requirement that the Court vindicated in
Hansen, 450 U.S. at 790, "essential to the honest and effective
administration" of the program.

   Nor will reopening the 1974 special emergency loan program a decade
after its expiration serve the objectives of that program.  The
emergency loan program was precisely drawn by Congress to benefit only
those farmers who had suffered losses from natural disasters in the
brief period between December 1972 and April 1973.  See page 4, supra.
 The purpose of the special loans was to tide farmers over from the
immediate shock of those losses, "in order that they may continue
their future farming or livestock operations with credit from other
sources" (7 C.F.R. 1832.81 (1975) (App., infra, 53a)).  Actual losses
rather than future needs provided the standard for eligibility.  /17/
The judgment of the district court, as affirmed by the court of
appeals, accordingly requires that loans be made under the reopened
program based upon the applicant's eligibility as of 1974, without
regard to whether any current need exists.  But there is no reason to
believe that those who suffered losses in 1973 have unredressed needs
for emergency loan assistance today.  Conversely, any need that might
exist today in a particular case cannot realistically be traced to the
1973 north Florida flooding.

   Thus, the remedy afforded by the court of appeals resembles nothing
so much as an unauthorized award of damages against the United States.
 See United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976).  /18/
Community Health Services makes clear (slip op. 9) that the equitable
estoppel doctrine may not be employed to exact such windfall benefits
from the Treasury.  Because the court below opposed these substantial
and unjustifiable burdens on the agency and on the federal fisc in
disregard for this Court's pertinent decisions, further review is
warranted.

                              CONCLUSION

   The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

   Respectfully submitted;

   CHARLES FRIED

      Acting Solicitor General

   RICHARD K. WILLARD

      Acting Assistant Attorney General

   KENNETH S. GELLER

      Deputy Solicitor General

   JOSHUA I. SCHWARTZ

      Assistant to the Solicitor General

   ROBERT E. KOPP

   RICHARD A. OLDERMAN

      Attorneys

   JUNE 1985

   /*/ The complaint named various incumbent and past occupants of
these offices as defendants in their individual capacities and sought
damages from these defendants.  The district court dismissed the claim
for damages and no appeal was taken from that ruling.  See App.,
infra, 6a n.7.  Thus this action survives only as one against the
various federal officials in their official capacities.

   /1/ By contrast, a different set of loan terms, much more generous
to the borrower, had been in effect in 1972, pursuant to Section 5 of
Pub. L. No. 92-385, 86 Stat. 557.  Under the 1972 statute, emergency
loans carried a 1% interest rate;  eligibility was not conditioned
upon unavilability of alternative sources of credit;  and borrowers
could have 50% of the loan principal, up to $5,000, cancelled at will.

   Because the 1972 loan program triggered an unprecedented volume of
loan applications, resulting in a severe drain on loan funds available
to FmHA, the Secretary halted the making of emergency loans on
December 27, 1972.  In response, on April 20, 1973, Congress enacted
Pub. L. No. 93-24, 87 Stat. 24 et seq. Section 1 of that Act repealed
Section 5 of Pub. L. No. 92-385.  Section 4 of Pub. L. No. 93-24 set a
rate of 5% for new emergency loans.  Section 3 imposed the requirement
that credit be unavailable from alternative sources.  A grandfather
clause (Section 8, 87 Stat. 25) provided that loans to cover losses
arising out of disaster declared prior to December 27, 1972, could
still be sought under the 1972 loan program, if application was made
within 18 days of the date of enactment -- i.e., by May 8, 1973.
App., infra, 10a-12a, 17a n.24.

   /2/ Technically, Section 4 provided that notwithstanding the
provisions of Pub. L. No. 93-24, which had phased out the more
generous loan program that had been in effect in 1972 under Pub. L.
No. 92-385, the 1972 loan program terms would remain available to
farmers who had suffered losses in natural disasters occurring between
December 27, 1972, and April 20, 1973 (the date of enactment of Pub.
L. No. 93-24).  See page 3 note 1, supra.

   /3/ Pertinent portions of Special Instruction 441.5 as originally
issued are reproduced at App., infra, 48a-49a.  Pertinent portions of
the provisions published in the Federal Register are reproduced at
App., infra, 52a-55a.

   /4/ The reference to the suggested news release was not included in
the Federal Register version of the publicity directive.  The
suggested news release itself is reproduced at App., infra, 50a-51a.
See also Emergency Disaster Loan Ass'n, Inc. v. Block, 653 F.2d 1267,
1272 (9th Cir. 1981) (Boochever, J., concurring, quoting Special
Instruction 441.5).

   /5/ The press release actually employed in Florida is reproduced at
App., infra, 57a-58a.  It is identical to the release attached to
Special Instruction 441.5.

   /6/ Respondent also sought damages for himself against the named
defendants in their individual capacities (C.A. App. 61a-67a).  The
district court dismissed the damages claim.  Respondent appealed, but
his appeal was dismissed because no order had been entered under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b).  Respondent did not cross-appeal when a final
judgment was ultimately entered.  The court of appeals accordingly did
not pass on the damages claim.  App., infra, 6a n.7.

   /7/ The court of appeals stayed the judgment of the district court
pending appeal (App., infra, 13a).

   /8/ In addition, the government argued that respondent Payne, who
had actual notice of the special 1974 loan program and had in fact
applied for and received a loan, lacked standing to complain that the
program publicity was inadequate and was not a proper representative
of a class seeking reopening of the loan program.  The court of
appeals granted a limited remand requested by respondent in this
connection.  See App., infra, 13a n.19.  On June 7, 1982, the district
court entered an amended final judgment naming Carbie Ellie, a member
of the class previously certified, as an additional representative
plaintiff (id. at 46a-47a).  The court of appeals concluded that these
developments rendered the standing issue moot (id. at 13a n.19).

   /9/ Because of this holding, the court of appeals did not reach the
question whether, as the district court had held, the publicity
provided failed to satisfy other requirements of FmHA regulations,
such as the requirement for "such public announcements as appear
appropriate" (see pages 6-7, supra).  The court also declined to
decide whether the latter requirement was simply too amorphous to be
judicially enforceable.  App., infra, 25a.

   /10/ Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 533(b)(B) and (d)(3), the agency
dispensed with notice and comment and made the regulations immediately
effective for good cause, explaining that such action was necessary to
"implement( ) the provisions of Public Law 93-237, and because a delay
in implementing the provisions of the public law by this regulation
would be contrary to the public interest." 39 Fed. Reg. 7569 (1974)
(App., infra, 52a).

   /11/ The court of appeals also thought Hansen distinguishable on
the additional ground that the erroneous advice of a Social Security
Administration employee at issue there was "revocable" -- i.e., the
action taken by the applicant for benefits was not irreversible.  By
contrast, the court reasoned, respondents could not now obtain loans
under the 1974 emergency program because the application period has
closed (App., infra, 20a-21a).

   The court of appeals misapprehended the thrust of the Court's
statement in Hansen (450 U.S. at 789), that the SSA employee's conduct
"did not cause respondent to take action, cf. Federal Crop Insurance
Corp, v. Merrill, supra, or fail to take action, cf. Montana v.
Kennedy, supra, that respondent could not correct at any time." The
Court could not have meant that the Social Security applicant's action
in the wake of receiving erroneous advice had not irreversible impact
upon her ability to receive benefits.  In fact, although Hansen
ultimately did apply for and receive Social Security Act benefits, she
did not receive all of the benefits she might have received absent the
erroneous advice, because the Act limited the reach of a retroactive
aware of benefits to a 12-month period.  450 U.S. at 786-787.  Thus,
the Court's observation indicated only that the conduct of the SSA
employee did not prevent the applicant from filing an application for
benefits that would have protected her rights to the extent permitted
by the applicable time constraints established by law.

   In short, the rule reflected in Hansen is that the courts may not
disregard lawfully established deadlines for applying for federal
benefits.  Because FmHA's failure to fully publicize the terms of
loans available under the special 1974 program did not prevent
respondents from applying for loans, Hansen is controlling here.
Moreover, respondents' eligibility for FmHA loans in time periods
subsequent to April 2, 1974 was unaffected by the agency's conduct in
1974.  The FmHA's action thus "did not cause respondent(s) to take
action" or "fail to take action" that respondents "could not correct
at any time" permitted by law (450 U.S. at 789).  In any event, as the
Hansen Court's citation (abid.) of FCIC v. Merrill and Montana v.
Kennedy indicates, it is not a requirement of the rule prohibiting
estoppel that private action taken in the wake of an agency error be
even partially reversible.  See also INS v. Hibi, supra.

   /12/ We do not concede that the publicity given to the 1974 special
emergency loan program in the north Florida disaster area failed to
comport with the agency's own publicity requirements.  First, the
court of appeals overlooked the fact that Pub. L. No. 93-237 covered a
host of subjects unrelated to the 1974 loan program.  The relevant
provision, Section 4, simply revived, temporarily, a program that had
previously been in effect in 1972.  See page 4 & note 2, supra.
Neither the interest rate applicable to that program nor the
cancellation provisions are even mentioned in Pub. L. No. 93-237.  In
the circumstances, the press release, which mentioned the availability
of a new loan program and the pertinent deadline and advised
interested persons as to how to secure more information, is entirely
consistent with the publicity directive requiring that the local media
be advised "of the provisions of P.L. 93-237."

   Moreover, in determining whether an agency has violated its own
regulations, substantial deference should be accorded to the agency's
contemporaneous interpretation of the requirements in issue.  Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).  In this case it is demonstrable,
virtually to a certainty, that the agency's publicity directive was
not intended to require that the details of the loan terms be
disseminated through the media.  As indicated above (pages 5-6 & note
5), this directive was accompanied by a suggested news release, which
was the very release actually employed in north Florida.  The
suggested release obviously reflected the agency's contemporaneous
understanding of the publicity requirement.  The finding of agency
noncompliance with its own regulations is thus untenable.  Commenting
on essentially identical facts in Emergency Disaster Loan Ass'n, Inc.
v. Block, 653 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981), Judge Boochever stated (id.
at 1272 (concurring opinion)):

      While that release did not set forth some of the material
      provisions of the new law, it is not disputed that the state
      officials sent out news releases embodying the provisions of the
      suggested one.  There was thus substantial compliance with the
      directive.

   /13/ We note, initially, that this suit cannot be considered one
for judicial review of final agency action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 702
and 704.  See FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232 (1980).
Respondent Payne sought and received a loan under the 1974 emergency
loan program (see page 6 note 8, supra).  With that single exception,
there is no allegation that either the other representative plaintiff
or any member of the class has ever applied -- even tardily -- to the
FmHA for a loan under the program.  Nor has any respondent otherwise
requested that the agency waive the April 2, 1974 loan application
deadline.  This is not a mere failure to exhaust rights of
administrative appeal.  Respondents simply have not at any point been
subjected to reviewable agency action.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 328 (1976).  As a result, there is not record on which the
court of appeals could have determined the reasonableness of agency
action.  In the circumstances it is difficult to conclude that the
relief awarded here is authorized by the APA.

   /14/ See, e.g., Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957);
Vitarelli v. Seaton 359 U.S. 535, 539-540 (1959);  see also Mortion v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974);  United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267 (1954);  but see American Farm Lines v.
Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U.S. 532, 538-539 (1970).

   /15 In Morton v. Ruiz the agency had denied benefits to an
applicant on the basis of a regulation that was defectively
promulgated.  The Court declined to accord legislative effect to the
regulation because the APA itself specifies the sanction of
unenforceability for such regulations.  See 415 U.S. at 231-235.

   /16/ As noted earlier (see page 20 note 13, supra), the court of
appeals overlooked the fact that none of the respondents had ever
asked the agency to waive or extend the application deadline.

   /17/ Emergency loans based on the April 1973 disaster were
available "to reimburse applicants for production expenses which went
into damaged or destroyed crop and livestock enterprises," but were
not available for the purpose of "produc(ing) new crops during 1974."
7 C.F.R. 1832.86(a), at 39 Fed. Reg. 7573 (1973).

   /18/ We note that the APA does not provide a cause of action for
money damages.  5 U.S.C. 702.

                               APPENDIX