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Tobi Mae Lippin,¹ Thomas H. McQuiston,² Kristin Bradley-Bull,¹ Toshiba Burns-Johnson,¹ Linda Cook,² Michael L. Gill,² Donna Howard,³ Thomas A. Seymour,⁴ Doug Stephens,² and Brian K. Williams⁵

¹New Perspectives Consulting Group Inc., Durham, North Carolina, USA; ²United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (USW), Tony Mazzocchi Center for Safety, Health and Environmental Education, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA; ³USW, Local Union 500689, Piketon, Ohio, USA; ⁴USW, Local Union 5, Martinez, California, USA; ⁵USW, Local Union 7-0706, Indianapolis, Indiana USA

Abstract
U.S. chemical plants currently have potentially catastrophic vulnerabilities as terrorist targets. The possible consequences of these vulnerabilities echo from the tragedies of the Bhopal incident in 1984 to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and, most recently, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Findings from a 2004 nationwide participatory research study of 125 local union leaders at sites with very large volumes of highly hazardous chemicals suggest that voluntary efforts to achieve chemical plant security are not succeeding. Study respondents reported that companies had only infrequently taken actions that are most effective in preventing or in preparing to respond to a terrorist threat. In addition, companies reportedly often failed to involve key stakeholders, including workers, local unions, and the surrounding communities, in these efforts. The environmental health community thus has an opportunity to play a key role in advocating for and supporting improvements in prevention of and preparation for terrorist attacks. Policy-level recommendations to redress chemical site vulnerabilities and the related ongoing threats to the nation's security are as follows: a) specify detailed requirements for chemical site assessment and security ; b) mandate audit inspections supported by significant penalties for cases of noncompliance ; c) require progress toward achieving inherently safer processes, including the minimizing of storage of highly hazardous chemicals ; d) examine and require additional effective actions in prevention, emergency preparedness, and response and remediation ; e) mandate and fund the upgrading of emergency communication systems ; and f) involve workers and community members in plan creation and equip and prepare them to prevent and respond effectively to an incident. Key words: anti-terrorism, chemical plant security, emergency response, hazardous materials, prevention. Environ Health Perspect 114:1307–1311 (2006) . doi:10.1289/ehp.8762 available via http://dx.doi.org/ [Online 27 April 2006]

Address correspondence to T.M. Lippin, New Perspectives Consulting Group Inc., 1429 Broad St., Durham, NC 27705 USA. Telephone: (919) 286-5995. Fax: (919) 286-2414. E-mail: info@newperspectivesinc.org

We thank the USW evaluation team and local unions.

USW funding was from the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) , National Institutes of Health, cooperative agreement U45ES06175-13S1.

This study was conducted by the Paper, Allied Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union (PACE) before its merger with the United Steelworkers to become part of the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (USW) . Contents are the responsibility of the authors and do not reflect official views of the NIEHS.

T.M.L., K.B.B., and T.B.J. are employed by a for-profit agency ; T.H.M., L.C., M.L.G., and D.S. are employed by the USW ; and D.H., T.A.S., and B.K.W. are represented by the USW, which performs representative and advocacy functions and is a party to the cooperative agreement with the NIEHS.

Received 20 October 2005 ; accepted 27 April 2006.