Detailed Information on the
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Programs, Western Hemisphere Assessment

Contract for an independent evaluation of key assistance activities in order to understand why the program is getting mixed results and what corrective actions can be taken.

Ensure that the State Department INL Bureau's new financial management system can track and report information needed to inform strategic planning and resource allocation decisions.

Link annual funding requests for each component of the program to relevant program goals.

Measure: Foreign nation seizures of illicit drugs (measured in U.S. dollars) per INCLE funds expended to support law enforcement interdiction efforts. (Measures the U.S. street value of seizures of cocaine, marijuana, and opium poppy in Mexico, Guatemala, and Jamaica and compares it to INCLE funds expended to support host nation interdiction efforts in the prior year.)

Explanation:Measures the US street value of seizures of cocaine, marijuana, and opium poppy in Mexico, Guatemala, and Jamaica and compares it to INCLE funds expended to support host nation interdiction efforts in the prior year.

Measure: Disrupt and reduce the flow of cocaine and heroin (measured in metric tons) entering the U.S. arrival zone by improving host government law enforcement interdiction capabilities. The baseline year was 1999, when 341 metric tons of cocaine and 15.25 metric tons of heroin from the Western Hemisphere region entered the U.S. arrival zone. The desired end state is to cut both of these amounts in half by the year 2010.

Explanation:Measures the estimated supply in metric tons of pure cocaine from Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia and pure heroin from Colombia and Mexico that enters the U.S. arrival zone. The numbers in the "Target" and "Actual" columns represent the metric tons of cocaine and heroine, respectively, that are expected to reach the U.S. arrival zone each year.

Measure: Foster host nations' ability to combat narcotics, as measured by host nations' progress in implementing effective legal, institutional and programmatic reforms. (Information is collected biannually.)

Explanation:Through diplomacy and program support, INL works with host countries and international organizations to foster political commitment, institutional reform and anti-narcotics capabilities. The Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM), managed by the Organization of American States (OAS), is used to evaluate progress. Countries receive an independent evaluation biannually on 82 indicators. Progress is evaluated in ensuing years resulting in a grade of "completed", "in progress" or "not started". Target and Actual percentages represent "recommendations completed" and "recommendations in progress," respectively.

Measure: Increase impact on potential harvest of opium poppy and marijuana in Mexico through continued support of ground eradication and increased aerial eradication.

Explanation:Measures effective eradication of opium and marijuana in Mexico. Figures represent the total combined amount of opium poppy and marijuana eradicated.

Measure: Increase the host governments' ability to intercept transient drug supplies as measured by the seizure rates of cocaine and heroin compared to the estimated supply.

Explanation:Measures the interdiction efforts of INL-supported law enforcement agencies in host countries to disrupt the flow of cocaine and heroin headed to the US by comparing the amount seized over the estimated amount transiting through the region. Percentages represent the amount of cocaine and heroine seized, respectively, out of estimated total supply.

Measure: Increase number of host nation narcotrafficking arrests.

Explanation:Shows the percentage increase over number of narcotrafficking arrests in baseline year of 2000.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The mission statement for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is to blunt the impact of international drug traffickers and other crime groups on the United States, American Citizens, and U.S. friends and allies. INL Western Hemisphere program objectives are to: disrupt and reduce the flow of drugs and other criminal influences in and through the Transit Zone; and focus on institutional development of judicial and law enforcement sectors, and on the coordination of drug crime and interdiction capabilities and capacities.

Evidence: INL's FY 2006 Bureau Performance Plan (BPP) is part of the State Department's strategic planning framework and defines the purpose and mission clearly for the bureau's programs in the Western Hemisphere.

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest or need?

Explanation: INL directly supports counter-narcotics and other law enforcement operations, and strengthens partner countries' capacities to conduct such activities, in Western Hemisphere countries. [Note: This PART focuses on INL's programs in Western Hemisphere countries not included in the Andean Counterdrug Initiative.] INCLE-WHA (International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement programs in the Western Hemisphere) focuses mainly on the countries responsible for trafficking narcotics into the U.S.: Mexico, Guatemala, Jamaica and the Bahamas, which together account for more than 70% of US-bound trafficking of cocaine, heroin, marijuana and synthetic drugs. INCLE-WHA also focuses on Mexico as a producing country of US-bound marijuana and heroin. INCLE attacks a broad range of issues underpinning such criminal activity, including partner country law enforcement, corruption, drug abuse and participation in international treaties, as well as money laundering and trafficking in persons.

Evidence: The Department of State's Strategic Plan for FY 2004-2009 identifies specific problems related to narcotics and international crime. The Department's FY 2004 Congressional Justification for Foreign Operations accounts discusses the existing problem and how it relates to the Department's mission. The Foreign Assistance Act includes a Congressional mandate for the Department to combat international narcotics with foreign assistance. The National Drug Threat Assessment is written annually and discusses drug flow estimates through the transit zone of the Western Hemisphere.

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: INL is organized to fill the responsibility bestowed upon the Secretary of State by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) to coordinate all U.S. counter-narcotics assistance to foreign countries. In most cases, INL is the only USG entity that can legally provide direct foreign assistance to law enforcement agencies to combat drugs. Other U.S. agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) provide operational and advisory support. INL ensures its programs are not redundant of other international organizations by regularly meeting at the Mini-Dublin conferences and with the Organization of American States (OAS). INL ensures U.S. counterdrug partners maintain their respected mandate by deconflicting efforts at the U.S. Embassy by defining roles and responsibilities in the Mission Performance Plan (MPP) and with law enforcement working committees.

Evidence: FAA, Part 1, Chapter 8 gives the Department of State the mandate to provide foreign assistance to combat narcotics. Mission Performance Plans for each host country receiving INL assistance define roles and responsibilities for all U.S. Government entities providing counterdrug assistance. The execution of these plans are further coordinated to eliminate redundancy at U.S. Embassy coordination meetings led by Embassy leadership. International efforts are coordinated with the Dublin Group and the Organization of American States.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: INL's counternarcotics program is a core effort to fight the effect of drugs and international crime at the national level. There is no strong evidence that another approach or mechanism would be more efficient or effective in achieving the intended purpose.

Evidence:  

Is the program effectively targeted, so that resources will reach intended beneficiaries and/or otherwise address the program's purpose directly?

Explanation: INL targets the Western Hemisphere countries most responsible for trafficking cocaine, heroin, marijuana and synthetic drugs to the United States. INL also targets Mexico as a substantial producer of US-bound marijuana and heroin. Budgets reflect targeting toward Mexico, which is the route for 70% of the Andean cocaine and methamphetamine commerce to the United States. Budgeting also reflects INL's attention to disrupting related illegal activities (e.g., money laundering, border security, trafficking in persons) and to strengthening the partner countries' capacities to conduct these activities. For example, in many of these countries, INL funds training and equipment for police officers, judges and prosecutors, as well as drug use reduction programs for the public. Lastly, budgeting reflects INL's bias towards host countries in which it can identify partner agencies that are effective and trustworthy.

Evidence: INL's annual Bureau Performance Plan, INL's annual Congressional Budget Justification, the Office of National Drug Control Policy's Strategy Report, Transit Zone Strategy

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: INL's Bureau Performance Plan (BPP) has two specific, outcome-oriented, long-term performance measures for its Western Hemisphere programs. These goals are in the measures tab and reflect the dual purpose of the program to reduce the flow of illicit drugs into the U.S. while at the same time train and develop professional foreign law enforcement agencies.

Evidence: INL's FY 2006 Bureau Performance Plan (INCLE WHA Goal Paper) defines the program's long-term goals and is part of the State Department's overall strategic and performance planning framework.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: Baselines and targets for the INCLE WHA program are in the measures tab. Each goal reflects ambitious targets and timeframes.

Evidence: INL's FY 2006 Bureau Performance Plan (INCLE WHA Goal Paper) identifies the program's long-term targets and timeframes and is part of the State Department's overall strategic and performance planning framework.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The Bureau Performance Plan has annual performance measures that tie to annual and long-term goals. There are three specific annual performance measures that support the long-term goals. These annual measures are reflected in the measures tab and include measures on aerial eradication efforts, ability to disrupt the transit flow of drugs through interdiction and seizures, and law enforcement capacity to make arrests.

Evidence: INL's FY 2006 Bureau Performance Plan (INCLE WHA Goal Paper) defines the annual goals and is part of the State Department's overall strategic and performance planning framework.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: The Bureau Performance Plan has baselines and ambitious targets for all annual performance measures, which are located in the measures tab.

Evidence: INL's FY 2006 Bureau Performance Plan identifies the annual targets and timeframes and is part of the State Department's overall strategic and performance planning framework.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: INL's host nation partners are committed to meeting long-term goals as defined in the annual Letters of Agreement (LOA) between INL and each partner nation. The ARINC contract supports the improved efficiency of the Mexican Government's aviation fleet. Through the Bureau Performance Plan (BPP) and Mission Performance Plan (MPP) planning process, all partner agencies participate in formulating plans, programs, and goals. Another formal mechanism at the Department level is the Deputy and Policy Coordinating Committee, which coordinates policy and resolves disagreements. In pursuit of international commitment, INL works closely with the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) as well as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to produce international standards.

Evidence: Bilateral Letters of Agreement are INL's execution documents with host countries and include goals and measures for each project. The Law Enforcement Committee Master Training Plan (Mexico) is an example of U.S.Government agencies coordinating and supporting program goals at the U.S. Embassy in host countries. Interagency agreements are commitment letters between INL and other U.S. agencies. Mission Performance Plans include performance initiatives with partner responsibilities. ARINC and GTSI contracts in support of Mexico's aviation fleet include general performance objectives.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: While the State Department Inspector General has inspected the U.S. embassies in Mexico, Guatemala and Jamaica, during which he also inspected the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in those missions, and while an independent study evaluated the success of U.S. judicial reform projects in Guatemala, INL does not regularly schedule independent evaluations to examine the overall program's success in achieving its mission and long-term goals. An initial review of the Bureau's performance and operations is currently being performed internally, and a Statement of Work has been drafted to contract out follow-on work.

Evidence: July 2003 OIG Report of U.S. Embassy in Mexico; April 2001 OIG Report of U.S. Embassy in Guatemala; independent review of law enforcement programs in Guatemala (paid for by NAS in Guatemala)

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: INL's annual budget requests are broken down by country and, within each country, by major program activity area. At the country level, INL relates budget requests to narrative descriptions of conditions in those countries. INL does not clarify, however, what the impact of funding decisions would be on expected performance, either at the country or program-wide level. The annual budget for INL is developed mostly with input from US missions overseas. Mission budget requests follow INL's budget request guidance and are based on each embassy's MPP.

Evidence: INL's annual Congressional Budget Justification; INL's FY 2006 Budget Call with Response and Review of Mexico and Guatemala

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: In the past year, INL has taken several meaningful steps to improve strategic planning. The Bureau is developing a new "Strategic Logic Model," a one-page, draft graphical document that seeks to coordinate INL's geographically far-flung operations into one focused, concise strategic plan. This model is meant to guide all future strategic planning documents, including Mission Performance Plans, Letters of Agreement with partner foreign countries, and annual budget request documents. In addition, the Transit Zone Strategy attempts to provide a program-wide vision with performance metrics and will establish targets and baselines in the near future.

Evidence: Strategic Logic Model; Transit Zone Strategy; Instructions for drafting Letters of Agreement

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: INL collects and disseminates substantial amounts of program-related information on a frequent and systematic basis. However, the evidence did not show that data relating to performance goals is used on a regular basis to inform managerial actions. Performance information is collected annually through INL's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) providing statistics on narcotics and counter-narcotics activities around the world and outlines the USG priorities in its "road ahead" section. On a regular basis, posts and partners generate periodic and ad hoc reports to INL Washington Desk Officers that are incorporated into reports to INL and Department leadership in the Assistant Secretary Daily Activity Report (ASDAR). Performance information from other agencies is used to inform Congress on progress of long-term initiatives such as the eradication and interdiction efforts in Mexico.

Evidence: INL produces the INCSR as an annual progress report on the fight against drugs. The Mexico 90-Day Status Report is an example of regular collection of information for the U.S. Embassy. The Narcotics Affairs Section of each U.S. Embassy in the region produces monthly reports for Washington headquarters. The Program Nacional Control de Drogas - Mexico 2001-2006 is an example of host nation reports shared with the U.S. Government. Contractors are required to provide monthly reports on progress towards goals.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: Letters of Agreement (LOAs) with partner nations articulate program objectives, require periodic performance reviews and, sometimes, set specific performance goals, which may or may not align with those in the respective MPP. Accountability can be pursued through at-will termination or the certification process, in which INL advises the President each year on which countries are so uncooperative as to warrant cuts in funding. U.S. agency partners can be held accountable through periodic reviews, as required in the inter-agency agreements. INL has used these means to enforce accountability (e.g., with the Department of Justice's program in Guatemala). However, INL did not identify the managers responsible for INCLE WHA performance, nor did they show that standards had been established for their performance.

Evidence: LOAs with Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras include accountability language. The End Use Monitoring Report is an annual report showing accountability for proper use of equipment provided by INL to host countries. ARINC Monthly Status Report regarding the contractor's support of the Mexican Government's aviation fleet.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?

Explanation: This question received a "YES," because this program is not in violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act, and there is no evidence of erroneous payments. It should be noted, however, that the evidence provided did not show that the program and partners establish schedules for obligation.

Evidence: Financial Management Activity Report (FMAR) is a quarterly report showing status of funds. Mexico Pipeline Report shows efforts to maintain status and age of funds since INL has multi-year and no-year funds.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: INL has procedures for employees to follow regarding, for example, use of Purchase Authorizations and End-Use Monitoring, but, while these focus on compliance with rules and laws, they do not standardize procedures that measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness. INL is investing in IT solutions that will directly link procurement invoicing to a new local accounting system which will lead to fewer accounting and invoice errors.

Evidence: INL Procurement Policies and Procedures Handbook; INL Financial Management and Property Tools; Guatemala Regional Narcotics Training Center - Canines (an effort to create economies of scale); Technical Requirements for Fleet Management Software - Mexico (document that shows efforts to use IT solutions with host nation partners)

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: There is extensive, constant and ongoing cooperation and interchange among offices dealing in INL-related programs, generally with the Embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) as the responsible coordinating authority. Coordination is done through formal mechanisms and regular interchanges at all levels. Policy, planning and program implementation in the field is coordinated with all interested USG representatives through the U.S. embassy country team as well as through direct communication. The effort to collaborate and coordinate is not only done with the interagency for country programs, but also with programs among several countries. INL has made special efforts to coordinate its programs sub-regionally within the framework of the hemisphere and regional strategies.

Evidence: NAS/Mexico cables for Mexican Government Counter Drug Cooperation show bilateral coordination. Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S) meeting notes reflect interagency coordination. Mini-Dublin meeting notes show international coordination. NAS/Guatemala Bilateral Counternarcotics Working Group and Rule of Law Committee notes reflect coordination at the U.S. Embassy level.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: INL currently has weak financial management systems that raise concerns about the bureau's ability to track, reconcile, and accurately report on unobligated balances. An internal review found that INL's current financial management system is inadequate to support its programs. Specifically, INL is unable to produce accurate and timely information (e.g., unit or overall costs, pipeline, burn rate) that would support day-to-day resource allocations or trade-off decisions. It should be noted, however, that INL plans to implement a new financial management system in August 2004 that is designed to rectify these problems.

Evidence:  

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: INL has undertaken a number of initiatives to address deficiencies. The bureau's Strategic Logic Model was established to improve coordination among planning, budgeting, execution, and monitoring. An updated Financial Management Handbook was distributed to improve accounting deficiencies followed up with a financial management training conference held in Panama in March 2004. INL is establishing a uniform country accounting system which will be launched in August 2004. The new Program Assistance and Evaluation (PA&E) Division performs in-depth reviews of post operations and provides guidance to improve management and financial processes.

Evidence: Strategic Logic Model; revised Financial Management Handbook; Program Assistance and Evaluation Execution Plan; Revised LOA instructions

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: INCLE WHA has demonstrated mixed results in pursuing its two long-term goals. Since 2000, the flow of cocaine into the U.S. has decreased cumulatively by 26% (although it actually increased in both 2001 and 2002 over the prior years), while the flow of heroin has increased by 33% (also exhibiting fluctuating annual changes). As per fostering host country law enforcement abilities, data for 2002 and 2003 demonstrate a small extent of progress among host countries implementing anti-narcotics recommendations.

Evidence: INL's FY 2006 Bureau Performance Plan and Mission Performance Plans for Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean; FY 2004 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR); 2004 CICAD Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM); Extrapolated data from the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement Report (IACM).

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: INL developed three new annual measures, one of which shows mixed results, one shows no results (due to lack of historical data) and one shows negative results. Outside of these measures, the BPP, MPPs, and INCSR demonstrate achievements in reaching other annual goals. While aerial eradication is a new measure, INL WHA has made considerable progress towards improving the infrastructure to effectively eradicate. Mexican law enforcement agencies continue to make record numbers of arrests.

Evidence: INL's FY 2006 Bureau Performance Plan and Mission Performance Plans for Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean reflect performance results; FY 2004 INCSR shows counterdrug performance results; 2004 CICAD MEM results

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: INL has developed a new efficiency measure to demonstrate its efficiency in fostering host nations' capacities to interdict drugs. This measure improved by 27% in 2001, but then diminished by 27% and by a further 3% in 2002 and 2003, respectively. Outside of this measure, however, INL did demonstrate positive results by assessing the Mexican Attorney General's airwing and implementing improvements, resulting in cost savings and improved processes.

Evidence: Efficiency measure statistics are derived from INCSR statistics and INL budget information. Cost-benefit analysis report in Mexico showed improved efficiencies.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: While other similar programs exist today (e.g., UN institution-building in Brazil, Peru and Bolivia, European government efforts in the Caribbean), the collection of data on such comparable programs, because they are relatively new and small in scope, would be inherently too difficult. In the future, however, comparison data may be easier to collect and analyze -- especially if INL proactively seeks to coordinate with these organizations -- and could offer meaningful, actionable insight.

Evidence:  

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: While no single evaluation satisfies the conditions of scope, quality and rigor for the entire INCLE WHA program, individual assessments focusing either on a single country or on a discrete program activity were conducted. These reports were either scheduled by external parties (e.g., Inspector General) or scheduled by INL on a one-time basis (e.g., evaluation of USG judicial reform programs in Guatemala). These reports indicate both successes and further improvement opportunities.

Evidence: State Department Office of Inspector General reports: Inspection of Embassy Mexico City (July 2003) and Inspection of Embassy Guatemala City (April 2001)