

May 9, 2005

Ms. Jeanette Thornton,
Office of Information Technology and E-Government
Office of Management and Budget
Washington, DC 20503.

Re: [FR Doc. 05-6959, 4-7-05]

Office of E-Government and Information Technology: Notice of Draft Department and Agency Implementation Guidance for Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation, PrivacyActivism, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, and the World Privacy Forum appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Office of E-Government and Information Technology's Notice of Draft Department and Agency Implementation Guidance for Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (Federal Register #6959, Vol. 70, No. 67, Friday, April 8, 2005).

We believe that the proposed guidance does not fully address the privacy and security difficulties inherent in the use of the proposed Federal ID card. We have articulated our specific and general concerns in previous comments for the proposed Federal ID card standards, which are attached to this letter and which should be included in these comments on the proposed guidance.

Our attached comments (Attachment 1) fully detail our concerns. We would like to additionally highlight several issues here, including publication of Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA), privacy policy guidance, Privacy Act notices on Forms I-9, Form 85, and Form 85P, and Fair Information Practices as applied to Smart Card applications on the Federal ID.

Publication of PIAs

Section 5C of the draft guidance indicates that agencies are to "Prepare and submit to OMB a comprehensive privacy impact assessment of your HSPD12 program, including analysis of the information technology systems used to implement the Directive. The PIA must comply with section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002 (44 U.S.C. ch. 36) and OMB Memorandum M-03-22 of September 26, 2003 'OMB Guidance for Implementing the Privacy Provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002.' You must periodically review and update the privacy impact assessment."

The guidance did not mention publication of the PIA. Because the new Federal ID cards will be deployed widely and amongst categories of civilian workers, such as guest researchers, systematic, consistent publication of the PIAs across all agencies is a high priority. Publication of the PIAs is critical for enabling members of the public to access the impact assessments prior to visiting a Federal facility, prior to using Federally-owned

computers, or prior to making a decision about whether to accept employment requiring Federal ID.

Accessing the PIA is critical for applicants and potential applicants because smart cards, such as the Federal ID card, have extended functionality that is not immediately transparent to the majority of individuals. For example, use of the new Federal ID will generate a variety of computer logs which the applicant or cardholder may not be aware of. The card contains a digitized biometric; many individuals may be unaware that the data could be misused in a number of ways if it were to fall into the wrong hands. And individuals may be unaware of the well-documented security challenges inherent to the functionality of smart card technologies.

As such, it is crucial for transparency and fairness purposes that Federal ID applicants understand and are informed about these deeper issues. We urge the OMB to include guidance that directs agencies to give each Federal ID applicant a copy of the PIA prior to the issuance of the Federal ID card.

We also urge that the impacted agencies make the PIAs public as soon as possible as part of the record for the generation of a privacy policy. Any privacy policy that is created to inform employees and other recipients of privacy and security issues relating to the Federal ID card will not be based on actual information practices unless that policy is based on a factual and thorough PIA.

Privacy Policy Guidance

The Draft HSPD-12 Implementation Guidance states in section 5F that agencies “Develop, implement and post in appropriate locations (e.g., agency intranet site, human resource offices, regional offices, etc.) your department’s or agency’s identification privacy policy, complaint procedures, appeals procedures for those denied identification or whose identification credentials are revoked, sanctions for employees violating agency privacy policies).”

The guidance already states that a privacy policy will be posted. We urge OMB to specify that the policy be posted in at least a minimum of two formats (paper and electronic) and in at least two places, HR offices, and the agency intranet site. Having a minimum consistent placement of this important policy will help ensure consistency of application of the guidance.

We also urge OMB to require agencies to email an electronic copy of the privacy policy to each applicant. This could be accomplished by sending, for example, a PDF formatted policy to the applicants. Additionally, the privacy policy should accompany the Federal ID card in paper form when the ID card is delivered to the applicant, or when the applicant is denied the card.

This Federal ID privacy policy is crucial for applicants and potential applicants because smart cards, such as the Federal ID card, have extended functionality that is not

immediately transparent to the majority of individuals. The new Federal IDs will contain a wealth of information about the individuals to whom the cards are assigned. As articulated in our attached comments (Attachment 1), smart cards suffer from well-documented security challenges inherent to the functionality of smart card technologies. The biometric information, name and place of employment contained in the Federal ID constitute sensitive personally identifying information. All Federal ID card holders must have a good understanding of how this information is stored, how it may be accessed, how it may be abused by mischief, among other things.

Regarding the factual content of the privacy policy, the privacy policy must be informed by an accurate, thorough PIA. Additionally, more detailed guidance is needed on what minimum elements should be required in the privacy policy. We recommend that at a minimum, the basic set of Fair Information Practices as articulated in the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, adopted on 23 September 1980 be set as the base for the privacy policy elements. The U.S. is a signatory to these principles; these principles continue to represent consensus on general guidance concerning the collection and management of personal information.

The principles are as follows:

Collection Limitation Principle

There should be limits to the collection of personal data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.

Data Quality Principle

Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and kept up-to-date.

Purpose Specification Principle

The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose.

Use Limitation Principle

Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with Paragraph 9 except:

- a) with the consent of the data subject; or
- b) by the authority of law.

Security Safeguards Principle

Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorised access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data.

Openness Principle

There should be a general policy of openness about developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the data controller.

Individual Participation Principle

An individual should have the right:

a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data controller has data relating to him;

b) to have communicated to him, data relating to him

1.

_ within a reasonable time;

_ at a charge, if any, that is not excessive;

_ in a reasonable manner; and

_ in a form that is readily intelligible to him;

2. c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs(a) and (b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and

d) to challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful to have the data erased, rectified, completed or amended.

Accountability Principle

A data controller should be accountable for complying with measures which give effect to the principles stated above.

(See:http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,2340,en_2649_201185_15589524_1_1_1_1,00.html).

Privacy Act notices on Forms I-9, Form 85, and Form 85P

As discussed in our attached original comments, we are concerned about the I-9 Form and the Standard Form 85 and 85P. These forms, which are to be used in the implementation of the FIPS standard, do not contain adequate Privacy Act notices. The I-9 form currently contains a Privacy Act notice that reads: "The authority for collecting

this information is the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603 (8USC 1324a) (Form I-9, p.1).” The Standard Form 85 and 85P both contain a Privacy Act notice of routine uses that is fairly detailed. However, we question whether the current notice includes an update to the system of records for the new identity cards.

Both forms lack any indication that the information is being collected for use in any identification card application, or that such use is a routine use under the Privacy Act. Moreover, the forms do not indicate to prospective employees how long the information will be kept, what system of records the data enters, where or how many copies are to be kept, and does not reference a privacy policy. All of this information should be provided in written form clearly and unambiguously to the applicant prior to the point at which the applicant’s personally identifiable information is collected.

Fair Information Practices and Smart Card Applications

Fair Information Practices, as discussed previously, need to be applied specifically to the smart cards that are to be included in the new Federal IDs. That is, the cardholder needs to have some (qualified, not absolute) right of control over the smart cards he or she uses, e.g.:

- To know what data and functions are on the card.
- To exclude certain data from being written onto the card.
- To control disclosure of data from the card.
- To delete data from the card.
- To have access to view and correct, where necessary, transactional logs containing personal information relating to the use of the card. For example, times in and out, dates used, etc.
- Control of what entities may access and use card data.

These information rights should be disclosed on the privacy policy, along with the potential risks that smart card use exposes the cardholder to.

Applying the full set of established Fair Information Practices to the smart card build into the Federal ID is particularly important in light of the card’s potential for expansion, both in terms of use and in terms of what data is stored on the card. We anticipate that the purposes for which the Federal ID card will be used will continue to expand over time.

For example, in testimony January 19, 2005, the World Privacy Forum noted that the D.C. Metropolitan Transit Authority was analyzing the possibility of using the Federal ID card as an official Farecard pass (“Transit Group Seeks Common Farecard System,” June 21 2004, Government Computer News). While this functionality may have some potential benefit to government workers and other Federal ID card holders, it is still important to note that there are inherent security flaws in smart card technologies and that expanded uses of the smart-card enabled Federal ID cards creates more potential for misuse of the personally identifiable information.

Additional expansion of the card may also come from expansion of, for example, the number of biometrics and other data included in the smart card.

The fact that the smart cards contain detailed biometrics and personally identifiable information should not be overlooked as a potential source of mischief and harm to the cardholder. Again, the harms that can be associated with misuse of the data contained in the smart cards may be mitigated by applying Fair Information Practices to the smart card applications from the outset.

Conclusion

The decision to build smart card technology into government identification documents raises significant privacy and civil liberties issues. Unfortunately, the proposed guidance has not addressed the technical issues related to smart card use in enough detail, and in some areas of the guidance, the privacy and security issues have not been addressed in any meaningful way.

We are still concerned that the Department has failed to conduct a meaningful technology and privacy assessment for the use of “contactless” technology on such a large-scale basis despite the obvious privacy risks. We are also concerned about the lack of meaningful and detailed guidance on applying Fair Information Practices to the specifics of the smart cards’ use and deployment. Additionally, while it is a positive step that the guidance requires privacy policies to be posted in the workplaces, there is not enough detailed guidance regarding the policies to make them as effective as they need to be to provide meaningful information to affected individuals.

Respectfully submitted,

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Attachment 1

Comments on FIPS PUB 201: Personal Identity Verification (PIV) for Federal Employees and Contractors Public Draft

General Comments about FIPS PUB 201

The Electronic Frontier Foundation, World Privacy Forum, Privacy Activism, and Privacy Rights Clearinghouse respectfully submit these comments on the Personal Information Verification System Standard. We generally oppose PIVSS, as explained below.

Our major concern is that the PIVSS will establish the infrastructure for a full-fledged national ID system, linking and integrating the various ID cards and systems now being created by the federal government. As the background document <http://csrc.nist.gov/piv-project/Papers/Background-Version3.pdf> shows, the Defense Department Common Access Card has been issued to 4.4 million people, the Transportation Security Administration Transportation Workers Identification Credential will be issued to 12-15 million people, and the “Contactless Chip” U.S. Passport will be issued to all American passport holders.

The PIVSS card will not only add to these numbers, but also provide an interoperability platform that can link these disparate systems. Absent any controls on “mission creep,” it is almost inevitable that the PIVSS card (or an architecturally compatible card system) will be used for state and local employees and their contractors, and eventually spread to state identification cards such as driver’s licenses. Of course, the current plans for the PIV in itself is ambitious. One of the NIST project briefing presentations about the

system states that it will include even “long term frequent visitors (e.g. press corps members),” which raises significant First Amendment press freedom issues. (See “Personal Identity Verification For Federal Employees and Contractors, <http://csrc.nist.gov/piv-project/PIV-BriefingSept16-2004-1.pdf>).

We will not repeat here the many objections to a national ID system, which are well known. See, e.g., the National I.D. Coalition letter of October 19, 2004 <http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=17146&c=206>. We do note, however, that most of the privacy and civil liberties issues associated with national ID systems are magnified by the use of biometrics and RFID or “contactless” smart card technology. Biometrics remains an evolving technology; many biometrics have not been tested over a ten-year-plus period; many have no proven track record for use in large-scale databases; all pose major privacy issues.

RFID – more generally, any “contactless” technology – poses the risk of unwanted and unnecessary exposure of information during transmission. As NIST well knows, cards using the ISO 14443 Type B contactless interface can be read by interlopers at a considerable distance.

“Using a reader equipped with an antenna, NIST testers were able to lift “an exact copy of digitally signed private data” from a contactless e-passport chip 30 feet away,” said Neville Pattinson, director of business development technology and government affairs for smart-card provider Axalto Americas.

(See Junko Yoshida, EE Times, “Tests reveal e-passport security flaw -- U.S. unfazed at copying of unencrypted data” Aug. 30, 2004, <http://www.eet.com/sys/news/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=45400010>.)

Procedural issues:

We are disappointed by the lack of publicity and outreach to the privacy community on PIVSS. The undersigned organizations did not learn of this project until a few days ago. For this reason, our comments today are far less substantive than they might have been. From what we can tell, no representatives from privacy organizations, not even the ACLU, presented at any of the PIV workshops this fall. Given the implications of a national ID system for privacy and civil liberties – a controversial issue since 9/11 – we believe it is important for the government to consider privacy and civil liberties issues at the beginning of this process.

We also believe that any meaningful public comment on PIVSS must include, at a minimum, some estimate of the cost of the system. We have been unable to find any cost estimate for implementation of PIV cards. Before the government spends any more taxpayer dollars on this initiative, the public should be told how much it is likely to cost.

Privacy policy issues:

Because of the grave implications of a national ID system, biometrics, and RFID technology for privacy and civil liberties, it is imperative that there be a robust and thoughtful privacy policy for the PIV card if the government continues with this project. We cannot ascertain, however, whether FIPS 201 contemplates a systemwide privacy policy, even though Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12) specifically directs compliance “with the Constitution and applicable laws, including the Privacy Act . . . and other statutes protecting the rights of Americans.” For example, Section 3.2 of the FIPS (“PIV Responsibilities”), which outlines PIV system roles and responsibilities, does not mention privacy or assign any particular agency the task of creating a privacy policy. Privacy guidance must be given to the government entities and private contractors that collect, store or process personal information for the system.

The process for developing such a policy must take place alongside any technical development, and should begin with a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) that complies with the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA). Under FISMA, agencies must conduct PIAs before procuring information technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates identifiable information or for any new information collection that uses information and that includes information in an identifiable form that could permit physical or online contact with a specific individual.

We also urge that the government make the PIA public as soon as possible as part of the record for the generation of a privacy policy. We expect that the government will follow the spirit and the letter of the Privacy Act, as specified in HSPD-12, and issue appropriate Privacy Act notices, including system of records notices, for all PIV implementations. Additional issues include the need for strong audit trails, access controls, and appeal procedures for individuals who are denied a card.

We also recognize that the standard legal framework for the Privacy Act contemplates that individual agencies comply with the Privacy Act. Where the system crosses agency lines in a regular and systematic way, as it does here, we believe that the government should comply with the Privacy Act on an interagency, integrated, systemwide basis.

Specific Comments about FIPS PUB 201

Comments on Section 1.2: Scope

A. Categories of Card Recipients

The scope of the standard as stated in Section 1.1 is overbroad, and needs to be specified in greater detail. According to this section, current categories of card recipients are “Federal employees and contractors (including contractor employees) for gaining access to Federally-controlled facilities and logical access to Federally-controlled information systems” (p. 1).

This categorization as stated does not adequately or precisely define the issue of non-employees/contractors who need long-term physical access to government systems or facilities. Press pool members, for example, have access to the White House. Will this category of individual, which does not fall into that of a government contractor or employee, be required to obtain a level one PIV? There are many other examples of individuals who may be required to obtain a PIV card, such as other types of long-term visitors who may not fall under the contractor or Federal employee umbrella.

All categories of PIV recipients need to be delineated in detail prior to the implementation of the PIV system. Otherwise, varying interpretations of the implementation will arise as a matter of course given the scale of the system.

B. Graduated position sensitivity levels

The FIPS states that position sensitivity levels are to be determined by departments and agencies. The absence of a systemwide policy on position sensitivity levels not only creates security issues, but also gives card issuers enormous discretion to conduct privacy-invasive background checks in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion.

Comments on Section 2.2.1: Identity Proofing and Registration of New Employees and Contractors

A. I-9 Form Information Collection, Copying, and Storage

According to Table 2-1 of the Public Draft, level one applicants will be required to turn in Form I-9. The I-9 forms contain a Privacy Act notice: "The authority for collecting this information is the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603 (8 USC 1324a) (Form I-9, p.1). This notice does not currently indicate that the information is being collected for use in any identification card application, or that such use is a routine use under the Privacy Act.

Moreover, the forms do not indicate to prospective employees how long the information will be kept, what system of records the data enters, where or how many copies are to be kept, and does not reference a privacy policy. All of this information should be provided in written form clearly and unambiguously to the applicant prior to the point at which the applicant's personally identifiable information is collected or stored.

B. Standard Form 85 and 85P Routine Uses

According to Table 2-1 of the Public Draft, level two through four PVI applicants will be required to turn in Standard Form 85 or 85P.

The Standard Form 85 and 85P both contain a Privacy Act notice of routine uses that is fairly detailed. However, Section 2.2.1 of the public draft does not discuss any routine uses under the Privacy Act notice on Standard Form 85 or 85P. The public draft needs to be amended to include details about which routine use this new system of records will

use, and how this routine use may be implemented.

Additionally, the forms do not indicate to prospective employees how long the information will be kept, what system of records the data enters, where or how many copies are to be kept, and does not reference a privacy policy. All of this information should be provided in written form clearly and unambiguously to the applicant prior to the point at which the applicant's personally identifiable information is collected or stored.

C. Inclusion of Source Document Copies with Application

This section states that an applicant "provides two forms of identification from the list of acceptable documents included in the Form 1-9." The section also states that these documents are photocopied and forwarded by the sponsoring organization with an application and a request for a PIV card to its management. These documents could include copies of birth certificates, SSN cards, drivers' licenses, and other documents containing personally identifiable information. This data is highly sensitive, and prior to acquiring such documents, a system of records, a privacy policy, and detailed access and privacy policies must be in place.

Additionally, when an individual terminates employment with the Federal Government or contractor and the PIV card is revoked, the copies of the source documents should be destroyed. If these documents are to be retained indefinitely, applicants should be informed of this prior to the information collection in a detailed privacy policy. While it may be reasonable to retain PKI certificates, it is not reasonable to retain copies of the source documents indefinitely.

D. Background Checks

As discussed in Table 2-2, some form of background check will be conducted for all PIV applicants. The Table information indicates that while levels 1 and 2 are subject to fingerprint checks and NACI checks, level three applicants are subject to a credit check, and level four applicants are subject either to a limited background check or a background investigation.

While it is clear that background checks will be conducted, there is a lack of clarity on precisely which candidates will get what type of background check. And while Annex D of the Public Draft indicates how deep the background checks will go, it does not discuss the full procedures for conducting the tests.

For example, how is the Fair Credit Reporting Act implemented in this environment? What are the specific procedures for the *implementation* of the background checks portion of the PIV system? Is there a standard already in place for Federal and contract employees? If so, it should be added in detail to this framework, as background checks are an integral part of the validation process.

Furthermore, as noted above, there is no obvious systemwide policy on either position sensitivity levels or background checks. Absent such a policy, an agency or department may abuse its discretion by conducting unnecessarily intrusive background checks of disfavored individuals, which is especially dangerous to civil liberties if applied to members of the press. Accordingly, there should be a systemwide policy, consistent with constitutional procedural due process requirements, for background checks.

E. Registration Authority Security and Access Control

In the current PIV scheme, the Registration Authority shall be responsible to maintain an extraordinary amount of highly sensitive data, much of which is apparently in paper format, at least originally. For example, Section 2.2.1 lists that the Registration Authority will keep copies of the identity source documents, a completed and signed background form from the Applicant, results of the required background check, and any other materials used to prove the identity of the Applicant.

Unfortunately, missing from this section of the public draft are the specific and detailed procedures the Registration Authority will use to store, handle, report on, correct, and delete these highly sensitive materials.

We strongly recommend that due to the highly sensitive nature of the documents entrusted to the Registration Authority, that a specific, detailed plan to implement fair information practices is included in this section.

The PIV system must be constructed in a way that protects individuals' privacy and data security. Knowing that much of the threat to this information will come from individuals with internal access to the data, much more detail and attention must be given to fleshing out this area of implementation.

Comments on Section 2.3: Identity Credential Issuance

The Issuing Authority will be responsible to maintain four items: the completed and formally authorized PIV Request, the name of the PIV identity credential holder, the expiration date of the identity credential, and the credential identifier such as an "identity credential serial number" (Public Draft, 8).

No discussion of controlling and limiting the use of the "credential identifier" is made in the public draft. This is a substantial omission, and should be corrected. If the history of the Social Security Number is any indication, this "credential identifier" may be appropriated and used in ways the originators of the system did not envision.

A thorough discussion of appropriate and allowable uses of the "credential identifier" need to be set down as part of the official framework. Disallowed uses of the "credential identifier" also need to be discussed and set down prior to implementation, in a public document.

Comments on Section 3.2.1: Agency Responsibilities

There is a significant omission in this section delineating agency responsibilities. In addition to the responsibilities listed in the Public Draft, agency responsibilities should also include the task of implementing the Privacy Act of 1974 in full in regards to the entire PIV process and framework.

Comments on Section 3.3.2

This section states that all information collected from the applicant, including biometric data, is stored in the Registration Repository. A detailed description of the Registration Repository needs to be given, along with information about what system of records the Registration Repository falls under, and the nature of the security controls that will be used to protect applicants' information.

Comments on Section 4.2: Cardholder Unique Identifier

The Federal Agency Smart Credential Number (FASC-N) that uniquely identifies each card is, according to the Public Draft, available through a contactless interface without card activation. For this reason, it is critical that the FASC-N is limited in when it may be collected, how the identifier may be used, and in what circumstances. Cardholders should be told when and where their cards may be read, and by whom.

It is also unclear whether the CHUID and the biometric data stored on the PIV card are secure against unauthorized access. Section 4.1.5.2 ("File Structure") states that "the CHUID and biometric information shall be stored as transparent files . . . to facilitate rapid retrieval for physical access control applications." If these two data elements are not encrypted, as this statement suggests, obvious privacy issues regarding unauthorized capture are presented.

Comments on Section 4.2.2: Asymmetric Signature Field in CHUID

A. Inappropriate Key Size

The key size requirements for the PIV are unacceptably low. An RSA 1024 bit encryption is not appropriate for information as sensitive as is contained on the PIV card, and such a low encryption level is not appropriate for card use in sensitive areas of employment. The ability to break 1024 bit encryption is well-documented and does not need to be rehashed here; however, waiting until the year 2010 to install 2048 encryption is unrealistically late. The standard set for the PIV card is too low to be secure.

B. Primes Testing

This section mentions X.509 certificates will be issued for the cards, however it did not mention primes testing of the certificates. At some point prior to implementation, primes testing needs to be completed for the PIV cards. This testing is essential. While the testing could conceivably take up to 6 months, depending on the number of certificates issued, it would be negligent to leave primes testing incomplete.

Comments on Section 5.1.1: Registration Database

The standard for the registration database discussed in the Public Draft does not specifically delineate the process by which individual access to the Registration Database will be controlled. Because of the highly sensitive nature of the information, and the importance of the Registration Database, this process needs to be spelled out in detail, and should be symmetrical or very nearly symmetrical across government agencies.

Comments on Section 5.1.2: PKI Repository, Certificate Management, and Associated Privacy Issues

It is assumed from this section of the Public Draft that once generated, a card will be revoked but not deleted due to the necessity of keeping a Master Certificate Revocation list.

However, no mention is made of this in the Public Draft. We strongly suggest that any stored revoked certificate is encrypted at a minimum of 2048 bit RSA, and preferably higher. A 1024 bit encryption level for revoked certificates in storage is not nearly robust enough to protect the information the revoked certificates would likely contain.

Additionally, a privacy notice should be provided to applicants prior to their initial hand-over of the PVI application documents that explains how their information will be handled long-term in the PKI certificate management environment.

Comments on Section 5.2.1

See comments for Section 2.2.1.

Conclusion

Media reports indicate that the current FIPS 201 will be significantly revised. We hope that NIST will obtain input from and increase the participation of privacy groups during the revision process.

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