Ms. Hedetniemi briefly reviewed the handouts. She noted a community member inquired as to why the minutes from the February and March meetings were not posted on the OCL website. She said that the oversight will be corrected.

Ms. Hedetniemi took the opportunity to tell the group that the OCL has a Web site that allows the community to access information about the CLC meetings, Council representatives, and information about NIH. The Web site also provides a means for the public to convey their questions and concerns to Ms. Hedetniemi; she will respond.

Ms. Hedetniemi asked if the group had read the article in The Washington Post or Gazette newspaper about an incident involving a Gaithersburg student who exposed his neighbors and classmates to mercury. She recalled a recent CLC presentation, the "Mad as a Hatter" campaign, given by Captain Ed Rau, Environmental Protection Branch, Department of Safety, Office of Research Services, NIH, in which he provides a way to make students aware of mercury. During Capt. Rau's presentation, many members volunteered to talk to children. Unfortunately, Capt. Rau forgot to pick up the sign-in sheets. Therefore, Ms. Hedetniemi passed around another volunteer sign-up sheet at the meeting.

Hemlock trees will be sprayed for infestation of hemlock woolly adelgids, Ms. Hedetniemi said. Questions can be directed to Lynn Mueller, Chief of Grounds Maintenance at NIH.

Ms. Hedetniemi thanked Harvey Eisen of the Edgewood Glenwood Citizens Association for writing a letter that appeared in the Gazette newspaper. She said Mr. Eisen's letter discussed NIH's pedestrian and dog-walking community.

Randy Schools of the NIH Recreation and Welfare Association reported that the annual NIH Film Festival will continue this year. It will be held on the grounds of Strathmore Hall Arts Center and the American Speech–Language–Hearing Association on Rockville Pike since NIH's new security measures do not allow the event to take place on campus. Mr. Schools is working in cooperation with the Montgomery County government for sponsors for the event. The festival will be held during the last two weeks of August.

When asked by Ms. Miller, Mr. Schools gave an update on the Farmer's Market. NIH continues to prohibit having weekday markets open to the general public on the campus because of security concerns. The farmers are looking for another site in the community. Because this is a Montgomery County Office of Economic Development program, it must be held on Tuesdays.

Ralph Schofer from Maplewood Citizens Association inquired whether household hazardous waste disposals would still occur on campus. Anthony Clifford, Director of the NIH Division of Engineering, said NIH officials had not yet addressed the issue. He added the community could find information and a schedule for other household hazardous waste sites in the Gazette newspapers or on its Web site.

PRESENTATIONS

Update on NIH Master Plan and Security Planning
by Stella Serras-Fiotes, Director, Office of Facilities Planning, Office of Research Services, NIH

Ms. Serras-Fiotes introduced her colleagues who play a large role in the ongoing deliberations of NIH's physical security plans. Collectively, she said, their extensive experience brings together security, law enforcement, Master Plan development, and State Department and federal agency security experience.

Overview and Purpose

Ms. Serras-Fiotes said she would begin by stating the obvious. NIH is a Federal agency and subject to Federal requirements, including those dictated by the Office of Homeland Security. Currently, the United States is under a level three (yellow) alert as set by the Homeland Security advisory system. U.S. Homeland Security Director, Tom Ridge, and Attorney General John Ashcroft expect the nation will remain at this level for the foreseeable future. Further, recommendations and information specific to NIH come directly from the General Services Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, and other Federal protective services.

The purpose of the security plan includes four major goals:

Ms. Serras-Fiotes said there are five objectives that the security measures incorporate:

When designing the security plan, all experts agreed that the "layering" concept was the most effective and efficient approach. Ms. Serras-Fiotes described the concept as establishing a level of protection at the outermost perimeter then moving inwards. This allows a more open environment inside the campus. The layering concept also allows for the use of technology rather than labor. In response to the September 11th attacks, labor had to be used because NIH did not have the needed physical security infrastructure in place. A critical part of the system is that it provides flexibility to adapt to less or more severe alert levels. Ms. Serras-Fiotes added that other considerations of protection were much more ominous than the perimeter fence, such as armed patrols that are present downtown even if not seen. NIH officials do not want to turn the campus into an armed fortress and clearly preferred the fence.

Ms. Serras-Fiotes believes it is important for the community to understand the purpose of perimeter control. First and foremost, perimeter security controls site access and limits intrusion. All persons entering the NIH campus will do so through specific entrances where monitoring, screening, and control can be done promptly and effectively. Visitors will then be sent on to conduct their business on campus. Perimeter control prevents secret entry or access. In addition, perimeter control maintains a safe distance for NIH employees, visitors and buildings.

Three elements comprise the perimeter security:

Fence Elements

Ms. Serras-Fiotes used a photograph of the fence that protects the vice president's residence to indicate one design under consideration. She noted it is both aesthetically pleasing and secure. Ms. Serras-Fiotes reiterated the fence will control vehicle and pedestrian access, as well as provide a safe distance from NIH buildings. The designers intend to provide an attractive border that will maintain residential scale and natural landscaping. NIH will continue to provide access to the Metro for the surrounding communities. A bicycle/pedestrian path will encircle the outside of the perimeter fence and tie in with the county bicycle path at certain locations.

At this time, security is extremely labor intensive. Registration of visitors is done at every building on campus, creating multiple work and gaps in the system. The Visitor's Center will be located off Rockville Pike and will provide one single entry point for all visitors to the campus. In addition, the Center will provide a point of orientation and information for visitors. The Center will also handle employee transportation needs, such as Transhare documentation. Visitors will be screened separately from employees, better managing traffic.

Ms. Serras-Fiotes said the Delivery Clearance Facility will provide a single entry point for all campus deliveries. Its planned location is also off Rockville Pike. The purpose of the Facility is to manage, screen, and coordinate small truck deliveries. NIH does not intend to inspect all deliveries on the campus. Instead, staff is looking for offsite locations to clear large volume deliveries. Ms. Serras-Fiotes emphasized the Facility is not a receiving center. Deliveries will proceed to the loading dock once inspected.

Ms. Serras-Fiotes stressed that the map she displayed was a diagrammatical depiction only of the proposed security plan. She did not distribute copies of the map, as requested, because she did not want the diagram taken out of context. She explained what the various color-coded items represented. She stated that until all concerns and conditions are heard, the fence could not accurately be sited. Numerous presentations on the security plan are expected to be given in the coming months, and she will provide exact locations and specifics at a later date.

Ms. Serras-Fiotes used the diagrammatical map to explain how the fence will affect the buffer zone. She stated up-front that because some buildings had been erected at the 250 foot buffer, much of the perimeter fence must reside directly in the buffer zone, as will the new security facilities mentioned. Where possible, the fence will sit back from the property line. It is intended to sit back approximately 100 feet from the chain link fence at the south border of campus, and current entrances in the chain link fence will remain. In other areas, the fence may be placed anywhere from 100 feet to 250 feet from existing buildings, except in the northern area where the Children's Inn sits. This is considered a safe distance and will keep uninspected vehicles and pedestrians away from the buildings. Natural topography and aesthetic barriers will serve as the additional vehicular barrier in some locations.

Metro Access

Ms. Serras-Fiotes noted that access to the Metro station has been a key consideration. A pedestrian/bike path around the outside of the perimeter fence will be constructed. She is aware of the many community concerns and informed the group that NIH has been working with Montgomery County officials, including County Executive Doug Duncan. Mr. Duncan has expressed his willingness to help find solutions; however, some community suggestions are currently not viable due to other limitations. For example, having a bus from Old Georgetown Road to Rockville Pike may not resolve community concerns because no left turn is allowed during rush hour.

The Metro station is located on NIH property on an easement. The easement will be reconfigured on the public side. The result will be a more spacious and accommodating area for public buses, Kiss-N-Ride patrons, and other functions, such as dropping off/picking up passengers.

Schedule

Ms. Serras-Fiotes outlined the proposed schedule. She informed the group that the Master Plan has been on hold pending security plan approval. NIH officials are now ready to resume the Master Plan Update and address new conditions in terms of transportation access and environmental effects. The fence design will be addressed from April to June. Many community concerns will be addressed during this phase. Fence construction is expected to begin in late summer and continue through Spring 2003. The Visitor's Center and Delivery Facility will be constructed in 2003 to 2004.

NIH does not embark on the proposed security plans lightly, concluded Ms. Serras-Fiotes. Unfortunately, officials had to react quickly after the September 11th attacks. Responding to Federal directives must be done, and implementing security plans is not negotiable. The proposed measures are the best means to prevent, detect, and respond to a variety of security risks.

Questions/Comments

A few guests said they had expressed concerns previously and that Ms. Hedetniemi had asked that the discussion be delayed until after the security presentation at this meeting. One guest read the March CLC minutes aloud stating NIH "would ask for community input." Ms. Hedetniemi reiterated that the CLC meetings are not a town meeting or open forum, and she asked the guests to please respect the CLC. Further, Ms. Hedetniemi clarified her comments from March. She said NIH had not formally approved the concept of the proposed plans in March; therefore, they could not present them for broad distribution. She added that when she refers to the community, she is speaking specifically about the CLC, the formal body that interacts with NIH and that NIH entrusts to provide it with the concerns from its respective constituencies. NIH and the CLC have been working together in this manner for more than six years.

An NIH employee suggested a town meeting might be in NIH's best interest because the security fence is a major issue. Ms. Hedetniemi said this would be taken into consideration.

Mr. Schofer did not understand how the fence would enhance neighbors' security. He added that NIH must assure the community that backups in traffic from deliveries and processing visitors at the newly proposed facilities off Rockville Pike would occur on NIH property, not the main road. Ms. Serras-Fiotes said the intent is to pull traffic off the main road. Traffic engineers are researching various arrival and processing rates, among other studies, for exactly this purpose. The Transportation and Environmental Working Groups will also address these issues. NIH intends for the bulk of deliveries inspection to eventually happen offsite, and she repeated the Delivery Facility is an inspection site not a receiving center.

Ms. Serras-Fiotes addressed Mr. Schofer's first concern by stating that any incidents causing damage on the NIH campus will not only hurt NIH, but the surrounding area and community as well. Therefore, if NIH is protected, the community is equally protected.

Robert Resnik, Ph.D., from the Huntington Terrace Citizens Association, was joined by association president Lorraine Driscoll. Ms. Driscoll said their association recognizes the immense security planning faced by NIH, and she said NIH is doing a great job in meeting the challenge. Their community supports NIH's efforts in making the area secure for all. However, erecting the fence impacts the local community's access to a taxpayer facility, the Metro. Another CLC member added the walk to the Metro will double for her community. Ms. Driscoll, and other CLC representatives, asked how their communities could work with NIH to explore ways to devise a system for neighbors to get security clearance and still have convenient access to the Metro station. Her comments were echoed by many in attendance. One CLC member commented that it was illogical for the public to come through the NIH campus to reach the Metro. While the Metro is a taxpayer facility, it does not mean NIH must open the campus for neighbors' convenience, as there are many stations on the Red line and many ways to reach them. Ms. Serras-Fiotes clarified one concern—the Metro will remain fully open to the public. She said NIH is aware that convenient access to the Metro is a major consideration and much depends on the alert level dictated by the Homeland Security advisory system. Under the current alert, it would be extremely difficult to devise a system that can work in accordance with clearance requirements. It is something they will keep under consideration, but it is anticipated that under current alert conditions only employees will have access to the campus by using card keys, or other electrical devices, that monitor entry. However, the fence design will accommodate varying alert levels. Under "normal" conditions, disabling the electrical devices will allow free pedestrian access onto the campus. Under the highest security level, a lockdown could occur disallowing all, even employees, onto the campus through these gates.

Ms. Hedetniemi said several suggestions are being explored to improve community access to the Metro. The OCL proposed having a jitney circulate the campus. A CLC representative said this would only add to the traffic, but another representative felt the jitney is a good idea, especially if it is a part of the Visitor's Center, providing transportation for thousands of campus visitors arriving by Metro.

The Glenbrook Village representative, Deborah Michaels, asked Ms. Serras-Fiotes how access to the Metro will be managed once the fence is completed since the Visitor's Center will not be constructed at the same time. Ms. Serras-Fiotes said part of the design includes implementation of a phasing plan and an interim plan of operation.

Steven Sawicki, representative from Edgewood Glenwood Citizens Association, asked if two entry checkpoints—one on both sides of campus—would be considered. Ms. Serras-Fiotes responded most visitors to NIH arrive by Metro; therefore, the Visitor's Center is most convenient in a nearby location. The Center is intended to avoid duplication, which would occur with two entry points. Also, funding two centers would double operating costs. Ms. Serras-Fiotes informed the CLC that pedestrian and vehicular surveys conducted during the past few months during peak periods showed approximately 30 to 50 people walked through the campus to the Metro station during peak periods.

Another CLC representative asked if guards would be stationed at the entrances on Old Georgetown Road and, if so, could the guards inspect those who walk through NIH and allow them to proceed only to the Metro. He also asked if construction workers would need to check in at the Visitor's Center. Ms. Serras-Fiotes said she could not answer the issue regarding construction workers as it had not yet been addressed. Stationed guards would not be equipped to inspect pedestrians as they will at the Visitor's Center, thus buildings on campus would need to be protected and duplicate inspections required; this defeats the purpose of the layering concept.

A few representatives expressed concern about whether the openings in the chain link fence would be closed. They also requested assurance that the perimeter pathway would always remain open to the public. Ms. Serras-Fiotes stressed the chain link fence openings would remain as they are as this will accommodate those going to the Metro. Both Ms. Hedetniemi and Ms. Serras-Fiotes confirmed the perimeter path outside the fence would be maintained and accessible.

George Oberlander from Huntington Parkway Citizens Association asked if 100 feet was the closest the fence would be erected around the campus, and how the roadway gates would be designed. He also requested clarification about the fence around the NIH residential section. Ms. Serras-Fiotes confirmed the 100-foot measurement from buildings and said the gates would be part of the overall fence design, but she did not have specific details. Regarding the residential fence, she said the diagrammatical map showed an option for adding this fence that allows NIH residents into the housing area, but it is not yet completely defined. Much depends on directives received and who will reside in the houses. Ms. Hedetniemi added this housing has been a part of NIH since the 1940s and it is for public health service officers, such as the NIH Director, the Surgeon General, and the Assistant Secretary of Health.

Regarding the buffer zone, Mr. Sawicki asked if the 250-foot buffer zone will be maintained although the fence will be erected in the buffer area. Ms. Hedetniemi stressed it absolutely will be maintained. He also requested as much of the green space be maintained as possible, especially in the southwest corner of campus. Ms. Serras-Fiotes replied NIH is definitely seeking to maintain a maximum amount of green space and will come back with designs that allow for the distances required while also considering the green space. Ms. Miller assured the guests that she has been an advocate for the community's concerns about the buffer zone for years. Great discussions have taken place about this area, and the CLC is committed to retaining the 250-foot buffer zone. Ms. Miller added the CLC does understand the need for the placement of the fence in the buffer zone, but community representatives will continue to support the maintenance of green space and disallowing building in the buffer zone.

Mr. Oberlander asked Ms. Serras-Fiotes if NIH is conferring with the National Naval Medical Center about traffic issues and what course of action it is taking. Ms. Serras-Fiotes stated NIH has been working more closely with the Naval hospital since September 11th to coordinate data, such as traffic analyses. She mentioned that NIH is always willing to openly share information with the Navy. She believes the two facilities have cooperated on these issues and will continue to do so. Ms. Hedetniemi added NIH will continue to work with Montgomery County and County Executive Duncan to ensure that an adequate traffic response is in place. Mr. Schools mentioned there are others in the community that NIH coordinates with on the issues, including schools, Metro, fire departments, and other emergency preparedness personnel.

Ms. Hedetniemi said one item that needs to be addressed and added to the considerations is access for non-NIH employees and parents of children who attend the daycare facilities on campus. Ms. Serras-Fiotes confirmed they will look into this.

Ms. Driscoll offered to collect the names of those community members in the room who walk to the Metro. She said these could be used during follow-ups on the security issues when NIH is considering the options. She reiterated erecting the fence is a major issue for the community and may put restraints on some families, such as forcing them to buy a car just to get to Bethesda.

Presentation on NIAID Biodefense Research
by Dr. Tom Kindt, Scientific Director, Division of Intramural Research, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, NIH

Ms. Hedetniemi said NIH staff often present problematic and uncomfortable issues to the community at the CLC meetings. They do so because it is important for the community to have accurate information, so the community is aware of what is being planned and can relay that information to their constituents. She introduced Dr. Tom Kindt to share information on NIH's initiative from the president and the Congress to conduct research in reference to biodefense.

Dr. Kindt explained the various facilities managed by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID). He informed the CLC that biodefense is studied in various NIH facilities including those in Bethesda, Baltimore, Rockville and Frederick, Maryland; the Rocky Mountain Laboratories in Hamilton, Montana and Bamako, Mali.

Dr. Kindt provided the CLC with a brief history of biowarfare. He said history traces the use of biowarfare back to the 14th century; British soldiers engaged in bioterrorism in the 18th century when they purposely gave blankets infested with smallpox to the Delaware Indians. Biowarfare was used in the 20th century as well by both the Japanese and the Germans. But, in 1925, the Geneva Protocol prohibited all biowarfare.

A few events have refocused attention on possible terrorist attacks in the United States. In 1982, the nation faced tampering issues when Tylenol containing cyanide was discovered. A religious cult intentionally contaminated salad bars with salmonella in 1984. Bioweapons were uncovered in 1995 in both Iraq and the Soviet Union. Then in 2001, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the anthrax mail scare and subsequent deaths caused much alarm and anxiety.

Dr. Kindt said the threat of bioterrorism is too real to ignore. Bioweapons discovered in the Soviet Union were found in poorly secured facilities. Iraq refuses to allow outside inspections; therefore, it is not known exactly what bioweapons may be concealed. And the September 11th terrorists showed an interest in cropdusters, presumedly to spread chemical or biological weapons.

Dr. Kindt explained the difference between "biowarfare" and "bioterrorism." Biowarfare is a direct tactical weapon used against military troops. Bioterrorism is used against civilians. Its primary goal is to spread terror; death and destruction may be a secondary goal. Dr. Kindt further explained how the
preparations differ between biowarfare and bioterrorism. One preparation involved in biowarfare and bioterrorism is the preparedness of vaccines. When populations are protected by vaccines, terror is eliminated.

Many Federal agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services have complementary roles regarding biodefense, said Dr. Kindt. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) investigates outbreaks, disseminates data and trains personnel. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) provides regulatory approval. The Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) mobilizes resources. NIH conducts basic research and develops diagnostics, medical interventions, and treatments.

In February 2002, NIAID convened a panel of experts to discuss exactly what needed to be done in response to bioterrorism. They prepared a research agenda. Full details on the conference can be found at http://www.niaid.nih.gov/dmid/pdf/biotresearchagenda.pdf.

Infectious disease researchers identified major biological threats, including smallpox, anthrax, botulism toxin, plague, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fevers, such as Ebola. Some of these are agents of emerging or re-emerging diseases, as well. The researchers determined characteristics of the agents that could be used in bioterrorism. For example, they recognized that certain of these agents could be weaponized. They also noted the high mortality and morbidity rate; the potential for person-to-person transmission; the threat of a low infective dose; the ability to contaminate food and water; the lack of effective specialized treatment; the need for safe and effective vaccines; and the potential to cause anxiety in the public and health communities, inducing terror.

NIAID scientists then devised a plan for what NIH could do in terms of biodefense. Their plan includes basic research on potential agents of bioterrorism, genome sequencing, development of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines. Dr. Kindt displayed a map detailing the numerous diseases that were not around in 1980, but have since emerged or re-emerged. He noted that agents of bioterrorism are introduced artificially into society. Dr. Kindt said that had the facilities existed, we might have vaccines for these diseases today. Included on the map were multi-drug resistant tuberculosis, malaria, pathogenic E. coli, Lyme disease, West Nile virus, and mad cow disease.

Dr. Kindt stressed the need for research facilities and the ability to study agents safely and effectively. He reviewed the various levels of biosafety labs as recommended by the CDC and NIH; the strictest biosafety lab level is four. He informed the CLC that the new facility planned for the Bethesda campus will be a biosafety level three lab, or BSL-3.

Dr. Kindt said the NIAID biodefense agenda includes experiments leading to vaccines. The studies include plague organisms and genomic analyses of pathogens. On the Bethesda campus, studies will be conducted on the poxvirus, and its various forms. Vaccine studies on the West Nile virus will be done, as well as development of antibodies.

Dr. Kindt provided a summary of the plans for the various new facilities. The President's Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 budget appropriated funds for a BSL-3/4 lab at the NIAID Rocky Mountain Laboratories in Montana. This facility is a high containment lab and animal facility. An expansion of the Twinbrook campus in Rockville is planned to include a BSL-3 facility. A BSL-4 clinical facility is also proposed for Ft. Detrick. The Bethesda campus is expected to house a research facility for biodefense and emerging diseases under the proposed FY 2003 President's Budget.

Dr. Kindt concluded by saying they hope the program, combined with the excellent research staff at NIH, will develop products that will protect individuals and eradicate terror within several years.

Questions/Comments

J. Paul Van Nevel from the NIH Alumni Association wanted to know why the biodefense facility was being erected by the parking lot near Rockville Pike. He thought diseases could not be 100 percent stopped from escaping a controlled lab. Dr. Kindt informed the members that a BSL-3 lab already exists safely on the Bethesda campus. He emphasized that no incidents have occurred where the lab has caused harm to the surrounding area. Ms. Serras-Fiotes mentioned the building, slated for the northeast corner of campus, is identified in the 1995 Master Plan.

Ms. Miller inquired about the status of the smallpox vaccines recently discovered at another facility. Dr. Kindt said they are in the process of testing the lots, including the dilution ratio. Ms. Miller also inquired whether vaccines have been developed for Lyme disease and anthrax. Dr. Kindt responded that no new product exists for anthrax, but a product is on the market for Lyme disease, though its efficacy is questionable due to the complexity of the reaction of the Lyme disease agent with the human immune system. The Rocky Mountain facility scientists are researching both diseases.

Mr. Sawicki questioned if any animal research will be conducted in the new BSL-3 lab on campus. Dr. Kindt said the Vivarium will be in the same building as the new lab and experiments will be conducted. He added that a BSL-3 lab already exists in Building 50 and at Twinbrook II, and the risks associated are strictly related to the rigidity that one operates within. Mr. Sawicki requested clarification on whether animals are used to test vaccines. Dr. Kindt confirmed they are used, and often it depends on whether it is a BSL-3 or BSL-4 lab. He stated some anthrax vaccine work is conducted on the campus at BSL-3, but with nonvirulent strains, and no inhalation experiments are underway.

Mr. Schofer asked if the BSL facilities are safe, why is there a secluded lab on Plum Island off of Long Island, New York. Dr. Kindt said that facility works with a single agricultural agent, the highly contagious hoof and mouth disease, but he does not know why the facility is on an island.

Eric Larsen from Sonoma Citizens Association inquired whether the new security programs at NIH had changed lab security. By definition, BSL-3 labs have several layers of security, such as two entry means and proper training, stressed Dr. Kindt. The levels of security on campus will not change because of the new facility.

Ms. Michaels pointed out recent news stories about anthrax contamination coming from an Army facility in Frederick, Maryland. She said it has been speculated that the anthrax came from inside the labs. She wanted to know how NIH would prevent such a breach of security. Dr. Kindt assured the CLC that a level of discretion must be used with select agents. These include keeping agents under lock and key, maintaining in/out logs, and using closed-circuit television monitors. He stressed the levels of security should make all feel safe.

Ms. Miller asked Dr. Kindt what the priority and urgency level is with the proposed research agenda. Dr. Kindt emphasized biodefense is a high priority and very urgent. NIH is waiting for the facilities, in which to conduct the necessary research.